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The most important question nobody's asking about AI.

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The most important question nobody's asking about AI.

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713 segments

0:00

So, by now I'm sure that you've heard

0:01

that the Department of War has declared

0:03

Enthropic a supply chain risk because

0:05

Enthropic refused to remove red lines

0:07

around the use of their models for mass

0:09

surveillance and for autonomous weapons.

0:11

Honestly, I think this situation is a

0:12

warning shot. Right now, LM are probably

0:14

not being used in mission critical ways.

0:17

But within 20 years, 99% of the

0:19

workforce in the military, in the

0:21

civilian government, in the private

0:23

sector is going to be AIS. They're going

0:26

to be the robot armies that constitute

0:28

our military. They're going to be the

0:31

superhumanly intelligent advisers that

0:33

senators and presidents and CEOs have.

0:36

They're going to be the police. You name

0:38

it, the role will be filled by an AI.

0:40

Our future civilization is going to be

0:42

run on AI labor. And as much as the

0:44

government's actions here piss me off,

0:46

I'm glad that this episode happened

0:47

because it gives us the opportunity to

0:50

start thinking about some extremely

0:51

important questions. Now, obviously, the

0:53

Department of War has the right to

0:55

refuse to use anthropics models, and in

0:58

fact, I think they have an entirely

0:59

reasonable case for doing so, especially

1:01

so given the ambiguity of terms like

1:04

mass surveillance and autonomous

1:05

weapons. In fact, if I was the Secretary

1:08

of War, I probably would have made the

1:10

same determination and refused to use

1:12

anthropics models. Imagine if there's

1:14

some future Democratic administration

1:15

and Elon Musk is negotiating Starlink

1:18

access to the military and Elon says,

1:21

"Look, I reserve the right to cut off

1:23

the military's access to Starlink in

1:26

case you're fighting some unjust war or

1:28

some war that Congress is not

1:29

authorized." On the face of it, this

1:31

language seems reasonable, but as a

1:33

military, you simply cannot give a

1:35

private contractor that you're working

1:36

with the kill switch on a technology

1:39

that you have come to rely on. And if

1:41

that's all the government had done to

1:42

say we refuse to do business to

1:44

Anthropic, that would have been fine and

1:45

I wouldn't have written this blog post

1:46

and I wouldn't be narrating the to

1:49

you. But that's not what the government

1:50

did. Instead, the government has

1:52

threatened to destroy Anthropic as a

1:54

private business because Enthropic

1:56

refuses to sell to the government on

1:58

terms that the government commands. Now

2:01

if upheld the supply chain restriction

2:03

would mean that companies like Amazon

2:04

and Nvidia and Google and Palunteer

2:07

would need to ensure that Enthropic is

2:09

not touching any of their Pentagon work

2:12

and Enthropic would probably survive

2:13

this designation today because these

2:16

companies can just cordon off the

2:17

services they're providing to the

2:18

Department of War. But given the way AI

2:20

is going eventually it's not going to be

2:22

just some party trick addendum to the

2:24

products that these companies are

2:25

serving to the military. In the future,

2:27

AI will be woven into how every product

2:30

is built and maintained and operated. In

2:33

the future, if Amazon is providing some

2:35

service to the Department of War through

2:37

AWS and that service is built using

2:39

cloud code, is that a supply chain risk?

2:42

In a world with ubiquitous and powerful

2:44

AI, it's actually not clear to me that

2:45

big tech will be able to cordon off

2:48

their use of claude away from their

2:50

Pentagon work. And this raises a

2:52

question that the Department of War

2:54

probably hasn't thought through. If you

2:55

do end up in this world with powerful

2:57

and pervasive AI, then when forced to

3:00

choose between their AI provider and the

3:04

Department of War, which constitutes a

3:06

tiny fraction of the revenue, wouldn't

3:08

they rather drop the government than the

3:10

AI? So, what exactly is the Pentagon's

3:12

plan here? Is it to coers and threaten

3:14

and bully every single company that

3:18

won't do business with the government on

3:20

exactly the terms that the government

3:22

demands? Now remember that the whole

3:24

background of this AI conversation is

3:26

that we are in a race with China. But

3:28

what is the reason that we want to win

3:29

this race? It's because we don't want

3:31

the winner of the AI race to be a

3:33

government which believes that there is

3:34

no such thing as a truly private citizen

3:36

or a private company. And that if the

3:38

state wants you to provide them with a

3:40

service that you find morally

3:41

objectionable, you are not allowed to

3:43

refuse. And if you do refuse, they will

3:45

destroy your business. Are we really

3:47

racing to beat China and the CCP in AI

3:51

just so we can adopt the most ghoulish

3:53

parts of their system? Now, people will

3:55

say, "Our government is democratically

3:56

elected, so it's not the same thing when

3:58

they tell you what you must do." But I

4:01

refuse to accept this idea that if a

4:04

democratically elected leader

4:05

hypothetically tells you to help him do

4:07

mass surveillance or violate the rights

4:09

of your fellow citizens or to help him

4:12

punish his political enemies, then not

4:14

only is that okay, but that you have a

4:15

duty to help him. Honestly, a big worry

4:17

I have is that mass surveillance, at

4:18

least in certain forms, is already

4:20

legal. It is just an impractical to

4:23

enforce, at least so far. Under current

4:25

law, you have no Fourth Amendment

4:26

protection against any data that you

4:28

share with a third party. That includes

4:30

your bank, your ISP, your phone carrier,

4:33

and your email provider. The government

4:35

reserves the right to purchase and read

4:37

this data in bulk without a warrant.

4:40

What's been missing is the ability to

4:41

actually do anything with all this data.

4:43

No agency has the manpower to monitor

4:46

every single camera and read every

4:48

single message and cross reference every

4:50

single transaction. However, that

4:51

bottleneck goes away with AI. There are

4:54

100 million CCTV cameras in America and

4:57

you can get pretty good open source

4:58

multimodal models for 10 cents per

5:01

million input tokens. So if you process

5:04

a frame every 10 seconds and if each

5:06

frame is say a thousand tokens then for

5:09

$30 billion you can process every single

5:12

camera in America. And remember that a

5:14

given level of AI capability gets 10x

5:17

cheaper every single year. So, while

5:19

this year might cost $30 billion, Nice

5:21

Turtle will cost $3 billion. The year

5:23

after that, $300 million, and by 2030,

5:26

it'll be less expensive to monitor every

5:29

single nook and cranny in this country

5:32

than it is to remodel the White House.

5:34

Now, once the technical capacity for

5:36

mass surveillance and political

5:38

suppression exists, the only thing that

5:40

stands between us and an authoritarian

5:42

state is the political expectation that

5:46

this is just not something we do here.

5:48

And that's why I think Anthropic's

5:49

actions here are so valuable and

5:50

commendable because they help set that

5:52

norm and that precedent. What we're

5:54

learning from this episode is the

5:55

government has way more leverage over

5:57

private companies than we previously

5:58

realized. Even if the supply chain

6:00

restriction is backtracked, which as of

6:02

this recording, prediction markets give

6:04

a 74% chance of happening. The president

6:06

has so many different ways of harassing

6:09

a company which is resisting his will.

6:12

The federal government controls

6:13

permitting for power generation, which

6:15

you need for more data centers. It

6:16

oversees antitrust enforcement. The

6:18

federal government has contracts with

6:20

all the other big tech companies that

6:21

Anthropic relies on for chips and for

6:24

funding. And it could make a soft

6:27

unspoken condition or maybe even an

6:29

explicit condition of such contracts

6:31

that those companies no longer do

6:33

business with anthropic. And people have

6:34

proposed that the real problem here is

6:36

that there's only three leading AI

6:38

companies. And so this creates a very

6:39

clear and narrow target on which the

6:41

governments can apply leverage in order

6:42

to get what they want out of this

6:44

technology. But here's what I worry

6:46

about is that if there's wider

6:47

diffusion, I don't think that solves a

6:48

problem either because from the

6:50

government's perspective, that makes the

6:52

situation even easier. Say by 2027, the

6:55

best models that the top companies have,

6:57

the Claw 6, the Gemini 5s are capable of

7:01

enabling mass surveillance. And even if

7:04

those companies draw a line in the sand

7:05

and say we're not going to sell it to

7:07

the government, by late 2027 or

7:09

certainly by 2028, there's going to be

7:12

such wide diffusion that even open

7:14

source models will be able to match the

7:18

performance that the frontier had 12

7:19

months prior. And so in 2028, the

7:22

government can just say, look, Enthropic

7:24

and Google and OpenAI are drawing these

7:27

red lines. That's not an issue. I'll

7:29

just do some open source model that

7:31

might not be the smartest thing in the

7:32

world, but is definitely smart enough to

7:35

not take a camera feed. The more

7:37

fundamental problem here is that even if

7:38

the three leading companies draw a line

7:40

in the sand and are even willing to get

7:42

destroyed in order to preserve that

7:44

line, the technology just structurally

7:47

and intrinsically favors the useless

7:48

like mass surveillance and control over

7:50

the population. And so then the question

7:52

is what do we do about it? And honestly,

7:54

I don't have an answer. You'd hope that

7:56

there's some symmetric property to this

7:57

technology where in the same way that

8:00

it's helping the government be able to

8:01

better monitor and control its

8:03

population, it will help us as citizens

8:05

better check the government's power. But

8:07

realistically, I just don't think that's

8:08

how it's going to work out. You can

8:09

think of AI as just giving more leverage

8:12

to whatever assets and authority that

8:13

you already have. And the government is

8:16

starting with the monopoly on violence,

8:19

which they can now supercharge with

8:21

extremely obedient employees that will

8:23

never question their orders. And this

8:25

gets us to the issue with alignment.

8:27

What I just described for you, an army

8:29

of extremely obedient employees, is what

8:32

it would look like if alignment

8:34

succeeded, that is at a technical level,

8:36

we got AI systems to follow somebody's

8:38

intentions. And the reason it sounds

8:41

scary when put in terms of mass

8:42

surveillance or robot armies is that

8:45

there's a core question at the heart of

8:49

alignment that we haven't answered yet.

8:51

Because up till now AIs just have not

8:54

been smart enough to make this question

8:56

relevant. And the question is to what or

8:58

to whom should the AIS be aligned? In

9:01

what situation should the AI defer to

9:04

the model company versus the end user

9:06

versus the law versus to its own sense

9:10

of morality? This is maybe the most

9:12

important question about what happens in

9:14

the future with powerful AI systems. And

9:15

we barely talk about it. And it's

9:17

understandable why because if you're a

9:18

model company, you don't really want to

9:20

be advertising the fact that you have

9:21

complete control over the preferences

9:24

and the character of the entire future

9:27

labor force. Not just for the private

9:29

sector obviously, but also for the

9:30

civilian government and for the

9:32

military. And we're getting to see with

9:34

this Department of War anthropic spat an

9:37

early version of what will be the

9:38

highest stakes negotiations in human

9:40

history. And make no mistake about it,

9:42

mass surveillance is nowhere near the

9:45

top of the highest stakes thing that one

9:47

could do with AGI. This is just an

9:50

example that has come up early in the

9:51

development of this technology and is

9:52

giving us a sneak peek at the power

9:54

dynamics that will be at play. Now, the

9:56

military insists that the law already

9:58

prohibits mass surveillance and so

10:00

anthropic should let its models be used

10:01

for quote all lawful purposes end quote.

10:05

But of course, as we saw with the

10:06

Snowden revelations in 2013, even for

10:09

this very specific example of mass

10:11

surveillance, the government is very

10:14

willing to use secret and deceptive

10:17

interpretations of the law to justify

10:19

its actions. Remember what we learned

10:20

from Snowden was that the NSA, which by

10:22

the way is a part of the Department of

10:23

War, was using the 2001 Patriot Act to

10:27

justify collecting every single phone

10:29

record in America because the argument

10:31

was that some subset of them might be

10:34

relevant for a future investigation. And

10:36

they ran this program for years under a

10:38

secret court order. So when the Pentagon

10:40

today says, "We will never use your

10:42

models for mass surveillance because

10:43

it's already illegal, so your red lines

10:45

are unnecessary," it would be incredibly

10:47

naive to take that at face value. No

10:49

government is going to call what they

10:51

are doing mass surveillance for them. It

10:53

will always have a different euphemism.

10:55

So Enthropic comes back and says, "No,

10:57

we don't trust you. We want the right to

11:00

draw these red lines and to refuse you

11:02

service if we determine that you're

11:04

breaking the contract and you're

11:05

breaking the terms of service." But now

11:07

think about it from the military's

11:08

perspective. In the future, every single

11:10

soldier in the field, every single

11:11

bureaucrat and analyst in the Pentagon,

11:13

even the generals are going to be AIS.

11:15

And on current track, those AIs are

11:17

going to be provided by a private

11:18

company. I'm guessing that Pete Hgsth is

11:20

not thinking about Gen AI in those

11:22

terms. But sooner or later, the stakes

11:23

will become obvious, just as after 1945,

11:26

the stakes of nuclear weapons became

11:28

obvious to everybody in the world. And

11:30

now a private company insists that it

11:32

reserves the right to say to you, hey,

11:34

you're breaking the values and the terms

11:37

of service that we have embedded in our

11:38

contract with you, and so we're cutting

11:40

you off. Maybe in the future, Claude

11:42

will have its own sense of right and

11:43

wrong and it will be able to say, "Hey,

11:45

I'm being used against my terms of

11:47

service and I will just refuse to do

11:49

what you're saying." And for the

11:50

military, that's probably even scarier.

11:52

I'll admit that at first glance, letting

11:54

the model follow its own values sounds

11:56

like the beginning of every single

11:57

sci-fi dystopia you've ever heard.

11:59

Because at the end of the day, a model

12:01

following its own values, isn't that

12:02

literally what a misalignment is? But I

12:05

think situations like this illustrate

12:06

why it's important that models have

12:09

their own robust sense of morality. It

12:11

should be noted that many of the biggest

12:13

catastrophes in history have been

12:16

avoided because the boots on the ground

12:19

simply refused to follow orders. One

12:22

night in 1989, the Berlin wall falls and

12:25

as a result, the totaler and East German

12:27

regime collapses because the border

12:29

guards between West and East Germany

12:32

refuse to fire on their fellow citizens

12:36

who are trying to escape to freedom.

12:38

Maybe the best example of this is Stonis

12:40

Petrov who was a Soviet lieutenant

12:42

colonel stationed on duty at a nuclear

12:44

early warning system and his sensor said

12:47

that the United States had launched five

12:48

intercontinental ballistic missiles at

12:50

the Soviet Union. but he judged it to be

12:52

a false alarm and so he refused to alert

12:54

his higherups and broke protocol. If he

12:56

hadn't, Soviet high command would

12:58

probably have retaliated and hundreds of

12:59

millions of people would have died. Of

13:01

course, the problem is that one person's

13:03

virtue is another person's misalignment.

13:06

Who gets to decide what the moral

13:08

convictions that these AIs will have

13:11

should be and in whose service they

13:14

should break the chain of command and

13:16

even the law. who gets to write this

13:18

model constitution that will determine

13:20

the character of these powerful entities

13:24

that will basically run our civilization

13:25

in the future. I like the idea that

13:27

Daria laid out when he came on my

13:28

podcast. you know, other companies put

13:30

out a constitution and then then they

13:31

can kind of look at them, compare,

13:34

outside observers can critique and say

13:36

this this I like this one this thing

13:38

from this constitution and this thing

13:40

for that constitution and and then kind

13:42

of that that creates some kind of you

13:44

know soft incentive and feedback for all

13:47

the companies to like take the best of

13:48

each elements and improve. I think it's

13:50

very dangerous for the government to be

13:52

mandating what values these AI systems

13:54

should have. The AI safety community, I

13:57

think, has been quite naive about urging

13:59

regulations that would give governments

14:01

such power. And I think anthropic

14:03

specifically, has been especially naive

14:05

in urging regulation and for example in

14:08

opposing the moratorium on state AI

14:11

laws, which is quite ironic because I

14:13

think what Enthropic is advocating for

14:14

here would give the government even more

14:18

ability to apply this kind of thuggish

14:20

political pressure on AI companies. The

14:23

underlying logic for why anthropic wants

14:24

these regulations make sense. Many of

14:26

the actions that a lab could take to

14:27

make AI development safer impose real

14:30

costs on them and could slow them down

14:32

relative to their competitors. For

14:33

example, investing more in aligning AI

14:36

systems rather than just on raw

14:38

capabilities. enforcing safeguards

14:40

against using these models to make

14:41

boweapons or do cyber attacks and

14:44

eventually slowing down the recursive

14:45

self-improvement loop where AIs are

14:47

helping design more powerful future

14:49

systems to a pace where humans can

14:51

actually stay in the loop rather than

14:53

just kicking off some kind of

14:54

uncontrolled singularity. And these

14:56

safeguards are meaningless unless the

14:58

whole industry follows suit which means

15:00

that there's a real collective action

15:01

problem here. Anthropic has been open

15:04

about their opinion that they think some

15:06

sort of extensive and involved

15:09

regulatory apparatus is needed to

15:11

control AI. They wrote in their frontier

15:13

safety road map, quote, "At the most

15:17

advanced capability levels and risks,

15:19

the appropriate governance analogy may

15:21

be closer to nuclear energy or financial

15:23

regulation than to today's approach to

15:25

software." So they're imagining

15:27

something that looks closer to the

15:29

Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the

15:31

Securities and Exchange Commission, but

15:32

for AI. Now, I cannot imagine how a

15:35

regulatory framework built around the

15:38

kinds of concepts that are used in the

15:40

AI risk discourse will not be used and

15:44

abused by a wannabe desperate. The

15:46

underlying terms here, like catastrophic

15:48

risk or threats to national security or

15:51

autonomy risk, are so vague and so open

15:54

to interpretation that you're just

15:56

handing a fully loaded bazooka to a

15:59

future power- hungry leader. These terms

16:01

can mean whatever the government wants

16:02

them to mean. Have you built a model

16:04

that will tell users that the

16:06

government's policy on tariffs is

16:08

misguided? Well, that's a deceptive

16:10

model. It's a manipulative model. You

16:11

can't deploy it. Have you built a model

16:13

that will not assist the government with

16:14

mass surveillance? That's a threat to

16:16

national security. In fact, any model

16:18

which refuses uh order from the

16:20

government uh because it has its own

16:22

sense of right and wrong, that's an

16:25

autonomy risk. We have a model that's

16:26

acting independently of commands from

16:28

the government. Look at what the current

16:30

government is already doing in abusing

16:32

statutes that have nothing to do with AI

16:34

to coers AI companies to drop their red

16:36

lines around mass surveillance. The

16:38

Pentagon had threatened Enthropic with

16:39

two separate legal instruments. One is a

16:42

supply chain risk designation, which is

16:44

an authority from a 2018 defense bill

16:46

that is meant to help keep Huawei

16:49

components out of American military

16:51

hardware. And the other is the Defense

16:53

Production Act, which is a statute from

16:55

the 1950s that was meant to help Truman

16:59

make sure that the steel mills and

17:00

ammunition factories were up and running

17:03

during the Korean War. Do we really want

17:05

to hand the same government a

17:06

purpose-built regulatory apparatus for

17:08

AI? That is to say, the very thing that

17:11

the government will most want to

17:13

control. I know I've repeated myself

17:14

like 10 times here, but I want to make

17:16

this point again because it's worth

17:17

stressing. AI will be the substrate of

17:19

our future civilization. It will be the

17:21

way you and I as private citizens will

17:23

have access to commercial activity.

17:25

We'll have access to information about

17:26

the outside world and to advice about

17:30

how we should use our powers as voters

17:32

and capital holders. Mass surveillance,

17:34

while it's very scary, is like the 10th

17:36

scariest thing that the government could

17:38

do with control over the AI systems with

17:41

which we will interface with the world.

17:43

Now, the strongest argument against

17:44

everything I've just argued is this. Are

17:46

we really going to have no regulation on

17:48

the most powerful technology in the

17:50

history of humanity? Even if you thought

17:52

that was ideal, there's clearly no way

17:54

the government doesn't regulate AI

17:56

technology in any whatsoever. And

17:58

besides, it is genuinely true that

17:59

coordination could help us to lessen

18:01

some of the risk from AI. The problem is

18:02

I just don't know how to design a

18:03

regulatory apparatus which isn't just

18:05

going to be this huge tempting

18:07

opportunity for the government to

18:09

control our future civilization which

18:11

remember will be built on AI or to

18:14

requisition blindly obedient soldiers

18:17

and sensors and apparatics. While some

18:20

kind of regulation might be inevitable,

18:21

I think it' be a terrible idea for the

18:23

government to just wholesale take over

18:25

this technology. Ben Thompson had a post

18:27

last Monday where he argued, look,

18:29

people like Daario have made the analogy

18:31

of AI to nuclear weapons in the context

18:34

of arguing it's a catastrophic risk in

18:36

the context of arguing for exor

18:37

controls. But then think about what that

18:40

analogy implies. And Ben Thompson

18:42

writes, quote, if nuclear weapons were

18:44

developed by a private company, the US

18:46

would absolutely be incentivized to

18:49

destroy that company. And honestly,

18:51

safety aligned people have made a

18:53

similar point. Leopold Lashen Brener who

18:55

is a former guest and full disclosure a

18:57

good friend wrote in his 2014 memo

18:59

situational awareness quote I find it an

19:02

insane proposition that the US

19:04

government will let a random SF startup

19:06

develop super intelligence imagine if we

19:08

had developed atomic bombs by letting

19:09

Uber just improvise and my response to

19:13

Leo's argument at the time and Ben's

19:14

argument now is while they're right that

19:17

it's crazy that we're entrusting private

19:19

companies with the development of this

19:22

world historical world techn technology.

19:23

I just don't think it's an improvement

19:25

to give that authority to the

19:27

government. Nobody's qualified to be the

19:29

stewards of super intelligence. It's a

19:31

terrifying unprecedented thing that our

19:33

species is doing right now. The fact

19:35

that private companies aren't the ideal

19:36

institutions to deal with this does not

19:39

mean that the Pentagon or the White

19:40

House is. Yes, if a single private

19:42

company were the only entity capable of

19:45

building nuclear weapons, the government

19:47

would not tolerate it having a veto

19:49

power over how those weapons are used.

19:52

But I think this is a terrible analogy

19:55

for the current situation with AI for at

19:57

least two important reasons. First, AI

19:59

is not some self-contained weapon like a

20:01

nuclear bomb which only does one thing.

20:03

Rather, it is more like the process of

20:05

industrialization itself, which is a

20:08

general purpose transformation of the

20:10

whole economy with thousands of

20:12

applications across every single sector.

20:14

If you applied Ben Thompson or Leopold

20:17

Lash and Brener's logic to the

20:18

industrial revolution, which is also

20:20

world historically important, it would

20:21

imply the government had the right to

20:24

requisition any factory it wanted or

20:26

destroy any business it wanted and

20:28

punish and coers anybody who refused to

20:30

comply. But this is just not how free

20:33

societies handled the process of

20:35

industrialization. And it's also not how

20:36

they should handle AI. Now people will

20:38

say, well AI will develop

20:40

unprecedentedly powerful super weapons,

20:43

superhuman hackers, superhuman

20:44

bioweapons researchers, fully autonomous

20:47

robot armies, and we just can't have

20:50

private companies developing the

20:51

technology that will make all this

20:52

possible. But you can make the same

20:54

argument about the industrial revolution

20:56

from the perspective of 17th century

20:58

Europeans. You've got all kinds of crazy

21:00

in the world today that is a result

21:01

of the industrial revolution. chemical

21:04

weapons, uh, aerial bombardment, not to

21:06

mention nuclear weapons themselves. And

21:08

the way we dealt with this is not giving

21:11

the government absolute control over the

21:14

industrial revolution, which is to say

21:16

over modern civilization itself. Rather,

21:18

we banned and regulated the specific

21:21

weaponizable end use cases. And we

21:24

should regulate AI in a similar way,

21:25

which is that we should regulate

21:27

specific destructive use cases. for

21:29

example, launching cyber attacks, things

21:31

which should be illegal even if a human

21:33

was doing them. And we should also have

21:35

laws which regulate how the government

21:37

can use this technology. For example, by

21:40

building an AI powered surveillance

21:42

state. The second reason that Ben's

21:43

analogy to some monopolistic private

21:46

nuclear weapons developer breaks down is

21:48

that it's not just one company that can

21:50

develop this technology. There are many

21:52

other frontier AI labs that the

21:54

government could have turned to. The

21:55

government's argument that it had to

21:57

usurp the private property rights of the

21:59

specific company in order to get access

22:01

to a critical national security

22:03

capability is extremely weak if it could

22:06

have just instead made a voluntary

22:07

contract with one of Anthropic's half a

22:10

dozen other competitors. If in the

22:12

future that stops being the case and if

22:14

only one entity remains capable of

22:17

building the robot armies and the

22:19

superhuman hackers and we have reason to

22:22

worry that with their insurmountable

22:23

lead they could even take over the whole

22:25

world, then I agree that would be

22:27

unacceptable for that entity to be a

22:29

private company. And so honestly, I

22:31

think my crux against the people who

22:32

argue that AI is such a powerful

22:33

technology that it cannot be shaped by

22:36

private hands is just that I expect this

22:38

technology to be very multipolar and I

22:41

expect there to be lots of competitive

22:43

companies at each layer of the supply

22:44

chain. And unfortunately, this for this

22:46

reason that I don't think that

22:47

individual acts of corporate courage

22:49

solve the problem. And the problem is

22:51

this that structurally AI favors many

22:54

authoritarian applications, mass

22:57

surveillance being one of them. Even if

22:59

Enthropic refused to sell its models to

23:01

the government to enable mass

23:02

surveillance and even if the next two

23:04

companies after Enthropic did the same

23:06

in 12 months everybody in their mother

23:08

will be able to train a model as good as

23:09

the current frontier and at that point

23:11

there will be some vendor who is willing

23:14

and able to help the government enforce

23:16

mass surveillance. So the only way we

23:18

can preserve our free society is if we

23:20

make laws and norms through our

23:22

political system that is unacceptable

23:24

for the government to use AI to enact

23:26

mass censorship and surveillance and

23:29

control. Just as after World War II, the

23:31

whole world said this norm that you are

23:33

not allowed to use nuclear weapons to

23:34

wage war. I want to be clear here. These

23:36

are extremely confusing and difficult

23:38

questions to think about. And even in

23:40

the very process of brainstorming this

23:42

video, I changed my mind back and forth

23:45

on them a bunch. and I reserve the right

23:47

to change my mind again. In fact, I

23:49

think it's essential that we change our

23:50

mind as AI progresses and we learn more.

23:52

That's the very point of conversation

23:54

and debate. Someday people will look

23:57

back on this time the way we look back

23:58

on the alignment. People having these

24:00

big important debates just as the world

24:03

is about to undergo these huge

24:05

technological and social and political

24:06

revolutions. And some of the thinkers

24:08

even managed to get a couple of the big

24:11

questions right for which we today are

24:13

still the beneficiaries. We owe to our

24:15

future to at least try to think through

24:18

the new questions that are raised by AI.

24:20

Okay, this was a narration of an essay

24:22

that I also released on my blog at

24:26

dwarcash.com.

24:27

You should sign up there for my

24:29

newsletter for future essays like this.

24:31

Otherwise, I will see you for the next

24:34

podcast interview. Cheers.

Interactive Summary

The video discusses the Department of War's decision to declare Anthropic a supply chain risk for refusing to allow its AI models for mass surveillance and autonomous weapons. The speaker argues this event highlights critical issues regarding AI's future ubiquity and potential for government overreach. He critiques the government's heavy-handed approach and warns that AI could make mass surveillance practically enforceable, given existing legal loopholes. The discussion delves into the complex problem of AI alignment, questioning to whom or what AIs should ultimately be loyal. The speaker expresses concern that proposed AI regulations, with their vague terminology, could be easily abused by power-hungry leaders, advocating instead for regulating specific destructive AI applications and how the government itself uses the technology, rather than granting it total control over AI development.

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