Over the weekend, the United States and

Israel launched a massive military

assault on Iran,

>> eliminating eminent threats from the

Iranian regime, a vicious group of very

hard, terrible people.

>> With an hour's Ali Kami was dead along

with much of his senior command. As I

record this on Monday, March 2nd, the

Iranian Red Crescent says over 550

people have been killed in the bombings.

We know of at least six American service

members killed. There will likely be

more as time goes on. There appears to

have been a girl school that was bombed.

The pictures from that. The grief of the

parents is it's almost unbearable to

look at.

>> That's all.

>> This is I just think it's so important

to say it's not all geopolitics. These

are people, civilians, their lives or

homes, their children. The attack on

Iran came less than two months after the

United States military captured Nicholas

Maduro, the president of Venezuela, in

an overnight raid on his compound in

Caracus. America has deposed two sitting

heads of state 8 weeks apart. I have

seen a lot of commentary accusing Donald

Trump of hypocrisy.

>> We believe that the job of the United

States military is not to wage endless

regime change wars around the globe,

senseless wars.

And now he is changing regimes left and

right. But I think this is not quite a

policy of regime change. There's not

American invading Iraq or Afghanistan

and restructuring the government

ourselves. Madura's regime was left

intact aside from him. In an interview

with the Times, Trump said that quote,

"What we did in Venezuela, I think, is

the perfect the perfect scenario." He

said, "Everybody's kept their job except

for two people." Trump has called for

the Iranian people to rise up against

their government, but he's also said he

intends to resume talks with the

existing Iranian regime. He said he had

a few choices for who might lead Iran

next, but they appear to have been

killed in the initial bombings. The

Iranian regime was monstrous, but Trump

is not insisting that it be changed. Nor

is his administration.

>> This is not a so-called regime change

war, but the regime sure did change. I

don't think what we're seeing here is a

policy of regime change. I would call

this head on a pike foreign policy.

America is proving that we can easily

reach into weaker countries and kill or

capture their heads of state. We will

not be dissuaded from doing that by

international law or fear of unforeseen

consequences or the difficulty of

persuading the American people or the

United States Congress of the need for

war. On that, we won't even try. We

don't particularly care who replaces the

people we killed. We will not insist

that they come from outside the regime,

nor they are elected democratically. We

care merely that whoever comes next

fears us enough to be compliant when we

make a demand. That they know that they

might be the next head on a pike.

Trump's belief appears to be that he can

decapitate these regimes and control

their successors and do so without

events spinning out of his control. He

appears to believe that it was idiocy or

cowardice or a laurly respect for

international rules that prevented his

predecessors from replacing foreign

leaders they loathed with more pliable

subordinates.

Trump is a man who has not read much

history, but who certainly intends to

make it. But what if Iran is not

Venezuela? What if the Iranian people

rise up as Trump has asked him to do and

are slaughtered by the Iranian military?

What if it descends into civil war as

happened in Iraq where America had

troops on the ground and yet hundreds of

thousands of Iraqis were killed? What if

it goes the way of Libya or Yemen or

Syria? Who will pay the cost if he's

wrong?

Ben Rhodess is a political analyst, a

New York Times opinion contributing

writer, and the co-host of the podcast

Pod Save the World. He served as a

senior adviser to President Barack

Obama. He joins me now. As always, my

email is Kleinshowny Times.com.

>> Ben Rhodess, welcome to the show.

>> Good to see you, Ezra.

>> So, you served in the Obama

administration. It was the policy of

that administration that Iran could not

be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. BB

Netanyahu was the prime minister of

Israel at that time. Been around a long

time. He was pushing very hard for

America to attack Iran, destroy its

nuclear capabilities, maybe change its

regime. Why didn't you do that then?

>> Uh because we were worried about what

the potential costs and consequences of

a military action could be, what it

could unleash across the region. Uh kind

of a version of what we're seeing. Um

just a lot of unpredictability.

Um and frankly, we thought that the

principal US security interest in Iran

um was the nuclear program. uh we we

that doesn't mean we didn't take

seriously its support for proxies and

its ballistic missile program but the

existential issue to us was the nuclear

program. So if you could resolve that

diplomatically and avoid a war um that

was preferable to the alternative and

you know a lot of people actually

complained that we made that argument

you may remember Ezra that it's either a

war or a diplomatic agreement um and

tragically you know here we are.

>> What were you worried about would

happen? you said a version of what we're

seeing play out now, but you know, if

you're in the US, you're seeing reports

of missiles being fired in all

directions, but it doesn't seem

completely out of control, at least at

this moment. So, tell me, talk me

through the scenarios you all considered

then.

>> Well, it's interesting. Um, we did, uh,

you know, war games, um, essentially

scenario planning, right? where you

anticipate what might happen in the

event of a military conflict. And

um you know part of what I just say at a

macro level is having been through Iraq

uh and Afghanistan and Libya and the

Obama administration uh we had just seen

the uncertainties that are unleashed in

any kind of military conflict in the

region. Um, and even in the case where

you bombed Iran's nuclear facilities,

um, first and foremost, what we

determined is you kind of couldn't

destroy the Iranian nuclear program from

the air. Um, they know how to do this.

They know the nuclear fuel cycle. They

could rebuild. And so, at best, if

you're trying to deal with the nuclear

program, at best, you could set it back

in a very successful strike, maybe a

year, right? And what are the risks that

you're taking? They're taking the risk

that Iran will strike, as we are seeing

now, uh try to strike out and lash out

at US military facilities across the

region, try to uh strike out at energy

infrastructure, which could be very uh

difficult for the global economy, strike

Gulf allies, uh strike civilian

populations uh in Israel. Um and and so

you could have a situation where you

essentially have a regional war um

instead of just, you know, you bomb the

nuclear program and get out. I think

inside of Iran there was just also the

question of um if the regime were to

implode in some fashion, what happens

next? Uh that that the the likelihood

was that you could have protracted civil

conflict and we've seen all of the

unpredictability that can unleash in

terms of refugee flows or kind of

conflict migrating across borders. um

and and we didn't see some pathway to,

you know, a quick transition to, I don't

know, a democratic Iran or or a

different kind of stable government

there. Um so when you weighed the risks

of a military action against the

benefits of you know what, setting back

the Iranian nuclear program a year, um

it it just didn't seem worth it. I think

Donald Trump believes he has figured

something out that has eluded his

predecessors, which is that you can

change these regimes without changing

the regime. You can capture Maduro. You

can use air power to killi.

And what you're going to do next is not

insist on democracy, is not insist on

rebuilding something you like. You are

going to simply insist on somebody who

is afraid enough of you that they are

more pliable when it matters that there

is that what you've created is not

exactly a puppet but someone who is

inclined to follow your orders when you

give them and that maintains a a limit

on how involved you need to be. Is he

right? Has he figured something out?

>> I I I don't think he's right. I think

you're right that he believes that he's

figured this out. Um but I think there's

a number of flaws uh with this thinking.

I mean the first thing in the case of

Iran is this for all the focus on Kam

who you know was a reprehensible leader

by the way I'm not sure how many years

he had left uh if we're just

decapitating him I mean time was about

to do that uh but this is a deep deep

regime you know w with in ideological

institutions that go far beyond even you

know the shaveista regime in Venezuela

right because what you're talking about

is he's sitting on top of this edifice

that has been built since the 1979

revolution that includes millions of

people under arms, right? The Islamic

Revolutionary Guard Corps, the RGC, the

Basias

uh that are usually responsible for the

crackdowns that we see when they're

peaceful protests. Um the Iranian

military and police um there there's a

lot of depth to this regime. So taking

out even the supreme leader doesn't in

any way change the regime. Um and in

fact if you talk about people that might

be afraid um you know the RGC's

sometimes been kind of more hardline

even certainly than the political

leadership that uh Americans usually see

uh in things like negotiations. Um and

then it's also the case you know Trump

thinks I I truly believe you know he

kind of thinks in in news cycle

increments. Um so you know I'll kill

someone to look like we changed the

regime. We got rid of the bad guy. We

kind of slayed the dragon here. Um and

and there's no you know what happens in

one year and three years and 5 years. Uh

I mean I was I'll be self-critical here

Ezra like uh you remember the Libya

intervention. We did the same thing

essentially. Um Gaddafi was killed uh

through a mix well there was an air

strike and then he was killed by people

on the ground. Um terrible guy,

reprehensible leader. Um when that

regime was removed uh nothing was able

to fill the vacuum except for the most

heavily armed people in Libya which were

a series of different militias. Um and

that that civil war you know spread

across borders and you know suddenly

that part of North Africa becomes you

know every an arms bazaar uh you know

conflict is spreading to neighboring

states. Um, so if the regime itself

stays in Iran, I don't think it's

fundamentally different just because

Kame is not there. And if the regime

implodes completely, uh, I worry about,

you know, a Libya type situation at

scale because this is a much bigger

country, right, with over 90 million

people. Um, so, you know, Trump, the

Venezueler, I think I I saw that and it

made me worried about this. One of the

things you have heard repeatedly from

Donald Trump is an exhortation to the

Iranian people that now is your chance.

We have degraded this regime. You are

being supported by air power. Rise up

and take back your country. I think

Trump said this is will be your only

chance for generations.

What do you hear when you hear that?

I hear

something that is incredibly

reckless and

um you know we already saw when he was

you know truth posting help is on the

way uh a few weeks ago um and Resa

Palavi the son of the uh deposed sha was

similarly saying go to the streets

um thousands if not tens of thousands of

Iranians were killed when they did go to

the streets um

>> by the regime.

>> By the regime and you you cannot

protect those people from the air,

right? I mean, let's say there's an

uprising and let's say all the remaining

instruments of the Iranian regime start

to massacre those people. Well, we can

bomb more regime targets. Um, but at a

certain point you kind of run out of

that and you're just talking about

people on the ground with small arms,

right? And it just I'm tremendously

sympathetic to the Iranian people and

what they've been through. Um, I would

love for them to have a different

government. Um, but you know, I'll say

this is the Obama guy. Like hope is not

a strategy. Just going out there and

saying, uh, I'm bombing your country. I

mean, this is part of what's so

disturbing to me about this, Ezra, is

that they they don't have any capacity

to articulate an endgame. And so, I

think people have to recognize and and I

had to, you know, uh learn this, you

know, uh the hard way, uh through the

Arab Spring. Um just because we want a

different government doesn't mean that

that's easy to execute. Um and frankly,

I think Iran was changing, albeit not at

the pace that we want. uh the women life

freedom movement succeeded in some ways.

It didn't change the regime but uh you

talk to people in that region and the

society was changing. Women were

starting to go around uncovered. Some of

the veneer of the regime had been

punctured. Kam was old. He was going to

die. like the capacity for the Iranian

people themselves to change that regime

over time um even though that's not on

the timeline that people want uh I think

would have been a better bet um than

just saying we're going to drop a bunch

of bombs and rise up uh because there's

just not a formula I mean as I was

thinking about this everybody's focused

on the American regime changeled

operations as they should Iraq

Afghanistan Libya in that part of the

world it's Not just those regimes that

have had trouble. Sudan had a popular

uprising. Look at Sudan today, you know,

or Egypt had a popular uprising um in

the Obama years and you know, Mubarak

ended up getting replaced by a more

repressive leader. And so we keep seeing

in these scenarios that the toppling of

an authoritarian government can lead

either to chaos or to further

repression. And that's my concern.

There's a profound, I think, confusion

in what Trump has been saying because at

the same time that he is saying rise up

Iranian people, this is your moment.

He's also saying that he had three

people in mind to lead the regime after

this, but now they're all dead, it turns

out. So maybe it's not going to be them.

>> Yeah.

>> He's also said that he is willing to be

in talks with the existing regime. They

were playing it too cute before, but

he's happy to talk now. And so there is

this way in which he is simultaneously

signaling an openness and eagerness to

see a bottom-up revolt and also a

willingness to cut a deal with what

remains so long as they, you know, get

the deal they wanted, which is no

nuclear program, no enrichment, um

probably no more ballistic missiles

program, a couple other things. But but

those two signals going out at the same

time seems worrisome to me. It seems

very worrisome because it it projects an

incoherence um to your policy and to

your head on the pike strategy. When I

hear Trump say that, I hear someone who

would like this to be over as soon as

possible. But the reality is the

Iranians get a vote on whether it's

over. Uh and what they know, for

instance, is US munitions, particularly

our air defense systems are going to run

lower and lower and lower. And in a way,

you know, they may be able to hit more

targets the longer this goes. I mean, I

the best case scenarios, you know,

because I was trying to, as someone

who's been critical, I want to inhabit

the best case scenarios, right? It feels

like the best case scenario may be a

chasened

regime that just wants to hunker down

and will agree at least for the time

being to you know not have any nuclear

program that is active and uh and kind

of you know lick its wounds. Um and

maybe that provides some opportunity for

that regime to be less repressive. I

mean I guess that's the the the landing

zone here that Trump is trying to to to

meet. But

at the same time, like we've bombed them

twice now in the middle of nuclear

negotiations and uh so if you have

hardliners in the RGC or in uh Iranian

circles, you know, and and they're being

told, well, let's stop and negotiate

with the Americans, like they're they're

not going to believe that that that they

can negotiate in any kind of good faith

with with Donald Trump. Um and and so I

I I I think that there's this kind of

strategic incoherence about what the

objective of this whole thing is. And

that that's seen not just by the

Iranians, it's seen by the Gulf Arabs

who are now, you know, they're they're

furious at everybody. I think they're

furious at the United States and Israel

for launching this war. And we can talk

about that. And I think they're, you

know, obviously furious at Iran for

targeting them indiscriminately. They

don't know what the what's what's going

on here? What's the goal here? Are we

trying to remove this regime? they

they're they're wary of removing the

regime because they don't want refugees

and chaos, you know, in their region.

You know, what you'd want, I guess, is

everybody in the world is, you know, the

relevant countries in the Gulf and the

region and in Europe being able to put

some diplomatic framework around this.

So, it's not just this kind of Steve

Woodoff and Jared Kushner trying to talk

to some Iranian in a room um via v the

Omanis. Um, but Trump's shifting

goalposts of what he's for um make it

much harder to to put any kind of

framework around this. This gets to

something I think pretty deep in the

Trump administration's thinking or lack

of thinking which is

>> it has often seemed to me if there's any

global problem they are worried about it

is refugee flows and migrations

>> and

>> they go to Europe and talk about how

Europe is ceasing to exist as a

civilization in part because of you know

Muslim Muslim integration and

immigration. There have been huge

refugee flows to Europe from Syria as

part of the Syrian civil war.

If you imagine a scenario here where you

end up a little bit between Trump's

imagined options, which is

simultaneously you do have opposition to

the existing regime, and you also have a

regime that has become more compliant to

Trump himself on things like the nuclear

issue, but is trying to hold power and

repressing those who are trying to

attack it. You could very quickly end up

in a significant refugee flow scenario.

Iran's a very very very big country.

You're talking about 90 million people.

>> And how do the states around Iran handle

that? How what does the Trump

administration think about huge outflows

of Iranians coming after the US and

Israel destabilize the the country? Have

they planned for that? Will they should

Europe and America take these people?

>> Yeah.

>> Should other What?

>> I honestly I it doesn't seem that they

planned for it. I will tell you that in

the run-up to this, I did talk to some

people I know in the region, right, um,

in the in the Middle East, in in the

Gulf, who um, uh, who were discussing

what they were warning the Trump

administration about, you know, and um,

one of the scenarios, the kind of worst

case scenario, so I I'm not suggesting

this is definitely going to happen, but

I think we have to inhabit this

precisely because there was no

discussion of the potential

consequences. If you have a a civil

conflict inside of Iran, the economy is

already in really deep trouble because

of, you know, US sanctions, a collapsing

currency. So, there's extreme poverty

there. There are ethnic separatist

movements inside of Iran, uh, in the

Kurdish regions, and the Bluke regions.

And so what you could have is an

implosion, you know, if the there's a

some kind of uprising and then there's a

kind of chaotic civil war, which is not

hard to imagine because we've seen that

in Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the

other places um where the US has been

involved militarily and millions. I

mean, somebody said to me, this is a

country that is four times bigger than

Syria, and remember that refugee crisis

and essentially the the only places to

go or in one direction it's Afghanistan

and Pakistan. Um that's not a

particularly stabilizing thing to

imagine. You know, huge refugee outflows

in Afghanistan. Pakistan, we already

have a war by the way. Pakistan bombed

Afghanistan the day before this started.

Pakistan could get drawn in to this

conflict. Uh they don't in part to get

refugees away and in part to prevent the

emergence of a separatist Balucan on

their borders. It crosses their borders.

And then the other direction is Turkey

into Europe. Um and you saw Turkey very

aggressively being a part of the

mediation efforts. This is one of the

reasons why they have a lot of fatigue

with hosting millions of Syrian refugees

and in Europe trying to keep those

refugees in Turkey instead of getting

Europe. They will find their way to

Europe from through Turkey. And so I

don't think there's been any real

planning for this. Um and that is to me

like the worst case scenario of a civil

war and even fracturing of the Iranian

uh sovereign territory. Um you'd have

huge refugee outflows. We have not been

planning for this. Israel has been

planning for some version of this for a

very long time. They're a full partner

in this operation which is distinctive

about it. What do they want?

I think first and foremost uh they want

to smash um you know anybody who poses a

perceived threat to them and and they

obviously been principally focused on

this axis of resistance right so um

Hamasah

other Iranian proxy groups and then

ultimately the Iranian uh regime itself

um weakening that regime is is in their

view kind of obviously good for their

security posture they're worried about

ballistic missiles worried about nuclear

program. If I was going to be cynical,

um, and I know this is a view of some

increasingly in the region, it's that

Israel's okay with chaos. That if, um,

if there's an implosion in Iran and, you

know, humanitarian uh, disaster there

and and kind of chaos um, that that that

actually advantages their security

situation in a way because that kind of

uh, Iran can't pose a threat to them. Um

and that if you look at

um Lebanon and Syria where Israel's also

been, you know, very active militarily,

um they're just kind of pushing out um

not just kind of the the perimeter, you

know, they're they're literally

occupying parts of uh southern Syria

now. Um they want this kind of buffer

zone in southern Lebanon. Um and I think

that the fears in the region is that

that they are just kind of methodically

yes eliminating threats but also

creating a lot of chaos and instability.

Um as almost a strategy of giving

themselves freedom of action um whether

that involves taking the West Bank,

whether that involves you know uh again

extending out kind of buffer zones into

Syria and Lebanon. Um and and you know

that seems plausible that seems more

plausible to me than they have some plan

to you know support the installation of

Resa Pabi as the transitional leader of

Iran.

>> I mean what they seem to me to have had

a plan for and I think you have to give

some credit to Netanyahu for one of the

most remarkable coups of his career was

involving Donald Trump in this.

>> Yeah. Yeah. And that was very very

effectively pulled Trump in by degrees

such that we were supposed to have a

very limited bombing campaign on Iran.

We were told after that that their

nuclear program was obliterated in

Trump's video announcing uh the this

operation. He both said Iran was posing

an imminent threat and that their

nuclear program had been obliterated

which I found a little bit strange. But

Netanyahu's ability to get Trump to do

what no other US president has been

willing to do is striking. And I think

that was on some level like the real

plan here. Israel had weakened Iran. It

had shown Iran to be weaker than people

thought it was. And I think the push was

made to Trump that you have this narrow

window of opportunity to do what no

other president has done. and at least

in the way it was presented to him,

permanently solve the problem and

permanently avenge

uh you know previous injuries and

insults to America. I think you are

exactly right. Uh I think it's worth

pointing out. I mean this we were both

in Washington at the time. I mean this

started coming up at the end of the Bush

administration in 2007208 when there was

a push uh for Bush to bomb the Iranian

nuclear facilities. Netanyahu has wanted

to do this since I have been in

politics, you know, very clearly. Um,

wanted the US, not Israel alone, the US,

uh, to take out the Iranian regime. And,

and every president has resisted this

except Trump, you know, we should say

like obviously there's people in the

United States, the Lindsey Grahams of

the world who want to do this as well.

So, it's not just Israel. Um, but it's a

pretty small set of constituencies. You

know, the public is broadly against

this. And you're right, they brought him

in by degrees. Uh, and we can even go

back to the first Trump term, right,

where uh, they he left the Iranian

nuclear deal. That was not something

that his advisers were telling him to

do. Jim Mattis, the Secretary of

Defense, was against it at the time, you

know, not even a huge fan of the Iran

nuclear deal, but because he saw if you

remove if you remove yourself from that

deal, you're kind of on a slow motion

movement towards this. Um, in a way,

it's funny. We we you know Trump likes

to say 12-day war and it's been one war

you know since he pulled out of that

nuclear agreement. It's been like a slow

motion series of events that led in this

direction.

>> Begins with economic war begins with

sanctions.

>> Maximum Yeah, exactly. So you pull out

of the Iran nuclear deal. You go to

maximum pressure sanctions. You

assassinate the Kam Solommani. Those are

all things that happened in Trump's

first term. Uh couldn't get him all the

way to to bombing Iran itself. Biden

clearly and I've been very critical as

you know of Biden's Middle East policy

on Gaza. He was clearly not keen to go

allin with Iran on a regional war. Um

maybe you know he was supportive of

going after the Iranian proxy groups.

Not this. Then Trump comes back and you

know they they they they do the nuclear

strike. But I think you're right. I

think the Israeli saw the Venezuela

operation. Oh, he's getting more

comfortable with this and he's getting

comfortable taking it to regime change.

Um and they see and this is where that

you know people the the continued use of

military force without any congressional

authorization is connected to this

because it's like okay there's a

president and Donald Trump who is

willing to just bomb countries and and

take huge risks absent any congressional

debate or discussion. Um I mean we we

dealt with this in Obama years. You must

inhabit the scenario of a war. If Donald

Trump had tried to prepare the American

people for this, they would have said

no. You know, if he had gone out and

given a series of speeches, now is the

time we must remove the Iranian regime,

it wouldn't have worked. And so I I

think you're right. This this kind of

vain glorious, I'm Donald Trump. I will

slay all the dragons. You know, we've

had these grievances with Madura, with

Kam, with the Cuban regime. I'm going to

remove all of them. You know, I think

that there's a vanity to that that

Israel and some of the hawks in this

country saw. and they went to him

knowing that he was reticent, you know,

to kind of break from his base this much

and do this, but they appealed to

something bigger than his short-term

political instincts, which is this will

make you an historic figure. Um, and and

I think BB Netanyahu has wanted to get

an American president to do this since,

you know, at least when I was in

government, and he has. So, one thing

that I think is important in that story

you just laid out is also there's been a

learning about Iran that has been

successive. So, America pulled out of

the nuclear deal, added the maximum

pressure sanctions. Iran wasn't able to

do very much about that. There was the

assassination of Solammani. There was no

significant reprisal for that. You saw

Israel decapitate Hezbollah. You saw the

uh then bombing of the Iranian nuclear

sites. And I do think something that has

been significant here is a growing sense

that Iran was not as fearsome as was

believed and did not have the capacity

to strike back as had been believed, but

that you could do this at low cost,

which was not what people thought

before.

This drives me a little crazy because I

think it's true, but you know, let's

just take Netanyahu. Um, the argument

was always that they're 10 feet tall,

that, you know, they're absolute maniacs

who are on the precipice of a nuclear

weapon and they've built this massive

axis that is coming for us. And and I

never believed that. I I never believed

that Iran was as as all powerful and I I

certainly never believed that they had

offensive you know that they were going

to launch some preemptive war against

Israel you know um they they were

interested in regime survival. Um that

was always my assessment and that even

you know some of the proxy groups were

meant you know the Iranian doctrine was

keep this out of Iran you know keep the

conflicts in Iraq and Lebanon. Um, so

part of what used to drive me crazy

about the hawkish uh prescriptions on

Iran from inside Washington and Israel

is that either argument led to war. If

Iran is really powerful, we must take

them out because, you know, they must be

stopped because they're on the precipice

of doing something or they're weak so we

can take them out. And and look, I I do

think it's bear saying first of all that

uh we should have a mindset that war is

bad and should be avoided. Um that that

should be a a legal and values

proposition that that that there are

preferable outcomes uh to to to war

itself. The other problem I have with

this, Ezra, is there's an incredible

short-term thinking about this because

you're also sending the message that,

okay, Iran was in a nuclear deal with

the United States. They were complying

with that nuclear deal and they then got

bombed. Um, whatever Iranian regime

emerges from this, I think, is very

likely to want nuclear weapons. So, this

doesn't happen. If you're sitting in

Riad or even Dubai and Abu Dhabi right

now, you're thinking, well, the

Americans are my security guaranter and

look at what we just got out of that

security guarantee. Like, we got a war

that they launched uh pretty much I

don't buy that the Saudis were pushing

for this. By the way, I I I I saw them

deny that report and um I think they

were very reticent about this. Um why

wouldn't they get nuclear weapons now?

It's like, well, we we can't uh, you

know, at the end of the day, the

Americans are are kind of willing to

play with our security, you know, or dep

prioritize it as against Israel's

security. Um, other would be

proliferators uh, are going to think,

you know, look at North Korea versus

Iran. And so there's these second order

effects, right? And one of them is

nuclear proliferation. um where the the

consequences might not be manifest next

year, but I don't know, five years from

now, I I I don't think that this kind of

action will have made us safer. I'd much

rather, you know, if you actually

believe in not nuclear

non-prololiferation,

it's much better to to have that be

something you fortify diplomatically

than than you just remove a regime

because it's weak.

>> I want to pick up on what you just said

about the Saudis. So there was a

Washington Post report that

>> cited at least four sources that had

knowledge of the conversations and

negotiations. What it basically said was

that in public Saudi Arabia has been

against this has denied it use of their

bases. In private uh Muhammad bin Salman

and top people in the Saudi government

have been privately pushing Trump to

act. This is something that you know if

you've been around these issues for a

while, you've heard a lot about. the

Israelis talk all the time about how

nobody wants

>> the Iranian government gone like Saudi

Arabia. So you don't buy that that is

what was happening?

>> I'm skeptical of it because I was

hearing different things. Um you know I

certainly uh you saw Qatar, Turkey and

Egypt um along with Oman obviously uh

trying to avert this outcome. The Egypt

thing was interesting to me because the

idea that Egypt would take that position

without Saudi Arabia, you know, as a

chief chief sponsor um supporting them

in that um makes me uh question it. You

also see in Saudi foreign policy, you

saw Rapro with Iran uh in the last few

years. I think Muhammad bin Salman, who

I've been hugely critical of. So this is

um anybody who's listened to me over the

years, I have no, you know, love for

that government. Um but I think, you

know, he's principally interested in

stability. Now here what I think is

quite possible is they were reticent of

this. Um they don't like instability of

this scale in their region. Um they

don't like the potential disruptions

obviously to uh energy infrastructure.

But when they see an inevitability to

it, they may have kind of come around

and been like okay like we'll talk to

you guys about this. You know they I

think they're the most likely scenario

is that they're a bit ambivalent. Um

because again like their uh their

security paradigm is is is stability,

stability, stability and this is you

know doesn't feel a lot like stability.

>> I'm not saying this is the biggest issue

in in this moment but the

>> centrality of Israel in the operation

has raised some concerns for me about

what this is going to mean for

anti-semitism. you see the amount of

talk on the MAGA right but but elsewhere

as well that you know Israel's leverage

over Donald Trump or that you know this

is all just some kind of uh Israeli

plot. I I wonder a bit about the there

are many ways which Netanyahu looks to

me to be gambling. Yes.

>> For short-term position

>> over the long-term sustainability of

both Israel's political position of

Israel's political position in America,

>> but but also just the generalized

view of the world at a time of very very

sharply rising anti-semitism about what

is going on here. Uh, I don't know how

it nets out or what it ends up meaning,

but

it certainly has me nervous.

>> It it it has it has me nervous, too. And

and there's two aspects to that. I mean,

the the the one is in the region and and

one is here. I'd just say briefly in the

region, like I was critical of the

Abraham Accords at the time, and I was a

bit of outlier to say the least about

that. Um because I you know Donald Trump

framed this as a big peace deal you know

uh when in fact it didn't resolve any of

the conflicts in the region and look at

what's happened since I you know it it's

been much more violent and if you talk

to people in the region they see that oh

wait a second this has all been about

Israeli hijgemony in this region um and

that is making the Arab states who were

prepared certainly to live with Israel I

didn't think Saudi Arabia like you know

had any threat to pose to Israel

um but they're increasingly concerned

about a dynamic where there's this

degree of freedom of action for Israel.

So um over what does that look like? How

does that evolve into in the long term

in the region? I think here you're right

it I I really worry about this because

look, this is not me saying Israel

pushed Donald Trump to do this. BB Nao

went out I think yesterday and said I

wanted this to happen for 40 years and

finally Trump did it you know and he's

doing it with us too but the US used to

be very careful not to do joint military

operations with Israel in part for this

reason

this is a huge I mean people need to

think about this like it was some it was

you know just to do joint exercises you

know was something people calibrated

carefully because we didn't want to make

it look like you know if if that there's

that Israel and the United States are

one and the same um for for reasons that

go in both directions. But here's the

thing is Americans are looking at this

and they're seeing um uh that we are in

a war that seems like it's something

Israel wanted us to do. Seems like the

the benefits acrew mostly to Israel. Um

you know the the the ballistic missile

program does not pose a threat to the

United States. There is no ICBM from

Iran that can reach the United States.

So, so a lot of what we're doing is

removing threats uh to Israel. If it

goes poorly, who's going to get blamed?

You know, um I I think that that some of

that anger will go in the direction of

Israel. And I think it's important for

us to talk about this because when when

there's not debate and discussion about

about it, it migrates to the darker

corners, right? Um and you're seeing

that certainly in MAGA. Well, I think

one reason this has fed conspiracies is

it has felt to many people like such a

almost inexplicable break from how Trump

sold himself.

>> Yeah.

>> So, I mean, you have, you know, back in

2023, Trump saying, "These globalists

want to squander all of America's

strength, blood, and treasure, chasing

monsters, and fandoms overseas while

keeping us distracted from the havoc

they're creating here at home." Very on

point. Uh JD Vance writes a Wall Street

Journal oped that year titled Trump's

best foreign policy not starting any

wars. Tulsi Gabbard of course sells no

war with Iran t-shirts.

Um

now you have Trump kind of start more as

certainly conflicts engagements like

left and right. Accordius Trump has now

authorized more military strikes in 2025

alone than Biden did in all four years.

So I I think for a lot of people there

has been this how do you reconcile

both Trump and the movement that was

around him, right? All the people

advising him with what we're seeing now.

I got asked over the weekend by

somebody, you know, what was a faction

inside the White House that wanted this.

>> Yeah.

>> And I found it actually hard to answer

that question. We have not seen a lot of

reporting saying Marco Rubio wanted this

to happen.

>> You know, JD Vance appears to have not.

Uh yeah,

>> instead we're talking about Israel and

Lindsey Graham who's not that

influential anymore. Muhammad bin

Salman. Maybe it I think a lot of people

have been very confused with how to like

how to explain Trump himself taking this

risk.

>> I had the same mental exercise, Ezra.

And let's just go through it. If you

look at all these polls, this is wildly

politically unpopular. And by the way,

that continues to hold even though the

Supreme Leader got killed. and the

supreme leader being killed will be the

high watermark of this operation. You

know, um there's not another person that

you can kill that Trump can say is a

head on a pike, right? Then if you look

at the people that want to inherit MAGA,

right, who who are looking ahead at the

Republican party, um JD Vance seems to

want to have very little to do with

this. Tucker Carlson is railing against

this. Um you know, the C Bannons of the

world are not enthusiastic about this.

Um, the Republican party is not going in

this direction. Um, so this is not

something that Trump is doing because

it's going to be wildly popular.

>> Military didn't want it. Joint Chiefs of

Staff, the

>> Joint Chiefs of Staff was clearly

putting out, leaking out, you know, that

they didn't want to do this. Um, Marco

Rubio is much more focused on this

hemisphere, you know, Venezuela and

Cuba, which they're trying to, you know,

strangle through with maximum pressure.

Um, the Democratic Party is, you know,

not for this and particularly the people

anticipating the future of the

Democratic Party. who is for this and it

it's a very small set of constituents.

it is basically Israel and then it is

kind of hardline you know uh

longstanding hawks uh in Congress or in

kind of the national security

establishment by the way the people that

Trump said he didn't like for this you

>> John John Balden so he's exactly you

know trying to to persecute is out there

defending it

>> so so it is hard to look at this and not

>> so wasn't part of the reason he talked

about getting rid of John Bolton that

he's like John Bolton always wanted me

to attack Iran

>> Iran Iran right and It is hard to not

conclude that that that BB Netanyahu and

Israel's kind of push for this was

determinative in some way because again

like the the only appeal to Trump that

made any sense is is kind of the one you

made earlier where you become a historic

figure. You know, you finally I mean I

do think there's a part of him that's

just like these governments have been a

pain in the ass for decades, right? Cuba

since the 59 revolution, Iran since the

79 revolution, you know, Venezuela since

the Shaveista revolution, I'm going to

be the one who finally settles all these

scores. Like there's some of that that

is separate from Israel. Um, but it is

hard to not conclude that um if Israel

wasn't, put it this way, Ezra, take the

counterfactual, the Israeli government

was not pushing for this, would it have

happened?

I want to talk about the ways in which

this might not remain limited in the way

Donald Trump has either promised a

country or I think promised himself. So

I see this as following from the 12-day

bombing some months ago, it turned out

that didn't do enough. And when it was

clear that Iran was racing forward with

ballistic missiles, reconstituting a

nuclear program that probably was not

obliterated in the way Donald Trump had

initially said it was. And so we were

now involved and Iran was defying him.

He It wasn't just that it was

obliterated. That obliteration was a

kind of command from him to them that

that was gone. They weren't giving up

enough at the negotiating table. And and

also, and I think this was meaningful to

to to Trump on some level, uh was now

slaughtering um its own people. You

know, he didn't like that either. I want

to give him credit for some humanitarian

impulse potentially here.

So now we're involved even more so. Now

we have kinetically destroyed

>> much of the regime and and its power.

>> But a lot could spin out of control

here.

>> So I am very skeptical

that the limit Trump seems to think he

has put on this is stable. And I'm

curious as somebody with more experience

here than than I have what you think of

it. I think you're right. And um the

Israelis have uh this it's not a

doctrine, but essentially this

terminology. It's called mowing the

lawn. Have you heard this? Um

>> which is and again I I hate even using

phrases like this when it comes to war

and human beings, but essentially the

mowing the lawn strategy is that if

there's a place that poses a threat, uh

you occasionally just kind of go in and

and b cut the grass. you you bomb the

threat periodically and and obviously

like Lebanon would be a perfect case of

where the Israelis pursued that.

>> Well, they always said this about Hamas.

How did that ultimately work out

>> exactly? And there is a risk like this

why I say we we have been at war with

like the idea that there was something

called the 12-day war and now there's a

different war. No, no. Like that's not

how these things work. Like once you

bomb a country um you know, you're

bringing this forever war paradigm uh to

it. And so I think it is quite possible

that, you know, in the same way that the

12-day war was the end of the story, if

Trump, you know, stops bombing Iran in a

week, two weeks, three weeks, um, that

we're back doing that in a few months,

um, because something happened that we

don't like, and then you start to get

massacres in the streets of Iran, or you

start to get refugee outflows or you

start to continue to see kind of ways of

random attacks at the Gulf. Are we

really going to do nothing? But then if

we're going getting back and back in,

you know, then we're, you know, getting

pulled into quicksand. We are

implicated. You know, we are involved. I

mean, the the common thread to this

conversation, Ezra, is like we need to

just get this short-term thinking that

that there such a thing as 12-day wars

or that you solve a problem when you

kill the leader. Like that that's not

how any of this goes. I think it is

genuinely striking and a break with

certainly the recent past how

little public deliberation there is over

quite major American foreign policy

actions. And

you know the Bush administration did lie

its way into war with Iraq, but it did

also spend a long time trying to

persuade the country that war with Iraq

was worth doing. and we debated how

many, you know, how much of the American

military it would take. What does it

mean to be entering into these kinds of

commitments, these kinds of projects,

these kinds of risks

without really any public debate, any

significant public or congressional

deliberation of what might happen? You

don't have a bunch of members of the

military repeatedly going to Congress

and and and going through scenarios.

>> I don't want to

place everything here on process being

poor, but it's but there's a reason that

the public and Congress are consulted

because if it ends up requiring more

Yes.

>> engagement, then you actually need that

support.

>> No, I I think process is is related to

outcome. And if you can't make a case to

the American people to sway public

opinion in the direction of a war or

make a case to Congress, I mean, the

single most important thing you could do

to keep America out of more wars is

actually require Congress to take a vote

because they're not going to vote for

it. um given the where public opinion

has done on this. And so I think it's

incredibly corrosive to democracy to

have this kind of loop of of conflict

that is increasingly sidelining Congress

and public opinion entirely. Um I I also

think there's something even more

dangerous, Ezra, which is uh

we keep you know I know a lot of people

are thinking

when are the you know when are we going

to know how bad it's going to get with

Trump? Like what if the things that you

fear are already happening? Like we

already have a president who clearly

came back into office wanting the

military to be more directly responsive

to him him than it was in the first term

when the military leadership and even

some of the Pentagon leadership stood up

to him more and more. We have seen him,

you know, purge the top of the military

general officers. We have seen him

address the general officers and say uh

hey the American cities might be

military training grounds. Now we've

seen him

um within a matter of weeks

and undertake multiple military I'll

just give you a few. We bombed Nigeria

on Christmas Day. Uh we were blowing up

boats in the Caribbean on totally false

pretenses that it had something to do

with like drug trafficking in the United

States uh and potentially committed war

crimes. We abducted the leader of

Venezuela. We now just killed the

supreme leader of Iran and are trying to

topple that regime. Or maybe we're not.

Um these are all things that have

happened within 3 months, right? And at

the same time, we see uh the Department

of War telling Anthropic, an AI company,

that you will be banned from any

business of the government if the

Pentagon can't ignore your terms of

service against mass surveillance of

Americans. And where I'm going with this

is the ultimate guardrail in democracy

is supposed to be the separation between

the president and kind of the military

as an institution. And if the military

of an institution can just can directly

serve the interest of Donald Trump with

no public debate about what it's doing,

no congressional votes on what it's

doing, how many more countries are going

to bomb and what is that military going

to end up doing in the United States,

you know, if he invokes the Insurrection

Act? And that's not to impug the

military, that's to impugn Trump is

taking this. So I think the darker

scenarios, it's not just process nerds

like we need to have authorizations for

use of military force and you know we

need briefings to Congress. It's no. Is

the military an institution that just

completely serves the whims of the

president or is it an institution that

is apolitical that is equally responsive

to Congress and the president? Uh

because those questions are going to

matter a lot how the next two and 3/4

years of the Trump administration.

>> Although I think it's important to say

it's not that Congress is being defied.

Congress has abdicated.

>> Yes. That's Yes. Yes.

>> Mike Johnson is not out there

complaining. he is supporting this. I

mean there are many ways in which Trump

is a disruptive break with the past but

the escalation of not going to Congress

for quite dangerous operations. I mean

that was president in the Obama era. I

mean this is this has been growing for a

very long time.

>> Well the thing that that that that Obama

probably you know gets the most grief

for in his foreign policy was the Syria

redline incident. But what was

interesting about that Ezra is you have

this chemical you describe what that is.

>> Yes. So, we have this uh Obama has said

it'd be a red line if uh the Assad

regime uses chemical weapons. Then

there's a massive chemical weapons use.

And we were preparing to bomb Syria. We

were I mean I was in meetings. I thought

we were going to bomb Syria. Um and you

know going through strike packages, that

kind of stuff. And then um you know

Obama makes this decision essentially to

say I'm I'm going to put this to a vote

in Congress. I'm not going to go to war

with Syria unless Congress votes to

authorize it. And almost immediately the

support for that begins to evaporate in

Congress. Even people like Marco Rubio

who are hawks would not vote uh to

authorize use of military force in

Syria. And Obama's point was if

Congress, the representatives of the

people as envisioned under our

constitutional system, don't want to get

us into another war with Syria and be

responsible for the consequences of

whatever happens, then we shouldn't do

it. That's how our system's designed.

Now, a lot of people have, you know,

pointed out that, you know, that was we

should have done more to stop Assad and

and that's, you know, I I agree. I'm

sympathetic to all those arguments, but

I'm also sympathetic to Obama's

argument, which is if people don't want

the war, we don't have to fight it. And

part of what Trump was tapping into in

his campaigns was that the gap between

elites, in particularly national

security elites, and public opinion. And

it is a crazy gap, Ezra. I've lived at

the precipice of it. like the

conversations and the strategies in both

parties of national security elites

versus what the American people want

their government to be focused on is a

deeply unhealthy gap. And all Trump has

done is okay, that establishment is no

longer there. It's just him. It's like

all of American exceptionalism, all of

the apparatus of American power, this

this, you know, I called it the blob,

whatever you want to call it, uh that

this edifice is now just in one man's

head, in one man's hands. And that's

instead of solving the problem he said

he was running to fix, he's made it

worse cuz it's just up to Donald Trump.

Now,

>> this gets to the question of whether

international law still exists in any

meaningful no way. It does not.

What does that mean?

>> It means it it implies in no way to the

United States of America at least. Uh we

we are completely ignoring it. There was

no like they don't even I mean here's

how it doesn't exist. In the past when

the United States would do things that

let's just say stretch the boundaries of

international law, you would still show

up and make a case. You know, here's why

this was an imminent threat or here, you

know, they don't even bother. And if you

look at even

because the the act of going to war, you

know, violates international law. If you

cannot demonstrate that there was an

imminent threat, that you're acting in

some form of of self-defense or that you

have to get UN sanction, you know, UN

Security Council approval. Um, absent

those things, uh, you're violating

international law. But even in the

conduct of war, you know, um if if the

United States is currently sanctioning

the International Criminal Court, which

is the kind of preeminent body that is

enforcing the laws of of war, what

message does that send, you know, about

the conduct of war? Um cuz we're doing

that because they, you know, uh tried

tried to indict uh BB Netanyahu for for

war crimes. But if you're basically

saying that that none of the laws apply

to us,

um at a certain point, Russia and China

say, "Well, then they don't apply to us

either." And if international law on the

most important matters of war and peace

and the conduct of war, whether to go to

war and how you fight a war, if those

laws don't apply to the any of the big

powers, how do they apply to anybody?

I've wondered how much the reaction from

some of our allies who you might have

thought of as more committed to

international law has actually reflected

a collective recognition that it is

gone. So Mark Carney in Canada was very

very supportive of Trump strikes. You

had you know real support from from

Australia. Germany was pretty square

behind us. And I think this all reflects

some of their feelings about the Iranian

regime. But I have been struck

>> Yeah.

>> by the complete absence of outcry from

countries that I think you know part of

their power has come from commitment to

these institutions that maintain uh a

kind of collective or multilateral

approach to to these questions. What

have you made of that?

>> I've been struck by it too. Um I think

part of what Trump counts on if is if

the people I'm taking out are, you know,

not don't have a lot of friends. Um I

have more room, right? if it's Maduro,

if it's Iranian regime. I'd say I'm very

disappointed in it though. Um Mark

Carney um I was one of many people that

thought his speech at Davos was

important and interesting and kind of

reflective of what's happening um and

also kind of pointed a path to some

emergence of something on the other end

of this that essentially if the middle

powers the kind of more responsible um

countries in the world that still follow

at least some international laws and

want some norms uh around conflict and

and other things um if they began to

kind of stitch together maybe that could

be a place that the United States could

kind of rejoin on the back end of Trump.

If Mark Carney is going to carve this

out, though, if he's essentially going

to say, "We need rules on trade, but if

you, you know, bomb Iran, go for it." I

think it hugely undermines Mark Carney's

own argument, like he has to be willing,

you know, it just makes it seem cynical.

It makes it seem like all he's really

concerned about is trade, you know, or

or all I'm concerned about is Greenland

because it's European territory, right?

I and I've taken a you can attest that

I've taken a lot of grief for this over

the years. But I just believe that if we

think that international law and norms

are important, they really have to apply

universally. Like we can't just say that

like well they don't apply to Iran,

Cuba, and Venezuela because we don't

like them. You know, the the the United

States built this system after World War

II because we recognize that if you

don't constrain everybody, you are going

to have a repeat of what happened in

World War I and World War II. You start

to create carveouts. People start to

move into those carveouts and there's

cycles of conflict that lead ultimately

to a world war. I think people need to

inhabit the reality that we're moving

into more than they are. There are no

constraints from international law

anymore. There is a rampant trend of

nationalism in the world. There are

leaders like Donald Trump in the United

States, Xiinping in China, Vladimir

Putin in Russia, BB Netanyao in Israel,

Narendra Modi in India, Taip Eragon in

Turkey. These are nationalists.

Nationalism absent international law

always leads to more war and those wars

beget more wars.

>> Let me strongman the the other side of

the case here which is international

law. The international law that allowed

Iran to slaughter his own people to

repress them to fund terrorist proxies

you know all throughout the region.

You're you're saying that international

law was should have restrained Israel

and America against a country that had

for decades now made one of its rallying

slogans death to Israel and death to

America and in fact was funding players

who wanted to do just that. that that

one of the critiques you'll hear from,

you know, the critics here of of

international law is that international

law has been used as a shield by,

you know, rogue regimes, regimes that do

not uh follow its dictates in all manner

of ways, but then hide behind it when

they face the consequences that they are

bringing down upon themselves.

>> I I guess I'd say first and foremost,

Iran has paid consequences. We worked on

the Iran nuclear deal for seven years.

And the reason I say seven years is that

for several years at the beginning of

the Obama administration, we built a

multilateral sanctions framework around

Iran based on the fact that they were

violating the nuclear non-proliferation

treaty, international law. Like so we

didn't say, "Oh, it's fine. You can

violate the international law." We said

no, we going to we got UN Security

Council resolutions that became the

basis of a maximum pressure campaign in

the Obama administration, but it was

meant to leverage a change of behavior

from the Iranians. You have to kind of

come into compliance with international

law via nuclear deal in which you are

committing to never build a nuclear

weapon. You are submitting to intense

monitoring and verification of a nuclear

program. By the way, like we still had

other sanctions on them over their

support for proxies. I don't like what

goes on inside a lot of countries in the

world. There's something peculiar

that we are normalizing the idea that

that is sufficient basis to go to war in

those countries. We don't like it when

Vladimir Putin does it. when Vladimir

Putin says, "Hey, the elected president

of Ukraine was ousted um in a protest

movement in 2014."

Uh in part by people that were funded by

the National Endowment for Democracy, I

don't agree with that narrative. Um but

how can we say that Vladimir Putin does

not have the right to invade that

country? But if we see things that we

don't like inside of other countries, we

have the right to do that. Um I I I I I

and I think what people see is that if

if you truly believe in, you know, human

rights, then you have to apply that

normative framework across the board,

you know, and and a lot of the very same

people that are suddenly human rights

advocates when it comes to what's

happening inside of Iran have nothing to

say about what's happening in the West

Bank right now. had nothing to say when

Jamal Kosigible was chopped up in uh the

Saudi consulate inside of Turkey. Have

nothing to say about the fact that uh

LCI, the president of Egypt, has 60,000

people uh who are political prisoners

suffering horrific treatment. So, you

either have to be universal and

consistent or I have a really hard time

listening to your argument.

I have seen a lot of Democrats and to

some degree I think the international

response too then somewhat paralyzed

between their legitimate loathing of the

Iranian government

and

their dislike distaste for the process

of violation of international law the

absence of public deliberation or

congressional approval but I think it

has created a kind of muddle in their

response right are they saying this

should have done. It's a good thing that

it happened, but they don't like that it

happened. Are they saying that uh the

only problem with it was poor process?

If Trump had gone to Congress, maybe

they would have given him the authority

to do it. How do you think Democrats

should respond to this? Because right

now, I've seen many of the leadership

really focusing not on was this a right

or wrong thing to do, but was the

process that led to it the right or

wrong process.

>> Yeah. They're saying all the things that

you said and I have a huge problem with

this. Uh because ultimately people are

not that interested in the process. If

someone who doesn't follow this super

closely hears a Democratic leader like

Chuck Schumer saying coming out of a

briefing about the potential war in Iran

that feels imminent and he says they

have to make their case more or

something that what does that sound

like? It sounds like a dodge. What do

you actually believe as a political

party? You know, I I was talking to a

friend of mine from the OB we do this

thing on our Obama group text Ezra which

wouldn't surprise you which is said

imagine if right so imagine if President

Obama announced a war on Iran from uh a

vacation property in the middle of the

night uh on a social media post made

casual remarks about the fact that

Americans are going to die. It is what

it is. And then within like two days

you're already seeing American

casualties, American planes falling out

of the sky, huge global economic

disruptions. The Republican party would

have been absolutely unified. And you

know, part of the reason Obama had so

little room for maneuver is that that

they as a political party were able to

make an argument against whatever the

thing that Obama was doing. The

Democratic party doesn't understand that

it's not enough to just say we want a

process vote or a procedural vote. We're

going to you support the Ro Kana Thomas

Massie resolution that most Americans

have no idea what that is, right? I

mean, I support it, but it's not going

to do anything. And and and I think most

Americans don't know that that it's it's

a vote on whether or not Congress has to

authorize something that has already

happened. It just makes you look, you

know, and again, this I'm totally

supportive of that effort. This is not a

criticism of Roan Thomas Massie, but the

point is is that like are you for this

or against it? And if you're against it,

why are you not all out saying that this

is reckless, that this is a betrayal of

what Donald Trump said when he ran for

president, that we don't need more wars,

that, you know, why are we spending

money? Uh the price tag of this is going

to be in the tens of billions. That's

money that could pay for the ACA

subsidies, you know. Yeah. At least that

that that there's your healthcare

subsidies right now. Our healthcare

subsidies are being spent on a war in in

Iran. Like Donald Trump is not, you

know, looking after your interest. He's

looking after some kind of grandiose

ambitions in the Middle East. This is a

very easy political case to make, Ezra.

Like this is the easiest thing in the

world that we should be nation building

at home, not abroad. You know, I

>> I saw this after Maduro. I think it

reflected what happened both in the

run-up and immediate aftermath of the

war in in in Iraq, which is that I think

that there is a difficulty people have.

Maybe they would not themselves go to

war for this. Maybe they would not have

supported a war for something like this.

But when it is against

a brutal dictator,

on what grounds are you opposing it,

right? Is opposing it supporting the

continuation of the regime. And I think

that's where a lot of the Democrats

you're talking about are getting caught

or some of the world leaders are talking

about are getting caught. So, you know,

aside from, you know, we can spend money

in one place versus another. I I I think

it's this quite deep question of what is

the difference between

how do people negotiate and how do they

argue against these wars that are

partially

demanded or justified

on humanitarian grounds. I mean the

Iranian regime as you mentioned just

killed thousands or maybe tens of

thousands of their own people. There

were you know Iranians marching in the

streets and it was not safe for them to

to to do so.

I I sort of have my answer to this, but

I'm curious for yours.

>> I think my answer to this is that war

itself

um is something to be avoided and and

and that may seem like a you know, you

know, obvious point, but it's not like

we I mean to to be a little you know,

provocative on this too. Um I I I think

that post 911

because we've we've normalized

so much use of military action. Um

because I could argue Ezra, it is

completely insane that we're sitting

here and having a conversation about

like um that if we don't bomb a regime

that we're therefore keeping it in

power. But does it report to us, you

know? Um, and I think what Americans

kind of intuitively get better than

their political elites, their national

security elites, and and even some of

the kind of media conversation in this

is they get this. They get that war is

terrible. War has risks. That um I even

if it's well-intentioned on paper, uh it

leads to bad outcomes for both the

Americans who have to fight it, the

American taxpayers to pay for it, and

pretty much the people on the other end

of the war that you saying you're trying

to help. We're trying to help the

Iraqis. We're trying to help the

Afghans. We're trying to help help the

Libyans. Now we're trying to help the

Iranians. And I guess the provocative

thing I want to say too is that this

seems to happen when the countries in

question are not are brown. Like I I

think there's a a a a dehumanization

since 9/11 where it's like oh look at

this Middle East the next Middle Eastern

country up that the regime does

something we don't like. We're going to

go and just bomb them. I mean, we

killed, if reports are accurate, some

either the US or Israel, over a hundred

girls at a school like, and it's not

really a big story in the United States.

And I I actually think to to, you know,

to tie this back home, like I don't

think that that mentality, that othering

of of people who are on the other side

of the world after 9/11, I think that

othering has come home. I I I think that

the capacity to have the mass

deportation campaign that is generally

targeting brown and black people is kind

of tied to this, you know,

dehumanization and desensitization of

violence. Uh that that we see in our

foreign policy like post 911, we

otherred a lot of populations. Um and if

you if you watch I mean I know we're

going a little far field, but I I think

this is really relevant. I noticed in

the Obama administration like the

othering on Fox, you know, that was once

just about Middle Eastern terrorists and

but then it's about the people crossing

the southern border and then and and it

comes one big other, you know, and so I

think we h I think it's a it's a pretty

it should be seen as a pretty extremist

proposition that if the United States

doesn't go to war with some government

in the Middle East, we're somehow

condoning everything. I was really mad

about the Jamal Kosogi thing. At no

point did I think we should bomb you

know Muhammad bin Salman for that.

>> I agree with a lot of that and I want to

offer maybe one other thing that I think

has been threaded through our

conversation and and it's sort of my

answer to to this question which is war

is inherently uncontrollable.

>> Yeah.

>> That the the

fantasy that we are always offered at

the beginning is that we can choose what

it is we are going to do. that we can

control the situation we are going to

create.

>> And as we have developed even more

precision weapons and more air power and

more drones and more ability to wage war

at a distance, the

seduction of that control for leaders

and and for others has become all the

more potent. But that the history of

this is we do not control it. And as you

mentioned with Libya, with Afghanistan,

with with Iraq,

We might think we are helping the

people, but if we set off a civil war,

you could easily have 70,000, 100,000,

200,000, 300,000 people die in that war.

>> And we have shown no interest in number

one, saying we will occupy the country

to make sure that doesn't happen. And

nor, as we learned in Iraq, even if we

do decide to occupy the country, can we

keep that from happening? We I mean,

Donald Trump was one of the people who

started trying to withdraw us from

Afghanistan, which then completed in the

Biden administration. again, the

inability over a very long time to

control the outcome of something like

this, even when we were willing to put

much more of our blood and treasure into

controlling it. And so to to me, one of

the like the great lie of war is that

you will get what you want out of it.

>> Yeah.

>> Among the many things that scares me so

much about Trump is how bllythe he is

with that.

>> Yeah. You don't feel like this has c

cost him any sleep at all. And if it

goes badly, I think he will walk away

and say, "Well, I gave you Iranians your

chance. You didn't take it or you didn't

succeed in taking it."

>> Yeah.

Well, yes, I think you're exactly right.

I mean, one thing I, you know, became

very aware of over 8 years in the White

House, but also in this whole post 911

period, is that the US military can

destroy anything, right? It can take out

any target set that it has. Um, but it

cannot engineer the politics of other

countries or build what comes after the

thing that is destroyed. We had 150,000

troops in Iraq and we couldn't stop

violence. And look, you know who knows

that? Um, the Iranian Revolutionary

Guard Corps colonel who's a total

hardliner right now, knows that

Americans are going to lose interest in

this. You know, knows that if we weather

this, you know, on the back end, we can

potentially do what we want. Um and and

and there's a callousness in the way

that Trump has done this and precisely

because I think war is so uncertain and

the cost of war is paid so

overwhelmingly by ordinary people. Um

one of the reasons I I would like to see

Democrats or anybody frankly who's

concerned about Trump be more outspoken

now is I think sometimes they are are

reticent to speak out because what if it

goes well? It's not just that the

Iranian regime is bad. said if it goes

well then they'll say you know you were

against this thing. I'm sorry. I'm

against this even if it has the better

case scenario because we need to if you

can't take a position on something as

fundamental as whether going to war when

you don't have to is is a good thing

then then what's the point of all this

right we could have achieved our

objectives on the nuclear issue through

negotiations um we we chose to bomb this

country instead um so I think that

precisely because war can lead to such

terrible outcomes you have to be willing

to take a stance against war itself

unless it is absolutely necessary. Uh

and this certainly didn't meet that

test.

>> I think that is a place to end. What was

our final question? What are a few books

you'd recommend to the audience?

>> Yeah, I uh so a few things. Um I mean on

this last question uh from the ruins of

empire by pankage Mishra um is a really

excellent kind of intellectual history

of um for lack of a better way of

putting it you know people global south

or people in the decolonized spaces um

in the 20th century uh coming up with

alternatives to uh western hegemony um

then uh I personally as someone who's

been trying to make sense of what it's

like to live in a collapsing liberal

order. Um, the world of yesterday by

Stefan Schwag. Uh, I found myself

reading twice since Trump's election,

but it's this just haunting and

beautiful um, contemporaneous uh, you

know, Stefan Swag was a great Austrian

writer writing this uh, writing in the

midst of World War II, his kind of life

story, but it's really about the

collapse of the liberal uh, order in

Europe. And then lastly, a book I read

uh very recently, this last few days, uh

it's called um Travelers in the Third

Reich by Julia Boyd. And what she did is

she found

letters uh journals uh other

contemporaneous accounts of of basically

British and Americans visiting Nazi

Germany and and so what were their

impressions?

um are did they see and you know spoiler

alert way too many of them did not see

how bad this was going to be or were

sympathetic and all those things I think

of course are are unfortunately relevant

to today.

>> Ben Rhodess thank you very much.

>> Thanks Ezra.