There's a lot of emphasis on China's

military capabilities. I think since

President Xiinping took over with this

whole wolf warrior diplomacy, it's

called in the west. Um, but what is

their specific capabilities? Because

there's a lot of skepticism over their

naval assets. Yes, they have aggregately

more ships now or battleships than the

US, but

>> not more battleships. I don't think

anybody has any battleships anymore.

>> Sorry. They have a few aircraft carriers

that are building into task forces and

so forth. But again, no, they have a

very

substantially greater military capacity

than they had before and in some

categories. Uh it is greater than what

the United States has. Um I would point

out that they have had no recent combat

experience.

In fact, when Chinese leaders would come

to Washington back when there were

regular exchanges and I was the director

of the CIA, I was often asked if I would

allow them to come out and meet with me

and I always said yes in part because at

some point in our conversation

uh I would note now as you all know

generals I of course had five combat

commands just as a general officer

alone. Uh many of you had uh combat

experience. Oh, maybe. Oh, I guess not.

Because of course, the last real combat

experience any of them had would have

been

uh in in that particular war after our

departure uh in the late 1970s. And

there's really been nothing all that

significant since then. So, yes, they've

built impressive forces. uh they've

realigned their command and control

structure to rationalize that to more of

what we have in terms of regional

combatant commands and joint forces and

so forth. Um by the way, in certain

categories of advanced technology,

they're ahead of us. We have better AI.

They have more applications. And you can

go back and forth all the way along on

all this. They have the stack. We're

betting on this, they're betting on

that. But at the end of the day, if you

have not actually been in combat uh and

really exercised, even if it's against

less than peer competitors, I think

that's a major disadvantage. Uh and our

forces have had enormous experience. And

all of our mid-level and senior level uh

commission and non-commission officers

have had extensive time in combat.

>> So, I was thinking of the word

dreadnots. shows you my uh knowledge

when it comes to maritime military

matters, General. But my last question

for you is you've discussed a little

bit, you touched upon about the potency,

but what's the propensity for there to

be potential engagement between America

and China over Taiwan? I mean, it's the

classic endgame question, but do you

really think that's possible? I think it

is conceivable given Xi Jinping's desire

for national rejuvenation and the window

that is closing. Most people point to

2027 or possibly 28. What would you what

would you share with the viewers about

this element and whether Taiwan is

>> Well, you've already answered the

question. Uh I think it's conceivable

obviously many things are conceivable.

I don't know how likely it is and

frankly there let's remember that we

have we get a vote um big time and that

is if our capabilities

uh are seen as substantial and uh

impressive and if our willingness to

employ those capabilities

uh is uh solid not needlessly

provocative. But again, these are the

elements of deterrence. The potential

adversaries assessment of your

capabilities on the one hand and your

willingness to use them on the other.

And we have agency here. Uh we can make

decisions and we are although I'd argue

that we need to accelerate uh the

application of the decisions when it

comes to transforming our capabilities

in part uh in view of lessons we should

be learning from the war in Ukraine. uh

and then also ensuring that there's no

question of our willingness to use our

forces if necessary, but that we do not

want to be needlessly provocative. Uh if

we do that right, I think the likelihood

is very low. Um if we don't, then I

think it opens the question up a good

bit more. But I'm hopeful actually and

you know one of the values of

unconventional conventional leaders and

certainly President Trump is that as is

uh Secretary Headsth is they're willing

to take actions that others would not

have taken and one of those needs to be

to blow up our military procurement

system and start over. uh to recognize

that the military-industrial

congressional complex as Senator McCain

uh used to describe it uh poratively

uh not fondly uh is that there are

vested interests in existing platforms

and capabilities and weapons systems,

existing basing arrangements, existing

maintenance contracts, all of this

um that all the individuals in these

different complexes, military,

industrial A congressional will say,

"Yes, we need to change procurement, but

don't start with the platform made in my

district. Don't start with the aircraft

carrier task force in my base in my

district. Don't do this, don't do that."

And I think there's got to be some

really aggressive action uh in this

regard to overhaul the overall system

and ideally to drive it with the basic

concepts developed by the Indo-Pacific

commander and his subordinate commanders

uh that then are operationalized

uh in a variety of different ways. Most

important of which would be those that

establish requirements

uh that then guide procurement.