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Gilbert Doctorow : Has Modern Warfare Become a Drone Operator's Game?

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Gilbert Doctorow : Has Modern Warfare Become a Drone Operator's Game?

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126 segments

0:00

Has the war, um,

0:03

>> [clears throat]

0:03

>> um, I'm trying to think of the right

0:05

verb, tran- transcended

0:09

battles with troops

0:11

and become a war of drones? And if it

0:13

has,

0:14

how many drone operators does it take to

0:17

stop a half a million troops?

0:19

>> [laughter]

0:19

>> If you If you can If you can give us

0:21

those numbers, I think you can because

0:22

I've read your piece.

0:24

>> Yeah, this is this is a key factor.

0:26

With 10,000 or 20,000 drone operators,

0:30

Ukraine can hold off half a million

0:33

Russian troops.

0:34

The troops cannot concentrate.

0:36

They They have to move in twos or

0:38

threes. They cannot,

0:41

uh, have an impact on the open field.

0:44

Where And that explains partly why the

0:46

big Russian push is not on the open

0:48

fields, but in taking a few key cities,

0:51

Kostyantynivka being the one most,

0:55

uh, most, um,

0:56

challenging right now. And that is the

0:59

the door to the leading to the to the

1:02

Dnieper River. So,

1:04

uh, apparently the the nature of

1:07

Ukraine's problem, that it was outmanned

1:09

from the beginning, that it had very big

1:11

loss of population, of people who fled

1:15

after country left the left, and the

1:18

the, um,

1:19

uh, army-eligible males were the first

1:22

to find shelter and leave, and those who

1:25

were dragooned into the army were the

1:27

first to desert. So, in that sense,

1:30

Ukraine was a big disadvantage in

1:31

manpower, and still is. Except that

1:34

manpower is no longer a decisive factor

1:37

in which way the war goes than it was.

1:39

>> Uh, but we know from the lesson in Iran

1:43

that you can't win a war by air power

1:46

alone. The Russians must know this. They

1:48

have to stop the drones, and they still

1:49

have to have this inexorable march of

1:51

troops. How close,

1:54

if at all, Gilbert,

1:56

is the Russian military

1:59

to achieving a conclusion

2:03

that would be satisfactory to the

2:04

Kremlin?

2:06

>> Nowhere.

2:07

The game has changed. The game has

2:09

changed repeatedly. And let's not look

2:11

at the past. Let's not look at February

2:14

2022. Let's look at where we are today.

2:17

I have been challenged by some people

2:19

who appear on your program with the not

2:21

me personally, but the notion that

2:24

uh that the um Russians cannot

2:27

um should be striking at Kiev much

2:30

harder and perhaps should be striking at

2:33

the factories that are supplying the

2:35

drones to Ukraine in the UK, in Germany,

2:38

and some other countries. They have said

2:40

they have said and it's a reasonable

2:41

argument, but what then? What happens

2:43

after that?

2:44

I turn it around and say to those who

2:46

believe there will be a Russian victory

2:48

and a capitulation by Ukraine, if the

2:50

Russians reach the the upper and perhaps

2:53

even capture Odessa, you say, "No, not

2:55

at all." There is no reason for Ukraine

2:58

to capitulate so long as Mr. Zelensky

3:00

and his team stay in the saddle.

3:03

And that is the key question. Is Russia

3:05

ready to take the initiative and to

3:07

destroy its enemies, to decapitate

3:09

Ukraine, or is Russia intending to fight

3:12

this war for the next 10 years and

3:14

probably lose against NATO?

3:16

>> All right, so back to my initial

3:18

question. What

3:19

What are the parameters of the debate?

3:21

Is there a debate going Is this an

3:23

academic debate involving

3:26

scholars like you and similarly situated

3:29

people in Russia, or is it a practical

3:32

debate involving officials in the

3:34

Kremlin, uh political

3:37

operational

3:39

intelligence, military, and President

3:42

Putin's Putin's office itself?

3:45

>> Well, it's impossible to answer the

3:46

question you posed with respect to

3:49

what's going on inside of Kremlin. By

3:50

nature, anybody who would step out of

3:52

line would have a very short career.

3:55

These people are not saying they're

3:56

yes-men. No, they they appear on

3:58

television, as my colleague, uh Raymond

4:00

McGovern, has said on your show, and

4:02

they have had televised discussion of

4:04

problems that the army is facing, like

4:06

lack of night vision devices, goggles,

4:08

and so forth.

4:10

But I say I say this is all political

4:12

theater. It is a show

4:14

uh to divert attention from the serious

4:17

questions of where do you go from here?

4:20

Um and where do you where they should go

4:22

from here, in my opinion, not just my

4:24

opinion,

4:25

is to attack and destroy the political

4:28

leadership in Kyiv.

4:29

The destruction of factories in Western

4:32

Europe is really almost an irrelevancy.

4:35

If Ukraine is destroyed as a political

4:38

as a military factor, Western Europe

4:41

will just go back onto the rock from

4:42

which it came. Western Europe cannot

4:45

fight Russia directly.

Interactive Summary

The video discusses the evolving nature of the war in Ukraine, specifically focusing on how drone technology has fundamentally changed battlefield dynamics by limiting the ability of Russian troops to concentrate. Experts argue that while Russia maintains a manpower advantage, it is no longer the decisive factor in the conflict. The discussion touches upon the limitations of air power, the political landscape within the Kremlin, and the strategic outlook for both Ukraine and Russia.

Suggested questions

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