Weekend Law: Meta Settles, Trump Outruns Courts & Officer Charged | Bloomberg Law
924 segments
This is [music] Bloomberg Law with June
Graasso from Bloomberg Radio.
>> This is a major breakthrough, a
milestone moment, a watershed moment. Um
because when it comes to protecting our
children's mental health, there is no
time to lose. That's California Attorney
General Rob Bont describing the
settlement where Meta will pay up to $18
billion and put stronger child safety
guard rails on its platforms to end a
California social media addiction trial
and resolve the claims of 48 states that
Meta deliberately designed features to
hook teenagers. Under the deal, the
social media giant will implement a
series of design changes for users under
18, including limiting the time they can
spend on Instagram and Facebook to 2
hours a day, blocking the apps from
midnight to 6:00 a.m., and disabling
features such as like counts. But this
doesn't close the book on social media
addiction litigation for Meta. It still
faces thousands of similar lawsuits
brought by individuals, school
districts, and Native American tribes.
Joining me is an expert in internet law,
Eric Goldman, a professor at the Santa
Clara University School of Law and
co-director of the High-Tech Law
Institute. This is being called a
landmark settlement. AG Bont said they
got as much and perhaps more than they
could have in litigation. I mean, how do
you view it? The settlement amount is a
huge absolute number. There's no doubt
that this is a major financial landmark.
At the same time, this number is not a
number that materially changes Meta's
business. I don't want to say it's
pocket change for them, but it's a
quarter of their 2025 net income. In
other words, they can afford this. And
also I would point out that Meta was
subject to a judgment in New Mexico that
ordered cumulatively roughly a billion
dollars of damages against Meta. And New
Mexico's roughly6%
of the US population. If you were to
multiply that billion dollar judgment in
New Mexico by the 6 population, actually
the $17 billion number looks smaller
than we might expect.
>> Bont said that the money was secondary.
What was important was the changes that
Meta has agreed to make. Do you think
those changes are significant?
>> The changes are important in part
because Meta has resisted them for quite
some time and Meta's obviously flipped
internally and decided that they could
live with these particular changes. So
the state AGS were able to accomplish
something that regulators around the
globe have had difficulty forcing Meta
to do. What's less clear is if these
changes are in the best interest of the
constituents that the state attorneys
general seek to serve. We don't know if
any of these changes solve the quote
mental health crisis. We don't know if
any of these changes materially benefit
any population of users. Simply put, we
don't have science to back up that these
changes solve any problem. And we also
don't know if these changes will cause
other users to have new problems because
of the restrictions. In other words, the
state attorneys general are gambling
that these changes are beneficial to
users without having the science to back
it up. And we'll find out if they're
right or wrong. But if they're wrong,
then we're going to have a lot of people
who actually have been harmed by this
agreement. Will you explain how the
changes in the platforms are going to
work in practice? Because the
effectiveness hinges on knowing how old
users actually are.
>> I describe these categories of
restrictions as segregate and suppress.
The first step is to segregate the user
population between adults and minors.
And then the second step is to suppress
some resources for the minor population.
This agreement codifies that approach.
In order to do the segregation, Meta has
agreed to deploy age authentication on
its user base. And the agreement has
very detailed specific provisions about
how that age authentication is going to
work. Among other things, something that
really was interesting to me is that the
agreement contemplates that age
authentication will never be perfect.
And it actually provides error rates
where Meta can make mistakes and still
be in compliance of the agreement. This
is really central to the question
because it means that there will be some
minors who will not be protected by this
agreement because of those error rates.
And I don't see that as a flaw, but it's
actually a big concession by regulators
to even admit that that could happen.
>> This deal came in the second week of a
jury trial in California that posed
enormous risks for Meta. I mean, juries
ruled against them in two prior cases,
one in New Mexico and one in California.
What do you think pushed them to settle?
>> Well, obviously the settlement has been
in the works for many days if not for
weeks or even months because it's so
long and detailed and it required the
agreement of 51 different state ag. So,
this agreement didn't just happen
because this trial has been going
poorly. This conversation is much longer
standing than that. But I don't know
exactly what caused Meta to flip on this
particular issue, but this is a standard
practice for Meta that they will push
and fight against restrictions until
they decide it's somehow in their
interest and then they're all in and
they're like super excited about it and
as agreement reflects and they want
everyone else on the same program too.
Like they're like, "Okay, we've decided
here's what the industry should do.
We'll be the first, but make sure
everyone else goes on the program as
well." So, I don't know what caused META
to reach that point where they decided
enough is enough, but it isn't some new
thing. It's something that obviously has
been on their minds for a while.
>> The deal includes the appointment of an
independent auditor to oversee
compliance, someone who can issue their
own recommendations and report findings
to the states. Do you think that that's
sufficient to ensure compliance by META?
Because I remember some years ago when
Meta was still Facebook, it didn't
comply with agreements with the FTC over
users data privacy.
>> Yeah, Meta has a history of having
independent auditors that have had no
real impact on its business. And so I'm
guessing Meta thinks it had a little bit
of fast one here that the state ags are
going to think this independent auditor
is going to dictate things to Meta. And
I'm guessing Meta is thinking it will
dictate to the independent author.
>> Eric, so Meta said the framework will
only work if all our peers join us.
Because teens move fluidly across dozens
of apps, we need an industry-wide
solution. Is that what this is really
about?
>> This is a metapecific issue. Meta really
really does not like being obligated to
comply with laws that its competitors
don't also have to comply with. So Meta
is less resistant to legal compliance.
It's more willing to accept that the
regulators can tell it how to run its
business, but only if in Meta's mind
it's a level playing field. So it was
absolutely critical to Meta in this case
that if it settled, it was going to drag
along its competitors, whether they
really wanted to be dragged along or not
to the same deal so that teams can't
just check out a Meta, go to the
competitor down the information
superighway and get a better deal there
and Meta then is at a competitive
disadvantage. And it mattered so much to
Meta that they did two things of
interest. The first is that it agreed to
restrict miners usage of Meta even more
if other competitors agreed to the same
restrictions. So that's a carrot for the
state ages to go out and get even
greater alleged protection for miners if
they can get the competitors under that
program. The second thing is that Meta
conditioned a large chunk of the
payments on the state AGs going out and
getting the competitors under the same
program. In other words, essentially
Meta has now deputized the state AGs as
its police against its competitors and
is paying them to do its dirty work. So
the state ags might think that this is a
win, but Meta is also looking this as we
got the state AGs to go off and harass
our competitors and we're willing to pay
them to do that.
>> And the California AG did say they'll be
going after Meta's competitors next.
>> Meta is part of the industry, a major
player in the industry, but there's a
big bigger ecosystem that we will not be
satisfied until we address all of the
problems in the entire industry. So we
are going to focus on Tik Tok. But we
are going to focus on Snap.
>> So Tik Tok and Snap and probably YouTube
will be pressured to make similar deals.
>> The competitors may not like this deal
at all, but now Meta and the state ages
are collaborating together against these
other competitors. So I can assure you
that YouTube and Snap and Tik Tok
reading this agreement at each line you
could just see the anger bar rising in
their heads because this is an agreement
that's against their interest. They had
no say in the agreement and now Meta is
throwing hundreds of millions of dollars
at this problem to try to get the state
ag
>> and Meta is still facing thousands of
other lawsuits. This settlement doesn't
apply to any of the other pending
litigation that's been brought by the
school districts, the Native American
tribes, and by individual victims, of
which there are thousands of individual
victims who've already sued Meta, and
that's why there's a large overhang of
additional legal risk that it still
needs to resolve. This settlement
doesn't have any bearing on that.
>> Do you have any First Amendment concerns
about this settlement? The agreement
represents the concession of meta of
certain editorial decisions that it
traditionally had the prerogative to
make. And it's interesting and a little
uncomfortable that the state attorneys
general have bound meta to that. In a
sense, part of the bargain for price was
the state AG's getting remedies that
might very well have not been available
to it in court because of the
restrictions on free speech.
Essentially, the state AGs are
controlling how Meta talks with its
users. So there's something disquing
about the idea that Meta and the state
ages have agreed to what are
fundamentally restrictions on Meta's
freedom to publish especially when we
don't even know if that's
constitutionally permitted. One
possibility this agreement will look
really weird if that question gets
answered by the Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court says that states have no
power to dictate how online publishers
present content to users. The meadow has
agreed to that and it might very well be
that that agreement is based on an
unconstitutional premise.
>> It's more complicated than it initially
seems. Thanks so much, Eric. That's
Professor Eric Goldman of Santa Clara
University Law School. Coming up next,
President Trump keeps racing ahead and
the courts can't catch up. I'm June
Graasso and you're listening to
Bloomberg.
The people that are opposing the
ballroom are people that in my opinion
are very disloyal to our country. Very,
very disloyal to our country. Uh, and I
think we're doing very well. We're way
ahead of schedule.
>> And that's important because President
Trump is racing to construct the 90,000
square ft ballroom with a 250 person
crew working 20 hours a day, 7 days a
week to keep the project ahead of
schedule. Speed is essential because
Trump is racing against the courts and
so far he's outrunning them. The project
has moved ahead without any input from
Congress or the public and despite two
courts ruling that Trump was flouting
the law. And Chief Justice John Roberts
has given Trump the go-ahad to outrun
the Supreme Court as well. he can keep
building his ballroom while the justices
take more time to consider the issue.
This isn't a new scenario for Trump.
He's been acting first and then daring
the courts to catch up with him since he
took office for the second time. Joining
me is James Fander, a professor at
Northwestern Law School. James, does the
Chief Justice's interim order tell us
anything about how the full Supreme
Court is going to look at this issue? I
don't think we learned much from the
order that the chief issued. It seems to
me like just a request for some
additional time suggesting the court's
taking the issue seriously, but hasn't
yet found its way to a resolution.
>> So, you've had two lower courts ruling
that the ballroom project is probably
illegal. But work was allowed to
continue. I mean, why was work allowed
to continue when they're saying that
it's illegal? I think it was an attempt
to accommodate the national security
concerns that are associated with the
proposed construction below ground. The
government took the position both in the
district court and the appellet court
that the below ground construction was
separable from the ballroom construction
and that the below ground construction
had all sorts of security implications.
bunkers and emergency medical care
facilities and and that sort of thing.
Very difficult for a court to
secondguess those kinds of concerns,
especially when the government is
basically admitting down below anyway
that the ballroom part of the project is
separable from the belowground national
security or security part of the
project. So the government pitched the
matter to the lower courts, I believe,
as a situation where we can do this
below ground thing without prejudice to
the eventual construction of a ballroom
above ground and we can figure out what
the legality of that is down the road.
But in the meantime, we've already
gotten this far with the national
security below ground work. So let's
continue with that. And I think that's
why both courts agreed that the
belowground work could continue thinking
that they would retain some control over
the ultimate shape of the above ground
ballroom. Now the government's taking
the position of course that the above
ground ballroom is integral with the
below ground security concerns that led
to the continuation of the construction
in the first place. I mean, what we had
here was President Trump knocking down
the East Wing before anybody could blink
their eyes. I mean, it was there one
day, it seemed like it was down the next
day. So,
>> three days. Yeah.
>> He So, he took that action without any
authorization and it's done. So, what do
the courts do to catch up to him? You
know, it's over. So in terms of
restoring the east wing, I think you're
right that it is done. And the question
is now what is the proper response
architecturally and historically to the
scars that have been created in this
place that belongs to the public and
belongs to the government and is within
the control and stewardship of the
Congress of the United States. And
that's a question that is not easy to
answer. There's no way to unring the
bell or restore the east wing. And I
don't think anybody believes that what
we should do is return to the best
reconstruction or recreation of the east
wing we could find. I think the question
is the legality of ongoing construction.
And I think the lower courts at least
with some justification view that
ongoing construction project as unlawful
because not lawfully approved by
Congress and therefore subject to
limitation control injunction and so
forth. And then the question is once
that injunction takes hold, what will be
the shape of the project going forward
if President Trump is required to secure
the approvals and authorizations that he
said he was going to get when he started
making noise about the ballroom and
never got, you know, because he decided
he wanted to do it his own way without
anyone else playing a part in the
magnificent ballroom he was about to
create. Isn't this sending a message
that illegal behavior is being rewarded?
You get to complete your ballroom even
though what you've done is illegal
because you've gone this far already.
This is a pattern and it happens in
immigration cases. It happens in grant
cases. It happens over and over again.
When the courts finally get involved,
it's too late. It's all over.
>> No, it's true. And what I call the first
mover advantage that the president
enjoys as a you know executive or
commander-in-chief means that he can
take action and proceed on the
assumption that it's lawful until
somebody tells him otherwise. I think
that's been his basic mo. And in past
presidencies, not in every case
obviously, but president showed a great
deal more restraint in this shadow of
uncertain law. I think this president
prefers to move in the shadow of
uncertain law. And even when there's no
uncertainty at all, if he believes that
either the constitution or some other
grant of authority allows him to take
the action, then he will take it and
turn the rest of it over to the lawyers.
And we've seen it, as you say, time and
again in the immigration space, the
removal of aliens under the Alien
Enemies Act. We've seen it with the
dismantling of USID. We've seen it with
the discharge of employees from
positions in the executive branch
without due process of law. If there
were questions about the legality,
there's a way to have a legal proceeding
to determine whether a person properly
holds an office. But instead, President
Trump would rather fire now and litigate
later. And that has been, I think, quite
the pattern of his presidency.
>> Well, it continues to work well for him.
The Supreme Court seems to continue
expanding presidential power. Is there
any reason to think that it will limit
him in this case with the White House
ballroom?
>> There, I think is reason to think that
the Supreme Court will be concerned
about President Trump's violation of
appropriations limitations that Congress
has imposed upon him. I'm not sure that
his role as the unitary executive under
article 2 will be understood to override
appropriations restrictions. So that may
be a place where the Supreme Court is a
bit more protective of the traditional
allocation of responsibilities as
between the president and the Congress,
the United States. And so I think
there's some hope in this case given the
fact that there's a pretty strong case
to be made that Congress has previously
appropriated money and understood itself
to be the responsible party in making
decisions about the shape of White House
construction projects. There's some hope
that the Supreme Court will understand
the threat posed to congressional
appropriation power by the actions of
President Trump with respect to the
White House and perhaps that will have
some, you know, radiating effect on
other of the projects that he has in
mind. There's um a history, I think, of
some minor alterations and improvements
in the language of the relevant statute
to the White House that are what you
might call presidential vanity projects.
you know, the installation by FDR of a
swimming pool indoors, the use of that
pool by JFK, the decision to close the
pool by Richard Nixon and put, you know,
a onelane bowling alley in the White
House, the decision by Gerald Ford to
create an outdoor swimming pool. These
were all relatively modest changes that
don't really change the footprint of the
White House or the appearance of it.
Nothing to compare, obviously, to a $400
million ballroom project of the kind
that's currently underway. And so it's
hard for the current project to fit
within that tradition of alterations and
improvements that we've seen in the
past. And for that reason, it may be
that the Supreme Court pushes back a
bit.
>> Does it make a difference that Trump
says that private donations are paying
for the ballroom, although some
reporting shows that public funds are
covering more than half the cost?
>> Yeah, that's a good question. And I was
puzzled by that myself a bit because one
of the claims being made here is that
the National Park Service collects
appropriated funds for use in connection
with National Park Service projects. And
so this relevant statute characterizes
those donated funds as appropriated. And
so the government has kind of cobbled
together an argument that goes like
this. Once the money has been collected
and placed in the vault of the National
Park Service, it's now appropriated
funds and the authorization to use
appropriated funds that appears
elsewhere in federal law, can be
stitched together with those donations
and create the appearance that these
funds have been in fact appropriated for
the use that they have been put to. I
think that's a very difficult argument
to make in the end given the jealousy
with which the Congress of the United
States guards its appropriation powers
and it's uncertain I think whether that
kind of argument will be accepted by the
Supreme Court but that's the argument
you know there's been nothing on this
scale before in terms of donated funds
put to the uses that they are being put
to here and it's at least very hard for
me to see how this could be considered
the kind of congressional control that
we normally associate with the
appropriations process.
>> What would be the best outcome, the best
case scenario for those who want to see
supervision and independent oversight of
the construction of the ballroom? So if
you were concerned about construction of
a ballroom and you wanted the best
possible outcome you could get, then it
seems a remand to the district court is
going to be required and that's going
to, you know, require the district court
to continue to oversee the project. I
mean, one possibility is a hold on above
ground construction, and that's all
that's really on the table right now.
put a hold on above ground construction
while we conduct the necessary
assessments and run through the
necessary authorization and approval
processes. That could all be handled as
expeditiously as possible. I assume that
President Trump might want to try to get
all that done before the November
election cycle, but it's obviously up to
him to decide how he wants to secure
that approval. And then once approvals
have been granted, then the project
could continue. And I don't necessarily
see it as delaying the completion or
leaving a hole in the ground. It seems
to me like everybody's going to say at
the end of the day, let's do it. Let's
just not do exactly all of that or maybe
we can scale it back or in a sense maybe
it can refer to the pre-existing east
wing in some way that reminds us that it
used to be there. I don't know. Hard to
predict how it might shake out. But
without consultation, you're not going
to get anything but Trump's vision,
obviously.
>> And there is no indication as to when
the Supreme Court will rule. It's been
great getting your insights, James.
Thanks so much. That's Professor James
Fander of Northwestern Law School.
Coming up next on the Bloomberg Law
Show, an Air Force major is facing
criminal charges after calling for
Trump's impeachment. I'm June Graasso
and you're listening to Bloomberg.
On July 1st, at a protest on the steps
of the US Capitol, Air Force Major Jason
Watson, dressed in his uniform, call for
the impeachment of President Trump for
ordering military action against foreign
countries like Iran. When the president
of the United States orders military
action against foreign countries absent
an emergency scenario where American
interests are under imminent dire threat
as was done with Venezuela, Cuba, and
Iran, that's an unconstitutional
usurppation of Congress's authority and
a violation of the war powers clause.
These violations resulted in the deaths
of 13 service members and injuries of
hundreds more.
>> For this, the president and vice
president must be impeached, convicted,
and removed.
After Watson, who served in the Air
Force for 17 years, repeated his
criticism of Trump on CNN, he was
criminally charged under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice with violating
article 88 for contemptuous remarks
about Trump, violating article 92 for
disobeying orders, and violating article
133 for conduct on becoming an officer.
The article 88 contemptuous remarks
charges are exceedingly rare. So much so
that there have only been a few
instances since the modern code of
military justice was enacted 75 years
ago. Joining me is Joshua Castenberg, a
professor at the University of New
Mexico law school and a former judge and
lawyer in the US Air Force. Josh, let's
start with the charges under article 88
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
which prohibits officers from using
contemptuous words against the
president, the vice president, Congress,
and other US representatives.
>> Well, those charges, first of all,
they're quite ancient. They go back to,
in a sense, Thomas Jefferson when the
first articles of war were being
rewritten from the British. And one of
the things that was changed from the
British article to what we now know as
article 88 is the US limited it to the
chain of command in the military. So
it's an old charge. It's a charge that
has been used in a very selective manner
over the years. You know, you can go
back to the Vietnam War. There was a
lieutenant calling Lynden Johnson a war
criminal. And then you can jump ahead to
the present and we've got this major
who's making disparaging words against
the president. But there have been
hundreds of others who've done it and
haven't been charged.
>> What's the standard used to determine
whether the remarks are contemptuous?
>> So remarks tend to be considered
contemptuous if they're made in a manner
that would undermine confidence and the
reliability of the chain of command. And
so you can go back for example to the
Vietnam War and there was this army
captain and he was a noted
dermatologist. He was training corman.
His name was Captain Levy. And he
started advising students who were, you
know, enlisted members in the United
States Army's medical corps not to go to
Vietnam by arguing that it was an
imperialistic, it was a white man's war.
It was making the rich richer. It was
immoral and unconstitutional. And you
know, he had a position of authority
over them. And so he was convicted in a
court marshal. It went all the way up to
the United States Supreme Court. and the
Supreme Court upheld the conviction in a
case we know as Parker versus Levy.
Today, I think one of the things the
defense council will raise is the idea
that this major would undermine the
chain of command and military discipline
is unprovable and that is a burden on
the government to have to prove.
>> Does the prosecution have to show that
what he said was contemptuous rather
than just critical? And what's the line?
Well, yeah. I mean, you're absolutely
right in asking that question. Words
have meaning and they particularly have
meaning in the law. The prosecution has
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the words were contemptuous. So what
might separate the major from say
Lieutenant How in 1967 who stood outside
of Fort Bliss with a sandwich board
calling Lynden Johnson a war criminal is
that it's unclear to me whether the
major engaged in any superfluous or
mean-spirited name calling and rather
just exercised what he believed his
prerogative to um warn Congress about
conditions in the military and how the
chain of command and might be acting in
an unconstitutional manner. That might
not clear the hurdle of contempt, but I
suspect it will.
>> People in the military don't have the
same First Amendment rights that the
rest of us do.
>> No, you're absolutely correct. I mean,
one of the things that you learn is that
you are surrendering to the federal
government some of your free speech
rights and that includes the right to be
politically engaged in a military
status. But you know, this
administration has done more to water
down the political military barrier and
they've instead politicized the military
to an unusual degree that they've set an
example that it's okay to cross the
line. And you see it in the speeches
that Secretary of Defense Hegsth has
made to uniform personnel, the speeches
the president makes at the academy
graduations, and just basically their
public comments and the overuse of the
military to promote the president's
ideology. There's no equal to that in my
lifetime. And so I suspect one of the
things that this major's attorneys are
going to argue is that it's the
president himself who's moved the
definitions of what political activity
and contemptuous language are and
therefore that is the standard by which
our client must be judged and therefore
they can't prove beyond a reasonable
doubt he's guilty of contempt.
>> There are 10 charges in all under three
articles. Tell us about the other
charges. So, article 92 is a failure to
obey lawful orders or regulations. And I
can tell you that demonstrating in a
military uniform for any cause without
permission, whether it's for wildlife
preservation, children's rights, or a
political rally that's partisan. If you
don't have permission to be in uniform
and you're part of it, you've crossed
the line. Now again, selective
prosecution is something that I'm sure
the defense council in this case will
raise because they'll point out the fact
that the president has used the military
at his partisan rallies. No one there
has been prosecuted. So, we'll see what
happens. As for article 133, that's the
easiest of all the charges to prove.
It's called conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman. and it
basically throws it out to um the court
marshal whether or not this major
crossed the line. The prosecution
doesn't really have to prove that
there's a threat to good order and
discipline. It's just rather whether or
not this major has crossed the line
against the norms and become something
of a of a criminal embarrassment to the
military. I mean, the classic line of
that is an officer who goes and does
something legal like gambling, but falls
into debt and can't pay the debt back.
But you do see examples of conduct, I'm
becoming an officer and a gentleman for
lots of different things that are
ordinarily legal. I think of all the
charges, this is the easiest to prove,
but this major's attorneys are going to
argue that their client is selectively
prosecuted in violation of his
constitutional rights. It hasn't
actually been decided yet whether Major
Watson will have to face trial.
>> Yeah. Well, the thing is that he's held
in pre-trial confinement, which is very
unusual for an officer. I mean, even
officers who are accused of violent
crimes like rape generally don't end up
being placed in pre-trial confinement.
So, first we have to wait and see
whether a military judge or if they go
and try to file in US District Court,
whether a US District Court judge would
order him released from pre-trial
confinement under the argument that
look, he's not a threat to good order
and discipline. He hasn't committed a
violent crime. He's not charged with
espionage. This is just something that
normal human beings can do in the United
States. So even before we were to get to
a trial, that could become an issue.
Then this has to go through the
military's equivalent of a grand jury.
That's done by one individual. It's not
really a grand jury, but it's the
equivalent of a grand jury. It's a
pre-trial investigation. And then and
only then would a senior military
officer known as a general court marshal
convening authority. And usually those
are major generals or you know rear
admirals upper half or higher lieutenant
generals fourstar generals and the like
able to convene a general court marshal
against this major. So, it's a process
and one of the things that makes this
process different is that I think the
government has opened the door to the
possibility of the defense council being
able to stop this process in its tracks
through some sort of appeal to the
United States District Court.
>> I thought that when you're in the
military, you're subject to the
jurisdiction of the military courts. How
would he get this into federal district
court? Well, when you can prove to the
federal courts that the government is
either incompetent, has violated your
client's rights to a constitutional
degree, or has committed a a major
infraction of the law, you can get it
into the US District Court, it's a very
high bar, but if you remember the case
of Lieutenant Aaron Wata, Aaron Wata did
not want to go and comply with his
orders to deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan.
and the prosecution was getting ready to
prosecute him in a court marshal for
failure to go. There was some problem
with the handling of evidence of the
discovery requirement to give Wata's
attorneys all of the government's
evidence. The defense council shrewdely
went to US District Court and the US
District Court shut that case down and
the military was never able to go
forward and prosecute Lieutenant Aaron
Wata for something that at least
facially Aaron Wata did which was refuse
to comply with orders. But for every
Lieutenant Wata, there are hundreds of
people who the military more or less
functions as it's supposed to do and
they can't get into US District Court.
What makes this case different is its
uniqueness.
>> It seems like they're charging him in
many different ways for the same act.
>> Yeah. Well, that's one area where the
military justice system can misfire
because a military trial judge, just
like a state criminal trial judge or a
US district court judge, has to make
sure that the charges do not overlap to
such a degree as to violate the
Constitution's prohibition against
double jeopardy. And I've taken a look
at the way this case has been charged.
And one of the features of it to me is
that there is enough of an overlap to
create a constitutional issue in this
case. A military trial judge could say
to the government, you're going to have
to decide which of these charges you're
going forward on and which you're not
because there's significant overlap or
I'll throw it out to the court marshal
to do that. The other possibility I
could see a military judge doing is
saying, "I'm just going to consolidate a
bunch of these charges if he's found
guilty of them for the purpose of
sentencing into a singular charge."
>> And Watson, who's about 3 years from
retirement, could be dismissed from the
service and lose his pay and benefits if
he's convicted. And there's also the
possibility of jail time. Thanks for
joining me, Josh. That's Professor
Joshua Castenberg of the University of
New Mexico Law School. And that's it for
this edition of the Bloomberg Law Show.
Remember, you can always get the latest
legal news on our Bloomberg Law podcast.
You can find them on Apple Podcast,
Spotify, and at
www.bloomberg.com/mpodcast/law.
And remember to tune in to the Bloomberg
Law Show every week night at 1000 p.m.
Wall Street time. [music]
I'm June Graasso and you're listening to
Bloomberg.
Ask follow-up questions or revisit key timestamps.
This episode of Bloomberg Law covers three major legal topics. First, it discusses a landmark settlement where Meta agreed to pay up to $18 billion to resolve lawsuits from 48 states regarding teen social media addiction, highlighting the complexities and potential First Amendment concerns of such a deal. Next, it examines the legal battle over President Trump's construction of a ballroom at the White House without proper congressional authorization. Finally, it explores the criminal charges brought against an Air Force major for making contemptuous remarks about the president and violating military regulations.
Videos recently processed by our community