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Repair Work Causes 100 Year Old New York Carpark To Collapse | 2023 Ann Street Disaster

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Repair Work Causes 100 Year Old New York Carpark To Collapse | 2023 Ann Street Disaster

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352 segments

0:00

So, just before we get started with this

0:01

week's video, I'm really happy to

0:03

announce that I have these root cause

0:05

analysis cards up for sale on my Band

0:07

Camp, as well as a new cassette tape of

0:11

some of my new music up for sale. I

0:14

really hope you check it out. And

0:15

without any further ado, let's get on to

0:18

this week's video. Repair works are a

0:20

vital part of building maintenance. Be

0:23

it the odd bit of rewiring, plumbing,

0:25

updating, reflooring, or pointing, etc.

0:29

This is much more prevalent in older

0:31

buildings. As like everything in the

0:33

world, age takes its toll. And to stay

0:35

fresh for the future, you need to keep

0:37

on maintaining your usefulness in order

0:40

to save off the bulldozers. The

0:42

importance of knowing the area you're

0:44

going to work on is also very important

0:46

because a small job can turn into an

0:48

absolute nightmare when you open up an

0:51

unexpected rat's nest or some bodgege

0:54

previous fix. This kind of is the case

0:57

back in 2023 when a very old building

1:00

was undergoing some repair works where

1:02

the workers assumed one thing that ended

1:04

up with this as the aftermath. Today

1:07

we're looking at the 2023 New York City

1:10

parking garage collapse. My name is John

1:13

and welcome to Play Difficult. This

1:15

video wouldn't have been possible if it

1:16

wasn't for my YouTube Patreon and Kofi

1:18

members. If you want early access to the

1:20

channel's videos, then you can from just

1:22

one pound per month. And as always, the

1:23

links are in the pin comment below.

1:25

Also, whilst you're there, check out

1:26

some of my other bits like the music I

1:29

make and random bits and pieces I sell

1:31

on reverb. Again, the links will be down

1:33

below

1:38

[Music]

1:42

background. So, this car park video is

1:46

different to the ones more recently.

1:49

on my channel of unexpected self

1:51

deconstruction in that the structure was

1:54

not fairly new. Instead it was the best

1:56

part of a century old when it decided it

1:59

didn't like being a car park anymore.

2:01

Thus our story begins in the year 23.

2:04

Not 2023

2:06

but 1923. This is an street Manhattan

2:10

New York. And in 1923, a building

2:12

standing on this plot of land around

2:15

number 57 is just a year away from being

2:18

condemned. In early 1925, a demolition

2:21

permit and alteration certificate was

2:23

issued. This would pave the way for the

2:26

building in our video. A certification

2:28

of occupancy would be issued in January

2:31

1926, stating a garage for more than

2:34

five autos. The building used cinder

2:36

concrete slabs reinforced with welded

2:39

wire fabric. These were supported on

2:42

concrete encased steel beams and girders

2:44

which were also supported on internal

2:46

concrete encased steel columns and

2:49

perimeter unreinforced loadbearing walls

2:52

and peers. Some of the brick perimeter

2:54

walls were constructed with the garage

2:56

in 1925. However, some others were

2:59

reused from older buildings that had

3:01

been on the site's pre-new build. And

3:04

just so you know, the foundations for

3:05

the building were spread footings. Over

3:08

the years, the building would receive

3:10

various modifications to increase its

3:12

car loading capacity. In 1957, the roof

3:15

was modified to add more parking with a

3:17

stipulation for passenger type vehicles

3:20

only. Being a parking garage in a

3:23

massively congested city like New York,

3:26

it would not be much of a surprise that

3:28

it saw a lot of use over the years.

3:30

Hundreds of tons of vehicles each day

3:32

would show on the building structure

3:34

with noticeable cracks, reinforcement

3:36

rusting, loose brick work, and

3:38

deteriorating concrete being a not

3:40

uncommon sight for motorists as their

3:43

family cars were parked. In 2003, and 6

3:47

years later, the city department of

3:49

buildings issued to the car park's owner

3:52

violations regarding poor maintenance

3:54

and illegal modifications. It was found

3:57

the building had experienced structural

3:58

damage during these notices. It was not

4:01

new, however, as over its operating

4:03

life, it had racked up multiple concerns

4:06

with staircases being cracked, spooling

4:08

concrete, and exposed steel beams. But

4:11

even though falling apart, a car park

4:13

had quite a few regular customers. One

4:16

such was New York City Sheriff's Office,

4:18

who regularly park some vehicles on

4:20

site. In 2010, repair works was

4:22

submitted to the Department of Buildings

4:24

and the work to add new supporting beams

4:27

was undertaken. 11 years later, a new

4:29

rule came into effect in New York City.

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This would require parking structures to

4:34

have regular department of building

4:36

inspections. The building's owners used

4:39

the consultants on retainer Experian

4:42

design group to undertake a survey of

4:44

the car park in May 2022 in preparation

4:47

for the city rules for submitting a

4:49

report by the 31st of December 2023.

4:54

The 3D survey used by EDG found some

4:57

issues which would require fixing. Most

5:00

notably cracking on pier E3 directly

5:04

beneath a thirdf flooror gerder. The

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company came back 4 weeks later for a

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second 3D scan. During this, they

5:11

identified Pier E3 again as needing work

5:14

and identified it as a masonry column

5:17

encasement instead of what it actually

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was, which was a solid brick loadbearing

5:22

pier. The difference would change the

5:24

way any repair work would be undertaken.

5:26

As it was just an enc casement, the load

5:29

of the floor above it would have been

5:31

taken by a steel column which the bricks

5:33

were encasing. On top of that, EDG did

5:36

not identify the cracking brick works

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condition as unsafe.

5:41

Instead, the pier was a solid brick

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arrangement. I know I'm repeating myself

5:46

here a bit, but the difference is that

5:48

if you remove the bricks from the solid

5:50

brick pier, then you are removing the

5:52

thing holding the weight above you. On

5:56

the 21st of March and 22nd of March

5:58

2023, EDG workers tasked with doing

6:02

another survey to assist in drawing up

6:04

repair plans discovered further damage

6:06

to Pier E3, and that was that some

6:09

cracked bricks had been removed prior to

6:11

their visit. In April, the garage repair

6:14

drawings were issued. There it was set

6:17

out that the brick work would have to be

6:19

removed and rebuilt. No instructions for

6:21

shoring up the floor and roof materials

6:25

being held up by the pier had been set

6:27

out. Which leads us onto the disaster

6:30

and repair works are set to deal with

6:32

the cracking brick work at Pier E3.

6:36

The disaster. It is the 18th of April

6:39

2023 and car park employees begin

6:42

removing damaged brick and mortar from

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the upper section of pier E3 on level

6:47

two. As each brick that was being

6:49

chiseled out and removed, it began

6:51

loading up more stress on the pier's

6:53

remaining brick work.

6:55

This work did not have the required

6:57

permit from the city, but I suppose the

6:59

managers of the car park didn't think

7:01

it'd be too much of a problem due to

7:03

still thinking it was an enc casement

7:05

rather than the actual thing holding the

7:07

floor up. The removal of the damaged

7:10

brick showed no steel support behind.

7:13

Photographs were taken and sent to EDG.

7:16

This was at around 10 3 in the

7:18

afternoon. EDG project manager Vivec Sha

7:22

instructed the workers to replace the

7:24

bricks which is all good and all

7:26

although no warning of urgency or danger

7:29

of the building was communicated to the

7:31

workers. Also, the lack of information

7:33

about the danger meant no attempt at

7:35

shoring was made on site. The workers

7:38

did not place any new bricks on the

7:39

pier, but they were very quickly running

7:42

out of time. Meanwhile, at 4 minutes

7:46

4:00 p.m., a car park member of staff in

7:49

a vehicle on the roof backed into a

7:51

drive aisle and drove past pier E3 and

7:55

into the vehicle lift. At around the

7:58

same time, the garage partially

8:00

collapsed on the northeastern and

8:01

southeastern quadrants of the building.

8:04

The second floor crashed into the first,

8:06

bringing down the structure above it.

8:08

Cars plunged into the wreckage as the

8:10

building let out a deafening crash,

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interrupting the hustle and bustle of

8:14

the New York landscape. Soon enough,

8:16

multiple 911 calls came flooding in and

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the first responders arrived on scene.

8:20

The adjoining buildings were evacuated

8:22

and in total, the collapse would end up

8:25

causing quite a widespread error of

8:27

effect. Subway services nearby had to be

8:31

operated at lower speeds. Nearby Pace

8:33

University classes were cancelled and

8:35

multiple areas had to be shut off due to

8:38

structural fears for the remaining parts

8:40

of the building, including its

8:42

streetside facade.

8:44

The building operated on a valley

8:46

parking service which limited the

8:48

numbers of people inside at the time of

8:50

the collapse. However, seven workers

8:52

were injured requiring minor medical

8:54

treatment. The collapse would take one

8:56

victim though, garage manager,

8:58

59year-old Willis Moore. His body would

9:01

be pulled from the wreckage the day

9:02

after the collapse. It was estimated

9:05

that 40 cars were in the building at the

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time of the disaster, which would

9:08

require removal by crane and an

9:11

estimated insurance cost for the

9:12

vehicles alone, coming to $1.5 million.

9:16

Demolition of the structure would begin

9:18

on the 20th of April, but not before

9:20

investigators would descend upon the

9:22

site for evidence gathering. This took

9:24

place using LAR scans and 360°

9:28

photography to build up a state of the

9:30

car park post collapse. Interestingly,

9:33

the investigating would be jobbed out to

9:35

a third party company instead of by the

9:37

city itself.

9:39

The company was L Consulting Structural

9:43

Engineers, which leads us onto our next

9:45

section of the video,

9:47

the investigation. So fairly soon after

9:50

the April 2023 collapse, LER was held on

9:54

retainer. They began by looking over the

9:56

photographs taken during initial first

9:58

responders work and started digging into

10:00

the building's history. As demolition

10:02

began, drones and cameras were employed

10:04

to gather evidence of the structure as

10:06

parts were removed. Important sections

10:09

were marked as evidence for fire

10:11

inspection and laboratory testing later

10:14

on. This in conjunction with witness

10:16

testimony and reviewing the surveys

10:18

undertaken by EDC gave investigators a

10:21

pretty good sense of the cause of the

10:23

collapse. Clearly the start of the

10:25

disaster was at Pier E3

10:28

as that was the epicenter of the

10:30

self-granded part of the building. This

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was the exact location that the masonry

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was being ripped out for replacement

10:37

works. It was discovered that Pier E3

10:39

was actually a repurposed chimney from a

10:42

previous party wall and it was not well

10:44

built for the task it was meant to do.

10:47

As stated by Le, the pier was not well

10:51

integrated to the party wall, leaving it

10:53

poorly braced against buckling, unable

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to effectively distribute concentrated

10:57

loads from the floor girders into the

10:59

surrounding wall and more highly

11:02

stressed than a pier that is well

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integrated to the surrounding wall. The

11:06

building was very troubled throughout

11:07

its life with a total of reported 64

11:11

building code violations between 1976

11:13

and 2023 alone. It was deteriorating at

11:16

such a rate that multiple areas were at

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a fraction of the strength that they

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were meant to be, such as rusted away

11:22

steel work and severely cracked brick

11:25

peers. But what was the collapse

11:27

sequence? Well, the repair works on

11:28

column E3 severely weakened the support

11:31

for the third floor girder. At around

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the same time, it was at its weakest,

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i.e. with many bricks removed, a vehicle

11:38

was driven on the roof above Pier 3.

11:40

Around the same time, this was just

11:43

about the right amount of extra weight

11:45

to set off the collapse. It crushed the

11:47

remaining bricks and mortar in pier E3.

11:50

This made the third floor girder to drop

11:52

a few inches, in turn, creating a void

11:54

on the pier at the third floor. The void

11:58

left only supports on the party wall to

12:00

hold up the upper story of pier E3. Soon

12:03

enough, this connection at the party

12:04

wall failed, thus bringing down the roof

12:06

girder into the third floor and down and

12:10

down and so on. Pier E3 was likely not

12:14

even built to codes of its day next to

12:16

the party wall and not built into it,

12:19

which when added to the neglect that the

12:20

building went through meant that it was

12:23

a ticking time bomb as noted by LER in

12:26

their report. During its 98-y year

12:28

lifespan, Pier E3 suffered long-term

12:31

progressive deterioration, likely caused

12:33

by a combination of natural aging and

12:35

long-term exposure to moisture and

12:38

potentially aggravated by the elevated

12:39

stresses due to the above described

12:42

design and construction deficiencies.

12:44

And this deterioration resulted in

12:46

severe cracking in the pier. The straw

12:49

that broke the camel's back was though

12:51

the improper survey that incorrectly

12:54

identified the pier as having steel

12:55

inside. Again for the LER report,

13:00

EDG failed to require shoring and

13:02

probing to verify the apparent

13:04

assumption that Pier E3 consisted of

13:06

nonstructural brick encasement of a

13:09

structural steel column. The collapse

13:11

was a real eye openener for the state of

13:13

many buildings in New York City. In the

13:15

aftermath, 61 parking garages would be

13:18

deemed to be immediately hazardous.

13:21

Understandably, the collapse would

13:22

generate multiple lawsuits against the

13:25

building's owners, which are still

13:26

underway, although I reckon they will be

13:29

successful as the LER report was

13:33

released only in April 2025,

13:36

which was rather damning as we've seen

13:39

during this video. So, that's my video

13:42

on the An Street car park collapse. It's

13:44

going to be three on my scale, and this

13:46

is what I've got for my root cause

13:47

analysis card. Do you agree? Let me know

13:49

in the comments below.

13:52

This is a pl production. All videos on

13:54

the channel creative comation shell like

13:56

licensed pl videos produced by me John

13:58

in the currently quite warm corner of

14:00

southern London UK. And all I have to

14:02

say is thank you very much for watching

14:04

and Mr. Music. Can you play out please?

14:08

[Music]

14:17

[Applause]

14:19

[Music]

Interactive Summary

This video examines the 2023 collapse of an aging parking garage in New York City. Built in 1926, the structure suffered from decades of neglect, poor maintenance, and structural deterioration. The collapse was triggered by faulty repair work on a load-bearing pier (Pier E3) that had been incorrectly identified by consultants as a non-structural masonry encasement for a steel column. When workers began removing bricks, they weakened the support holding up the upper floors. Coupled with the weight of vehicles on the roof, this caused a progressive structural failure that resulted in the death of the garage manager and extensive legal and regulatory consequences for the city.

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