Long Siege, US Plan For Iran Mirrors Syria Playbook
333 segments
All right, Alexander. Let's talk about
the situation in Iran, or actually the
situation between Iran and the United
States
and the the deal that will be signed
maybe maybe today, maybe tomorrow.
Who knows when, but all all signs, at
least from the Trump administration and
some signs from from Iranian officials,
including the foreign minister, is that
we're very close to the signing
of this MOU. Of course, we've heard that
40 times before. So,
what's what's the situation? Or how do
you see things?
>> The the thing that makes it look as if
this time it is for real is that the
Iranians appear to be saying that we are
indeed close to this.
And it's not been widely talked about,
but there was a meeting between Iran
representatives from Iran, China, and
Russia. So, it looks as if the Iranians
were briefing the Chinese and the
Russians about the deal, and that
suggests and the Pakistanis are also
saying that we are about to get a deal.
It could be signed on Sunday
or it might be signed a little later,
but we are close to a deal. If so, then
everything that I'm hearing about it um
everything I'm learning about it
suggests it is exactly the same deal
that was there basically on the table
about two, three weeks ago. And then if
you remember, we had a troop of neocons,
uh um
um uh Lindsey Graham, um um
um others as well, Ted Cruz, all came
out and criticized the deal. Netanyahu
telephoned Trump. The deal then fell
apart at the last moment. We then had an
extraordinary period of military
escalation that lasted for several uh
weeks.
Uh and then uh we've gone through all of
that. Nothing much has been achieved
during that period. In fact, nothing at
all has been achieved in that period.
Inflation numbers are rising in the
United States. Trump's popularity in the
United States has been falling. And
well, it looks like we're back to where
we were
two or three weeks ago as I said with
the essentially the identical deal was
on the table.
>> This is not really
an end to to the conflict. What you're
looking at if this does get signed.
You're you're looking at at an MOU and
the beginning
of real negotiations. I mean, that's
that's what we're talking about here.
This is not going to This is not a a
deal that ends everything and and all
the fighting has stopped.
And we've come to some sort of a
resolution between the the various
sides. We're looking at real
negotiations
beginning for 60 days.
>> This is a vitally important point. We
are not anywhere close to an actual
deal. All we are looking at in effect is
an extension of the current ceasefire.
Now, there going to be certain things
that will happen supposedly as a result
of that. The Strait of Hormuz is going
to be reopened, but it's going to be
reopened with the Iranians still
in essential control. They're not going
to be levying fees apparently. But they
are going to still be there. The United
States is going to back off its sea
blockade. But essentially, it is a
return to the situation which existed
before the 28th of February when the
conflict began except of course with the
critical difference that before the 28th
of February, the United States thought
that it could attack Iran,
achieve regime change, or at the very
least
push the Iranians towards some sort of
capitulation.
And now they know that they can't and
that Iran is much more powerful and much
stronger than they assumed it was. So,
the balance
the the balance of negotiating power
will have shifted in favor of the
Iranians. But, that doesn't mean that
the deal is uh done or anything like it.
It doesn't mean that we don't have a
real possibility of a return to conflict
later. The Iranians early on in the war
said that they were not going to end the
conflict. They weren't going to stop
fighting until there was a final
settlement agreement because they
worried that if there was an interim
agreement, a temporary ceasefire in
effect, which is what we are getting,
then the Americans would go back, come
back, and they would try again, and
there would be another war. They were
saying this very clearly throughout
March. And then China told them, "You
have to agree to a ceasefire." And they
agreed to a ceasefire. And this prolongs
that ceasefire. But, it doesn't mean
that we're going to get a final
agreement between the United States and
Iran on nuclear issues, on any other
issues.
There's a possibility that we could be
back in a war situation. But,
nonetheless, and notwithstanding,
the balance of strength now has tilted
much further towards Iran.
>> Is this just about buying time, even if
we get a signature to this MOU?
Is this really all about buying time for
the United States and and Israel? They
They can restart, they can rearm.
They can rethink
how to go after after Iran.
Of course,
this also gives Iran time as well. If if
they're coordinating with China and
Russia, this gives them time to to
prepare as well.
Um is is much of this just about media
optics at least for President Trump to
have this virtually signed on his
birthday while he has the the big MMA
fight and 250 years and and all of all
of this Bretton Woods stuff for him to
have this this deal signed today
virtually.
He can then come out and give give a
speech and then talk about how he's the
peace president and he's resolved 10
wars or 15 wars or whatever. Give me a
Nobel Peace Prize. It's my birthday,
everybody. I mean,
is that what this is really about? Are
are we
are we seeing both sides trying to to
genuinely
figure out how to how to end the
fighting? It doesn't feel like that's
that's what's going on.
>> It is exactly how you have described it.
There is no good faith and no trust
between these two sides. As far as the
Israelis are concerned, this is
obviously unfinished business. The
Israelis absolutely still want regime
change in Iran. If you follow the
Israeli media as I do, you can see that
there has been no change in Israel's
long-term objectives with respect to
Iran. Netanyahu's objectives have not
changed. Um Netanyahu doesn't want this
agreement um
because he worries that the Iranians
will use it to strengthen their
positions. But of course, if there is a
ceasefire, you are absolutely correct.
That is exactly what each side is going
to do. They are going to prepare for the
next round. Now, here we come back to
that meeting between the Iranians, the
Chinese, and the Russians because I
assume that the Iranians understand this
perfectly well. They probably realize
that it's very unlikely that even the
terms of the MOU are going to be
implemented. I mean, the chances that
the US will unfreeze assets and pay back
Iran money, I would have thought are
nil, actually. So, this is preparation
for the next round. The question is, who
will prepare faster
and better?
And Iran, this time, I think, probably
understands that
in the future, it does need to accept
more of the help that it's been
previously offered by its friends. And I
suspect that's what that meeting with
the Iranians and the Chinese and the
Russians was about. So, we we will
probably be back in war in a year's
time.
>> If if everything gets signed and we have
60 days.
>> If everything gets signed and we get
>> is is is quite a long time.
>> And realistically, 60 days is not going
to be enough for a final agreement. Not
Not Not over such a very complicated
issue as the one we're seeing. And with
so many outside parties, the Israelis on
the one hand and the Chinese and the
Russians on the other, different
factions within Iran, different factions
within the United States, very very
difficult to And no negotiating team
on the part of the United States. I
mean, unless if we're talking about Wed
Golf and Kushner, they're not going to
be able to negotiate anything. So, um
it's Expecting that this is going to be
resolved fully and completely and
finally in 60 days is, I think,
completely unrealistic.
>> Look, with the money, they found a
workaround. I I wouldn't be surprised if
Iran gets some money, 3 billion, 6
billion, 10 billion. Um
They They figured that out. Qatar and
and the UAE will give that money to Iran
so the United States can say well we
didn't give any money to to Iran and and
that's important for Trump because Trump
is bashing Obama all the time because he
sent pallets of cash to to Iran. And so
it's very important for Trump not to
appear to be giving money
to Iran. So they figured that one out.
They told Qatar just give them 5 billion
or 10 billion. What's 10 billion to
Qatar, right? Anyway, so so they figured
that part out.
Uh the the thing that that that it looks
looks like to me is going on
just to wrap up the video is that the
the United States forget about Trump.
The US strategic planners, the the war
planners, and the deep state in the
United States has figured out that the
best approach, given everything that's
happened, perhaps the only approach to
pick apart Iran now
is is to to do it like they did Syria.
Yeah, over time. Step by step so you
have this this slow burning conflict
that starts and stops, starts and stops,
and and you have all of this stuff going
on over over 6 months, a year, 2 to 3
years, whatever. Even the administration
changes and you get a new
administration. But over time
they're they're they're thinking we can
pick apart Iran in much the same way
that we picked apart Syria. I mean
is is that how how you're seeing it? It
doesn't look like they're they're
thinking about going for the quick
knockout anymore. Obviously they're not
going to get the quick knockout win
anymore, which is what Trump would have
preferred to have, a 2-3 day uh
uh strike on Iran, regime change, and
you get the the win like in Venezuela.
That's not going to happen. So
you move to the next scenario which is
to try and and just degrade them over
time.
>> The long siege, which is exactly what
the Iranians were afraid of and what the
the supreme leader who was killed,
Ayatollah Khamenei, warned against that
Iran needed to try and avoid a long
siege. And I think that is exactly the
strategy the Americans and the Israelis
are going to follow. The Americans in
particular are going to follow. It'll be
exactly as you say.
Um the Syrian
scenario worked in Syria.
But it need not have worked in Syria. Um
what made it possible in Syria was
certain very
unwise decisions
made by the Assad government, by Assad
himself,
and by some of his officials.
Iran is in a much much stronger country
than Syria ever was. And if the Iranians
use the time that they are given and
work efficiently
and successfully,
then they can defeat that, too.
But they need to work with their
friends. They can't afford to just try
and do everything by themselves because
a long siege is indeed going to put
enormous pressure on Iranian society.
>> Yeah. And if they make one mistake, one
misstep, and they're not working with
their partners, with BRICS, their
friends, their allies,
>> Yes. Yes.
>> then they then the US and Israel will
capitalize on it.
>> Absolutely.
>> Yeah. Just like they did in Syria.
Correct. And Assad made some some
critical mistakes. Yeah.
>> Exactly.
>> And they capitalized on it. All right.
We'll end the video there. The Duran
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>> [music]
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Ask follow-up questions or revisit key timestamps.
A conversa aborda a iminente assinatura de um memorando de entendimento entre os EUA e o Irã, que funcionaria essencialmente como um prolongamento do cessar-fogo atual, em vez de uma resolução definitiva do conflito. Analisa-se que a balança de poder pendeu a favor do Irã, que não é mais visto pelos EUA como um alvo de fácil "nocaute" ou mudança de regime. O cenário futuro provável é descrito como um "longo cerco", uma estratégia semelhante à aplicada na Síria, onde os EUA e Israel buscam degradar o Irã lentamente ao longo do tempo, forçando-o a depender de alianças estratégicas com China e Rússia para resistir à pressão.
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