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AI Sells Labor, Not Software — Legendary Investor Elad Gil

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AI Sells Labor, Not Software — Legendary Investor Elad Gil

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278 segments

0:00

I'm looking at a piece in front of me.

0:02

This is from a while ago, but

0:06

it's you discussing long-held dogma that

0:09

ends up being unviable. So, for

0:11

instance, the common-held belief after

0:13

PayPal's sale to eBay that fraud will

0:15

kill you in the payment space, right?

0:17

>> Yeah. And I'm wondering how you orient

0:19

yourself as an investor to

0:22

stress test

0:24

those types of dogma. It's really hard

0:26

because you often end up You start out

0:30

with some set of beliefs. You think

0:31

something's interesting.

0:33

Or maybe you invest in it, maybe you

0:34

start a company in it.

0:36

And then it turns out the thing you

0:37

think is really interesting turns out to

0:39

be really hard and you get killed.

0:41

And then 5 years later a company comes

0:42

up that actually does it and wins. Mhm.

0:45

And the question is why? Why did the

0:48

thing suddenly work when it didn't

0:50

before? Or there's 10 attempts to do X

0:53

and then

0:54

suddenly is it that technology got good

0:55

enough? It could be a regulatory change.

0:57

It could be a market shift. It could be

0:58

whatever. An example be Harvey AI Legal

1:01

where selling to law firms traditionally

1:03

has been awful.

1:04

And Harvey's not much broader than that,

1:05

right? They also have very strong

1:07

enterprise adoption and

1:09

lots of different people using them in

1:10

different ways, but the dogma was always

1:12

like building stuff for law firms is

1:14

crappy as a business and you should

1:15

never do it. But what AI did is it

1:17

shifted things from selling tools to

1:19

selling work product or selling units of

1:21

labor. That's really the shift in

1:23

generative AI.

1:24

We're going from seats and we're going

1:26

from software

1:27

and SaaS and we're moving into a world

1:29

where we're selling human labor

1:31

equivalents. We're selling work hours or

1:33

labor hours or whatever you want to call

1:34

it. Mhm. of cognition. And so, Harvey is

1:37

effectively helping really augment

1:39

lawyers in different ways. And part of

1:41

that's a knowledge corpus, but a lot of

1:43

it is this tooling that really helps

1:44

lawyers achieve the goals that they have

1:46

in different ways in a collaborative

1:47

manner in some cases. And so, this is a

1:49

fundamentally different type of product

1:50

from what people were selling before.

1:52

And so, it opened up the market in a way

1:54

that the market wasn't open before.

1:55

There's actually a broader conversation

1:57

around is the world market limited or

2:00

founder limited in terms of

2:01

entrepreneurial success. The Y

2:03

Combinator school of thought is that we

2:05

just don't have enough founders, and if

2:06

we had 10 times as many founders, we'd

2:08

have 10 times as many big companies.

2:10

And there's an alternate school of

2:11

thought, which is how many markets are

2:13

actually open in any given moment in

2:15

time, and those are the ones where you

2:16

can build big companies. Cuz if the

2:17

market isn't open to innovation or

2:19

change or whatever or hasn't is

2:21

undergoing a shift, you can't really

2:23

build anything or anyhow, so why do it?

2:25

And the striking thing about AI is it's

2:27

opened up tons and tons of markets that

2:29

were closed for a long time.

2:31

And it's opened it up because of

2:32

capabilities, but it's also opened it up

2:34

because every CEO is asking themselves,

2:36

"What's my AI story?"

2:38

And there's way more openness to try

2:40

things than I've ever seen in my life.

2:41

And so,

2:43

we have this odd moment in time where

2:44

things are massively available for

2:46

founders to do new things.

2:48

And if you're an AI company and you're

2:49

not seeing explosive growth quickly,

2:51

something's fundamentally broken.

2:53

Because the markets are so open

2:56

that you can suddenly grow at a rate

2:58

that you've never grown before. There's

2:59

always been cases of companies that just

3:00

go like this.

3:02

But again, you look at the ramps of

3:04

OpenAI and Anthropic, and it's the

3:05

fastest ramps to tens of billions ever.

3:07

Percentages of GDP, it's like crazy. If

3:09

we come back to your comment of

3:12

not necessarily market first and

3:14

strength of team second all the time,

3:16

but like you said, you 90% agree with

3:18

that, right? And

3:20

if you have an excellent team in a

3:21

terrible market, like that's going to be

3:23

that's going to be a difficult one to

3:25

execute. How do you determine what is a

3:28

good versus great market or just what is

3:30

a great market? What do you look for?

3:32

And the example you gave, I might be

3:34

overreading this, but what you said that

3:37

when Google shut down, I think it was

3:39

Maven, right? That's an interesting kind

3:41

of event-based approach as an input to

3:44

investing, right? Cuz you're like,

3:45

"Okay, if they're not going to build it,

3:48

we're

3:49

that suddenly creates

3:51

a playing field for

3:54

startups. Yeah. to play in that space.

3:56

So, could you speak to more

3:58

of how you determine or look for great

4:00

markets? I mean, there's a few different

4:02

ways to think about it. One is like,

4:03

some people take the framework of why

4:05

now. What's shifted now that makes it

4:07

something interesting market because

4:08

people have been trying to do things for

4:09

a long time in every market. And so,

4:11

that may be a regulatory shift, right?

4:12

Some Sara, the fleet management company

4:14

benefited from the fact that somebody

4:15

was regulation around needing in-cab

4:17

monitoring of drivers. So, you had some

4:19

of the cameras watching people so they

4:21

don't fall asleep while they're driving

4:22

trucks on the road, right? Mhm. And so,

4:24

that was their entry point to that start

4:25

building out a suite of software.

4:27

But, it was a regulatory shift.

4:28

Sometimes there's technology shifts,

4:29

like what's happening in AI. And the

4:32

crazy thing about the AI shift is

4:34

the foundation models instantly plugged

4:37

into a massive set of markets, which is

4:39

basically all enterprise data and

4:41

information and email and just all white

4:44

collar work was suddenly available to

4:46

AI. Mhm. Cuz it was the perfect market

4:48

for that. It also plugged into code,

4:50

which is a type of white collar work.

4:51

So, it's just suddenly it just inserts

4:53

into language and language is used

4:54

everywhere in in enterprises as well as

4:56

in consumer. And so, there's just a

4:57

massive market to tap into and transform

4:59

or set of markets. Robotics is a little

5:00

bit different from that because even if

5:01

you had the world's best robotic model,

5:03

the submarkets that already have robotic

5:05

hardware are quite small on a relative

5:07

basis.

5:08

And so, you don't have that instant

5:10

runway that you would with

5:12

language unless you come up with

5:14

something new there. That's kind of an

5:15

aside that I think robotics is really

5:17

interesting and be important. It's more

5:18

just that nuance of like what's that

5:20

instant thing you plug into

5:21

commercially. And then,

5:23

there's regulatory shifts and technology

5:24

shifts, there's

5:25

incumbency or company shifts,

5:27

competitive shifts.

5:29

A company may blow itself up, it may get

5:31

bought by a competitor. One company I'm

5:33

I'm excited about on the security side

5:34

is called In-Q-Tel and they're basically

5:36

competing in part with Hashi. Hashi got

5:38

bought by IBM. Anytime you get bought by

5:39

IBM, you slow you slow down a lot

5:41

usually. Mhm. Suddenly it creates more

5:43

opportunity for a startup. So, I I feel

5:45

like there are these different things

5:46

that can change at a given moment in

5:48

time. Mhm. [clears throat] It could be

5:49

the market trying really fast as

5:50

Coinbase and crypto, right? You just

5:52

have suddenly this adoption and

5:53

proliferation of token types. There's

5:55

lots and lots and lots of different

5:57

markets that are interesting. The

5:58

commonality is usually like is it also

6:00

big? Is there a big enough town? And

6:02

there's two types of towns. There's fake

6:03

town. Just for people listening who

6:04

might not have it. Your total

6:06

addressable market.

6:07

>> Total addressable market. So what's the

6:08

market you're in?

6:09

And sometimes people come up with these

6:10

fake markets. They're like, oh well,

6:13

we are facilitating

6:15

global e-commerce and global e-commerce,

6:18

I'm making up the number is $30 a year

6:20

and so we're in a $30 a year market and

6:22

if we get just a tenth of a percent of

6:23

that is 300 billion of revenue and

6:25

you're like, that's not

6:27

that's not your market. Your market is

6:28

like you built this little optimization

6:30

engine for SMB websites or whatever.

6:33

That's not a $30

6:35

market. And so really it's kind of

6:37

defining the market. There's a really

6:39

famous example of this where defining

6:41

your market changes how you think about

6:42

it.

6:43

And so that was Coca-Cola, right? So

6:45

Coke and Pepsi were roughly neck and

6:46

neck in terms of market share

6:48

for decades.

6:50

And then one of the Coke CEO said, hey,

6:54

maybe we should be thinking about our

6:55

share as share of

6:58

liquid sold.

6:59

Like drinks, not share of soda.

7:02

And so we just went from 50% market

7:04

share to 0.5%.

7:06

And that's why they bought Dasani and

7:08

that's why they entered all these other

7:09

markets, right? Because they said,

7:11

our definition of our market is wrong.

7:13

>> Mhm. We're not in the soda pop business,

7:14

we're in the drinks business. And so I

7:15

think also conceptualizing what you're

7:17

doing can really help change

7:19

your scope of ambition or how you think

7:20

about what you're doing. If you're

7:22

trying to spot

7:24

along the lines of the fraud kill you in

7:27

the payment space, right? Any

7:29

dogma in the AI world, the sphere of AI,

7:34

right?

7:35

Anything anything hopped to mind where

7:37

you think, uh, maybe that's not true now

7:40

or maybe in like two years it'll be

7:42

completely untrue, but people will have

7:44

latched onto this belief as

7:47

one of the thou shalt not or thou thou

7:49

shall

7:51

commandments. I don't know. I mean,

7:52

there's some things that have circulated

7:54

in the past around what's the ROI on the

7:55

capex spend of that and whatever be paid

7:57

back and I just like

7:59

I think that stuff is probably off. But

8:01

yeah, I think fundamentally there are

8:03

moments in time where it's very smart to

8:05

be contrarian. And there are moments in

8:07

time where being consensus is the

8:09

smartest possible thing you can do. And

8:11

I think right now we're in a moment in

8:12

time where being consensus is very

8:14

right.

8:15

You know, and you can really overthink

8:17

it and what's the contrarian thing? We

8:18

should go do a bunch of hardware stuff

8:20

cuz blah blah blah. And like maybe just

8:22

buy more AI. You know what I mean? I

8:23

think people make these things way too

8:24

complicated.

Interactive Summary

The video features a discussion on how investors identify and stress-test dogmas within potential markets. The speaker highlights how technological and regulatory shifts can open previously unviable markets, using examples like generative AI's impact on legal services. The conversation also explores the importance of defining a market's true scope—using the Coca-Cola example—and argues that in the current climate, following consensus in AI can be more strategic than forced contrarianism.

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