I’ve been trying to think about how to begin this

episode, which is a very, very tricky one.

And I found myself thinking about a debate I

heard a lot in 2023 and 2024.

"Free free Palestine."

You would hear these chants and see these signs

"From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free"

From the river to the sea, from the river to the sea

And it flared into this huge controversy.

"Free Palestine from the river to the sea

means get rid of all the Jews.

No from the river to the sea means the land in between

is free.

Everyone in between is free."

"No

This is a genocidal chant."

It was always so strange to me,

so backwards about this focus on college campus protesters.

Was it.

There was this reality.

People weren’t really admitting that there is one

power from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea.

That power, that sovereign, which

if you travel in that area and I have is just visually

undeniable, is Israel.

American politics has not grappled really

at all with the level of day to day domination

that Israel exerts over Palestinian lives

and the complete absence of any horizon at all for that

to end.

And this was true before October 7th.

In early 2023, the political scientist Michael Barnett,

Nathan Brown, Marc Lynch and Shibley Telhami

published an edited volume called "The One State Reality."

Their argument, which also made in a very controversial

Foreign Affairs piece, was that "Palestine is not a state

in waiting and Israel is not a Democratic state.

Incidentally, occupying Palestinian territory.

All the territory west of the Jordan River

has long constituted a single state

under Israeli rule, where the land and the people

are subject to radically different legal regimes

and Palestinians are permanently

treated as a lower caste."

What they were saying then is that the hope of a two state

solution in the future had become a way many in America,

particularly avoided reckoning with the one state

reality of the present.

That reality was not accidental.

It was not.

It is not intended to be transient.

It was being etched into the land in stone

and cement, in settlements and checkpoints,

in the construction of walls, and the demolition of homes.

That might have been a controversial claim

when they made it.

What has happened since October 7

has made it an undeniable reality.

Israel now occupies more than half

of Gaza, also, the more than two million Gazans

have been herded into less than half

of the land they formerly occupied.

And Gaza, it should be said, was already

one of the most overcrowded places on Earth.

The conditions Gazans now live in, they’re hellish.

And there is no near term.

There’s no imagined, there’s no envisioned relief.

This is, and it remains, collective punishment.

Hamas, not the children of Gaza,

attacked Israel on October 7th.

The conditions of the children of Gaza now live in are

they’re not moral. In the West Bank.

Israel has choked off money to the Palestinian Authority.

It has built settlements chosen to build settlements

at a record pace.

More settlements were approved in the last year

alone than in the two decades before combined.

Israel has allowed has protected

a terrifying rise in settler violence

and military violence towards the Palestinians.

There is no doubt if you go there, who rules the West Bank

and is not the P.A.

When Netanyahu signed a recent settlement project, a project

the United States had opposed for a long time

because it would effectively bisect the West Bank,

making a Palestinian state physically unimaginable,

Netanyahu made clear that was exactly why he was signing it.

He said, "we are going to fulfill our promise that there

will be no Palestinian state.

This place belongs to us." In the north.

Israel has used war on Iran as cover to invade Lebanon,

displacing more than a million people, a million,

and suggesting that up to 600,000 will not be allowed

to return to their homes until Israel has established its

security zone, whatever that proves to be,

and that it is decided that Israelis in the north are

safe.

To put it bluntly, it bluntly, it is an open question whether

any of those 600,000 Lebanese will ever be able to return

to their homes, or if they will even have homes to return

to.

I do not want to underplay what Israel is actually

dealing with here.

I have immense sympathy for Israel’s war against

Hezbollah.

They are defending themselves in a way that any state would.

But this, again, is collective punishment.

Those million Lebanese.

They are not all Hezbollah.

Israel’s security challenges are very real.

It’s horror.

It’s fear, it’s trauma.

After October 7 was very real.

Its determination to make sure that never happened again

is what any state and any people would do.

Its right to reprisal against Hamas and Hezbollah

were undeniable.

I am not someone who wants to see the state of Israel

cease to exist, but what Israel is choosing here.

A one state reality that already

is and will continue to be understood the world over

as apartheid.

It endangers that state too. The cost of Israel cannot morally

be the permanent subjugation of millions of Palestinians.

In February, Gallup found for the first time, more Americans

sympathized with the Palestinians than the Israelis

Among Democrats, among young Americans,

it is not even close.

Israel maintains support among older Americans,

and it has benefited from the advanced age of the last two

presidents.

Their views of Israel were forged in another time

around another Israel.

American politics has not yet fully grappled

with what Israel has chosen to become.

So what does it mean to grapple with Israel’s one

state reality to see what Israel is now,

what the West Bank is now, what Gaza is now,

what Lebanon is now.

Without illusion.

Shibley Telhami is the Anwar Sadat Professor

for Peace and Development at the University

of Maryland, College Park.

Marc Lynch is the director of the Project

on Middle East Political Science at George Washington

University.

Lynch is the author, most recently,

of "America’s Middle East: the Ruination of a Region."

But together, they were two of the editors on that 2023 book

I mentioned "The One State Reality."

As always, my email ezrakleinshow@nytimes.com.

Marc Lynch.

Shibley Telhami welcome to the show.

Pleasure thanks.

So I want to start, Mark, before October 7th,

you and Shibley and a few co-authors published a book

of essays and a big “Foreign Affairs" article called

"Israel’s One State Reality."

And the argument you make is that the two state solution

is a fantasy.

It’s dead, that there is a reality that we are failing

to apprehend in Israel, which is that there is one sovereign

from the river to the sea.

And so I want to ask you what you were seeing that convinced

you to make that argument.

How did this work, in your view, say in the West Bank?

Sure and I think it is important to put this

into a bit of a trajectory historically.

So back in the mid 90s, during the Oslo years,

you actually had a situation where if you’re living

in Jerusalem, if you’re living in Ramallah,

if you’re living in Nablus or Jenin,

you can actually feel a state emerging around you.

You can see the Palestinian legislature is actually

active.

They have ministries, the checkpoints are coming down.

You’re able to travel.

If you have an olive oil business,

you can actually load it into the back of a truck

and sell it in Bethlehem.

So it actually was this idea that it’s not just that we

were negotiating towards a two state solution,

but people could feel two states coming into existence.

Fast forward 10 years after the Second Intifada.

That’s just not true anymore.

Now, you’ve got a whole range.

You’ve got the big security wall,

which is de facto a new border.

You’ve got a whole range of checkpoints that have come

into place, making it impossible to really move

freely across the West Bank.

Palestinian Authority has basically been destroyed

and is being rebuilt from scratch.

If you’re just an average Palestinian living in the West

Bank, you no longer feel like you’re on the path towards

a state.

You might follow the negotiations,

but now you feel that you’re living under occupation.

Then fast forward another 10 years, another 15 years,

and you’re in a situation where nothing has happened

in all of that time, which would make you believe that

a two state solution has become more likely.

There’s more settlements, more settlers,

more settler only roads, more repression, no elections,

nothing which would make you feel like you’re moving

towards something else.

So there is this real sense of stagnation,

and we’re looking at this and we’re trying to understand

as political scientists, what is this entity.

It’s clearly not something on a path to two independent

sovereign states.

It’s clearly not anything which is familiar to us

as just an occupation or just a transitional phase.

But it also isn’t really formally yet a single Israeli

state.

It hasn’t been annexed.

It hasn’t come fully under Israeli law.

It’s just this limbo which goes on forever.

And so that’s what we were trying to capture with the one

state reality is that in reality,

everybody living between in mandatory Palestine,

everything from the river to the sea is under the effective

power of a single sovereign, which is the Israeli

government.

But they experience it very, very differently.

They had different rights, they

have different responsibilities,

they have different security concerns.

If you’re born in one place, you are trapped within Gaza.

If you’re born in Ramallah, you have one set of rights,

but your family, who’s just a couple kilometers away

in Jerusalem, they might have a few more rights.

And so it was a highly differentiated legal regime,

but one in which Israel ultimately held all the cards.

Shibley, one thing that Israeli Jews said to me

when I say something like this to them

is no, the Palestinian Authority

is the government in the West Bank.

What do you think about that?

That’s a really good starting point,

because think about what Palestinians are facing now

in terms of settler attacks, meaning these are obviously

civilians who are very often in the West Bank illegally

and going into homes of Palestinians or burning them

or going into properties and stealing them or going

into cars and burning them, and in some cases shooting

people.

And that’s on Palestinian territory and Palestinian

land.

There is not a single policeman stopping them.

Not a single one.

Because they don’t dare.

They’re not supposed to.

And the Israeli military would shoot them to death.

And at the same time, look at what they’re doing.

They are working hard around the clock

to make sure that there are no attacks on Israelis.

One reason why we haven’t seen a lot of attacks or even

demonstrations during what happened in Gaza on the West

Bank.

So the Palestinian Authority is a joke if you’re thinking

about it as a real government.

It certainly has no real control.

And to think about the asymmetry of power that

has defined the past few decades,

think, again, that Israel could

put Mahmoud Abbas under arrest,

the Palestinian Authority president, in his compound,

they did with Yasir Arafat, the founder

of the Palestinian movement.

He was confined to his compound, not able

to move until his death.

We could describe the awfulness of the life

on the West Bank, and a lot of people don’t get it.

They don’t understand, for example,

how important the prisoner issue to Palestinians.

You’ve got more than a million Palestinians, probably,

who have been arrested by Israeli forces throughout

the occupation.

It’s a very small population, and you’ve got there’s not

a family that’s not touched by it.

And many of them, thousands of them are held without charges.

And if they’re taken to court, they’re going to military

court.

And in that military court, the conviction rate

is close to 100%.

A settler who kills a Palestinian on the West Bank,

they probably will not even be charged.

And if they ever ever charge, they go to civil court

and rarely do they get convicted.

So that is, I think, one of the things that probably drove

us to think about this you have to be even handed here,

say, well, yeah, Palestinians should reform too.

Yeah right.

Well, it probably should for sure.

Even if it’s a municipality, there’s corruption that could

be repaired.

But to think that that’s going to matter at the strategic

level, it’s really a joke.

The other thing I want to say about this

is that I think there is a religious narrative, even

in the secular Israel, about the entitlement to the land,

particularly after 1967, and holding on to the West Bank

as part of Israel.

And I think the entitlement to at least the occupied

territories is tied in back of the mind is that

the legitimacy of Israel derives from the biblical

narrative, not from the fact that it’s recognized

by the United Nations as a legitimate state.

And I think that narrative has really

grown in a way that subconsciously,

even for people who are not religious in a way

that it really dominates the thinking

and in a visible way in the West Bank.

And that’s why a lot of people look away when they don’t

agree with the crazies who are killing or doing something,

and they want to pretend it doesn’t exist,

but they’re not entirely uncomfortable with

the outcome.

Something that I wanted to zoom in on a bit is

the American narrative, actually,

that you’re getting at, which is I think the American

narrative thinks a lot about the failure of the peace

process, the failure of Camp David in 2000.

To some degree, you’ll hear about the failure

of negotiations between Olmert and Abbas in 2008.

In 2009, Netanyahu comes back into power,

and he has been now prime minister

with short interruptions since then, which is a long time.

I was going to bring this quote in later,

but I think it’s worth talking about now.

This is something Netanyahu said recently,

which I think helps shift maybe the understanding

of whether or not what we’re looking at is the failure

of a process or the success of a project.

Netanyahu said there will be no Palestinian state

to the West of the Jordan River.

For years, I have prevented the creation of that terror

state against tremendous pressure,

both domestic and from abroad.

We have done this with determination

and with astute statesmanship.

Moreover, we have doubled the Jewish settlement

in Judea and Samaria, and we will continue on this path.

Mark, when you listen to that, what do you hear?

I think it’s a very honest and direct statement

of the reality.

I think that again, I do think that there

was a serious effort to negotiate a two state

solution under Oslo.

For all of its flaws, it was real.

But Netanyahu opposed that at the time

and was very happy to bring it grinding

to a halt when he first became prime minister in 96.

And I think he’s been extremely consistent his

entire career.

And I think that has really, I think,

been part of his political success in a way of being able

to position himself as the one who is able to advance

this particular project.

And I don’t think that Americans are blind to this.

They tend to look at it as Netanyahu is the problem.

He’s always pushing back.

He’s always slowing things down.

He’s always giving us problems.

And if we could just get rid of Netanyahu,

if we could just find a way to get a more reasonable

alternative as Israel’s prime minister,

then we can get back to the business of a two state

negotiations and the.

And that’s always been a very willful misreading

of the situation.

I think that Netanyahu isn’t like a magician who is somehow

convincing an Israeli public to accept this.

He’s reflecting what I think is a real and a steadily

growing kind of center position in Israel,

which is they really don’t see the need for there to be two

states.

The left wing in Israel back in the 1990s,

they were consumed with the idea that Israel had to make

a choice between being Jewish or being Democratic.

And if you annex the West Bank,

if you control the West Bank in Gaza,

then you get to a demographic situation

where Jews are no longer a majority in this territory.

And I think that dilemma was resolved a long time ago.

They chose to be Jewish, not Democratic.

And the vehicle for doing that was

the perpetuation of this idea that eventually, someday,

there will be a two state solution.

Maybe but we don’t need to think about giving any kinds

of rights to the Palestinians.

And again, I don’t think that Americans were blind to this.

I think that they were just willing to go along

with it because it was convenient to do so.

So we have to talk about the West Bank.

We talk about Gaza.

But there are many Palestinians living in Israel

proper, Israel’s traditional borders,

however you want to call it.

One of the arguments you make in the piece is that the one

state reality is, quote, based on relations of superiority

and inferiority between Jews and non-jews across all

the territories under Israel’s differentiated

but unchallenged control.

Israeli Jews often make the point of telling me

that Palestinians in Israel have equal rights, that they

are equal citizens in Israel proper,

and such that Israel is a democracy.

In fact, it is a multi-ethnic democracy.

Why don’t you agree?

No, we didn’t say we don’t agree.

Actually, we put it on a scale from on the one end,

you have citizens who do have civil rights

and can vote and get elected.

They’re discriminated against in a very real way,

structurally and in practice, for sure.

But then on the other hand, you

have these Gaza and the West Bank on the other end

of the spectrum.

So we look at it as a spectrum.

So the reality is, if the chief of police

is supremacist.

Ben-Gvir, who thinks a Jewish life

is more valuable than Arab life.

It’s not about citizenship.

It’s about ethnicity.

It’s about religion.

And there are fears already.

You could see the tension.

It’s hard to also decouple particularly in times of war

and crisis.

But what happens is that let’s say you’re in a factory

together.

You have an Israeli citizen who’s Jewish and Israeli

citizen who is an Arab, and they’re working together.

And they post on social media and they’re the Palestinians

saying, this is genocide.

What’s happening with the Israelis are doing,

and the Israelis saying, go to the army,

and they’re sitting next to each other.

What do you think is going to happen to them.

So then where on the spectrum prior to October 7

is Gaza for you.

Because when I speak to Israeli Jews about this,

their view is that they did not have control of Gaza.

They had withdrawn from Gaza and after they withdrew,

Gazans chose Hamas, a group dedicated to Israel’s

destruction, and eventually the result was October 7.

And so, to many Jewish Israelis,

the lesson of the Gaza withdrawal

is not that they had too much control,

but that they had too little, that they had

offered too much autonomy.

And more than 1,000 of their citizens paid a terrible price

for that.

So when you include Gaza in this period,

in the single state reality, how do you explain that?

Well, well, first of all, with regard to October 7,

obviously it’s a horrific attack and there’s nothing

justified.

I mean, we can analyze it politically.

We can analyze and explanation justification, not one,

not one and the same thing.

A lot of people kind of conflate the two.

Sometimes when you talk about it.

But control doesn’t mean you have to be there physically.

Certainly Gaza didn’t have sovereignty.

It can’t.

Gazans couldn’t go in and out without Israeli permission.

So when you’re controlling the water,

when you’re controlling the electricity,

when you’re controlling the trade,

when you’re controlling the movement of people when you’re

controlling the money, even that goes in and out.

I think that I know that many Israelis buy that.

It’s an easy way out.

But in reality, this was not the case.

Can I add something here?

Because what’s very interesting about this is that

if you look at the role that Gaza played in all of this

and in Israeli politics, that in effect,

this became actually what seemed to be a very

sustainable and workable situation for a very long time

for Israel by withdrawing from Gaza and establishing this

kind of control from the outside and controlling all

the points of access and for everything that gave them

the ability to regulate things, turn it on or off.

And if Hamas was running it that’s in a sense,

Hamas functionally became something like the Palestinian

Authority in the sense of providing enough security

on behalf of Israel to make sure that things didn’t blow

up too much.

There’s this huge scandal in Israel, as about Netanyahu,

supposedly working with Qatar and signing off

on the transfer of significant funds from Qatar to Hamas.

But there’s nothing especially scandalous about this.

If you’re in a situation of basically maintaining enough

stability so that the problem doesn’t have to be dealt with

anymore.

And I think that’s what was happening in Gaza from

the perspective of people in Gaza.

This was a horrific life.

You’re living in a situation where you don’t have

sufficient access to food, to water, to medicine,

to leave and go see the outside world,

all these other things.

You’re at the mercy of Israel.

They can cut it off at any time.

But at the same time, you did have the tunnel system

going out into the Sinai, which allowed Hamas to engage

in enough smuggling to make sure

that the needs would be met, but also to ensure

their own power.

In other words, it was a very symbiotic relationship

where Hamas could stay in power

and thrive under the situation of blockade.

Even if many Gazans suffered, Israel didn’t have to worry

about trying to deal with a very hostile and difficult

environment.

And up until October 7, this seemed

like a workable situation.

And I think that is part of why it was such a profound

shock on October 7, because up until that moment,

it really seemed, from an Israeli perspective,

from Netanyahu’s perspective, that this was working.

Maybe it wasn’t a long term solution,

but solutions are overrated.

And as I understand it, this is one of the reasons

that the intelligence that is signaling

something like October seven is coming is discarded.

It’s not that Israel had no warning,

but that there was such a strong belief that Hamas

wanted to maintain its current situation,

that they would not dare to append the equilibrium

so violently causing this kind of Israeli response Yeah and I

think also, Gaza doesn’t have for all Israelis,

doesn’t have the same status as the West Bank.

Now, it’s true that Ben-Gvir and some people like Ben-Gvir,

who is now the chief of police,

who comes out of a very far right party that he did say he

wanted to at some point have essentially ethnic cleansing

in Gaza.

They should be removed somewhere else.

But in general, I think if you look even

among the right Likudniks, the Likud party of Benjamin

Netanyahu, throughout there were voices

that kind of wanted maybe Gaza not to be

part of the overall Israel.

So there’s a mixture.

I don’t think the Israelis were all unified about what

would happen with Gaza at some point.

They even preferred it going back to Egypt.

The Egyptians didn’t want it.

So I don’t think they all have universal views of what Gaza

should be.

But now I think they do.

So October 7 does shatter this equilibrium.

It shatters Israel’s sense of security,

sense that any of this was working or could work it

traumatizes Israeli society.

There are hostages who have only the last of them only

came home fairly recently.

Now, I still think it is impossible to overstate

how much that has remained a live trauma,

but the part of this that I think

we have followed in America, to the extent we followed it,

is the war in Gaza.

Very quickly after October 7,

life begins to change in the West Bank, too.

So tell me a bit, Mark, about what begins to change.

I think that you really capture well

this idea of this being a genuine national trauma

and just really kind of shattering

a lot of the boundaries and the taboos that had previously

shaped Israeli strategy and Israeli political life

and things that previously had been unthinkable

became thinkable.

And as you said in Gaza, we saw how that played out.

But in the West Bank, what I think you saw

was the real unleashing of the extreme right wing settler

movement, who now began working almost in partnership

with the Israeli state, with the Israeli government,

in ways that in the past there had been

some degree of restraint, where you might have had

extremist settler groups who were trying to expand,

establishing hilltop settlements trying

to take more land and then daring people

to stop them from doing so.

And after October 7, that really began to change,

where now it was a much more direct and coordinated

movement to take more territory to expel more

Palestinians, to seize houses, to destroy olive trees,

to destroy agricultural land.

Again, it went beyond just toleration

and often into active coordination,

where you would have IDF troops standing

by and watching, making sure that things would get done.

And the idea that this was something

which would have to be done secretly, that it would have

to be done in the dead of night,

and then dare people to pull them back.

That change now it’s in broad daylight,

it’s on social media, and it’s actually presented in this

veil of legitimacy like this.

We’re not just taking land.

We’re asserting a claim that this is legitimately our land

in ways that I think would have repelled many people

in Israeli society before October 7.

And now I think they’re more receptive,

at least to the idea.

You probably both saw this event.

It became an international incident, functionally,

where there was a team of CNN reporters in the West Bank.

They were reporting on settler violence in the West Bank,

and they stopped.

And I would say threatened and detained by Israeli soldiers.

They’re showing their passports.

They’re showing themselves to be journalists.

But there’s this remarkable conversation they have with

some of the soldiers.

I’m Israel.

Israelite Israelite.

Rocky Rocky.

As are you O.K. And the soldier

explicitly describes that what they were doing is revenge.

Because a settler was killed in a car accident.

It seemed, as I understood it.

And you saw like the level of interplay

between the settler violence and the Israeli army,

which one of the things that we were looking

at when we were preparing for this episode

was the way the composition of the Israeli military,

Israeli cabinet officials.

But Israeli military leadership has changed.

And the Israeli military leadership

used to be highly professionalized, often

very centrist.

There’s been of rolling purge replacement under Netanyahu,

as he’s tried to put people who are more loyal to him

into senior positions in order to sustain itself.

His coalition has had elements that

in Israel Ben-Gvir and Smotrich,

had been seen as much more extreme.

But you look at what senior people now say,

and it’s fairly shocking.

So the Shin Bet, which is one of Israel’s internal security

forces, one that at times would prosecute radical

settlers for violence.

Its leader, David Zini, has now

said that the Palestinians are, quote,

"a divine existential threat", that "messianism" is not

a dirty word.

And this one in particular, we will return to Zion

and we will have an army, warriors and wars,

and the kingdom will return to Israel.

Such is the way of redemption in days of yore

and in our time.

And when that is what the people leading the security

force are saying.

You can imagine how the security

force itself is operating.

How do you understand that military paramilitary

dimension that has emerged in the West Bank? Yeah, I think

that has always been there.

But it’s gotten much worse, particularly

because of the fact that you have,

people like Ben-Gvir who has a say,

but even on make up of certain units.

And so yes, CNN captures that in this particular case,

but it happens every day.

I mean, we’ve had, I think, over 100 such incidents just

over the past month in March.

And the military, when people say, oh,

it’s just the settlers.

Yes, of course, they’re just the settlers who are actually

carrying out the violence, but they’re being empowered

by the military.

Even if the military don’t necessarily sympathize with

them, even under the best of circumstances,

they’re going there to protect them.

But it’s not under the best of circumstances,

because you have units who actually are very sympathetic

with them and therefore see the project that the settlers

are pursuing to be perfectly legitimate.

And what role do the settlers play.

I mean, there’s this concept out there between functional

and dysfunctional settler violence,

and dysfunctional is when it creates international anger

when they go after a CNN camera crew.

Functional is when.

And it’s a very.

Cold term.

But it’s when they’re being used a little bit as a tool

of ambitions that the state actually has.

I mean, I’ve talked to many people in Israeli human rights

organizations who say the way to understand what is

happening in the West Bank is ethnic cleansing.

And it may not look like that to Americans

because people are staying in the West Bank

largely, although some leave and are pushed out.

But that the brutality of living under settler violence

and settler threat and then military violence and military

threat and police violence and police threat to say nothing

then of this bureaucratic machinery that says you don’t

actually have claimed your land because you don’t have

papers that never existed in the way,

that the land was passed down through generations.

And what it’s doing is functionally pushing

Palestinians onto a smaller and smaller part of the West

Bank, which creates more room for Israeli Jews to settle

there.

So how should one understand the settlers.

I mean, I think they used to be presented

in the American conversation as a splinter religious sect.

But that’s not what they’re doing now.

No, this is a long term project which they have been,

trying to execute and carry out for many decades.

And now they have a permissive environment

in which they can move much more

aggressively and with functional state support.

I mean, we used to make these distinctions back

in the old days about the bedroom settlements.

Basically, you want to get a cheap apartment.

You’re basically in Jerusalem anyway, and you just go there.

You’re not ideological.

And when they talked about land swaps after the old Oslo

negotiations, that’s what they were talking about.

Just you would just Israel would

annex those big settlement blocs

that were very close to the border.

And then meanwhile, you had the radical settlers

who were at the ideological settlers who

were out there establishing hilltop settlements

and going close to a Palestinian population

centers.

And they were seen as primarily the source

of the problem.

But as you said that they were seen

as a relatively minor kind of fringe element

within this broader settler movement.

And I think a lot of that has been reversed now

where I think that this messianic notion of reclaiming

the land of Judea and Samaria is now actually

at the heart of a large state supported movement

in which the settlers are not just a fringe that

are challenging the state.

They really are, in many ways a leading edge of the state

project, which is to capture and colonize as much

of the West Bank as possible.

People talk about the growing lawlessness on the West Bank.

And from a Palestinian perspective,

it is very much about lawlessness.

You have no recourse.

You cannot protect yourself when settlers come and drive

you off of your property and uproot your trees and kill

your kill your livestock, you have no course of no recourse.

But it’s not lawlessness in the sense that there’s no

policemen or there’s no military.

It’s actually the opposite.

This really is something which is being supported and enabled

by the law, the actual functional law in that area.

And so I think that it would be

wrong to think about this as simply

this kind of random, chaotic splinter element.

I think that’s much more now at the center of what is more

or less official state ideology.

The Kahanists have taken over, and they

are implementing precisely the kind of strategy which they

would have done in the past.

If they had been in the same position

in Israeli political society and in the state.

Well, it seems to me there’s a braided rationale that

emerges, and that I think, is quite important that there’s

a messianic dimension of this people,

Israeli Jews who believe Judea and Samaria, as they call it,

is guaranteed to the Jews in the Torah.

But for more secular Israelis, there

is a shifting understanding.

It seems to me, in my reporting

and I going there of what the settlements are,

of what these outposts are, and they

go from a radical religious project

to something like a century system.

If the problem in Gaza was that Israel didn’t have people

there, didn’t have boots on the ground,

didn’t have effective.

All of a sudden, the settlements and the outposts

and the settlers become a way of being

sure that no violence, no horror, nothing like October 7

is going to rise out of the West Bank.

And so it seems to me that what you have happen, maybe

for the first time, at least at this level,

is a merging of the security establishment

and the security thinking in mainstream

Israel and the religious settler movement that

wants the land as a kind of fulfillment

of biblical prophecy, and together these become

a very potent force, I think.

I think that really preceded October 7.

If you look at the 2015 poll by Pew in Israel,

already back in 2015, more than a decade ago,

found that half of Israelis supported removing Arabs

from Israel itself, from Israel, from who are citizens.

And the poll showed that 79 percent of Israeli Jews

believed that Jews should have privileges

over non-Jews in Israel.

So I think it crept in.

I think now, October 7 is a very good kind

of rationalization, justification of a trend that

has already taken place.

But I don’t want to drop you and I agree with what you’re

saying, but I do want to argue that something changes here.

So there’s this chart from peace now tracking Israeli

government approval of New settlements that I find really

striking in 2020.

No New settlements are approved 2021, none in 2022.

None in 2023, the year of October 7

Nine new settlements are approved.

In 2024.

It’s five.

In 2025 it is 54. Yeah, 54 new settlements approved

by the Israeli government.

So I think that ideologically what you’re saying is true.

But clearly some the shackles came off.

No, I agree.

I think that’s true.

I think there is something in terms

of the permissiveness of what is happening on a scale

that we have not seen.

I agree with that.

I mean, I think there’s no question October 7

intensified.

What I’ve been pointing out to is that there is an implicit

assumption of biblical legitimacy,

even among secular Israelis.

And it’s very hard to think about this biblical legitimacy

without entitlement to the West Bank.

I mean, Hebron is more biblical than Haifa.

I agree with what you’re saying,

but can I go back to this, your braided notion,

because it’s really interesting.

I hadn’t thought about it in quite that way before.

I think there’s a third component to it,

which is really important that we don’t want to miss,

which is that I think many Israelis looked at what they

see as almost the betrayal of Hamas playing their role

in Gaza and made an equation from that to the Palestinian

Authority that basically each of them was supposed to be

providing stability and security.

If Hamas did this horrible thing to us,

Palestinian Authority might do the same thing.

And I think that has led to a number of things.

You mentioned the approval of new settlements,

but there’s also withholding of tax revenues that’s

supposed to go to the Palestinian Authority.

There used to be agreements on where Israeli forces could

operate Zone A and Zone B not supposed

to go into zone and of the old Oslo agreements.

And I think all of that basically went away

is that now the entire West Bank became

a permissive zone for the IDF to operate

and for Israel to operate.

And that leaves the P.A. in a very difficult place.

What is it if it’s no longer even a security subcontractor

for Israel, what is its purpose now.

I agree that loss of faith is a profound part of this.

I was doing a bunch of reporting

before we had this conversation,

and one of the things I found myself

talking about with a number of Israelis who I talked to

during this was the collapse of faith among Israeli Jews,

and simply the idea of political deals

that this was true, I think, with their views,

after the peace process, we tried a peace process

and we got the Second Intifada.

This was true to some degree in what you’re saying about

Hamas and Gaza.

There was a sense that they were letting in more money

and trying to stabilize.

You can argue about their perception of this

or their role in this, but in terms of how they see it,

political deals, settlements, negotiations failed them.

The only thing that is reliable

is might and force and dominance and deterrence

that if I were to describe the entirety of the shift

and I mean, one reason I want to have you both on

is that as you say, this is the acceleration of trends

that existed before October 7.

You cannot pin everything here on October 7.

But I think the most profound shift in terms

of the mainstream of the country’s orientation is that

the only way to be safe is to dominate, to be there,

to have your troops there, to have control of the Syrian

airspace, to have a security zone in Lebanon,

to have a security zone in Gaza,

that there’s no more belief in deals.

Diplomacy none of it like you dominate.

And that is how you are safe and not even deterrence,

because deterrence still requires the other actor

to behave in a rational way.

And so even that is no longer seen as acceptable.

So between Israel and Iran, there

was basically deterrent relationship for years

between Hezbollah and Israel.

There was a deterrent relationship that evolved.

And I think Israel’s no longer willing to accept that anymore

because it’s not about their ability to dominate

militarily, as you say.

I don’t agree, actually, that Israel had worked with

deterrence.

I think the Israeli strategy from day one

has been to have what they call escalation dominance.

Escalation dominance is not mutual deterrence.

It is one sided deterrence.

It is that whenever there’s a fight with any party

in the region, Israel can escalate it to the next level

until it has the upper hand, and it will always have

the upper hand.

In my opinion, that is why Israel doesn’t want Iran

to have nuclear weapons, not because they fear Iran is

irrational.

I think that if North Korea doesn’t use them and Maoist

China doesn’t use them as standard,

Russia doesn’t use them.

The Ayatollah's Iran is not going to use them.

I think the reality of it, though,

is that it neutralizes their upper hand,

and that increases the chance of attrition for them.

And I think the problem when you have that in effect,

you’re saying you have to have strategic dominance over every

conceivable party in the Arab world and the Middle East.

That’s half a billion people, and you’re a country of 10

million.

In order to have that upper hand,

there is no way you can sustain that without depending

on the United States.

I want to talk about that broader regional question

and particularly the Lebanon and Hezbollah side of this.

But I want to talk about Gaza first.

You people listen to the show, understand the scale

of devastation and death that the war brought to Gaza.

But what has happened since the ceasefire.

What is the structure of Gaza now?

First of all, Israel, if Israel didn’t control

physically much of Gaza before,

directly now it controls a little over half.

So these are areas that were supposed to be buffer,

according to the ceasefire agreement that

was negotiated by Trump to end the conflict, to end the war.

Of course, the war has not ended

because just yesterday there were 10 people were killed.

So fewer people are dying right now.

But there’s still a lot of people dying.

But Israel has taken control of the so-called buffer zone

and clearly intends to keep it.

And Netanyahu has been saying so he actually is taking

credit that now we have half more than half of Gaza

leveling it, keeping it, shooting anyone who comes near

it inside Gaza, it’s a disaster because you can see

that what we’ve witnessed during the war is still

ongoing.

In terms of the still not enough aid is going in.

Medical facilities are still in huge trouble.

They haven’t been repaired and many of them are still not

operational.

People are still obviously living in tents or homeless

and the structures are destroyed or damaged.

They’ve come up with this peace board that was supposed

to be not only ambitious toward resolving the Gaza

situation, but even replacing the UN Security Council

at some point.

It certainly hasn’t done anything.

And the worst part of it is that now nobody

is looking at it.

So the structure of the Trump ceasefire plan

was that what would eventually happen is Hamas would disarm

and Israel would withdraw.

Now, there was never really an obvious way to do that.

When I had Israelis, Jews on the show right after,

they said, that’s not going to happen.

And sure enough, it is not happening.

Hamas is in control in the less than 50 percent

that Palestinians are now allowed to live on.

And I was very struck by something

that the Israeli Defense forces chief of staff,

Eyal Zamir, said in December.

He said, quote, We will not allow

Hamas to reestablish itself.

We have operational control over extensive parts

of the Gaza Strip, and we will remain on those defense lines.

The yellow line is a new border line,

serving as a forward defensive line for our communities

and a line of operational activity.

And that New border line language really caught my eye

because what I hear him saying and what others in Israel

said is like, this is ours.

Now we’re going to keep this buffer zone.

We’re going to keep this security zone that we’ve

simply redrawn the map border line.

It’s an interesting language because Israel doesn’t have

borders.

That’s been one of the issues all along.

But whether he called it a borderline or not,

this is more of a zone of control

where they basically want to create this expanded

territorial control as a buffer and everything else.

I think we’re seeing the consolidation of that.

I see almost no prospect by which that 50 plus

percent of Gaza will ever become

part of a Palestinian entity.

At this point, they’re fortifying it.

And they’re there to stay life like for the Gazans.

Now, Gaza was already one of the most crowded places

in the world.

You now have that 2 plus million

people in less than half the space they were in before.

It’s absolutely horrible because all of the conditions

that sustain human life have been destroyed,

especially when you’ve just recently had the storms coming

through and the horrible weather and just the quality

of life is almost staggering.

I think probably the Israeli hope

will be that as the border crossings are allowed

to open in one direction, more and more people will just

leave and not be allowed to come back in,

kind of steadily emptying it out.

I think there’s a long history of control of the border

crossings in that one direction,

encouraging people to go to Egypt.

You mean also towards Jordan, encouraging

people to leave the West Bank over the Allenby Bridge

into Jordan, just as a way of thinning out the numbers.

And so I think that over the long term,

I imagine they just figure they’ll figure it out.

Now, though, it really does feel like it’s in this highly

destructive, miserable limbo where Israel’s attention is

elsewhere.

And the main focus in Gaza is just keeping it as it is,

consolidating control over the everything on their side

and just neglect.

And what’s the condition of Hamas there.

Well, they’re obviously still consolidating control.

The remarkable thing about this,

and particularly when we’re thinking about an Iran

or a country of 93 million.

And huge geographically, how Israel had such a small,

tiny place that it had been controlling,

really dominating for decades with only a few thousand

fighters underground and couldn’t really despite

the fact of leveling the place that they still even

in existence, really should send a message.

And they obviously weakened dramatically, weakened

and weakened economically.

They can control internally.

And they were asserting themselves internally

because there’s no alternative right now to them internally.

But their capacity to wage war across borders

is obviously very, very limited.

I do think that the mindset, though,

of now we have them and we now can prevent them is just

so flawed because it’s not Hamas.

Of course, we know what it is.

And yes, the Israelis wanted control.

But you look at the history of this conflict or any conflict.

If it’s not Hamas going to be something else.

You’ve created so many tens of thousands orphans.

You created so much devastation and ruin.

And so what’s happening to the next generation where they’re

going to go if you’re not going to solve it politically

and give them freedom.

And if it’s not, Hamas going to be something else.

And we forget

How was Hamas born originally

I mean, Israel thought the PLO was the problem.

It was secular, but it was the biggest Palestinian movement.

They started helping the Muslim Brotherhood in the West

Bank and allowing it to compete with the PLO,

and the Muslim Brotherhood gave birth to Hamas.

When during the First Intifada in 1987.

So we see this book everywhere.

So you get the jihadis to help in Afghanistan,

and then they become the biggest anti-American force

in the Middle East.

The part about Hamas that I find even more troubling

is this framing of the conflict.

Because if you turn this conflict into a religious

conflict, it’s irreconcilable between Israel

and Palestinians.

The issue is just irreconcilable.

There is it’s a zero sum game.

And now you add to it the American religious layer.

We’re talking about of the erosion of the appeal

to international law or human rights or something.

I mean, there’s a reason why the Israeli government.

Had like Ron Dermer, who was the confidant of Netanyahu

in 2021, said we need to rely on the evangelicals,

not on American Jews in America,

because American Jews are essentially too

much into human rights and democracy

and international law.

And just to rely more on this religious narrative,

even in the American side.

So I worry about the I worry about the continuation

of this, the religious right, and in Israel.

The religious right and the Palestinians,

our religious right.

I think that’s frightening to me.

So Israel consolidates control over Gaza.

I mean, certainly it’s consolidated a lot of control

over the West Bank.

And from there’s been a series expansionary moves.

There was during the Gaza war, the decapitation of Hezbollah,

which initially, we were told, actually destroyed them

as the organization.

That seems to have not been true.

They do succeed in convincing President Trump to bomb Iran’s

nuclear facilities.

We’re told the nuclear facilities are obliterated

and the threat is over.

That appears to have not been true.

And now Israel, whether they drag the US into war,

convinced it or is simply a union of interest,

I think is a little bit unclear,

but I think they have a much clearer vision of what they

are trying to achieve in the war with Iran

than the US does.

And then Donald Trump does.

I think they had planned for it and thought about it

in a way that we hadn’t.

So what, Mark, is Israel’s theory of security here.

So I think you’re absolutely right about the mismatch

between Israeli and American goals here.

And I think Trump, I think really doesn’t know what he

wants to achieve.

But I think, as you said, Israel does.

And I think that what they really want

is to make Iran no longer the kind of state

that can threaten them, either in Israel

or across the region.

And what that means is, if it were

possible to simply decapitate the regime

and replace it with a friendly leader,

they might be willing to accept that.

But I don’t think that’s their preference.

Even if it’s someone who seems like pro-American,

pro-Israeli figure, there’s no guarantee that person would

stay in power.

And so that once again, that would be a deal, that they

would be trusting someone else to provide their security.

They don’t want to do that anymore.

So I think that from the point of view of at least some

of the strategists in Israel, I don’t want to speak about

Israel, all Israelis.

But I think the current strategy is one of saying,

look, we want to destroy Iran’s ability to project

power and to function as a state.

And that is preferable to any of

the other possible outcomes.

If you look at the way particularly in this war,

more than the 12 Day War.

They’ve been targeting state capacity.

They’ve been targeting state institutions,

repressive capacity, but also kind of infrastructure,

all the things that basically allow a state to function

as a state.

And if it turns into a series of localized civil wars,

ethnic breakaway secessionist regimes, and a long term state

failure, that from an Israeli point of view,

I think is just fine.

They’re insulated from the consequences of that.

Everyone else in the region is horrified by that outcome.

That’s their worst case scenario.

If you’re in the Gulf, if you’re in Syria,

if you’re in Turkey, the idea of having an Iran that’s

shattered and you have state failure, refugees,

the emergence of different extremist armed groups,

all the things we saw in Syria that we see in Libya,

terrorism, that’s like the worst case scenario,

the thing they want to avoid at all costs because they will

pay the immediate costs of that.

And I think you saw that in the hesitation

that most of the Gulf states had at the outset of the war,

where they had not chosen this war.

They did not want this war because they could see where

it would very likely go.

And then the United States, of course,

is always in the position of trying

to bridge its allies, where you have Israel pushing

in one direction, Gulf states pushing

in the other direction.

And as leader of this awkward coalition,

the US has to pay attention to both of those things.

And I think the difference that they

split was going for this knockout blow, decapitation

of the regime and calling on people, Iranians,

to rise up in the hope that essentially you

just win this war quickly.

And then when that didn’t happen,

when the regime refused, when the regime didn’t fall,

when you didn’t see a mass uprising and you saw Iran

immediately targeting the Gulf states,

then you shifted into plan B, the Trump administration

didn’t have a plan B, but Israel did.

And I think if you look at their targeting,

if you look at what they’ve been doing,

that plan B has very much been we’re going after state

capacity.

We are trying to break the ability of the Iranian

of this regime, but also of the state,

not just to threaten us, but to control Iran as a state.

Do you think they can achieve that?

I think certainly the Iranian state will

be set back by many years.

It is now.

But if by that we mean, then there

will be capitulation by Iran, or necessarily

that the state will disintegrate.

I mean, it could obviously none of us would know.

As Mark said, I think disintegration

would be the worst thing for the international community,

except perhaps for Israel.

But it would be certainly the worst thing for the America’s

Arab allies.

It would be the worst thing for the US.

So what is really obvious is that they’ve been planning

for this war.

The Iranians, unlike us, they’ve been planning it

perhaps for decades, and I would be shocked if they

didn’t think that at least the Israelis,

they may not know where Trump will go,

would want to go after their infrastructure,

that they had not planned for these contingencies,

that they don’t have additional surprises

in their sleeve.

I actually expect that they will go

far further than they have.

They have gone.

But that’s what makes it unpredictable.

And I think right now it’s fluid.

So I think that probably we don’t know where Trump is

getting his assessment.

We don’t know what he’s expecting.

So I’m terrified not so much by what might happen

to the regime.

Who cares what might happen to the people of Iran.

I mean, when you’re threatening something

on the scale of genocide, I’m not just worried about what

happens to Iran.

I’m worried about what happens to us.

I am terrified that we as citizens in what’s supposed

to be the greatest democracy are having things done

in our name over which we have absolutely no control.

On a scale that offends us when anybody else in the world

does it.

And so that’s why I think it’s a terrifying moment.

So Marjorie Taylor Greene calling for the 25th Amendment

to be used to remove Donald Trump and Marjorie Taylor

Greene, has become your voice of moral clarity

in your country.

You’re in a position amidst the Iran war,

which is I think, the part of this that most people

in America are paying attention to.

There’s been this huge expansion of Israel’s war

in Lebanon.

I don’t know that people really appreciate the scale

of this.

A million Lebanese are now displaced.

It’s around a fifth of the population and around 600,000

of them coming from places that Israel said maybe they

will not be allowed back into.

Mark, what is the theory, what is Israel

attempting to do in Lebanon?

What are they envisioning here?

I mean, I think what they want is

to achieve a final, decisive victory over Hezbollah,

which they were unable to achieve

through this decapitation strike, which

had seemed to be so successful back in November 2024.

I don’t think there was any immediate threat to which they

were responding.

I think this was very much an opportunity for them that this

was happening at a moment when the world’s attention is

elsewhere and that they can actually do something they’ve

been wanting to do for a very long time.

They want to find some way to remove Hezbollah completely

from the equation.

So they were putting pressure on the Lebanese army to do so.

But I mean, that’s a joke.

I mean, the Lebanese army doesn’t fail to disarm

Hezbollah because they don’t want to.

It’s because they don’t have the capacity to do so.

Hezbollah is more powerful than they are.

But even the attempt to do so risks, risks, retriggering

Civil War.

And I think that from the perspective of many Lebanese

that’s one of the most horrifying possible outcomes,

a return to the kind of inter-ethnic

and inter-religious violence which tore the country apart

in the 1980s.

It’s one of these things where Americans tend to have a very

short memory, and they don’t remember exactly how horrible

the Lebanese Civil War was in the 1980s.

Lebanese, remember.

And for many of them, it never really ended.

It just kind of it paused.

And then there’s this constant expectation that maybe it’ll

start again.

And this push to disarm Hezbollah

by the Lebanese army.

Many people think that actually

could trigger a return to that kind of street violence

and complete breakdown of the state.

And so if that’s not going to happen.

And you haven’t been able to remove Hezbollah simply

by decapitation strike and the usual mowing the grass

strategy, then I think the Israeli strategists said,

look, we want to solve all of our problems permanently all

at once.

Everything everywhere.

All at once.

Gaza and Hamas.

Hezbollah and Lebanon.

Iran this is our moment.

We don’t know how long Trump’s going to be in office.

This is a moment when we’re just going to use everything

we’ve got to solve our problems.

And they’ve learned that they will face no serious

international pressure or sanctions for doing so.

They learned that in Gaza, they’ve learned that

repeatedly.

And the idea that they’re just displacing a million people

from the South of Lebanon, as bad as that is,

they’re doing much more than that.

They’re actually bombing all over the country.

They’ve been basically calling for the evacuation of much

of the Southern suburbs of Beirut.

And this is like asking people to evacuate Brooklyn and don’t

give them any place to go.

And I think that they once again have, in a sense,

been surprised by the inability

to resolve to win decisively.

I think they were surprised at how many missiles Hezbollah

actually still had at the continuity of Hezbollah’s

command and control.

I think they basically thought that Hezbollah was just

limping along as this basically decimated legacy

organization.

That would just require one more push.

And I think they’re finding that’s not true.

And now they’re in this situation where they’re

probably moving into long term occupation of that Southern

zone without having actually resolved the problem that they

set out to resolve.

This is one of those places where

the center of Israeli society seems

to have embraced something that from the outside,

looks quite radical.

I want to read you a quote in early March

from Yair Lapid, who is not part to the Netanyahu

coalition, of opposition very much within Israeli politics,

understood as a moderate centrist figure, he says.

In the end, we will have no choice

but to try to create some kind of sterile zone

in Southern Lebanon.

Not huge, but something similar to the yellow line

in Gaza, which is that more than half of Gaza

that Israel now controls.

That is to say, an area with no Lebanese villages in it,

but rather a completely clean strip of land

between the last Lebanese village

and the first Israeli settlement.

He goes on to say it might be unaesthetic, perhaps,

or unpleasant, to scrape away two or three

Lebanese villages, but they brought it upon themselves.

It’s their problem.

No one told them they had to become the host state

of a terrorist organization.

What do you make of that?

Yes and I think this is the consequence

of lack of accountability because this

is what Lapid said.

And it’s good that you started it because he’s supposed to be

much more moderate.

But if you listen to the defense minister who’s

actually making the decisions, he says.

Basically, we’re going to do what we did in Gaza.

We’re going to do what we did in Rafah.

And, in essence, if we think that our

if we have to defend ourselves,

everything is legitimate.

There are no rules of law, there is no human rights.

There’s no difference between civilian and combatant.

And I say that literally because obviously there you’re

uprooting entire villages and you actually destroying

the homes.

So to make sure they don’t return and destroying

the infrastructure following the book in Gaza,

including health institutions and hospitals so that

the people cannot don’t have an infrastructure to service

them.

And even going more than that, because now they’re calling

on non-Shia Lebanese, whether they’re Christian or Sunni,

not to or Druse, not to host Shia because Shia essentially

it’s all the same Shia therefore,

is just like Palestinian.

Therefore Hamas, Gaza and therefore Hamas now Shia.

Therefore Hezbollah.

So yes, it’s troubling.

And as Mark said, yes, the International community speaks

up, but the US shields its own actions and Israeli actions

in a way that renders all these international efforts,

whether they’re the International Court of Justice

or the International Criminal Court or European Union’s,

they can’t do anything because we take actions to prevent

the consequences.

And that has been a big part of the problem that we face.

Well, one reason I think you see a comment like that

from Lapid, though, is that two Israelis,

the Hezbollah problem has been maddening.

They did there was an international settlement

and a UN resolution which ended up not really

being enforced, which created a deep sense of betrayal.

I’ve talked to Israeli Jews who live in the North and they

say, look, I can see Hezbollah members from my home.

Like, how am I supposed to allow my family to live there.

During the Gaza war, there were rocket fire.

You had the evacuation of the Israeli North.

And I think to them, to people I spoke to they felt

completely failed by this.

And unlike with the Palestinians,

the Hezbollah just seems like an aggressor organization.

They understand it as an Iranian proxy.

And what are you going to do.

You’re a state.

You have to protect your people.

So what Lapid is saying in his own way here is, look,

this is ugly.

It’s unpleasant.

Unaesthetic is, I guess, a word that gets used there

in that comment.

But what are we supposed to do.

I mean, is he right.

I think that makes a lot of sense.

If you’re kind of living in this Eternal Sunshine

of the Spotless Mind thing, where history started

yesterday.

And the Hezbollah perspective is

that Israel invaded Lebanon.

They did it repeatedly in the 1970s and then in 1982,

and then they kept the security zone until 2000.

And Hezbollah emerged as a resistance organization

to that Israeli occupation.

And then it kept its weapons and kept its guns

because of the ongoing threat which

Lebanon and Hezbollah believed that they faced from Israel.

I remember the 2006 war, remember there’s been a lot

of episodes of this over the years.

And this is not to take Hezbollah’s side,

but rather to say that this is a strategic interaction

between Israel and Hezbollah, which has been going

on for a long time, and that the fact that Israel now finds

itself in a situation where neither diplomacy nor military

force seems to work, is in many ways a function of that

long history of aggression on both sides.

I don’t think that they’re right that Hezbollah is just

an Iranian proxy.

I think they became more of an Iranian proxy

after the killing of Hassan Nasrallah

and much of the other senior leadership,

because Hezbollah, they needed to rebuild,

they needed to rebuild the organization.

And from all the reporting I’ve seen that has increased

IRGC influence and control over Hezbollah,

things that were not true five years ago are more true today.

And I think the Israeli theory of change here is that if it’s

not just creating the buffer zone,

it’s also by doing this bombing,

by doing creating all this misery and displacement

and everything that what this is going to do is it’s going

to force the Lebanese to deal, to take care of this for them,

that it’ll make Hezbollah so unpopular that maybe

the Lebanese armed forces or somebody will finally deal

with it for them.

But that’s going to fail, too.

I mean, I think that what this is actually doing is creating

exactly the kind of environment in which Hezbollah

can thrive when they’re dealing,

when they’re in a normal, relatively stable situation,

then their ugly side becomes very clear.

When there’s actual Israeli aggression,

then their claims to resistance become stronger.

And so I understand Lapid’s frustration.

I understand Israel’s frustration with regard

to Hezbollah.

But at the same time, they’ve kind of locked themselves

into this, and I don’t really see an exit for them either.

In a general sense, throughout a number

of the recent wars, particularly America

entering into the Iran war, I mean, I began reading you,

Mark, in the post 9/11 period.

In this period when we’re getting old, Ezra,

tell me about it, when Americans had to confront this

reality that things you did decades ago create

the conditions for radicalization and enmity

among people who have a longer memory than you do,

because it mattered more to them than it did to you.

And it can come back in horrifying ways

quite a long time later.

And people trying to take revenge not just right

now, but over long periods, people

who lost their parents, who lost their children, who

lost their pride, who lost their business, who

have been displaced.

I mean it the entire sense that there

is a memory. Yeah has just been so strangely absent to me

in the discourse, the focus on short term victories, again,

the absolute insistence on not having any sense of history

in the conflict, treating October 7 as the beginning

of history as opposed to a part of history,

a horrifying part of history, but a part of history.

It has just been a very striking dimension

of this because we all know better.

That doesn’t mean we know what to do,

but we all know better than this.

Yes, I think it’s.

And it’s good that you said about the history

and particularly October 7 because it’s horrible that was

and obviously expect consequences.

It is part of a much deeper, longer history.

And the same thing in as Mark said about the Lebanon thing.

Also, it’s true of Iran.

I mean, remember that the Iranians,

to this day tell the story of the overthrow of Prime

Minister Mosaddegh, the National, the National

prime minister, and the kind of saving the Shah of Iran.

And that was part of the forces behind the revolution

and part of the forces of targeting America

after the revolution.

And what’s happening now is so much more intense than what

happened then.

And to expect no blowback or to expect no blowback out

of whether Hamas as an organization exists

or not to expect no blowback out of Palestinians,

or to expect no blowback out of Lebanese.

And I think the public, by and large,

particularly with related to international affairs,

is really usually only invested

when there is a crisis.

And so those are the moments when they formulate

their opinions and they don’t really follow.

What I get frustrated with is not so much

policymakers, but really the level

of analysis and discourse of people

who write about it, who should know more

and should frame the questions a little better.

I would go a little bit farther.

I think the fundamental problem is that we just

have an extremely difficult time seeing these people

as real human beings.

And I think we just do not see them

as people with families and lives

and complicated motivations.

There’s a real abstraction.

And frankly, a frankly, a lot of racism that goes

into basically saying, well, that’s just the way Gaza is.

That’s just the way Syria is.

That’s just the way the Iranians are.

And we just make assumptions about their behavior,

which we would never accept when

if people wanted to apply that analysis to us.

And I think if we were just more

able to have a certain kind of empathy,

not even kind of a liberal empathy

of the wishy-washy stuff, but a strategic empathy

to be able to see what the world looks

like from their eyes.

Then I think we do much better at some of these things

to understand that these are actually human beings.

Of course, they’re going to be upset that you bombed

their school and killed their children.

Who wouldn’t be upset by that?

And yet we seem to abstract away from it in ways that

makes it, just seem so easy and so natural,

you’re going to push a button and something will happen.

And that’s just not the way things work here or there.

I think that brings us back to the big picture

of this episode, which is the entrenchment.

The expansion of Israel’s single state reality.

Its one state reality.

And, you think through what we’ve talked about here,

a tightening of control and vast expansion of settlements

in the West Bank, and a much more messianic attitude

towards the West Bank, a sense that it is part of Israel’s

divine right.

Now, the taking more than half of Gaza and the cordoning

off of the place where Palestinians live in Gaza,

beyond the now so-called yellow line.

There’s now going to be a large security zone

in Lebanon, a sterilized zone in the very sterile language

being used.

There’s been territory taken and airspace dominance

in Syria.

A bombing of Iran.

Annexation of the Golan Heights.

Don’t forget that Yeah, that’s what I meant by territory

taken.

And so where does that leave the reality

of the Middle East.

In your original piece, you write that Palestine is not

a state in waiting and Israel is not a Democratic state.

Incidentally, occupying Palestinian territory.

All the territory West of the Jordan River

has long constituted a single state

under Israeli rule, where the land and people are

subject to radically different legal regimes

and Palestinians are permanently

treated as a lower caste.

Policymakers and analysts who ignore this one state reality

will be condemned to failure and irrelevance.

What does it mean to not ignore it.

In a situation where Israel is so much

the hegemon of the region.

I mean, that’s a tough question,

because right now I think we are very far down that road.

Bob Dylan used to he had the song "it’s not dark yet,

but it’s getting there."

And I think right now it’s getting really, really dark.

I mean, there’s a reason that everyone converged on the two

state solution for so many decades,

because it really is the only way to provide genuine justice

for both Palestinians and Israelis.

And I think that even now, even people like us

who see this as impossible still

understand that actually having two sovereign states

is the only way to realize these national ambitions.

But where we are right now is exactly as you say,

that what’s left is to fight for equality, civil rights,

human rights, justice, all of that within the context

of Israeli domination.

And yet I see almost no opportunity to do so,

given the realities within Israeli society.

Everything is pushing in the other direction.

And so then you really are forced to confront what does

it mean to have a state that’s a major American ally

and supposedly part of the West, which is going to be,

not just functionally but fairly explicitly,

a long term apartheid type system.

And I think that’s very uncomfortable normatively

to think about.

I mean, I don’t think that we have a good answer to what

else can be done at this point.

But I think that that’s if you’re going to push.

I think that’s a more productive way to push,

to try and really call out the inequalities,

the structural domination, and say can’t keep ignoring

the fact that these people are living in these horrifying

conditions because we are pretending that someday they

might get a state.

So the time to start advocating for human rights,

equality, and everything else is now but in the world we’re

living in right now.

I don’t really see liberal values in Washington.

I don’t see liberal values in Israel,

and I don’t know where that push would come from.

And so we really have this idea right now,

at least for me.

I can’t speak for Shibley or anyone else that in a sense,

it’s almost too late.

But right now is limited.

And one thing that when I think about this,

even from Israel’s perspective,

is Israel settles into an apartheid condition.

I don’t really see a way to avoid thinking about it that

way.

You create an Israel that is highly

compatible with an evangelical right wing populism

and fundamentally incompatible with modern liberalism.

You have a situation where inside the Democratic Party,

not just AOC, but Rahm Emanuel thinks

we should no longer give Israel military aid, where

Gavin Newsom is dancing back and forth around the language

of apartheid.

It’s going for Israel to become like a symbol modern

apartheid, for it to be a symbol modern apartheid

in a situation where it has a lot of enemies all around it.

And it is trying to maintain control

of the West Bank and Gaza.

And who knows what will be the situation in Iran.

I mean, that doesn’t seem stable either.

It’s one thing when you have Donald Trump in power,

but that’s not where the politics of this country are

going.

I mean, you look behind Donald Trump and the Republican

Party, and support for Israel is increasingly

an older generation dynamic.

It’s Ted Cruz, it’s not JD Vance.

They’re not trying to maintain deniability.

They’re not trying to create a space for Democratic

politicians can stay near them.

They have heightened the contradictions

to an unbearable level Yeah and when

I think about it, as I said, given the Israeli agenda,

which is an expansionist agenda right now,

at least for the West Bank, Gaza, Southern

Lebanon and maybe beyond.

And given its strategic outlook,

which is escalation, dominance,

which really means military dominance, over half

a billion people.

Number one, there is no way this

can be maintained without almost

unlimited American support.

Just cannot.

You cannot maintain that posture.

Number two, I would want my government

to intervene to prevent the inequality and injustice

and violation of international law.

And in fact, when I write about it and when we even

wrote the book, "The One State Reality,"

when we edited it and had the project,

our aim was actually to address our public discourse

just as much meaning to as Americans,

we know that we play a role in what’s happening there.

And so we weren’t really trying.

I am not personally, when I’m writing,

I’m not trying to tell the Israelis and the Palestinians

you should have two states or one state.

But what I do insist on, at least from my moral point

of view, or as an American, as somebody

who cares in international law,

is that we as the United States,

not basically trying to tell them

what to do, but to reject anything that violates

our basic norms, a set of basic norms, what

we used to call our values and international law.

But from the Israeli point of view,

if you’re looking at it down the road and you’re seeing

the trends are going as you have described,

not just the Democrats, but also Republicans,

really even the interpretation among evangelicals,

it’s changing.

Look at the religious discourse that’s changing

about in some circles, particularly among Catholics,

the attack on the very theology that espoused by some

evangelicals that embraces Israel.

There’s a huge explosion of debates right now on this

issue.

So down the road, you can imagine, number one,

a different government than the one we now have

and a different kind of power center,

especially given the public opinion that we now see.

So that’s why I think this moment is ultra dangerous,

because if you’re sitting in Netanyahu’s chair and you are

looking at this as an existential war based on his

own objectives in the region, whether what’s happening

in Iran, what’s happening in Lebanon,

but also the fight in America for America’s soul,

for what we stand for, then existential war,

everything goes.

This is his moment.

He sees Trump as the last chance.

He sees the evangelical support

as the last block of support.

And he’s going to go all out.

And so that’s what makes this moment extremely dangerous,

not just now, but really throughout this

administration.

Something you’ve mentioned a few times is Israel’s

dependence on the United States.

And I want to ask if that is still true.

I mean, Netanyahu has talked about the need

or the likelihood that Israel have to become autarkic,

relying on its own ability to manufacture weaponry.

And Israel’s a very wealthy state now.

Its tech sector is booming.

There were clearly moments between Netanyahu and Biden

and the two administrations where Netanyahu said, look,

if you can’t support us on this, we’ll go our own way.

We thank you for your help up until this point.

And the Biden administration decided to not allow

the rupture to happen.

But traditionally, I think the view

has been that Israel relies on the US for weaponry protection

and support in a way that it would not

be viable without that.

Is that true for modern Israel,

or does Netanyahu’s behavior reflect a view that actually

Israel can be self-sufficient, even more true than

in the past.

And let me tell you, why not.

In the sense that Israel can’t live as a state on its own

if it’s at peace with its neighbors.

As long as you covet the West Bank and Gaza and prevent

a Palestinian state, you’re not going to be in peace with

your neighbors.

And if you’re not in peace with your neighbors,

you’re going to maintain your strategy of dominance,

escalation, dominance, over half a billion people

in the Middle East, and you’re only a country of 10 million.

Even if you’re rich per capita,

that’s not going to make a dent in what you need

to maintain that and to get a scale of it.

It’s not just the money.

The money isn’t the problem.

It’s the military dimension of it.

You say they do their military technology.

Of course they do.

They’re very good and innovative people.

But most of the sophisticated weapons

that are being employed are American weapons.

I mean, the planes that are incredibly

effective in bombing Iran to refueling all of that

is American technology.

The THAAD missiles that are intercepting

the incoming Iranian missiles.

Each one costs maybe 12.5 million.

You shoot two to just intercept one look at in Gaza,

when Israel entered after October 7,

Israel needed immediate replenishment

of munitions, immediate replenishment of munitions.

We were of like taking them even out of own stockpiles.

We were running out even for the Gaza war, let alone

intercepting missiles that were coming

from Iran or the Houthis.

Later on, with the US without the US intercepting them,

the 12 Day War would have looked differently even

in the end.

Now, even now, think about what we have,

what we are deploying in the Middle East.

We are depleting our missiles right now, our own stockpiles,

to the point that we’re now not able to employ them

in Ukraine.

Or we’re telling Japan that we can’t deliver the tomahawk

missiles because we have to use them now in this is

a superpower.

Remember, we are the mightiest state on Earth.

We are the richest state on Earth.

And we still to fight this war with Israel.

We’re running out ourselves.

So no.

And this, of course, does not.

I mean, the most critical part for Israel

is, of course, the military technology and the dominance

in that area.

Because you take that away, it’s impossible to maintain

that posture.

But then there is the international law part

because it’s the shielding at the UN,

it’s the shielding at the International Criminal Court,

it’s the shield.

And if you without that, there would have been many more

measures that the US had either vetoed or prevented

a UN Security Council to come that would have stopped

settlements, for example.

And by the way, even aside from the military dimension

and the intervention international organizations,

anyone who worked with the US government

or advised the US government, as I

have get a sense of the amount of time

we spend twisting arms of other people,

using our muscle with this country or that country

or that country, in order to make Israel

to protect Israeli policy.

If you remove that, I just don’t see it.

And if anything, if I’m in the Israeli position,

I want to maintain this posture.

I even see that I have to even maintain

more of an upper hand in the region.

And I have an idea of controlling more territory.

And I see how dependent I have been in the last 2 and 1/2

years on the US.

I would be terrified of losing it,

and there is no country in the world that can replace that.

Netanyahu can use that as we’re going to go on.

We’re going to be the ally of China instead of India,

or India is more like it, actually,

because they have a close relationship with India.

But no one has that kind of power.

The one that we bring to bear.

And then always our final question what are three books

you’d recommend to the audience?

And Mark, why don’t we begin with you.

Sure So I think that to really understand the limitations

of Palestinian strategy, I really liked Nora Erakat’s

book, "Justice for Some," where she takes international law

seriously and says, what can you actually accomplish with

this.

And I think it’s pretty essential reading for a lot

of the stuff we were just talking about a second book,

Afshon Ostovar has a recent book called "Wars of Ambition,"

which is a really sweeping history of American Iranian

competition across the entire Middle East,

and it’s pretty much as timely as you can get in terms

of really trying to understand where this all came from.

And then for the last book, I really went back and forth,

but I think I’m going to go with Howard French’s recent

book called "The Second Emancipation."

It’s a biography of Kwame Nkrumah and Ghanaian

independence, and it has nothing to do with

Israel-Palestine or the Middle East,

but it’s just a fascinating story about decolonization

and the frustrations of independence that followed.

And it’s a great read.

The first book is by Diana Greenwald,

"Mayors in the Middle," which is really

about the indirect Israeli control

of Palestinian territories.

And she does that in a brilliant way,

in a way that kind of brings home why it is a one state

reality.

The second book is by Omer Bartov.

Omer has a New book.

It’s called "Israel: What Went Wrong?"

It’s coming out this month.

I happened to read the galleys before it came out,

and it’s very powerful kind of interpretation of what

happened in Israel, a country that was essentially,

in part built to protect Jews globally and in fact gets

the opposite, where the Jews are more threatened.

And he has a brilliant take on it

that I think is worth reading.

The third book is by Hussein Agha, Robert Malley.

"Tomorrow is Yesterday."

These are two seasoned analysts.

Robert Malley, of course, served in the US government

for many years on israel-palestine

as well as on Iran.

And I had advised the Palestinian delegation

they had written together in the past.

But this book is a powerful book,

really about looking forward and backward

at American policy toward israel-palestine.

Shibley Telhami, Mark Lynch, thank you very much.

Thank you.

Pleasure