MoU Turned into Trap. Hormuz Tensions Rise as Hardliners Gain Ground
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All right, Alexander, let's talk about
the situation with the United States and
Iran. Theou is uh is crumbling or has
has disintegrated. It's is there anou?
The United States is actually saying now
as the markets are opening on Monday,
the US is saying that theou is is is
still holding. It's still still talks
are proceeding. All is good. um Friday
as the markets were closing and we know
from NBC News that the Trump
administration did not want to announce
strikes into Iran until after the
markets closed. But as the markets
closed, we got a whole lot of strikes
and then we got the Iran retaliations.
We have the the IRGC hitting tankers
that are taking the southern route
instead of their approved route. um a
weekend of of of strikes and counter
strikes and fighting between uh both
sides. What are your thoughts?
I think that there is an um a a a
powerful faction in Iran which concludes
I think rightly that Iran has been
played here in the sense that they
presented to the Americans this MLOU
which contained all of these enormous
apparent concessions by the Americans.
And um what the Iranians are now
starting to understand is that the
Americans signed theou with only one
purpose to get the straight of Hormuz
reopened and that they have no in
interest or intention of moving forward
with any other part of theou. They're
not going to repay any money to um Iran.
They're not going to freeze any assets.
They're not going to lift any sanctions.
they're not going to do any one of these
things. So um and of course the Israelis
continue their pressure on Hezbollah in
Lebanon and have just um come to an
agreement with the Lebanese government
which is Christian dominated and
therefore hostile to Hezbollah which um
basically um an agreement which
basically requires um Hezbollah to
disarm and um conceds Israeli control of
large parts of southern Lebanon. So I
think there are there is a faction
within the IRGC which has been looking
at all of this. They're saying this is
really we we we've given away our most
important piece of leverage. So they're
striking at um tankers that have been
trying to pass through the straight of
Hormuz. They're trying in other words to
create issues with the straight of
Hormuz. Again, they are probably trying
to lay minds or talking about laying
minds and the result is that theou
exactly as you say is starting to
crumble. There is still within Iran a
group probably Galibbuff maybe Iraqi too
who on the contrary are saying and
Peskan obviously who who are saying well
you know let's not give up on this yet
um we've got theou the Americans
conceded an awful lot let's see whether
we can take this thing forward let's see
whether the negotiations lead anywhere
and is
acting as a force for restraint. Um, as
it becomes increasingly clear that in
fact theou process is going to go
nowhere, I think you're going to see the
hardliners in Iran without
>> uh there there's a big military buildup
that has been taking place and continues
to take place
>> from the United States into into the
region.
>> Yeah. Um I I don't know what what uh
what that's going to to result in or
what the reason for for that is. Many
people suspect many analysts suspect
some sort of a a renewed largecale
operation.
>> Yeah.
>> Some analysts say ground ground forces.
I don't I don't I don't think so. But
>> you know a lot of the buildup is
happening in Iraq.
Um,
>> we had these Iraq uh Iraqi raids into
the green zone, the purging of of uh of
politicians and and officials.
>> Yes.
>> Who I believe now it has been cons
confirmed um were were working with
Iran, at least an oil minister
>> and uh and his team that that seemed to
have been working with Iran that the
Trump administration was not happy
about.
>> And so we had the raids into the green
zone. by the way a lot of people think
the green zone is why would why would
Iran aligned Iraqi politicians be in the
green zone I mean the green zone is is
not only US embassy it's it's a huge
area of land it has uh the US embassy
but also has all the politicians are
there the NOS's are living there I mean
it's it's basically where all of these
people are are living that's where they
are
>> um but um but I think that was an
interesting development it it shows that
the Trump administration
>> is using these 60 days and theou in my
opinion to to put a type of squeeze onto
Iran. So, so, so they're looking at Iraq
and they're saying, "Okay, let's try to
remove Iranian influence in Iraq. Let's
continue the military buildup. Let's
continue to to to restock on our weapons
and and whatever we had in the Middle
East. Let's let's pour weapons in there.
We might need them in after the 60
days." Um, let's look at point one of
theou, which is the Lebanon ceasefire.
Let's find a way to work around that.
Okay, let's get the deal between Lebanon
and Israel and tell uh Iran, here you
go. Uh, point number one, there has to
be a ceasefire in Lebanon. Well, the
Lebanese government and the Israeli
government, they've signed a framework
which says that Hezbollah needs to
disarm. So, we're throwing the ball back
at you, Iran. Yes. And then you have uh
what you said which was the the the ways
to work around
>> Hormuse
>> by by looking at the at the southern
route at the Oman route.
>> And then of course the price of oil
which has gone down.
>> Yes.
>> Considerably which does give the White
House time and space.
>> Exactly. I I think that is exact. I
think you've summed it up precisely. I
agree with you by the way about the
events in Iraq. They're clearly a purge
of pro-Iranian
um politicians in Iran. Of course, you
can always talk about corruption.
Corruption there is everybody in Iraq is
corrupt to a certain degree. Anybody in
public life is corrupt. But ultimately,
this is just the um this is just the you
know the rationale given for what is
really a political purge. But you're
absolutely right. That's exactly what's
going on. and the American buildup is
taking place and um
the US never really planned
never really intended to implement theou
and
the original supreme leader Ayatah Ali
Ham the one who was killed by the
Israelis
um on the first day of the of the 40-day
war he he warned about this. He said,
you know, we must never ever concede
temporary ceasefires to the Americans.
They will never implement the terms.
They will always take advantage. It will
just mean that we are prolonging the
conflict and that won't play out to our
advantage. Now, he was killed. there's
been this unstable political situation
in Iran itself because the new supreme
leader is um untested. He's probably
been badly wounded. He doesn't have the
authority of his father. There's been
very heavy pressure from China to get
the Straight of Hormuz reopened. The
Chinese do not like the idea of straits
and international waterways being closed
because they worry that will create a
precedent that the United States might
one day use against them. So instead of
sticking to the policy of the the
assassinated supreme leader, the
Iranians got theou which was as we know
essentially set out set out their
shopping list of demands. But of course
what they've discovered is that the
Americans sign a document but they're
not really interested in implementing
its terms. They're doing exactly what
you said. They're they're coming up with
workarounds and they're conducting
buildups and they're purging the friends
of Iran in Iraq. So that's exactly
what's happening. I think you've
described it exactly correctly. The the
question is this. Will the Iranians
continue to be uh strung along in this
way? Or alternatively,
will the hardliners win the people in
the IRGC? I think that in Iran the IRGC
the hardliners have been greatly
strengthened by what has happened over
the last um few months.
They after all can argue that it was
they who fought the Americans to a
standstill and in the end I think they
will prevail and at some point over the
next few weeks we'll probably see the
straight of Hormuse essentially closed
again and we might quite easily be
drifting back into a war but um that's a
guess there obviously people in Iran
Pezan Galibbath Arashi others who
probably take another approach. And of
course, there's still the issue of China
and what it wants.
>> Yeah. China. Uh this time around,
wouldn't Iran have a difficult uh time
um explaining the the closing of Hormus?
>> I mean, what is Iran going to say this
this time around? They have theou. They
signed up to it. Yeah,
>> they're going to say we're closing
Hormoose because Oman is allowing ships
to pass through their um territorial
control of of the strait. I mean, how do
they justify that? And then you have the
pressure of the Chinese who are going
to, as you said, who are who are going
to tell Iran, look, just just try to to
work through theou because we don't want
waterways closed because if if this
precedent is set, then they're going to
to close our waterways, the US, or they
might. I mean you know let me just
reveal to China they will close your
waterways with whatever happens in Horus
or not.
>> So I mean you know I don't understand
the Chinese rationale there. They might
it might be used as a precedent to
possibly close. No they are going to
close the waterways around China doesn't
matter what happens in in Iran
>> but um but but how does yeah how does
Iran u rationalize this? How do they
convince the international community
this time? Or the first time around it
was pretty straightforward. We were
attacked.
>> We have to defend ourselves. One of the
ways we defend ourselves, we close
Horamoose. Whether you like it or not,
Oman or the Gulf countries. But what are
they going to say this time if they
decide to close Hormus?
>> It's going to be very very difficult
indeed. And um I I I I think that they
are um politically, diplomatically in a
much weaker position than the one they
were in. um if um you thought the policy
of the original supreme leader had been
followed and they you know held out for
uh you know a complete withdrawal from
the U by the US and had said you know
we're not prepared to um agree temporary
ceasefires
um and instead stick to the policy that
there must be a final agreement which
the United States must honor and
basically withdraw from the Middle East
or the that that part of the Middle
East, it's going to be much much more
difficult. I think that the IRGC
their approach is
we don't care. We don't care what China
is saying. We don't care what the uh
Persian Arab Gulf States are saying. We
don't really believe that the Persian
Arab Gulf States are interested in the
security architecture that they're
stringing us along with. So we just do
that which is going to work for us and
what these other countries do, what
policies they follow, uh what complaints
they make, that really isn't our
concern. We're here to defend Iran.
We're not here to keep the Chinese, the
Russians, the Saudis, the Kuwaitis, the
Qataris, all of those pe the even happy.
And I think probably that view will
eventually prevail. Now about China, um
we come back here to the way that the
Iranians
have in the past treated their friends
and I think that the Chinese would have
been much more sympathetic to Iran if
Iran had been more cooperative with them
in the past. Um I we've discussed in
these programs the fact that the
Iranians did not fulfill it was the
Iranians who always walked back uh or or
resisted offers of military help from
Russia and that it the reason that Iran
didn't acquire the Suhoy 35s before or
didn't acquire the air defense system
before that the Russians offered was
because various factions in Iran Iran
didn't want them. Um, which seemed
strange to me, but it does seem that
that was the true reason. And it turns
out, it's been the same story with China
as well. Um, apparently, in fact, we I'm
sure you both remember that a few years
back, there was a massive agreement
signed between China and Iran. Um, a
strategic partnership deal. uh China was
going to invest hundreds of billions of
dollars in the Iranian economy. It would
have transformed the Iranian economy.
And then as soon as that deal is signed,
Iran takes the deal, leverages it and
uses it to sign a whole set of deals
with with Western companies. And not a
single Chinese company apparently landed
a deal directly after this agreement was
signed. The Chinese were apparently
furious about this and felt very
offended and this soured
badly their relationship with Iran and
um it meant that the Chinese then pulled
back on their offers for aid to Iran.
Iran has not treated those who would be
its friends well. If Iran in the past
had moved forward
and worked with China to build up strong
economic links with China, if there had
already been hundreds of billions of
dollars of Chinese investment aid in
Iran, probably the Iranian economy would
be much more stable. Perhaps the attack
on Iran would not have happened because
China was there. And certainly China's
stance towards Iran would be different
from the one we have seen. The Iranians
have repeatedly made this mistake and uh
you know
it begs the question why but you know
this thing with China
which I read about by the way first read
about in the Guardian I've asked around.
It turns out it's true and it tells you
an awful lot about the way in which Iran
has not handled its diplomacy very well.
>> Well, it's it's complicated. Um, yeah,
because China is supporting or did
support Iran and continues to support
Iran in in a way to a certain extent
with regards to the conflict with the
United States and China
>> needs Iran to uh
>> to survive.
>> Yes.
>> For its own well-being.
>> Yes.
>> For its own interest. It it needs Iran
to survive and and of course you have
you do have the the uh the energy trade
w with Iran which is important to to
China as well as the the shipping lanes
and and the waterways.
>> Absolutely. Absolutely. But there's a
there's a huge difference between
China making pragmatic decisions to
support Iran in its own self-interest
and um China supporting Iran because it
likes Iran and feels a certain degree of
affinity for the country. um I in
relations between people and it's also
true in relations between states actual
friendship that goes beyond merely
self-interest
can actually affect behavior um in the
relationship between China and Russia
has also been very complicated. the
Chinese weren't in happy about the SMO
from a Chinese point of view. Um, an
operation that seeks to redraw
recognized international borders is
something that the Chinese find very
difficult. But the Russians have gone
out of their way to make friends with
China. They've opened up Russia to
Chinese investment. They've worked very
hard with China. Putin meets with
Cinping regularly. So the Chinese have
gradually been one round. Iran did not
has not done that to anything like the
same degree.
>> Uh final uh final question we turn to to
Trump. Uh we said it was the a good deal
theou.
>> Yeah.
>> Uh very good that Trump signed it. Very
good that he accepted it. Yes. the
United States uh did did take a loss in
the in the 60-day uh war with Iran, but
at the end of the day, it was a smart
thing to do to sign theou. And it did
provide the Trump administration with a
way to to get out of this mess,
>> to walk away from this and get out of
this mess.
>> Now, the Trump administration, it looks
like they're they're not walking away
from this mess and they're using theou
>> correctly. They signed it. It would have
given them a way out.
But now they're using theou to get back
in and to turn a loss into a win. Yes. I
it it's a classic example of how to be
cunning and not to be wise.
Uh signing a an agreement that you have
no intention of honoring in order to
trick the other side into making
concessions is can be cunning. It can be
clever. Um, it can be devious, but it's
not really wisdom. And it's certainly
not wisdom in this case. I I I I think
we can reiterate what we said in our
previous program. Theou the terms of
theou were for the United States a
deliverance an escape from these
entanglements in the Middle East which
have just drained away American power
and have been tying the United States
into a region where it doesn't have any
real long-term interests or even
business to be. So get out of the Middle
East. That's what most people in the US
want. That's most pe what most people
who serve in the US military, it seems
to me, also want. It was one of the
things that enabled Trump to win the
election in 2024 that he said to people
who had been in the military and who'
been involved in all the regime change
wars, I'm not going to do this. I'm
getting America out of this region.
Instead,
he's used
a
agreement, which is what theou in a
sense is, which could have been a
pathway to achieving precisely that
objective,
as something completely different, as a
trick to get deeper into the Middle East
and to reverse this defeat that the
Iranians have inflicted on him. That's
cunning, but it's absolutely not wise.
We have in Greek a word cutoos.
Very difficult to translate into
English, but I think you know exactly
what it means. It means to be cunning
and clever but stupid at the same time.
>> Yeah.
>> All right, we will end the video there.
The duran.locals.com. We're on xron
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description box down below.
Ask follow-up questions or revisit key timestamps.
The video discusses the deteriorating state of the 'ou' (agreement) between the US and Iran. The analysis suggests that while the agreement was initially seen as a potential path for the US to exit Middle Eastern conflicts, the Trump administration is now using it as a deceptive tactic to regain strategic ground, increase military presence, and purge Iranian influence in Iraq. Tensions are rising again, with potential for renewed conflict in the Strait of Hormuz, while Iran faces internal division between hardliners seeking to retaliate and those hoping to salvage the diplomatic process. Additionally, the video highlights Iran's failure to cultivate strong diplomatic relationships with potential allies like China, further weakening its position.
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