I have found myself struggling to

describe the war President Trump has

chosen to enter into with Iran.

The the strange lightness with which he

seems to have chosen this.

>> Stay sheltered. Don't leave your home.

It's very dangerous outside. Bombs will

be dropping everywhere.

>> I would say the war is spiraling out of

control, but there's never real pretense

that it was under control. I find it

hard to say Trump's plan for the war is

failing because it is not clear there

was any plan at all. There was a

decision to strike. There was perhaps a

belief that Iranians would rise up and

overthrow their government as Trump

invited them to do.

>> When we are finished, take over your

government. It will be yours to take.

But there appears to have been an almost

opposite belief held by the same people

at the same time that the Iranian regime

included senior figures who might take

power and make a deal with America much

as Deli Rodriguez did in Venezuela. To

the extent America imagined who those

leaders might be, there was no policy to

identify and empower and work with them.

Quite the opposite, Trump himself has

said the leading candidates were killed

in the initial attacks. So, you know, we

had some in mind from that group that is

uh is dead.

>> We are so used to American wars failing

because of the presence of bad

assumptions and bad information and bad

plans. We're less used to what this

appears to be, an almost absence of

planning or information at all. There's

almost a pride this administration takes

in it. Trump appears to believe that it

is not his job to know about the world.

It is the world's job to know about him.

>> He acts. The world reacts,

>> to do the work of planning, learning,

building coalitions, considering

consequences. All that is beneath him,

beneath a superpower. But now we are at

war. And any better future will require

fuller understanding of how America,

Israel, and Iran got to this place. So I

want to ask someone on who could

describe that history or to be more

specific those histories because the

three countries narratives and

understandings are very different. Ali

Viz is the Iran project director at the

international crisis group. He was

involved in the negotiations that led to

the 2015 nuclear deal. He is in fact

himself a nuclear scientist and he's a

co-author of how sanctions work Iran and

the impact of economic warfare. As

always, my email escline showny

times.com.

Ali Vayas, welcome to the show.

>> Great pleasure. Thanks for having me.

>> So, I want to start back in the Iranian

revolution which begins in 1978, topples

the sha in early 1979.

We remember it now as an Islamic

revolution, but at the time it has

liberals, it has leftists, it has

feminists, it has nationalists.

What did these groups want out of the

revolution and then how did it take the

form it ultimately took?

>> Well, the Iranian people had a lot going

for them before the revolution. The

country was prosperous economically. It

had very good relations with the outside

world. It's really stunning to think of

it, Ezra, but the Sha really didn't have

any serious enemies. Um, it had good

relations with the Soviet Union. It had

good relations with the US. It was the

strongest military in the Middle East.

Iranian uh society was uh opening up uh

and and a lot was going for the Iranian

people except one thing. They didn't

have political freedom and the power was

strictly in the hands of Tasha and his

political elite who were also very much

corrupt and there was also this

impression uh that he was a puppet of

the United States that he was not acting

independently that was an incorrect uh

perception but it was widespread uh

among the population and what happened

was that there was this consensus that

was formed uh that he should go uh

without really having a sense of what

will come after

was seen as a transitional leader not as

uh the leader of the country in the

future. Uh and he was u clever enough to

portray himself as one. Um he said all

the right things before assuming power.

He said uh that women would be able to

have equal rights in the society. He

banned the clerics from having any role

in in politics. This is why we had this

extraordinary situation in which you had

leftists and Mauoists and communists and

uh you know conservatives and religious

people everybody u coalitioning around

him as the as the leader of the

revolution. But of course, as soon as he

touched down in Thran and there were 3

million people on the streets welcoming

him, he realized that his power is

basically unchallenged. And at that

point, he started monopolizing power and

established uh an Islamic republic in

the form of theocracy.

>> And very quickly from there, we have the

what gets at least remembered in America

as the hostage crisis. This is something

that Donald Trump talks about in his

video announcing and explaining the

beginning of the war he has launched in

Iran. Now, for 47 years, the Iranian

regime has chanted death to America and

waged an unending campaign of bloodshed

and mass murder, targeting the United

States, our troops, and the innocent

people in many, many countries. Among

the regime's very first acts was to back

a violent takeover of the US embassy in

Tran, holding dozens of American

hostages for 444 days. What is that? How

do you understand that as as a both a

political decision and as a historical

event resetting American and Iranian

relations?

That is a seminal moment uh because it

created a rupture in uh Iran US

relationship that has not been uh healed

uh in the past 47 years.

>> Good evening. The US embassy in Thran

has been invaded and occupied by Iranian

students. The Americans inside have been

taken prisoner.

>> The students want the deposed sha

returned to Iran for trial.

The US's first response to the hostage

crisis was to impose sanctions. And

Iranians wanted uh those assets

released, wanted the Shaw to be returned

uh to Iran to stand trial um and wanted

the United States to recognize uh their

independence and promised not to

interfere in their internal affairs. Um

but it really goes back to another

event. It goes back to 1953 when the US

and the UK helped topple the popular

government of uh Prime Minister Mosad

who had nationalized Iranian oil.

>> Iran where the government of Premier

Mosedc with pro red tendencies is

overthrown by royalist supporters of the

sha. Iran with its rich oil resources

focal point of dispute with the British

is strategically important to democracy.

Masedc held power at the crossroads of

conquest in the very heart of the Middle

East

>> and therefore there was always this

sense of vandetta among segments of

Iranian society against the United

States. Uh one of the key motives of the

revolution was uh neither the east nor

the west the Islamic Republic. Uh in

fact prior uh to taking over the US

embassy um angry Iranian students and

zealots and revolutionary zealots they

had taken over both the US embassy and

the Soviet embassy but they were kicked

out of both of them. Uh and eventually

um another takeover of the US embassy by

the students was successful

um primarily because it played into the

hands of ayati trying to monopolize

power. He wanted to get rid of the more

moderate forces of Iranian politics and

he used the embassy crisis uh to do

that. The entire government resigned and

he could bring his own people uh to

power. So uh the embassy hostage crisis

was an an opportunity for Iran to

demonstrate uh that it no longer is

going to be subjugated to the United

States. uh and it also allowed uh Kmeni

uh to uh appropriate all means of uh

power in Iran.

>> I think it's important to stop on what

you said a minute ago about the US and

the UK participating in uh coup in Iran.

And and I think as we sort of unspool

this story, there can be a a a sense in

America that we are hated by the Iranian

government for no obvious reason. But

the counternarrative is that there's

been a longer war of America and the

West against Iranian self-determination.

And I just like to hear you talk for a

minute about how those sort of dueling

senses of of who started what and who

has what interest here have sat and

persisted and shaped the decisions of

the actors, you know, for decades now.

It's a very good point uh Isra because

uh it is important to understand that

Iran as a weak country during the 18th

and 19th centuries was one of the only

countries in the world uh that did not

become a colony to a western power. Uh

there is a very strong sense of Iranian

nationalism. uh in the same way that the

Chinese have this middle kingdom

thinking uh that sense of uh Iran having

its own dignity and pride is is really

built into the DNA. Um and that created

resentments towards the United States

that then again showed itself uh in

1979.

Some of these historic events have a

long tale especially when you're dealing

with ancient civilizations.

uh they have long memories uh and and it

is important to understand uh that many

in the US might not even know what

happened in 1953 but every uh school

children in Iran has heard of this event

and is sort of built into their psyche

>> to to your point that the history is a

long tale here. I mean, even now, one of

the people being talked about, it seems

unlikely, but being talked about for a

leader in Iran if the current regime

collapses is the Sha's son, who is in

exile and has become a more popular

opposition leader and has better

relationship with Israel and is more

favored by the West. I don't think that

many people think it would work to

install him, but you've certainly heard

that hope voiced quite often by people

who are uh hopeful that the current

regime will collapse.

>> Absolutely. And and again there is there

is precedent uh his grandfather uh Resa

founder of the dynasty uh came to power

with uh British uh interference uh in

another coup in uh in the earlier uh

20th century. Um and his father was

restored uh to power by the United

States and now he's trying to regain

power uh through help from Israel. Um

and and this is why you know even if uh

a formula like this succeeds which I

agree as a as a low chance uh but but we

have to see these kind of short-term

gains in the longer perspective of how

often they come back to hunt us.

>> So let me bring us back to the hostage

crisis.

How does Iran, how does the Kmeni

ultimately agree to give up the

hostages? For what, in what context? For

what reasons?

>> So, this again has a lot of uh patterns

that have been repeating uh uh

themselves throughout these years. Um

they engaged in negotiations and talks

dragged on uh until um the the Reagan

team uh in the run-up to the 1988

election. Um basically uh promised uh

the Iranians that they would give them

better terms. I have been accused of

lately of having a secret plan with

regard to the hostages. Now, this comes

from an answer that I've made at least

50 times during this campaign to the

press, which is that the question would

be, "Have you any ideas of what you

would do if you were there?" And I said,

"Well, yes, and sometimes I think some

of my ideas might involve quiet

diplomacy where you don't say in advance

or say to anyone what it is you're

thinking of doing." and Ayati

um uh determined to humiliate President

Carter um even though the heavy lifting

of the negotiations in Alger had been

done with uh the Carter team dragged the

process on until uh uh President Reagan

was inaugurated and just a few minutes

later uh he released uh the American

hostages. Now, day one. Day one of

Ronald Reagan's presidency and day one

of freedom for 52 Americans. The new

president had not been in office an hour

when the former hostages became free men

and women again.

>> But the US did not deliver on its

promise of not interfering in Iran's

internal affairs and did not deliver on

its promise of returning most of Iran's

frozen assets.

>> There's an odd pattern that recurs here.

You you mentioned a minute ago Humeni

choosing to humiliate Carter and

functionally empower Reagan and I would

say over time there is this tendency for

Iran to act in ways that empower the

rightwing of the countries that they are

in conflict with. Reagan was going to be

in many ways much more hardline over

time than Carter was. Iran has in many

ways been central to Benjamin

Netanyahu's career and certainly some of

the proxies that Iran has funded uh you

know Iran we'll talk about this in a few

minutes but did a lot to to try to

destroy the Azo Accords and and and the

peace process

what is behind that

um I I think it's uh it's it really can

be boiled down to what comes around goes

around in the sense that uh you know

both sides both hardliners on uh on all

sides actually uh they they feed each

other um and they um empower one

another. Uh it's not just that the

Iranians have empowered uh the

hardliners in the west or or in Israel

but but the other way around is also

true. Um in the 1990s uh the reformist

president Katami um started on a

consiliatory tone towards the United

States and Katami was discredited. uh um

same happened to uh Roani with the

nuclear deal uh in 2015 and he was

burned by that and and that gave way to

uh more hardline uh Iranians coming to

office. Uh it is unfortunately a pattern

uh in which this uh enmity has become

institutionalized in a way that always

benefits uh the hawks on all sides more

than the moderates who've tried to

change course. We're going to come back

to both those post 911 and and nuclear

deal moments. But but here as the

hostage crisis is ending, another thing

is beginning, which is Saddam Hussein,

the the then leader of Iraq, invades

Iran in 1980. The US, it's complicated,

but basically backs Iraq.

Take me through both that war and US

policy in that moment and in that era.

>> Um, so, uh, Ezra, I was growing up in

Iran at that time. Um and uh my first

memories are of the Iran Iraq war. Uh

and it was also the formative experience

of uh most of Iran's leadership.

Um it was uh an unequal war in the sense

that Saddam was clearly the aggressor.

Um and he was backed by almost the

entire um region and world powers. Uh

whereas Iran was alone. Of course, all

revolutions want to export their model.

Um and almost always they create a

backlash. I mean if you look at the

French Revolution, the Russian

Revolution, uh they always uh scare

neighboring countries and mobilize them

to try to uh nip them in the bud and

prevent them from spilling over their

borders, especially Iraq as another uh

country with a majority Shia population

ruled by a Sunni minority at the time.

Um and so Saddam feel felt threatened,

but he also saw an opportunity. This was

a revolutionary regime that had come to

power. Uh had uh the biggest arsenal,

American arsenal in the region, but uh

it was uh purging and killing a lot of

uh US trained pilots and generals and

commanders. Uh and it appeared that uh

it is not uh in a position to be able to

fight back. So Saddam went in kind of

similar to Putin's calculation in in the

Ukraine war in in 2022 that this would

be a quick win. uh and uh and it was

also supported by other uh Arab Gulf uh

monarchies uh because they were afraid

of a uh revolutionary uh system in Iran,

a republic um and a system that had

politicized Islam. Um and so they all

saw Saddam and Iraq as a shield to

contain this Iranian system. And for the

United States, it was also uh a means of

containing Iran, making sure of all

these American weaponry will be degraded

and not used by uh the the Jacobian in

Iran. Uh and that sense of strategic

solitude really framed and shaped

Iranian strategic thinking for years to

come. This concept of having proxies

away from Iran's borders to deter

attacks on on its soil was really born

out of this sense of strategic solitude.

And um uh and in that uh uh and that is

the beginning of Iran's own ballistic

missile program because it was uh

desperately trying to uh fight fire with

fire and um and and what's important to

understand about that war is that it

actually helped consolidate uh the power

of a uh an infant uh revolutionary

regime which was uh undergoing a lot of

turmoil uh a lot of the purges. that we

talked about before uh were happening in

conjunction with this war. Um uh

economically uh Iran was on its knees.

Uh the price of oil had dropped

significantly and Iranian oil facilities

were were targeted. Uh it was a very

very dark and difficult period and yet

not only it survived the war, it

consolidated uh the revolutionary

system. Uh and it is this is the first

war in almost 250 years. uh in which

Iran didn't lose territory. Um it didn't

win territory uh but it also didn't lose

anything. Um and that uh created a

narrative of martyrdom of uh you know

sacrifice uh that that really

consolidated the regime's power.

>> So you mentioned a minute ago how

something that people are hearing a lot

about now Iran's ballistic missile

program has its origins in that moment.

There's something else we're hearing a

lot about now. The Islamic Revolutionary

Guard Corps also has its origins in in

that war. So, so tell me about the IRGC,

how it emerged

and what it over time became. Um so when

the revolutionaries came to power the

the moment of revolution's victory was

the moment that the Shaw army declared

itself neutral in the fight between the

state and the society. Uh and the United

States did play an important role in

convincing uh the army uh which was

trained by the US um and modeled after

the US army uh to take a step back. Um

but uh the Iranian revolutionaries

didn't trust the army. Uh they they

thought it was too aligned with US

interest and so they had to create a

parallel army uh which would do their

bidding and that's the origin of the

revolutionary guard. If you even look at

the title it says Islamic Revolutionary

Guard Corps. Uh it doesn't have the word

Iran in it because it is really designed

uh to safeguard the revolution. Um and

they were really uh trained in the

crucible of this horrible war, a

traumatic war from 1980, 1988. Uh which

was, you know, almost a trench warfare

uh similar to First World War. Um a a a

dragged out terrible affair in which

chemical weapons were used and it was

just very very ugly. uh and so uh it

created real hard men with very fixed

views about the world, the region, the

United States, Israel, and how Iran

should uh safeguard its interests.

>> So then there's another dimension of

this that I think is worth bringing in

in the 80s, which is the Islamic

Revolutionary Guard Corps gets very

involved in Lebanon after the Israeli

invasion of Lebanon.

it begins to support and uh help with

what becomes Hezbollah.

At the same time, Israel is also in the

80s selling weaponry to Iran.

So, so there's a complicated

relationship going in both directions

here that I think a little bit defies

the way we think about the relationship

today. So, what is happening between

Iran and Israel in the 80s?

Well, I don't think Israel saw Iran uh

immediately out of the gate uh after

revolution as an existential threat. In

fact, Saddam was a bigger threat uh to

Israel. Uh and there is this famous

saying uh that it's too bad that both

sides can't lose in this war. Um and in

the initial phases of the war um when

Iraq actually had significant

territorial control in Iran and the

Iranians were uh using their bigger

numbers to try to push back but they

were not succeeding uh that I think

Israel believed that it would be useful

to try to uh change the balance uh and

make sure that the Iranians would not

lose. part of the uh broader uh

arrangement uh that turned out to be the

Iran Contra uh which has its own

complicated story. Uh but it is really

after uh the fall of Saddam as a serious

threat to Israel um in after the first

Gulf War uh that Israel's threat

perception about Iran changes because to

a large extent Saddam was neutralized uh

and Iran was still standing and was

becoming more aggressive uh towards

Israel and was putting in place all the

tools that was uh that it needed uh to

carry on uh that challenge to Israel's

power in the region. Iran also by that

time has a different leader. Kmeni dies

in 1989.

Um Ali Hamei becomes the second supreme

leader. Who is he at the moment of that

elevation and how does he become the

successor? Oh, he's an absolute

underdog. Uh he's the president of the

country at that point but someone uh who

nobody took seriously um because the

presidency was a symbolic position.

There are these famous stories of Kmeni

chasticizing K in public speeches and

Kami going to the roof of the

presidential palace and and crying out

loud um uh because he was humiliated. Um

uh and and the second most powerful man

uh in Iran after Kmeni was the speaker

of parliament um Akar Hoshimir Raf

Sanjani. this very wely uh statesman um

uh sort of like uh Cardinal Rishilio or

eminence gre of of the system um and uh

he's the one who ends up becoming the

kingmaker uh he makes

uh the next supreme leader he says that

was very close to him had designated as

as his successor there's no evidence uh

to back that up but uh everybody that he

believed Raf Sanjani at the time because

he was so powerful. Um but but long

story short uh Makam uh becomes supreme

leader because Raf Sanjani believed that

uh he would he would be uh he would

remain an underdog uh and he would be

able to and Raf Sanjani would be able to

run the show without much challenge from

Kame but Kam wasn't even an Ayatah when

he became a supreme leader um and so

they had to overnight uh make him an

ayatah but K turned out to be uh a

calculating, very clever man uh who uh

basically over several decades managed

to outwit and outweight everybody else

in that system. Uh because he didn't

have the right religious credentials

uh quickly uh looked for another source

of uh of basically backing up his power

and that became the revolutionary guards

and and this is why he started

militarizing Iranian politics. uh in

ways that uh Kmeni had actually banned

uh had banned the revolutionary guards

from entering into politics. Um and uh

and it's it's really an extraordinary

turn of events of how he managed to then

sideline uh Rafanjini and everybody else

and uh reach the pinnacle of power uh in

a way that no other Iranian ruler even

the the sh of the recent recent past had

that much that much institutional power.

So I I think it's easy doing the kind of

work I do to to sort of focus endlessly

on the institutional maneuverings of

people in power, but what is life like

for Iranians and what are the what are

the divisions of of Iranian society at

this point? I mean, we've gone in just a

decade or two from, as you say, a very

modern country with good relations with

the outside world, a revolution, the

Iran Iraq war, and incredible amounts of

suffering and, you know, death.

And now you have this sort of IRGC and

um you know successor government.

What is life like? What is life becoming

like for Iranians? How has it changed?

>> So look the 1980s were really dark uh

because uh there was repression uh at

home. There was uh war of aggression uh

against the country. Uh it it was uh a

terrifying period. Uh but you know in a

decade after one of the most popular

revolutions in the world uh the system

still had uh sufficient goodwill and

support to move forward. Um and uh but

people wanted change to to become much

more institutional. And this is why uh

in an upset election in 1997, they opted

for uh gradual change rather than uh

radical revolutionary change by voting

for a reformist uh president. Um and

when Katami was elected, uh that's the

first election that I voted in and the

last election I voted in. Uh but uh but

there was a real sense of hope that he

was saying all the right things. He

wanted to do all the right things. Um

and uh and from that point on I would

say it was a downward spiral because the

deep state uh in Iran by that point

represented by Kam his office uh and the

revolutionary guards u were absolutely

against uh uh reforms. Um and and you

can understand psychologically where

that came from. uh for Kam uh he came to

power in 1989 when the Soviet Union was

falling apart because it had opened the

door to reforms

um and so Kam's view was that an

ideological system

uh if you start paying playing with the

pillars of it the whole thing will

unravel

um and so it's really that's the

beginning of you know ruptures between

uh the state and the society because the

society wanted gradual reforms. But the

fact that Katami's experience uh ended

in failure um I think was the beginning

of a lot of people losing hope and this

regime's ability uh to change course.

>> So in the 1990s,

Bill Clinton is president uh in the

United States for most of it and his

focus in the Middle East is on the

Israeli Palestinian peace process.

And you've already had the the Oslo

Accords

and Iran enters into this picture

funding terrorist attacks in Israel uh

through Hamas and others meant to

destroy the peace process, meant to

destroy Oslo. Why?

So uh one has to understand that um

again going back to the Iran Iraq war,

Iran realized that one of the only ways

that it can uh project power beyond its

borders as a Shia nation surrounded by

Sunnis, as a Persian nation surrounded

by Arabs and Turks, was to pick up a

cause that would allow it to transcend

all of these inherent limitations. And

that was the Palestinian cause that was

left on the ground by the Arabs.

Um and uh and that's why as of the early

1980s it became the champion of the

Palestinian cause. Uh for instance,

Israel's invasion of Lebanon in in 1982

uh provided Iran with an opportunity to

uh create Hezbollah in Lebanon. Uh and

then with uh the attack on uh uh in

Beirut that killed 241 US Marines, uh

Iran saw its first uh impressive

victory, which was that someone as uh

hawkish as President Reagan in response

to that attack, packed his bags and left

the region. I have no regret at the fact

that we went in there with the idea of

trying to bring peaceuh to that troubled

country. We are redeploying because once

the terrorist attack started uh there

was no way that we could really

contribute to the original mission by

staying there as a target just hunkering

down and waiting for further attacks.

>> And so any solution to the Palestinian

cause uh that would not include Iran and

its interest uh by definition would be a

threat to this agenda. Um and this is

why Iran was trying to sabotage uh any

solution along those lines. And the fact

that uh processes like the Madrid

process for instance explicitly excluded

Iran uh played into those fears that

whatever comes out of this uh would be

at their expense and therefore they

should try to prevent it from happening.

Is your understanding that the

Palestinian cause for them was

geopolitical, it was a a case of

rational self-interest or that it was

ideological and that their kind of

support in a in an ongoing way

reflected,

you know, values-based commitments as

opposed to geopolitical calculations.

I do believe that it had an ideological

veneer uh but deep down it was a

geopolitical instrument uh that the

Iranians were willing to fight uh Israel

to the last Palestinian or the last Arab

uh but they really did not care much

about the Palestinian cause. And this is

why you see uh the the rupture between

uh Iran and the PLO for instance over

the years uh because it was very clear

that Iran was uh instrumentalizing uh

the Palestinian cause for its own

interest. I

>> I feel like there is this tension that

that you see emerging here and in and

also in the way we talk about Iran here.

So there's a vision of Iran you will

hear from the American right and from I

think mainstream Israeli society which

is that Iran is an Islamic theocracy.

It is a society that remembers itself as

an empire and is patiently and

strategically plotting to find its way

back to that level of power. And the

counter you will hear to that is no no

it's a rational regime that is oriented

towards survival and it calibrates its

diplomacy. It calibrates its projections

of power. It calibrates its actions to

survive, to to to sort of thrive, to

protect itself. It should be understood

as as someone you can negotiate with.

and in kind of consistently

uh funding attacks on Israel, you know,

uh to some degree against uh America

too, it is making itself the target of

the world's sole superpower military and

the strongest military in that region

even as other countries in the region

are cutting deals and beginning to

moderate relations. So, how do you

understand this tension between, you

know, the vision of Iran as focus on

regime survival and the Iran that is

consistently making itself an irritant

an aggressor and a target for Israel and

the United States by funding proxy

attacks and and and terror.

>> It is a very pertinent point uh Ezra. Um

it's it's a question of uh you know this

uh double uh um identity in Iran

strategic thinking that on the one hand

uh it plays like any other chess player

in a in a strategic manner but there is

also a an ideological element. A very

good example is uh the story of its

engagement or lack thereof with

President Trump. uh a lot of other

countries including uh North Korea's

dictator Kim Jong-un figured out how to

cater to President Trump's ego. How that

it actually doesn't take much to try to

uh open up a channel of communication

with him and change his perspective uh

on the country. Um and yet the Iranians

would not be were not able to do so uh

because of that ideological rigidity.

And uh and I think one of the main

criticisms towards the Iranian regime

that there have been uh maybe eras or

episodes uh in in the past few decades

when it failed to capitalize uh on its

leverage uh and and doubled down in a

way that it actually uh ended up uh not

just burning its leverage but also

hurting itself. uh you know in the

run-up to October 7th uh they were

pretty powerful and and well established

in the region they could have uh

negotiated for instance with the Biden

administration from a position of

strength and found a way out of this

deadlock but they didn't and that too

has a long history uh it's it's very

Persian uh I have to say and I just give

you um quick uh historic anecdotes just

just to help you understand the the

mentality

uh in uh in Isvahan uh there was an

attack by Israel on a on a Safavid era

palace uh which has damaged uh parts of

the UN UNESCO uh heritage site. Um and

it has a magnificent fresco at at its

entrance is about a war um between uh

the Iranians and the Ottomans uh called

the Cheron conflict. Um it is uh such an

epic uh painting. Uh and if you don't

know, you wouldn't realize that this is

a war that the Iranians lost. Uh what

the painting is showing you is is not

about victory. Uh is about the the

courage and the valor and and you know

the fact that the Iranians were

outnumbered and outgunned and

nevertheless uh you know uh did fight

and tried to defend their country. But I

think this gets to a an important

fundamental point which is this question

and and I think we'll keep circling this

of of what does Iran want. When I when I

speak to Israelis and these are not just

you know Israelis on the right. These

are Israelis on the certainly the center

left.

They will say you Americans do not

understand Iran. You do not understand

this country. It does not just want to

survive as a regime. It does not just

want a stronger economy. It does not

just want better relations with the

West. If it wanted that, it could have

had that long ago. It ultimately has

ideological and imperial ambitions. And

as such, deals will only ever be

temporary and they will only be, you

know, in the regime's interest. And the

way you know that is this sort of moving

back and forth that you're describing a

little bit here between acting like any

other geopolitical

chess player at the chess board and

these more ideological moments where

it's not just that they are projecting

power out or trying to take over the

Palestinian cause, but they are

imperiling arguably their own regime.

And so, you know, the Israelis have said

to me for a very long time, and I think

this helps explain, you know,

Netanyahu's position on Iran and others,

that when they hear death to Israel,

they take Iran seriously. They take it

at its word and they un and in their

understanding there is no safety for

Israeli society and the Israeli

government so long as the you know

Iranian regime as it has been composed

in these decades persisted

and and I think you can't understand

this war and and how hard Netanyahu has

been pushing for it for so long without

understanding that and so it raises this

question of whether or not he and and

and the Israelis were right.

>> Look, so there is no doubt that uh what

the Iranians might see as defensive

could be seen as offensive uh from from

the Israelis. Uh and there is no doubt

that we are in a in a in a vicious cycle

that um you know whatever Israel does uh

deepens Iran's uh threat perception and

pushes them to double down on policies

like their missile program or their

support for proxies which deepens

Israel's threat perception which in turn

would then drag the US further in and

put more pressure on Iran and engages in

covert operations and sabotage and and

so on that again uh deepens Iran's

threat perception. ion and the cycle

goes on. Uh the real question is um the

way that Israel and the west uh largely

have treated uh Iran in the past uh four

decades uh which I think is is can

really be summarized in in one word

which is containment.

Has it resolved the problem or made it

worse? It's a very simple question and

even by Netanyahu's own metrics the

problem has become worse. uh the nuclear

program he's been warning against for

many many years uh according to himself

when he went to war last year uh had

become u an intolerable existential

threat. Um in June of last year he said

that he had set back Iran's missile

program uh 8 months later he's back at

war because uh the missile programs or

the missile program is now an

existential threat. Um, so again, it's a

question of not necessarily the concept.

I'm not challenging that. I understand

why the Israelis see Iran as an

existential threat. I understand why the

Iranians believe that uh Israel is a

threat to them. Uh but um I'm talking

about the the means of trying to resolve

the problem. And again, you know,

throughout the past 47 years, with the

exception of a very short period of 3 to

four years, we have tried tools that

have not worked or made the problem

worse. And I think we should learn from

that experience. You you mentioned the

Iranian narrative that much that looks

offensive to the rest of the world to

them is understood as defensive that

Iran does not understand just itself as

a threat to Israel but Israel and to the

to some degree particularly right now

America is a threat to to Iran. So if I

were if I were talking to a member of

the you know Iranian government and they

were giving me their narrative of this

or trying to persuade me that the

Israeli narrative is wrong,

how is the support for Hamas, the

support for Hezbollah, the the some of

the actions we see in this period, how

is that understood in the Iranian

perspective, the the the race to nuclear

weapons as defensive as opposed to um

offensive?

Well, it's very simple and they would

say the proof is in the pudding. U when

when Hezbollah had uh hundreds of

thousands of rockets and missiles aiming

at Israeli population centers, um Israel

did not dare uh attacking Iran. When

Syria was there, um there was no uh

routes for Israeli fighter jets to to

come and uh and bomb Iran uh through the

uh Syrian airspace. So their their

argument is that actually uh this policy

worked and protected them uh for a long

time and now that it has uh their

regional deterrence has been degraded

this is why uh Israel is coming after

them. So if you talk to Iranian

officials they would say uh that the

reason that they were locked into this

uh uh pathway uh and they there was

basically path dependency was because

they never saw a viable alternative. Uh

it is not as if they were willing to

give up on their proxies or to whatever

Israel found threatening uh whether it's

their missiles or their nuclear program.

Uh that the world would then recognize

them uh would allow this uh theocracy to

thrive in the way that Arab Gulf states

have that all of these were aimed at

undermining and toppling them. Um,

nobody was willing to give them uh

conventional weapons to be able to

defend themselves. Um, nobody ever

recognized that they had some legitimate

security concerns. Uh, and so they had

no choice other than uh continuing down

this path. That's the argument that they

they would make. And even in areas that

they had compromised like on their

nuclear program, um it uh it it resulted

in the US not uh delivering on its

promises. And of course, that's just one

example. There are multiple other

examples as well. Um, you know, the

Iranians helped uh release US hostages

in Lebanon uh in the 1990s and the

George HW Bush administration didn't

deliver on uh his promises to them. Uh

again, Clinton sanctioned them and

canled the oil contract that they had

put on the table uh for US companies. Um

um Obama even didn't fully deliver on

sanctions relief. Biden with whom they

had uh a prisoner deal uh as part of

which there was a humanitarian

arrangement that moved $6 billion of

their assets from South Korea to Doha.

Um pulled the plug on their ability to

access that money after October 7th even

though the money had nothing to do with

uh Iran's regional policies. So there's

a long list of reasons that they would

bring up to say this was always

existential from the other side as well

and so we had no choice other than

doubling down. And so there seemed like

there was this moment where things could

change after 9/11. Iran is for the for a

moment

on the side of the US. It's offering

intelligence. Um it's against the

Taliban and and al Qaeda. Colon Powell

then the Secretary of State shakes hands

with the Iranian foreign minister at the

UN. And you know 911 was a

geopolitically disruptive event and a

lot can change in the aftermath of them.

So what was happening then and how did

that set of possibilities if you think

they were real fall apart?

>> So the story of Iran US relations is

really a history of missed opportunities

uh and is replete with misunderstandings

and and this episode is is one of them.

You know it's it's quite stunning that

uh there was uh a real opportunity for

uh a new beginning. Um, you know, Ezra

is is now in retrospect is really uh

quite something when you think about the

fact that Kasam Solmani, the commander

of the revolutionary guards uh

expeditionary force uh the goods force

uh was uh first man to arrive in

Afghanistan uh to prepare to prepare it

for US fighter jets to land uh in the

operation to uh to get rid of the

Taliban. same commander that uh

President Trump uh assassinated in uh

2020. Uh but uh but but Iran believed

that by cooperating with the United

States um even at the military level,

intelligence level um to get rid of a

common foe would be the beginning of a

new chapter. Uh and then all of a sudden

uh President Bush uh in 2002 in his uh

State of the Union speech u uh

designated Iran as a member of the axis

of evil. Some of these regimes have been

pretty quiet since September the 11th.

But we know their true nature.

North Korea is a regime arming with

missiles and weapons of mass destruction

while starving its citizens.

Iran aggressively pursues these weapons

and exports terror while an unelected

few repress the Iranian people's hope

for freedom.

Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility

toward America and to support terror.

States like these and their terrorist

allies constitute an axis of evil arming

to threaten the peace of the world

>> and that shut the door uh to uh further

improvements of relations. North Korea

responds to the axis evil speech by

accelerating its nuclear program.

Eventually Tesla weapon is now a nuclear

power. Um Iran is watching that uh the

US invades Iraq which had no nuclear

weapons. Um later on Libya will give up

its nuclear program and Gaddafi will

eventually be uh decapitated from power

um in US air strikes and we'll will die

in a ditch. So how do the the sort of

how do the nuclear experiences of other

countries that are in the axis that are

named into the axis of evil how does

that end up shaping Iranian politics and

and thinking?

>> Um so that's not a linear line in the

sense that um you know Iran uh revived

its uh nuclear program uh in the the mid

1980s during the Iran Iraq war. uh

primarily out of fear that Saddam was

going to use nuclear weapons against

them because he had already used weapons

of mass destruction in the form of

chemical weapons uh and was believed to

be developing nuclear weapons and in

fact that was the reason the US invaded

Iraq in 2003.

Um and we now know uh in retrospect that

one of the reasons that Saddam didn't

want to dissipate that view that he had

nuclear weapons was because he wanted

the Iranians to to be afraid of him.

they might have some secret nuclear

weapons. Uh but you see based on US

intelligence that the the organized uh

Iranian push to develop nuclear weapons

stopped in 2003. What happened in 2003?

Saddam was toppled. The threat was gone.

So that's the first phase in Iranian

calculation that the immediate threat

was gone but they could now continue to

hedge uh their nuclear policy basically

develop this dual use technology

um put all the elements together and

then maybe at some point down the road

if they needed nuc nuclear weapon it

will be a uh quick political decision to

cross the Rubicon and develop uh a

nuclear program. They also used uh their

nuclear program as part of uh the as as

leverage in at the bargaining table with

the west to try to get sanctions relief.

Uh but uh so this was way before they

saw what happened to Gaddafi. Um and way

before they saw how North Korea was

treated uh with tremendous amount of

respect by uh President Trump. Um and

this is why um I do believe that now

that they have gone through this

experience

um especially even after the Ukraine war

uh that Ukraine also give gave away its

nuclear arsenal in return for security

guarantees only to be invaded uh by

Russia. uh they have concluded uh that

uh they've paid the price of a nuclear

bomb as the ultimate deterrent uh both

economically through years of sanctions

and also uh from a security perspective

being attacked. Um and I think that uh

the religious edict that Ayatam had

against uh nuclear weapons probably died

with him. uh and if this regime survives

and if his son remains uh the supreme

leader at the end of this war um I

almost have no doubt uh that the regime

will be determined uh to try to develop

nuclear weapons because every historic

president that you look at uh and their

own experience teaches them that that's

the only way to try to create a shield

for their own survival. I want to come

back to that thought, but I think before

we we sit there for a moment, we should

talk about the the effort of nuclear

deal which you had some uh role in

helping to to negotiate or try to bridge

the gaps on.

This happens under Obama happens after

the Bush administration after sort of

there's an Iranian effort to have

negotiations with Bush administration

that is sort of ignored in 2003.

Obama comes in. He has promised a

different approach to Iran.

>> Rather than remain trapped in the past,

I've made it clear to Iran's leaders and

people that my country is prepared to

move forward.

The question now is not what Iran is

against, but rather what future it wants

to build.

I recognize it will be hard to overcome

decades of mistrust, but we will proceed

with courage, rectitude, and resolve.

take me through the thinking that leads

to the JCPOA. Um, that doesn't happen

until 2015. So, there's a lot of

preparatory work and a lot of thinking

that goes in before that. But, but what

is the basic

orientation of the Obama administration

towards Iran?

Look, I I think in his first term,

President Obama listened to those who

were telling him Iran doesn't respond to

pressure, it responds to huge pressure.

Uh and so if you mobilize the

international community to put massive

financial sanctions on Iran, uh cut them

off of uh the US uh dominated global

financial system. Uh bring international

sanctions against them. Even the

Russians and the Chinese if they join uh

at the UN level to impose sanctions uh

eventually the Iranians will uh come to

their knees and they would accept to

give up uh on uh on having access to

nuclear fuel cycle technology which is

uh a a a dual use technology with which

you can fuel reactors or nuclear

weapons.

Um and at at towards the end of his

first term in office uh I think

President Obama was smart enough to

understand that uh it's not going to

work. Uh that uh a uh pressure ccentric

approach uh without uh an open door and

without some sort of a reasonable uh

endgame uh is an exercise in futility.

uh and he decided to change course uh

and sent uh Bill Burns and and Jake

Sullivan uh to Oman for secret

negotiations uh with the Iranians in

which he made the first concession and

that concession was that for the first

time since the beginning of the nuclear

crisis in 2003, the US agreed that uh uh

zero enrichment uh is not uh a realistic

policy goal and allowed Iran to have a

very limited but very tightly and

rigorously monitored nuclear program on

its own soil. And that's what uh

eventually led uh to the joint

comprehensive plan of action uh in 2015.

But between 2011 and 2015 uh it took a

long time and a lot of work to get to

that stage. Uh but that is what made the

difference.

>> What was the theory of the joint

comprehensive plan of action? Um,

I think to the extent people followed

this, it was hard even to know what to

think of it because people so disagreed

on what it did or didn't do. It was sold

as a deal that would prevent Iran from

getting nuclear weapons. It was

criticized as a deal that would be

unable to prevent Iran from getting

nuclear weapons. Um, Israel's main

interest in all this is that Iran

doesn't get nuclear weapons, but they

were aggressively opposed to the deal

under Netanyahu. And you know, Netanyahu

did everything he could to to scuttle

it.

>> This deal won't be a farewell to arms.

It would be a farewell to arms control.

And the Middle East would soon be

crisscross by nuclear trip wires.

A region where small skirmishes can

trigger big wars would turn into a

nuclear tinder box.

>> So what was in the JCPOA?

What was the actual both like technical

approach and and what was the broader

theory of it? Uh so the JCPO is a

159page uh very complex document but it

really boils down to a very simple

bargain uh nuclear restrictions and

transparency measures in return for

economic incentives. That's really it.

Um and Iran agreed uh to limit its

nuclear program uh roll back uh its

nuclear activities, ship out 97% of its

stockpile, dismantle half of its

centrifuges accept the kind of

inspections that no other country in the

world uh has uh ever accepted and

basically make itself an exception to

the norm because in among the

non-prololiferation treaty member

states, you basically have already two

classes. uh one are nuclear weapons

states and one are non-uclear weapons

states but Iran agreed to create a

category of his own uh in terms of

restrictions and transparency measures

that he had agreed to. Um so this

guaranteed that Iran would not be able

to have uh a nuclear weapon for uh at

least a period of 15 years. But a lot of

these restrictions had sunsets, meaning

that they would expire after a period of

time. And that is because

um no country would ever be willing to

make itself an exception to the norm

forever. that is giving up a right

internationally that again a regime that

had come to power based on the concept

of trying to safeguard Iran's

independence went through a very bloody

war in which it lost half a million of

its people uh in order not to lose an

inch of the country. didn't want to give

away that right. Um and uh and the JCPOA

did secure that right. Uh but it meant

that the can was only kicked down the

road. Uh and was not the problem was not

resolved forever. Uh the other problem

with it at the time I used to say the

good news is that we have a nuclear

deal. The bad news is that we only have

a nuclear deal. Uh that it didn't really

address other areas of disagreement uh

with Iran about its ballistic missile

program, about its proxies. But the

concept uh for the Obama administration

was that you resolve the most urgent

problem uh and then maybe based on that

you can build trust and improve

relations and then tr try to address

other areas of disagreement. But we

never really got a chance uh because the

deal was implemented in January 2016 and

of course President Trump was elected in

November of that year. Um and uh and as

soon as he walked into the Oval Office

he started undermining the agreement. So

when you say the agreement guaranteed

that Iran will not get a nuclear weapon

for at least those 15 years, you know,

one thing that Republicans said was

they'll just do it in secret. They'll

they'll create secret facilities.

They'll be underground. You know, we

won't know where to inspect. So what

were the safeguards there? So the entire

nuclear uh inspection regime um since

the second uh world war um has always

been designed to look at the file

material nuclear material with which you

can make a bomb for the first time in

the JCPOA

u mechanisms were defined to also look

after the equipment. So every knot and

bolt that goes into uh the centrifuges

uh which would enrich uranium uh or any

other machinery involved uh in Iran's

nuclear program. Uh there were uh online

smart detectors. Uh there were um uh

inspectors who had access to them 247.

Uh there was literally no way that Iran

would be able to cheat. And uh when the

deal was being implemented for um as I

said from January 2016 until Iran

started rolling back its uh uh

commitments uh a year after the US

withdrew from it from that. So that's

May 2019.

Um the IAEA uh conducted uh very

rigorous monitoring and issued uh

quarterly reports. So there were about

15 reports in this period and in all of

them the IEA confirmed that Iran was

fully committed uh to all of its uh

commitments under the agreement. Now we

can choose not to believe uh the IEA um

but even the US intelligence even uh the

Trump administration's own intelligence

officials were saying that there is no

evidence of Iranian uh divergence uh

from uh from the agreement. whereas of

course the same could not be said about

the United States.

>> So there's also a political theory to

the deal which is that it was the

beginning of trying to create a

different relationship over time between

the US and Iran that it would pull Iran

further into the international system um

unwind some of the sanctions so there's

more economic development maybe

strengthen moderates inside the regime.

How did you think about that side of the

deal and some counterfactual history

where Hillary Clinton wins the 2016

election and there there's sort of time

to build on it? Do you think that there

was a a possible other path here or

there's also of course those who say

this would have just given Iran, you

know, money and time to strengthen proxy

networks. It would have given it more

freedom to to pursue expansionistic

objectives. How do you think about what

was possible and what was not possible

building on that deal?

>> Um, so I I tell you how I uh perceived

it. In my view, um, Iran at the time uh

was a country that despite years of

sanctions, mismanagement, and corruption

still had a middle class uh that was

about 65% of the Iranian society. And

the Iranian middle class, for anyone

who's been in touch with them, um is

extremely open-minded, pro-western, even

pro- American despite years of being

subject to anti-American propaganda by

the state. Um uh moderate uh and and is

basically the west's uh best ally uh in

that part of the world. Um and um my

concept was that if you get uh 5%

economic growth over a period of 10

years, you can grow this middle class

from 65% to around 80 85%. And that

would coincide with the time that uh the

the ruling elite of the Islamic

Republic, the original uh Jacobines of

the 1979 revolution are dying out just

by the force of nature. Um so you will

have a situation in which these two

lines will cross one another uh and the

country by definition would be in a

better position to transition to

something better even if that transition

uh requires a degree of upheaval. So

that was the concept. That was the

theory of change that it it wasn't

supposed to magically in a year or two

make Iran change all of its policies.

But it was supposed to put the two

countries on a better pathway in which

eventually with building trust they

would be able to address other areas of

this agreement and again put the country

on a trajectory that when Kam would die

there would be uh enough uh uh material

to work with to put the country on a

better trajectory. When Trump instead

takes office, when he wins the election,

he somewhat over the objection of some

in his own administration, rips up the

deal and begins a policy of what he

calls maximum pressure.

>> We will be instituting the highest level

of economic sanction.

Any nation that helps Iran in its quest

for nuclear weapons could also be

strongly sanctioned by the United

States. America will not be held hostage

to nuclear blackmail.

>> So, we've talked about what the theory

of the JCPOA was. What is the theory of

maximum pressure? Both what is the

substance of that policy, but but what

is the political thinking beneath it?

Well, I think the theory of maximum

pressure was once very clearly uh

described by former Secretary of State

Mike Pompeo who said Iran should reach a

stage that it should choose between

feeding its own people or continuing uh

the policies that are problematic from

the perspective of the United States.

And so that really turned the concept

that I was describing to you on its head

fundamentally in the sense that it

really weakened uh the middle class and

strengthened the hard men in the Islamic

Republic. Um and in this period again

according to the United States uh and

state department and intelligence

community the revolutionary guards has

become even more powerful than before.

So we completely changed the dynamics

and and weakened our best allies and

strengthened uh our our worst

adversaries uh in that system through

maximum pressure which was supposed to

bring Iran to its knees. Now the

Iranians uh not only didn't surrender

but they doubled down across the board.

Uh they doubled down and supporting

proxies. Uh they became more aggressive

in the region, more repressive towards

their own people.

uh they resumed their nuclear program uh

first gradually and then uh really uh uh

speeded uh jacked it up ratcheted up uh

significantly uh and and reached levels

that u we could not even imagine in the

past enrichment to 60% or having uh

advanced centrifuges

um which eventually of course uh ended

up uh in the conflict that uh that we're

currently in. One of the sort of rupture

moments in the Middle East that I think

leads to to where we are now in this

period is of course October 7th. Uh

Hamas is understanded by many to be an

Iranian proxy, not fully under Iran's

control, but but Iran is a a major fun

of it. What to your understanding now is

the relationship between Iran and the

October 7th operation? How much did they

know? Did they give it the green light?

what was a communication between them

and Senoir because that explodes all of

this

>> right um so this is precisely uh when

you can see uh the major shortcoming of

Iran's policy of uh as a state to

subcontract its regional foreign policy

to non-state actors because they have

fun fundamentally different interests at

the end of the day and you could see uh

that very quickly after the October 7th

came out and tried to create distance

even though he supported Hamas. Um but

uh he wanted to say the Iran was not

involved.

Um but um uh but the reality is uh that

it it really was a uh distinction

without a meaningful difference by that

point uh because Hamas uh was clearly in

the Iranian orbit was clearly financed,

trained uh and supported by Iran. Uh and

so uh by that point uh Israel was going

to go after um not just Hamas but uh

everybody who supported Hamas. Uh and so

Israel was going to come after Iran and

Iran failed to adopt the strategy

accordingly um not realizing uh that the

so-called octopus doctrine that was

already in place even way before October

7th as of 2021 uh of going after not

just uh Iranian arms in the region but

the head of the octopus uh by targeting

Thran directly. Uh the Iranians failed

to adopt uh their strategy. Uh at every

point uh they miscalculated.

Uh they either uh responded uh in in a

bold way when they had to be cautious uh

or were too cautious when they had to be

bold. Um and this uh created the

circumstances that led uh eventually to

this war.

>> When you say they they miscalculated,

what was the nature of the

miscalculation? What did they not

understand about Israel or what did they

not understand about Donald Trump? They

did not want to be here. So, in the

moves they made, what was the uh

misperception

that led them to miscalibrate?

So I mean it's a series of

miscalculations but uh but let's start

with the fact that uh you know the

Iranians were trying to put in place in

2023 uh a mechanism that they called the

ring of fire which was this concept of

uh being able to open four fronts

against Israel all at once. Uh and the

concept was that this would be um uh so

difficult for Israel to deal with that

it would never be able to project power

beyond its immediate uh near abroad. Um

they tested this concept in April of

2023. And the Iranians concluded that uh

they're not ready. Uh they're not there

yet. Uh and of of course they failed to

communicate that to Senoir and they

failed to hold Cinear back. And uh I

think uh one explanation in that was

that uh the elimination of Slemani in

2020 who had personal relations with a

lot of these leaders in the so-called

access of resistance this network of

proxies that Iran has in the region and

had uh the charisma and the authority to

be able to uh push them in the

directions that he wanted uh did provide

more space for freelancing for people

like Senoir. Um so that was the first uh

first mistake. The second mistake was um

you know took distance from October 7th

but did endorse it uh and did not try to

hold his bullah back from uh entering uh

into this this conflict because Kam was

giving was subcontracting a lot of these

policies to Nasallah the leader of his

he truly believed in his uh strategic

vision and he taught that as an Arab in

that part of the world he understands it

better than Persians a thousand

kilometer way. Uh, and that too I I

think was a mistake. And then the

biggest mistake of of all was that when

Israel started going after Iran's assets

in a much more aggressive way,

especially in Syria uh and and went

higher and higher up the ranks, killing

uh commanders in the field. Uh and

eventually uh in April of 2024 uh they

targeted Iranian uh consulate in

Damascus uh and killed senior uh Iranian

military officials who were there. Uh

and that's the moment that Kame decided

to put aside his cautiousness and become

bold. uh and he fired u hundreds of

missiles and drones towards Israel. for

the first time opening a a a for the

first time a direct attack from Iranian

soil towards Israel. And that opened the

path uh to a direct confrontation with a

military power that is much more capable

and much more superior um than Iran,

which I think again in retrospect was a

was a major mistake.

uh but uh but he did it in a way uh that

it also didn't really signal strength.

It just stren signaled willingness to

cross a red line but uh but he

telegraphed in advance so that there

will be uh minimum Israeli casualties

and fatalities so that this doesn't

escalate. But these are all um again if

you put them together it's a chain of

miscalculations that led to Kam's

killing uh at the beginning of this war

>> and and what is happening with the the

nuclear program during this period.

>> So during this period the nuclear

program is advancing very quickly uh

because uh the Iranians again in a major

miscalculation

uh failed to revive the agreement with

the Biden administration. Uh I mean

there's plenty of blame to go around.

Biden uh uh I think missed an

opportunity uh to revive the deal u in

the short overlap that he had with

President Roani who had negotiated at

the JCPOA in 2015

uh because uh he postured and was too

hesitant uh and that burned a lot of

bridges with the Iranians. And then in

2022 the Iranians and the Russians were

responsible for not uh reviving the

agreement. Uh but since then Iran

quickly accelerated its nuclear program.

Um and every time Israel tried to set it

back through sabotage or covert

operations uh the Iranians even doubled

down in uh in in accelerating the the

program to the point that uh of course

by the time President Trump walked into

the Oval Office. Uh there's a metric in

the JCPOA that success was basically

measured against that which is a

so-called breakout time. This is the

amount of time that it takes to enrich

enough uranium for a single nuclear

weapon. That timeline when President

Trump walked into the Oval Office in

2017 as a result of the JCPOA was more

than 12 months. In January 2025, when

President Trump walks into the Oval

Office, that timeline is 6 days. I've

never quite understood what this

breakout line means, if I'm being

honest. Because if the timeline is six

days and Iran's leaders have on some

level concluded that there is safety to

be found in having a nuclear deterrent,

you know, that's January of 2025. Uh

they're not attacked for at least some

months after that. So why didn't they

just run over the line? Um or is the

6day line not everything you need for a

nuclear weapon?

>> Yes. So you're right. It's uh this is

like having the ingredients for a cake.

You still have to bake it into a cake.

Uh that's the weaponization process that

takes uh between 6 to 12 months

depending on which timeline you want to

believe and depending on whether you

want to have a crude nuclear device or a

more sophisticated one. Uh but that can

happen in secret in any facility in any

underground laboratory. Um the part that

could be monitored is the enrichment

part uh which was done under the IEA

supervision. Uh and that's why the

breakout time was important because we

were trying to prevent the ingredients

uh from from being prepared because we

knew that the weaponization part would

not be done in a visible way. And so

then on some level, is Donald Trump

right that the only way to stop Iran

from going nuclear is to attack first

the the 12-day bombing that we saw some

months ago and and and and now what

we're in or were these negotiations that

were happening on and off most recently

with Jared Kushner and Steve Whit, could

they have succeeded? Was there still a

diplomatic path that was viable or was

that over now?

Um, so, uh, look, Ezra, I I've, uh, I've

looked at some of, uh, the briefings

that, uh, Jared Kushner and and Steve

Wkov have, uh, have done since the end

of the negotiations

in 2026. Uh, and I've now concluded

that, uh, these negotiations were always

doomed to fail. um they went in uh

expecting not a um complex um technical

deal but a yes and no uh kind of answer

from the Iranians. Um I was shocked that

uh you know Steve Wikoff was surprised

that the Iranians had uh were able to

manufacture their own centrifuges. uh

and he describes one of Iran's advanced

centrifuges, the IR6 model, uh which is

a pretty powerful centrifuge as as

probably the most powerful centrifuge in

the world, which is not true. Um so the

the technical understanding was never

really there. The patience to uh find uh

solutions that would be mutually

tolerable and presentable was never

really there. um they often didn't take

even experts with them uh to these

negotiations. So they were not serious,

they were not professional um and it was

not going to work unless and until Iran

was willing to basically capitulate uh

and that was never on the books. Um so

in retrospect I think the these

negotiations could have never worked.

But but let me ask a counterfactual

question which is what if the Trump

administration had sent more serious

negotiators? What in what if instead of

Trump's real estate buddy and his

son-in-law, he had sent, you know, under

Marco Rubio, the State Department does

have a lot of expertise, there are

people there. They could have sent a

special envoy who had, you know, more

experience with this question.

Would the Iranians have been open to

that? Do you think there was openness on

the Iranian side or do you think in

addition to the Trump side not being

that serious about negotiations that the

Iranians at this point weren't that

serious? I mean, they'd watched the

Trump administration tear up a

diplomatic agreement they had made with

the Obama administration. They were now

under tremendous pressure from Israel

and the United States. you know, maybe

they were biting for time, you know, at

the same time that they would then

eventually one day, you know, pop up and

say, "Well, the negotiations failed and

we have a a weapon now." That was

certainly Israel's view on what would

happen.

>> Well, I do believe that the Iranians

were actually desperate for a deal and

and and I base that uh again based on

experiences I've had with this process.

Uh it's been very rare and you can ask

any European or or other negotiator

who's been involved in this process for

the Iranians to come up with their own

initiatives. They often prefer to uh

react to other people's ideas. Uh and

yet in these negotiations uh they were

coming up with uh one uh working paper

after another putting ideas on the table

in the hope that uh it would work. I do

believe that they were willing to give

President Trump way more than they gave

President Obama. Uh maybe not last year,

but certainly this year. Um and he could

have gotten a better nuclear deal if he

wanted to. Uh but again, it was not

about marginal improvements. Uh it it

was about uh Iran surrendering uh to

America's terms. And from uh the Iranian

regime's perspective, the only thing

that was more perilous uh than suffering

from a US strike uh would have been uh

surrendering to US terms because again

all of this history of you know the sort

of the debt of this regime of

safeguarding Iran's independence of not

being uh subjugated uh especially by an

American president all of that would be

undermined and for a regime that in the

process all these years has also lost

um you know starting from that very high

point of popularity at the beginning of

the revolution to a point that it now

relies on maybe 5 to 10% of the Iranian

society uh who constitute its its core

constituents um it cannot afford to

alienate them uh because then uh it has

uh nothing to stand on uh and that's why

it could not ever afford uh to

capitulate uh to to the United States.

But if Trump wanted a better deal than

what Obama got, that was certainly on

the books.

>> I think part of Trump's calculation, I

mean, he said this explicitly, is that

the Iranian regime was under tremendous

pressure at home as well. It wasn't just

Israel, it wasn't just America, although

the sanctions from America were were

meaningful here. There were huge

protests. Um, the Iranian regime had

killed thousands of Iranian protesters,

you know, just in January. And there was

a sense certainly in uh America that it

was weak enough that if America pushed,

if it bombed, if it began to to destroy

and degrade the regime's capacity to

exert force that the there might be

another revolution. Trump explicitly

invited the Iranian people to to rise up

and take their and take their government

back.

So what can be said right now of the

relationship between the state and the

society? You say this is a regime with

only 5 to 10% support, you know, by this

point. Now it's a regime that doesn't

have much support and does not have, you

know, its the leadership it has had for

some time. Is it weak? Will it crack? Is

there some possibility of a of a Iranian

revolution coming up from the ground?

>> Well, so this is now an example of of

American miscalculation. uh because it

is true that uh the Iranian regime uh

especially with its recent uh act of uh

uh massacre against its own people

created the kind of rupture that is

really um unreparable. Um but

nevertheless it is a regime that is very

entrenched and is also deeply benched.

Uh you know one has to understand that

there are two elements that keep this

regime in place. One is the fact that

it's political elite and security

establishment.

Don't see a plan B. Don't see an exit

Don't see a day after for

themselves. These are not the Shaw elite

who had their villas in Kotazour or in

Swiss Alps or in Southern California. Uh

these people have nowhere to go. Um

second uh is that uh you know with bombs

and missiles of course you can degrade

military capabilities and uh and kill

political leaders but you cannot

manufacture a viable political

alternative and that alternative does

not exist in Iran today. There is no

opposition with a ground game with

organizational capacity. And so for

these two reasons, regardless of how

weak the Iranian regime is or how hated

it is, it is very difficult to get rid

of it, especially through the sole use

of air power without boots on the

ground. Iran's strategy since the

beginning of of this assault has been to

expand the war in both time and space,

to expand it horizontally to other

regimes. So they cannot effectively

strike Israel or the United States, but

they can they can strike Bahrain, they

can strike, you know, the UAE, they can

strike, you know, into Dubai.

So they are setting much of the Arab

world on fire, which is, I think,

destroying many of their relationships.

Um, and there seem to be some schisms in

the regime around this. There was an

apology from some leader from from one

leader but they are continuing the the

the missiles and the drones.

How do you understand that strategy?

What what do they get out of that or not

get out of that? Is it working for them?

I mean how would you assess where we are

at this point?

Um, look, I think the Iranian strategy

is uh can be summarized in this way that

they know that they're outgunned uh but

they think that they can outlast uh

Israel and the United States. Uh it is

true that the US and Israel uh as uh the

world's most powerful army and the

region's most powerful military um have

the upper hand in terms of inflicting

pain on Iran. Uh but the Iranians

believe that they have a higher

threshold for pain. I mean, imagine uh

the 12-day war last year. Iran lost

about a thousand of its citizens and yet

it it it portrayed that war as a v

victory because it survived. Um if there

are a thousand American or Israeli

casualties, there's no way that this

could be portrayed as a win. Um and this

time uh the Iranians uh I think based on

the lessons of the 12-day war decided uh

to escalate in a horizontal manner and

spread the pain spread the pain not just

uh to the rest of the region but to the

global economy uh that has resulted in

uh energy prices shooting up. Um and

this is only because uh the export of

energy out of the region is disrupted.

Now if this crisis continues and

production is also affected either

because countries would have to shut

down production uh as storage spaces

fill up fill up uh or that they would

have to if if production facilities are

targeted and destroyed uh and then you

would have long-term shortages in the

market definitely the price of oil will

go above $200 uh dollars a barrel and

that would be uh an economic disaster

for the world and it's a policy that it

is also based on stretching ing out the

timeline uh because again based on the

12-day war they realized that there is

uh another shortage uh which is a

shortage of interceptors to shoot down

their ballistic uh missiles and drones.

And so in the first few days of this

war, they have tried to deplete uh the

Gulf States uh uh interceptor arsenal as

quickly as they could as well as Israel

and the United States so that once they

bring out their more powerful missiles,

they can hit targets much more

effectively and end the war on their

terms. Now this is their calculation. I

am not sure if it stands the test of

time and uh you know it is quite

possible that the US might be able to

completely neutralize their retaliatory

capacity especially against uh Israel by

taking out their launchers. Uh so it

might turn out to be another Iranian

miscalculation. But one thing that they

can do over a long period of time uh and

we've already seen this movie in Ukraine

uh is that they can probably continue to

fire drones uh into the Gulf States and

target shipping through the uh straight

of Hormones. And the only way that the

US can maybe stem this is to um invade

the southern shore of Iran and and put

boots on the ground. And that has

obviously political and human uh

implications of its own. Um so for now

the Iranians I think believe that this

has turned into an attritional conflict

uh and they have more staying power uh