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Minute By Minute Of What Happens If A Nuclear Bomb Hits & How To Survive It!

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Minute By Minute Of What Happens If A Nuclear Bomb Hits & How To Survive It!

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3471 segments

0:00

No matter how nuclear war begins, it

0:03

ends in 72 minutes and 5 billion people

0:08

would be dead. Do you think there will

0:10

be a nuclear war? So, I've interviewed

0:12

former secretaries of defense, the

0:14

former nuclear sub commander, the Secret

0:17

Service, and what I learned was

0:20

oh my god. Annie Jacobsen, investigative

0:23

researcher and writer who specializes in

0:25

uncovering the world's biggest secrets.

0:28

We are one misunderstanding away from

0:30

nuclear apocalypse. And yet you have

0:33

presidents threatening nuclear war. In

0:35

fact, the president of the United States

0:37

doesn't need to ask anyone to launch a

0:39

nuclear missile.

0:40

It makes me realize how important the

0:41

decision to pick our leaders is. Nothing

0:43

could be more important. Could you play

0:45

out a scenario where nuclear war broke

0:47

out?

0:47

Yes, and I can describe in painstaking

0:51

horrific detail precisely what happens.

0:53

So,

0:57

but after nuclear war, the survivors

1:00

would be forced to live underground and

1:02

envy the dead.

1:04

Annie,

1:05

is there anyone you interviewed that

1:06

brought you to tears? Yes, I met a woman

1:09

who was a survivor of the Nagasaki bomb,

1:11

and I haven't written about this yet.

1:14

But someone I interviewed and someone

1:16

that meant a lot to me wired that

1:19

nuclear weapon that was dropped on

1:21

Nagasaki.

1:23

Can you speak about the impact that it

1:25

had on both those individuals? Mhm, and

1:27

it's horrifying.

1:30

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1:32

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1:54

episode.

1:59

Annie,

2:00

you wrote this book about nuclear war

2:02

and published it in March 2024.

2:06

The timing

2:08

of this book seems to be a little bit

2:12

coincidental when I

2:14

or not, when I look at what's going on

2:15

in the world at the moment.

2:17

Why did you write a book about nuclear

2:19

war? Mhm. And why did you write it now?

2:23

As an investigative journalist,

2:26

before nuclear war a scenario, I had

2:29

written six

2:30

previous books, all of which are about

2:33

the military and intelligence

2:36

organizations in the United States,

2:37

DARPA, Area 51, always the Pentagon, the

2:40

CIA. That's my That's my beat.

2:43

And think about how many sources I have

2:46

in each book, 100 or more. How many

2:49

covering all the wars, by the way, since

2:52

World War II.

2:53

All these intelligence and military

2:55

programs

2:57

uh intensely kinetic,

2:59

and think of how many people said to me

3:02

with a kind of

3:04

pride, I dedicated my life to preventing

3:08

nuclear World War III. That's always the

3:11

idea in the Defense Department and in

3:13

the CIA. We are there to prevent nuclear

3:16

war. And so, during the previous

3:19

administration,

3:20

former President Trump,

3:22

there was this presidential rhetoric

3:24

going on.

3:26

You may recall fire and fury.

3:29

Trump and the president of North Korea,

3:32

the leader of North Korea, threatening

3:34

this kind of thing, and I, like many,

3:37

I'm sure, began to wonder, my god, what

3:40

if deterrence, another word for

3:43

prevention, fails?

3:46

And that is the question that I put to

3:49

all of those sources in the book, and

3:51

that result is nuclear war a scenario.

3:55

What was your intention?

3:58

I wanted to show in horrific detail

4:03

just how

4:06

horrible, just how apocalyptic nuclear

4:10

war will be.

4:12

Because I think many people have

4:15

forgotten

4:17

or don't know to begin with

4:20

the consequences

4:22

of a nuclear exchange. As I show in the

4:24

book, almost certainly,

4:27

if a nuclear exchange happens, and we're

4:29

talking strategic ballistic missiles, it

4:31

will not stop until the world ends.

4:34

And we are talking about in seconds and

4:36

minutes, not in days and weeks and

4:41

months.

4:42

That is astonishing.

4:45

When did you start writing the book?

4:47

When was the first word written?

4:49

So, probably during COVID was the first

4:52

word written, but keep in mind, my

4:54

reporting on nuclear weapons goes back

4:57

my entire career. My first

5:00

book, Area 51,

5:02

is about a a joint CIA Air Force base

5:06

out there in the Nevada desert inside

5:09

a secret test and training range where

5:12

the United States government used to

5:14

explode nuclear weapons.

5:16

Atmospheric nuclear weapons in the '50s.

5:19

And so, my when I was reporting Area 51,

5:23

I I wound up quite literally, I did not

5:26

intend to, but I wound up interviewing

5:29

the people who armed, wired, and fired

5:34

those nuclear weapons, early Manhattan

5:36

Project members.

5:37

And they That was kind of my B story of

5:40

Area 51.

5:42

And what I learned was like,

5:44

oh my god. And I was also surprised to

5:47

learn that most people didn't even know

5:49

we, the American government, set off 100

5:52

some odd atmospheric nuclear weapons in

5:55

the desert in Nevada testing them.

5:58

So, my reporting, to answer That's a

5:59

long-winded answer of I've been on this

6:02

issue

6:04

peripherally,

6:05

you know, for years, for more than a

6:07

decade, but the idea in this book, the

6:10

word one, as you asked, was like, once I

6:13

understood that nuclear war is a

6:15

sequence,

6:17

it begins the first fraction of a second

6:20

after detection,

6:21

then I could see clearly, oh my god,

6:24

it's a ticking clock scenario.

6:26

Because it just all happens so fast.

6:29

I'll ask that again because So, if you

6:31

started writing the first word of the

6:33

book on nuclear war in COVID, sort of

6:36

2020,

6:37

Mhm.

6:37

2020, roughly? 2021?

6:40

Around there.

6:40

Yeah. 2020, 2021, yeah. Since then,

6:43

things have escalated around the world

6:45

in terms of conflict in a way that I

6:46

imagine you couldn't have forecasted.

6:48

And even it's almost ironic that in the

6:50

month that your book was published,

6:51

Putin moved I think he moved nuclear

6:53

weapons into Belarus, and the rhetoric

6:56

and he started saying that he would use

6:57

them. And if you look at the terminology

6:59

him and his commanders are using towards

7:01

the world, it seems like we're at a

7:03

moment that I haven't seen in my

7:05

lifetime where the subject of nuclear

7:07

war seems to be more real than ever

7:09

before.

7:10

You're absolutely right, and that is

7:12

astonishing because in 2021, when I

7:15

began the interviews,

7:18

people were forthcoming with me, you

7:21

know, as you know from the list of

7:22

sources I've interviewed, former

7:24

secretaries of defense, former nuclear

7:27

sub commander, you know, former STRATCOM

7:30

commander, former FEMA director, former

7:33

cyber chief.

7:35

And a lot of these individuals shared

7:37

with me in 2021 this idea that wow, the

7:41

world has kind of forgotten that the

7:43

nuclear

7:45

threat is always there.

7:47

And so, over the course of reporting and

7:50

writing, you're absolutely right that

7:53

the geopolitical

7:55

temperature of the world has escalated

7:58

to a point that you have not seen in

8:01

your lifetime and I haven't seen in my

8:03

lifetime.

8:05

Setting the stage even more, we talked

8:07

about how possible nuclear war is, but

8:11

one thing I learned from reading your

8:12

book, which actually surprised me,

8:15

was that it doesn't take thousands of

8:17

people to agree on a nuclear war for it

8:19

to begin.

8:20

In the case of the United States, it

8:22

only takes one person to make that

8:23

decision,

8:25

which I find quite unnerving that

8:27

there's one individual

8:29

that can theoretically make the decision

8:32

that would destroy the earth.

8:34

Uh you're absolutely right, and this

8:37

kind of thing is surprising to almost

8:39

everyone. One of the things that I

8:42

strive to do in my reporting is take

8:45

very complex

8:47

science and technology, military issues,

8:51

and simplify them down for the layman,

8:54

just for the average Joe or the average

8:56

Jane. And I do that by interviewing

9:00

the really smart, really knowledgeable

9:03

people on those subjects. I have two

9:07

things going for me, perhaps, as an

9:09

investigative journalist that help in

9:11

conveying a story, is that I'm not a

9:13

scientist, and so, I can ask questions

9:17

that the average person would ask, like,

9:19

really try and help me understand this,

9:22

whatever this is. And then also that I

9:25

have a real interest in

9:27

making what is conveyed to me

9:31

make sense

9:33

to other people in their lives, right?

9:35

So, and also, perhaps, make them

9:38

realize,

9:39

I never even stopped to think about the

9:41

fact, how strange is it that the United

9:43

States president, this is what you learn

9:45

in the book and you're talking about,

9:46

the United States president has sole

9:48

presidential authority to launch a

9:50

nuclear war. What does that mean? It's

9:53

exactly like it sounds. What's so

9:55

interesting is a lot of this stuff, this

9:56

nomenclature that gets thrown at you,

9:58

if you just break it down, it's sole,

10:01

solo,

10:02

presidential, he's the POTUS,

10:05

authority. He doesn't have to ask anyone

10:08

for permission.

10:09

Not the SECDEF, not the Chairman of the

10:11

Joint Chiefs of Staff, not the Congress.

10:14

I love the worried look on your face in

10:15

this moment because it is Once you know

10:19

that,

10:21

you say Well, first you might Google, is

10:23

it really true? And you will get, for

10:26

example, on Reddit, like, that's not

10:28

really true. You'll get like hundreds of

10:30

thousands of people,

10:32

you know, coming in with their opinions

10:34

about how that's not really true.

10:36

Well, it is really true.

10:38

It's absolutely true. And in fact,

10:40

during the former President Trump

10:42

administration,

10:44

Congress became so sort of

10:47

And I want to say motivated or alarmed

10:49

by this issue, meaning they were being

10:50

asked questions by the powers that be,

10:54

is this actually true? That they

10:55

released a report stating specifically,

10:59

and I quote in the book, yes, it is

11:00

true. As Commander in Chief, the

11:03

President has this sole authority. He

11:06

doesn't need to ask anyone.

11:08

And hopefully,

11:10

sort of my bringing sort of concepts

11:13

like that to the fore right away, the

11:15

reader can then become engaged and they

11:17

say, well, that's weird. Why? And then I

11:20

can give you a very simple answer

11:22

without

11:24

necessarily taking you through the whole

11:25

history of presidential authority, but

11:27

it has to do with the ticking clock of

11:29

it.

11:31

And I explain to you right away that a

11:33

ballistic missile

11:35

travels from one continent in It's

11:37

called an ICBM. People have heard of

11:39

that. Intercontinental ballistic

11:42

missile. Again,

11:43

exactly like it sounds. It can travel

11:45

from one continent to the next in

11:48

roughly 30 minutes carrying a nuclear

11:51

warhead to strike a target.

11:53

Once you realize, wait a minute, there

11:55

are only 30 minutes,

11:57

this isn't like, hey guys, should we go

11:59

have a war in Iraq? Let's discuss this.

12:01

Let's debate this. Let's take it to the

12:03

Congress.

12:05

This is There is a ballistic missile,

12:07

sir, coming at the United States, and

12:10

you must act.

12:13

And that's why, in the simplest layman's

12:16

terms, sole presidential authority

12:19

exists.

12:21

So, let's define then

12:23

what these weapons are. We Many of us

12:25

have seen that film Oppenheimer. We saw

12:26

them out in the desert, I think, in New

12:28

Mexico playing playing with all these

12:29

weapons and eventually making this one

12:31

bomb that they would then drop drop in

12:33

Japan.

12:35

The weapon we see in that film, which

12:36

was in the 1940 made in the 1940s that

12:38

ultimately led to the end of the war, is

12:40

that the same weapon that we're talking

12:42

about today?

12:43

No.

12:44

Well, in in in sort of principle, in

12:47

yes, meaning it's an atomic bomb, but

12:50

there's two things that separate where

12:52

we are now.

12:53

One has to do with the size and the

12:55

power of the bomb.

12:57

So, the the In 1945, there were atomic

13:00

bombs. Now, there are thermonuclear

13:02

bombs. So, an atomic bomb is used inside

13:06

a thermonuclear weapon as the trigger.

13:10

Okay.

13:11

It is a bomb inside a bomb. And the

13:13

power of the thermonuclear bomb is so

13:16

astonishingly,

13:18

you know, destructive, you can read the

13:20

details. I interviewed Richard Garwin,

13:22

who designed the first thermonuclear

13:25

bomb for Edward Teller when he was 24

13:28

years old. I interviewed him, he's in

13:29

his 90s. He explains to me, and I

13:32

explain to you,

13:33

what the power is behind that. But this

13:36

So, the atomic bomb and and it has to do

13:38

with size. Like, the old atomic bomb,

13:39

the one that was dropped on Hiroshima

13:41

was the size of a small elephant.

13:44

Okay, 15 kilotons in a big giant

13:48

elephant-sized bomb inside of an

13:50

aircraft having to fly from Tinian

13:53

Island to over Hiroshima where it drops

13:57

in an aircraft.

13:59

That all changed

14:01

when we brought the Nazi scientists to

14:04

us. Ooh, let's have Let's figure out how

14:07

to do two things. Let's figure out how

14:08

to

14:09

create more powerful bombs. That's the

14:11

result The result is the thermonuclear

14:13

bomb. And let's make them smaller.

14:16

We can't load an elephant-sized weapon

14:18

into the top of a ballistic missile. It

14:20

needs to be smaller. And so, so much of

14:22

this buildup was about creating more

14:25

powerful weapons to be smaller in size.

14:29

And then you see the military-industrial

14:30

complex. You see You can imagine, and I

14:33

do this as a history lesson in just a

14:35

few short pages to try to bring readers

14:37

up to speed without losing the drama of

14:40

the narrative.

14:42

And

14:43

the result, so if you flash forward to

14:45

where we are now, which is where we've

14:47

been for a very long time, is a nuclear

14:49

triad, just like it sounds, three parts.

14:53

We have ICBMs, silos under the ground.

14:57

So, those are weapons hidden in the

14:58

ground? In the United States, there are

15:00

400 of them. There were more. Now, there

15:03

400. You can find out where they are on

15:05

a map.

15:06

They're in silos, underground silos

15:08

across the Midwest and the West.

15:12

Then we have our nuclear-armed,

15:14

nuclear-powered submarines that carry

15:18

that same kind of concept of a ballistic

15:21

missile

15:22

with a warhead in its nose cone.

15:25

We have those same systems on

15:27

submarines.

15:28

And the technology behind it is

15:30

astonishing. I take the reader through

15:31

it fast from the experts who explain it

15:34

to me in a digestible way.

15:36

And those systems lurk around in the

15:40

oceans

15:41

all 24 hours a day,

15:44

7 days a week, 365

15:46

days a year. They're called the

15:47

handmaidens of the apocalypse. They're

15:50

almost impossible to find, right? They

15:52

are impossible to find. The nuclear The

15:54

former nuclear force sub commander,

15:57

um

15:58

Admiral Connor,

16:01

had this great way of describing it to

16:02

me. When I said, like, how hard is it to

16:04

find a sub? He said, Annie, it's easier

16:07

to find a grapefruit-sized

16:10

object in space

16:14

than a nuclear sub under the sea.

16:16

And it's not just the United States that

16:18

have these weapons, which I think is

16:20

important to say. There's many people

16:22

listening all around the world now who

16:24

have these weapons in their country,

16:25

too. You list um several of those

16:27

countries. I think it's nine countries

16:28

in total that have nuclear weapons,

16:30

right? What are those countries? I know

16:32

we have them back in the UK.

16:33

Yeah, there are nine nuclear-armed

16:35

nations. Also really interesting to

16:37

think about that the whole sort of

16:39

let's have a triad. Let's have all these

16:41

weapons that we will use We will have a

16:42

concept of mutually assured destruction,

16:44

so we will have these weapons, but we

16:46

will never use them because everyone

16:48

would be destroyed. Those concepts go

16:50

back to the '50s when there were only

16:53

two nuclear-armed nations, the United

16:56

States and Soviet Russia. So,

16:59

you know, really making all of this more

17:01

precarious, talk

17:03

looping back to your,

17:05

you know, notion that, like, my God, we

17:07

are at this precipice

17:09

of

17:10

danger, which we are, is because there

17:12

are nine nuclear-armed nations, many of

17:14

which are in direct conflict with others

17:18

or their neighbors. And they are the US,

17:21

Russia, China,

17:24

the UK, France, India and Pakistan,

17:28

Israel,

17:30

North Korea.

17:32

And there's some threat that Iran

17:36

are trying to Absolutely. I mean, that

17:39

is a very, very, very significant

17:42

threat. And you really have to look I

17:45

think the book

17:46

I stay away from the sort of

17:48

geopolitical

17:49

posturing or analysis or even,

17:52

um

17:53

you know, opinion about the political

17:56

aspect of all of this. But I think

17:59

readers get to take their away there and

18:02

have, because I have read a lot of the

18:04

responses and had a lot of really

18:06

interesting conversations since the book

18:09

published a month ago.

18:11

But yes, you can take away what you

18:13

think about the fact, what, my God, you

18:15

put a 10th nuclear-armed nation in here.

18:19

That is Iran.

18:21

How

18:23

more destabilizing is that going to be

18:26

to safety and security?

18:30

And when I look at the list of countries

18:32

um you've written about that have these

18:33

nuclear weapons,

18:35

the US, Russia, they're both basically

18:37

in proxy wars at the moment with

18:39

obviously the the war going on in

18:40

Ukraine.

18:41

Think about Pakistan and India, um

18:44

Israel and Iran, you know, they're both

18:47

at conflicts flat throwing different

18:49

missiles at each other and drones at

18:50

each other at the moment.

18:52

Um the UK and and France are obviously

18:54

part of NATO, so they're kind of

18:56

sucked into the whole Russia-Ukraine-US

18:58

conflict that's going on, that proxy war

19:00

there. These countries right now, many

19:03

of them, I think the majority of them,

19:04

are involved in a direct war or some

19:06

form of proxy war as it is.

19:08

And with many of these wars, it's hard

19:10

to find the way that it ends, the way

19:12

out, the kind of golden bridge, because

19:14

Ukraine aren't going to relent, so

19:16

Russia aren't going to necessarily

19:19

decide one day that they're going to

19:21

lose the war. That would cause

19:22

significant ramifications for Putin, his

19:24

reputation, and Russia as a whole. The

19:26

US can't let Ukraine lose for a variety

19:29

of geopolitical reasons. And then at the

19:31

same time, all this conflict started in

19:32

Israel following the the attack in

19:34

Israel, which has sucked Iran in and

19:36

much of that region. It's all seems

19:38

like,

19:39

you know, these are the countries right

19:41

now that are involved in

19:43

the conflict that is scaring many much

19:45

many of us

19:47

um in a significant way. And if all

19:48

these countries operate in a similar way

19:50

where there's one individual that can

19:51

make the decision

19:53

to release those weapons.

19:57

It is quite scary.

19:58

The UN Secretary General said recently

20:01

that we are one

20:03

misunderstanding, one miscalculation

20:07

away from nuclear Armageddon.

20:10

And so the scary part of it is that when

20:14

you look at that sort of verbage, right?

20:16

When I talk about you know, nuclear

20:19

Armageddon, nuclear apocalypse, nuclear

20:22

holocaust.

20:24

Those are words out of the mouths of

20:27

some of these leaders. So there is a

20:30

very clear notion that if nuclear war

20:34

starts, it ends

20:36

civilization. That is almost certainly

20:40

known among the leaders. And yet

20:43

you have people like the president of

20:46

Russia and the president of the United

20:48

States

20:49

and the leader of North Korea

20:52

throwing around threats and terms. You

20:56

know, the leader of North Korea recently

20:59

accused the United States of having a

21:01

sinister intention of provoking nuclear

21:05

war.

21:06

I mean, that is a provocation on top of

21:08

a provocation in you know, embedded in

21:10

but to your point

21:12

what's the point of being scared?

21:14

Well, the point is

21:17

to realize that passivity

21:20

is not necessarily the answer. That your

21:23

knowledge of the situation leads to

21:28

change. That's just the that's just the

21:29

history of of civilization. One of the

21:32

things that did make me think when I

21:33

realized that there's one individual in

21:36

in the United States, where we are now,

21:37

who can make that decision and that

21:39

there's basically like someone following

21:41

the president with a briefcase called

21:43

the it's like the football or something.

21:45

Yes. What is that football for people

21:46

that don't know? Yeah. And so so now

21:49

that people know about the football or

21:50

when they read it, you'll you'll see you

21:53

can see in photographs of the president,

21:55

you will almost if he's in frame, you'll

21:57

see the mill aid. That's the military

21:59

aid. An individual who is assigned to be

22:03

with the president 24/7 365. And inside

22:07

the football, it's called the emergency

22:09

satchel

22:10

are two important things. There's

22:13

instrumentation that allows the

22:15

president to be identified as the

22:18

president to the National Military

22:21

Command Center, which is the nuclear

22:22

bunker beneath the Pentagon.

22:25

Okay? So it's a it's a call and response

22:28

authentic authentication.

22:31

And then there is something called

22:34

colloquially the black book.

22:37

And it was told to me the reason it's

22:39

called the black book is cuz it involves

22:40

so much death.

22:42

And what the black book is is a list of

22:45

nuclear strike options for the president

22:48

to choose from. And so once the

22:51

president is notified that a ballistic

22:53

missile is coming at the United States

22:56

and he has to make a decision about a

22:58

counterattack

23:00

he must look quickly because as you

23:02

learn in the book and as I learned from

23:04

presidents

23:05

uh there is a 6-minute window of

23:08

decision-making.

23:10

And so there's no time for a round table

23:13

discussion.

23:15

There is a list of options that has been

23:18

pre-prepared

23:20

for the president to choose from.

23:23

And I interviewed for the book someone

23:25

who actually

23:27

was responsible for some of those

23:28

decisions in the '80s.

23:30

And he

23:33

described to me in appalling detail

23:36

what it was like to have worked on this

23:39

in the Pentagon, like worked out

23:43

numerically different targets and why

23:46

they would be targets in said strike XYZ

23:49

or Q against said nation.

23:51

And then later seeing the black book and

23:55

realizing the like sort of transmutation

23:57

of that information to what was

23:59

described by the only mill aid who's

24:02

ever gone on the record speaking about

24:04

this as essentially like a Denny's menu

24:07

list of options.

24:09

And

24:11

so you understand that this list is so

24:14

watered down

24:16

into strike options and there is so

24:20

little time that the president in

24:22

essence has really no idea

24:25

what he's striking and how many millions

24:28

of people will be killed.

24:30

When I

24:31

hear that, it makes me realize how

24:33

important the decision to pick our

24:34

leaders is.

24:35

Something I didn't realize before.

24:37

Nothing could be more important. And yet

24:39

I learned in the book and I'm talking

24:41

about from former secretaries of

24:43

defense, people very close to the

24:45

president, that most presidents are

24:48

ill-informed about their role as

24:52

commander in chief in a nuclear war

24:54

because and it was said to me, most

24:56

don't want to know.

24:57

And again, so this brings us back to

24:59

that paradox of deterrence. The original

25:03

question I asked in writing and

25:04

reporting this book, what if deterrence

25:06

fails? Deterrence is this idea, we will

25:09

have so many nuclear weapons pointed at

25:12

the other side, they will have so many

25:14

nuclear weapons pointed at us, no one

25:16

would be insane enough to let any of

25:18

them loose.

25:20

That's how we all stay safe.

25:23

Another way of saying deterrence is more

25:25

nuclear weapons make us more safe. You

25:28

can decide if you think that's a little

25:30

Orwellian, but that is what exists.

25:33

Okay, so with that in mind, we should

25:35

really be doing

25:37

mental

25:39

checks on our leaders every 3 months

25:42

because we've all probably

25:44

had an experience with someone who's had

25:46

a

25:49

episode.

25:50

You know, and I'll I'll leave it at at

25:52

episode because there's a variety of

25:53

different types of episodes one can

25:54

have. And I was thinking, well, if the

25:56

president just has a bit of an episode

25:58

and gets a little bit paranoid or you

26:00

know, sort of has a little bit of a

26:01

schizophrenic paranoia

26:04

which can happen to people for a variety

26:06

of different unpredictable reasons then

26:09

that president could potentially make a

26:10

decision to end the planet and there

26:12

doesn't seem to be a

26:14

defense mechanism to stop him doing that

26:16

or her doing that. You're reminding me

26:18

of a famous story when Nixon was

26:20

president and it was during the

26:21

Watergate scandal. He probably knew the

26:24

end of his presidency was near. And he

26:27

was very drunk one night and he began to

26:31

threaten or rather he just began to

26:33

talk, you know,

26:34

in in a sort of extremely verbose

26:36

drunken manner about how he could end

26:38

the world or kill tens of millions of

26:40

people with a push of a button. And his

26:43

it is said that that Kissinger called up

26:46

the military and said, if the president

26:48

orders any kind of a nuclear strike,

26:50

talk to me first.

26:52

Really?

26:54

And you'd say that you think that would

26:55

have happened?

26:57

I mean, we you know It's hard to know,

26:59

isn't it?

27:00

All of these stories, unless they come

27:03

out of the mouth of the individual who

27:05

actually said that, are in essence

27:08

stories. So there's an element of truth

27:10

to them for sure. Um you know, the

27:13

actual command and control, who's going

27:16

to follow the rules, people ask me that

27:18

question often. And I took that exact

27:21

question like

27:23

you know, I think people have a naivete

27:24

that if you're in the nuclear command

27:27

and control, whether you're a missileer

27:28

in a underground silo or a submariner on

27:31

a sub that you might when you get this

27:34

command, suddenly have this heart, you

27:37

know, like in a Hollywood movie, have

27:38

this moment where you say, my goodness,

27:41

I'm going to save the planet rather than

27:42

destroy it.

27:44

I put that question to Dr. Glenn McDuff,

27:47

the

27:48

historian at the classified

27:51

museum at Los Alamos, the one you and I

27:53

can't go see.

27:55

Um and I said, do you think that could

27:57

happen? And he said

27:58

Annie, you have a better chance at

28:00

winning Powerball

28:02

than betting on someone in the nuclear

28:06

chain of command and control

28:08

to defy orders. And I said, why? And he

28:11

said, well

28:12

you are trained to follow orders.

28:16

I spoke to a CIA agent or should I say

28:18

former CIA agent called Andy Bustamante.

28:21

Might have seen him, he did does some

28:22

podcasts. And

28:24

after speaking to him, I I completely

28:25

agree because as he said, he was trained

28:27

to

28:28

basically he was selected and trained on

28:31

the basis that he would

28:33

follow orders in that moment and they

28:34

even do drills to make sure dummy drills

28:36

to make sure that they're prepared, I

28:38

guess psychologically to follow through

28:40

on those instructions. It made me think

28:42

as well that if if um

28:44

what if the president's dead? What if

28:46

the president is hit by a nuclear weapon

28:49

from another country and now they can no

28:51

longer make the decision. Is the

28:53

decision deferred on to somebody else?

28:56

Well, I take the reader through that

28:57

precisely because those are the kind of

28:59

questions that I had to ask of my

29:01

sources as I was reporting this.

29:03

On the one hand as I was learning what

29:05

happens in the seconds and minutes you

29:07

know, after a launch is detected because

29:10

we have a satellite system that detects

29:12

the launch of a nuclear weapon in under

29:14

a fraction of a second. But it's not

29:16

always very trustworthy. This is why I'm

29:17

concerned.

29:18

The ours is very trustworthy as far as I

29:20

understand. It's called SIBERS. It's

29:22

built by Lockheed and it's astonishingly

29:24

powerful. Other nations do not have that

29:27

same kind of technology.

29:28

Cuz I was reading about the sort of

29:29

historic

29:30

mistakes that were made. Sometimes

29:31

people thought there was a a nuclear

29:33

bomb or a strike coming and it was

29:34

actually just a bunch of swans.

29:36

Absolutely. So I was a little bit like

29:39

you know.

29:39

these are these are you know, this is

29:40

the one miscalculation, one

29:42

misunderstanding away from nuclear

29:43

Armageddon.

29:45

What what are those instances from

29:46

history where the nuclear detection

29:48

system was triggered and someone in some

29:50

country decided um

29:53

not to follow through on a notification?

29:56

I think the most interesting stories

29:58

that I report come from the person who

30:01

is an actual first-hand witness to it

30:04

because what often happens is the

30:06

telephone game, you know, whereby one

30:08

person tells the story and then you

30:10

imagine you add a detail. So, I write

30:12

about a couple of them in the book, but

30:14

one of them came to me first-hand and

30:16

I'll share that with you, which was

30:18

former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry.

30:21

And he was on the night watch during the

30:23

Carter administration. He wasn't the

30:25

Secretary of Defense yet. He had like

30:26

the job before that, the Director of

30:28

Research and Engineering at the

30:30

Pentagon. But it was his his night watch

30:32

inform the president job.

30:35

And he was told by the National Military

30:38

Command Center, which is the bunker

30:39

beneath the Pentagon,

30:42

that

30:43

there were ballistic missiles on the way

30:46

from Soviet Russia.

30:48

This was confirmed

30:50

by the nuclear bunker beneath Offutt Air

30:53

Force Base in Nebraska, the STRATCOM

30:55

bunker.

30:57

And not only were they intercontinental

30:59

ballistic missiles flying at the United

31:01

States, but they were sub-launched

31:04

ballistic missiles coming at the United

31:05

States. And it was a massive mother lode

31:09

of warheads.

31:11

And Perry described to me as I recount

31:13

in the book what that was like

31:17

to try and process

31:19

in your mind oh my god, I'm going to

31:22

have to tell the president

31:25

and going to have to and he is going to

31:27

have to make a counterattack.

31:30

And

31:31

within a matter of minutes

31:34

he got word that it was a mistake.

31:37

And a mistake, you might ask like a

31:39

mistake? How does a mistake happen? What

31:42

he told me was that it was a VHS tape,

31:46

a simulated war game,

31:48

a simulated attack by the Soviet Union

31:52

against the United States.

31:54

And the VHS tape

31:56

had mistakenly been inserted into a

31:59

machine in the nuclear bunker beneath

32:01

the Pentagon and because it is linked to

32:03

STRATCOM,

32:05

it was seen in both places.

32:08

And Perry said to me, it looked real

32:10

because it was meant to look real.

32:13

Hm.

32:16

There was a president you talk about

32:19

that played a nuclear war game

32:23

and discovered that

32:24

there could be no winners.

32:26

So,

32:28

Proud Prophet Proud Prophet, yeah. is

32:30

one of the few

32:32

a very rare declassified nuclear war

32:35

game. People talk about, you know,

32:38

jealously guarded secrets in the United

32:40

States government. You can be sure that

32:42

anything having to do with nuclear war

32:44

gaming is way up there

32:47

in the top secrets along with what is

32:50

actually in that black book.

32:53

But the Proud Prophet war game was

32:54

declassified. Reagan had ordered it. I

32:57

don't believe he participated in it. His

32:59

sec desk everybody in the commit nuclear

33:01

command and control participated in for

33:03

two weeks in 1983.

33:06

And this is declassified. I reprint some

33:09

of it in the book. And if you have a

33:11

look at it, you might say to yourself,

33:13

well, what's the point of declassifying

33:15

something that looks like this? It's

33:16

just black. It's like there's a number

33:19

here and a word there and a page number,

33:22

but mostly it's entirely redacted.

33:25

And so, what's the point of

33:27

declassifying it? Well, for the public,

33:29

something very valuable came out of

33:32

that, which is it allowed a certain

33:35

civilian who was participating, Yale

33:37

professor named Paul Bracken,

33:40

to actually speak about it in a general

33:42

way. He couldn't, you know,

33:44

couldn't tell OPSEC, but he could

33:47

generally talk about it. And what he

33:49

said in his own book was that no matter

33:53

how nuclear war begins,

33:55

NATO's involved, NATO's not involved,

33:57

China's involved, China's no matter how

33:59

it begins, it ends in nuclear

34:02

Armageddon. And Bracken's words was that

34:04

everyone left really depressed.

34:09

Nuclear Armageddon essentially means the

34:10

world is destroyed. Nuclear Armageddon

34:13

is the world is destroyed. And when you

34:14

get to the end of the book, which

34:15

happens in 72 minutes, and that comes

34:19

from something that

34:21

former STRATCOM director General Keeler

34:23

said to me when we were discussing and

34:25

interviewing and I said we I asked him

34:28

about what could happen if there was a

34:30

nuclear exchange between Russia and the

34:32

United States and he said, the world

34:35

could end in the next couple of hours.

34:38

So, from where we are now in this

34:40

conversation to the end of this

34:41

conversation, if a nuclear war broke out

34:43

when we were sat here,

34:45

by the end of this conversation,

34:47

basically the entire world would be

34:49

destroyed. And we you and I wouldn't

34:50

even know before the first missile hit.

34:52

That was shocking to me to have that

34:54

confirmed in essence by

34:56

uh Obama's

34:58

FEMA director. So, FEMA, the Federal

35:00

Emergency Management Agency, is the is

35:03

the agency in the United States that's

35:04

in charge of disasters, right? So, if

35:06

there's a hurricane or a flood or an

35:08

earthquake, FEMA steps in to help the

35:11

people. They have something called

35:13

population planning.

35:15

Craig Fugate was Obama's FEMA director

35:17

for 8 years and he just covered an

35:20

extraordinary amount of catastrophes in

35:22

the United States. He was also

35:24

responsible for planning for a nuclear

35:26

war. He told me that they did that. He

35:28

also said, we plan for asteroid strikes.

35:31

These are called low probability, high

35:34

consequence events.

35:36

But what Fugate told me that was

35:37

shocking is that

35:39

there is no population protection

35:41

planning in a nuclear war because

35:43

everyone will be dead.

35:45

And he explained to me that there's

35:47

nothing

35:48

that that that that he could do as FEMA

35:51

director. He would really be putting his

35:53

efforts from this nuclear bunker where

35:55

he would be, which is called Mount

35:56

Weather, he would be putting his efforts

35:58

on

36:00

the continuity of government issues, the

36:02

continuity of like the government has

36:05

what are called essential functions. So,

36:08

and you know, as a nuclear war is

36:10

happening, the government is trying to

36:13

prepare to keep the government running,

36:16

which is a form of fantasy in itself.

36:19

And when you read Fugate's interviews

36:21

with me, he's just so candid about how

36:25

there is nothing anyone can do. And you

36:29

know, what he told me was so shocking, I

36:31

went back to him

36:33

and said like, I just want to really

36:35

make sure these are your actual quotes

36:37

that you that that

36:39

And he absolutely, you know, he was one

36:42

of the first people

36:44

to write an Amazon review of the book

36:46

after it published here in the United

36:47

States.

36:48

And I find that

36:51

both terrifying, but also heartening for

36:54

this reason is that a lot of these

36:57

people who leave office because my

37:00

sources are all former

37:02

and then the title.

37:04

They when they are in the command and

37:06

control, they are very focused on doing

37:09

their job. Hence what we spoke about

37:11

earlier about like following orders.

37:13

They are civil servants. They are

37:15

dedicated civil servants. They believe

37:17

in national security. They believe in,

37:20

you know, the perseverance of

37:22

government. And then they leave office

37:24

and they are just regular people again.

37:27

And that's when the heart

37:30

I think begins to lead and particularly

37:34

as people get older

37:35

because I interview a lot of people in

37:37

their 80s and 90s.

37:39

And then they begin to think about

37:42

what this means in terms of legacy.

37:46

What is nuclear command and control

37:50

really as buttoned up

37:52

as this is might be them talking, you

37:54

know,

37:55

as I thought.

37:57

And is it a good idea

38:00

in a world that is so rapidly changing

38:03

both geopolitically and also in terms of

38:07

technology?

38:08

Was there one individual you met that

38:10

comes to mind when I ask who the most

38:13

troubled person was in terms of the work

38:16

they participated in or troubled in the

38:18

context of

38:21

what they know and what it means for

38:22

humanity and how they're grappling with

38:24

that? The most concerned and sort of the

38:27

most activated by all means would be

38:29

former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry.

38:31

And he's now in his 90s and I I don't

38:34

believe he's doing interviews anymore.

38:36

But it it's not surprising that Perry

38:39

shared with me his intense worry about

38:43

all of this because he has been actively

38:46

working on this and

38:48

you know, for at least 15, 20 years. And

38:52

when I say this, I mean bringing the

38:56

information to the public so that the

38:58

public is aware. He wrote his own book

39:00

with a colleague called The Button. And

39:03

he has, you know, really

39:05

he did a podcast called At the Brink.

39:08

And what's fascinating is Perry spent

39:10

most of his life dedicated to what you

39:14

might call the military-industrial

39:15

complex, right? To the research and

39:18

development of weapon systems that I

39:21

write about in my other books,

39:24

the DARPA book in particular because

39:26

this is all part and parcel to what

39:27

we're talking about here that you have

39:30

this sort of

39:31

industry,

39:33

military weapon system industry that is

39:35

in a constant state of

39:38

forward movement. It's deeply tied to

39:41

economics, to jobs, to prosperity. And

39:44

so, where does that take us? And and at

39:48

what point does it end? It was

39:50

Eisenhower who said in his famous speech

39:52

where the public really learned about

39:54

this so-called military-industrial

39:56

complex because Eisenhower spoke of it

39:59

in his farewell speech. But he also said

40:01

an important thing in the second half of

40:03

that speech which doesn't get nearly as

40:05

much airtime, which is that a

40:07

knowledgeable and alert citizenry

40:11

is how you balance sort of an idea of

40:14

peace with an idea of defense.

40:18

And I think what frightens both of us

40:19

that we talked about in the beginning

40:20

here was that peace and defense are very

40:25

different than constant states of war.

40:30

72 minutes.

40:32

You you go through this in the book

40:34

minute almost minute by minute showing

40:36

exactly what will happen. We know in

40:37

this first

40:39

couple of minutes there's the

40:40

notification that there's a you know, a

40:42

nuclear bomb coming in from somewhere.

40:44

My question on that was and I was

40:45

thinking about this earlier as we were

40:46

talking about it, how does the president

40:48

know? How does the world leader of that

40:49

country know? The prime minister of the

40:50

UK, whoever it might be, or Netanyahu,

40:53

or Putin know where that nuclear bomb

40:57

has come from because we talked about

40:58

this sort of black black book of places,

41:00

this menu that the president has in that

41:03

football that his aide is carrying

41:05

around.

41:06

How does he know which place to pick on

41:09

the menu to send the nuclear bomb back?

41:11

Powerful distinction, right? This is not

41:13

9/11 where suddenly there are planes in

41:16

the Trade Center towers and

41:19

you know, everyone is scrambling to say

41:21

who did this and the CIA is saying this

41:23

is Al-Qaeda, it has the mark of Al but

41:25

no one knows for sure. This is not that.

41:29

This is the fact that for 79 years the

41:32

United States has been building nuclear

41:34

weapons, nuclear weapon systems, and

41:36

also systems to detect other people's

41:40

nuclear weapons should they have them.

41:42

What are these submarines? Okay, so

41:45

good point on the submarines, which is

41:47

but

41:48

we have a set of satellites called

41:51

Sibers, which are parked. Now, I'm only

41:54

talk when you said what how would

41:56

Netanyahu know, how would the president

41:57

of

41:58

that is a different scenario.

42:02

What I am talking about is the US

42:04

president because I have interviewed

42:07

people in the US Defense Department and

42:10

the intelligence community. And the

42:11

Defense Department knows precisely where

42:16

a weapon comes from within a second of

42:17

launch because the Siber satellites can

42:20

measure the hot rocket exhaust. So, you

42:22

imagine a rocket taking off, lots of

42:25

fire beneath it. That is measured

42:28

from 22,000 miles up in geosync. I mean,

42:31

that is just a technological

42:33

astonishment.

42:34

And then there begins the data sent down

42:39

to these various commands in the United

42:41

States, the Aerospace Data Center, the

42:43

Space Force, and they begin measuring

42:45

the trajectory of the missile and

42:48

figuring out where it's going to go.

42:49

Like, it's not going to Moscow and it's

42:51

not going to Guam, those would be

42:53

opposite directions. Is it going to San

42:55

Francisco or is it going to the East

42:57

Coast? That is learned in 100 seconds

43:01

approximately. Okay? Now, you are right,

43:04

you cannot you if some if a submarine

43:07

launches a ballistic missile, there's no

43:10

way of knowing where that came from,

43:11

which is why in the scenario I have that

43:13

happen and it creates a whole other set

43:17

of problems.

43:18

What are these I mean I mean I mean what

43:20

is the answer to that? Cuz I was

43:21

imagining

43:22

if the Siber system sees a nuclear bomb

43:25

coming out of the Pacific Ocean,

43:27

I mean, that could be Rishi Sunak, that

43:29

could be

43:30

that could be the UK firing one at

43:33

America. It could be, you know, could be

43:35

anybody. You are absolutely right that

43:37

there is no way of knowing. And in the

43:38

scenario that I chose because I wanted

43:40

to try to take the reader through a

43:43

logical sequence, if you could even call

43:46

any of this logical because it's all you

43:48

know, they call it MAD, Mutual Assured

43:49

Destruction. It's really madness.

43:52

But you cannot know who launched that.

43:56

So does we just go for our enemy in that

43:58

situation?

44:00

I mean,

44:01

Do you know what I mean?

44:02

now you

44:03

have a new task. You are going to write

44:06

nuclear war an even worse scenario.

44:09

Well, cuz that's what you would do,

44:10

right? If you're President Biden, your

44:12

aide turns to you and goes, "Hi

44:13

President, there's a nuclear bomb

44:14

heading our way." I go, "I know exactly

44:16

who that who did that."

44:20

And you might start firing a couple of

44:21

back back at just the people that you

44:23

assume would do it.

44:24

And then they do the same.

44:27

Um

44:29

The nuclear-armed submarines

44:32

that

44:34

are owned by Russia and China

44:37

regularly come within a couple hundred

44:40

miles of East of each coast of the

44:42

United States and you can assume the

44:44

same about England.

44:46

And how do we know this?

44:48

Well, you can't see a submarine moving

44:50

in real time, but you can track the

44:53

submarine's movements after the fact

44:56

owing to a very

44:58

complex system of underwater

45:01

surveillance

45:02

systems that we have in place.

45:05

And there's a map that appeared in a

45:08

recent Defense Department budget request

45:11

to Congress, which I reproduce in the

45:13

book, that shows just how close those

45:17

submarines, those enemy submarines get

45:19

to the coast. And that reduces the

45:22

travel time of a ballistic missile down

45:25

to under 10 minutes. And so this idea

45:28

that we really are living at the edge of

45:31

apocalypse is not an exaggeration. The

45:34

question is, how would this start? Why

45:36

would this start? Again, read the

45:39

scenario and you begin to realize

45:43

this could start in or have a discussion

45:46

with you and you this could start in so

45:48

many

45:50

the training test tape. I mean,

45:52

and the real takeaway is asking

45:55

ourselves is

45:56

why do none of us know about this? Or

45:58

most of us rather.

46:02

There's so many ways this could start

46:03

and one of them one of them obviously

46:05

again has emerged

46:06

front of mind for society since you

46:08

started writing the book, which is

46:09

artificial intelligence. Before I get to

46:11

that though, I really want to I really

46:12

want to close off on this 72 minutes. I

46:15

understand the first couple of minutes

46:16

there.

46:17

Um

46:19

what does the person listening to this

46:20

need to know about what happens in the

46:22

subsequent what are 60 minutes?

46:25

There's a very fast process where the

46:28

trajectory of the ballistic missile is

46:31

being determined and we're talking in

46:33

the first minutes of the sequence

46:35

because everyone is getting ready to

46:37

tell the president because what they're

46:38

going to tell the president is, "Sir,

46:40

you need to choose a counterattack."

46:42

That is called get the blue clock

46:44

running. Does the president not like

46:46

getting some plane super quick?

46:48

So, we'll get there in a second because

46:49

that's where the that's a decision tree

46:51

problem.

46:51

Okay. So, everyone is working on

46:54

figuring out the trajectory of the

46:55

ballistic missile.

46:57

And there is the first confirmation when

47:00

you see it and by the way, a ballistic

47:01

missile cannot be redirected or

47:04

recalled. Cannot be.

47:06

Now,

47:07

ultimately the Defense Department will

47:10

wait for second confirmation of that

47:12

missile from a ground radar system. We

47:15

have them around the world. The one in

47:17

the scenario that would see it is in

47:18

Alaska.

47:19

It has to be able to see and confirm

47:23

that missile is definitely coming this

47:25

way.

47:26

And that happens at around 8 or 9

47:28

minutes. And so the process in between

47:31

that everyone's getting ready to brief

47:33

the president about a counterattack. And

47:36

so

47:37

in the scenario the president learns

47:38

around 3 minutes and then they're

47:41

waiting on the secondary confirmation.

47:43

And in my interviews with the Secret

47:44

Service,

47:46

as I was reporting the book, interesting

47:48

things would happen exactly like your

47:50

question, like, "Wait a minute.

47:52

What would

47:54

would the president be staying at the

47:55

White House?" So, I as the reporter put

47:57

that question to the former director of

47:59

the Secret Service, who explains to me

48:02

how there is a team called the Counter

48:04

Assault Team.

48:06

Um and that is that is the sort of

48:08

paramilitary organization of the of the

48:11

Secret Service that's going to always be

48:13

there to move the president really fast

48:16

if need be. And in this situation, they

48:20

make a decision, "We're moving him." If

48:23

the target is Washington, D.C. or

48:25

anywhere on the East Coast for that

48:26

matter, we cannot have the president

48:29

anywhere near ground zero.

48:31

And their job that they are sworn to do

48:34

is to protect the president. And so that

48:36

then you're going to have a bit of a

48:38

stalemate because the military command

48:41

wants the president on on coms to be

48:44

able to give him counterstrike orders.

48:47

That is what they want.

48:48

And they can only get those orders from

48:51

the president, but the Secret Service

48:53

has a totally different agenda. And in

48:55

my scenario, the Secret Service,

48:57

considering they're the only ones in the

48:59

room that are armed, win.

49:01

They take the president out and he flies

49:04

out of Washington, D.C. in Marine One.

49:08

Marine One being the helicopter? The

49:10

helicopter that is that Yeah. You know,

49:12

and then I learned even more interesting

49:13

details like, "Okay, so in the scenario,

49:16

the likely situation is that the

49:18

electromagnetic pulse will really

49:21

threaten the the electronic system in

49:23

Marine One and it will be in deep danger

49:25

of crashing." What is that for people

49:27

that don't know? For people that don't

49:28

know, an an electromagnetic pulse is

49:30

like a three-pulsed

49:32

sort of shock wave that essentially just

49:35

zeros out electronics. Imagine your

49:38

house getting struck by lightning, a

49:40

direct hit,

49:42

and no surge suppressor. I mean, just

49:44

just it's all all the electronics go

49:46

out, and that will almost certainly

49:48

happen. Marine One is outfitted

49:51

retrofitted against EMP attack cuz they

49:54

think about these things, but no one

49:57

knows if it's going to really work. It's

49:58

been tested in a chamber. They're

50:01

So So, what you're saying, sorry, just

50:01

to be clear, is that whoever's attacking

50:04

the United States or another country

50:06

would send an electronic pulse first?

50:09

No, the pulse is part of the of the bomb

50:11

going off.

50:11

Ah, okay.

50:11

It's It's a It's inherent in the nuclear

50:14

explosion. Okay. And so, even if you

50:16

even if you're getting the president

50:17

out, if he's 7 8 9 miles 10 miles out of

50:21

ground zero, as they rush because

50:23

remember this is all happening in 30

50:24

minutes, under 30 minutes, as they rush

50:27

to get him out of the White House,

50:29

the EMP could seriously damage the

50:31

Marine One. So, the Secret Service

50:33

people I interviewed explained to me

50:35

that they would have a backup plan,

50:38

which would be to tandem jump the

50:40

president out of the aircraft

50:43

in a with with a parachute. They would

50:44

strap the president onto them and jump

50:46

out of the aircraft cuz at least there

50:47

would be the the aircraft is going to

50:49

crash if it gets hit by the

50:50

electromagnetic pulse.

50:52

So, at least there's a better chance.

50:54

Well, then you have to have the mill aid

50:56

has to have a parachute cuz he's got the

50:58

black book. And the direct the the

51:01

special agent in charge of the president

51:03

is definitely going to go. So, then I

51:04

learned that this incredible detail that

51:07

there aren't parachutes in Marine One.

51:10

So, they have to go to the White House

51:12

office to get the parachutes. You know,

51:14

these kind of details

51:16

I believe provide the reader with a

51:18

number of things like the the

51:21

astonishing understanding of how many

51:24

different scenarios are in play all the

51:27

time, you know, being rehearsed so that

51:30

we because we might have a nuclear war.

51:33

At the same time that the messaging is

51:35

we will never have a nuclear war.

51:37

And then when you begin to look at all

51:39

the competing agendas that will happen,

51:42

you you realize it's just chaos upon

51:44

mayhem.

51:46

What if the president dies

51:49

in the strike

51:51

and before we've made a counter attack?

51:53

Which is something that Stratcom thinks

51:55

about and it's certainly why I have that

51:57

in the scenario because if the president

51:59

is the only one that can order a

52:01

a counter attack, that can launch

52:02

nuclear weapons, what if he dies?

52:05

And so, I learned in the reporting that

52:07

if you're the president, let's say he

52:09

even gives the order, okay, here's my

52:11

counter strike. I'm choosing this from

52:13

the black book.

52:15

The situ- the command and control is set

52:18

up that if the president orders 82

52:19

nuclear weapons is in response,

52:22

you can't launch 83 nuclear weapons.

52:25

It's 82 and 82 only. And then to do

52:28

another launch requires passwords I

52:32

mean, it requires so much bureaucracy.

52:35

There's not time for that. And so,

52:36

there's this almost unknown little

52:40

detail inside of the nuclear command and

52:42

control apparatus called a universal

52:45

unlock code, which I learned about in

52:47

the book, and the eyebrow goes up for

52:49

exactly that reason, as did mine when I

52:52

Wait, what? And then you find out that

52:54

the president can release to the

52:57

Stratcom commander

52:59

the universal unlock code, which

53:01

basically says, okay, you if I die, you

53:05

have permission to launch

53:08

nuclear weapon number 83

53:11

or nuclear weapon number 5,000, you

53:13

know, all the way up. And that

53:16

is a pretty

53:18

shocking concept.

53:23

The president responds to the nuclear

53:24

attack,

53:26

hits I don't know, let's say they they

53:28

hit Russia.

53:29

They send the submarines out to

53:32

send the

53:33

ICBMs or whatever it's called to hit

53:36

strike Russia.

53:37

Russia have these submarines as well,

53:39

they send more back.

53:42

What does What's the aftermath

53:44

of

53:45

nuclear you know, that 72 that 72nd

53:48

minute? Cuz I imagine from the minute

53:50

the president hears that um

53:52

gets the notification that there are

53:54

it's been confirmed, it's had the second

53:55

confirmation,

53:56

he's going to make the decision to fire

53:58

nuclear weapons back, I assume.

54:00

And then from I mean, from there it's

54:02

just all fire as far as I'm concerned.

54:04

There's a concept called jamming the

54:05

president, which is So, the president

54:08

learns in the scenario I write that

54:10

North Korea has fired

54:12

a ballistic missile and then a second

54:13

one comes in from a sub and hits a

54:15

nuclear power plant in California.

54:17

Why did you pick North Korea?

54:19

I picked North Korea because of my

54:21

interviews with Richard Garwin, the

54:23

designer of the nuclear thermonuclear

54:25

bomb, the first one, which he designed

54:27

for Teller,

54:29

because in our interviews I asked him

54:31

what scared me most. Garwin, also in his

54:33

90s, has advised every president of the

54:35

United States since Eisenhower.

54:38

He was an early founder of NRO. I mean,

54:40

our one of our most classified agencies.

54:43

His

54:44

opinion matters. And while he didn't

54:47

want to be specific, he gave me sort of

54:50

a very interesting, almost poetic

54:52

metaphor when he spoke of the mad king.

54:56

And the mad king with a nuclear arsenal,

54:59

and he even used us that French phrase

55:02

après moi le déluge.

55:05

This idea of like after me the flood. If

55:07

I die, who cares? And I

55:10

interpreted that that Garwin was talking

55:13

about North Korea because North Korea is

55:15

the rogue nuclear-armed nation that

55:18

regularly sets off ballistic missiles

55:21

and doesn't tell anyone. There is an

55:23

unspoken reality among the other nations

55:26

that you inform people when you're going

55:28

to test an ICBM with a dummy warhead, of

55:31

course.

55:32

North Korea doesn't adhere to that. So,

55:34

you know,

55:35

when I interviewed people who are in

55:37

those command and control bunkers, those

55:39

first 100 seconds we spoke of where the

55:41

ballistic missile is on its way, and and

55:44

and all of that command and control is

55:46

focused on is this coming at us or is it

55:49

as launching a space satellite or is it

55:51

going into the Sea of Japan? That's what

55:53

North Korea does.

55:55

They don't announce those tests, and so

55:57

imagine the anxiety

55:59

in those command bunkers

56:02

every time they launch

56:04

a ballistic missile. They have launched

56:06

uh more than 100 ballistic missiles in

56:08

an 18-month period from like 2022

56:11

forward.

56:12

Testing.

56:13

Okay. Testing.

56:14

So, this is so dangerous and so rogue.

56:18

If they're, you know, on the one hand I

56:20

say there are no rules to nuclear war,

56:22

but there are a few nuclear rules to

56:24

nuclear deterrence like you tell your

56:26

neighbors. And that's why I chose North

56:28

Korea. But just to finish that, the

56:30

sequence

56:33

the president launches 82 missiles at

56:37

North Korea in a counter attack.

56:39

And that is And in the scenario that I

56:42

write, the failure

56:44

now becomes about miscommunication, a

56:47

very important concept, and also about

56:50

technology not working.

56:52

And I source in the book precisely where

56:55

this information comes from. So,

56:57

Russia

56:59

misinterprets

57:01

our launching nuclear weapons at North

57:04

Korea

57:05

as being launched at Russia. Why?

57:09

Because actual fact, our ICBMs do not

57:13

have enough range

57:16

to travel

57:17

to North Korea without overflying

57:20

Russia.

57:22

And so, imagine in a climate like now

57:26

with hostilities as an all-time high,

57:29

the Russian president just saying, okay,

57:32

well, maybe they're not coming for us.

57:34

And nuclear policy, the policy of

57:36

deterrence is you launch if someone's

57:38

launching at you. And so, that is where,

57:42

you know, in the second act of the book,

57:45

it's 24 minutes 24 minutes 24 minutes

57:47

end game, Russia launches. And Russia

57:50

launch You don't launch If someone's

57:52

attacking you with nuclear missiles,

57:55

you don't launch

57:57

one or two back. That's mad king logic.

58:01

You launch the mother lode, and that's

58:04

what I have Russia launch in the

58:05

scenario. What do you mean mad king

58:07

logic? Well, mad king logic is

58:11

why would you do that? Yeah, yeah.

58:13

Okay. So, in the book

58:15

in the mad king logic of the book, the

58:17

leader of North Korea, who is nameless,

58:20

um

58:21

launches a nuclear weapon at the United

58:23

States for reasons we don't know, and we

58:24

will never know because history will

58:26

end. The ability to write history ends

58:29

in 72 minutes of the book.

58:32

So, we will never know why.

58:35

And that is the sort of,

58:38

you know, question.

58:40

Mad king logic is very different than

58:42

Defense Department logic or in many

58:45

regards

58:46

Russian nuclear command and control

58:48

logic, which I interviewed sort of the

58:50

world's expert on those subjects to be

58:52

able to, you know, give readers quickly

58:55

an idea of what that logic is and why

58:59

it has held for 79 years.

59:03

Can't we just shoot it out the sky?

59:06

That is the great fantasy that is a

59:08

fallacy, right? So,

59:11

let's talk numbers for a second.

59:14

America has 1,770

59:16

nuclear weapons on ready for launch

59:20

status. They're deployed.

59:22

Okay? They can launch in seconds,

59:24

minutes, maybe some of the bombers take

59:26

an hour or two.

59:28

Russia has roughly the same, 1,674.

59:32

That's the parity of the nuclear

59:34

treaties. That says nothing of the

59:36

thousands more that we each have in

59:38

reserve. But those are actual nuclear

59:40

weapons that are pointed at one another

59:42

ready to go.

59:43

Ready to go. Okay? So those numbers

59:48

The US has an interceptor program

59:52

to allegedly intercept a long-range

59:56

ballistic missile. I'm not talking about

59:57

short-range or even medium-range,

59:59

long-range like that would come from

60:02

Russia or North Korea. We have 44

60:07

interceptor missiles. Four of them are

60:09

at Vandenberg Air Force Base in Santa

60:11

Barbara. 40 of them are at Fort Greely

60:14

in Alaska.

60:15

44. So if Russia has 1,607

60:19

nuclear weapons how are our 44

60:23

interceptors going to go up against

60:25

those?

60:26

And that and that says nothing by the

60:28

way, and I get into this in sort of the

60:30

little bit of the wonkiness inside a

60:33

nuclear warhead

60:35

many of them are what are called MIRV's,

60:37

which means they have multiple warheads

60:39

inside of it. And so when the warhead

60:41

unleashes the multiple warheads go out

60:43

along with decoys so that if an

60:46

interceptor missile is coming at it

60:48

it it greatly reduces the chance that

60:51

the interceptor will be able to shoot it

60:52

out of the sky. The way that it was said

60:54

to me was like this.

60:55

An interceptor missile, which is

60:57

basically just like a small ICBM, right?

60:59

It's a small rocket.

61:01

It

61:03

is like trying to shoot a bullet with a

61:05

bullet. That's a quote from the

61:08

spokesperson of at the Pentagon.

61:11

One of them is traveling at 14,000 miles

61:14

an hour, the ballistic missile. 14,000

61:17

miles an hour.

61:19

The interceptor, the little kinetic

61:21

vehicle inside of it that's going to hit

61:23

the warhead, hopefully, is traveling at

61:26

20,000 miles an hour. That's where you

61:29

get the trying to hit a bullet with a

61:32

bullet. And by the way, this is all

61:33

happening 500 miles up in space.

61:37

Good luck.

61:38

The success rate of our interceptor

61:40

program is between 40 and 55%. That's on

61:44

a good day where they're testing these

61:46

things and they go, "Hey, we're doing an

61:48

interceptor test. It might be around

61:52

there, right?" That's called a curated

61:54

test. That's not in the madness of the

61:56

moment.

61:58

The bombs land.

62:00

If I was a

62:03

fly on the wall, not that there would be

62:05

a wall left.

62:06

What would I what would I and I was

62:07

looking at America or the UK after it

62:09

had been strike struck by these nuclear

62:12

bombs by thousands of, you know, Russian

62:14

or North Korean nuclear weapons, what

62:16

would I see? What would the visuals be

62:18

in those minutes after the strike?

62:20

I describe the first bomb in the

62:23

scenario that strikes the Pentagon. It's

62:25

a one megaton thermonuclear bomb in

62:27

painstaking horrific detail all sourced

62:30

from Defense Department documents,

62:32

defense scientists who have worked for

62:33

decades to describe precisely what

62:35

happens to things and to humans. And

62:38

it's horrifying. But on top of the

62:41

initial flash of thermonuclear light,

62:44

which is 180 million degrees, which

62:46

catches everything on fire in a 9-mile

62:49

diameter radius. On top of the

62:51

bulldozing effect of the wind and the

62:53

all the buildings coming down and more

62:56

fires igniting more fires. On top of the

62:58

radiation poisoning people to death in

63:01

minutes and hours and days and weeks if

63:04

they happen to have survived. On top of

63:05

all of that, each one of these fires

63:08

creates a megafire that is 100 or more

63:12

square miles. And so essentially in

63:15

essence, what do you see? Well, in the

63:17

scenario at minute 72, a thousand

63:20

Russian nuclear weapons land on the

63:22

United States. And so it just becomes a

63:25

conflagration of fire. It's just fire

63:29

fires burning. Fires 100, 200 square

63:34

mile fires burning. And then we move

63:37

into nuclear winter. And that's sort of

63:40

the denouement of the book where I tell

63:43

you about nuclear winter from the point

63:46

of view of one of the original

63:49

scientists who wrote that original

63:51

nuclear winter paper with Carl Sagan

63:54

back in 1983. And his name is Professor

63:56

Brian Toon, and he's spent the decades

63:58

since working with the state-of-the-art

64:01

climate modeling systems that can now

64:03

precisely tell us what nuclear winter

64:06

will look like. Cuz I've always thought,

64:07

you know what, nuclear war wouldn't be

64:09

that bad if, you know, Russia launched a

64:10

thousand of their nuclear bombs at the

64:12

United States and I was here in New York

64:14

where I am now

64:15

I would die instantly so I wouldn't

64:17

really know it happened.

64:18

Is that true? I think you would want to

64:21

die instantly. I mean, there's a quote

64:22

from Nikita Khrushchev, the former

64:25

um premier of the Soviet Union, and he

64:27

said, "After nuclear war, the survivors

64:30

would envy the dead."

64:33

Because there is right? There is this

64:36

sense of if you survived, I mean, there

64:40

is no more law and order. There is no

64:43

more rule of law. There is no

64:46

government. Craig Fugate made that very

64:48

clear. The bunkers that the people in

64:51

the military command and control centers

64:53

would be in, let's say the secret

64:55

bunkers, not the ones that are targets

64:56

that Russia's going to take out that I

64:58

write about in the book, but the smaller

64:59

ones those are going to only function

65:03

for as long as there's gasoline to run

65:05

the diesel in the diesel generators. And

65:08

then those people are going to have to

65:09

come out. And who's left? It's man

65:13

returning to the most primal, most

65:16

violent state as people fight over the

65:20

tiny resources that remain. And by the

65:23

way, they're all malnourished.

65:25

Everybody's sick. And most people have

65:29

lost everything and everyone they know.

65:31

How's that going to feel?

65:35

It's going to feel as you describe here

65:36

on page 277

65:39

there are a thousand flashes of light

65:41

superheating the air in each ground zero

65:43

to 180 million degrees Fahrenheit. A

65:46

thousand fireballs each more than a mile

65:48

in diameter.

65:50

A thousand steeply fronted blast waves.

65:53

A thousand walls of compressed air. A

65:56

thousand American cities and towns where

65:59

all where all engineered structures in

66:01

5, 6, or 7-mile radius change physical

66:04

shapes, collapse, and burn. A thousand

66:06

cities and towns with molten asphalt

66:08

streets. A thousand cities and towns

66:10

with survivors impaled to death by

66:11

flying debris. A thousand cities and

66:13

towns filled with tens of millions of

66:15

dead people. With tens of millions of

66:17

unfortunate survivors suffering fatal

66:19

third-degree burns. People naked,

66:21

tattered, bleeding, and suffocating.

66:23

People who don't look or act like people

66:27

anymore.

66:30

Across America and Europe, hundreds of

66:31

millions of people are dead and dying

66:33

while hundreds of military aircraft fly

66:35

circles in the air until they until they

66:37

run out of fuel.

66:39

I mean, that is

66:42

that is some visual.

66:44

How many people would be

66:46

dead or dying, do you think, after those

66:48

72 minutes?

66:51

Hundreds of millions of people die

66:55

in the fireballs, no question. But the

66:58

number that I think is very interesting

67:00

to think about comes from Professor Toon

67:04

and his team who wrote a paper for

67:07

Nature uh recently, 2022, and sort of

67:11

updated nuclear winter idea based around

67:15

food. And the number that they have is 5

67:18

billion people

67:20

would be dead. The population of the

67:22

planet currently is about 8 billion?

67:24

Yes. So there'd be 3 billion people

67:26

still alive.

67:29

Where shall I go to be one of the 3

67:32

billion? I I was just in New Zealand and

67:34

Australia. That's exactly where you'd

67:36

go. Although according to Toon, those

67:38

are the only places that could actually

67:41

sustain agriculture.

67:43

I was there two weeks ago. Not even two

67:46

weeks ago, it was maybe 10 days ago. I

67:47

was in New Zealand and Australia.

67:49

And at that time

67:51

I think Iran attacked Israel.

67:54

Right. Yes.

67:58

I was kind of happy. You're in the right

68:00

place at the right time. Yeah. I was

68:01

kind of happy for where I was located if

68:03

I'm you know, and I was thinking I

68:05

actually remember I was talking to my

68:06

friends and I pulled up a map and I was

68:07

trying to see how far away I was from

68:09

everything. I was thinking if cuz World

68:11

War III started trending on Twitter, I

68:12

was thinking if if it does break out

68:14

now, I think I'm pretty probably pretty

68:16

well placed. Is that the place to be, do

68:18

That is. That is according to Professor

68:20

Toon. I mean, he was so generous with

68:22

me. He shared a lot of his slideshows

68:25

that he has for his students. And that

68:28

is really pretty much what's left. I

68:29

mean, because most of the world is

68:32

certainly the mid-latitudes would be

68:33

covered in these,

68:35

you know, sheets of ice. The the

68:37

freshwater bodies,

68:39

places like Iowa and Ukraine would be

68:42

would be just snow for 10 years. And so

68:44

agriculture would fail. And when

68:47

agriculture fails, people just die. And

68:50

and on on top of that, you have the

68:52

radiation poisoning because the ozone

68:55

layer will be so damaged and destroyed

68:59

that

69:00

you can't be outside in the sunlight.

69:05

And so people will be forced to live

69:07

underground. And so you have to imagine

69:11

people living underground fighting for

69:13

food everywhere except for in New

69:14

Zealand and Australia. Um there was also

69:17

another interesting detail that that he

69:20

shared with me that, you know

69:22

66 million years ago an asteroid hit

69:27

Earth and wiped out the dinosaurs

69:30

and something like 70% of the known

69:32

species.

69:34

And Professor Toon compared nuclear war

69:38

to that situation.

69:41

And so when you really think about it

69:43

and and again this was also echoed by

69:44

Craig Fugate

69:46

FEMA's director.

69:49

You think about it there's nothing we

69:50

can do about an asteroid.

69:54

At least not right now.

69:56

And yet there is something

69:58

nuclear war is a man-made threat

70:02

and therefore it has to be a man-made

70:05

solution.

70:07

What is the solution?

70:10

I really believe that people motivate

70:12

other people. It's like a fundamental

70:14

truth on the smallest scale and on the

70:16

biggest scale. And so there's one person

70:19

who is incredibly powerful and that is

70:21

the president of the United States. For

70:23

better or for worse, it's just the way

70:25

it is. And so in the same way that the

70:27

president has

70:28

presidential sole authority to start a

70:30

nuclear war, the president also has a

70:32

very powerful pen with which he can

70:34

write executive orders and EO.

70:38

And the story I tell on the hopeful note

70:40

goes like this. When I was in high

70:42

school in 1983 there was an ABC TV movie

70:46

called The Day After

70:48

and it

70:49

showed a fictional war between the

70:52

United States and then Soviet Russia.

70:55

It was horrific and terrifying, okay?

70:58

100 million Americans watched it.

71:01

100 million Americans It's like the

71:03

third of the the population.

71:05

And I think it was half the population

71:08

then.

71:08

Um

71:09

President Reagan was one of those

71:12

Americans. He had a private screening at

71:14

Camp David.

71:16

His advisers told him not to watch it.

71:18

He did watch it. Before that President

71:21

Reagan was a hawk. He was pro nuclear

71:25

weapons. His position was the more

71:27

nuclear weapons the better. He was the

71:29

one putting nuclear weapons in space

71:32

with the Star Wars program, the SDI

71:34

program, okay? He couldn't have been

71:36

more pro deterrence

71:39

supremacy.

71:41

He saw The Day After

71:44

and he changed his position. He wrote in

71:47

his White House journal that he became

71:49

greatly depressed, his words.

71:53

And he reached out to Gorbachev.

71:55

And then they had a Reykjavik Summit a

71:57

summit in Iceland

71:59

Reagan and Gorbachev

72:01

and

72:02

through communication, right? Through

72:06

both of them realizing this is madness

72:09

realizing what could happen seeing The

72:11

Day After and realizing my God

72:14

this cannot happen. And they famously

72:16

issued a statement that said a nuke the

72:18

joint statement between the two of them

72:20

that said

72:20

a nuclear war cannot be won

72:24

and must never be fought.

72:26

And the result of the Reykjavik Summit

72:29

was that the world has gone from 70,000

72:32

nuclear warheads. That was the all-time

72:35

high.

72:36

70,000.

72:38

Why do you need 70,000 nuclear warheads?

72:42

That's what there were in 1986. And now

72:46

here we are because of the reductions,

72:48

because of the treaties, thanks to those

72:50

two.

72:52

12,500

72:54

approximately nuclear warheads. That is

72:57

the movement in the right direction.

73:00

And it came from

73:02

a dramatic story being told and it came

73:05

from the president taking action because

73:08

people would not stand for this anymore.

73:11

There were massive protests. Do you

73:13

believe we could ever get to zero?

73:15

Honestly.

73:15

That is for the disarmament experts. I

73:18

like to stay in my lane as a

73:20

storyteller, as an investigative

73:22

journalist. I like to give you the

73:24

dramatic

73:26

fast read and then pass the baton

73:30

to those who have been working on that

73:34

issue for decades because boy are they

73:35

qualified. I just had the great fortune

73:37

of being invited to Brussels where I was

73:40

part of a nuclear expo and there were

73:43

members of the European Parliament in

73:44

the audience.

73:46

And I and and there were all these

73:48

disarmament people there and I learned a

73:50

lot about all of these groups and they

73:54

have the answer and they are the ones

73:56

that should be asked that question and

73:58

they are doing a lot to get us there.

74:01

From the moment you wrote the first word

74:05

in this new book um nuclear war scenario

74:08

to when you finish the book, how did

74:10

your feelings change about the subject

74:13

matter?

74:18

It's interesting because

74:21

you

74:22

you write the This is just my experience

74:25

as a journalist, but

74:26

you you write the book and you're like

74:28

any

74:29

professional person you want to do a

74:31

really good job at your job, right? So

74:34

so I was very focused on gathering the

74:37

facts and then relaying them in a

74:39

readable way, you know? My husband Kevin

74:42

always says like you got to write

74:43

something that someone can read on the

74:44

beach or an airplane. Right? Which is

74:46

not necessarily conducive to like Nazi

74:49

scientists or the other things I've

74:50

written about. But for this it became

74:52

clear to me nuclear launch to nuclear

74:55

winter fast. Have people read it fast

74:59

because you want to grab their attention

75:00

because

75:01

I'm a mother, you know? I'm a hopeful

75:04

person that believes that we do not have

75:06

to live with this threat overhead. And

75:08

so my focus of the work was really on

75:12

doing the best job I could to narrate

75:15

the story and I think you you take your

75:18

hat off about um maybe any more sort of

75:23

emotional or sentimental feelings. You

75:26

try to

75:27

you try to push that into the prose I

75:30

suppose. So maybe in subtext

75:33

there is

75:34

a sense of urgency and and even fear.

75:39

But for me intellectually, you know as

75:43

an investigative journalist it was it

75:45

was just what's what's the next page

75:47

going to read like. But how do you feel

75:48

about you know the nature that you It's

75:50

interesting as well because you when you

75:52

think about the books you've written I

75:53

don't even think how many have you

75:54

written now six or seven? Seven books in

75:56

total.

75:57

The subject matter of your books are all

76:00

the basis of a lot of conspiracy theory.

76:03

If that makes sense. You know you've

76:04

written about Area 51 and this thing

76:06

called Operation Paperclip and the

76:07

Pentagon and

76:09

and our nuclear bombs and the CIA, all

76:11

these kinds of things which are the

76:12

basis of many of the conspiracy theories

76:14

that I hear hear about. Um so you've

76:18

you've got a very unique perspective on

76:19

the world because you've had the

76:20

privilege and the access of interviewing

76:22

some of the most interesting people that

76:23

are closest to these very interesting

76:25

subjects.

76:26

What are some of the things that you've

76:28

come to learn that you once thought were

76:29

just conspiracy theories?

76:33

I mean conspiracy theory is such a

76:35

loaded word and I think it's too bad

76:39

that um it's used as a catchall to kind

76:42

of dismiss

76:45

uh a lot of curiosity. Mhm. Because

76:48

curiosity is important, right? And

76:50

curiosity leads toward reading. I mean I

76:52

couldn't be a bigger fan of reading or

76:54

listening to pod you know educating

76:56

yourself. I mean things have really

76:57

changed in terms of audio. Like you can

77:00

listen to a podcast

77:02

and learn a lot. You can listen to an

77:04

audio book the same way that you used to

77:06

have to read them. And

77:08

and so

77:10

to just call things conspiracy

77:13

theories I find to be intellectually

77:17

thin, right? It's just too easy. And

77:19

it's also very self-righteous.

77:21

And I think two things I always work to

77:24

avoid um

77:26

is like

77:28

kind of being a know-it-all. And I am

77:30

around a lot of know-it-alls because

77:32

people who become experts in subjects

77:36

um and maybe they don't get as much

77:37

attention as they think they deserve

77:40

tend to become

77:41

a little bit of self-righteous

77:43

know-it-alls.

77:44

And so I have to wind my way

77:47

through that world because I'm always

77:50

What interests me are

77:52

subjects that

77:54

make me ask the question why, right?

77:57

Like

77:58

why does no one know about Area 51? What

78:00

why why is Area 51 so secret? I mean

78:03

when I wrote the book Area 51 the word

78:05

Area 51 was still classified. Really?

78:08

You couldn't say it. I went to the CIA

78:10

and I was told by my minder

78:12

if you say a certain word and number

78:17

you will be asked to leave.

78:19

It was classified. It only became

78:20

unclassified when President Obama spoke

78:23

about it publicly. Oh really? He just

78:25

mentioned it

78:27

and then it was unclassified. Right? And

78:29

so

78:32

to answer your question um

78:35

I find it really interesting tackling

78:37

subjects that are in the zeitgeist that

78:41

people are interested in and then trying

78:43

to unpack

78:45

the truths and the fictions. Is there

78:48

something you heard about you heard a

78:50

you know a whisper about and you thought

78:51

that can't possibly be true? And then

78:53

after doing a little bit of

78:54

investigative researching and journalism

78:57

you discover that it actually was true

78:58

and you were blown away. And I say that

79:00

in part because

79:01

I lived much of my life thinking that a

79:03

lot of these subjects Area 51, the CIA,

79:05

this idea that there's all these spies

79:07

and they're doing all this stuff and I

79:09

thought a lot of it was

79:12

just internet rumors and you know people

79:15

who certain people who have you know

79:18

they have like the silver foil on their

79:19

heads and they're just like whatever.

79:21

And then I had the privilege of speaking

79:24

to

79:25

some people on this podcast and just out

79:28

there in the world

79:29

who confirmed that a lot of the things I

79:32

once thought were

79:34

tin foil hat stuff is actually true. And

79:37

once once you have the curtain pulled

79:40

back,

79:41

it kind of blows your mind open to what

79:43

else could be true.

79:45

And I'm I'm a person that kind of like

79:46

needs evidence and logic and I'm not

79:48

going to believe something cuz I saw it

79:49

on like an Instagram post or a story or

79:51

a Telegram community.

79:53

But my mind's been blown, especially

79:55

over the last couple of years, about

79:56

how um how some of these things that

79:58

people consider to be conspiracy

79:59

theories are actually very true. Have

80:01

you had those moments in your career?

80:04

Oh, absolutely. But I mean, you can

80:06

really drill down on this stuff and

80:07

figure out the thematic element of

80:11

what's going on and then the specifics.

80:12

And I'll give you an example. Like in

80:14

Area 51, I learned about something

80:16

called strategic deception, which is a

80:19

CIA concept, okay?

80:21

And this plays into

80:25

conspiracy theories and when you come

80:28

across something

80:30

maybe having this information I'm about

80:32

to tell you will help you go,

80:34

"Okay, let me look at it in terms of

80:35

these two lanes." So it goes like this.

80:38

The CIA's

80:39

had a was building spy planes out at

80:42

Area 51.

80:43

The U-2 spy plane, which was going to

80:45

spy on the Soviet Union in the '50s

80:48

from above and figure out whether they

80:50

were preparing for nuclear war.

80:53

And the plane was built at Area 51 cuz

80:55

this no one could know about it. It flew

80:57

at 70,000 ft.

80:59

It was out of range of any

81:00

surface-to-air missiles.

81:02

Um I interviewed the first man who flew

81:05

over the Soviet Union in a U-2, Hervey

81:08

Stockman. And he took pictures with

81:10

these massive CIA cameras

81:12

that, you know, came back to the agency.

81:14

It was wet film and allowed the CIA to

81:17

understand what was actually going on on

81:19

the ground in Soviet Russia. It was

81:21

photographing military bases.

81:23

So the spy plane was being built and it

81:24

was so secret, like only the president

81:26

knew about it. At the same time, nuclear

81:29

weapons were being exploded next door,

81:32

right? So Area 51 and then over at Area

81:35

23 was where the the the bombs were

81:37

going off.

81:39

And

81:40

there was a I was interviewing all the

81:42

engineers who were building the spy

81:43

plane.

81:44

And Bob Murphy was one of the lead

81:46

engineers and he told me this story

81:48

about strategic deception. So,

81:50

he and others would go to the ranch,

81:53

that's what they called Area 51, then

81:54

they'd fly back to Burbank, California

81:55

where they all lived for the weekends to

81:57

be with their families. And they would

81:58

take the shuttle back and forth.

82:01

And one day, um they went to a big party

82:04

the night before and Bob Murphy got

82:05

drunk. He was not a guy who gets drunk,

82:07

but he got drunk.

82:09

He missed the shuttle.

82:11

And he was like, "Oh my god, I'm going

82:13

to lose my job. I'm in trouble." And he

82:14

opens the door, is how he described it

82:16

to me, to like,

82:17

you know, go out and deal with this. And

82:20

there's an FBI agent like about to knock

82:22

on the door.

82:24

And they tell and the guy turns white as

82:26

a ghost because Bob Murphy was supposed

82:27

to be on that flight, so he was on the

82:29

flight manifest and it crashed into

82:31

Mount Charleston on the way there and

82:33

everyone was dead.

82:34

Okay?

82:36

So that is a dramatic thing to begin

82:38

with, but here's how it ties up with

82:39

strategic deception.

82:42

The CIA

82:44

learns that its aircraft full of U-2

82:48

engineers, pilots, designers, all these

82:51

incredibly important people on this top

82:52

secret project are dead. They just

82:55

crashed into Mount Charleston.

82:57

What are they going to do? How are they

82:59

going to keep this secret? All the news

83:01

stations are racing up to the top of the

83:04

mountain to try to get to the crash

83:06

site.

83:07

Oh my god, this is going to be the

83:09

project's going to be blown open. What

83:11

are we going to do? So they quickly rope

83:13

off the areas. They do the damage

83:15

control to the best that they can.

83:17

But they're spinning and I have all the

83:19

declassified documents from that part of

83:21

it, learning how worried they are.

83:22

There's

83:23

almost no doubt the project's going to

83:24

be revealed. The U-2 program is going to

83:27

be no more because once the Soviets know

83:29

about it, it's off.

83:32

And instead, the press

83:35

comes up with a story.

83:37

The press reports that it's all these

83:39

atomic scientists working on this secret

83:42

new weapon. They just completely make

83:43

this up in essence, right? It's this new

83:45

weapons project. And that's what they're

83:47

all doing. Who knows who put what bug in

83:49

someone's ear.

83:51

And so that's the story that comes out.

83:54

And the CIA is like,

83:57

"Perfect." And what I The story explains

84:00

that there are two kinds of strategic

84:02

deception. There's cover when you say,

84:05

like Bob Murphy said to his wife, "I'm

84:07

just an engineer working out there on

84:09

some television systems." That's cover.

84:11

That was his cover. He didn't say I'm

84:13

working on the U-2 spy plane. And then

84:16

there's disinformation.

84:18

When the press reports that the crash

84:22

was full of a bunch of atomic engineers

84:24

working on a secret weapons program.

84:26

And those are both kinds of strategic

84:27

deception. And so you begin to realize

84:31

that

84:32

there is a purpose behind a lot of

84:35

information coming out into the public.

84:37

And the CIA often uses that to its

84:41

advantage. And so whenever a situation

84:43

happens, you have to say to yourself,

84:45

"Is this really what happened? Or is it

84:47

covering up something else?" And then of

84:50

course you have to put your rational

84:51

person

84:52

hat on and you can't just imagine

84:56

what the true story might be. You have

84:59

to actually find it and report it. Does

85:01

the CIA

85:03

um or the I think in the UK it's called

85:05

MI5 or MI6. MI6, I think it's the

85:07

equivalent. Does MI6, all of these sort

85:09

of special secret service agencies

85:11

around the world, do they work with the

85:13

media?

85:15

That's a much That's a totally separate

85:17

podcast. We could talk forever because

85:19

there's history of the CIA. I and I'm

85:21

not an expert on foreign intelligence

85:24

agencies as much as I am on the United

85:25

States. But by all means, there's a long

85:27

history of the CIA working with uh

85:31

journalists, reporters, authors,

85:34

um

85:34

to

85:36

put information there. I mean, there's

85:38

almost nothing that the CIA hasn't done

85:41

to my eye. The question is, you know,

85:44

reporting it in the context of

85:48

how that's happening. I wrote about in

85:50

The Pentagon's Brain, if you want a

85:52

little homework, you know, and you go

85:53

into the back and in the index and look

85:57

up brainwashing.

86:00

And there's a long story

86:03

uh where I talked to where I explain

86:06

exactly how this happened in the '50s

86:10

with

86:11

what ultimately an element that became

86:13

known as the MKUltra program, okay? So

86:15

like MKUltra was a real program and it

86:18

had a lot of sinister components to it.

86:21

Is it everything that, you know,

86:24

certain

86:25

groups of people that sometimes get

86:27

called conspiracy theorists say that it

86:30

was? No. But there are threads of truth

86:32

in it. And if you reverse engineer the

86:35

brainwashing concept from the back, you

86:37

will see what I'm talking about. And

86:39

it's I think it's a very interesting

86:40

story cuz it actually involves

86:41

the head of the CIA, a guy called Allen

86:43

Dulles, and his son who got brain

86:46

damaged in Korea, whom I tracked down

86:49

and interviewed for that book. Spoiler

86:52

alert.

86:54

What what happens?

86:57

Which part? I mean,

86:58

which part of I'm so I'm so compelled by

87:00

the the whole idea of the CIA because we

87:02

we had somebody here recently talking We

87:03

had Andrew here recently talking about

87:05

what goes on in the CIA and

87:07

I think um one of the things he said to

87:09

me is that the role of the CIA has

87:10

changed over time and once upon a time

87:13

it was

87:14

more capable of doing more things. And

87:17

by the way he described it, it sounded

87:18

like the CIA has less powers and can do

87:20

less of the things that it's been

87:22

accused of in the past. I think it's

87:24

been accused of killing the president

87:25

here

87:26

by some people or being involved in the

87:28

assassination of one of the presidents

87:30

here.

87:31

Um and

87:33

does the CIA report directly into the

87:34

president?

87:35

The CIA features in almost every one of

87:37

my books.

87:39

Um

87:40

the most sort of comprehensive look I

87:43

did at the CIA was a book called

87:45

Surprise, Kill, Vanish, which is about

87:47

the CIA's paramilitary.

87:49

And once I reported that, I understood

87:52

that there are actually two very

87:53

distinct components of the CIA. There's

87:56

the sort of Central Intelligence Agency,

87:59

the primary

88:01

um human

88:02

It's called human intelligence. And

88:04

there's analysts and there's espionage.

88:06

And And then there is the

88:08

paramilitary organization, which was set

88:13

up in 1947

88:15

specifically to go against the Russian

88:19

version of itself.

88:22

Sort of to do the darkest,

88:24

dirtiest,

88:26

nastiest

88:27

operations that we had to because the

88:30

Russians were. And so,

88:32

you know, the CIA is a is a is a giant

88:36

organization with a lot of tentacles.

88:39

And I think it's important to

88:41

speak, at least for me, having reported

88:44

on many of these different programs. You

88:46

know, Area 51 covers the aerial

88:48

espionage element of the CI, the science

88:50

and technology. The CIA was responsible

88:53

for putting the first satellite in

88:56

space, the Corona program.

88:58

Dr. Bud Wheelon, who I interviewed for

89:00

Area 51, remarkable

89:03

intelligence, surveillance, and

89:04

reconnaissance programs. And then you

89:06

have the paramilitary operators, the

89:08

trigger pullers,

89:10

uh the snake eaters, the individuals

89:13

who, you know, find, fix, and finish

89:16

people. That's a euphemism.

89:19

Um

89:20

the teams that do that.

89:22

But I prefer to speak very specifically

89:26

on programs because I find it's

89:29

the most

89:30

it it's the most responsible or the most

89:33

factual way for me to stick to a certain

89:36

lane of the agency because it is so

89:39

vast.

89:40

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90:36

On the the nuclear war subject, we

90:38

talked a little bit about um another

90:40

thing that has what we I kind of alluded

90:42

to it that has emerged since you started

90:43

writing this book, which is the

90:44

conversation around artificial

90:45

intelligence.

90:47

And when I start thinking about how you

90:48

overlay that with this idea of nuclear

90:50

war, it becomes even more

90:52

um concerning because we're heading

90:55

towards a world of what they call

90:56

artificial general intelligence, where a

90:57

lot of these systems will be making

91:00

autonomous decisions. They'll be able to

91:02

and a couple of people that I've spoken

91:04

to from DeepMind or from um Google have

91:07

talked to me about a world where

91:10

this is an extreme case, but our elected

91:11

leaders will be

91:13

either AI themselves or being basically

91:15

working in lockstep with AI. And And

91:18

then when you think about our nuclear

91:19

weapon systems, who is better to make

91:21

that decision? Is it a Joe Biden that's

91:23

better to make a decision to launch a

91:25

nuclear weapon, or is it some kind of

91:27

artificial intelligence that is so

91:29

advanced

91:30

we might not even know what it's

91:31

thinking or doing. Have you thought much

91:33

about artificial intelligence since this

91:34

book came out and since you started

91:36

writing? Absolutely. It's something I

91:38

covered at length in The Pentagon's

91:41

Brain, which is the book about DARPA.

91:43

And I think

91:45

that

91:45

maybe I'll speak to an origin story

91:47

here, right? Because I think of

91:48

Shakespeare, it's like what is past is

91:50

prologue. We can understand better the

91:52

question you raise, especially for

91:54

younger people, like, what is this going

91:56

to look like in the future? Is a

91:57

president really going to be working in

91:59

consort with AI?

92:01

If we know, wait, how did this all

92:03

begin? It somehow, at least to my eye,

92:08

becomes easier to

92:11

think about these things in a grounded

92:13

manner.

92:15

And so

92:16

I'll throw this detail at you. In In

92:19

reporting The Pentagon's Brain, it was

92:21

fascinating to learn that during World

92:23

War II, computers

92:25

were people.

92:28

A computer was someone who computed

92:31

mathematical

92:33

you know, call right

92:35

trajectories, bomb explosions were all

92:39

measured by people and pencils.

92:43

And right? So, then and I love the smile

92:45

because suddenly it all becomes easier.

92:47

Then you have a guy called John von

92:48

Neumann, the the The Pentagon's Brain.

92:51

He was the first brain that the Pentagon

92:54

really was interested in. And he created

92:57

one of the first

92:58

computers. You can't really assign the

93:00

first computer to anyone, but there was

93:02

a computer that was doing calculations

93:04

for

93:05

called ENIAC. And ultimately after the

93:08

war, von Neumann went to the Atomic

93:11

Energy Commission, the most powerful

93:13

organization in the world at the moment,

93:15

and said, I want to build a computer

93:17

that can actually think for itself. That

93:21

can He's kind of the progenitor of this

93:23

idea of software, not just hardware. So,

93:26

for a long time it was kind of Texas

93:27

Instruments type computing, almost just

93:30

like a giant calculator.

93:32

And von Neumann

93:34

wanted to put the brain inside the

93:37

calculator.

93:39

And they gave him a lot of money to do

93:41

it, and he did this in the basement of

93:44

Fooldall over at the Princeton Institute

93:46

for Advanced Study.

93:48

And it was giant vacuum tubes, and he

93:50

would do these tests, and I describe

93:52

this in The Pentagon's Brain, because

93:55

it's really interesting to think this

93:57

was only in 1945.

94:00

There were vacuum tubes and, you know,

94:02

cords, and they had to worry about mice

94:04

eating cords, and John von Neumann was

94:06

so brilliant and smart that his he could

94:10

beat the computer initially.

94:12

The his assistants would give him

94:14

numerical calculations, he would do them

94:16

in his mind, the computer would be

94:17

trying to do them, he would win.

94:20

And then one day, and like I think it

94:22

was 1946 or 1947, the computer beat him.

94:27

That was the moment that von Neumann

94:29

realized computers are going to be

94:32

computers just got smarter than me,

94:34

than man.

94:36

And then he began

94:38

to develop and systems, the Defense

94:41

Department began to put an extraordinary

94:43

amount of money into computer systems.

94:45

And if you really want to know where

94:47

they took off, cuz this has to do with

94:48

AI.

94:49

This is man-computer interface. The

94:53

Defense Department hires a guy called

94:55

Licklider

94:56

to essentially shrink computers down

94:59

from the size of a a house

95:02

to the size of this room. And think of

95:03

what they are now.

95:05

So, the Defense Department has always

95:07

led with artificial intelligence, which

95:09

is computer-based.

95:11

And when you can see that origin story,

95:14

you can begin to understand where we're

95:15

going. And AI had to have these military

95:19

the the benefits of these military

95:21

systems

95:23

to develop, right? Like nanotechnology.

95:26

Things had to start becoming smaller.

95:29

And that all happens in that book.

95:33

You know, not all of it, but in other

95:34

words, you can you can learn in a sort

95:37

of poetic manner the trajectory of

95:40

computers

95:41

and where they began not so long ago and

95:44

where we are now.

95:46

And it was in 1983 that DARPA, that

95:48

organization, decided that the battle

95:52

place the battlefield is no place for

95:56

humans. That was a statement of its

95:58

first robotic AI program.

96:00

I went on ChatGPT um a couple of months

96:02

ago, and I asked it, I said, could you

96:04

play out a scenario where the world ends

96:06

because an artificial intelligence

96:08

basically gets leaked out of its

96:11

out of the

96:12

computer that it was um

96:14

born out of born on. And it the scenario

96:16

that it played out involved nuclear war

96:18

because halfway, I think it was in step

96:20

three or four, it says that the AI

96:22

basically takes control of the nuclear

96:25

warheads

96:27

or at least some of them,

96:28

and then it kind of launches them at

96:30

other countries.

96:31

And

96:33

it hearing ChatGPT

96:37

say that

96:38

and and it and in step three or four use

96:41

nuclear weapons as a way to kind of make

96:43

the world extinct, it felt plausible.

96:46

Okay, so I'm going to push back against

96:48

that, and which is by no means right.

96:50

I'm not right. But we're just having a

96:52

like sort of theoretical conversation

96:53

here.

96:54

ChatGPT is gathering its information,

96:56

right? So, my I would argue that ChatGPT

96:58

has got a lot of information from The

97:00

Terminator movie. Yeah. Okay? There is

97:02

that in the zeitgeist of what happens.

97:05

Then I want you to consider that

97:09

the communication systems in nuclear

97:11

command and control, which is actually

97:13

nuclear command control and

97:14

communication,

97:16

the the ability to for

97:19

NC3 to communicate with the actual

97:21

weapons is so profoundly classified that

97:23

I don't have access to it. But I'm going

97:25

to give this to you as an idea.

97:27

What I do know and learned reporting

97:29

nuclear war scenario is a fascinating

97:31

detail that stands as an analogy, at

97:34

least for me,

97:35

which is how analog

97:38

our ballistic missile systems are

97:40

because of the exact

97:42

fear that you describe or that and that

97:44

ChatGPT

97:46

described back at you.

97:47

And will they stay that way forever?

97:51

Probably not, but are they that way

97:53

right now? From what I understand, yes.

97:56

Our submarine-launched ballistic

97:58

missiles

98:00

that that are just so the technology

98:02

behind them, and I I delineate it for

98:05

the reader, you it's it's astonishing

98:07

that you can launch a missile

98:09

from underwater, it can breach the

98:12

surface,

98:13

it's afterburners take off, and then it

98:15

begins its trajectory, you know, boost

98:18

phase, midcourse phase,

98:21

terminal phase, hits the target. This is

98:24

incredible.

98:25

And how does it get there?

98:28

You might ask. I asked. It gets there by

98:31

starsighting.

98:34

Oh, really?

98:36

So, you realize there's this little

98:37

panel that opens up in the ballistic

98:40

missile.

98:41

And there are other ways that it's

98:43

navigating. But the primary mean of

98:45

navigation is starsighting.

98:48

Right? I mean, you just have to really

98:49

stop and go, oh my first of all, it's

98:52

actually really interesting concept that

98:54

the

98:55

most advanced, potentially

98:57

civilization-ending

98:59

ballistic missile is guiding itself to

99:02

its target by this ancient concept,

99:07

like that our hunter-gatherer ancestors

99:10

used, which is looking at the stars.

99:12

It's looking at the stars and then

99:13

navigating using them.

99:18

And that's meant to be

99:21

a defense against a system an enemy

99:25

taking control of your nuclear weapons.

99:28

The issue we have is that there's

99:30

potentially nine or 10 different nuclear

99:32

powers

99:33

and they don't all have the same system.

99:34

So, if a if we get to the point of AGI,

99:37

which a lot of people almost see as the

99:39

singularity, almost you can't see past

99:41

moment where there is a new being

99:43

amongst us that is capable of

99:46

thinking faster and more expansively and

99:48

more intelligently than humans. It knows

99:49

things we don't.

99:51

I think it might look at our systems as

99:53

child's play. As maybe not our systems,

99:55

but maybe it'll look at North Korea's

99:57

systems as child's play. It might be

99:58

able to put that VCR into the system and

100:00

play out the nuclear simulation that

100:02

tricks those people into believing

100:04

they're being attacked and that Yes. And

100:07

so Which is maybe time for the answer to

100:10

your question of should we be at zero,

100:12

right?

100:13

Yeah. So, what you have presented, which

100:16

would be the whole point of somebody

100:17

like me writing a book that somebody

100:18

like you would read of a younger

100:20

generation and begin having these

100:22

conversations with their colleagues and

100:25

their thought leaders and the people

100:27

that could maybe influence public policy

100:29

and saying

100:30

well, that would be a very good reason

100:32

to have zero nuclear weapons or, you

100:34

know, everybody gets 10. I'm making that

100:37

up, but right?

100:37

Yeah, yeah. Because if you have 12,500

100:40

nuclear weapons, it's better than

100:43

70,000,

100:45

but that's way too many for an

100:47

artificially intelligent, you know,

100:50

trigger scenario like you're talking

100:51

about.

100:55

Are you optimistic?

100:57

Optimistic about I I am

101:01

I mean

101:02

I am an optimistic person by nature and

101:05

so Do you think there will be a nuclear

101:07

war

101:08

in the course of humanity?

101:12

I

101:13

wrote this book as the optimistic

101:17

hopeful person that's saying read this

101:23

and realize

101:26

that a man-made problem has a man-made

101:29

solution.

101:30

Earlier you talked about there being

101:32

high consequence and low probability,

101:34

but the more the years tick on, that

101:36

probability increases by nature of there

101:38

being this mad king

101:39

Absolutely.

101:40

point. So, you know, and that's what I

101:42

think. So, I was asking myself,

101:43

eventually, if we if we play this

101:46

forward, I don't know, 1,000 years,

101:48

what what is most likely to cause the

101:51

end of humanity? Is it

101:52

a mad king somewhere who doesn't want

101:54

that, you know, he realizes that he's

101:56

going to either die, he's got cancer, he

101:57

realizes that, you know, he's got some

102:00

sickness and he doesn't really want that

102:02

his son to take power. He starts getting

102:04

a bit agitated, maybe he has some kind

102:05

of psychosis, schizophrenia, I don't

102:07

know, decides to in his

102:10

dying days to let a couple of these

102:11

things fly. Is that

102:14

eventually going to happen? The laws of

102:15

probability, the laws of averages say

102:17

that the longer we're here, the longer

102:19

we have these weapons,

102:20

the higher the probability.

102:23

I mean, I leave that to people like you

102:26

to think about and talk about because I

102:28

do and I am fascinated that I find that

102:30

people of your generation

102:32

ask that question a lot more than

102:35

perhaps people of my generation and

102:36

older. Like that was not a mindset that

102:39

people necessarily

102:41

had and talked about and I think that

102:42

has to do with the confluence of events

102:45

that you talk about. First of all,

102:46

people are

102:47

have access to information in a manner

102:49

they didn't,

102:50

you know, 30, 40 years ago or it took a

102:52

lot more effort. And also that there are

102:56

these incredible new threats that you're

102:57

talking about that are that you cannot

102:59

overlook. And so you would think that

103:02

it's time to kind of and I'm not a

103:03

Pollyanna, but you have to move away

103:06

from seeing everyone and everything as

103:08

an enemy and moving toward it's fine to

103:11

have adversaries. Having opponents is,

103:15

you know,

103:16

Sportsmen have opponents, right? But

103:19

everyone being an enemy and having, you

103:22

know, wars

103:24

escalating around the world, it seems as

103:28

if what you are saying is there has to

103:30

be a fundamental shift in what people

103:35

are considering important. But war has

103:37

always existed and it's existed as long

103:39

as humans have. So, it makes me think

103:41

that war is just part of humans trying

103:44

to coexist. And all of the things that

103:46

are hardwired into us, our search for

103:47

status and ego and reproduction and

103:50

resources and survival result in war.

103:53

Like they result in recessions.

103:55

So, I read a lot about the origin of

103:57

war. Like there it's a debate. No one,

103:59

you know, it but it is discussed and the

104:01

anthropologists, I think, have the most

104:03

interesting

104:04

sort of thoughtful concepts around it,

104:06

which I'll share with you, which is

104:07

this. Because yes, technically men there

104:10

has always been war. And that one of the

104:11

debates is, you know, did war begin with

104:14

civilization or were hunter-gatherers

104:15

warring?

104:17

But more interesting to that, I think,

104:18

is about the anthropologists who studied

104:22

in the '60s the hunter-gatherer tribes

104:24

like in the Amazon when there were still

104:26

access to them and they were sort of,

104:28

you know, they were unaffected by

104:30

civilization at all and they could look

104:33

at how they perceived

104:36

enemies. And an interesting idea came

104:39

out of that, which makes me think about

104:41

optimist versus pessimist, right? Sort

104:43

of or rather those who trust versus

104:46

those who are suspicious. That

104:48

that no matter if a hunter is out

104:50

hunting in a that's part of a

104:52

hunter-gatherer tribal environment and

104:56

he comes across another person,

104:59

obviously, there could be that person is

105:01

either threatening or that person is

105:03

someone to team up with against the

105:05

greater threat.

105:07

And the anthropologists do not know why

105:10

it is that some people

105:13

interpret this person with suspicion and

105:15

then might kill him

105:17

and others would interpret that person

105:20

as a teammate.

105:23

And so, if we don't know

105:26

how human, you know, is it genetics?

105:28

Like how do people

105:30

either fall on one of those two sides,

105:32

but what we do know is that people can

105:36

learn to think differently. You talk

105:39

with half your guests on the podcast

105:40

about this. People can be trained, not,

105:44

you know, propagandized, but people can

105:47

learn to think differently. So, if

105:48

you're me who

105:50

is a hopeful person and wants to see the

105:52

positive side of even my dark reporting

105:57

because that's a better choice for me

106:01

and for my family.

106:02

I train myself to find, if you will, the

106:06

silver lining or rather, if that's too

106:08

Pollyanna-ish, to find the way in which

106:10

how do I look at the person coming at me

106:13

as someone who could be on my team or

106:16

even an

106:17

an opponent, but not an enemy that I

106:20

would have to kill.

106:21

What's the most interesting thing that

106:22

you've written about that we haven't

106:23

discussed?

106:25

Of all the and I don't just mean in the

106:26

nuclear war, I mean in all these books.

106:28

I mean, I'm particularly fascinated by

106:29

DARPA because I think in a lot of the

106:31

world, especially in Europe, in the UK,

106:32

we we don't even know what DARPA means.

106:35

So, you know, it was interesting reading

106:36

about the existence of that. But in all

106:38

these books, what is the most

106:40

interesting thing, the most resonant

106:42

thing when you talk about your work to

106:43

people? Maybe that surprised you.

106:47

I mean,

106:48

every single one of my books is

106:50

powerfully important to me, not just

106:51

because of the information there, but

106:53

because the people I met along the way.

106:55

And I really could not sit, you know,

106:58

put one over the other because that

106:59

would be like favoring a child. And I

107:01

mean that literally, you know,

107:04

sometimes when I prepare to do a

107:05

podcast, I read my own books. And I and

107:08

I'm really

107:09

it for me, it's the it's the

107:12

it's the sum total of these incredibly

107:15

fascinating people I have had the

107:18

incredible fortune of interviewing and

107:21

also how

107:23

fate and circumstance always seems to

107:25

play a role in all of their lives and

107:28

that's maybe the theme that I take away

107:30

from all of this as opposed to the

107:31

specific shocking thing. Because

107:33

remember that many of the people that I

107:35

interview,

107:36

because they're war fighters or

107:38

intelligence agency people,

107:41

many of their friends have died.

107:43

Is there anyone you interviewed that

107:44

brought you to tears when you were

107:45

interviewing them? Oh, absolutely. I

107:48

can't I can't even I can't even say it

107:50

now cuz I might

107:51

Yeah.

107:52

Yeah.

107:53

going to ask you for the example. You

107:55

want the example? I'll tell you right

107:56

now.

107:58

It's a hard one. Um

108:02

So, I was just in

108:08

I was just in uh Brussels, I told you,

108:10

at the nuclear convention and

108:14

and I met a woman who was 1 year and 10

108:17

months when

108:20

the bomb was dropped on Nagasaki.

108:22

So, she's a survivor of the Nagasaki

108:24

bomb.

108:26

Right?

108:28

And

108:30

I met her, I brought her a signed copy

108:31

of my book, right? I mean, you just

108:33

think about being

108:34

a victim of that. And also, I learned so

108:38

much about the stigma that followed

108:42

the survivors of the atomic bombs

108:45

of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The stigma

108:47

because they were perceived as sort of

108:51

tainted people, tainted humans and there

108:54

was this deep fear of the legacy of

108:56

radiation.

108:59

And

109:01

I met her and I expected to just be so

109:03

composed, but in talking to her,

109:06

I got very emotional kind of, you know,

109:09

because you can't avoid that. And part

109:11

of the reason why I got so emotional was

109:14

that, and I haven't written about this

109:16

yet, but I will, is that

109:19

someone I interviewed and someone that

109:20

meant a lot to me and that I have

109:21

written about a lot wired

109:24

that nuclear weapon

109:27

that was dropped on Nagasaki.

109:33

And so, when you think about it,

109:37

and there's little old me, the reporter,

109:39

who fate and circumstance put in

109:41

Brussels last week at a Nuke Expo. You

109:44

couldn't make that up

109:46

if you were me, you know,

109:48

even a year ago, let alone 10 years ago,

109:50

let alone when I was a child.

109:53

And here I am, and one hand of my

109:57

reporting goes to that source that

109:58

worked with me for a very long time,

110:01

whose story I haven't written yet, who

110:03

wired the bomb that was dropped on

110:06

Nagasaki. And my other hand goes to

110:09

someone

110:10

who was there.

110:15

That

110:16

that wells you up.

110:18

Because it's the human condition.

110:25

Can you speak to this impact that

110:29

that had on both those individuals?

110:32

So,

110:33

starting with if we start with the

110:37

individual who was involved in wiring

110:38

that bomb.

110:40

Mhm.

110:44

So, and I know less about her than I

110:48

know about him, right?

110:50

And I've reached out to her and we will

110:52

do interviews now, okay? So, but for

110:55

him,

110:57

it impacted his whole life. And he

111:00

became a member of the Manhattan

111:01

Project, and he became uniquely tied

111:04

into the nuclear weapons industry.

111:07

So, these kind of long arcs of history

111:12

are so deeply interesting to me,

111:14

especially as I get older.

111:16

You move from

111:18

um

111:20

the intensity of specific missions that

111:24

people were on, of specific operations

111:26

they ran, and you begin to look

111:30

at a human

111:33

over the course of their life, and what

111:35

that means, because ultimately that's

111:37

the most interesting storytelling of

111:39

all. It's the most interesting

111:41

conversation you and I can have. And And

111:43

you have to get a little bit older to

111:46

know that, you know? But sometimes when

111:48

I'm interviewing people who are in their

111:50

80s and 90s, and I see them looking at

111:53

me,

111:54

and I like especially going back 15

111:56

years ago when I started reporting all

111:58

this, and I could see I can you know,

112:00

they're old and they're like earlobes

112:02

sag, and they have you know, incredible

112:04

wrinkles and

112:06

the course of their lives, what they

112:08

have done, and they're all involved in

112:10

these top formerly top secret programs,

112:12

and I can

112:14

I can

112:15

I sense them looking at me with this

112:18

sense of their own legacy, that they are

112:22

like, I'm telling her my story, and then

112:25

I'm going to be gone. And that's really

112:27

that's powerful.

112:30

It's a lot of trust as well, isn't it?

112:33

It It is. That's the role of the

112:36

reporter. You You work, at least my job

112:40

as an investigative journalist is like,

112:43

you know, I want people to trust me that

112:46

I am getting the in their information

112:48

down on the public record. And that has

112:50

a lot to do with why, you know, people

112:52

say, "How did you get so many people to

112:54

talk to you about nuclear weapons,

112:56

right?" So, to loop this back to

112:59

nuclear war scenario, I know I'm doing

113:02

my job, at least it feels like I'm doing

113:04

my job properly or earnestly, that I can

113:08

in the same week last week have two

113:12

people that are 100% part of the

113:14

military industrial complex, working for

113:16

the Space Force in Los Angeles,

113:19

you know, at a Space Force convention,

113:21

come to my house for dinner,

113:24

have a conversation with my family,

113:25

including my young son who's closer to

113:28

your age,

113:29

and then the week before have been with

113:31

peace activists

113:33

addressing members of the European

113:35

Parliament. I have my lane,

113:38

but yet all of these people are around

113:42

me.

113:43

They might not think they can get along,

113:46

but they probably can. And if I'm the

113:50

middle of the road of all of that, that

113:53

is important to me as an investigative

113:55

journalist, and but also like as an

113:58

American citizen as and as I said

114:00

earlier, as a as a mother.

114:03

That individual that wired that that

114:05

bomb, took took part in the Manhattan

114:07

Project, was involved in dropping the

114:09

bomb on the lady that you met recently.

114:13

How do they feel about that now in

114:14

hindsight with with their age and as

114:16

they look back?

114:16

He has died. Oh, okay.

114:18

He has died. Um and

114:19

How How did he feel about it?

114:22

There were other things that bothered

114:24

him more, which is

114:27

the great conundrum

114:29

of

114:31

using your own eyes to

114:36

perceive another person. And it's why I

114:39

have not written that book yet, because

114:41

it is still very confusing, and there is

114:43

a lot of mysterious elements of it. And

114:46

sometimes when people are involved in

114:47

really classified programs,

114:50

you have to spend a lot of time to

114:53

uh

114:55

dig and uncover and discover. It's a

114:59

long process.

115:01

Um and he was involved in some other

115:03

programs that

115:04

he had more intense thoughts about. And

115:08

that alone is enough to

115:10

I mean, the look on your face is the

115:12

look on my face

115:14

interviewing him. A happy man?

115:16

Absolutely.

115:18

Absolutely. Regret?

115:21

Yes, most definitely. Almost everyone

115:23

that I end up spending hours and hours

115:25

and hours with, that I would travel

115:27

with, and you know, another person that

115:28

comes to mind was Billy Waugh in the

115:30

Surprise Kill Vanish book, sort of the

115:31

longest serving singleton for the US

115:35

government as a paramilitary operator.

115:37

The saying goes, Billy Waugh killed more

115:39

people than cancer.

115:41

Okay? We traveled to Hanoi together. We

115:44

traveled to Havana together.

115:46

Um I spent a lot of time with him.

115:49

Uh they were you know, both of these men

115:51

were probably the two most powerful

115:53

sources I worked with in my life, in

115:55

their 80s and 90s. Both happy men?

116:01

Billy was more complex than happy, you

116:04

know? Um

116:06

you work hard to kind of get at the

116:11

to get at the character of someone, and

116:13

you you you you try the best to

116:15

represent them. But I mean,

116:17

you know, Billy had so many people um he

116:20

was involved in so many missions with so

116:22

many people that died that

116:24

I don't know if happiness is He

116:26

certainly wasn't ang- He certainly

116:27

wasn't sour,

116:29

but uh he had a lot of anger about a lot

116:32

of things. And then the lady, she was 1

116:34

and 1/2 years old when the bomb was

116:36

dropped. She survived as a baby. Mhm.

116:38

Her family, did they survive? Yes, and

116:40

it was it's fascinating. Um

116:43

uh I'm not saying her name because I

116:45

don't I I don't have quite her

116:46

permission yet, right? So, but um

116:48

although she is a public figure, but she

116:52

didn't know

116:54

about her story until she got older,

116:56

because it was kept hidden from her,

116:57

which is

116:58

So, these layers upon layers about what

117:01

we know about our own selves, you've

117:04

made me think of, which is you balance

117:06

that out with

117:09

ques- what you know about your own self

117:11

versus what how easy it is to to judge

117:14

someone else or perceive someone else.

117:17

And I think those two journeys in life

117:19

are interwoven always. Like, our own

117:22

journey for self-discovery,

117:24

right? In a way, you're on that with

117:26

your podcast, I'm guessing. You probably

117:28

learn as much about yourself

117:31

um as you do about others. I know I do.

117:33

I'm usually in your seat. Um and there's

117:35

no camera running. It's just a pen. And

117:38

so, I can learn so much from people

117:41

about how they speak, why they speak,

117:44

what they say to me, "I don't want this

117:46

on the record. I want you to know this

117:48

about me because it's important, but I

117:50

don't want it publicly known." And I

117:52

honor that, because in a way, being a

117:55

journalist is

117:57

being

117:58

a a trusted source that someone can

118:02

share information with within a context

118:04

that the person I I mean, knows the

118:06

groundwork about. Many people's

118:09

grandchildren's

118:10

grandchildren don't

118:12

they don't know what grandpa did.

118:15

And they might not know

118:17

for decades. I had a guy show up at one

118:20

of my book signings at the LA Times

118:22

Festival of Books just last Sunday. And

118:25

he had,

118:27

you know, a binder, and he said, "After

118:29

you're done signing, would you mind

118:32

looking at this binder and interpreting

118:34

it for me?" And of course I did, you

118:36

know? And his grandfather was a

118:38

seriously high-ranking person working on

118:41

nuclear sub launched ballistic missiles

118:45

in the early days of what was called the

118:46

Polaris experiment. And he had all these

118:49

documents, and no one in his family

118:50

cared about it. He had ID badges and

118:53

letters and pictures with the president

118:55

and picture and I could say to him, "Oh,

118:57

yes, this is the you know, I could give

118:59

him some context." And his wife was

119:01

there, and you know, it was just like

119:03

it's a great example of how

119:06

we sometimes have a desire to know about

119:09

our own selves and our own legacy. Where

119:11

did we come from? And then grandpa has

119:13

passed. And so my job is like getting

119:15

grandpa's story on the record.

119:18

That conversation you had um

119:20

since the book had come out with the

119:22

lady you met in Brussels.

119:24

Did it change how you viewed your your

119:26

book and the work you've done here

119:29

in writing this? Did it add an element?

119:31

Oh, it most certainly enhanced and added

119:34

and particularly that emotional one that

119:35

you saw for me when I think about that,

119:37

you know,

119:38

um

119:40

and I immediately had a long

119:41

conversation with my husband about it

119:43

when when I got home, right? Because I

119:45

use sounding boards to understand how I

119:48

even really feel about things, but

119:50

I already had a context to know about

119:52

survivors having read a lot of accounts

119:57

from survivors

119:59

to report the book and I mention

120:03

some of them. Setsuko Thurlow was a

120:06

survivor of Hiroshima and has given a

120:08

lot of incredible public statements on

120:12

the record to the United Nations and

120:13

elsewhere and I quote her in my book to

120:16

narrate the part of the story where we

120:18

learn about the bomb dropping on

120:19

Hiroshima and then I read a lot of the

120:22

ancillary material about that so I can

120:25

understand more

120:27

and try and a lot of work as a

120:29

journalist you're just at least if you

120:31

write narrative non-fiction as I do,

120:33

you're really trying to imagine

120:37

the situation. But then you meet someone

120:39

and it all becomes real. And that's

120:41

where the this comes in cuz it's not

120:43

just words on the paper. It hasn't been

120:46

When they say survivor

120:49

what what

120:50

how do you categorize or define a

120:52

survivor of a nuclear bomb?

120:57

Um there's a word in Japanese and I

120:59

don't want to get it wrong and it's

121:01

something like Hibakusha, right? So

121:03

forgive me for not having that word.

121:05

But um

121:07

that is an actual term

121:09

that is used by

121:12

anyone who

121:14

lived through

121:16

the atomic bombings in August of 1945

121:20

of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

121:23

So if you lived through it, you are

121:27

in that category of people. If you lived

121:29

through that Yeah, yeah, yeah. And so in

121:32

other words now

121:34

uh this was, you know,

121:36

79 years ago.

121:38

So most of the survivors you can just

121:42

think about the ages of the people

121:44

involved. Setsuko Thurlow is 90.

121:47

You know, she's she's

121:48

one she was a recipient of the who I who

121:51

I write about. Um

121:53

she was a recipient of the Nobel Peace

121:56

Prize in 2017 with a group of physicians

122:01

Dr. Carlos Omana and others whom I met

122:03

in Brussels that are all part of these

122:06

organizations working to reduce nuclear

122:09

weapons down to zero.

122:12

Right? They are against

122:14

nuclear war.

122:16

And their organizations work diligently

122:19

to bring the information to the fore and

122:22

to affect change at a geopolitical level

122:25

like the United Nations.

122:27

That conversation you have with your

122:28

husband when you got home that day after

122:30

meeting her.

122:33

What can you tell me about that

122:34

conversation?

122:36

It's probably like you have with your I

122:38

mean my husband and I've been married a

122:39

very long time. So he knows everything.

122:43

Um

122:44

there's also a joke that he has what's

122:46

called spouse privilege which he does,

122:48

right? You can tell your spouse anything

122:50

legally

122:53

But no, those conversations are

122:55

priceless. Those are the conversations

122:56

that allow me to try and peel back one

123:01

layer

123:02

of what the next book is going to be and

123:06

what the next book aims to do because I

123:09

am always working on the next book. I am

123:11

one of those people who loves writing.

123:14

And so and I also love evolving as a

123:18

writer. So you want to get better in

123:19

terms of the small mistakes you make and

123:22

you want to get better in terms of the

123:25

the intentions that you might have

123:27

thematically about conveying it. And so

123:29

thank you for pointing out to me

123:31

and I mean this sincerely is that what

123:33

you helped me realize is that

123:34

the next book is trying will try to move

123:37

more toward those themes of cause

123:41

that was him and effect that was her.

123:45

This idea that there are always

123:47

consequences.

123:49

And very real people on both sides that

123:53

you know

123:54

one could class as both victims and

123:57

innocent at the same time, I guess.

124:00

I've just a horrific situation.

124:02

Absolutely. I'm really intrigued now by

124:04

this idea that you almost have to embody

124:06

two roles. You're a human being but at

124:08

the same time you've got a job to do

124:11

here

124:12

and you've got a mission.

124:14

And when you meet that person who's who

124:16

is a survivor of a nuclear attack

124:19

those lines can understandably become at

124:22

at least in your head

124:23

the wall can drop between the two. And

124:25

as you you touched your heart, you

124:27

referred to your head which I think is

124:28

typically when you're talking about your

124:30

journalistic hat, but then we all have

124:31

hearts as well, thank God.

124:33

Um you come home and I don't know the

124:35

conversations I have with my partner.

124:37

I guess I I'm assuming, you know, the

124:39

conversation you have with your husband

124:40

there is about

124:43

the complexity of the emotions you feel

124:44

upon meeting that person.

124:46

Absolutely and what you do with that and

124:48

what that means and you want to be able

124:49

to have those conversations so that you

124:51

can I think

124:55

have both of those bring both of those

124:58

components into your

125:00

into your work. I mean

125:02

maybe with the exception being the

125:03

military or the CIA, the two

125:05

organizations I write about. You know,

125:07

Billy Waugh can't bring his heart into

125:10

the mission when he is assigned to go X

125:12

Y Z.

125:14

You know, find, fix and finish someone.

125:16

They're not allowed to tell that that

125:17

partner are they in the CIA? No.

125:19

I was told to you. And and so so what we

125:21

that aren't in the military or the

125:23

intelligence community have that luxury.

125:26

Is it a luxury?

125:27

I don't know, but it's a necessity for

125:29

me.

125:31

What if you couldn't?

125:32

I wouldn't be myself. I wouldn't I

125:35

wouldn't choose that. I could never be

125:37

in the military. I could never be in the

125:39

agency.

125:40

Because I I think you are asked to wear

125:44

a hat that removes your heart.

125:47

And that's not possible for somebody

125:50

like me. I mean we just figure out our

125:52

strengths and our weaknesses. Um and

125:55

society needs all of those people by the

125:56

way. That is what a democracy is. It is

125:59

made up of all kinds of people. I'm all

126:02

for that. It's why I have so many

126:05

friends and colleagues from different

126:07

worlds on different sides of the aisle.

126:09

They just make me think

126:12

more interesting things about the world

126:15

in which we all live.

126:18

We have a closing tradition on this

126:19

podcast where the last guest leaves a

126:20

question for the next guest not knowing

126:22

who they're leaving it for.

126:23

And the question that's been left for

126:25

you

126:26

was written in Europe when we were in

126:27

our studio then.

126:30

It is what is the last thing you changed

126:33

your mind about?

126:38

Well, I'll just

126:39

it comes this comes to mind only because

126:42

it's apropos to what we've been talking

126:43

about and it has to do with reporting

126:45

not my personal life which is maybe more

126:47

interesting to people. Um

126:52

I always strive to interview people

126:55

and ask them questions even if they are

126:57

hard, even if I have a preconception

126:59

that maybe they are the sort of bad guy,

127:01

shall we say, or the you know

127:04

perpetrator the what?

127:05

the perpetrator some something not

127:07

necessarily the bad but just that like I

127:09

might not my brain might not think I

127:11

agree with what they did or the project

127:13

they were on.

127:14

And there was a general that I was

127:16

trying to interview for the Pentagon's

127:18

brain and he had he was kind of the

127:21

creator behind what's called the soldier

127:23

super suit, okay? And that's a totally

127:25

different subject but that these idea to

127:26

make super soldiers, okay? Off of this

127:29

idea of the this concept called the

127:31

weakling on the battlefield that humans

127:34

feel fear and get fatigued and those are

127:36

not good things for soldiers and so

127:38

there are all these programs to try and

127:40

enhance our top tier military fighters

127:44

to become super soldiers. This is a

127:46

fact. And this one general was part of

127:48

that program and I had reached out to

127:51

him and asked him to interview with me

127:54

and I get it. Lots of people say you

127:56

know, I'm going to pass. I don't want to

127:57

interview. That's fine. But he ignored

127:59

me. And I felt slighted. And so I'm

128:02

telling on myself here from your view.

128:05

And so when I was writing my narrative

128:07

of the super soldier, he essentially was

128:10

kind of cast as the bad guy.

128:12

And then

128:15

I was in the editorial phase of the book

128:18

and I got an email from him and he said,

128:20

"I'm so sorry I didn't get back to you.

128:22

My wife had cancer."

128:27

And I what a valuable lesson. What a

128:30

valuable lesson.

128:32

And we did two interviews. And I told my

128:35

editor, "I have to rewrite that

128:36

chapter." And I did.

128:42

I mean that story speaks to a lot of the

128:45

subjects we spoken about today which is

128:46

when we

128:48

see someone as different, when we see

128:49

them as aliens, adversaries, enemies,

128:51

opponents

128:52

we are much more likely to treat them

128:55

as such, but

128:57

in reality it often turns out that we're

129:00

all very much the same, struggling with

129:02

the same things, with the same worries,

129:04

anxieties, concerns,

129:06

apprehensions, and it's just sometimes

129:08

when there's a bridge built, in the case

129:10

of that email, that we realize that

129:13

we're not enemies after all.

129:15

And that we don't need to be at war,

129:16

whether that's with words or whether

129:17

it's with

129:19

nuclear weapons.

129:21

And when you see that fellow

129:23

hunter on the path,

129:26

they might not be

129:28

the enemy. They might be someone to work

129:31

with.

129:32

It's very good of you to admit that,

129:33

Annie, because

129:35

what you're actually admitting is that

129:36

you're a human being.

129:38

Because we all do that kind of thing.

129:40

When we see someone as an adversary, I

129:41

think, as you say, it's feels like it's

129:42

hardwired into us in some way, but also

129:44

within that story we learn to

129:46

try and find or make the bridge

129:47

ourselves.

129:49

Which in the world we live in now, with

129:50

social media and stuff, is

129:52

doesn't seem to be um

129:54

easy or obvious for people, with all of

129:56

this polarization and such. And maybe if

129:58

the you know, if the US could make a

130:00

bridge with some of these foreign

130:02

adversaries, we wouldn't be talking

130:04

about nuclear war in your book, nuclear

130:06

war scenario.

130:07

Thank you so much for writing this book,

130:09

because

130:10

I'm a big believer and a big

130:12

um advocate of confronting the realities

130:15

honestly and openly, regardless of how

130:17

uncomfortable it is, because

130:19

if we don't, I think it actually

130:20

increases the probability of us

130:23

finding ourselves in a 72-hour

130:26

scenario, as you write about in the

130:27

book. And I The same thing

130:28

72 minutes.

130:29

72

130:29

Christ, only two hours. Did I say 72

130:31

hours?

130:31

Yes.

130:32

We all make Freudian slips. Okay. I wish

130:34

it was 72.

130:36

Well, no, I actually don't. I

130:37

Well, if it was going to happen, I'd

130:38

rather it just

130:40

happened in the blink of an eye. But um

130:42

but no, I think it's it's so, so

130:43

important to write. A lot of people

130:45

would be scared. A lot of people would

130:46

choose not to even click on this

130:47

conversation, because they're scared of

130:48

the subject matter. But I I think it's

130:50

leaning in that helps us to resolve and

130:53

find solutions and start the

130:54

conversation. And I know lots of people

130:56

listen to this. You never know, like

130:58

that

130:59

like that documentary or movie you

131:00

talked about earlier, who's listening

131:02

and the powers that they have, and the

131:04

decisions that they can make to change

131:06

things or to create one of those bridges

131:07

to to sort of denuclearize the world.

131:10

And that's the work you're doing. So, I

131:11

think it's very, very important work,

131:13

and I'm glad that you've committed your

131:14

brilliance to doing it. So, thank you.

131:16

Thank you so much for having me.

Interactive Summary

This episode features an in-depth conversation with investigative researcher Annie Jacobsen about her book 'Nuclear War: A Scenario.' She explains the devastating reality of a potential nuclear exchange, which would last only 72 minutes and likely result in global annihilation. The discussion covers the sobering reality of sole presidential authority to launch nuclear weapons, the mechanics of nuclear deterrence, and the psychological impact on those involved in nuclear weapon programs. Jacobsen stresses that by understanding these harrowing details, society can better advocate for policies that prevent such a catastrophe.

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