Prof. John Mearsheimer : Iran's Real Endgame: Control of the Strait of Hormuz Exposed
141 segments
Here's uh of all people Jake Sullivan,
the national security adviser to
President Biden for the four years that
President Biden was in uh the White
House. Uh basically saying the Iranians
outsmarted Trump's real estate agents.
Cut number three. If you just look at
how they work, the wording of the
agreements they do, they are highly
detailoriented, not just because they're
lawyerly, but because they want to
extract benefits from those details.
Just one example from theou the
provision that says the US would wave
sanctions refers to oil and then there's
this little clause that says and
derivatives what are derivatives the
prochemical sector that is the second
largest sector in Iran now do I think
the US really even understood what it
was signing with that maybe not but Iran
knew it would get billions and billions
of dollars just by inserting that word
and that's why you bring a very large
delegation because you're looking for
every advantage
in this highly complex, detailed
negotiation. And I think as long as
they're bringing that expertise and
we're only bringing a couple guys, it
will be advantage Iran.
>> They're bringing expertise, he's being
charitable, and we're bringing two New
York City real estate agents. I
>> I actually think this is all nonsense.
Uh I I think that basically he's arguing
that we were fleeced that it was
inexperience that produced uh this
document, this surrender document. It it
wasn't the fact that we were fleeced. It
reflected the balance of courts of
power. Uh look, those documents that
were floated around before we reached an
agreement on the final memorandum of
understanding on June 17th
>> and the final is almost the same as the
initial that they proposed.
>> Yes, it is. But you know, we proposed uh
a counter document, right? There were a
number of documents floating around.
There were endless negotiations
on these documents. I find it hard to
believe that we didn't look over every
word. And the reason that we had to
swallow
uh all of these provisions that were to
Iran's advantage and our disadvantage
was because the balance of coercive
power decisively favored the Iranians.
So, how did Iran defeat the United
States and Israel? How do you make sense
out of Iran's military victory? Well,
first of all, it had the military
capability to shut down the straight and
in effect threatened to take the
international economy off a cliff. Uh,
President Trump likes to talk about how
he destroyed the Iranian Navy and the
Iranian Air Force. He may have destroyed
a big chunk of each of those
institutions, but the fact is that the
Iranians were left with enough military
power they could that they could shut
the straight and keep the shut and keep
the straight shut down. So that's the
first major point. The second point is
they have a significant missile
capability, mainly ballistic missiles,
but also cruise missiles as well as
drones. And they have the ability to do
enormous damage to our bases in the
region and to the infrastructure in the
six Gulf States. In addition, they have
the ability to pound Israel with those
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and
drones. So if you get into a shooting
match with them, which we did, we could
only go 40 days and we had to quit. It
is very important to understand that we
quit after 40 days without a victory.
This is the air war because we were
running out of precious munitions. And
furthermore, we were running out of
targets to hit. We had hit so many
targets. The fact is that the Iranians
could absorb an enormous amount of
punishment. No,
>> we didn't find ourselves in a position
where we could uh dish out more
punishment because again we were running
out of munitions. This is what I say
when the balance of course of power
favored the Iranians. This is what
happened. Here's why I think um
uh Trump will dismiss Sahath. Why didn't
the Pentagon plan for that? Why didn't
they warn Trump about it? How could they
not have foreseen these events? Did they
fall? Did the Pentagon fall as Trump
fell hooked, line, and sinker for what
Mossad and Netanyahu said to Trump?
Well, I distinguish between Hegsith and
General Kaine, who's the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. And my memory
tells me very clearly that before
February 28th, uh when we were talking
about attacking Iran, uh General Kaine
made it clear that we had a serious
problem uh in terms of the amount of
munitions that we had for a war against
Iran. So I think that Kaine was not
enthusiastic at all about this war. Uh
all the evidence is that Hegsith was.
Uh, so I think that there were voices in
the Pentagon for sure who said that this
was not a good idea. And you want to
remember from that famous New York Times
article that detailed what the
negotiating process between the Israelis
and the Americans looked like in the
runup to the war. It seems clear from
that article that almost all of uh
Trump's advisers except for Hexith
thought that uh going to war against
Iran the way we did on February 28th uh
was not going to work out. It appears
that it was Netanyahu and David Barnea
who was to Adam Assad plus Hegsith who
who were the real hawks here and uh
played the key role in convincing Trump
that this was a good idea.
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The video discusses the complexities of negotiations with Iran, analyzing whether outcomes were due to poor American strategy or shifting power dynamics. Experts examine how Iran leveraged technical details to extract benefits and how their military capabilities, including missile technology and the ability to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, ultimately influenced the balance of power. The conversation also explores internal conflicts within the Trump administration regarding the decision to engage in military action and the role of key advisors and intelligence entities in that process.
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