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Prediction Markets Are a Scam (With a Chart)

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Prediction Markets Are a Scam (With a Chart)

Transcript

717 segments

0:00

It's traditionally been understood that

0:02

financial markets exist to allocate

0:04

capital to its most productive uses.

0:07

Recently, however, the definition of a

0:09

productive use has been expanded to

0:12

include betting on whether a regaton

0:14

artist will wear a dress to a football

0:17

match. In the past, if you had wanted to

0:20

place a bet on Bad Bunny's wardrobe

0:22

choices or perhaps the precise timing of

0:25

an Iranian missile strike, you had to

0:27

find a man who conducted his business

0:29

behind a local pub. Today, the process

0:33

is a bit smoother. Through a rather

0:35

impressive piece of legal rebranding,

0:38

what the authorities used to call

0:40

gambling is now referred to as trading

0:43

event contracts. This means that when

0:45

you inevitably lose your money on these

0:47

platforms, you're no longer a degenerate

0:50

gambler. You're a retail liquidity

0:52

provider contributing to a truth

0:55

machine, which sounds much more

0:57

respectable. I wouldn't necessarily put

0:59

it on your CV, though. Reading up on

1:02

prediction markets is somewhat

1:04

exhausting. Unfortunately, we seem to be

1:07

determined to financialize every single

1:10

aspect of human existence. It used to be

1:12

that if you wanted to know if it might

1:14

rain tomorrow, you'd just look out the

1:16

window, but now it seems you have to

1:19

check the bid ask spread on a

1:21

precipitation swap. The advocates for

1:24

platforms like Cali and Poly Market

1:26

argue that they're providing a vital

1:29

public good. The theory is that by

1:31

allowing people to bet on anything from

1:34

congressional control to the next

1:36

Federal Reserve decision, the

1:38

information fed back will be far more

1:41

accurate than traditional polling, which

1:43

is a lovely idea. But looking closely at

1:47

how these markets actually work, it

1:49

appears that we haven't so much invented

1:51

a truth machine as put a glossy user

1:54

interface on a 1920s bedding shop. and

1:58

to make it even better, invited a group

2:00

of quantitative algorithms to come in

2:02

and extract money from the public.

2:05

Today, we're going to look at how these

2:06

markets actually work, the legal

2:09

absurdity surrounding them, why the

2:11

commodities regulator is suddenly

2:13

interested in elections, and whether any

2:16

of this makes the world a better place,

2:19

or if we've just turned the whole world

2:21

into a casino. To understand why the US

2:24

government is fighting with itself over

2:26

who gets to regulate a bet on a football

2:29

game, we need to go back to the origins

2:31

of American financial regulation and

2:35

specifically onions. In the United

2:38

States, there's a federal agency called

2:40

the Commodity Futures Trading Commission

2:42

or the CFTC. They were originally

2:45

established to oversee futures contracts

2:48

on things like wheat and cotton. The

2:50

idea was that these markets would allow

2:52

farmers and factory owners to hedge

2:55

their price risks while making sure that

2:58

these contracts weren't just illegal

3:00

gambling. For a long time, the CFTC

3:03

applied what it called an economic

3:06

purpose test. They only approved

3:08

contracts that served some hedging or

3:10

price discovery function. But over the

3:13

years, the exchanges realized that they

3:16

could generate significantly more

3:17

revenue by listing futures on interest

3:20

rates and stock indices. The CFTC went

3:24

along with this and the definition of a

3:27

commodity future was slowly expanded to

3:29

include things that are not really

3:31

commodities at all. A few years ago,

3:34

Bitcoin was even classified as a

3:36

commodity. while it's about as far from

3:39

being a basic raw material, agricultural

3:42

product, or physical asset as anything

3:44

could be. So, almost anything can be

3:48

considered a commodity with one notable

3:50

exception. Thanks to the 1958 Onion

3:54

Futures Act, you can trade futures on

3:57

almost anything in America, but it's

3:59

illegal to trade futures on onions. This

4:02

happened because in the 1950s, two

4:05

traders managed to corner the Chicago

4:08

onion market, artificially inflating the

4:10

price before crashing it entirely. The

4:13

chaos led to angry farmers and naturally

4:16

an act of Congress. So to summarize the

4:19

current state of American financial law,

4:22

you can legally bet on the outcome of a

4:24

geopolitical conflict. You can bet on

4:26

the future price of an internet meme

4:28

token. And thanks to platforms like

4:30

Kalshi, you can now bet on who will

4:33

control the United States Congress. But

4:36

if you attempt to hedge your exposure to

4:38

French onion soup, or really any onion

4:41

soup, the federal government will step

4:43

in to protect the public from you.

4:46

>> No soup for you.

4:48

>> Now, regulators used to frown on

4:50

gambling, but things have changed. But

4:52

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4:55

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10% off. Now, up until recently, the

6:19

CFTC has been quite skeptical of what

6:22

they call event contracts. They

6:24

explicitly banned contracts involving

6:27

war, terrorism, assassination, and

6:30

gaming. They also tried to ban election

6:33

contracts, arguing quite sensibly that

6:36

approving them would effectively turn

6:38

the commodities regulator into an

6:40

election cop. And this is not an

6:43

unreasonable concern. If you allow

6:45

people to trade contracts on election

6:47

outcomes, the CFTC is then responsible

6:50

for making sure no one is manipulating

6:53

those outcomes, which means that they

6:56

now would have to worry about whether an

6:58

election has been rigged or if foreign

7:00

governments are getting involved. The

7:02

CFTC was set up to make sure that wheat

7:05

prices are fair. Election monitoring may

7:08

be even further outside their mandate

7:10

than Bitcoin. One way or another, the

7:14

prediction market platforms decided to

7:16

push back. They took the regulator to

7:19

court, arguing that predicting an

7:21

election is not gaming. And somewhat

7:24

surprisingly, a federal judge agreed

7:26

with them. Having established the right

7:29

to offer election contracts, the

7:31

prediction market platforms naturally

7:33

decided to push their luck. Their logic

7:36

is fairly straightforward. If a

7:39

presidential election is just an event,

7:41

then a football game is surely also just

7:44

an event, too. So, earlier this year,

7:47

Kalshi began self-certifying sports

7:50

contracts. They started offering bets on

7:53

the Super Bowl, the NBA, and the

7:55

Masters. I say bets, but Kali would

7:58

obviously prefer if I said event

8:00

contracts. The distinction is important

8:02

to them, if not to anyone else.

8:06

This came as something of a surprise to

8:08

the individual American states. Since

8:11

the Supreme Court struck down the

8:13

federal ban on sports betting in 2018,

8:16

nearly 40 states have spent a great deal

8:19

of time and money setting up highly

8:22

regulated, heavily taxed sports betting

8:24

regimes. They have set up state gambling

8:27

licenses, compliance departments, tax

8:30

collection, the whole thing. No sooner

8:33

was that done when these tech companies

8:35

turned up offering what appears to be

8:37

functionally identical bets, but they're

8:40

claiming that they're completely exempt

8:42

from state gambling laws and state taxes

8:46

because their bets are technically

8:48

federal commodity swaps. If you are a

8:51

state gaming regulator who has spent the

8:54

last six years building out a licensing

8:56

framework, you might find this argument

8:59

somewhat frustrating.

9:01

A number of states have responded by

9:03

sending seize and desist letters.

9:06

Arizona has gone a step further and

9:08

simply filed criminal charges against

9:11

Kalshi for operating an illegal gambling

9:14

business, which is a bit of a step up

9:16

from a cease desist letter. Ohio has

9:20

taken an even more creative approach. A

9:23

company there is suing Kashi using the

9:25

statute of an. This is a British law

9:28

from 1710 passed during the reign of

9:32

Queen Anne, which allows third parties

9:34

to sue to recover other people's

9:37

gambling losses. The theory is that if

9:40

Kelshi is operating an illegal sports

9:43

book in Ohio, any enterprising person

9:46

can sue them to get the losing betters

9:48

money back. It's the sort of 18th

9:51

century legal instrument that you would

9:54

expect to find in a museum and not in an

9:56

active federal lawsuit against a Y

9:59

Combinator startup. But this is where we

10:02

are now. You might expect the Federal

10:04

Commodities Regulator to step in at this

10:07

point and clarify that a bet on the New

10:10

York Knicks is not in fact a vital

10:12

financial derivative. But they have not.

10:16

According to the Financial Times, the

10:18

CFTC has mostly just been avoiding the

10:21

question. Well, it's actually a bit

10:24

worse than that. Under the new

10:26

administration, the CFTC and the

10:28

Department of Justice have gone to

10:30

federal court to block the state of

10:32

Arizona from enforcing its gambling laws

10:36

against Koshi. So, the federal

10:38

government now appears to be deploying

10:40

its legal resources to defend a tech

10:43

platform's right to operate what Arizona

10:46

considers an unlicensed sports book,

10:49

overriding state law in the process.

10:52

Whatever your views may be on prediction

10:54

markets, you have to agree that this is

10:57

a rather unusual use of the Department

11:00

of Justice's time.

11:02

Now, if you're wondering why the new

11:04

administration might be so accommodating

11:06

to these prediction platforms, there's

11:09

one small detail that's probably worth

11:11

mentioning. A fellow named Donald Trump

11:14

Jr., who seems to be some sort of

11:16

relative of the sitting president, is

11:19

currently serving as a strategic adviser

11:22

to both Kalshi and Poly Market. I looked

11:25

up this fellow's background and he

11:27

appears to have no real work experience

11:29

in either strategy or advice. He seems

11:32

to be a reality TV star who also worked

11:35

for his dad's real estate company. I

11:38

can't think of why they hired him, but I

11:41

suppose it's still worth noting that the

11:43

president's son advises the companies

11:46

that the federal government is currently

11:48

shielding from state prosecutors. I'm

11:51

sure that it's it's all a coincidence.

11:54

Anyhow, if you ask the executives at

11:57

these firms why they deserve special

11:59

treatment from regulators, they won't

12:02

talk about the strategic advice they've

12:04

received. They'll instead talk about the

12:06

truth machine. The core argument in

12:09

favor of prediction markets is that they

12:12

provide more accurate information than

12:15

traditional polling or expert analysis

12:18

does. The idea is that when people have

12:21

to back their opinions with their own

12:23

money, they strip away their biases.

12:26

They bet on what they think will happen,

12:28

not what they hope will happen. The idea

12:31

is that the market absorbs all available

12:34

information and price is an objective

12:37

probability of an event occurring. It's

12:40

the efficient markets hypothesis applied

12:42

to everything, not just stock prices,

12:45

but elections, wars, weather, and

12:48

apparently bad bunny's wardrobe. Now,

12:51

this might sound great in a university

12:53

lecture hall, but the problem is what

12:56

happens when these ideas meet reality?

12:59

Because prediction markets are often

13:01

quite small and thinly traded, it

13:04

doesn't take too much money to move the

13:06

odds. And if the media is treating those

13:09

odds as objective truth, then buying the

13:12

odds might be a really efficient way of

13:14

buying positive press coverage. This has

13:17

happened already. During the 2012 US

13:20

presidential election, a single trader

13:23

lost around $7 million systematically

13:26

buying contracts on Mitt Romney to

13:29

artificially inflate his chances on a

13:31

platform called Inrade. The goal wasn't

13:34

to win the bet. The goal was to make the

13:37

race look closer than it actually was

13:40

and to keep voter enthusiasm high. $7

13:43

million is a lot of money to spend on

13:46

something that isn't a bet, but as a

13:49

media strategy, it's not bad. Cable news

13:53

covered in trades odds constantly.

13:56

More recently, in 2021, a YouTuber named

14:00

Brian Rose ran for mayor of London.

14:03

During the campaign, he was accused of

14:06

gaming the odds on the betting exchange

14:08

markets by allegedly having people place

14:12

bets on his unlikely victory. He could

14:15

then point to those betting markets as

14:17

evidence that he was a serious candidate

14:20

with real momentum, which journalists

14:23

then reported. So, if a wealthy

14:25

individual or a political campaign can

14:28

spend a few million dollars to move the

14:30

odds on a thinly traded prediction

14:33

market and then point to those odds as

14:35

evidence of public support, you haven't

14:38

really built a truth machine. You've

14:40

built a PR tool, but one that comes with

14:43

a chart. So, if prediction markets are

14:46

not entirely reliable as truth machines,

14:49

what are they actually for? To

14:52

understand the current boom, it helps to

14:54

look at the broader shift in retail

14:56

investing over the last few years.

14:59

Dimmitri Cafenus of the Hidden Forces

15:01

podcast uses the term financial nihilism

15:05

to describe what's been going on. The

15:08

idea is the traditional paths to

15:10

building wealth feel increasingly out of

15:13

reach for a lot of young people. So

15:15

instead of saving and investing

15:17

carefully, they try to get rich quickly

15:20

by putting money into crypto tokens

15:22

featuring pictures of dogs that were

15:24

pitched to them by edgy billionaires or

15:27

buying shares in bankrupt companies.

15:30

Prediction markets slot in perfectly

15:32

here. If you go back 5 years, crypto was

15:36

the exciting product that everyone was

15:38

talking about. But crypto is kind of

15:41

dull today. Bitcoin is up about 25% over

15:45

five years, which sounds okay until you

15:47

realize that a money market fund paying

15:50

4% with no risk at all would have gotten

15:53

you most of the way there. Your dad has

15:56

achieved triple the return of Bitcoin

15:58

over the last 5 years with his index

16:00

fund. And he didn't have to check his

16:03

phone at 3:00 in the morning or pretend

16:05

to understand what a layer 2 rollup is.

16:08

Michael Sailor is desperately trying to

16:11

make crypto seem exciting again by

16:13

structuring leveraged payouts that could

16:16

give you a return of 10% or wipe you out

16:19

entirely, which might not be the kind of

16:21

excitement most people need. At least

16:24

with prediction markets, you can watch

16:26

the sports you've bet on and have

16:28

something exciting to talk about, like

16:31

the fact that someone just bet $100,000

16:34

that the US government will announce the

16:36

existence of aliens at some point this

16:38

year. The problem with all of this is

16:42

that whenever a large pool of

16:43

enthusiastic retail money shows up

16:46

somewhere, the professionals are usually

16:49

not far behind. According to the

16:51

Financial Times, large quantitative

16:54

trading firms like Susahana and DORW,

16:57

firms that normally act as market makers

17:00

on stock exchanges, are now setting up

17:03

dedicated prediction market desks.

17:05

They're reportedly paying traders base

17:08

salaries of $200,000 a year to build

17:12

algorithms that systematically identify

17:15

mispriced contracts on these platforms.

17:18

So, on one side of the trade, you have a

17:20

person betting on the Super Bowl because

17:22

it seemed like fun, and on the other

17:24

side, you have a machine that does this

17:26

24 hours a day and never gets excited

17:29

about anything. This brings us to what

17:32

the gambling industry calls the sharks

17:34

and fish problem. In the early 2000s,

17:38

there was a huge boom in online poker.

17:40

Millions of amateurs, the fish, logged

17:43

on to play. But it didn't take long for

17:46

the professionals or the sharks to show

17:49

up. The professionals didn't play for

17:51

fun. They played the odds methodically,

17:54

and eventually they deployed bots to do

17:57

it for them around the clock. The

18:00

survival time of a new recreational

18:02

player on these sites was eventually

18:04

reduced to not very long. The amateurs

18:08

worked out that they were no longer

18:10

really playing a game. They were

18:12

donating their money to a server farm in

18:14

New Jersey. They stopped logging in. The

18:17

liquidity dried up and the whole

18:19

ecosystem collapsed. The sharks had

18:22

eaten all of the fish and then starved.

18:26

Today, prediction markets are full of

18:28

retail money and the platforms are

18:30

growing quickly. But unlike trading a

18:33

meme stock where the price is just

18:35

whatever the next person is willing to

18:37

pay, an event contract eventually

18:40

resolves to either true or false. There

18:43

is an actual answer. And if you're a

18:46

retail trader betting on a geopolitical

18:48

event based on a feeling and the person

18:51

on the other side of your trade is a

18:53

gamma neutral algorithm being run by a

18:55

multi-billion dollar hedge fund, the

18:58

odds are not in your favor. This is not

19:01

a skill gap that can be closed by doing

19:04

more research. It's a structural

19:06

disadvantage. When the quants have

19:08

extracted enough money from the retail

19:10

public, the excitement will wear off.

19:14

The platforms will likely be left with

19:16

sports betting, which the states will

19:18

eventually either regulate or shut down,

19:21

and a few novelty contracts that exist

19:24

entirely for marketing purposes. You'll

19:27

still be able to bet on whether Bad

19:29

Bunny wears a dress to a football match,

19:31

but the truth machine will be mostly

19:34

empty. Now, in fairness, there is one

19:37

thing prediction markets do better than

19:39

the traditional alternative. If you walk

19:42

into a sports book or open a DraftKings

19:45

account and you start winning

19:47

consistently, the sports book will

19:49

reduce your bet size, restrict which

19:52

markets you can access, or simply close

19:55

your account. This is standard practice.

19:58

The house is your counterparty and a

20:00

winning better is bad for business.

20:02

Several states have tried to pass laws

20:05

making this illegal, which tells you how

20:07

widespread it is. Prediction markets

20:10

don't do this because the platform isn't

20:13

your counterparty. It's a peer-to-peer

20:16

exchange. It just matches buyers and

20:18

sellers and takes a small fee. If you're

20:21

winning, the platform doesn't care.

20:24

someone on the other side of your trade

20:26

is losing and the platform collects its

20:28

fee either way. So in that sense,

20:31

prediction markets are structurally

20:33

fairer than sports books. Of course, the

20:36

reason you're winning on a prediction

20:38

market is most likely that you're a

20:40

quantitative algorithm. So this is

20:43

primarily good news for quantitative

20:45

algorithms. The traditional sports books

20:49

have noticed all of this. By the way,

20:51

DraftKings, FanDuel, and Fanatics have

20:54

all quietly launched their own

20:56

prediction market products while

20:58

simultaneously spending $48 million on a

21:02

super PAC to push for sports betting

21:04

legalization in states like Texas and

21:07

Georgia. So, they're fighting prediction

21:10

markets with one hand and copying them

21:12

with the other, which is a reasonably

21:14

common strategy in American business. If

21:18

you are a retail trader who's tired of

21:20

losing money to hedge fund algorithms,

21:22

you might be tempted to look for an

21:24

edge. In traditional financial markets,

21:27

acquiring non-public material

21:28

information and trading on it will

21:31

generally result in a conversation with

21:33

the authorities and eventually a lengthy

21:36

stay in a federal facility. In

21:38

prediction markets, however, insider

21:40

trading is often described by proponents

21:43

as a feature, not a bug. That's right, a

21:47

feature. If we look at recent events,

21:50

this feature appears to be working

21:52

remarkably well. Last summer, a Poly

21:55

Market user operating under the

21:57

pseudonym Rico Suave 666 made a series

22:01

of highly precise and highly lucrative

22:04

bets regarding the exact timing of

22:06

military strikes in the Middle East. It

22:09

later turned out that Rico Suave 666 was

22:13

not just a very astute reader of

22:15

geopolitical tea leaves. The Israeli

22:18

government arrested two men, including

22:20

an army reservist, for allegedly placing

22:23

bets using classified military

22:25

intelligence. So to be clear, a soldier

22:29

with advanced knowledge of when bombs

22:31

were going to be dropped used that

22:33

information to win money on what is

22:36

essentially a crypto gambling website,

22:39

which is not really what people have in

22:41

mind when they talk about the wisdom of

22:43

crowds. We saw something similar with

22:47

the capture of Nicholas Maduro. Shortly

22:50

after the United States announced the

22:52

operation, someone placed a series of

22:55

very large and very confident bets on

22:57

Poly Market that he would be removed

22:59

from office, walking away with a few

23:02

hundred,000.

23:04

It's not clear who placed those bets,

23:06

but they appear to have had a better

23:08

understanding of US foreign policy than

23:10

most of the US Senate. Now, if you ask

23:14

the operators and advocates of these

23:16

markets about this sort of thing, they

23:19

are surprisingly relaxed. They argue

23:21

that insider trading is actually a good

23:24

thing. The logic is that the insider

23:27

brings valuable information to the

23:29

market which makes the price more

23:31

accurate. The market absorbs the leak,

23:34

the odds adjust, and society gets a more

23:37

accurate forecast. This, they say, is

23:41

the troop machine working exactly as

23:43

intended. It's a rather creative

23:46

argument. If a military officer leaks

23:49

classified operational plans so that his

23:51

friend can win a few hundred,000 on a

23:54

cryptobetting site, we should apparently

23:57

all be grateful for the positive

23:58

externality of slightly more accurate

24:01

price discovery. I'm sure that the

24:04

soldiers involved in those operations

24:06

would be reassured to learn that their

24:08

safety was compromised in the noble

24:10

pursuit of market efficiency. The reason

24:14

insider trading is banned in the stock

24:16

market is fairly simple. If ordinary

24:19

investors believe the game is rigged,

24:21

that only insiders can win, they will

24:24

stop investing. And if people stop

24:26

investing, companies can't raise capital

24:29

to build factories, fund research, or

24:32

hire workers. The whole system depends

24:35

on participants knowing that the market

24:37

is at least roughly fair. One of the

24:41

reasons the US economy has been so

24:43

successful over the last 90 years is

24:46

that it's had some of the best

24:48

institutions in the world. fair

24:50

securities regulation, good consumer

24:53

protections, and a functioning legal

24:55

system. Americans invest confidently

24:58

because they broadly trust the system.

25:01

And American businesses have access to

25:04

capital because investors are willing to

25:06

put money in. In countries where

25:09

investors know they'll be ripped off,

25:11

they behave like the fish on the poker

25:13

websites did and log off. This is

25:16

extremely economically harmful.

25:19

Prediction markets don't raise capital

25:21

for anything. They don't fund new

25:24

businesses or build infrastructure. They

25:26

just move money from the pockets of

25:28

retail betterers into the pockets of

25:30

quantitative algorithms and apparently

25:33

people with highlevel security

25:35

clearances, which is a rather elegant

25:38

system if you think about it, just not

25:41

for the retail bers. You might think

25:44

that it doesn't matter. Prediction

25:46

markets aren't the stock market. But if

25:48

this market is overseen by the same

25:51

securities and commodities regulators

25:53

that oversee investment markets and the

25:56

public decide that it's all rigged, they

25:58

might not just log off from prediction

26:01

markets. They might start to wonder if

26:03

the entire system is rigged too. And

26:06

that kind of distrust once it sets in is

26:09

very difficult to reverse. So, if the

26:12

retail better is structurally

26:14

disadvantaged against quantitative hedge

26:16

funds and people with high level

26:18

security clearances, the obvious

26:20

question is what happens to them when

26:23

their money runs out. Since 2018, when

26:26

the Supreme Court cleared the way for

26:28

states to legalize sports betting, the

26:31

United States has essentially been

26:32

running a largecale experiment in what

26:35

happens when you make it very easy for

26:38

people to gamble from their phones. Now

26:40

that we've added prediction markets to

26:42

the mix, that experiment has now been

26:45

expanded to cover politics, pop culture,

26:47

and monetary bets. You can now lose

26:51

money on almost anything at any time of

26:54

the day without even getting out of bed.

26:57

The results of this experiment are

26:59

starting to come in too, and they are

27:01

not great. Recent academic researcher

27:04

highlighted by the economist shows that

27:07

the introduction of online betting in

27:09

the state is associated with a roughly

27:12

12point drop in average credit scores

27:15

along with higher rates of personal

27:17

bankruptcy and loan delinquencies.

27:20

If you make it incredibly easy for

27:22

people to gamble from their smartphones

27:24

24 hours a day, it turns out that a

27:27

rather large number of them will do

27:29

exactly that, right up until the point

27:32

where their credit cards are declined.

27:34

Now, you could argue that adults in a

27:37

free society should be able to spend

27:39

their money however they like. And I

27:41

mostly agree with that. I don't want to

27:44

be told how I can spend my money. It's

27:46

mine. If someone wants to bet their rent

27:49

money on a basketball game or the exact

27:52

date of a Federal Reserve rate cut,

27:54

that's their right. The prediction

27:56

market platforms would certainly agree

27:59

with this. They describe themselves as

28:02

neutral marketplaces facilitating price

28:05

discovery, which is a very dignified way

28:07

of describing a website where you can

28:09

bet on whether it'll snow in April. The

28:12

problem is that when millions of people

28:15

simultaneously damage their personal

28:17

finances, it stops being a private

28:20

problem. Loans start to go unpaid,

28:23

mortgages default, and eventually the

28:25

costs get absorbed by the broader

28:28

financial system. And the individuals

28:30

who fall into bankruptcy end up relying

28:33

on state and federal safety nets funded

28:36

by taxpayers who in many cases were

28:38

sensible enough not to gamble their rent

28:41

money on a basketball game. So when you

28:44

look at the mechanics of the whole

28:46

thing, prediction markets start to look

28:48

less like a truth machine and more like

28:51

a wealth transfer mechanism. The

28:53

platform takes a transaction fee. The

28:56

quantitative algorithms extract capital

28:58

from retail betterers. The insiders

29:01

extract capital from everyone and

29:04

society picks up the tab for the

29:06

bankruptcies and the unpaid bills. It's

29:08

a wonderful business model for everyone

29:11

except the people using it. Look,

29:14

prediction markets are not going to

29:17

destroy the American financial system.

29:20

The stock market survived bucket shops

29:22

in the 1920s, penny stock boiler rooms

29:25

in the 1980s, and whatever was going on

29:27

with crypto in 2021. It'll likely

29:31

survive this, too. But it's worth

29:33

noticing what has actually been built

29:35

here. a set of platforms that are

29:38

regulated as commodity exchanges,

29:40

advised by the president's son,

29:43

populated by hedge fund algorithms, and

29:45

the occasional military insider, and

29:48

marketed to 25 year olds as a fun way to

29:51

make sports more exciting. You can bet

29:53

on elections, wars, the weather, and the

29:57

wardrobe choices of regaton artists. You

30:00

just can't bet on onions because that

30:02

would be irresponsible. The advocates

30:04

call it a truth machine. The states call

30:07

it an illegal sports book. The quants

30:10

call it a new source of alpha. The

30:12

retail betterers call it entertainment.

30:15

The reality is probably somewhere

30:17

between all of these. A financial

30:19

product that is too sophisticated to be

30:22

called gambling and too simple to be

30:24

called investing. operating in a

30:26

regulatory gray zone that exists mainly

30:29

because no one in Washington can agree

30:32

on what it actually is. We haven't

30:34

really invented a truth machine. We've

30:37

just found a more elaborate way of

30:39

losing money and given it a chart. If

30:42

you found this video interesting, you

30:44

should watch my video on Micro

30:46

Strategies infinite money glitch next.

30:49

Don't forget to check out our sponsor

30:51

Plaude using the link in the video

30:53

description. Talk to you in the next

30:56

video. Bye.

Interactive Summary

The video examines the rise of 'prediction markets' or 'event contracts'—platforms like Kalshi and Polymarket that allow betting on political events, sports, and other occurrences. While proponents claim these platforms are 'truth machines' that provide accurate information through market consensus, the analysis suggests they function more as wealth transfer mechanisms. Retail bettors are often disadvantaged against sophisticated quantitative algorithms and individuals with insider information. The video also highlights the legal and regulatory confusion surrounding these platforms, which operate in a gray zone between commodities and gambling, and warns of the potential societal and financial risks for individual participants.

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