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Weekend Law: Meta Settles, Trump Outruns Courts & Officer Charged | Bloomberg Law

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Weekend Law: Meta Settles, Trump Outruns Courts & Officer Charged | Bloomberg Law

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0:02

This is [music] Bloomberg Law with June

0:05

Graasso from Bloomberg Radio.

0:08

>> This is a major breakthrough, a

0:11

milestone moment, a watershed moment. Um

0:14

because when it comes to protecting our

0:16

children's mental health, there is no

0:19

time to lose. That's California Attorney

0:21

General Rob Bont describing the

0:24

settlement where Meta will pay up to $18

0:26

billion and put stronger child safety

0:30

guard rails on its platforms to end a

0:33

California social media addiction trial

0:36

and resolve the claims of 48 states that

0:39

Meta deliberately designed features to

0:42

hook teenagers. Under the deal, the

0:45

social media giant will implement a

0:47

series of design changes for users under

0:50

18, including limiting the time they can

0:54

spend on Instagram and Facebook to 2

0:57

hours a day, blocking the apps from

0:59

midnight to 6:00 a.m., and disabling

1:02

features such as like counts. But this

1:05

doesn't close the book on social media

1:08

addiction litigation for Meta. It still

1:11

faces thousands of similar lawsuits

1:13

brought by individuals, school

1:15

districts, and Native American tribes.

1:18

Joining me is an expert in internet law,

1:21

Eric Goldman, a professor at the Santa

1:23

Clara University School of Law and

1:25

co-director of the High-Tech Law

1:27

Institute. This is being called a

1:30

landmark settlement. AG Bont said they

1:33

got as much and perhaps more than they

1:36

could have in litigation. I mean, how do

1:38

you view it? The settlement amount is a

1:41

huge absolute number. There's no doubt

1:43

that this is a major financial landmark.

1:46

At the same time, this number is not a

1:49

number that materially changes Meta's

1:52

business. I don't want to say it's

1:53

pocket change for them, but it's a

1:56

quarter of their 2025 net income. In

1:58

other words, they can afford this. And

2:01

also I would point out that Meta was

2:03

subject to a judgment in New Mexico that

2:06

ordered cumulatively roughly a billion

2:09

dollars of damages against Meta. And New

2:11

Mexico's roughly6%

2:14

of the US population. If you were to

2:16

multiply that billion dollar judgment in

2:19

New Mexico by the 6 population, actually

2:22

the $17 billion number looks smaller

2:25

than we might expect.

2:26

>> Bont said that the money was secondary.

2:29

What was important was the changes that

2:32

Meta has agreed to make. Do you think

2:34

those changes are significant?

2:37

>> The changes are important in part

2:39

because Meta has resisted them for quite

2:42

some time and Meta's obviously flipped

2:44

internally and decided that they could

2:47

live with these particular changes. So

2:49

the state AGS were able to accomplish

2:51

something that regulators around the

2:53

globe have had difficulty forcing Meta

2:56

to do. What's less clear is if these

2:59

changes are in the best interest of the

3:02

constituents that the state attorneys

3:04

general seek to serve. We don't know if

3:08

any of these changes solve the quote

3:10

mental health crisis. We don't know if

3:13

any of these changes materially benefit

3:16

any population of users. Simply put, we

3:19

don't have science to back up that these

3:22

changes solve any problem. And we also

3:26

don't know if these changes will cause

3:29

other users to have new problems because

3:33

of the restrictions. In other words, the

3:35

state attorneys general are gambling

3:37

that these changes are beneficial to

3:40

users without having the science to back

3:42

it up. And we'll find out if they're

3:44

right or wrong. But if they're wrong,

3:46

then we're going to have a lot of people

3:48

who actually have been harmed by this

3:49

agreement. Will you explain how the

3:52

changes in the platforms are going to

3:55

work in practice? Because the

3:57

effectiveness hinges on knowing how old

4:01

users actually are.

4:03

>> I describe these categories of

4:05

restrictions as segregate and suppress.

4:08

The first step is to segregate the user

4:10

population between adults and minors.

4:12

And then the second step is to suppress

4:14

some resources for the minor population.

4:17

This agreement codifies that approach.

4:20

In order to do the segregation, Meta has

4:22

agreed to deploy age authentication on

4:25

its user base. And the agreement has

4:27

very detailed specific provisions about

4:29

how that age authentication is going to

4:31

work. Among other things, something that

4:33

really was interesting to me is that the

4:36

agreement contemplates that age

4:38

authentication will never be perfect.

4:40

And it actually provides error rates

4:42

where Meta can make mistakes and still

4:44

be in compliance of the agreement. This

4:46

is really central to the question

4:48

because it means that there will be some

4:50

minors who will not be protected by this

4:53

agreement because of those error rates.

4:55

And I don't see that as a flaw, but it's

4:57

actually a big concession by regulators

4:59

to even admit that that could happen.

5:01

>> This deal came in the second week of a

5:03

jury trial in California that posed

5:06

enormous risks for Meta. I mean, juries

5:09

ruled against them in two prior cases,

5:12

one in New Mexico and one in California.

5:15

What do you think pushed them to settle?

5:17

>> Well, obviously the settlement has been

5:18

in the works for many days if not for

5:21

weeks or even months because it's so

5:23

long and detailed and it required the

5:26

agreement of 51 different state ag. So,

5:30

this agreement didn't just happen

5:32

because this trial has been going

5:33

poorly. This conversation is much longer

5:35

standing than that. But I don't know

5:37

exactly what caused Meta to flip on this

5:40

particular issue, but this is a standard

5:43

practice for Meta that they will push

5:46

and fight against restrictions until

5:49

they decide it's somehow in their

5:50

interest and then they're all in and

5:52

they're like super excited about it and

5:54

as agreement reflects and they want

5:56

everyone else on the same program too.

5:57

Like they're like, "Okay, we've decided

5:59

here's what the industry should do.

6:01

We'll be the first, but make sure

6:02

everyone else goes on the program as

6:04

well." So, I don't know what caused META

6:06

to reach that point where they decided

6:08

enough is enough, but it isn't some new

6:10

thing. It's something that obviously has

6:12

been on their minds for a while.

6:14

>> The deal includes the appointment of an

6:16

independent auditor to oversee

6:18

compliance, someone who can issue their

6:21

own recommendations and report findings

6:24

to the states. Do you think that that's

6:26

sufficient to ensure compliance by META?

6:30

Because I remember some years ago when

6:33

Meta was still Facebook, it didn't

6:35

comply with agreements with the FTC over

6:39

users data privacy.

6:41

>> Yeah, Meta has a history of having

6:44

independent auditors that have had no

6:47

real impact on its business. And so I'm

6:50

guessing Meta thinks it had a little bit

6:53

of fast one here that the state ags are

6:56

going to think this independent auditor

6:57

is going to dictate things to Meta. And

6:59

I'm guessing Meta is thinking it will

7:00

dictate to the independent author.

7:03

>> Eric, so Meta said the framework will

7:06

only work if all our peers join us.

7:09

Because teens move fluidly across dozens

7:12

of apps, we need an industry-wide

7:14

solution. Is that what this is really

7:16

about?

7:17

>> This is a metapecific issue. Meta really

7:21

really does not like being obligated to

7:24

comply with laws that its competitors

7:27

don't also have to comply with. So Meta

7:30

is less resistant to legal compliance.

7:33

It's more willing to accept that the

7:35

regulators can tell it how to run its

7:36

business, but only if in Meta's mind

7:38

it's a level playing field. So it was

7:41

absolutely critical to Meta in this case

7:44

that if it settled, it was going to drag

7:47

along its competitors, whether they

7:49

really wanted to be dragged along or not

7:52

to the same deal so that teams can't

7:55

just check out a Meta, go to the

7:57

competitor down the information

7:59

superighway and get a better deal there

8:01

and Meta then is at a competitive

8:03

disadvantage. And it mattered so much to

8:06

Meta that they did two things of

8:08

interest. The first is that it agreed to

8:11

restrict miners usage of Meta even more

8:15

if other competitors agreed to the same

8:18

restrictions. So that's a carrot for the

8:21

state ages to go out and get even

8:24

greater alleged protection for miners if

8:27

they can get the competitors under that

8:28

program. The second thing is that Meta

8:31

conditioned a large chunk of the

8:33

payments on the state AGs going out and

8:36

getting the competitors under the same

8:38

program. In other words, essentially

8:40

Meta has now deputized the state AGs as

8:44

its police against its competitors and

8:48

is paying them to do its dirty work. So

8:51

the state ags might think that this is a

8:54

win, but Meta is also looking this as we

8:57

got the state AGs to go off and harass

8:59

our competitors and we're willing to pay

9:02

them to do that.

9:03

>> And the California AG did say they'll be

9:06

going after Meta's competitors next.

9:08

>> Meta is part of the industry, a major

9:11

player in the industry, but there's a

9:12

big bigger ecosystem that we will not be

9:14

satisfied until we address all of the

9:17

problems in the entire industry. So we

9:19

are going to focus on Tik Tok. But we

9:20

are going to focus on Snap.

9:22

>> So Tik Tok and Snap and probably YouTube

9:25

will be pressured to make similar deals.

9:28

>> The competitors may not like this deal

9:31

at all, but now Meta and the state ages

9:34

are collaborating together against these

9:37

other competitors. So I can assure you

9:40

that YouTube and Snap and Tik Tok

9:43

reading this agreement at each line you

9:46

could just see the anger bar rising in

9:48

their heads because this is an agreement

9:50

that's against their interest. They had

9:52

no say in the agreement and now Meta is

9:55

throwing hundreds of millions of dollars

9:57

at this problem to try to get the state

10:00

ag

10:01

>> and Meta is still facing thousands of

10:03

other lawsuits. This settlement doesn't

10:06

apply to any of the other pending

10:08

litigation that's been brought by the

10:10

school districts, the Native American

10:12

tribes, and by individual victims, of

10:14

which there are thousands of individual

10:16

victims who've already sued Meta, and

10:19

that's why there's a large overhang of

10:22

additional legal risk that it still

10:25

needs to resolve. This settlement

10:26

doesn't have any bearing on that.

10:28

>> Do you have any First Amendment concerns

10:30

about this settlement? The agreement

10:33

represents the concession of meta of

10:38

certain editorial decisions that it

10:40

traditionally had the prerogative to

10:42

make. And it's interesting and a little

10:45

uncomfortable that the state attorneys

10:47

general have bound meta to that. In a

10:49

sense, part of the bargain for price was

10:52

the state AG's getting remedies that

10:55

might very well have not been available

10:57

to it in court because of the

11:00

restrictions on free speech.

11:02

Essentially, the state AGs are

11:04

controlling how Meta talks with its

11:07

users. So there's something disquing

11:09

about the idea that Meta and the state

11:11

ages have agreed to what are

11:14

fundamentally restrictions on Meta's

11:15

freedom to publish especially when we

11:18

don't even know if that's

11:19

constitutionally permitted. One

11:21

possibility this agreement will look

11:23

really weird if that question gets

11:25

answered by the Supreme Court and the

11:27

Supreme Court says that states have no

11:29

power to dictate how online publishers

11:32

present content to users. The meadow has

11:34

agreed to that and it might very well be

11:36

that that agreement is based on an

11:38

unconstitutional premise.

11:40

>> It's more complicated than it initially

11:43

seems. Thanks so much, Eric. That's

11:45

Professor Eric Goldman of Santa Clara

11:48

University Law School. Coming up next,

11:50

President Trump keeps racing ahead and

11:53

the courts can't catch up. I'm June

11:56

Graasso and you're listening to

11:58

Bloomberg.

12:00

The people that are opposing the

12:02

ballroom are people that in my opinion

12:05

are very disloyal to our country. Very,

12:07

very disloyal to our country. Uh, and I

12:10

think we're doing very well. We're way

12:11

ahead of schedule.

12:12

>> And that's important because President

12:14

Trump is racing to construct the 90,000

12:18

square ft ballroom with a 250 person

12:21

crew working 20 hours a day, 7 days a

12:25

week to keep the project ahead of

12:27

schedule. Speed is essential because

12:30

Trump is racing against the courts and

12:33

so far he's outrunning them. The project

12:36

has moved ahead without any input from

12:38

Congress or the public and despite two

12:42

courts ruling that Trump was flouting

12:44

the law. And Chief Justice John Roberts

12:47

has given Trump the go-ahad to outrun

12:49

the Supreme Court as well. he can keep

12:52

building his ballroom while the justices

12:55

take more time to consider the issue.

12:58

This isn't a new scenario for Trump.

13:00

He's been acting first and then daring

13:03

the courts to catch up with him since he

13:05

took office for the second time. Joining

13:08

me is James Fander, a professor at

13:10

Northwestern Law School. James, does the

13:13

Chief Justice's interim order tell us

13:16

anything about how the full Supreme

13:18

Court is going to look at this issue? I

13:21

don't think we learned much from the

13:22

order that the chief issued. It seems to

13:25

me like just a request for some

13:27

additional time suggesting the court's

13:29

taking the issue seriously, but hasn't

13:31

yet found its way to a resolution.

13:34

>> So, you've had two lower courts ruling

13:37

that the ballroom project is probably

13:40

illegal. But work was allowed to

13:43

continue. I mean, why was work allowed

13:45

to continue when they're saying that

13:48

it's illegal? I think it was an attempt

13:51

to accommodate the national security

13:54

concerns that are associated with the

13:57

proposed construction below ground. The

13:59

government took the position both in the

14:01

district court and the appellet court

14:02

that the below ground construction was

14:05

separable from the ballroom construction

14:07

and that the below ground construction

14:10

had all sorts of security implications.

14:14

bunkers and emergency medical care

14:17

facilities and and that sort of thing.

14:20

Very difficult for a court to

14:21

secondguess those kinds of concerns,

14:25

especially when the government is

14:26

basically admitting down below anyway

14:29

that the ballroom part of the project is

14:32

separable from the belowground national

14:35

security or security part of the

14:37

project. So the government pitched the

14:40

matter to the lower courts, I believe,

14:42

as a situation where we can do this

14:44

below ground thing without prejudice to

14:47

the eventual construction of a ballroom

14:50

above ground and we can figure out what

14:52

the legality of that is down the road.

14:54

But in the meantime, we've already

14:56

gotten this far with the national

14:58

security below ground work. So let's

15:01

continue with that. And I think that's

15:03

why both courts agreed that the

15:06

belowground work could continue thinking

15:09

that they would retain some control over

15:11

the ultimate shape of the above ground

15:13

ballroom. Now the government's taking

15:15

the position of course that the above

15:16

ground ballroom is integral with the

15:19

below ground security concerns that led

15:22

to the continuation of the construction

15:24

in the first place. I mean, what we had

15:26

here was President Trump knocking down

15:29

the East Wing before anybody could blink

15:32

their eyes. I mean, it was there one

15:33

day, it seemed like it was down the next

15:35

day. So,

15:36

>> three days. Yeah.

15:37

>> He So, he took that action without any

15:40

authorization and it's done. So, what do

15:44

the courts do to catch up to him? You

15:46

know, it's over. So in terms of

15:48

restoring the east wing, I think you're

15:50

right that it is done. And the question

15:52

is now what is the proper response

15:55

architecturally and historically to the

15:58

scars that have been created in this

16:01

place that belongs to the public and

16:03

belongs to the government and is within

16:05

the control and stewardship of the

16:07

Congress of the United States. And

16:08

that's a question that is not easy to

16:10

answer. There's no way to unring the

16:13

bell or restore the east wing. And I

16:16

don't think anybody believes that what

16:17

we should do is return to the best

16:21

reconstruction or recreation of the east

16:23

wing we could find. I think the question

16:26

is the legality of ongoing construction.

16:29

And I think the lower courts at least

16:31

with some justification view that

16:32

ongoing construction project as unlawful

16:35

because not lawfully approved by

16:37

Congress and therefore subject to

16:40

limitation control injunction and so

16:42

forth. And then the question is once

16:44

that injunction takes hold, what will be

16:47

the shape of the project going forward

16:49

if President Trump is required to secure

16:52

the approvals and authorizations that he

16:55

said he was going to get when he started

16:58

making noise about the ballroom and

17:00

never got, you know, because he decided

17:02

he wanted to do it his own way without

17:04

anyone else playing a part in the

17:06

magnificent ballroom he was about to

17:08

create. Isn't this sending a message

17:10

that illegal behavior is being rewarded?

17:14

You get to complete your ballroom even

17:16

though what you've done is illegal

17:18

because you've gone this far already.

17:20

This is a pattern and it happens in

17:23

immigration cases. It happens in grant

17:26

cases. It happens over and over again.

17:28

When the courts finally get involved,

17:31

it's too late. It's all over.

17:33

>> No, it's true. And what I call the first

17:36

mover advantage that the president

17:37

enjoys as a you know executive or

17:39

commander-in-chief means that he can

17:41

take action and proceed on the

17:44

assumption that it's lawful until

17:46

somebody tells him otherwise. I think

17:48

that's been his basic mo. And in past

17:52

presidencies, not in every case

17:54

obviously, but president showed a great

17:56

deal more restraint in this shadow of

17:58

uncertain law. I think this president

18:01

prefers to move in the shadow of

18:02

uncertain law. And even when there's no

18:05

uncertainty at all, if he believes that

18:08

either the constitution or some other

18:09

grant of authority allows him to take

18:12

the action, then he will take it and

18:14

turn the rest of it over to the lawyers.

18:16

And we've seen it, as you say, time and

18:18

again in the immigration space, the

18:20

removal of aliens under the Alien

18:22

Enemies Act. We've seen it with the

18:24

dismantling of USID. We've seen it with

18:27

the discharge of employees from

18:29

positions in the executive branch

18:31

without due process of law. If there

18:32

were questions about the legality,

18:34

there's a way to have a legal proceeding

18:36

to determine whether a person properly

18:38

holds an office. But instead, President

18:40

Trump would rather fire now and litigate

18:43

later. And that has been, I think, quite

18:45

the pattern of his presidency.

18:47

>> Well, it continues to work well for him.

18:50

The Supreme Court seems to continue

18:52

expanding presidential power. Is there

18:55

any reason to think that it will limit

18:58

him in this case with the White House

18:59

ballroom?

19:00

>> There, I think is reason to think that

19:03

the Supreme Court will be concerned

19:05

about President Trump's violation of

19:09

appropriations limitations that Congress

19:11

has imposed upon him. I'm not sure that

19:14

his role as the unitary executive under

19:18

article 2 will be understood to override

19:21

appropriations restrictions. So that may

19:23

be a place where the Supreme Court is a

19:25

bit more protective of the traditional

19:27

allocation of responsibilities as

19:30

between the president and the Congress,

19:31

the United States. And so I think

19:33

there's some hope in this case given the

19:36

fact that there's a pretty strong case

19:38

to be made that Congress has previously

19:41

appropriated money and understood itself

19:43

to be the responsible party in making

19:45

decisions about the shape of White House

19:47

construction projects. There's some hope

19:49

that the Supreme Court will understand

19:51

the threat posed to congressional

19:53

appropriation power by the actions of

19:56

President Trump with respect to the

19:57

White House and perhaps that will have

19:59

some, you know, radiating effect on

20:01

other of the projects that he has in

20:03

mind. There's um a history, I think, of

20:06

some minor alterations and improvements

20:09

in the language of the relevant statute

20:11

to the White House that are what you

20:13

might call presidential vanity projects.

20:17

you know, the installation by FDR of a

20:19

swimming pool indoors, the use of that

20:21

pool by JFK, the decision to close the

20:24

pool by Richard Nixon and put, you know,

20:26

a onelane bowling alley in the White

20:28

House, the decision by Gerald Ford to

20:31

create an outdoor swimming pool. These

20:33

were all relatively modest changes that

20:36

don't really change the footprint of the

20:37

White House or the appearance of it.

20:39

Nothing to compare, obviously, to a $400

20:42

million ballroom project of the kind

20:44

that's currently underway. And so it's

20:47

hard for the current project to fit

20:49

within that tradition of alterations and

20:52

improvements that we've seen in the

20:53

past. And for that reason, it may be

20:55

that the Supreme Court pushes back a

20:57

bit.

20:57

>> Does it make a difference that Trump

20:59

says that private donations are paying

21:02

for the ballroom, although some

21:04

reporting shows that public funds are

21:06

covering more than half the cost?

21:09

>> Yeah, that's a good question. And I was

21:11

puzzled by that myself a bit because one

21:14

of the claims being made here is that

21:16

the National Park Service collects

21:19

appropriated funds for use in connection

21:22

with National Park Service projects. And

21:25

so this relevant statute characterizes

21:28

those donated funds as appropriated. And

21:31

so the government has kind of cobbled

21:33

together an argument that goes like

21:35

this. Once the money has been collected

21:37

and placed in the vault of the National

21:40

Park Service, it's now appropriated

21:42

funds and the authorization to use

21:44

appropriated funds that appears

21:46

elsewhere in federal law, can be

21:49

stitched together with those donations

21:52

and create the appearance that these

21:54

funds have been in fact appropriated for

21:57

the use that they have been put to. I

21:59

think that's a very difficult argument

22:01

to make in the end given the jealousy

22:04

with which the Congress of the United

22:06

States guards its appropriation powers

22:08

and it's uncertain I think whether that

22:11

kind of argument will be accepted by the

22:12

Supreme Court but that's the argument

22:15

you know there's been nothing on this

22:17

scale before in terms of donated funds

22:21

put to the uses that they are being put

22:24

to here and it's at least very hard for

22:26

me to see how this could be considered

22:29

the kind of congressional control that

22:32

we normally associate with the

22:33

appropriations process.

22:36

>> What would be the best outcome, the best

22:39

case scenario for those who want to see

22:42

supervision and independent oversight of

22:46

the construction of the ballroom? So if

22:48

you were concerned about construction of

22:50

a ballroom and you wanted the best

22:53

possible outcome you could get, then it

22:56

seems a remand to the district court is

22:59

going to be required and that's going

23:01

to, you know, require the district court

23:03

to continue to oversee the project. I

23:06

mean, one possibility is a hold on above

23:09

ground construction, and that's all

23:11

that's really on the table right now.

23:13

put a hold on above ground construction

23:15

while we conduct the necessary

23:18

assessments and run through the

23:21

necessary authorization and approval

23:24

processes. That could all be handled as

23:27

expeditiously as possible. I assume that

23:29

President Trump might want to try to get

23:31

all that done before the November

23:32

election cycle, but it's obviously up to

23:35

him to decide how he wants to secure

23:37

that approval. And then once approvals

23:40

have been granted, then the project

23:41

could continue. And I don't necessarily

23:44

see it as delaying the completion or

23:48

leaving a hole in the ground. It seems

23:49

to me like everybody's going to say at

23:52

the end of the day, let's do it. Let's

23:54

just not do exactly all of that or maybe

23:57

we can scale it back or in a sense maybe

23:59

it can refer to the pre-existing east

24:01

wing in some way that reminds us that it

24:04

used to be there. I don't know. Hard to

24:05

predict how it might shake out. But

24:08

without consultation, you're not going

24:10

to get anything but Trump's vision,

24:12

obviously.

24:13

>> And there is no indication as to when

24:16

the Supreme Court will rule. It's been

24:19

great getting your insights, James.

24:20

Thanks so much. That's Professor James

24:23

Fander of Northwestern Law School.

24:26

Coming up next on the Bloomberg Law

24:27

Show, an Air Force major is facing

24:30

criminal charges after calling for

24:33

Trump's impeachment. I'm June Graasso

24:35

and you're listening to Bloomberg.

24:38

On July 1st, at a protest on the steps

24:41

of the US Capitol, Air Force Major Jason

24:45

Watson, dressed in his uniform, call for

24:48

the impeachment of President Trump for

24:50

ordering military action against foreign

24:53

countries like Iran. When the president

24:55

of the United States orders military

24:58

action against foreign countries absent

25:01

an emergency scenario where American

25:03

interests are under imminent dire threat

25:07

as was done with Venezuela, Cuba, and

25:10

Iran, that's an unconstitutional

25:13

usurppation of Congress's authority and

25:15

a violation of the war powers clause.

25:19

These violations resulted in the deaths

25:21

of 13 service members and injuries of

25:24

hundreds more.

25:26

>> For this, the president and vice

25:28

president must be impeached, convicted,

25:30

and removed.

25:34

After Watson, who served in the Air

25:36

Force for 17 years, repeated his

25:39

criticism of Trump on CNN, he was

25:42

criminally charged under the Uniform

25:45

Code of Military Justice with violating

25:48

article 88 for contemptuous remarks

25:50

about Trump, violating article 92 for

25:54

disobeying orders, and violating article

25:57

133 for conduct on becoming an officer.

26:01

The article 88 contemptuous remarks

26:04

charges are exceedingly rare. So much so

26:08

that there have only been a few

26:09

instances since the modern code of

26:12

military justice was enacted 75 years

26:16

ago. Joining me is Joshua Castenberg, a

26:18

professor at the University of New

26:20

Mexico law school and a former judge and

26:23

lawyer in the US Air Force. Josh, let's

26:26

start with the charges under article 88

26:29

of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,

26:32

which prohibits officers from using

26:35

contemptuous words against the

26:37

president, the vice president, Congress,

26:40

and other US representatives.

26:42

>> Well, those charges, first of all,

26:44

they're quite ancient. They go back to,

26:47

in a sense, Thomas Jefferson when the

26:49

first articles of war were being

26:51

rewritten from the British. And one of

26:54

the things that was changed from the

26:56

British article to what we now know as

26:59

article 88 is the US limited it to the

27:02

chain of command in the military. So

27:05

it's an old charge. It's a charge that

27:07

has been used in a very selective manner

27:10

over the years. You know, you can go

27:12

back to the Vietnam War. There was a

27:14

lieutenant calling Lynden Johnson a war

27:16

criminal. And then you can jump ahead to

27:18

the present and we've got this major

27:20

who's making disparaging words against

27:22

the president. But there have been

27:23

hundreds of others who've done it and

27:25

haven't been charged.

27:26

>> What's the standard used to determine

27:29

whether the remarks are contemptuous?

27:31

>> So remarks tend to be considered

27:34

contemptuous if they're made in a manner

27:36

that would undermine confidence and the

27:40

reliability of the chain of command. And

27:42

so you can go back for example to the

27:44

Vietnam War and there was this army

27:47

captain and he was a noted

27:48

dermatologist. He was training corman.

27:51

His name was Captain Levy. And he

27:53

started advising students who were, you

27:56

know, enlisted members in the United

27:58

States Army's medical corps not to go to

28:00

Vietnam by arguing that it was an

28:03

imperialistic, it was a white man's war.

28:05

It was making the rich richer. It was

28:07

immoral and unconstitutional. And you

28:09

know, he had a position of authority

28:11

over them. And so he was convicted in a

28:14

court marshal. It went all the way up to

28:16

the United States Supreme Court. and the

28:18

Supreme Court upheld the conviction in a

28:20

case we know as Parker versus Levy.

28:23

Today, I think one of the things the

28:25

defense council will raise is the idea

28:28

that this major would undermine the

28:31

chain of command and military discipline

28:33

is unprovable and that is a burden on

28:36

the government to have to prove.

28:38

>> Does the prosecution have to show that

28:41

what he said was contemptuous rather

28:44

than just critical? And what's the line?

28:47

Well, yeah. I mean, you're absolutely

28:48

right in asking that question. Words

28:51

have meaning and they particularly have

28:52

meaning in the law. The prosecution has

28:55

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

28:58

the words were contemptuous. So what

29:00

might separate the major from say

29:03

Lieutenant How in 1967 who stood outside

29:07

of Fort Bliss with a sandwich board

29:09

calling Lynden Johnson a war criminal is

29:12

that it's unclear to me whether the

29:15

major engaged in any superfluous or

29:18

mean-spirited name calling and rather

29:20

just exercised what he believed his

29:23

prerogative to um warn Congress about

29:26

conditions in the military and how the

29:28

chain of command and might be acting in

29:30

an unconstitutional manner. That might

29:33

not clear the hurdle of contempt, but I

29:36

suspect it will.

29:38

>> People in the military don't have the

29:39

same First Amendment rights that the

29:42

rest of us do.

29:42

>> No, you're absolutely correct. I mean,

29:44

one of the things that you learn is that

29:47

you are surrendering to the federal

29:49

government some of your free speech

29:51

rights and that includes the right to be

29:54

politically engaged in a military

29:56

status. But you know, this

29:58

administration has done more to water

30:01

down the political military barrier and

30:04

they've instead politicized the military

30:06

to an unusual degree that they've set an

30:09

example that it's okay to cross the

30:12

line. And you see it in the speeches

30:14

that Secretary of Defense Hegsth has

30:17

made to uniform personnel, the speeches

30:20

the president makes at the academy

30:22

graduations, and just basically their

30:25

public comments and the overuse of the

30:27

military to promote the president's

30:30

ideology. There's no equal to that in my

30:34

lifetime. And so I suspect one of the

30:37

things that this major's attorneys are

30:40

going to argue is that it's the

30:42

president himself who's moved the

30:45

definitions of what political activity

30:47

and contemptuous language are and

30:50

therefore that is the standard by which

30:52

our client must be judged and therefore

30:54

they can't prove beyond a reasonable

30:55

doubt he's guilty of contempt.

30:57

>> There are 10 charges in all under three

31:00

articles. Tell us about the other

31:02

charges. So, article 92 is a failure to

31:06

obey lawful orders or regulations. And I

31:09

can tell you that demonstrating in a

31:12

military uniform for any cause without

31:15

permission, whether it's for wildlife

31:18

preservation, children's rights, or a

31:21

political rally that's partisan. If you

31:23

don't have permission to be in uniform

31:25

and you're part of it, you've crossed

31:27

the line. Now again, selective

31:30

prosecution is something that I'm sure

31:32

the defense council in this case will

31:34

raise because they'll point out the fact

31:36

that the president has used the military

31:38

at his partisan rallies. No one there

31:40

has been prosecuted. So, we'll see what

31:43

happens. As for article 133, that's the

31:45

easiest of all the charges to prove.

31:47

It's called conduct unbecoming an

31:49

officer and a gentleman. and it

31:51

basically throws it out to um the court

31:54

marshal whether or not this major

31:56

crossed the line. The prosecution

31:59

doesn't really have to prove that

32:01

there's a threat to good order and

32:03

discipline. It's just rather whether or

32:05

not this major has crossed the line

32:07

against the norms and become something

32:09

of a of a criminal embarrassment to the

32:11

military. I mean, the classic line of

32:13

that is an officer who goes and does

32:15

something legal like gambling, but falls

32:18

into debt and can't pay the debt back.

32:21

But you do see examples of conduct, I'm

32:23

becoming an officer and a gentleman for

32:25

lots of different things that are

32:27

ordinarily legal. I think of all the

32:29

charges, this is the easiest to prove,

32:31

but this major's attorneys are going to

32:34

argue that their client is selectively

32:37

prosecuted in violation of his

32:39

constitutional rights. It hasn't

32:42

actually been decided yet whether Major

32:45

Watson will have to face trial.

32:48

>> Yeah. Well, the thing is that he's held

32:50

in pre-trial confinement, which is very

32:53

unusual for an officer. I mean, even

32:56

officers who are accused of violent

32:59

crimes like rape generally don't end up

33:01

being placed in pre-trial confinement.

33:04

So, first we have to wait and see

33:06

whether a military judge or if they go

33:09

and try to file in US District Court,

33:11

whether a US District Court judge would

33:13

order him released from pre-trial

33:15

confinement under the argument that

33:17

look, he's not a threat to good order

33:19

and discipline. He hasn't committed a

33:21

violent crime. He's not charged with

33:23

espionage. This is just something that

33:26

normal human beings can do in the United

33:29

States. So even before we were to get to

33:32

a trial, that could become an issue.

33:34

Then this has to go through the

33:36

military's equivalent of a grand jury.

33:39

That's done by one individual. It's not

33:41

really a grand jury, but it's the

33:43

equivalent of a grand jury. It's a

33:44

pre-trial investigation. And then and

33:47

only then would a senior military

33:50

officer known as a general court marshal

33:52

convening authority. And usually those

33:54

are major generals or you know rear

33:57

admirals upper half or higher lieutenant

34:00

generals fourstar generals and the like

34:03

able to convene a general court marshal

34:05

against this major. So, it's a process

34:07

and one of the things that makes this

34:09

process different is that I think the

34:12

government has opened the door to the

34:14

possibility of the defense council being

34:18

able to stop this process in its tracks

34:20

through some sort of appeal to the

34:22

United States District Court.

34:24

>> I thought that when you're in the

34:26

military, you're subject to the

34:28

jurisdiction of the military courts. How

34:31

would he get this into federal district

34:33

court? Well, when you can prove to the

34:36

federal courts that the government is

34:38

either incompetent, has violated your

34:41

client's rights to a constitutional

34:43

degree, or has committed a a major

34:46

infraction of the law, you can get it

34:49

into the US District Court, it's a very

34:51

high bar, but if you remember the case

34:54

of Lieutenant Aaron Wata, Aaron Wata did

34:57

not want to go and comply with his

34:59

orders to deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan.

35:02

and the prosecution was getting ready to

35:05

prosecute him in a court marshal for

35:07

failure to go. There was some problem

35:10

with the handling of evidence of the

35:12

discovery requirement to give Wata's

35:15

attorneys all of the government's

35:17

evidence. The defense council shrewdely

35:19

went to US District Court and the US

35:21

District Court shut that case down and

35:24

the military was never able to go

35:26

forward and prosecute Lieutenant Aaron

35:28

Wata for something that at least

35:31

facially Aaron Wata did which was refuse

35:33

to comply with orders. But for every

35:36

Lieutenant Wata, there are hundreds of

35:38

people who the military more or less

35:40

functions as it's supposed to do and

35:42

they can't get into US District Court.

35:44

What makes this case different is its

35:46

uniqueness.

35:47

>> It seems like they're charging him in

35:50

many different ways for the same act.

35:53

>> Yeah. Well, that's one area where the

35:56

military justice system can misfire

36:00

because a military trial judge, just

36:03

like a state criminal trial judge or a

36:06

US district court judge, has to make

36:08

sure that the charges do not overlap to

36:11

such a degree as to violate the

36:13

Constitution's prohibition against

36:15

double jeopardy. And I've taken a look

36:18

at the way this case has been charged.

36:20

And one of the features of it to me is

36:22

that there is enough of an overlap to

36:25

create a constitutional issue in this

36:27

case. A military trial judge could say

36:29

to the government, you're going to have

36:31

to decide which of these charges you're

36:33

going forward on and which you're not

36:35

because there's significant overlap or

36:36

I'll throw it out to the court marshal

36:38

to do that. The other possibility I

36:40

could see a military judge doing is

36:42

saying, "I'm just going to consolidate a

36:44

bunch of these charges if he's found

36:46

guilty of them for the purpose of

36:48

sentencing into a singular charge."

36:51

>> And Watson, who's about 3 years from

36:53

retirement, could be dismissed from the

36:56

service and lose his pay and benefits if

36:59

he's convicted. And there's also the

37:01

possibility of jail time. Thanks for

37:03

joining me, Josh. That's Professor

37:05

Joshua Castenberg of the University of

37:08

New Mexico Law School. And that's it for

37:10

this edition of the Bloomberg Law Show.

37:12

Remember, you can always get the latest

37:14

legal news on our Bloomberg Law podcast.

37:16

You can find them on Apple Podcast,

37:18

Spotify, and at

37:20

www.bloomberg.com/mpodcast/law.

37:24

And remember to tune in to the Bloomberg

37:26

Law Show every week night at 1000 p.m.

37:29

Wall Street time. [music]

37:30

I'm June Graasso and you're listening to

37:32

Bloomberg.

Interactive Summary

This episode of Bloomberg Law covers three major legal topics. First, it discusses a landmark settlement where Meta agreed to pay up to $18 billion to resolve lawsuits from 48 states regarding teen social media addiction, highlighting the complexities and potential First Amendment concerns of such a deal. Next, it examines the legal battle over President Trump's construction of a ballroom at the White House without proper congressional authorization. Finally, it explores the criminal charges brought against an Air Force major for making contemptuous remarks about the president and violating military regulations.

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