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Prof. John Mearsheimer : Iran's Real Endgame: Control of the Strait of Hormuz Exposed

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Prof. John Mearsheimer : Iran's Real Endgame: Control of the Strait of Hormuz Exposed

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141 segments

0:00

Here's uh of all people Jake Sullivan,

0:04

the national security adviser to

0:06

President Biden for the four years that

0:08

President Biden was in uh the White

0:11

House. Uh basically saying the Iranians

0:14

outsmarted Trump's real estate agents.

0:17

Cut number three. If you just look at

0:19

how they work, the wording of the

0:20

agreements they do, they are highly

0:22

detailoriented, not just because they're

0:24

lawyerly, but because they want to

0:26

extract benefits from those details.

0:28

Just one example from theou the

0:31

provision that says the US would wave

0:32

sanctions refers to oil and then there's

0:35

this little clause that says and

0:36

derivatives what are derivatives the

0:39

prochemical sector that is the second

0:41

largest sector in Iran now do I think

0:44

the US really even understood what it

0:46

was signing with that maybe not but Iran

0:48

knew it would get billions and billions

0:50

of dollars just by inserting that word

0:53

and that's why you bring a very large

0:55

delegation because you're looking for

0:56

every advantage

0:58

in this highly complex, detailed

1:00

negotiation. And I think as long as

1:02

they're bringing that expertise and

1:03

we're only bringing a couple guys, it

1:05

will be advantage Iran.

1:08

>> They're bringing expertise, he's being

1:10

charitable, and we're bringing two New

1:12

York City real estate agents. I

1:14

>> I actually think this is all nonsense.

1:17

Uh I I think that basically he's arguing

1:20

that we were fleeced that it was

1:23

inexperience that produced uh this

1:27

document, this surrender document. It it

1:31

wasn't the fact that we were fleeced. It

1:34

reflected the balance of courts of

1:36

power. Uh look, those documents that

1:40

were floated around before we reached an

1:43

agreement on the final memorandum of

1:45

understanding on June 17th

1:47

>> and the final is almost the same as the

1:50

initial that they proposed.

1:52

>> Yes, it is. But you know, we proposed uh

1:55

a counter document, right? There were a

1:57

number of documents floating around.

1:59

There were endless negotiations

2:01

on these documents. I find it hard to

2:04

believe that we didn't look over every

2:07

word. And the reason that we had to

2:10

swallow

2:11

uh all of these provisions that were to

2:14

Iran's advantage and our disadvantage

2:18

was because the balance of coercive

2:20

power decisively favored the Iranians.

2:23

So, how did Iran defeat the United

2:27

States and Israel? How do you make sense

2:30

out of Iran's military victory? Well,

2:34

first of all, it had the military

2:37

capability to shut down the straight and

2:40

in effect threatened to take the

2:43

international economy off a cliff. Uh,

2:45

President Trump likes to talk about how

2:47

he destroyed the Iranian Navy and the

2:49

Iranian Air Force. He may have destroyed

2:51

a big chunk of each of those

2:53

institutions, but the fact is that the

2:55

Iranians were left with enough military

2:57

power they could that they could shut

2:59

the straight and keep the shut and keep

3:01

the straight shut down. So that's the

3:04

first major point. The second point is

3:07

they have a significant missile

3:09

capability, mainly ballistic missiles,

3:11

but also cruise missiles as well as

3:14

drones. And they have the ability to do

3:17

enormous damage to our bases in the

3:21

region and to the infrastructure in the

3:25

six Gulf States. In addition, they have

3:28

the ability to pound Israel with those

3:31

ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and

3:33

drones. So if you get into a shooting

3:36

match with them, which we did, we could

3:39

only go 40 days and we had to quit. It

3:42

is very important to understand that we

3:44

quit after 40 days without a victory.

3:47

This is the air war because we were

3:49

running out of precious munitions. And

3:52

furthermore, we were running out of

3:54

targets to hit. We had hit so many

3:56

targets. The fact is that the Iranians

3:58

could absorb an enormous amount of

4:00

punishment. No,

4:02

>> we didn't find ourselves in a position

4:05

where we could uh dish out more

4:07

punishment because again we were running

4:09

out of munitions. This is what I say

4:11

when the balance of course of power

4:15

favored the Iranians. This is what

4:17

happened. Here's why I think um

4:20

uh Trump will dismiss Sahath. Why didn't

4:24

the Pentagon plan for that? Why didn't

4:26

they warn Trump about it? How could they

4:28

not have foreseen these events? Did they

4:31

fall? Did the Pentagon fall as Trump

4:34

fell hooked, line, and sinker for what

4:36

Mossad and Netanyahu said to Trump?

4:41

Well, I distinguish between Hegsith and

4:43

General Kaine, who's the chairman of the

4:45

Joint Chiefs of Staff. And my memory

4:47

tells me very clearly that before

4:49

February 28th, uh when we were talking

4:52

about attacking Iran, uh General Kaine

4:55

made it clear that we had a serious

4:58

problem uh in terms of the amount of

5:01

munitions that we had for a war against

5:04

Iran. So I think that Kaine was not

5:07

enthusiastic at all about this war. Uh

5:12

all the evidence is that Hegsith was.

5:14

Uh, so I think that there were voices in

5:17

the Pentagon for sure who said that this

5:19

was not a good idea. And you want to

5:22

remember from that famous New York Times

5:24

article that detailed what the

5:26

negotiating process between the Israelis

5:29

and the Americans looked like in the

5:31

runup to the war. It seems clear from

5:34

that article that almost all of uh

5:38

Trump's advisers except for Hexith

5:41

thought that uh going to war against

5:43

Iran the way we did on February 28th uh

5:46

was not going to work out. It appears

5:48

that it was Netanyahu and David Barnea

5:50

who was to Adam Assad plus Hegsith who

5:54

who were the real hawks here and uh

5:57

played the key role in convincing Trump

5:59

that this was a good idea.

Interactive Summary

The video discusses the complexities of negotiations with Iran, analyzing whether outcomes were due to poor American strategy or shifting power dynamics. Experts examine how Iran leveraged technical details to extract benefits and how their military capabilities, including missile technology and the ability to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, ultimately influenced the balance of power. The conversation also explores internal conflicts within the Trump administration regarding the decision to engage in military action and the role of key advisors and intelligence entities in that process.

Suggested questions

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