What is the status of America's war with

Iran? If you are trying to follow it

through what President Trump is saying,

you are going to be I have become

hopelessly lost.

Trump within a single day will veer

wildly between saying the war is almost

over and that he's preparing to escalate

it dramatically. That negotiations are

going great and that there's no one to

talk to. That Iran must open the

Straight of Hormuz and that America

doesn't care if it's closed. On

Wednesday night, in a nationally

televised address, Trump sought to

finally clear the fog to make the path

forward clear to the American people and

to our allies.

>> I've made clear from the beginning of

Operation Epic Fury that we will

continue until our objectives are fully

achieved. Thanks to the progress we've

made, I can say tonight that we are on

track to complete all of America's

military objectives shortly. very

shortly. We are going to hit them

extremely hard over the next two to

three weeks. We're going to bring them

back to the stone ages where they

belong.

>> It's all hard to say which goals exactly

we've achieved because from another

perspective, Iran seems to think it's

winning this war. The regime has

survived. It has learned how much power

it can exert over the world economy by

choking up the strait of Hormuz. It has

seen sanctions lifted on its oil and

it's looking towards a new order where

it charges countries to pass through the

strait. And Trump appears to be

abandoning the strait. That I think was

the most shocking part of his speech,

telling our allies it's their problem

now.

The promise Trump made was an end to

threats from Iran. He repeated that

promise on Wednesday night. Tonight,

every American can look forward to a day

when we are finally free from the

wickedness of Iranian aggression and the

spectre of nuclear blackmail. Because of

the actions we have taken, we are on the

cusp of ending Iran's sinister threat to

America and the world.

>> But if you listen to experts on Iran,

that is not what they see coming. What

they see coming is an Iran that has

learned quite a lot from this war and

that might emerge from it much more

dangerous. Suzanne Maloney is a vice

president and director of the Brookings

Institutions foreign policy program. She

is one of Washington's leading Iran

experts, having advised multiple

presidential administrations, both

Democratic and Republican, and written

or edited a number of books on Iran. And

I was really surprised how blunt she was

here. Iran, she said, thinks it's

winning this war, and there's a good

case that they are. We spoke on

Wednesday morning before Trump's speech,

but his speech reflected her analysis

almost perfectly. As always, my email

times.com.

>> Suzanne Maloney, welcome to the show.

>> Thanks so much for having me. So, I find

the state of the war in Iran confusing.

Even as somebody who's been covering it,

I hear Donald Trump talking uh daily now

about how the war only has two to three

more weeks in it. Negotiations are going

great. You know, this is almost over.

And I also see that we're moving about

10,000 more troops into the area

alongside other military assets.

What should I believe here? Which of

these should I be tracking?

Well, I think at this point we have to

be tracking both the language that the

Trump administration and the president

himself are using, especially on social

media. Um, but we also have to be

watching what's happening on the ground

because, you know, what we've seen even

in the buildup to the war is that the

president has often said one thing and

done something different. And that's

something that the Iranians are well

aware of and and very much prepared for.

And it I I think he's probably getting

different opinions. Um, and it's not

entirely clear that President Trump

himself has decided precisely what he

wants to do other than I think it's

quite clear that he is trying to bring a

close to this war that will enable him

to declare victory and to walk away from

the conflict.

>> Last week, the Trump administration sent

the Iranians a 15point peace plan. This

was supposed to be the basis for

negotiations. What was in that plan?

Well, it was a lot of the same demands

that the president and his negotiators

had put on the table prior to the war

itself. So, he wants a durable

commitment to no enrichment, to no uh

nuclear weapons in the program in the

future. Um, he was looking for another a

number of other steps that the Iranians

would take to end their support for

proxies, to end their ballistic missile

program. These have all been

long-standing concerns on the part of

the United States. They really do date

back to even the the negotiations that

the Obama administration led that

produced a a deal that temporarily put

constraints on a number of Iran's

nuclear activities. And I think what

President Trump is trying to achieve is

what um he's been pushing for uh

throughout both his first and second

terms and he's not able to achieve

conclusively through military action.

>> How did the Iranians respond?

The Iranians effectively um believe that

they have the upper hand at this point

in time and so they have indicated that

they don't really see themselves as

prepared to negotiate directly with

Washington. They are embittered

obviously as a result of the

negotiations that were taking place both

in the days before the president

launched the strikes about a month ago

as well as uh the same sort of dynamics

that preceded the June war um where

negotiations were really just a prelude

to military action and in some effect to

some extent a ruse to uh dupe the

Iranians into complacency even as the

attack was being mobilized and so you

know it's a little bit difficult to get

direct deploy diplomacy with Tehran. Uh,

in the best of of circumstances, this is

a regime that has, you know, sort of

based its ideology on anti-Americanism.

It has often um frequently, in fact,

refuse to deal directly with American

negotiators. And so, you know, under the

current circumstances where there have

been thousands of strikes and many

deaths in Iran, um, including some of

the top leadership, they're not terribly

inclined to sit down, nor are they

particularly inclined to compromise with

the United States.

>> Why do they believe they have the upper

hand?

They believe they have the upper hand

precisely because they were able to

seize control of the straight of Hormuz,

which is of course the strategic

waterway through which about 20% of the

world's oil and natural gas exports pass

on a daily basis. What the Iranians did

in the first days of the war is to was

to strike at ships that were passing

through the Gulf and um effectively

persuade insurers and shipping companies

and uh oil companies to avoid the Gulf

unless they had some kind of assurance

from the Iranians that they could pass.

Since what we've seen is, you know,

originally in the pre-war period, there

would be anywhere from 130 to 140

tankers traveling to and from uh over

the straight of Hormuz uh every day. Um

we've seen only a handful take place

over the course of the past month. And

that has had a severe impact on um oil

exports, on prices for oil around the

world. and it will over time have a

catastrophic impact on the global

economy if there isn't a resolution to

this stoppage of the strait.

>> But but go level go a level deeper on

that for me. Why does that give them the

upper hand? They've had I think more

than 10,000 sites attacked by US and

Israel. They've had a huge number of

senior political and military leadership

killed in strikes. They are militarily

tremendously outmatched. So yes, they've

been able to close the straight that is

sending energy prices, fertilizer

prices, um other kind of key components

of the global economy rising, but so

what? That's pain for them too. What why

why do they seem so confident?

>> They can afford to wait. They have

already suffered, as you know,

tremendous losses to the leadership.

This has had a terrible impact on um

Iranian cities across the country. But

in fact, you know, in effect, they're

able to um they have the advantage of

time at this point in time because every

day that the stoppage goes on, the

impact on the global economy is

magnified and that will have a direct

impact on President Trump's um political

standing and uh it also hurts all of

America's partners and allies in the

region and around the world. This is,

you know, creating huge constraints in

Asia and that is going to be something

that the United States is going to um

hear from all of its partners and allies

when it's um engaged in diplomacy that

they are looking to see an end to this

war too. And so for the Iranians,

they're prepared. This is an existential

crisis. They're prepared to to wait this

out as long as they can. And I think

that's the real question now. Who blinks

first?

>> Talk to me for a minute about the

timing. So Trump, as you note, he seems

much more incentivized to end this

quickly than the Iranians do, at least

in the two sides public statements. And

my understanding is that we are entering

this period where the closure of the

strait is going to start really biting

the global flow of of energy and

commodities. that we've been in a period

where tankers that had already gone

through were still arriving at ports

around the world, but we're we're moving

into something where you're going to

cease having the landings in Asia of

energy tankers that had been needed in

Europe. Um fertilizer is about to get

crunched. that right now we've been

really worrying about futures and people

are pricing things higher out of fear of

the future but we're about to hit the

point where these shortages become

material in the present and so when

Trump looks forward 2 to three or 4

weeks if this keeps going what has been

modest price rises can become globally

something much more severe and for the

Iranians that they see their leverage

increasing very very rapidly in the

coming weeks is at is that accurate how

you complicate that? Talk to me a bit

about that that that question of the

coming timing.

>> I think that's exactly right. You know,

we've never had a prolonged closure of

the straight of Hormuz. We've never had

this length of disruption in terms of

oil exports and as you note other

prochemicals and commodities that are

key to the global economy. This is

something that is completely

unprecedented and in effect markets

haven't fully priced in the potential

impact at this point in time. Americans

are still effectively paying the price

at the gas pump that is determined by

production in the United States and by

supplies on hand. But as the we've

already seen rapid and severe increases

in price prices of uh oil and other

products in Asia and that's been uh

they're they're closer to the source.

Um, and as prices normalize over time,

as the disruption is priced in, we will

be seeing not just four and five and $6

uh prices for gasoline at the pump, but

much much higher. And it will play out,

as you note, in all sectors of the

economy, particularly some of the key

sectors that that are crucial for the

whole affordability debate here in the

United States, food and and commodity

prices. Um, chips are going to be

impacted by the limits in supply of

helium. And so that will have an impact

on all the tech that we buy. Everything

from our televisions to our cars could

be impacted as a result of this. So you

know, Prime Minister Modi in India

compared this to effectively COVID and

the pandemic and the the impact on

global supply chains. I think that that

is a very apt comparison particularly if

this extends over the course of another

month or so. So are we moving into a

period now where the asymmetric balance

of the two sides weapons are are are

changing that

we have done a tremendous amount of

damage to Iran. We've killed many of the

senior leadership and they have

effectively absorbed that the question

of what we can do next that is worse

than what we've already done. It's not

impossible to imagine that all those

things like say taking Car Island expose

us to much more risk. Whereas for Iran,

the

weapon they have been using which is

choking off the straight of Hormuz is

about to become a much more potent and

powerful weapon because a shortage has

become real and material as opposed to

notional.

>> Yes, I think that's exactly right. And

um from the Iranian perspective, they

now believe that they have survived this

war. The regime was not taken down even

though Ali Kam, the individual who had

been the supreme leader for 37 years was

killed on the first day of the war and a

number of other senior figures have been

eliminated. And we see this happening on

on an ongoing basis. But if regime

change was one of the goals of the war

from the Trump administration and of

course this was something that President

Trump's first messages around this war

really highlighted the Iranians now

believe that they have been able to

survive and that the regime itself

despite it having been grievously

wounded will remain intact. That is

something that is uh also quite a threat

for their neighbors. And so we we do see

this I think debate happening both in

public and certainly in private between

the United States and some of its

regional partners, the United Arab

Emirates, the Saudis, theQataries and

others who are very concerned about

being left with a wounded, embittered

and emboldened Iran on their doorstep.

um an Iran that still has managed to

preserve its missiles and its drones and

its capability to fire on its neighbors

and also by the way has some stockpile

of highlyenriched uranium perhaps buried

under the ground in Isvahan, perhaps

dispersed at other sites and whatever

restraint they had around their nuclear

program um is likely to be um eliminated

as well in the aftermath of this crisis.

we may see a regime that would be

looking to move very quickly to nuclear

weapons capability.

>> This maybe brings up Iran's counter

proposal. We mentioned the Trump

administration's 15-point peace plan.

There's been talk of a five-point plan

from the Iranians. What's been in that

plan?

>> Well, the Iranians would like um

compensation for the the suffering and

the economic losses that they've

experienced during the war. They would

like to retain some control over the

straight of Hormuz and effectively

continue to monetize their ability to

determine who and what might pass

through this particularly strategic

waterway. And so they're looking to come

out of this war, I think, in a stronger

position. And that's not entirely

inconceivable. It's going to be, you

know, a regime which has taken enormous

hits. The country um has suffered um

tremendous losses in terms of its

productive capabilities, in terms of its

own economy. And as we know that was in

pretty dire straits. Um you know the

economy had collapsed to a point where

people went to the streets back in

January in very large numbers all around

the country. So they're facing a really

difficult situation. But their goal is

to essentially use their leverage at

this key moment to ensure that they come

out in a stronger position.

There is a difference between these two

plans as I understand them which is

Trump's plan requires the Iranians to

affirmatively do a series of things.

Iran's plan at least in some of its

dimensions seems actually somewhat under

their control. They clearly have the

capacity to turn the state of her moves

into a toll booth where in order to pass

it you need their permission and that

either comes from alliance with them or

paying them off. I doubt they're going

to get reparations from America as

they're asking for, but if they begin

monetizing the strait,

that is a form of money coming in. And

and the sanctions I would think would be

absurd except for the fact that we've in

fact lifted sanctions on Iranian oil and

they're making more money from that than

they were now before is my

understanding. So that also seems

suddenly possible particularly if the

global energy supply is highly squeezed

and as such the oil they are exporting

even other players is more valuable to

them.

So to what degree is this not even like

a negotiating position so much as simply

them articulating what their strategy is

going to be whenever this ends.

>> I think that's um to some extent the

truth. But they do want the the

reparations. They do want the sort of

acknowledgement that they were wronged

in this war and I don't think they're

going to receive that. So the question

is what is it that they're likely to

settle for. The other concern is that

the international community does not

want to see a toll booth put at the

mouth of the straight of Hormuz because

that effectively means that the Iranians

retain control in perpetuity and can

change the terms if and as they like and

that would be um highly unpredictable

and no one wants to give Iran that kind

of control. Is it under anybody's power

to deny it to them?

>> Well, this is the question. I mean,

there it certainly would be a military

solution if we were prepared to pay the

cost. It would be, you know, very time

consuming, very costly and of course, we

would um feel the hit to the economy

even before we succeeded and it could

take many months to do. But that is

certainly an alternative that's

available to the president. there could

be um mitigating factors uh or

mitigating missions. The escort effort

that has been uh put underway with some

support from the UK and others in Europe

that would enable um tanker some amount

of tanker traffic to reopen. So there

are avenues that we have to try to

undertake this without conceding to the

Iranians. I think again you know the

best and the best solution for everyone

here is one that that ends this crisis

as quickly as possible. And so that

probably isn't going to be a military

solution. It's going to have to be a

diplomatic solution.

>> Even for President Trump, the

velocity at which his statements have

become self-contradictory has

accelerated. Uh you will listen to him

within a single paragraph, it seems to

me, take positions that are

diametrically opposed to each other. But

so I find it hard to to take anything

he's saying at this point too seriously

as a statement of American policy.

That said, he has begun saying something

in various interviews over the past week

that has surprised me, which is that

America will simply leave in 2 to 3

weeks without any agreement with Iran

and without opening the straight of

Hormuz. And Trump told the New York Post

on Tuesday, my attitude is I've

obliterated the country. they have no

strength left and let the countries that

are using the straight let them go and

open it. He has talked about this

specifically about the UK said, you

know, you want the oil, you go do

something. I weaken them. You go secure

the straight.

What would it mean for Trump to simply

say, we're done. We have declared

victory. We are not worrying about the

straight. Trump's view seems to be that

we don't really need the straight. You

can buy oil from us or you can secure

the straight if it's so important to

you. seems very embittered towards

countries who did not participate in

this operation and almost seems to see

it maybe as a way to punish them for

that. What would that mean?

>> Well, the logic of the president um is

somewhat questionable. It's not clear to

me or to anyone who understands the

economics of the energy markets that uh

you know if the straight remain closed

that somehow the prices in the United

States wouldn't be impacted. it's very

clear that we would feel the hit both in

terms of energy prices but also to wider

um markets and and that's something the

president himself is very sensitive to.

So it's not a very wellthoughtout plan.

I think the other piece of it is that,

you know, to um put the burden on our

friends and partners and allies or even

on other world powers like China to try

to drive towards some solution to this

crisis when none of those parties were

consulted or in any way participated in

the decision to launch the war against

the Iran Islamic Republic of Iran that

was taken by the United States and

Israel um you know I think would mean

the end of some of those very

long-standing partnership ship and

alliances that have been so critical to

our ability to promote security and

prosperity around the world. They're

core to the identity of the United

States as a global power and that

there's no other party that's going to

come in and play that role in our

absence. And it will mean a much less

safe and much less prosperous world as a

result.

>> I don't know that Trump fears

relinquishing that role for America. So

So let's take him at his word or that

particular version of his word for for

one moment. Let's say in two weeks he

announces, "We're done. We have hit the

military targets one hit. We have set

their programs back. We've obliterated

them as he said last time.

And if somebody else wants to open the

straight, good on them." What would

happen then?

I think the likely outcome of a United

States withdrawal from this conflict

would be that first of all, the Israelis

would probably continue to try to strike

Iran and so the conflict itself would

not be over. The Iranians would

essentially assume the role of toll uh

collector at the Gulf and they would use

this to opportunity to to really rebuild

their own finances and to exert more

power over their partners and allies. I

think it would have a very destructive

impact on the global economy over time

because we would still see a continued

constraint in terms of traffic and so

again that's going to fall uh on on our

own doorstep very quickly. We're not

insulated from um these dynamics around

the world and uh you know we would

probably um wind up with um very

different relationships with countries

that have been very important to our

security in the region as well as around

the world. whether that's our NATO

allies or countries like Saudi Arabia,

the United Arab Emirates and Qatar that

have been really important and important

frankly to the president in terms of his

own monetization of his role. They have

um in many cases invested in the

president's family and I can't imagine

they're going to be very happy holding

the bag for this crisis.

>> All right, then let's flip the

possibility here. So, we know, the

Iranians know he's moving more military

assets into the region, about 10,000

troops. As I mentioned before, I've seen

many military analysts, and at this

point, if you look at betting markets,

uh, they have a more than even odds

view that the US will be conducting

ground operations in Iran before the end

of April.

How likely do you think that is? You

know, it's very difficult to assess

where the president's tweets and his uh

actions connect. Um but I do think it's

a realistic possibility that we will see

American forces occupying some or

attempting to occupy some uh ground

positions in Iran. Um the most obvious

contenders are Carg Island, which is the

export terminal through which much of

Iran's oil passes. It is not the

production facility. It is really just

the place at which the tankers are

loaded. And if that car island was taken

by American troops, then theoretically

the Iranians would not be able to export

their oil. And that's been one of the

interesting dimensions of this crisis

that in all the war gaming and planning

and thinking about what might happen in

a closure, the assumption was that that

Iran would feel some pressure because

its economy would be hit. And what

they've been able to do is is very

selectively enable their own exports to

go. If that changed, then they might

have some more time pressure. But of

course, you know, the risks to American

troops uh on Car Island um would be

severe. Our ability to resupply them

with munitions as well as just basic

living conditions would also be severe.

We would have the um impact to the

global economy because we would have

turned off the spigot on another million

or million five barrels a day. There

have been war games uh that have looked

at what a United States Iranian war

might how it might play out and they

have all involved some threat to the

straight of Hormuz as well as some

response from the international

community led by the United States to

reopen it. You know the the military

options for the United States in terms

of reopening the strait are are not

particularly attractive ones. This is a

a very small and narrow passageway, but

the entirety literal coast of the

Persian Gulf would have to be defended

if we were going to ensure that we could

um have uh normal tanker traffic moving

through the Gulf. And you'd really have

to occupy a significant swath of

territory because obviously those troops

would be vulnerable to Iranian attacks.

So, it's not uh it's not something that

five or 10 or 20,000 troops are going to

be able to do over a sustained period of

time in an effective way. I think this

this idea that Car Island or Keshum

Island, which is another large uh

strategically positioned island in uh

the Gulf or taking parts of Iran's

coastline, um you know, they sound great

on paper. in practice, they don't fix

the problem quickly or neatly, and they

probably result in a large number of

casualties for the United States. And I

think that all of this just underscores

that there wasn't really a plan thought

through around um this military

operation. The president and prime

minister Netanyahu seem to have engaged

in magical thinking that somehow that

the regime which had been heavily

weakened by the internal protests by the

June war that had obliterated in the

president's words the nuclear program

and by the erosion of Iran's proxy

militias around the region over the

course of the past several years. And

the presumption seems to have been that

the regime would just collapse on day

one or two or three. That hasn't

happened. and it doesn't appear likely

to happen, at least under the current

circumstances. And so we're what we're

stuck with is just an array of very bad

options, bad diplomatic options, bad

military options.

>> I don't really understand in a long-term

way what that achieves in a world where

you are not committing the ground forces

necessary for regime change and trying

to install and secure your own regime.

you can, you know, plausibly land our

forces and, you know, secure the strait

for a period of time, but so long as the

Iranian regime is in place, eventually

they will take it back.

And what has not been discussed,

certainly what the American people have

not been prepared for or asked to

prepare for, what Congress has not been

prepared for or asked to prepare for, is

a regime change and rebuilding operation

such that there's not a an ongoing

threat to American troops or ongoing

capacity of the Iranian regime to secure

the strait. The idea that we are just

going to be stationed

in Iran in a extended way holding the

straight as the regime rebuilds itself

and presumably launches constant

asymmetric

attacks on our forces doesn't seem like

a plausible

long-term equilibrium to me.

>> No, I think you said it better than I

possibly could. that this isn't really

there there isn't really a military

solution to the strait that can be

achieved by the United States as long as

the regime remains in power. The Islamic

Republic was in intended to fall as a

result of this uh military operation by

the United States in Israel. When that

didn't happen, I think the the president

didn't really have any other options.

It's clear that, you know, he has

campaigned really and in some ways he

was precient in in appreciating the

impact of the quote unquote forever wars

on the American people, on the American

economy. Something that has been a long

um trend and theme in his own political

career from his first bid for the

presidency throughout his first term and

and again in this term. And yet he has

been very prone to using military action

in this second Trump term. but in

discreet limited ways that were intended

as decap decapitation strikes or other

you know very small boore efforts and I

it seems that he didn't fully recognize

the potential fallout from an Iran

strike that there was no way to

decapitate the regime and quickly move

to some kind of an alternative power

that would be more friendly to the

United States. It simply doesn't exist

within the Islamic Republic. Well, he

seems to me to have had two theories of

this. One theory was the regime will

fall as the Iranian people rise up to

destroy it. And the other, which he

talked about at other times, was more

the Venezuela option, that he would

decapitate the regime, they would kill.

and that a layer or two down

there would be some set of pragmatic,

more businessminded, more transactional

leaders who would cut a deal with the US

that, you know, they would get our

support, the kind of structure of the

regime could remain in place, but they

would be friendlier to our interest and

do what we said when we told them to do

it. And it seems when neither of those

things happened, and I I'd be curious

for your perspective on why they didn't

happen, but when neither of them

happened, there was actually never a

plan C.

>> Yes, I think that's exactly right. And I

think neither of those outcomes happened

for very much the same reason, which is

that this is a deeply embedded regime

and one that has very strong control

over all aspects of society, the

economy, and the government. It is not a

personalistic regime where you know you

can swap out a leader and somehow get

one that might have a different view.

This is a regime that came to power

through a popular revolution. So it has

spent 47 years ensuring that no one can

do to it what it did to its predecessor

the monarchy which meant that when uh

the decapitation happened on the first

day died there was um joy heard from

many Iranians but they were also still

terrorized. They also did not have a

political movement that they could turn

to that could in fact potentially

challenge the system at a moment of

vulnerability. They could go to the

streets, but they had done so only a

month before and they had been

slaughtered in historic numbers by the

regime itself. And they could see that

those forces were still out there.

Government officials were um uh sending

text messages. The pace of executions of

dissident and protesters has remained

high. They're sending a very clear

signal to the population. don't you dare

take this opportunity. And in the

aftermath of the massacres that occurred

in January, it's understandable that

Iranians weren't going to take that

risk. For the same reason, the the

deeply embedded nature of the regime,

this is why we're not seeing a different

perspective or a more pragmatic or

rational perspective from those who are

somewhere lower in the ranks of the

regime itself. when the top echelon was

killed, their successors in many ways

are more radical, are more hardline.

That was true of the supreme leader

himself. He's been replaced by his son

who had fewer uh religious credentials,

less political experience, but is very

closely aligned with the revolutionary

guard and is likely to govern in a much

more author even more authoritarian way

than his father. And that's been true of

many of the figures who've come into

senior positions um as individual

leaders have been picked off. It is a

much more heavily militarized regime,

but one that has no real differentiation

in terms of the anti-American,

anti-Israeli

radical ideology.

>> Trump told the Financial Times, speaking

here of Hamean, who's now the the new

Supreme Leader, quote, "The son is

either dead or in extremely bad shape.

We've not heard from him at all. He's

gone."

What do we know about who's in charge?

It's a very good question. Um what we

know are that there are still a number

of officials most of which have senior

military experience who appear to be um

essentially running the government.

There is also a sort of administrative

side to the governance in Iran which is

still being led by a president who was

elected in uh in the aftermath of the

death of another uh potential contender

for the supreme leader just a couple of

years ago. He has very little power but

he can keep the the system running. Um

the key figures are those from the

military. Mojaba Kam who has been named

the supreme leader who has issued

several statements has not been seen in

public. There are um a wide range of

rumors about the state of his health

that he may have been grievously injured

in the same attack that killed his

father his mother his wife and other

members of his family on the first day

of the war. But in effect it's almost

irrelevant at this point. Majaba can

remain kind of a cipher. He can govern

um from afar because there are these

military officials who are essentially

running the show and the system that his

father set up has ensured that you know

this is highly institutionalized. The

supreme leader had representatives in

every aspect every administrative office

of the government. They will continue

running the state in the in the vision

of the Islamic Republic. And if Mojaba

is never seen in public, if he is known

to be grievously injured, of course, his

father had experienced um a significant

terrorist attack early in his career,

lost the use of his right hand, that

actually just plays into the themes of

martyrdom and sacrifice that are so

important to this regime. So, I don't

think it's actually a deficit that we

that that we have this kind of shift in

the balance of power away from the

clergy toward the military. It's

something that we're I think the the

regime is leaning into at this point in

time.

>> The speaker of Iran's parliament, who's

also a former IRGC commander, Muhammad

Bakar Khalib, he doesn't seem amendable

to negotiation. I've heard from many

people the I believe that he's one of

the the key people in charge. But but to

the point you're making, you posted on

X, which is kind of amazing that this is

a place where Iran and America are

communicating. quote, "We believe the

aggressor must be punished and taught a

lesson that will deter them from

attacking Iran again." So, what what is

Iran learning here? What is the

perspective on the on on the war and and

future security for Iran that has taken

hold among the people who do seem to

still be there and who are still in

charge?

>> That's a really important point. The

Iranians want to ensure that they don't

face yet another round of attacks. And

so one of the concerns that they have

about a potentially preemptive end to

this war is that it will just be the

prelude to another uh set of strikes.

This is what they experienced um in June

of 2025 and they were waiting for the

next round. They understood it was

coming. They studied the war in June and

they have studied how the United States

has prosecuted its wars in other parts

of the region, particularly in Iraq. And

so they were very much prepared this

time. And what they want to do is ensure

that the pain level is high enough that

the United States and the Israelis will

be dissuaded from taking further action

so that they can rebuild, so that they

can reconsolidate their power without

the fear that there's just another set

of strikes lurking around the corner.

I want to ask about some of these other

joint war aims of of America and and

Israel and and and I want to do so with

the recognition that maybe our aims

somewhat diverge, but certainly Corda

Netanyahu's

long-term advocacy for a war of this

nature was eliminating the threat of

Iran's nuclear program to Israel.

We had a bombing campaign um you know

about a year ago. We were told after

that that the Iranian nuclear program

had been obliterated that that this was

done. Um then at the launch of this war

we were told they were you know days

away from getting a nuclear weapon.

To what degree has that

game been achieved, pushed forward, set

back? Like how would you describe the

state of ensuring the state of the goal

of ensuring Iran will never have a

nuclear weapon?

>> I think we are still um some ways away

from ensuring that Iran can never have a

nuclear weapon. And that is simply

because Iran still has the technical

expertise and it still has potentially

large quantities of highlyenriched

uranium which would enable it to move

quickly. The this current state of the

war, this current round of strikes has

done even more significant damage to

Iran's nuclear infrastructure than was

done during the June war. And so it has

compounded the the technical challenge

that the Iranians will have to

reconstitute the program. But as long as

they have the expertise, as long as they

have the potential fuel and they have

the knowhow to build the machines and

and create the infrastructure, they can

get there again. And you know what we

know is that Ayat, the supreme leader

who was killed was in fact one of the

sources of some constraint on the

decision to move forward uh or not with

a weapons program. Iran had a weapons

program which it put on ice in 2003

after the US invasion of Iraq. The

intelligence community has been somewhat

um uh confident that that uh weapons

program w was not active at this time,

but we can't verify that and we know

that much of Iran's activities were

underground and so there isn't the level

of visibility and confidence that we

have hit every possible element of the

program even in in this second round of

war.

>> How about the ballistic missiles

program?

Well, the what we've the latest that

we've heard is that the US assesses that

about 30% of Iran's missile capabilities

have been taken out by strikes. They've

also expended some of the rest of their

missiles um in in their own strikes. But

we believe that they still have both the

the the missiles, the launchers, and

again, even if the production facilities

have been destroyed, they have the

capability to rebuild at some point in

time. We have seen the Israelis in

particular take wider strikes clearly

aimed at undermining the larger economic

infrastructure in Iran, whether it was

at the South Paris gas field or the more

recently the steel manufacturing plants

around the country. I think that's all

intended to make the the road harder and

longer toward reconstituting

a a really industrialcale ballistic

missile program. But the Iranians have

also been very calculated in how they've

used those missiles. Um, they appear to

be improving their accuracy over the the

the course of this war and they still

have the capability to both strike their

neighbors and Israel with ballistic

missiles and they have an even larger

and probably more flexible capability

when it comes to drone construction. You

know, if you listen to Secretary of

Defense of War Pete Hugsf

in his commentary, we're always

pretty close to destroying Iran's

ability to fire missiles, to have

offensive capability. Um, you know,

Trump himself talks constantly about

obliterating their ability to project

power. We don't seem to have been able

to do it. Why is that? Why why has this

proven militarily so hard to kind of

shut Iran's capability to threaten

infrastructure throughout the region to

threaten ships coming through the

straight?

>> We have destroyed a lot of Iranian

capabilities, but they have more than we

fully appreciated and they've also been

able to both hide and reconstitute some

of those capabilities that were already

hit. Um, I think that kind of resilience

was something that was not fully

appreciated by the Trump administration

or by the war planners that this is a

regime that has um seen the worst

before. Um I often point to the period

um in the first several years of the

Islamic Republic when there were tribal

revolts, there was urban street

fighting, there was intense factionalism

and terrorist attacks on the leadership

and uh severe economic constraints and

then the Iraqi invasion in September

1980 and the presumption was that Iran

would simply collapse. That didn't

happen. they fought back. And I think

what we're seeing now is that same

resilience, that same determination to

push forward even when the odds seem

tremendously negative. Um, and we

discounted their ability to do exactly

what they have done in the past.

>> Countries learn things during wars and

Ukraine is a very different country in

terms of its

knowhow in fighting, in terms of what it

produces and how it produces it than it

was before Russia's invasion.

What is Iran learning during this war?

Assuming some coming scenario, you know,

whether it's in 2 weeks or 6 months

where America and Israel are not bombing

any longer.

What will Iran have learned and how will

that in your view change the way it

tries to rebuild its defense, its

deterrent capability, its strategic

capabilities?

What what have we turned Iran into here

under this pressure?

>> I think they've learned a lot of very

dangerous lessons. And this is something

that we know the Iranians have studied

not just America's wars. They've studied

their own wars. The Iran Iraq war was

the subject of like a 100 volume study

by the revolutionary guard. And this is

something that the entire Iranian

leadership has essentially been tutored

on over the course of its of their

careers. And so they're watching this

war. And I think some of the lessons

they're taking are that uh time can be

on their side. They can actually seize

the strait and then they have the upper

hand. That ingenuity and um some of the

same skills that they used to to sustain

the war with Iraq at a time where they

were largely cut off from international

weapons supplies as well as battered

economically can be applied here that

they can still manage to sustain a war

and again that time will be on their

side. Finally, I think they're they have

seen in real time that they can hit

their neighbors in a way that strikes

not just at the economic infrastructure

but at the larger political and

strategic aims of their leadership

particularly in the the Emirates and in

Saudi Arabia. These are uh leaders that

are trying to affect a massive

transformation of their of their

societies really and try to tie them

much more thoroughly and in w more

widelyworked ways with the global

economy through tech, through tourism,

through sports. And all the Iranians

need is a drone through a window of a of

a luxury hotel to persuade um Americans

and Europeans who might have been

planning a spring break in Dubai to

reconsider and a drone through an

airport will cut off um the traffic that

is so important to these uh countries.

They have targeted very clearly, the

Iranians have targeted very clearly some

of the emerging tech infrastructure in

the region, the data centers. And so

that's going to be a really long-term

concern for their neighbors.

>> We've talked a bit about how it doesn't

really appear that America had planned

this. The Trump administration had

planned this at a high level of detail.

That's not my view about the Israelis. I

think the Israelis actually did

understand their war aims. I think that

they did undergo quite a lot more

planning over a much longer period of

time. And I think that they are willing

to accept outcomes that from the

American perspective would not be great

and not have justified this, but are

from the Israeli perspective, you know,

progress. So what is your sense of what

they wanted and what they have achieved

and what position this has put them in

compared to where they were two months

ago?

I think Prime Minister Netanyahu wanted

to achieve the dream that he's had for

decades, which was to see the end of the

Islamic Republic, the end of the threat

that it posed to Israel's existence, and

that it championed um this threat to

Israel, Israeli existence. So, I think

that, you know, for Prime Minister

Netanyahu, the persistence of the regime

is going to be a tremendous

disappointment. But the Israelis, I

think, are very satisfied with the

military objectives that they have been

achieving. they are prepared to maintain

a long hot war against Iran because it

does present such a powerful adversary

to Israel and to uh all Israelis. Um and

you know they will continue to mow the

lawn as long as they have the

opportunity and there is I think a

consensus around this goal among much of

the Israeli national security

establishment at this point in time.

It's not purely a a Netanyahu centric

effort. Israelis um by and large feel as

though you know they can't uh wait for

the threats to come to them. They have

to go out and proactively eliminate

those threats. They learned this

horrific lesson on October 7th and

they're not prepared to live with a

monster on their doorstep in perpetuity

and so they will continue. does a mowing

the lawn strategy which refers to how

Israel for many many years treated Hamas

and notably that in the long run did not

actually work but where when they see a

rise in capability in their enemy they

bomb they you know use other kinds of uh

sometimes more covert means to try to

reduce their enemy's capability does

that actually work with Iran in the long

term because it seems to me that after

this war that if Iran is repeatedly

bombed by Israel, but they are back in

full control of their area and they've

rebuilt their weapons programs to some

degree. They're going to use the Strait

of Hormuz

to force the international community to

stop Israel from repeatedly bombing

Iran. I it's hard for you to imagine

Iran just simply accepting a mowing the

lawn scenario after this. and and it's a

much more complex thing for Israel to do

that to Iran than to to try to do that

to to Hamas and in Gaza. And again, even

doing that to Mamas and Gaza in the long

run was not a strategy that kept Israel

safe.

>> I don't think mowing the lawn is a is a

strategy that is going to keep Israel

safe uh in the future, but I think that

they don't see better options at this

point in time. And they're also counting

on, you know, the fact that the regime

will have to contend with a a very

unhappy, very much impoverished

population. It will have to figure out

how to rebuild potentially without the

support of the international financial

system. And you know, Iran will be a

weaker, more uh embittered state in many

respects. And we don't know what will

happen six months from here. We may see

the tremors that were created by these

attacks produce some fissures within the

regime and actually make it less

strenuous and less threatening. We we

simply don't know and I think the

Israelis are prepared to do what they

have to do. I I I don't think it's a a

strategy for for regional um peace and

that I think is going to be something

that creates some strains with um their

their new relationships. As much as the

Saudis and the Amiradis um detest this

regime, they're going to have to live on

its periphery and they're going to want

to avoid the the continuation of this

crisis even at a lower clip.

>> The the war in Iran has also led to a

second front in in in this war where you

had Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy in part

launching missiles and Israel has

undertaken a pretty significant invasion

now of Lebanon. I mean the death toll is

very very significant. there is a large

amount of troops and material involved

in this. I think in America, we're

really paying attention to to what is

happening in Iran. But but for those

who've been hearing about this, how

would you describe what is now happening

between Israel and Lebanon?

>> I think what's happening in Lebanon

deserves much much more attention. It's

really worrisome. Um the Israelis are

planning to occupy a large swath of

territory in the south of Lebanon. We

know how that ended the last time. um in

a perpetual war. It contributed to the

long-term weakening of the central

state, the long-term strengthening of

Hezbollah, and it also was very costly

for Israelis as well. They lost many

people. And um you know if Lebanon

becomes a failed state, if

hundreds of thousands or millions of

people are forced from their homes and

Israel um continues to occupy a

significant swath of Lebanese territory,

then again, I think it's going to be

very difficult um to build on the the

nent Abraham Accords to create a real

normalization across the region. And

it's it's it's going to be disastrous

for a country that has so much

potential, so many educated people, such

a incredible rich and diverse history.

Um, and and you know, it it it will

leave us here in the United States once

again tied to a an unstable, violent

Middle East that we can't seem to um

withdraw from. I I want to hold on that

point about Hezbollah because I I think

it gets at something that felt like a

lesson many people seem to have learned

after 911 that has now been forgotten,

which is that

you can think you are destroying an

enemy and create a vacuum in which more

lethal, more ideological, more radical

enemies arise. Um, al-Qaeda somewhat

comes out of uh American involvement in

both Afghanistan and and the broader

region. Hezbollah comes somewhat out of

uh Israel's invasion of of Lebanon. ISIS

comes out of the war in Iraq that I I've

just felt there's a very strange level

of short termism in a lot of the

discussions I've been hearing as if

we've never had the experience before of

having you know western powers or

Israeli military power appear to score

victory and then what emerges later on

is more radicalized more dangerous

uh does not respond to negotiation in

the way that a normal statewood. Somehow

the idea that this could all lead to

terror or other forms of

um asymmetric revenge does not feel very

present in the conversation. But as

somebody whose kind of formative

political period was 9/11,

I don't really understand why.

I think that Americans have put the n

911 and the wars that were spawned in

its aftermath very much in their

rearview mirror and President Trump is

very much part of having shifted that

conversation. However, you know, it's a

very real possibility. We know the

Iranians have had uh relationships with

terror networks all around the world.

They've had the capability to affect

terrorist attacks from Asia to Europe to

Latin America. And while we haven't seen

a lot of that uh on American soil in the

very uh near term, we know that they

credibly threatened both Iranian

dissident living in the United States as

well as former senior officials, some of

whom served in the first Trump

administration and retained their

government protection until President

Trump came back into office last

January.

>> We began this conversation by talking in

part about the proposed 15point uh peace

plan from the Trump administration. We

talked about the Iranian response to

that.

One thing you hear from Donald Trump is

various reports on how negotiations are

going. One thing we hear from the

Iranian government is that there are no

negotiations ongoing.

Are there negotiations ongoing?

>> There are always negotiations ongoing. I

think it's highly unlikely that we have

Americans and Iranians sitting across

the table from one another. But there

are messages that are being passed.

There are efforts that are being

launched and particularly if the

president goes forward with his uh

announcements at various points in time

that we are simply going to leave uh

once the mission is finished even if the

strait is not open. We do see other

actors coming to try to play a larger

role particularly the Chinese, the

Pakistanis, others are looking for some

sort of an opportunity to end this

crisis because you know this will impact

the entire world if it plays out for

weeks uh and months unended.

>> How serious are the Pakistani and and

Chinese efforts here? And ask this from

two perspectives. One, you know, could

they actually create the form in which

this is brought to some kind of

conclusion?

But two, if America launches a

illthought through war with Iran

that then ends in some kind of

confusing,

somewhat humiliating absence of achieved

objectives

and the people who end it are the

Chinese who come in as the adults in the

room to sort of help negotiate a

settlement.

I don't know. If I imagine a historian

writing a book on changing world orders

in 50 years, that might feel to me like

one of those moments when you begin to

see the balance of

responsibility and weight shifting in

the global order.

>> Well, I think however this ends, it is a

critical juncture. It is the end of

American global leadership. it is the

end or the the diminishment of our

partnerships and alliances that have

been so critical in the post-war era to

preserving stability and and security

and prosperity in many places. And

what's also interesting is that the

timeline for the end of this crisis is

very much also influenced by the Chinese

because the president had scheduled a

summit in Beijing. He moved that as a

result of the war uh being a bit more

protracted than he had presumably

intended. that that new date for the

summit in Beijing is May 14th and 15th

and he would presumably need to have

this uh in his rearview mirror by the

time he goes to Beijing and that will

give all the parties a bit of a stronger

hand to try to push for a solution. But

it will not be a solution that will

probably be driven by the United States

at this point in time. President Trump

went into this war with um without a

plan for the day after, not even a plan

for day two or three of the war. And

what we now see is that, you know, the

rest of the world is going to have to

pick up that mantle and try to drive

toward a solution for this crisis

because if it continues, it will have

absolutely catastrophic impact.

Just thinking through our conversation

here,

if you imagine a world a month from now

where

the war is winding down or has wound

down because America couldn't bear the

disruption to global energy, helium,

fertilizer, etc. supplies. The Iranian

regime remains in place

controlling the straight of Hormuz

probably charging different ships uh

tolls to go through and you know or

making particular deals with different

countries that benefit Iran in order to

have safe passage through the strait.

That feels to me like a war we would

have lost.

Is that wrong?

>> I think that's correct. I don't see a a

victory in real terms at the end of this

crisis. We may be able to extricate

ourselves without even more catastrophic

human losses than have already been

experienced. But there is very little

evidence that we're going to be able to

come out of this war with a different

regime in Iran with uh less control over

the straight of Hormuz. And that is a a

very dangerous outcome for the long

term. the the wider implications of the

United States having undertaken this

action in a way that alienated partners

and allies in the region and all around

the world and effectively seated huge

financial benefits to the Russians and

potentially seated some diplomatic

opportunity to the Chinese. And um it's

not clear that President Trump is

prepared to sustain American leadership

or that even if he were in the aftermath

of this what appears to be a a

catastrophic overreach and

miscalculation with the uh attacks on

Iran that in fact the United States will

be trusted to do that by uh countries

around the world. It feels like a Suez

moment in some respects. And also, I

mean, and I think this is one of my

other concerns,

maybe has left a more dangerous Iranian

regime that is both learned lessons

about what its deterrence capabilities

actually are and has also learned

lessons that negotiations cannot be

trusted. We entered into a deal with

Iran under the Obama administration.

Trump ripped it up. He then negotiated

with Iran and bombed them twice during

negotiations. So you might end with an

Iranian regime which has learned a

lesson that you cannot negotiate with

the United States. You cannot trust the

negotiations even if you do have a

partner you can work with. It could just

be ripped up by the next administration.

Your only true safety is your deterrence

capability to impose tremendous pain on

the global economy through the straight

of Hormuz through attacking

infrastructure throughout the Gulf, data

infrastructure, energy infrastructure,

and ultimately perhaps trying to get a

nuclear weapon.

And so I mean a world in which we have

somewhat degraded Iranian weapons

capability in the near term but left a

regime with that set of lessons in

charge for the long term and with that

set of battleh hardened learnings.

I mean that seems again not like a

contribution to world security at the

end of this.

I think that's exactly what the Iranians

are driving toward. And at this point in

time, it appears as though they may in

fact achieve those aims of being

stronger at the end of this war, even if

the economy's been battered, even if

they've lost thousands of their own

people. um that they believe that their

ability to endure the worst that two

technologically superior, economically

superior uh adversaries have given them

and come out on top um I think will be

tremendously emboldening for a regime

that has um been very dangerous even at

its weaker moments.

>> I think that's a sobering place to end.

Always our final question. What are

three books you would recommend to the

audience?

Um, I would recommend a couple of books

outside of the norm perhaps. I know

you've had a lot of folks talking about

Iran lately and they all mention some of

the great classics in the field, but um,

especially because we're talking about

the US Iran relationship. I wanted to

recommend one um, The Twilight War by

David Christ. Um, the subtitle is The

Secret History of America's 30-year

conflict with Iran. So it's obviously a

little bit outdated, but David Christ is

a Pentagon historian and he writes about

the tanker war period as well as you

know other other skirmishes between the

United States and Iran. I think it's a

particularly important one for

understanding how these how the the

history has shaped the crisis. Um,

another one I would recommend is an even

older book that was done of the hostage

crisis. Um, edited by Warren Christopher

who of course uh served in many senior

positions and um really just uh talked

through all of the diplomats, the

military officials and the bankers who

were played a really important role in

in helping end what was also a very

protracted and a crisis that diminished

the United States in many respects in

the world. It's called American hostages

in Iran, the conduct of a crisis. Um and

the third book I'd recommend um by an

Iranian author, Iranian academic um

renown retired Misag Para, Democracy in

Iran. Why it failed and how it might

succeed and I hope that it will in the

long term.

>> Suzanne Maloney, thank you very much.

>> Thank you.