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Joe Rogan Experience #2473 - Bill Thompson

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Joe Rogan Experience #2473 - Bill Thompson

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4331 segments

0:01

Joe Rogan podcast. Check it out.

0:04

>> The Joe Rogan Experience.

0:06

>> TRAIN BY DAY. JOE ROGAN PODCAST BY

0:08

NIGHT. All day.

0:12

>> What's up, Phil? How you doing, Joe?

0:13

>> Good to see you, brother. Good to see

0:14

you.

0:14

>> This is This might be one of the coolest

0:16

things anybody's ever given me. So, you

0:19

gave me this knife.

0:21

Explain all this.

0:22

>> All right. So, I mean, there's a larger

0:24

explanatory reason behind this. My

0:27

brother and I grew up, my father died

0:28

when I was five. My brother and I grew

0:31

up doing um these things called

0:33

rendevous. Have you ever heard of them?

0:35

>> Um in what way? What is a ren?

0:37

>> So there you go. So what a rendevous is

0:39

is it's not you know you go to those

0:41

like uh what I don't even know what

0:43

they're called, but people do like

0:44

reenactments.

0:46

>> Oh, okay. Like Civil War reenactments.

0:48

>> It's not like that. So it's the closest

0:50

thing approximation to probably what it

0:52

is. You get invited to them or these

0:55

days they're easier to get to. But my

0:56

stepfather, my the guy my mother

0:58

remarried, brought us to them. All you

1:00

do is camp, but you're only allowed to

1:02

camp and no one comes to the camp or

1:04

sometimes they might have people at the

1:05

end. But while you're in the camp,

1:06

everything in the camp has to be 1840 or

1:08

prior. So there can be no modern

1:11

pertinances, nothing like a, you know,

1:12

refrigerator or nothing like that.

1:14

>> 1840. Why that year?

1:16

>> At the end of the fur trapping. At the

1:18

end of like that, that was considered

1:19

like Jeremiah Johnson time, like peak

1:21

fur trapping. Oh,

1:22

>> so there's people, you know, they dress

1:24

like either, you know, revolutionary,

1:27

like American revolutionaries or they

1:28

dress like mountain men or they dress

1:30

like Indians.

1:30

>> How'd you guys dress?

1:31

>> Mountain men. So, uh, while we're there,

1:34

you learn all kinds of stuff while

1:36

you're reenacting. Like, I learned how

1:37

to brain tan hides. I learned how to

1:39

traditionally art, do traditional

1:41

archery, stuff like that. So, anyway,

1:44

this knife was a knife I had actually

1:45

started working on with my brother a

1:46

while ago. I do more of like the brain

1:49

tanning tomahawk.

1:51

>> And when you're saying brain tanning,

1:52

you talk about using brains to tan

1:54

animal hides, right? Using animal

1:56

brains. What What does brains do? Why

1:58

does brains do?

1:59

>> It softens the leather in a natural way.

2:01

And what's cool about it is every

2:03

animal, no matter what animal you kill,

2:05

has the exact amount of brain needed in

2:07

order to tan the hide.

2:08

>> So, you don't need any additional like

2:10

people use egg yolks or mayonnaise or

2:12

something like that. All you do is you

2:13

take the brain out of the cavity, you

2:15

grind it up, you mix it into some water,

2:17

and then after you've after you've

2:19

cleaned the leather and you've scraped

2:21

it clean, you stretch it. I usually use

2:24

like a dull shovel, you stretch it over

2:25

the dull shovel, and then you soak it in

2:27

the brain water mixture and then you

2:30

just keep repeating that pattern and the

2:33

leather gets like a really nice soft um

2:36

uh feel to it.

2:37

>> What is it about the brain? Is it the

2:38

fat?

2:39

>> It breaks down the leather. Uh, I'm not

2:42

sure if it's the fatter. I haven't

2:43

gotten that deep into it, but it breaks

2:45

down the leather and just makes it feel

2:46

really soft, really nice. So, anyway,

2:48

this knife here, I started I killed that

2:51

bear. So, the jaw is made out of two um

2:53

bear jaws or out of one bear jaw split

2:56

in half.

2:57

So, um that was a bear I killed in

3:00

Canada in 2017 was my biggest black um

3:03

black bear. And uh so we split the job,

3:06

put that together. Um it's Irish linen

3:09

threading. Then that's a knife that um

3:11

my brother picked up that was from 1860.

3:13

It was totally rusted. We had to grind

3:15

it back or he had to grind it back down.

3:17

And then the sheath is uh is traditional

3:21

like you know you could the cool thing

3:23

about doing rendevous and the cool thing

3:24

about this is you could have a Delorean

3:27

and drop that in 1840 and somebody pick

3:29

it up and think it was made yesterday.

3:31

And so everything on there has been done

3:33

traditionally from the um the quilling

3:35

on the bead work is made from porcupine

3:37

quills. The backing is um uh buffalo

3:41

brain tan and then the front is beaver

3:44

hide or beaver tail, I'm sorry.

3:47

>> And then um the sides are horse and

3:49

turkey hair hanging off of it.

3:51

>> And these are bear teeth.

3:53

>> And those are bear teeth. Yep.

3:54

>> Wow.

3:55

>> From the same bear. So when I was

3:57

thinking about what I was cuz I wanted

3:58

to give you something for inviting me on

4:00

because it's still a shock to me that

4:01

you did it. Even though we've been

4:02

talking for so long, I just never

4:04

imagined a scenario where you'd want to

4:06

have me on here. So,

4:07

>> well, you're an interesting dude.

4:08

>> I thought, what could I give this guy

4:10

that, you know, money or people or

4:12

whatever couldn't get you? And so, I

4:14

thought, this is the right thing to do.

4:16

So, it went from a me project to a you

4:18

project. And, uh, my brother Aaron uh,

4:21

helped me out with it tremendously.

4:23

>> So, how did you find this knife from the

4:24

1860s?

4:25

>> Well, he found it. My brother is um,

4:27

even more esoteric and odd than I am,

4:30

believe it or not. And, uh, he collects

4:32

this kind of stuff. Um they I mean the

4:34

guy who dated it said 1860 to to 1890

4:38

they is what they figured

4:40

>> and uh and you can tell by the way that

4:42

like around the hilt and the way that

4:44

it's the the pitting on it and stuff

4:46

like that and the way that it was made

4:48

that it fits that era. I mean it could

4:50

have been somebody redid it in 1900 but

4:53

it's definitely that old the type of

4:55

steel and the way that it was worked and

4:57

the way that it is around the hilt and

4:58

on the bottom there.

4:59

>> Wow. And um so it's at least, you know,

5:03

130, 140, but most likely 160, 170.

5:06

>> It actually fits my hand perfect.

5:08

>> Yeah. So that's also something my

5:10

brother and I talked about about how

5:12

long it was going to be and we made some

5:14

educated guesses and put it all

5:16

together. So yeah, I mean, like I said,

5:18

not something you can just go pick up

5:19

somewhere, something that will, you

5:21

know, hopefully mean something. Not

5:23

saying it's pra practical, like it's not

5:25

something you'd be gutting a elk out

5:27

with, but um

5:28

>> Well, if we get attacked by zombies in

5:30

the studio, it's a good thing to have on

5:31

the desk.

5:32

>> Yeah. I mean, if you're going to make a

5:33

last stand, you know, that's a pretty

5:35

good that's a pretty good knife to make

5:37

your last stand with.

5:38

>> That's a good way to go out.

5:39

>> Yeah, exactly.

5:40

>> That's awesome, man.

5:41

>> Yeah. So, the rendevous um uh we did

5:44

those from when

5:44

>> How long do they last?

5:46

>> Uh they vary from a week and then some

5:48

go up to three weeks.

5:49

>> And what do you do for food while you're

5:51

out there? Um, so inside of your lod, so

5:53

there's two types of rendevous

5:55

at most rendevous inside of your lodge,

5:58

you can have a cooler as long as it

6:00

doesn't leave the lodge. So I have like

6:02

a a 20ft tepee that I take to these

6:04

things and uh inside of my tepee, you

6:07

can have a cooler.

6:08

>> And some modern pertinances.

6:10

>> Did they have any kind of coolers in the

6:12

1800s?

6:12

>> I mean, they had ice boxes and like

6:15

steel ice boxes and that type of thing,

6:16

but nothing like we have today. um you

6:19

know stuff was getting um dug out,

6:21

buried in the ground or put into the

6:22

ground like cool areas of the ground or

6:24

digouts and they dried everything. So

6:26

pemkin would have been the you know

6:28

everyday thing to eat that's just dried.

6:31

>> So did you bring your own food or did

6:32

you have to hunt for food?

6:34

>> So you bring your own food but there are

6:36

other rendevous that are kind of invite

6:38

only and I don't even think a lot of

6:39

people who do rendevous know about these

6:41

but there's ones that I think they're

6:42

called I think I might be speaking out

6:44

of school. Somebody might send me an

6:45

email after this, but I'm going to talk

6:46

about it anyway because I never got read

6:47

the right act. They're called jured I

6:50

think they called them jured southerns

6:51

and I've only been to one of those. And

6:53

that's where everything in the camp has

6:55

to be pre-1840. And you meet down in the

6:57

parking lot, you put everything on the

6:59

back of a mule and you when I did mine

7:01

it was up in the I think it was the big

7:03

horns. So, you know, you talk to a

7:05

rancher um get everything packed up. If

7:08

you go to the back of the big horns and

7:10

everything in camp has to be pre-1840 as

7:13

close as it can get. They'll even look

7:15

at your stitching and say, "Oh, that was

7:16

sewn with a with a uh sewing machine.

7:18

You got to take that off." And it's

7:19

always these weird like eccentric

7:22

history teachers that run them. Like

7:23

guys who,

7:24

>> you know, uh teaches history at Berkeley

7:27

or something like that or other places.

7:29

They just really enjoy living like this.

7:30

And at those ones, if they're in season,

7:32

you can hunt whatever is in season.

7:34

You're hunting with traditional archery.

7:35

And it's really good for kids. Like the

7:38

internet wasn't a problem as much when I

7:39

was a kid. I was certainly into

7:40

computers. I have been since I was a

7:42

child, but you could just detach.

7:45

Everyone's running around crazy. You're

7:47

sitting around the campfire at night.

7:49

People are singing with the, you know,

7:50

songs in the guitar. You're learning how

7:52

to do things like this. You're learning

7:53

how to brain tan. You're learning how to

7:55

live traditionally. And uh it's it's a

7:57

eccentric cult kind of. It's not a cult.

8:00

It's an eccentric group of people. It's

8:02

a lot of fun. People take it very

8:03

community. People take it very

8:05

seriously. They there's there's more

8:07

advertising surrounding it now than

8:08

there used to be because num numbers are

8:10

kind of dwindling, but uh I did my last

8:13

one last year with my brother. So if you

8:15

go on my Instagram, there's a picture of

8:16

my brother, my son, and I doing I think

8:19

our second rendevous together and we're

8:21

just dressed like, you know, I've

8:23

actually got an awesome war shirt. I can

8:24

show you the picture. I've got an

8:26

awesome war shirt that a friend of mine

8:29

went to war with. His he was half Native

8:31

American. His grandfather was um Ajiway

8:35

or something, a chipwa, something like

8:36

that. And he was I don't remember what

8:40

his role was, but anyway, I went we we

8:42

deployed to Iraq together and his

8:44

grandpa made me this war shirt. Oh,

8:45

there you found it. F Jamie, he pulled

8:48

it up. That's my lodge. Um

8:51

>> how much do you enjoy a shower after you

8:54

get out of here?

8:54

>> I mean, I I as long as you um keep you

8:58

know, they have showers in camp. They've

9:00

got a showering area, a showering area

9:02

where it's just like pallets. That's the

9:03

inside of my lodge. Um, so there's a

9:05

cooler at this one. This is not a jured

9:08

rendevous. Um, and uh, so you can shower

9:12

while you're some of them, they call

9:13

them hooters. There'll be like a latrine

9:15

in a shower area in camp, but also like

9:17

some of them I don't I don't do it at

9:19

all.

9:20

>> This is wild.

9:21

>> And so there's no reenactment like

9:22

there's not like civilians walking

9:24

around.

9:24

>> It's not like Renaissance fair.

9:25

>> Yeah, exactly. It's just more like I

9:27

want to act like it's 18:40 for a couple

9:29

of weeks and not look at my phone one

9:31

time and not worry about the news. It's

9:34

amazing after a week here, you really

9:36

forget about the world and you like

9:38

don't even know you're supposed to be

9:39

stressed out about things. You're just

9:41

out there doing your thing for a couple

9:42

of weeks

9:43

>> and you just cook over open fire.

9:45

>> Everything gets done traditionally that

9:46

way. Yep.

9:47

>> And did you bring your own meat in?

9:48

>> Yeah, you bring your own meat and stuff

9:50

in a cooler. Um, and then, uh, there's

9:52

also cooking classes where they teach

9:54

you like all the recipes to do with like

9:55

a a Dutch oven, like an old cast iron

9:58

oven. And, uh, they do gambling at

10:01

nights. So, you'll walk into like a

10:03

huge, they call mares, but it's like a

10:05

huge 100 foot square lodge. There'll be

10:07

three gambling tables in there, girls in

10:09

like the low cut shirts and dealing

10:10

cards and smoking cigars and just having

10:13

an amazing time. And there are pe you go

10:15

by camp names while you're in there.

10:17

Nobody uses their real name. Well, some

10:19

people use their real name. I'd say 60%

10:21

of people don't use their real names.

10:23

>> What was your camp name?

10:25

>> This is embarrassing.

10:27

>> It should be.

10:28

>> Yeah. So, uh, I got my camp name. I got

10:31

christened with my camp name in the big

10:32

horns when I was 14 or 13 and it was

10:37

talks a lot.

10:38

>> Talks a lot.

10:39

>> Yeah. And Sue it was pronounced.

10:42

And uh,

10:42

>> just because you talk a lot or

10:43

>> when I was a kid, I talked a lot.

10:45

Actually, as an adult, I don't talk that

10:47

much unless I know you. Um, but as a kid

10:50

I would never shut up. I had really bad

10:52

ADHD. They kind of diagnosed me with

10:54

having some lowle version of Asberers.

10:57

And uh I was a rap scallion in class.

11:01

Just never shut up, never listen, never

11:03

did anything. And uh

11:05

>> those are the people that are the most

11:06

fun.

11:06

>> Well, they didn't enjoy me in high

11:08

school or in grade school. I

11:09

>> probably would have been your friend.

11:11

But uh yeah, they they called me Iota uh

11:15

and you know, we got christened and uh

11:17

it was a you know, it's a one of the

11:20

things we're kind of missing in culture

11:21

today or something that I'm trying to

11:22

reinvigorate, especially with my son and

11:25

with other you know, young men that I

11:26

run into is kind of like coming of age

11:28

rights.

11:29

>> Yeah.

11:29

>> Something to say you're a man and I'm

11:32

going to start treating like a man from

11:33

this moment forward. Like, you know,

11:35

what does that There should be structure

11:37

to that. you know, we we're tribal and

11:39

um it's important to me. So, uh

11:41

>> I think that is really something that's

11:44

missing from society. I think that it I

11:46

used to think it was silly when I was

11:47

young and then as I got older I

11:49

realized, well, I went through that. I

11:51

became a black belt and I started

11:53

fighting

11:54

>> and you had a group of men telling you

11:55

you're at this level, we're going to

11:57

treat you like that and if you fall from

11:58

grace, we're going to remind you right

12:00

away.

12:01

>> Yeah.

12:01

>> And uh we we just don't do that with

12:03

young men. And we have a society now

12:04

where young men act like young men till

12:06

they're 45 or 50 or 60

12:08

>> and sometimes never stop.

12:09

>> Yeah. And um you know women nature

12:12

imposes itself on women. They become

12:14

fertile. They're able to have babies and

12:17

uh and uh they got to seek security or

12:20

find a husband or a really good job that

12:21

will supplement whatever a husband would

12:23

provide and they got to start acting

12:25

like a woman. Whereas men can sit in a

12:27

basement, you know, and it becomes very

12:29

dangerous.

12:30

>> Especially men that never have children.

12:31

Yeah. And they they're perpetual

12:33

children.

12:34

>> Yeah. And if you don't impose nature on

12:36

yourself by undergoing those types of

12:37

rights and understanding what it means

12:39

to become a man, nature will impose

12:40

itself on you by either a you're never

12:42

going to have children and therefore

12:43

you're dead forever or b it will kill

12:46

you because you're fat and in your mom's

12:48

basement, you get diabetes and the foot

12:49

chopped off and you're 35. And you know,

12:52

we just don't tell men. We don't have a

12:54

the military did it for me. I had really

12:57

put off uh responsibility or uh seeking

13:01

meaning or any of those things until I

13:03

was in the military. And like I said, my

13:05

father died when I was five. So I really

13:07

had no central male authority until I

13:09

was about 13 or 14 when I met this guy

13:11

Steve. Um and uh he kind of initiated

13:15

some of those rights for me and and held

13:17

me to account. But it was really the

13:19

military which was a turning point for

13:21

me where um I there was a standard and I

13:24

was expected to hold it. I I think

13:26

there's a reason why most ancient

13:27

cultures and a lot of ancient religions

13:29

have these rights of passages where you

13:32

are like now officially officially a

13:34

man.

13:35

>> Yeah.

13:36

>> Officially, you know, you're

13:37

responsible. You you are you have to

13:39

think of yourself as a different thing

13:41

now. Whereas if you leave it up to your

13:43

own decision, men sort of dwindle into

13:47

this perpetual state of childhood.

13:49

>> Yep. And it's not about you anymore.

13:51

it's about other people like that that

13:53

for me having children I've got four

13:55

kids

13:56

>> um really you know the military was kind

13:59

of the first inkling of responsibility

14:01

but then having children and realizing

14:03

this isn't about me at all and I need to

14:05

be willing to break my back for these

14:06

people who depend on me um

14:08

>> this weird primal feeling that you know

14:11

you're responsible for these like very

14:13

vulnerable little people

14:15

>> that you love more than life itself. It

14:17

just changes everything. It just kicks

14:19

you into gear. But for some people it

14:21

doesn't, you know, some people that are

14:23

so stuck in that perpetual childhood

14:25

thing, they just wind up deciding it's

14:27

too much of a drag and they get

14:28

divorced.

14:29

>> Yeah.

14:29

>> You know, and then they [ __ ] up the

14:31

kids.

14:31

>> Yeah. Uh God, we have so many rabbit

14:34

holes we could go down on this, but I

14:36

mean it it was um

14:38

>> you know, growing up in the 80s and the

14:40

early 90s, it was really like a divorce

14:43

culture. Mhm.

14:44

>> And I obviously understand that if

14:46

you're in a bad relationship or an

14:47

abusive relationship or you know there's

14:49

there certainly there's a threshold

14:51

where marriage should dissolve. No

14:53

question.

14:54

>> But I kind of feel like it our the

14:56

central thrust of a lot of culture at

14:58

that time was about like divorce or not

15:00

getting married or you know discovering

15:02

yourself and that type of thing which in

15:03

some ways is good. There's goodness

15:05

there. But when it becomes a central

15:07

thrust or a central narrative and

15:08

divorce becomes very easy or it's

15:10

happening everywhere it's normalized and

15:13

it's normalized it's super destructive.

15:14

Children are the ones who suffer the

15:16

most on it and I think the data is clear

15:17

on that. M

15:18

>> um when you look at you know single

15:20

parent homes or no parent homes or being

15:21

raised you know without a an authority

15:24

>> or an abusive step person

15:25

>> or an abusive and that is you know when

15:27

you look up the stats on that like

15:29

remarage and having a new family like

15:31

that

15:32

>> that becomes the single most likely

15:34

vector of abuse in a child young child's

15:36

life is that new person right because

15:38

now they're raising someone else's kid

15:39

or whatever

15:41

>> um

15:41

>> I mean it's a that's in every old movie

15:44

the evil stepmother

15:45

>> you know.

15:46

>> Yeah. or evil stepfather, but in the old

15:48

movies, it's always the stepmother that

15:50

abuses the girl,

15:52

>> you know.

15:52

>> Yes. And and and so, you know, I kind of

15:55

uh I kind of resented that part of that

15:58

time, that culture was um I shouldn't

16:01

say when I was a child, I should say as

16:02

I got older, cuz I was in a single mom

16:04

home. And uh the guy that my mother

16:06

remarried right after my father died was

16:08

abusive. And um you know, he really got

16:11

hard on my younger brother. And you

16:13

know, my mother moved us out almost

16:15

immediately. But uh when I reexamined

16:18

that time, it really was uh you know, I

16:21

don't know how to describe it, but you

16:23

know, there are no rules when it comes

16:26

to relationships and family and every

16:28

family is special in particular in its

16:30

own way and they all need to be

16:31

venerated. And there's of course some

16:33

truth to that. We shouldn't deride

16:34

someone because they come from a broken

16:36

family, but we shouldn't elevate it like

16:38

it's at the same level as a unified

16:40

family. Um, and and that's a tricky line

16:43

to to walk, but also the people who were

16:46

making those movies and that culture

16:47

came from the 50s and 60s where divorce

16:49

was just not in the cards. And so that

16:52

was, you know, Hook's law. As you bend

16:55

any object, it wants to return back to

16:57

its natural state. And Hook's law kind

16:59

of played there where nobody could get

17:01

divorced in the 40s, 30s, 40s, 50s, and

17:03

60s. Then you had the baby boomers who

17:05

kind of culturally said, you know,

17:07

actually there's it's not as bad as we

17:09

think. But then it overcorrected and

17:11

then it became kind of part of that

17:13

cultural zeitgeist.

17:15

>> And that's kind of what humans do,

17:17

right? We always overcorrect.

17:18

>> Yeah, we do.

17:19

>> Yeah. We go in one direction until we

17:21

realize it's destructive and then we

17:23

overcorrect until we realize that's

17:24

destructive.

17:26

>> Yeah.

17:26

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18:38

>> And I would say that's the and not this

18:40

isn't a political thing. This is just

18:42

the reality of it. That's mostly what

18:44

makes me conservative in nature is I

18:47

agree systems need to change, but they

18:48

need to change slowly and pragmatically.

18:51

So we because you know any social um any

18:54

social scientist worth their salt will

18:56

know a social experiment almost never

18:58

has the outcome that we thought it was

19:00

going to have. In other words, we

19:02

thought doing something to society would

19:04

form society this way, but it almost has

19:06

the the inverse, the antiattern like we

19:08

talked about before and almost ends up

19:10

propagating itself. And so that makes me

19:13

I'm I'm still a proponent for change,

19:16

but it should be slow and and thought

19:18

out and and done in pockets first.

19:22

>> Yeah.

19:22

>> Kind of, you know, federalism. Let's do

19:24

little changes here. Let's let

19:25

California be crazy for a while and see

19:27

how that works out for them.

19:29

>> But let's not nationalize the craziness.

19:31

Let's learn from what they learn there.

19:33

And there there will be goodness, you

19:34

know, hopes that make great coffee and

19:37

cool art. and let's take those parts,

19:39

but how about the rampant homeless?

19:42

Let's find out what caused that and and

19:44

and solve for that. And and you know,

19:46

that was kind of the founders intent

19:48

with federalism. They're really

19:49

federalist minded, stateminded. And

19:51

there's, you know, even for that being

19:53

as 250 years ago, there's a profound

19:56

amount of profoundity in that like let's

19:58

change things slowly and let social

20:00

experiments take place and adopt the

20:02

best parts of those things and then

20:03

integrate them into the culture overall

20:05

as we move along. But, you know, let's

20:07

not throw the baby out with the bath

20:09

water.

20:09

>> Yeah. I think in this country, one of

20:12

the primary problems that people have is

20:14

a profound lack of respect for

20:16

discipline and how important discipline

20:19

is for your life. Yeah.

20:20

>> And discipline is associated with

20:22

conservatism.

20:23

>> And because of that, like a lot of

20:25

people think that I'm

20:27

>> I don't think I'm anything. I I think I

20:29

I have politically or ideologically, I

20:33

have a lot of everything in me. I don't

20:35

think I identify with one side or

20:37

another. But if one thing that I agree

20:39

with conservative people on,

20:40

conservative people lend more towards

20:42

the importance of discipline, hard work,

20:45

discipline, don't complain, get things

20:48

done. Re deal with the hand that you've

20:50

been dealt with and just sort it out and

20:53

get to work. Don't don't cry. Don't look

20:55

for other people to save you. They're

20:57

not going to.

20:58

>> And this is not something that's

21:01

celebrated in society. It's thought of

21:03

as a cruelty that if you you say that

21:06

you need discipline that well you're

21:08

you're not treating these people that

21:09

are victims of circumstance with the

21:12

proper respect or with the proper

21:14

empathy. And I think a certain amount of

21:16

empathy is probably not so good for you

21:18

at a certain point in time. There comes

21:19

a point in time where you're letting

21:21

people wallow in their [ __ ] and just

21:23

make excuses for why they're not getting

21:24

anything done. And in that sense, I

21:26

think California is that that is a giant

21:29

part of what's wrong with California.

21:31

what's wrong with California when it

21:32

comes to crime, what's wrong with

21:34

California, you know, their the way they

21:37

address crime and the way they address

21:39

homelessness and all these issues that

21:41

they have. They don't put their foot

21:42

down. At a certain point in time, you

21:44

got to realize like what Godad calls

21:46

suicidal empathy. Uh society can suffer

21:49

from suicidal empathy. And at a certain

21:51

point in time, you got to enforce rules

21:52

and you got to make it so that people

21:54

have to get their [ __ ] together.

21:56

>> Yeah. And that suicidal empathy becomes

21:58

a way for the person who's imposing it

22:00

on someone else to feel good about

22:01

themselves, which makes it even trickier

22:03

and even more um insidious because

22:06

they're they're they're feeling good

22:08

from the the weaponization of other

22:09

people's

22:11

um lot in life.

22:13

>> Mhm.

22:13

>> And and and the the thing about that is

22:16

none of the rules that you're going to

22:17

impose, especially as a legislator or as

22:20

somebody in a think tank, you'll never

22:22

feel the repercussions of them. You'll

22:24

never have to actually deal with it

22:25

dayto-day. You're just imposing it on

22:27

someone else and saying, "I better

22:29

understand the structure of reality and

22:31

the fabric of the world, and you can't

22:33

help but be this way. It's the system

22:35

that's done this to you. So, let me give

22:37

you pittance that I'm going to take from

22:39

someone else."

22:40

>> Mhm.

22:40

>> And and that makes me benevolent. I get

22:43

to feel good about that. That's a giant

22:44

part of government for sure. That's a

22:46

giant part of what's the problem with

22:47

like liberal governments. Liberal

22:49

governments should they should get paid

22:53

based on whether or not the city does

22:57

better or worse financially than when

23:00

they were in office. If their policies

23:02

lead to uh greater domestic production

23:06

of goods and services and you know GDP

23:09

does better and everything does better

23:11

then you should get paid more. If more

23:13

real estate sales, more people are

23:14

making more money, medium medium income

23:17

raises, less homeless people, you should

23:18

get paid more. And you should get paid

23:20

less if homelessness goes up. If crime

23:22

goes up, if there's more destruction, if

23:25

there's more, you know, assaults and

23:28

home invasions, you should get paid

23:29

less. You're you're doing a shitty job.

23:32

And if you did that, I think they would

23:34

impose laws that made it safer and

23:36

healthier and made it for, you know,

23:39

better for society.

23:40

>> Yeah. and then they would just

23:41

inevitably change the ways that we track

23:43

and measure those things and pay

23:45

themselves more.

23:45

>> Well, they shouldn't have the

23:46

opportunity to do that. Then you need

23:48

some sort of an oversight that's you're

23:51

right though. You're right to be cynical

23:52

because that's what they do about

23:53

everything.

23:54

>> Someone was explaining to me yesterday

23:56

>> that

23:57

>> one of the problems with um cleaning up

24:00

fraud is that fraud is responsible for a

24:03

giant percentage of GDP. And if you you

24:06

have hundreds of billions of dollars of

24:08

fraud in this country and you eliminated

24:10

that, you actually lower GDP because you

24:15

you actually lower the amount of money

24:17

that's in circulation.

24:19

>> That's interesting. I've never thought

24:20

about that before. He was explaining to

24:22

me and I was like, "Oh my god, that is

24:24

crazy that a giant percentage of our GDP

24:27

is fraud." And if that was somehow or

24:29

another eliminated, it mean like one of

24:32

the things that they do when they raise

24:34

jobs, like they they increase GDP. We've

24:36

we've added, you know, 200,000 jobs to

24:40

the market. Well, what are those jobs?

24:42

Like what are those jobs? Are these

24:44

government jobs? Cuz the government is a

24:46

giant percentage of our GDP. Government

24:48

jobs. You know, it's it's way bigger

24:50

than it should be.

24:51

>> Way bigger. And those jobs, a lot of

24:53

them are [ __ ] and waste. A lot of

24:55

them.

24:56

>> Yeah.

24:56

>> You know, and that was some of the stuff

24:57

that was uncovered during Doge, you

24:59

know, the limited amount of access that

25:01

Doge had to it. Just just the beginning

25:04

of it where you got to see the curtain

25:06

pulled back and got to see exposure of

25:09

so many of these fraudulent supposedly

25:12

charitable organizations that were

25:13

really just money laundering. They're

25:15

really just funneling money into these

25:18

people's hands like like the homeless

25:20

thing in California.

25:21

>> Oh my goodness.

25:22

>> It's a bonkers situation where they've

25:25

spent $ 24 billion. They cannot track

25:28

it. They've tried to audit it. The the

25:30

government has vetoed these audits and

25:33

they have no idea where that $ 24

25:35

billion went and yet homelessness went

25:38

up.

25:38

>> Yeah. But you've got a giant machine

25:41

that is this homeless establishment,

25:44

this homeless industrial complex that is

25:47

being funneled money into that and that

25:49

actually aids the GDP which is kind of

25:52

crazy.

25:53

>> Yeah. I mean it it it was one of the

25:55

things my last three years in the

25:56

military um I was advising a colonel and

26:00

a twoar general and they were in charge

26:02

of all of the uh offensive cyber

26:04

development

26:06

ethical hacking offensive cyber

26:08

development. I was their technical

26:09

adviser

26:11

and one of the things I kind of learned

26:12

about government at that point was

26:15

um these systems have their own

26:18

incentive and the incentive is not the

26:20

output of their purported mission. The

26:22

incentive is the growing of the

26:24

organization and the execution of

26:26

budget. So while they're in there, you

26:29

know, I've never seen a field grade

26:30

officer get dressed down more than when

26:32

he didn't spend all of the money that he

26:34

was budgeted for for that year.

26:35

>> Isn't that crazy?

26:36

>> He would go to the Pentagon and they'd

26:38

be like, "Well, you didn't execute $300

26:40

million of OKCO of overseas contingent

26:42

operations funds here." And they would

26:45

dress them down for an hour. And what

26:46

people don't understand is if you don't

26:48

spend that money, your budget for the

26:51

next year will be lower because there's

26:53

no need to have a higher budget

26:54

>> instead of tying it to mission to say

26:56

did you achieve your mission objectives?

26:59

>> We started the year agreeing agreeing

27:00

from the president's framework, the NIP

27:03

if the national intelligence priority

27:04

framework. We wanted to achieve these

27:06

effects. What you would want to hear is

27:08

we achieved them and we saved 25%.

27:11

>> But instead it's we achieved them but we

27:13

didn't execute all of this money. Well,

27:14

you're fired. And I literally have seen

27:16

that happen. I've literally seen that

27:18

happen. And and that kind of

27:20

>> what a sick society.

27:21

>> Yeah. And that kind of shifted my

27:23

thinking in that um these systems have

27:26

their own incentive to exist and to grow

27:29

because those guys that were holding

27:30

that general officer or that '06's that

27:32

colonel's feet to the fire, they also

27:35

have an incentive to because they were

27:36

part of that trickle down and they've

27:38

got bureaucracy that surrounds them. And

27:41

if they didn't execute it, that means

27:42

they didn't execute it. And that means

27:43

they have to go to whomever. This was

27:45

during the Biden administration. I

27:47

believe Hegathth for everything we could

27:49

say has actually tightened this up quite

27:51

a bit and he's kind of rehauled the way

27:53

development works, especially on the

27:55

offensive cyber side. But they have

27:57

bureaucracies and the incentive of the

27:58

bureaucracy is to make sure that we grow

28:00

and that's it. And then then you think

28:02

about that for a minute and you're like,

28:04

well, it's no longer a question why we

28:05

have $30 trillion of of debt. 39

28:09

>> 39 trillion and then what like 150

28:12

trillion of unfunded liability. In other

28:14

words, we've promised people money for

28:16

the next 30 years. And and it's debt

28:19

that, you know, I don't see how we'll

28:21

ever escape that debt. Um and it's the

28:24

thing about it is is and and I don't

28:26

want to be pigeonholed because I'm

28:27

actually quite liberal when it comes to

28:30

my politics are are like yours in that

28:32

I'm a kind of a man without a home, but

28:34

they also change at different levels of

28:36

analysis. I'm very liberal with my

28:38

family and I'm very like communist. I

28:41

protect them. I give them everything

28:43

they need. I'm trying to give them

28:45

structure. And even in my community,

28:47

I'll help someone out out of pocket or

28:49

do something for them that's a strain on

28:51

my time or might hurt something else

28:53

because there are really no solutions.

28:54

There's just trade-offs.

28:56

>> That's supportive for the community

28:57

though. That's how people are supposed

28:58

to do charity.

28:59

>> And and I'm also very non-judgmental in

29:01

someone how they care. I don't care what

29:03

they do in their house. I don't care if

29:04

it's a Roman orgy on the weekends. Like,

29:06

be a predictable, productive person

29:09

Monday through Friday and go do your

29:10

Roman orgy on the on the weekend. I

29:12

don't care. I won't judge you. Like, I

29:14

don't I really have enough crap in my

29:16

own life.

29:17

>> As long as someone's not getting hurt.

29:18

>> Yeah. As long as no one's getting hurt,

29:19

consenting adults. Like, I I have enough

29:21

problems and I screw up enough and

29:23

people have have there's a laundry list

29:24

of things that people could say about me

29:26

how I've screwed up in my life.

29:27

>> But then as I graduate and get higher

29:29

and higher, more conservatism

29:32

takes place. Um, and and and that's a

29:35

result of just, you know, having an

29:37

engineering mindset when I'm looking at

29:39

life and understanding that it's just

29:42

not Republican or Democrat or leftist or

29:46

rightist or or liberal or or

29:48

classicalally liberal. All of these

29:50

monikers

29:52

don't work for me because they break

29:53

down at at some level of analysis,

29:56

>> right? And I think that's the problem. I

29:58

think the problem is these ideologies

29:59

that people subscribe to where you have

30:01

a predetermined pattern of thinking that

30:03

you're supposed to adopt.

30:04

>> Yes,

30:05

>> you're supposed to adopt these opinions

30:07

and some of them just don't fit. And

30:09

that's how people get pigeon that's like

30:10

on people on the left, they get

30:12

pigeonholed into weird stuff that you

30:13

can't really really justify like trans

30:16

women in sports. Like what the [ __ ] are

30:17

you doing? You know, like we're we're

30:19

you know, we're being inclusive. Like

30:20

no, you're not.

30:21

>> We're loving the borders of Ukraine

30:22

while hating our own border.

30:24

>> Yeah. [ __ ] bonkers. Yeah. It's

30:26

there's so many crazy things. There's so

30:29

many crazy things that people just adopt

30:30

that don't make any sense. And you know,

30:33

when you subscribe to an ideology, the

30:35

problem is if like if you you define

30:37

yourself as this person, I am this. I am

30:40

a hardcore right-wing blah blah,

30:42

whatever it is, you you immediately

30:44

close the door to all the very

30:46

productive and interesting things that

30:48

the other side thinks.

30:49

>> Yeah. And you're also making yourself

30:50

into a tool of propaganda. Mhm.

30:52

>> Cuz if I if someone if I meet someone

30:54

and they just say, "I'm this."

30:56

>> It's like, "Well, I could reasonably

30:58

predict everything that's going to come

31:00

out of your mouth."

31:00

>> Yeah.

31:01

>> That's not entertaining. I don't want to

31:02

have a conversation with that person. I

31:04

can't seek to learn from them cuz I

31:05

could just pick up the Communist

31:06

Manifesto or Minecom and have a pretty

31:09

good understanding of who I'm dealing

31:10

with and therefore a conversation is not

31:12

>> is not relevant. It's not needed.

31:14

>> A lot of people are afraid of social

31:16

ostracization, too. So they're they're

31:17

afraid of straying outside of the

31:20

narrative, whatever side they're

31:22

supposed to be on. And you know, some

31:24

groups are really good at making you

31:27

feel like dog [ __ ] if you don't agree

31:29

entirely with even things that don't

31:31

even make any sense. And so that's why

31:33

people go along with stuff that's

31:34

illogical, like open borders or whatever

31:36

it is.

31:37

>> Yeah.

31:37

>> They go along with things that's not in

31:39

their best interest because they're

31:40

scared. They're scared of being

31:42

ostracized. They're scared of being cast

31:44

out of the kingdom. there's, you know,

31:45

they're scared of being excommunicated.

31:47

>> Yeah. I dealt with a lot of people first

31:50

when I retired from the military and

31:52

then more recently um leading up to the

31:54

last election where you know I was

31:56

entertaining the deal of doing some work

31:58

for government um believe it or not and

32:01

cuz I'm as we talk more you'll figure

32:03

out I'm pretty anti-

32:06

institutions. I'm I'm really uh against

32:09

those types of things. But I really

32:11

felt, if you would have asked me three

32:12

years ago how I felt about the Trump

32:14

election and all of that stuff, I was

32:16

very excited because he was saying a lot

32:17

of things that I wanted someone to say.

32:19

Trump fits a pattern and this is what

32:22

people I think kind of lack when they

32:25

my whole life is built around pattern

32:27

analysis. I really enjoy patterns and

32:28

exum exuming and ex and looking into

32:31

patterns. And there's a pattern of like

32:34

a

32:36

there's you'll laugh when I say this

32:37

first part of the pattern, but then I'll

32:38

I'll I'll make it make more sense later,

32:40

but he fits the pattern. Well, first

32:43

he's a jonian and and and in in that

32:46

he's a pragmatic person the way that he

32:48

governs, which I liked, or at least I

32:50

didn't, you know, there's some things

32:52

he's done recently that I don't enjoy.

32:54

And um but he's also a an outsider or or

32:58

a savior type

33:01

Allah, you know, I don't remember the

33:03

movie, but The Magnificent Seven back in

33:05

the day. I don't remember the actor's

33:06

name. There's this group of, you know,

33:08

there's this western town, everything's

33:10

going to [ __ ] These seven guys walk in.

33:13

I think Chris Pratt remade it with

33:14

Denzel Washington or someone else. Oh,

33:16

really?

33:17

>> I think so. I I can't remember. But

33:18

there's an old one that I used to watch

33:20

from my grandpa.

33:20

>> God, there's too many movies. And uh

33:22

there's this pattern where you wouldn't

33:25

invite these guys to a dinner party. You

33:27

wouldn't want them in church on Sunday.

33:29

But when a system is so corrupt and so

33:31

horrible, you have to rely on these

33:33

types of people to come in and be a

33:35

check to the system. But then also, you

33:37

don't want them to stick around when the

33:39

system is reset. So there's a scene in

33:41

the movie where he says, uh, you know,

33:43

man, these the se these seven guys are

33:45

talking. They said, man, these people

33:46

must have really wanted us. Like it's

33:48

crazy. They must be happy we're here.

33:50

And I think it's Gary Cooper or someone

33:51

or one of these guys says looks at him

33:53

and says they're going to be even

33:54

happier when we leave. And Trump kind of

33:57

fits that narrative. Wolverine from the

33:58

X-Men would be another one who fits this

34:00

narrative. Like is he going to be at the

34:02

X-Men Christmas party? No. Right. Is he

34:05

trying to hit on Scott Gray's wife,

34:07

Cyclops? I'm a comic nerd, so I'm sorry.

34:09

Is he trying to hit on is he trying to

34:11

sleep with Cyclops's wife? Yes. Uh did

34:13

he chop a guy's head off and throw it at

34:15

a car? Yes. But we're about to go face

34:17

Galactis and we're going to need him.

34:20

And so we have to put up with all of

34:23

this other stuff because we understand

34:24

that when the system is corrupt at every

34:27

level, you need someone who's outside of

34:29

the system to come in and set the system

34:30

right. It's a western uh um pattern as

34:34

well. Other people who fit this would be

34:35

like Patton, right? Married his cousin,

34:38

>> slap soldiers who did really his cousin.

34:40

>> Yeah, I think it's his third cousin.

34:42

>> Uh

34:42

>> how many cousins removed it doesn't

34:45

become okay? I don't know.

34:46

>> Is it third, fourth?

34:48

>> If there's blood,

34:49

>> have you never met them?

34:50

>> I'm Icelandic, so I really can't say

34:51

anything, right? They literally have

34:52

apps in Iceland. Like my grandparents

34:54

are and my great-grandparents are all

34:56

from Iceland. My my they settled in

34:58

Manitoba, Gimly Manitoba, which is this

34:59

Icelandic community. And they literally

35:01

have apps in Iceland to make sure you're

35:03

not dating your cousin. So, you know,

35:06

you know, less

35:07

>> such a small community,

35:08

>> less than a million people all in one

35:10

island, you know, it's

35:11

>> so you're trying to prevent that stuff.

35:13

But anyway, um patent. Yeah. uh slap

35:15

soldiers who had tuberculosis. One of

35:18

them probably had cell shell shock. It

35:19

got in the newspaper. They wanted his

35:21

head. And thankfully the generals were

35:23

like, "No, he's the guy that we need for

35:24

the moment." Right? He he had the ivory

35:26

pistols and he dressed like not like a

35:29

general. He didn't talk like a general.

35:30

He wasn't like a um Eisenhower where he

35:33

had the the veneer of a general, but we

35:36

knew he was the only guy we could have

35:38

at the Battle of the Bulge. like the

35:39

Germans talked about him like he was

35:41

already a mythic legend in his own in

35:44

his lifetime. Um, but the p part of this

35:47

pattern that people should understand or

35:48

when they examine this pattern is it

35:50

never ends well for these anti-heroes.

35:51

They're always killed and they're always

35:53

killed or defamed in the final analysis.

35:56

So when the Magnificent 7 come in,

35:58

they'll go to another town and all get

35:59

killed. When Patton retired, he died in

36:01

some weird jeep accident. Um, you know,

36:04

Wolverine, he's the only guy left uh on

36:07

this desolate like world where the

36:09

Hulk's in charge and it's a horrible

36:11

existence. Uh, Pat or not Patton, um,

36:13

Petraeus is another one. I I you know, I

36:16

briefed Petraeus. I worked for not for

36:18

him, but for people who worked for him

36:20

in in Iraq and um, he was the guy that

36:24

got us through with the surge. But, um,

36:27

he he was really a weird guy when you

36:29

would talk to him. like you you knew

36:31

that he knew something you didn't and

36:33

that he was seeing things that you

36:34

weren't. But even for myself as being

36:37

like a chief warrant officer at that

36:38

time, a low-level technician, he would

36:40

ask questions like he got it. He didn't

36:42

act like other generals. Like other

36:43

generals would have their three things

36:44

they want to talk about, then they'd

36:45

want to get out of dodge. He would ask

36:47

questions that really had implications

36:49

and and and he is another one of these

36:52

outsiders who came in to write a system

36:53

that was not working visav Iraq in 2006.

36:58

And then what happens to him when he

36:59

leaves? He they put him in charge of the

37:01

CIA. They knew he had been screwing

37:03

around with this woman and they're like,

37:05

"Okay, we he served his function. Now he

37:07

needs to get out of dodge." And then he

37:08

now he's, you know, uh got tried for all

37:12

these things and sleeping with someone

37:14

while he wasn't married. And you know,

37:15

there's it's not a ceremonious end for

37:17

these types. I saw And

37:19

>> is that really what happened to

37:20

Petraeus? That's how he ended.

37:22

>> Yeah. He was sleeping with some girl

37:24

that was writing his book or something

37:25

along those lines.

37:26

>> That's it.

37:26

>> Uh Well, I'm not saying yeah, I'm not

37:29

saying that's the end of him. All I'm

37:31

saying is that's history will remember

37:33

the pattern is ending unfavorably.

37:36

>> You know what I'm saying?

37:37

>> And so when I examine Trump, I I I said,

37:40

"Yeah, I don't like what he says. I

37:41

wouldn't want him around my daughters. I

37:43

don't want wouldn't want him at a dinner

37:44

party." Um, but he seems to be saying

37:47

these things like he's going to reset

37:49

this system. you know, I think it was

37:51

Chappelle was on your show or another

37:52

show or someone like that where he

37:54

talked about Hillary saying uh, you

37:56

know, something about the tax loopholes

37:58

or whatever and he just hit right back

37:59

at her and said, "Well, you the people

38:01

who are funding your campaign take

38:02

advantage of those same loopholes and if

38:04

they're there, I'm going to take

38:05

advantage of them. I wouldn't be a

38:06

pragmatist if I didn't." When he started

38:08

saying stuff like that, it seemed to me

38:10

like he was going to upend this system.

38:12

Uh, the jury's out on that because I

38:14

don't know how I feel these days. We can

38:15

get into that if you need to, if we want

38:17

to, but um uh he's an outsider

38:19

personality and I thought he was going

38:21

to really reset the system and and there

38:24

are, you know, good things that are

38:25

happening. You know, if I were to grade

38:27

him, I would probably give him a C+ or a

38:28

B minus. Um he's certainly better than,

38:31

you know, what was happening under

38:32

Biden. Um I was still in the military

38:34

when Biden was in charge and it was

38:36

awful to say the least. Um you know,

38:38

>> what were the problems?

38:39

>> Oh my goodness. um books that general

38:42

officers were being told to read and

38:44

that I as an adviser were being told to

38:46

read, books like White Rage, like

38:49

understanding why your problem uh you as

38:52

a white man are a problem in the modern

38:54

day military because um this whole

38:57

thing's built on systemic racism. You

38:59

have inbuilt implicit bias that you

39:02

can't escape even if you wanted to or

39:03

you recognized it.

39:04

>> Is woke politics. Yeah, it was woke

39:06

politics and and it was um and it was uh

39:09

you know I would sit there and say you

39:11

know all of the friends all the people

39:13

that I know who have died during this

39:15

war not all of them but 80% of them and

39:17

the numbers bear this out when you look

39:18

at them they're all white guys from the

39:20

middle of the country who were on their

39:23

farms or you know not all of them 80% of

39:25

them I think the numbers bear out about

39:27

80% of them were these guys from the

39:29

Midwest or these places where they

39:31

didn't really have a lot going and they

39:33

went off to fight a war that we probably

39:34

shouldn't have

39:35

fight fighting in the first place,

39:36

especially in Iraq, and they died for

39:39

their cause. And uh and now you're

39:41

saying that those people who make up the

39:43

majority of the combat deaths are

39:44

somehow part of this problem and that

39:47

other people aren't benefiting from it.

39:49

Um I don't believe race to me is

39:52

disgusting. Even to talk about someone's

39:54

race, even, you know, on both sides of

39:56

the spectrum when they were, you know,

39:59

electing that Supreme Court justice, I

40:01

can't remember her name right now off

40:02

the top of my head just cuz I'm a little

40:03

nervous still. um she was black and they

40:06

were talking brown Jackson.

40:07

>> Yeah. They were talking about how it's

40:08

historic because she's black and Biden

40:10

had said he's going to hire a black

40:12

woman to do this job.

40:14

>> If I had worked my whole life to do

40:16

something, but now I'm only being

40:17

elevated to this next position because

40:19

of my gender and the color of my skin,

40:21

>> I would turn that job down so fast

40:23

because that's not what I want to be

40:25

known for. These are immutable

40:27

characteristics that I'm not in control

40:28

of. I wasn't I didn't choose to be born

40:30

white or with blue eyes. I didn't choose

40:32

to be born in a trailer park in the

40:34

middle of nowhere without a dad at five.

40:36

I didn't choose any of those things. I

40:38

don't see how I benefit from these

40:39

things at the individual level. And you

40:42

know, the indiv individual level of

40:43

analysis for me is really the only way

40:45

to evaluate someone for their pluses and

40:47

their minuses. And anything beyond that

40:49

to me is discriminatory on its face.

40:52

>> Of course, it's just a great way to

40:53

control people because you pit people

40:56

against each other that way. And it's

40:57

it's just an awesome way that they can

40:59

stay in control and make everybody walk

41:02

on eggshells and think that, you know,

41:04

they've victimized people in order to

41:06

get to their position and they have to

41:08

be shameful of who they are that they

41:11

had no control over.

41:13

>> It also gives people an easy rubric to

41:14

judge other people.

41:15

>> Yeah.

41:16

>> Because nothing's easy really. And it

41:18

gives some like white guy bad.

41:20

>> Mhm.

41:21

>> You know, black guy good, Chinese guy,

41:23

as long as he's not applying to the

41:24

college I want to get into, he's good,

41:26

>> right? Um, and and it gives people

41:29

people want easy answers really at the

41:31

end of the day. They want to be told the

41:33

easy rubric to navigate life because

41:34

really none of it's easy and it requires

41:36

discipline like you said before um and

41:39

thought and and and so it was that stuff

41:42

in the military. I remember getting told

41:45

in an equal opportunity briefing we were

41:47

getting um it doesn't matter what you

41:50

meant when you said what you were

41:52

saying. It only matters what the person

41:54

felt when you said it.

41:57

>> They'd said that in a military briefing.

41:58

>> This is a military equal opportunity

41:59

briefing. So, and the example they gave

42:02

was if a woman walks into the like we

42:04

worked with a lot of civilians at this

42:06

um at this uh military organization

42:08

where we're developing these um uh

42:11

offensive cyber capabilities. A lot of

42:13

civilians in there. And uh so if you

42:16

know woman X walks in today and she's

42:18

got a dress on and the thought in your

42:19

head is I'd like to get my wife that

42:21

dress or something like it or find out

42:23

where she bought it and you just say

42:25

that's a nice dress. Anyway, here's the

42:27

TPS reports. If she heard

42:30

something sexual or didn't like the

42:32

connotation or whatever, there's going

42:34

to be an investigation. You're going to

42:36

be pulled out of that office. This is

42:39

all going to happen despite what you

42:40

meant. So the idea probably was good. We

42:43

want to prevent sexual harassment inside

42:46

of the office. Um,

42:47

>> but it was weaponized.

42:48

>> But but it was weaponized and it was

42:50

carried out in a way where it's only

42:51

about how people feel and not what a

42:53

reasonable person standard would be in a

42:55

particular situation. And from the time

42:57

I joined the military until that time,

43:00

we had been at war. My entire time in

43:01

the military, we were at war. Um, I

43:04

deployed throughout my career. And I I

43:06

wouldn't say that I was a war horse. I

43:08

was not a long tabber. I was not a cool

43:09

guy kicking indoors. It was my job with

43:12

the as the guy with, you know, tape over

43:13

his glasses to point out the door for

43:16

someone else and say bad guys in there.

43:18

Um, so I was not, you know, a super

43:20

badass in that regard. I was a nerd for

43:22

super badasses and um, but we also all

43:26

engaged in gallows humor and we would,

43:28

you know, the jokes and stuff. Even

43:31

someone, even someone who had recently

43:33

died, we would make a joke about. It's

43:35

because you have this tremendous

43:37

uh pressure and comedy is the relief

43:40

valve for that in a lot of ways. Yeah,

43:42

of course. and but then someone would

43:44

overhear that joke or something and now

43:46

you're looking down the barrel of a 156

43:48

which is a military investigation

43:51

and all of these things that could

43:53

permanently impact your life in a way

43:54

and give you a scarlet letter to where

43:57

you could never be employed again or do

43:58

anything ever again because you were

44:01

simply trying to relieve some pressure

44:03

or you were trying to find what out

44:04

where to buy your wife at the next dress

44:07

and now your life's being ruined and I

44:08

know guys who suffered under that sword

44:10

like I wouldn't name them but I know

44:11

guys who you know their career met a

44:15

terminal end because of a dumb joke or

44:18

something. It's like you can't be

44:19

expected to go out and shoot people in

44:20

the face and then be sensitive to

44:23

someone's feelings an hour later,

44:25

>> right?

44:25

>> It's just it doesn't it does not work.

44:27

Now, should you talk to that guy and

44:29

say, "Hey, you know, you made woman X

44:30

feel so be more cognizant of that

44:33

whenever you're around her in the

44:34

future."

44:34

>> Well, you should also have a rational

44:36

discussion with the woman. Said, "What

44:38

did he ask you?"

44:39

>> He said, "Where did you get that dress?

44:40

It's very lovely. I'd like to get one

44:43

for my wife. Why were you upset at that?

44:45

Like, does this is this rational? Like,

44:48

how you can't be in an office if you're

44:51

that sensitive? Like, it's one thing if

44:53

the guy said, "I'd like to get you out

44:54

of that dress." Well, now we're now in a

44:57

different world.

44:58

>> 100%. 100%.

44:59

>> Right.

44:59

>> But if someone says, "You look great.

45:01

>> You know, have you lost weight? You look

45:03

fantastic." That's the that's a

45:05

compliment.

45:06

>> And if someone gets upset, I felt

45:07

sexually objectified. I felt harassed.

45:10

Like, okay, he just said you look great.

45:12

>> Yeah,

45:13

>> that's it. It's not you look great. I'd

45:15

like to get you naked. Now we've crossed

45:17

the Rubicon. Right now we're into

45:18

>> for sure. For sure.

45:20

>> But just you look great or I like your

45:22

dress.

45:23

>> That's like if you said that to a man

45:25

like, "Hey, great suit." And he's like,

45:27

"I need to file a complaint."

45:29

>> Yeah.

45:29

>> I need to file a complaint.

45:30

>> Yeah. You've trimmed up, Joe. You're

45:31

looking

45:32

>> great, Bill. Like, oh my god, I'm being

45:34

harassed. I need to like complaint.

45:36

>> That would have worked during the Biden

45:38

administration.

45:38

>> That is [ __ ] crazy. that would have

45:40

worked.

45:40

>> That's so crazy.

45:41

>> And the other thing that they were doing

45:42

in this briefing, which is where I kind

45:43

of, you know, the last couple years of

45:46

my military career, I got in trouble a

45:47

couple of times, or I should say called

45:48

down. I was a senior C. I was a CW4. I

45:52

was one rank from the top. I was

45:53

advising two star generals, colonels,

45:56

um, on very important matters. I wasn't

45:58

high. I was a I wasn't high in the in

46:00

the dominance hierarchy, but I was

46:02

adjacent to people who were as an

46:04

adviser. and um uh the the amount of in

46:11

this briefing in particular um they had

46:13

gotten into uh you know it's bad that

46:16

there are so many white people uh this

46:20

I'm doing high points here but we need

46:22

more diversity. I was part of a accepted

46:24

career program that they were starting

46:25

to call like the old white boys network

46:28

because most of the people so the

46:30

requirements for for this network were

46:32

you had to speak a couple languages, you

46:34

needed an engineering degree or some

46:36

kind of demonstrated engineering

46:37

background. Uh you had to have deployed

46:41

um they wanted you to speak the language

46:43

very well. They wanted you to be able to

46:45

go through these engineering courses,

46:47

these other things.

46:49

And and what happens naturally is you

46:51

now need people who are interested in

46:53

engineering. All right? So you've got

46:55

somebody who's maybe more constrained in

46:57

their thinking. You need somebody who

46:59

speaks languages. Well, now they also

47:01

need to be kind of um you know speak

47:04

French, speak Russian, whatever it was.

47:06

So they had to have studied or lived in

47:08

an area and done this. And they need to

47:10

be able to go through these crazy

47:11

tactical and strateg strategic types of

47:13

courses. By virtue of those things,

47:16

you're going to get men and and there

47:18

are were lots of women, but then

47:20

there'll be more white men. And it's

47:22

it's not because the po the pool

47:24

presented itself that way. Now you have

47:26

to extract from that pool. And so in

47:29

this briefing when they were talking

47:30

about like the old white boys network or

47:32

how we need to change things, I said,

47:34

you know, do you realize that most men

47:37

are have more in common um than most

47:39

women? Or like if there's a if if if I

47:42

if I say I need more diversity in a

47:44

particular room, if you said diversity

47:46

of thought, I'd be fine with that. But

47:48

but Joe and you know random black guy in

47:52

the in the same program in the same

47:54

office have far more in common than the

47:56

white woman. But if all but what you're

47:59

saying is these people need to have all

48:01

separate different colors and different

48:03

and different like all of this needs to

48:05

be this way. It's going to naturally

48:07

present itself that way because men in

48:09

the military generally are disagreeable.

48:11

Men in the military who like engineering

48:13

are generally hyper disagreeable. and

48:16

and the the only difference between

48:18

these two people is the pigment of their

48:19

skin. So this fake diversity quota that

48:22

they're putting on top of us doesn't

48:24

achieve anything other than giving some

48:26

officer a bullet on their OEER. And you

48:29

know I got pulled into the office

48:30

afterward. I said way more than that,

48:32

but essentially afterwards they were

48:33

like, "Hey chief, you can't uh you can't

48:35

say that in those briefings like the way

48:37

that you were getting animated in there

48:38

and what you're saying what you're doing

48:39

like uh yeah, this is not going to fly."

48:43

And this was like 2018 or 2019 or

48:45

something.

48:46

>> Just being rational.

48:46

>> Yeah. Just trying to be rational and say

48:48

that there's there's more difference in

48:50

groups than there is between groups. And

48:53

that the similarities in the way that

48:54

things stack up, you recruit from a pool

48:57

of volunteers and candidates. If I'm

48:59

recruiting from a pool of volunteers and

49:01

candidates who are 80% male and white, I

49:03

have to expect that the selected

49:05

individuals are going to be a male and

49:08

white. The majority of people who join

49:10

the military, I don't control this. I'm

49:12

just as an engineer, I'm looking at

49:14

statistics.

49:15

>> Also, if you want a highly functional,

49:16

productive group, it's got to be based

49:18

on meritocracy.

49:19

>> Yeah, for sure. For sure.

49:21

>> Anything other than that is literally a

49:23

threat to national security.

49:24

>> Yeah. You're you're you're denigrating

49:26

lethality.

49:26

>> Yeah.

49:27

>> The role of the army is to deter war

49:29

through exuding superior military

49:32

fighting and technology. And when

49:34

deterrence fails to win, that's it. It

49:38

those are the those are the two things

49:39

that we need to do with our military. It

49:41

needs to look like the guy in the

49:42

playground who you would not muck about

49:44

with and if you were to muck with him,

49:45

he will beat you senseless. That's it.

49:48

Now whether or not we should be using

49:50

that all the time or how we use it or

49:51

that's a separate question. But the

49:53

entity itself needs to comport itself in

49:56

this way. Otherwise, you are endangering

49:58

this this truly special experiment which

50:01

at least in its beginnings valued the

50:04

individual. It valued individual rights

50:07

and states rights and it and it and and

50:09

and the and the founders and this was

50:11

another thing I said in that briefing

50:13

was the founders knew yes they were all

50:16

slaveholders but they knew that the

50:18

constitution and the bill of rights and

50:19

the declaration of independence would

50:21

eventually lead to a system where we had

50:24

to acknowledge these people as people

50:26

and we fought a civil war where a

50:29

million white dudes died to see this

50:32

experiment through the scaffolding was

50:34

there. You have to look at the things

50:36

the zeitgeist of the time if they had

50:38

just said nope everyone's going to be

50:40

sla free there will be no slaves you

50:43

would have never gotten ratification

50:44

through the southern states but they

50:46

knew that there were and when you read

50:47

the federalist papers they knew that

50:48

they were erecting this system and when

50:51

you look at Thomas Jefferson and some of

50:52

these other great thinkers who yes he

50:54

owned slaves I get it um they knew what

50:57

they were building and they knew that

50:58

what what would it ultimately terminate

51:00

in and then we had a civil war where we

51:02

destroyed our country from inside to see

51:06

this dream come about and now we're just

51:08

going to all go back and say they're all

51:09

slave owners. Like I know this has all

51:11

been said here a million times, but this

51:13

stuff animates me because it's built

51:14

with blood and treasure. Well, it's also

51:16

you can't judge people from the past

51:19

based on the standards of the present.

51:21

>> For sure

51:21

>> because culture changes, people

51:24

understand things better. We have a more

51:27

a much greater recognition of what was

51:30

wrong with things a 100 years ago, 200

51:34

years ago. And I'm sure in the future

51:36

we're going to look back on today with

51:38

the same lens. There's It just always

51:41

works that way.

51:41

>> Did you know Joe had a gas-powered car?

51:43

>> Exactly. That kind of stuff. Yeah.

51:45

>> Did you know that

51:46

>> you consumed more, you flew more? You

51:48

ate more meat? You did whatever you did.

51:51

You You were a problem.

51:52

>> He was a problem. Yeah. And and now why

51:54

would we ever like I'm voting to get rid

51:56

of the Joe Rogan experience from the

51:57

National Archives because you drove a

51:59

gas car.

52:01

>> Yeah.

52:01

>> You know what I mean? Like someone, you

52:02

know, stores your stuff for profoundity

52:04

sake for the future to hear about this.

52:06

>> You know, I I I've always loved your

52:09

podcast, Joe. And it was because you're

52:11

a genuinely curious person, and I'm not

52:13

kissing your ass right now.

52:15

>> You're a genuinely curious person that

52:17

was saying things that were not in the

52:19

current zeitgeist at the time, and you

52:21

refused to apologize for it. And it it

52:23

led it, you know, led to a lot of great

52:25

things, but it led to the an updating of

52:28

the system. And you did it with

52:29

dialogue, with the D logos, with, you

52:31

know, two people trying to learn things

52:33

about each other. And it led to an

52:35

updating of a system. I think it's very

52:37

important for culture to have free and

52:39

open dialogue so we can update our

52:40

system. So bad ideas can die so we don't

52:43

have to die instead of our bad ideas.

52:45

>> Yeah.

52:45

>> Because if I can't express a bad idea, I

52:47

have to act it out.

52:48

>> And if I act out the bad idea, it could

52:50

kill me. and the celebration of good

52:52

ideas

52:53

>> and and the celebration of good ideas.

52:55

And uh it's just really there's just

52:58

been such a weird inversion in politics

53:00

where the free hippie loving liberals of

53:04

yester year are now the ones telling you

53:06

what words you can use. There are no

53:08

borders. All of these crazy things. Um

53:11

and I always say to people, I said it to

53:13

Andy some my last podcast with him. I'm

53:16

like a 1996 Bill Clinton Democrat. If

53:19

you go watch his State of the Union and

53:21

he talks about lowering debt, getting

53:23

out of debt, actually working with Nuke

53:25

Gingrich to get out of debt,

53:27

>> um securing the borders, making work and

53:30

education freely accessible.

53:32

>> Um I'm voting for that guy.

53:34

>> I know. Isn't it crazy that I mean

53:36

that's why the problem of labels doesn't

53:38

work, ideological labels, because if you

53:42

go back far enough and look at Clinton

53:44

for example, he's one of the best ones

53:46

and by the way did balance the budget.

53:47

>> Yeah, he did. He actually did.

53:48

>> We had a surplus when he left office.

53:50

Amazing.

53:51

>> Did a [ __ ] amazing job. So he got his

53:53

dick sucked. Yeah. Who didn't back then?

53:56

That's the other thing. Judging people

53:57

by the standards of the past, you know,

54:00

JFK doesn't look so good in the Me Too

54:03

movement. You know, you know, I mean, he

54:04

would have got cancelled.

54:06

>> It's like you you have to recognize that

54:08

those this ideological bubble that we

54:11

find ourselves in left versus right,

54:13

Bill Clinton does not fit in that. Bill

54:15

Clinton is securely on the right in

54:18

terms of, you know, 1996 standards

54:21

applied to today.

54:22

>> He would never want to hear that.

54:23

>> No, he would never want to hear that

54:24

because he's kind of shifted with the

54:26

zeitgeist because that's what you kind

54:28

of have to do if you want to stay in

54:29

your party and be protected by your

54:31

party.

54:31

>> Yes.

54:32

>> You know, but he's essentially he had a

54:35

lot of the I mean, we've talked about

54:36

this before. We've played clips of uh

54:38

Hillary Clinton from 2008 and she's more

54:41

MAGA than MAGA. I know. You know, her

54:43

her take on the border was like hardcore

54:47

was hardcore. If you've been convicted

54:49

of a crime, get out. You know, if you

54:51

stay here, pay a stiff penalty and you

54:53

have to get in line and you have to

54:54

learn English and everybody cheers.

54:56

>> Yeah.

54:57

>> Like that is a hardcore right-wing 2026

55:00

perspective.

55:00

>> Obama did it too in 2012.

55:02

>> Absolutely. And Obama deported more

55:04

people than Trump did.

55:05

>> Yes, exactly.

55:06

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to learn more. And and it's just I'm not

55:58

saying like my thought is I'm always

56:00

updating I'm always updating my systems.

56:02

I'm always getting told things. I always

56:05

have a p preescribed way of looking at

56:08

the world that I'll have a good

56:09

conversation with someone. I'll update

56:11

my system. But generally my principles

56:13

are in place. And when you watch these

56:16

people who get in their 30s, 40s, 50s,

56:17

and 60s and their core foundational

56:20

principles are changing, it really

56:22

should give you cause for concern

56:24

>> because like you were saying this at

56:26

this time and now you're saying this at

56:27

that time. It's like generally my rubric

56:30

that I don't think will change about

56:31

myself is I'm fervently for the

56:34

individual and I'm fervently for truth

56:37

and and that we can that the that the

56:39

world you you should measure it and look

56:42

at not what your intentions are but what

56:44

the outcomes are and and then evaluate

56:46

the system and how it scales based on

56:48

those outcomes. Those are that's

56:50

principally if you I try to live that

56:53

standard up to myself. I fall fall short

56:55

of that standard all the time, but I try

56:56

being a human.

56:57

>> I try to live by that standard. And I I

56:59

feel like that will always be me even

57:01

into my 90s.

57:02

>> Like unless something goes horribly

57:04

wrong. Right.

57:04

>> Right. Right. And and I've pretty much

57:07

been here since, you know, the past

57:08

seven or eight years or so. Like even

57:10

into my 30s, I wasn't quite sure who I

57:13

was um as a human. And uh but I'm I'm

57:16

pretty, you know, steadfast in that. and

57:20

the amount of opportunities and the

57:22

amount of goodness in my life and my

57:24

children and and my home and the things

57:27

I've been able to do have really been

57:29

born out of that last seven years of the

57:32

truth's going to be the top of the of

57:34

the decision matrix for me, the top of

57:36

the hierarchy for me. I'm gonna try not

57:38

to cut corners whenever I can and help

57:41

good people around me and and and the

57:44

truth is the way that I'll organize and

57:46

function myself in life and that I will

57:48

try to only judge people as individuals

57:51

and the world you know these are

57:53

Christ's teachings from 2,000 years ago

57:55

and but the world for me has just opened

57:58

up in a way that I could have never

58:00

predicted using a very simple rubric.

58:03

It's not easy, but it's simple. And if

58:06

more people just took those, and this

58:08

isn't me. I didn't come up with this.

58:09

This is the result of, you know,

58:12

watching a bunch of experiments go bad.

58:14

But if people just adopted that very

58:16

simple thing and just tried it for 3

58:17

months, you'll feel better about

58:19

yourself. You'll feel better about the

58:20

world. You feel better about the people

58:22

approximately around you. It might make

58:24

you hate the government more.

58:25

>> Yeah.

58:26

>> But uh um

58:27

>> but I don't think if you don't hate the

58:29

government, I think you're not paying

58:30

attention.

58:31

>> Yeah. Yeah. For sure. I mean,

58:33

>> when you were working in cyber defense,

58:36

like what what

58:37

>> cyber offense,

58:37

>> cyber offense, what was the the primary

58:40

function? Like what did you do?

58:42

>> Um, so in the beginning, it it I I have

58:46

no short answers and I apologize.

58:48

>> In the beginning,

58:49

>> I don't like short answers.

58:50

>> Yeah. I just I always feel like I'm

58:52

>> I like a good long answer. Don't worry

58:54

about that.

58:54

>> Okay. When I joined the military, I was

58:56

in signals intelligence. Um, and

58:59

essentially learning the ins and outs of

59:00

radars, how radars work, what they do,

59:04

um, how they function.

59:05

>> Did you guys ever see any weird [ __ ]

59:07

like UFO [ __ ]

59:08

>> I I wish I had.

59:10

>> I really do.

59:11

>> I wish you had too.

59:12

>> Yeah, I really do. Um, I was more in the

59:14

signals intelligence side of the house.

59:16

um focusing first on electronic signals

59:18

or emanations from radars, mapping them

59:21

so that you know if we were going to go

59:23

do the ground invasion and there was

59:25

going to be some air support going in

59:26

first and blowing [ __ ] up, we would tell

59:28

them, "Hey, there's a man packable SA7

59:30

here, there's a SA10 here, there's this

59:32

here, there's there." And then telling

59:33

these pilots so they didn't get shot out

59:35

of the sky.

59:36

>> Um quickly when the war kicked off that

59:39

became irrelevant because there was no,

59:41

you know, surfacetoair missiles,

59:42

surfacetos surface missiles in Iraq. We

59:44

had knocked them all out in the first

59:46

few weeks. So then it shifted to

59:48

communications intelligence. So I kind

59:50

of retrained on communications

59:51

intelligence and that was at that time

59:53

off of cell phones, off of uh pushto

59:56

talk radios, repeaters, um long haul

59:59

networks, terrestrial networks,

60:01

extraterrestrial networks. And what I

60:02

mean by that is stuff satellites in the

60:04

sky um and doing analysis on those to

60:07

try to inform the the the what we call

60:10

the common operating picture of the

60:12

battlefield for a combatant commander.

60:14

So, command commander wants to know

60:15

where the bad guys are, what they're

60:16

doing, what they're saying. To the event

60:18

to the amount that we could, my job was

60:19

to um come up with solutions and

60:22

conduct, you know, um passive and active

60:26

um signals analysis on these things and

60:28

then inform the commander so that we

60:30

could, you know, uh mitigate risk. It

60:32

was all about mitigation of risk. Um

60:35

from this is 2008 or so. I've been doing

60:37

this for about seven years, eight years.

60:40

And um from there it shifted to the

60:42

phones getting smart and essentially it

60:44

went from you walking around with a 2G

60:46

phone or a 3G phone that had limited

60:49

comput capability to now there's robust

60:52

comput capability with the advent of

60:54

like the iPhone and now it's like well

60:56

now we've got to get after guys who are

60:57

you know essentially walking around with

60:59

a computer we could never have

61:00

envisioned 20 years ago in their pocket

61:02

with all this capability cuz the

61:04

military and our and our our forces that

61:07

we're fighting against it all comes down

61:09

to our ability to shoot, move, and

61:10

communicate. Communication being the

61:12

part that I was focused on. So, as the

61:14

advent of the iPhone and those things

61:15

came out, the army realized we didn't

61:17

have a a computer network operations

61:19

MOS. We didn't have a um offensive um

61:22

cyber component. We didn't have a

61:24

defensive cyber component. So, we kind

61:26

of I was there for at the ground floor

61:27

when we were building out these new

61:28

MOS's now that are all over the

61:30

military. But, at that time, there was a

61:32

a thought going into, you know, we need

61:35

to have people who know how to be oned

61:36

operators. ethical hacking. As

61:39

paradoxical as that sounds, that's how

61:41

the lawyers called it that. So, it's

61:43

hacking at the end of the day, but

61:44

ethical hacking because you've got the

61:45

backing of the US government. And so, we

61:48

set up that framework and really started

61:50

launching into operations, you know,

61:52

2006 78 all the way into my last

61:56

deployment in 2017 or 17. It was all

62:00

focused on computer network operations

62:02

and how they lash up with terrestrial

62:04

networks. How do we exploit all of that?

62:07

um was one facet of my job and um uh

62:11

your question was how did I

62:13

>> get into all of that and that that was

62:14

that that was the um

62:15

>> how do you get into it and what was what

62:17

what did what was like what was the

62:18

operational aspect of it like how did

62:20

you actually what did you do

62:23

>> uh going so you know there's there's

62:25

I'll stick to terms that are more um

62:28

generally understood by the public but

62:30

learning how to do things like war

62:31

driving um collecting on networks Wi-Fi

62:34

you know endpoints um cell phones, uh

62:38

understanding the ins and outs of them,

62:39

understanding how to do forensic

62:41

analysis of them. So after there was an

62:43

operation and a bunch of gorillas have

62:45

been sent sent in to kill the bad guy,

62:47

um we could derive maximum intelligence

62:50

value from the hand from the handset to

62:52

plan other operations. Um and so you

62:56

know it would be passive um monitoring

62:59

of networks to inform the intelligence

63:01

picture which would lead to either

63:04

combat operations or active computer

63:07

network operations where now it's like

63:09

well there's you know a uh I don't know

63:12

a

63:14

Iraqi or an Afghani router that hasn't

63:17

been patched in 3 years and we think we

63:19

can either write or find a zero day

63:21

which is just an exploit of those

63:23

routers.

63:24

where um we can muck with their router

63:28

in a way where they think they're

63:29

getting a good information and they're

63:30

not or they're or erecting other things

63:35

um to uh mitigate risk for the

63:38

commander. And so um that really you

63:41

know exploded at that point and between

63:43

that and human intelligence which is

63:45

kind of the um the actual gathering of

63:48

intelligence from other people. You know

63:50

you would call it spy or you know James

63:52

Bond but that's James Bond was a

63:53

horrible spy. Um was he

63:56

>> I mean yeah you know your job is to

63:57

remain u anonymous and you're walking

64:00

into a casino and there's Goldfinger

64:02

calling you by your first and last name.

64:04

It's not a great look. um you know

64:07

generally you don't want to be sleeping

64:09

with your sources or uh um you know

64:12

using your real name or whatever. So

64:14

human intelligence and then my focus for

64:16

the last 10 years was how does signals

64:18

intelligence computer network operations

64:21

um become a force multiplier for people

64:23

conducting overt and clandestine

64:25

operations um throughout the theater at

64:28

that time. uh my you know my deployments

64:30

and my time was spent in Iraq,

64:32

Afghanistan, um Africa, Northern Africa,

64:36

and then the a lot of people don't know

64:37

it, but we were in active combat

64:38

operations in the southern Philippines

64:40

as well for uh a fair amount of time. I

64:43

want to maybe say seven or 10 years. We

64:44

were doing combat operations. When was

64:46

this?

64:46

>> In the southern Philippines. My first

64:48

deployment to the cell um um southern

64:50

Philippines was uh 2007.

64:54

>> Who were we doing operations against? So

64:57

um there were terrorist elements down

64:59

there that were traveling back and forth

65:01

from Pakistan and Afghanistan and there

65:04

was a terrorist organization down there

65:06

called the Abu Sai group and uh there

65:08

were other ones as well. Jama Islamia I

65:11

think was the name of the other one and

65:13

uh they were conducting their own

65:15

terrorist anti-Christian operations in

65:17

the southern part of the Philippines.

65:18

And the in the southern part of the

65:19

Philippines I don't can I say it? Can I

65:21

say the word?

65:21

>> What do you mean

65:22

>> Jamie? Can you pull up a map of the

65:23

Philippines? Can you pull it up? Oh, say

65:26

that term. Yeah, pull it up. Been

65:28

listening to it forever. Uh, so there's

65:30

what's called the autonomous region of

65:32

Muslim Minina, which is the southern

65:34

part from like a place called Zambwanga

65:36

down to Hulu or Holo Island. Um, and

65:39

there's a it's a funny joke because if

65:42

you zoom into Zambanga, which is

65:44

>> God, look how many islands.

65:45

>> I know. Go down to the south there. You

65:47

see Zambbo? Go down right there. Right.

65:49

Right. Zoom right there on that island.

65:51

Now move to Sorry. Now move to the

65:53

southwest.

65:55

You see that penis?

65:58

>> At the tip of that penis is called

65:59

zambanga.

66:00

>> All of our combat operations. Now, if

66:02

you zoom out a little bit more and and

66:05

pan more south

66:07

and zoom out just a little bit more so

66:08

the joke hits all that sperm south of

66:12

the tip of the uh the Zambwanga city,

66:15

this there are terrorist operations in

66:17

here. Now, if you go to that main island

66:18

called Sulu,

66:20

>> there's Holo Island. That's where I was

66:23

on this tiny island out in the middle of

66:24

nowhere. And on that there's a mountain.

66:27

>> That's all the Philippines.

66:28

>> Well, no. I mean, this is all the

66:29

Philippines down here. Yeah. Wow.

66:31

>> So, this is called There's a mountain in

66:32

there. I think it was called Mount

66:33

Tumatalk or something like that on the

66:36

near on the eastern part of the island

66:37

called Luke. It's called Luke. Yeah. So,

66:39

there's mountains. There's a mountainous

66:41

region there. There are a bunch of

66:42

terrorists up there. They were killing

66:44

people in the area, conducting bombings.

66:46

They were getting trained. Um, in fact,

66:48

there was a guy and I believe I'm going

66:49

to get his name wrong perhaps, but I

66:52

believe his name it was either Insulon

66:54

Haplan

66:55

or oh, it was Jamar Pekch. Jamaal PCH.

66:59

He was actually arrested outside of

67:01

Osama bin Laden's compound the day after

67:02

he was killed. We were trying to kill

67:04

him on that island or in and around that

67:06

island is where we were trying to find

67:07

him and kill him. Uh, so they're

67:09

terrorist facilitators. Um, they did the

67:11

USS Coal bombing was

67:14

>> zoom back out. I want to see the

67:15

Philippines one more time. like all the

67:16

islands when you zoom all the way out.

67:19

It's so nuts how many islands there are.

67:22

>> Yeah. So up north up north of Manila is

67:24

mostly the Christian um population and

67:27

as you get down south it's the

67:28

autonomous region of Muslim men now

67:31

>> and that is all of where these terrorist

67:32

operations were happening. Um and I

67:35

believe that mostly pulled out of there.

67:37

There might be still some people in

67:38

Zambwanga. I'm not sure anymore cuz it's

67:40

been 5 years four years since I retired.

67:44

But um yeah, we were doing

67:45

counterinsurgency operations down there

67:46

and guys died down there and there were

67:48

combat operations and uh I was out there

67:52

um I was in a tactical military

67:54

intelligence battalion and I was

67:55

attached to the first special forces

67:56

group and we were down there a couple of

67:58

times and uh a lot of people don't even

68:00

know about it. So

68:01

>> yeah, I never heard about it.

68:03

>> Yeah. So uh anyway, um

68:05

>> just I'm sorry,

68:07

but I'm so stunned at how many islands

68:09

are in the Philippines, how spread out

68:11

it is.

68:11

>> Yeah, it's it's insane. And the the the

68:14

thing about it is is I'd go to all of

68:16

these little outposts in these out

68:17

islands. We were always debriefing these

68:19

guys and I'm going to get these terms

68:21

wrong, so I'm sure there'll be people in

68:22

the comments, but I think they were

68:24

called bonger eyes or something like

68:25

that, but they were like these mayors of

68:27

each one of these little islands. And

68:29

there would be terrorists in and around

68:31

those areas, and we'd try to make

68:32

friends with these guys so they give us

68:33

some information. Um, and every one of

68:36

those places was absolutely beautiful.

68:38

Like you'd go there and be like, "Man,

68:40

Hilton could turn this into something in

68:41

a short order, right?"

68:43

>> You know, when you're out of these

68:44

places, beautiful beach, beautiful, lush

68:46

jungles, the best swimming water.

68:48

>> Nicest people, too.

68:49

>> Oh, Filipino people are some of my

68:52

favorite people, man. Like, you want to

68:53

talk the guys that we worked with out

68:55

there. They're uh scout I think they're

68:57

called scout sniper, scout rangers, and

68:59

they were special, I think they were

69:00

like their special forces. We go to the

69:02

range with these guys and show them

69:03

stuff and they're are the most um ride

69:06

or die type of guys you'll ever meet in

69:08

your life. Like you know so and so said

69:10

this about you last weekend. I could

69:12

kill them. It's like no dude it's cool.

69:13

It's like don't worry about it. Like

69:15

>> fun fact there's some of the best pool

69:16

players on earth too.

69:17

>> Oh really?

69:18

>> Great. Some of the greatest pool players

69:19

of all time came out of the

69:20

>> They're just great people. I mean I just

69:22

the people down there were fantastic.

69:24

And it was awful because those guys

69:25

would be bombing churches, Christian

69:27

churches and stuff like that. and uh

69:29

they're doing counter operate like I

69:31

said counter um um intelligence

69:34

operations out there doing intelligence

69:35

operations collection to inform that

69:37

battle picture but those guys had direct

69:39

links with Osama bin Laden and other

69:41

people. Um I had no idea.

69:42

>> Yeah. Right after we like I said I think

69:44

it was I think if you look it up I think

69:46

his name is um Pekk P A T P A T E K. And

69:51

he was arrested outside of Osama bin

69:53

Laden's compound and we had been chasing

69:54

him in the Philippines.

69:55

>> Wow.

69:56

>> Cuz we thought he was still down there.

69:57

Um, there was another guy that we I

69:59

believe we killed him. His name was

70:00

Albader Perod.

70:02

Um, but yeah, my job was not I always

70:05

say this on podcasts because the veteran

70:06

community is wild right now. They love

70:09

to cut each other down right now.

70:10

There's something weird going on where

70:12

like obviously lying Yeah. call the

70:14

people out. I prefer to call people out

70:16

face to face.

70:18

>> Um, but uh I always make sure people

70:20

know I was not a cool guy. Like

70:22

sometimes I got to dress like one, you

70:24

know, for a few years I didn't wear any

70:25

uniforms and I got to grow my beard out

70:27

and act like a cool guy. But I was

70:29

really a nerd for cool guys. I've

70:30

literally got pictures of myself down in

70:33

the in the holo or in Afghanistan or

70:35

anywhere else and tape around my glasses

70:37

and, you know, Pez dispenser and my

70:40

radio and collection equipment looking

70:42

like a true blue American nerd. But I

70:45

was not the guy who kicked the door in.

70:46

I was always the guy pointed the door

70:48

out. So I'd be safe in the humvey in the

70:50

back, you know, eat an MRE and somebody

70:51

that looked like another gorilla, you

70:53

know, like an Andy Stump or Tim Kennedy

70:55

or someone like that be like, "Is that

70:57

the house?" Be like, "Pretty sure that's

70:58

the house. You guys might want to be

71:00

safe, but go ahead. I'll be in the

71:01

Humvey. I'll be out here or I'll be in

71:03

an airplane above, you know." Um and uh

71:06

yeah, it was it was being born in North

71:09

Dakota and and uh you know my mother

71:12

single mother after she left that first

71:14

guy um trailer house in the middle of

71:18

this little town called Cavalere, North

71:19

Dakota. I had no options. I was a

71:21

horrible student. And uh what did

71:24

>> That's crazy that you're so smart, but

71:25

you were a horrible student.

71:26

>> I wouldn't Yeah, I wouldn't I'd call

71:27

myself curious before. I'd call myself

71:29

smart. But um uh you know my mother you

71:33

know I I don't know if you remember you

71:35

would remember this but maybe other

71:36

people my age you know you get these

71:39

scholastic book order forms that you'd

71:41

bring home from school and you could

71:42

order books.

71:43

>> There'd always be on the back page there

71:45

would always be like little cool stuff

71:46

like you could get like you know a pair

71:49

of gloves or a hat or something. Anyway,

71:51

one time there was a um a coil radio

71:54

that you could order where with an

71:55

earpiece and you put this coil radio

71:57

together and with an earpiece, no

71:58

battery. It was just the electromagnetic

72:01

radiation would would would um activate

72:04

the coil and the coil would you could

72:06

listen to radio chatter

72:08

>> really with no battery?

72:09

>> Yeah. Yeah. Just tiny little little

72:11

radio.

72:11

>> How did it what was the power? the

72:13

electromagnetic radiation and you would

72:15

just kind of like a record like you know

72:18

how you co you hit a record

72:20

>> electromagnetic radiation would hit the

72:22

coil and the coil would feed up to an

72:24

amplifier or up to an earpiece and the

72:26

earpiece you could hear chatter and you

72:27

could hear

72:28

>> Did the earpiece have a battery?

72:29

>> No, I don't think anything had a battery

72:30

on it at the Yeah, I think it was just a

72:33

>> Wow.

72:33

>> I could be mistaken, but I don't believe

72:35

there was

72:35

>> powered by electromagnetic radiation.

72:38

>> Yeah, I mean you can look it up, Jamie,

72:39

if you want. Sorry to say that again,

72:41

but

72:41

>> tighten that thing down. That thing's

72:43

driving me crazy.

72:44

>> Yeah. Sorry. This thing like like here

72:45

or here?

72:46

>> Right here. Look at my finger.

72:47

>> It's right here.

72:48

>> Yeah. I've been meaning to do that like

72:50

literally when everybody uses this

72:51

[ __ ] thing. It's wobbling around

72:53

ready to fall off.

72:54

>> Yeah. But if you look up coil coil radio

72:56

with small earpiece. I could be wrong. I

72:58

don't remember there being a battery on

72:59

it.

72:59

>> Electromagnetic radiation powered.

73:02

That's bananas.

73:03

>> Yeah. So kind of like a same thing with

73:05

like, you know, not at the same wattage,

73:06

but a microwave, right? Um sends power

73:09

through the air,

73:09

>> right? But it uses DC,

73:11

>> but it uses power in order to send it.

73:13

>> Yeah. But I I could be wrong. But um at

73:16

any rate, that was the first time I got

73:17

a radio and I was hearing things and I'd

73:20

put it together and I'm listening to

73:22

things and

73:22

>> like what kind of things?

73:23

>> Uh HF radio, VHF radio, people talking,

73:27

that type of stuff. And um it was just

73:30

and then I found out how to get an

73:31

antenna to make the antenna larger and

73:33

started ordering auxiliary pieces for

73:35

it. And then really changed me was my

73:38

mother let me get a my mother and I

73:40

would clean houses. She was a waitress

73:42

but we also would go around and clean

73:43

houses and there was a lawyer that we

73:44

worked for. His name was Phil Culp and

73:47

um he had a old 286SX IBM and uh it was

73:52

just sitting in his basement and I told

73:54

my mom I was like hey if I clean for

73:55

like a month can I have that computer?

73:57

Like he doesn't use it. He's got a new

73:58

486 up in his place here. And he

74:01

instantly said I could have it. And then

74:02

that started me down the computer

74:04

networking realm and like look, how

74:06

could I get this 286 to act like a 386

74:08

or how could I force it to run Windows

74:09

or how do I update the memory? How do I

74:11

do these things? In this little town,

74:13

Edinburgh, North Dakota, there was a guy

74:14

who had a computer store in a basement

74:17

of an old general store and his name was

74:18

Jeff Munzen. And uh I would go there and

74:21

ask him questions about computers and

74:23

just start learning like ins and outs

74:25

and how do I update the RAM? How do I

74:27

get memory better? How do I augment the

74:28

storage? Uh how how could I force this

74:31

thing to run Windows 3.1 so I could have

74:33

a guey instead of using command line? Um

74:36

>> gooey mean graphic user interface. Yeah.

74:39

Yeah. Sorry. And um so that kind of

74:42

started me on that

74:43

>> and that for me like I said um I had all

74:47

kinds of problems with attention deficit

74:49

disorder and not being able to pay

74:50

attention. That was the only time I

74:53

could I would go for three. I

74:56

>> don't believe in ADHD.

74:58

>> I might be wrong. I think it's a

75:00

superpower.

75:01

>> I mean, it certainly I remember I would

75:03

spend two days working on a problem and

75:05

not sleeping.

75:05

>> That's what I'm saying. I think it's a

75:07

superpower. I think it just keeps you

75:08

from being interested in things you're

75:10

not interested in.

75:11

>> Yeah. I I have a theory on that, too,

75:13

that I can get into after. But, um, that

75:16

started me down that road, but in

75:17

school, I couldn't pay attention. Me

75:19

neither. There was this teacher, I

75:20

always tell this story, it's a great

75:22

teacher. She's still around. Um, her

75:24

name is uh Connie Trenbbeth and she was

75:26

my English teacher or literature teacher

75:28

or something like that. She might not

75:30

even remember the story, but here I am

75:31

telling it on your podcast. I remember

75:33

it. Um, she kept me after class once and

75:36

she goes, "You know, I knew your dad,

75:37

Bill, and uh, you know, your your uncles

75:40

were all smart and your my gr my my

75:43

great uncle has an engineering wing of a

75:45

school named after him out in western

75:47

North Dakota." And she goes, "All these

75:49

guys were thinkers and your dad did all

75:51

this great stuff and built all this

75:52

stuff." And uh essentially what she was

75:54

telling me is you're a waste of life.

75:58

Like all you do is you come in here, you

76:00

disrupt the class, you upset people, no

76:03

one can talk.

76:04

>> Sounds like me.

76:05

>> You're trying to dominate every

76:06

conversation. But when you know I you

76:09

had written one paper on something that

76:11

interested you and I don't remember what

76:12

it was and she's like that was a

76:14

wonderful paper. Yeah.

76:15

>> She's like, "If you could just do that

76:16

every time." And uh I was not hearing

76:21

it. Like I remember the conversation cuz

76:23

I actually remember I think she said

76:24

waste of life. I think she actually said

76:26

that like you're wasting like you're

76:28

obviously

76:30

my RP my CPU clocks high. I'm always

76:32

thinking even when I'm not thinking and

76:34

even as we're sitting here talking I'm

76:36

thinking about other things or stuff I

76:37

want to do when I get back to my

76:39

computer or stuff I want to do for my

76:40

business. And um and so I joined the

76:43

military and the the absurdity of life

76:46

is this. I joined to be a military

76:49

policeman which I absolutely would have

76:50

hated. Um all of them got turned into

76:53

infantry people or stand gate guard

76:55

which is a needed function in the

76:57

military but it doesn't apply to my

76:58

personality. But when I went to the

77:00

recruiter station out in far Minneapolis

77:02

I think it was I was a bonehead and I

77:04

forgot my driver's license. And they're

77:07

like well and I was supposed to leave.

77:08

And at this time, I had dumped my

77:10

girlfriend, told everyone goodbye. I

77:12

wiped the dust off my boots, like left

77:15

Cavalier, North Dakota, and um I I was

77:18

like, "Hey, uh I'm not going back." So,

77:22

whatever we got to do right now. And

77:24

he's like, "Well, we can you can go

77:26

home, get your license, cuz the MEP's

77:29

station was in Minneapolis. Was it

77:31

Fargo? It doesn't matter." It was five,

77:33

six, seven hours away. and they're like,

77:34

"Well, you're not leaving today without

77:37

a driver's license." So, I looked at my

77:39

recruiter and I was like, "I don't know

77:40

what job you need to get me into, but it

77:42

needs to be a different job." And

77:44

they're like, "Well, you scored, you

77:45

know, exceptionally high in your general

77:47

technical um part of your ASVAB, which

77:49

is like understanding machines and

77:51

objects and stuff so we could get you

77:53

into this like intel job where you'd

77:55

learn about radars and stuff." And that

77:57

immediately clicked for me. And then

77:59

he's like, "Well, we got to go brief you

78:01

in this skiff room. there's a, you know,

78:03

secure compartmented information

78:04

facility. There's only one guy who's got

78:06

a clearance and he can brief you on the

78:08

job and if you want that job then you

78:09

can leave tomorrow. I instantly started

78:11

hearing like the James Bond music, you

78:13

know,

78:15

yeah.

78:17

And so they walked me in this back place

78:19

and you know, nothing super crazy and

78:22

briefed me up on the job and I went back

78:23

out and I said, "Yeah, this is actually

78:25

the job for me." So the absurdity of

78:27

life is me forgetting my driver's

78:28

license when I was 16. And I was 16 when

78:30

I signed up. Um maybe 17. No, I was

78:33

turning 17 that December. When I signed

78:36

up for the military, um I can connect

78:39

with a string to forgetting my driver's

78:41

license to being here with you today.

78:42

>> You can you can sign up when you're 16.

78:45

>> I I think I was turning 17.

78:47

>> You can sign up when I didn't even know

78:48

you could sign up when you're 16.

78:49

>> I had signed my delayed entry program

78:51

thing. Um and I left a little bit before

78:54

my 18th birthday, so I just graduated

78:56

from high school. But um yeah, you can

78:59

sign up when you're 16, I believe, as

79:00

long as your parents signed the waiver.

79:01

My mother signed the waiver. She was

79:03

happy to get me out of the trailer. Um

79:05

so, uh yeah, I was 17, almost 18 when I

79:09

left.

79:09

>> Make a radio out of that.

79:10

>> Yeah, right there. So, that's all the

79:11

pieces.

79:12

>> They called a crystal radio.

79:13

>> Yeah, I was going to say crystal

79:15

controlled.

79:15

>> That's a radio.

79:16

>> There it is. That's actually the exact

79:18

thing. That looks almost That is almost

79:20

exactly what it looks like.

79:22

>> Slinky made it.

79:23

>> Well, they bought the brand. They just

79:24

the Slinky brand now bought this toy.

79:26

There's a bunch of these all over the

79:28

internet. Yeah.

79:28

>> Wow. Make your own working radio without

79:32

batteries.

79:32

>> Yeah. And it uses a I was going to say

79:34

crystal controlled radio because it uses

79:35

a crystal diode

79:37

>> on it. Would you say Tesla coil, Jamie?

79:39

>> Yeah, it's a Tesla coil.

79:41

>> This guy's explaining it. So, this thing

79:43

has actually kind of cool, too. Let me

79:45

find this thing. Uh, a rocket radio they

79:47

called, which is like further

79:49

development. This thing it attached to a

79:51

phone.

79:54

So, you plug that onto a phone cable.

79:55

There's a picture of it somewhere on

79:57

here, but um it explains like you're

80:00

picking up There you go.

80:02

>> Wow.

80:02

>> No power.

80:03

>> Wow. No battery or current needed, hence

80:06

no operating expense and long life.

80:08

>> Yeah, this is fit onto a phone. What

80:11

year was this,

80:12

>> man? This is old.

80:14

>> Yeah.

80:15

>> So, it also shows here this is like

80:17

you're picking up power from a radio

80:18

tower.

80:19

>> Yeah.

80:19

>> Wow.

80:20

>> More powerful the signal. This is sort

80:22

of like what they're paying for at the

80:23

FCC. The more powerful your radio tower,

80:25

the longer and more people you can

80:27

reach.

80:28

>> Crazy. That has no battery.

80:31

>> And that's also why some radio signals

80:33

come in very well on your radio and some

80:35

don't. It's like dog [ __ ]

80:37

>> Yeah.

80:37

>> They got weak power.

80:38

>> Yeah. And then the frequency modulation,

80:41

like amplitude modulation isn't as

80:43

efficient as frequency modulation when

80:44

it comes to for the vocorder to produce

80:48

sound. Amplitude modulation travels

80:51

farther, but it doesn't have the um the

80:54

amount of information. It's not

80:56

modulated with the the carrier wave

80:58

can't be modulated with as much

80:59

information as you need. Whereas

81:00

frequency modulation is much quicker,

81:02

megahertz, and you can amplitude and add

81:04

more um um sound or more information,

81:07

which is why it sounds better. So FM

81:09

sounds better, but it doesn't travel as

81:10

far.

81:11

>> AM sounds worse. I always when I was

81:13

training people in the military on this,

81:15

I always use the analogy of if a party's

81:17

happening next door, you can hear the

81:18

bass music,

81:19

>> but you can't hear the treble. You can

81:21

hear the bass music because that

81:23

frequency travels farther because it's

81:25

lower in the frequency band.

81:27

>> But you can hear the treble because or

81:30

you can't hear the treble, I'm sorry,

81:31

because it's higher frequency and

81:32

there's more modulation and so it it

81:35

disperses quicker and you can't hear it

81:37

as well. And it's the same thing with

81:38

like VLF comms coming off of like a

81:40

submarine can travel underwater for a

81:43

very long ways, but you can't put as

81:45

much information in them as you could if

81:47

you were doing, you know, VHF or UHF

81:50

comms where there's lots of modulation.

81:52

So it's the dispersal and you know a lot

81:55

of my you know mid part of my career was

81:58

explaining this stuff to you know

81:59

military guys who were trying to

82:01

understand like here's how a cell phone

82:02

works and this is how frequency works

82:04

and this is how we send information and

82:06

just kind of demyst demystifying you

82:09

know how you know a GSN network works.

82:12

One one of the things that I wanted to

82:13

ask you about that is when new

82:16

technology is emerging, how how do you

82:21

how do you stay ahead of the ability to

82:27

extract information from this

82:29

technology, hack into networks

82:32

before people understand the capability?

82:35

>> You really can't. You really can't. And

82:37

that's the beauty of the free market is

82:39

that the innovation to perform the

82:41

function that you want someone to pay

82:43

for will always move faster than your

82:46

ability to exploit the technology.

82:48

>> Then how do you explain things like

82:50

Pegasus?

82:51

>> Well, I mean something like Pegasus,

82:54

well, first off,

82:55

>> explain Pegasus to people that don't

82:57

know.

82:57

>> It was a a persistent implant on cell

83:00

phones for people. Um,

83:02

>> initially it was you had to click it. It

83:04

was a click. Initially it was a click a

83:06

click and then it became a non-click

83:07

exploit. So in other words you had to

83:09

interact with something on the phone in

83:11

order to initialize and install the

83:13

implant and then after and but the the

83:15

reason why it was so good is because it

83:18

wasn't stored in the um it wasn't stored

83:22

in the usual areas that you would want a

83:24

persistent impl or where you would have

83:25

a persistent implant. for instance, uh

83:28

you know, you might want to put it in

83:30

the application layer of an app or

83:31

something like that where there's a

83:33

binary that can run and execute commands

83:35

or functions. Um, and so they I won't

83:40

get into the very specifics of where and

83:42

how they did this because I'm not sure

83:43

if I got this information from the

83:45

government or not, so I won't say it,

83:47

but they stored it in a place where it

83:48

wasn't normal. Um, and you can read

83:51

papers on your own for and look at the

83:53

forensics of it and how the actual

83:55

implant was executed, but it

83:57

essentially, you know, allowed people to

83:59

own your phone. Um, and and uh, you

84:03

know, was the kind of implant I only

84:05

dreamed of when I was helping develop my

84:07

own plant implants in the military.

84:10

Mostly what we would rely on is um you

84:12

know zero day architecture and looking

84:14

for something in a phone that either

84:16

they hadn't patched or that the phone

84:18

that you were looking at hadn't been

84:19

patched. So phones as they have their

84:22

own red teams are going through the the

84:24

phone for their own because they want to

84:25

sell a product that people will use and

84:27

people won't use stuff that can get

84:28

hacked. So they'll do their own red

84:30

teaming and they'll discover like oh you

84:33

know we we on this router we developed

84:35

we left this port open and it shouldn't

84:36

have been open. So now we're going to

84:38

write a patch that will close that port

84:39

so that this port is no longer

84:41

accessible by a guy like me. So I can't

84:42

go in there and and do something to this

84:44

particular type of router. Another great

84:46

thing I'll say something good about the

84:48

administration. They're doing some stuff

84:49

right now to make sure that we're

84:50

getting rid of um Chinese technology and

84:53

Chinese um routers and um um you know

84:57

there's a widespread network of um uh

85:00

there's the PLA has a and I can't

85:02

remember the name of the botnet but they

85:04

essentially implanted a bunch of old

85:06

unpatched routers to get access to

85:09

government and business um proximal

85:13

people and it was widespread and huge

85:15

and you know they it looked like to me.

85:18

I haven't read this anywhere, but if I

85:20

were looking at this implant and how it

85:22

was done, they were trying to really

85:24

cause some trouble. Um, it was being

85:26

placed at critical places. Think power,

85:29

think energy, think banking. Like, they

85:31

really wanted to cause some ruckus. And

85:34

I I have not been part of this

85:36

administration, so I'm not saying

85:37

anything classified for those of you who

85:38

are listening. And so, but there was a

85:41

decision to say, hey, we need to make

85:43

sure that these things get patched. And

85:44

also that we're not bringing in um

85:46

architecture from the overseas because

85:49

they don't play by the same rules that

85:50

we at least say we play by.

85:51

>> Well, that's why they banned Huawei

85:53

devices.

85:53

>> Oh yeah. And ZTE.

85:54

>> Yeah. Well, Huawei had a phone that I

85:57

was really interested in back in the

85:59

day. They had a Porsche design had

86:02

partnered with Huawei and made this

86:04

insane Android phone with like the best

86:06

camera, the best battery. It was like

86:08

really high level and I was like going

86:10

to buy it. And then all of a sudden they

86:12

banned all the Huawei phones. And I was

86:14

like, "What's going on?" And then, you

86:16

know, I had heard some people say, "Oh,

86:17

they're just trying to stop competition.

86:19

It's like American companies are trying

86:21

to stop it." And then I I went into it

86:23

deeper and I said, "No, it seems like

86:25

there's third party input on some of

86:27

their routers and some of their um some

86:30

of their network devices that they had

86:33

engineered

86:34

>> in order to be able to access them by

86:36

third party." And this because of

86:41

whatever lack of understanding, lack of

86:43

uh knowledge of how these things are

86:46

constructed, the people that purchased

86:47

them didn't weren't weren't aware of

86:49

them. And these things had gotten into

86:50

place. And they had gotten into place in

86:52

universities. They got into place in

86:55

military establishments. They were using

86:57

them in cell phone towers that people

86:59

had, you know, inadvertently bought from

87:01

China.

87:02

>> Yep. And and that's really I mean I can

87:04

tell you firsthand from having done some

87:06

of the forensic exploitation on this

87:08

stuff. Another large part of my career I

87:09

didn't talk about was just on mobile

87:11

forensics and media forensics

87:13

>> which is essentially you think of like

87:15

CSI Miami or CSI whatever the city was.

87:18

There's a crime someone was killed. You

87:20

have forensics that are doing forensics

87:22

on like blood and fingerprints and blood

87:24

splatter and all that stuff. There's a

87:25

whole another part of that same

87:27

forensics branch that focuses on media

87:29

forensics. what was deleted off this

87:31

phone at one point, what remains on this

87:33

phone, what was it being used for? I

87:35

would do this in the military so that

87:37

when we did do an operation, and I was

87:38

part of some of the largest ones ever

87:40

done out in Afghanistan, uh there would

87:43

be treasure troves of phones and all of

87:46

these computers and stuff like that. And

87:47

it was my job and I had a great team

87:49

that worked for me. uh in 20 my

87:52

deployment in 2015 um we would go in

87:55

afterwards gather up all of this stuff

87:57

and you know the task force commander

88:00

would literally be standing by and we'd

88:02

say you know here's the intelligence

88:03

that we've derived here's the

88:04

multi-point analysis here it you know it

88:07

was on this hard drive it was here it

88:08

was here you know there's a bad guy

88:09

place out here and those guys be rolling

88:11

like within moments after the last

88:13

operation like some operations we do

88:15

where we'd be rolling one after another

88:16

target because we were getting really

88:18

good at media forensics and intelligence

88:21

that was there and then getting into

88:22

active media forensics which is a

88:24

different discipline but essentially I

88:26

I'll get I can get into that later if

88:28

you want to but um launching and and and

88:31

doing these these follow on operations

88:33

off you know dumping the binary from a

88:36

phone and examining it at the ones and

88:37

zeros level to say everything that was

88:39

going on with this thing or if it was a

88:41

really high like the organization that I

88:43

worked for at that time uh did the

88:45

analysis of the Osama bin Laden media

88:48

and you know at on that media were far

88:50

more than we would for another piece of

88:53

media and that we're, you know, x-raying

88:55

it and we're looking at maybe what the

88:57

the disc looked like before, what was

88:59

destroyed or reconstructing things,

89:01

spending millions of dollars on that

89:02

intelligence analysis because we wanted

89:04

to fully understand everything that this

89:06

guy was involved in, what he was doing

89:07

and where he was and who he was talking

89:09

to. Um, and so that was another part of

89:11

my career that I did for about 5 years

89:14

or so.

89:14

>> What was going on with the Huawei

89:16

phones? Like what were they doing with

89:17

them? I mean they were they were they

89:20

were either some of them were coming out

89:21

implanted in other words there was

89:22

access built in for a foreign actor and

89:25

then in other terms other places with

89:27

routers with the ZTE stuff there were

89:30

just things that you would patch or that

89:32

you would fix as a company who was

89:34

trying to protect the consumer and

89:36

create a product that would people you

89:37

would use and they weren't doing it. So

89:39

they were creating persistent back doors

89:42

either by actively placing code on there

89:44

that would allow you know rooe access or

89:46

they were leaving things open especially

89:49

in Africa like the work that we you know

89:51

when I was working in Africa the Chinese

89:53

were just owning Africa. They were just

89:55

giving them communications

89:56

infrastructure and uh they were doing

89:59

that because they wanted their resources

90:01

and they wanted to know what these

90:02

people were saying and what they were

90:03

doing. Um, and so I'm a free market real

90:07

like I'm as free market as a guy can

90:09

get. I want the best people building the

90:10

best products and I want everyone to be

90:12

able to compete. But in that case, I

90:15

would never own a Huawei or a ZTE or

90:17

anything else.

90:18

>> On a consumer level, what were they

90:20

doing with those phones? Like if they

90:22

had imported them to the United States,

90:24

if they didn't have that ban, what would

90:26

have been the issue? uh getting access

90:28

to, you know, mil any number of people

90:31

that the Chinese really want access to

90:33

everybody. But you could start at the

90:35

topical level of just saying, you know,

90:38

getting Joe Rogan to use his ZTE would

90:40

be that would be my wet dream as a guy

90:42

who used to do this work back in the day

90:43

because you're talking to the president

90:44

or you're talking to this guy or that

90:46

guy. and I can build out a a network of

90:49

understanding who you're in contact

90:50

with, who you're talking to, what's

90:52

being talked about, but then also

90:53

finding out, you know, this person's

90:55

phone number, and now doing a deep dive

90:57

on there. So, it's really about, you

90:59

know, getting all of that data and

91:01

constructing an, you know, an analyst

91:03

notebook essentially outline of who's

91:05

talking to whom, who do we need to

91:06

implant, and it but it's for business as

91:09

well. Like, they're really trying to go,

91:10

they would want this in the hands of

91:11

somebody who's in charge of a business

91:12

because they want their IP. They would

91:14

want this in soldiers hands so they

91:16

would know deployment dates or who's

91:17

going where and who's doing what. They

91:19

want this in routers because um routers

91:21

are usually the most unpatched piece of

91:23

technology in that you're not especially

91:25

you know these days they're more

91:27

automated patching but back in the day

91:29

like you had to manually update a router

91:31

and if you didn't well then you had

91:33

potential exploits that were sitting on

91:34

that router where I could gain access to

91:37

your the router in your home or I could

91:38

gain access to a BGP router which is

91:40

like a border gateway which is moving

91:43

all of the internet data or I could get

91:45

access to a microwave terminal. You

91:46

know, if you look at a cell phone,

91:48

they've got the microwave terminals on

91:50

there that are sending information in

91:51

between them. If those are Chinese parts

91:54

that are either being used for the

91:56

processing, the CPU, or the phys the

91:58

physical infrastructure of that, the the

92:00

products that they were putting out

92:02

would give me direct access to the

92:03

information that's being passed on those

92:05

terminals. So you're getting, you know,

92:07

system level, root level access through

92:10

machinery, through communication

92:12

devices, and through things like routers

92:14

where you can know everything you want

92:16

to know about your enemy.

92:17

>> Wow. And so as far as today's

92:20

technology, I see you you use an Android

92:21

phone.

92:22

>> Like is there a phone that is more

92:25

secure or a platform that is more

92:27

secure?

92:29

>> It all depends. Like I I always take

92:32

this from Thomas Soul. There are no

92:33

answers. are only trade-offs. So there's

92:36

there's like the way to answer that

92:37

question would be is like who are you?

92:39

What are you trying to do with your

92:40

life? What are you talking about on your

92:42

phone? What are you doing on your phone?

92:44

You know, most of these phones if you're

92:46

just an average everyday citizen who's

92:47

just going about your job. Um you know,

92:50

the phones today are pretty secure,

92:52

especially versus a few years ago. Um if

92:54

you're a reporter,

92:57

now come the nexus is do you trust the

92:59

government and do you trust Apple? If

93:01

you trust the government, you trust

93:02

Apple, then Apple's probably your best

93:04

bet um for using an, you know, there's

93:06

lockdown mode on an Apple phone or um

93:09

they used to call it back in the day. I

93:11

think it was called reporter mode, but

93:12

there was way to ways to encrypt the

93:14

devices and to encrypt the chatter and

93:17

the um tunnel coming out of the phone.

93:19

Um the RF coming out of the phone and uh

93:22

you know

93:22

>> what is lockdown mode

93:24

>> there? I don't know if that's exactly

93:25

what it was called or not cuz I've never

93:27

really used Apple just for my own

93:28

personal reasons. What personal reasons?

93:31

>> I don't trust Apple.

93:32

>> How so?

93:33

>> Uh they are more interested in

93:35

monetizing people's data than they are

93:38

providing them capability. So every time

93:40

you take a photo, every time you upload

93:42

a document, every time you talk to it,

93:44

every time it asks you about your, you

93:46

know, you you'll get these questions

93:48

where it says uh if your password's

93:50

lost, you can back up your password in

93:52

these ways. Tell us where you were born.

93:54

Tell us your mom's maiden's name. Tell

93:56

us your mom's this, your mom's that.

93:57

Lockdown mode is an extreme optional

93:59

protection. It'd only be used if you

94:00

believe you may be personally targeted

94:01

by a highly sophisticated cyber attack.

94:03

Most people are never targeted by

94:05

attacks of this nature. When iPhone is

94:07

in lockdown mode, it will not function

94:08

as it typically does. Apps, websites,

94:10

and features will be strictly limited

94:12

for security and some experiences will

94:14

be completely unavailable. Yeah. Yeah.

94:16

So, when I was adv advising guys back in

94:18

the day on going out and doing like a

94:20

high-risisk source meet, so you're going

94:22

to go meet, you know, a spy for another

94:25

country and you're a military guy and

94:27

you're debriefing someone or doing

94:28

something, I would always tell them to

94:29

use lockdown mode. I knew that it did

94:31

those things. I didn't know if that was

94:32

the term or if I thought that

94:33

>> So, can you still send IME messages?

94:36

>> You can still text and call.

94:37

>> Text and call. That's it.

94:38

>> Yeah. But there's other things that you

94:40

can't do. And so, when you're

94:41

>> Well, like Meta just recently announced

94:42

they're no longer encrypting your DMs.

94:46

Why would they do that?

94:47

>> Well, they said that it's for protection

94:49

or whatever to make sure that people

94:51

aren't doing bad things. I don't know

94:52

what. See what their um explanation for

94:56

it was.

94:57

>> Was it Sorry, I'm worried about this

94:58

reporter that

94:59

>> I'm sorry. Um the word

95:01

>> Meta Meta got

95:02

>> Meta recently announced that they're no

95:04

longer encrypting your DMs on Instagram.

95:08

And a lot of people are up in arms and

95:10

they're stopping using any DMs on

95:13

Instagram and any of that stuff.

95:15

And the idea is that other people can

95:17

read your stuff now. Now whether it's

95:19

Meta can read your stuff or who

95:22

>> That's what I mean. And I said, "Why

95:23

don't you trust Apple?" It's the same

95:25

reason I don't trust Meta. They're not

95:27

>> the dangers behind Meta killing endtoend

95:29

encryption for Instagram DMs. Meta

95:31

blamed users for not opting into the

95:33

privacy protecting feature. Experts fear

95:35

the move could be the first major domino

95:37

to fall for endtoend encryption tech

95:39

worldwide.

95:40

>> That's a horrible narrative.

95:42

Yeah, it seems squirly.

95:46

Um, so, oh, you've read your last free

95:49

article.

95:50

>> Oh my god,

95:51

>> give me money, [ __ ]

95:52

>> But, but what Apple and Meta want to do

95:54

is like they're trying to build these

95:56

new neural networks. They're trying to,

95:58

you know, humans, and we can get into

96:00

this too later if you want, humans are

96:02

the only thing, in my opinion, and and

96:04

I'm happy to have you disagree with me,

96:06

and I love to have this conversation. In

96:08

my opinion, we're the only ones that are

96:10

after May 8, 2026 announced plans to

96:13

discontinue support for end toend

96:15

encryption for chats on Instagram. If

96:16

you have chats that are impacted by this

96:18

change, you will see instructions on how

96:20

you can download any media or messages

96:22

you may want to keep. Social media giant

96:24

said in a help document, if you're on an

96:26

older version of Instagram, you may also

96:28

need to update the app before you can

96:29

download your affected chats when reach

96:32

for comment. This is what Meta had to

96:34

say. Very few people are opting for end

96:35

to end encrypted messages and DMs. So,

96:37

we're removing this option from

96:38

Instagram in the coming months. Anyone

96:40

who wants to keep messaging with end to

96:42

end encryption can easily do that on

96:44

WhatsApp, but WhatsApp is a little

96:46

squirrely, right?

96:46

>> WhatsApp. Yeah. I mean, they're all

96:48

squirly. Um, and that's the problem. And

96:51

so, you ask me why I don't trust them.

96:53

It's because they want to they want to

96:55

you so humans in my opinion and some

96:58

animals are the only things

97:01

that are that have the ability to

97:02

project consciousness. And projecting

97:05

consciousness is how you train a neural

97:06

network and it's how you train all these

97:09

large networks that we a lot of my time

97:10

also in the military is spent in art I

97:12

was doing artificial intelligence in

97:14

2012 2011 like before it was even a

97:16

catch term we were using artificial

97:18

intelligence to map dynamic networks and

97:20

to do other things more pragmatic uses

97:22

of it than how it's being used today

97:24

with large language models or

97:25

convolutional neural networks but um

97:28

they need consciousness to train their

97:29

models so when Google offers you meta or

97:33

Instagram or whoever house offers you

97:34

photo storage. It's because they want

97:36

your face to train neural networks. If

97:38

they're going to pay for the compute, if

97:40

they're going to pay for the storage for

97:42

these things, they're doing it because

97:44

they're going to use the data. If you're

97:46

getting a free app in in essence, any

97:49

free app, any if you're the product's

97:50

free, then you're the product. So, when

97:52

Google is allowing you to use a Google

97:54

Drive and get a gig of storage, they're

97:56

going to use those photos to train

97:58

neural networks to do better facial

97:59

recognition.

98:00

>> What if you're paying for Google Drive?

98:02

I don't know about their terms of

98:04

service. Now, that is one of the best

98:05

things that I use with large language

98:07

models is any product I download, I have

98:10

the um the neural network examine the

98:12

terms of service and then you can pretty

98:15

much understand like here's how here's

98:16

my focus, here's the 40page terms of

98:19

services document when you click that

98:20

link that you got, what are they able to

98:22

do with my data? So, that's how I sign

98:24

up for apps and that's one of the great

98:25

uses of a large language model in my

98:27

opinion is to quickly understand what

98:29

how these things are being used. And

98:31

that's why I say with Apple, with Meta,

98:33

with all of these large information, you

98:35

are more the product than the product's

98:37

the product. And that is because they're

98:39

trying to build the most powerful

98:40

capable um artificial intelligences,

98:43

which I think is a misnomer. And again,

98:45

we can get into it later, but they're

98:46

trying to build these hyper competent

98:48

artificial intelligences and you need

98:50

training. You need two things for that

98:52

really is training data and you need

98:54

compute. And that's why you start seeing

98:56

them coming out with like Meta's

98:57

building its own nuclear engineering

98:58

facility or something nuclear facility

99:00

or something like that. And they need

99:02

more they need more training data. So if

99:04

I want to build a you know a replica of

99:07

Joe Joe Rogan that I can make

99:08

hyperrealistic AI videos for. I need

99:11

every picture of your face from every

99:13

angle. I need every wse, every squint,

99:15

everything you've ever done so I can

99:17

introduce more training data to better

99:20

train that neural network in order to

99:22

generate more hyperrealistic um versions

99:24

of yourself. And so when a company's

99:26

offering you something for free, and

99:28

it's fine, like if people are fine with

99:30

that idea, then by all means download

99:32

all the free apps that you want. But if

99:35

you're downloading a free app, it's

99:36

because you are the product. They either

99:38

want to see how you type. They want to

99:39

see what you're saying. They want to see

99:41

how you're thinking about things. They

99:43

want to understand your political

99:44

biases. They want to look at your

99:45

photos. And this isn't because they're a

99:47

deep-seated nation state actor. They can

99:49

become that. But it's because they're

99:51

trying to build the best products

99:53

because the big money is in AI. That's

99:56

where the biggest money is. So, anytime

99:57

you're doing any of these things, and

99:59

it's just been obvious to me from the on

100:00

not from the onset, but pretty close to

100:02

the onset that um

100:04

>> yeah, this is a good example, right?

100:06

Pokémon Go players built a 30 billion

100:08

photo map. That's how training robots to

100:11

deliver your pizza. There you go.

100:14

Um, so you you know they view PE and

100:17

they can say they don't and maybe if

100:19

someone from there catches this podcast,

100:21

which they well could, they might put

100:23

out a statement that's saying that

100:24

that's not they're doing. But I'm

100:25

telling you as a person who has done

100:27

media forensics, who has done computer

100:29

network operations, and who has trained

100:31

artificial intelligence models, that is

100:33

precisely what they are doing. That is

100:36

there's no

100:37

>> What is the difference between using

100:38

Apple and using Android?

100:41

>> Well, Android will do the same things

100:42

and Google will do the same things. It's

100:44

just that I can root my phone or I can

100:46

install a custom operating system like

100:48

Graphine or something like that which

100:50

I'm not doing right now.

100:52

I I had to make a sacrifice when I

100:54

started my cart my company Spartan Forge

100:56

and the sacrifice was I had to be the

100:58

face of this product. And so I never had

101:01

a social media until I started the

101:03

company. And I didn't upload things to

101:05

the cloud until I started this company.

101:06

And it became just like I have to sell a

101:09

product. I have to, you know, and I'm

101:11

actually selling a product, not people's

101:13

data or people's photos.

101:14

>> I have to sell this product. I have to

101:16

let people people often don't know who

101:18

is the company or who is the organizing

101:20

principle and what do they care about in

101:21

the company.

101:22

>> And I just made that trade and said, I'm

101:25

going to have to become a public person

101:27

and start putting things out there. And

101:29

uh so you know when I started a company,

101:31

we started our first Instagram and I

101:32

started my my marketing team started my

101:35

first Instagram and uh I had to start

101:38

uploading things and talking about how I

101:39

felt about things because um I wanted

101:42

people to know that this company was not

101:44

going to be like the other companies

101:45

that are out there. We don't sell their

101:47

data. We don't sell emails. I can make a

101:49

half million dollars off my email list

101:50

tomorrow and I've been offered that

101:52

money. You know, we've got millions of

101:53

emails from people who have signed up

101:54

for our apps. other companies who are

101:56

starting companies, they want to go out

102:00

and reach marketing people. So, if

102:01

you're starting another hunting app,

102:02

maybe for cameras or for a call or a

102:05

turkey call or an elk call or something,

102:07

and you ha found Spartan Forge, and you

102:11

said, "Man, they've got two million

102:12

emails. I could pay them a half million

102:15

dollars for that $2 million and start

102:16

some top of mark top ofline marketing,

102:18

top off ofunnel marketing, and go blast

102:21

them." So, they would pay me a lot of

102:22

money for those emails. I will never do

102:24

that. I'll never sell my company's

102:26

emails, the people's emails. I'll never

102:28

do any of those things. Um because the

102:30

product is the product for my company.

102:31

It's not the people. Um

102:33

>> so the reason why you use Android over

102:36

Apple is the ability to root it and

102:39

install things like graphine.

102:40

>> Yeah. Custom OSS and uh

102:42

>> but yet you don't use it.

102:43

>> Uh not now. But what I still can use and

102:45

what I still do use is Android also

102:47

publishes their their their framework in

102:50

an open source fashion where you can ex

102:52

you can look at the and it's called AOSP

102:55

Android open source project. So the

102:57

basis of Android the the nuts think of

103:00

it as the nuts and bolts. I'll try not

103:01

to talk in too technical terms here but

103:04

the basic framework think about it like

103:06

a car the frame and the engine makeup is

103:09

published so you can look at how things

103:11

work on the inside. Apple goes the

103:13

opposite way and they don't publish any

103:15

of that. You can't see any of that

103:16

stuff. I'm for the free and open version

103:19

because at least if something at least

103:21

if I'm worried about my phone having a

103:23

problem, I can actually dump binary or I

103:25

can create an EO1 file and exume. I can

103:28

look at the binary and say is my phone

103:30

acting like it should or doing what it

103:31

should or is there some kind of

103:32

persistent implant? I wouldn't be able

103:34

to do that with a I would have to trust

103:36

Apple and Apple's ecosystem and whoever

103:38

their Macaffy or whatever they're using.

103:41

I would have to trust them, which I

103:42

don't. Um, so I like the Android. Um,

103:45

because

103:46

>> is that option available for the average

103:48

consumer that's not that learned in

103:51

computers?

103:51

>> Well, the great part about large

103:53

language models now is if you wanted to

103:54

dump your own phone today, you could

103:57

follow along with a large language model

103:58

and do it your own Android.

104:00

>> And how would you do that?

104:02

>> Um, well, there's you would have to buy

104:04

some expensive there. There is some

104:06

things you'd either have to pay a firm

104:08

to do it or you could download things

104:10

like uh uh celbrite. You could get a

104:13

celbrite uh or there's other things

104:15

called forensic toolkit other things

104:17

like that that allow you to examine your

104:19

phone at a deeper level.

104:21

>> And is this an app forensic?

104:23

>> They're they're products

104:24

>> products. So it's a physical product to

104:26

dump your phone into.

104:27

>> Yeah. And there's software

104:29

>> um and there's connecting and all that

104:31

type of stuff. Tools I used throughout

104:32

my military um career. Um, Celebrite is

104:35

one of them, but they're Israeli owned.

104:37

Um, I've got nothing against Israel.

104:39

I've just got everything against foreign

104:40

actors. Just if they're not an American

104:43

company, that automatically kicks them

104:44

down a level for me. So, um, anyway,

104:48

there's there's all kinds of Android

104:50

just makes it much easier to examine

104:52

your phone or to understand if you've

104:54

got something going on that's funky than

104:57

it is on Apple.

104:58

>> So, for the average person, like for me,

105:00

like if I got

105:01

>> You're not the average person.

105:02

>> Well, let's pretend I am. If I got an

105:04

Android phone and I wanted to examine my

105:06

phone, what would I what would be the

105:08

process?

105:09

>> Uh, you would download some of the

105:10

software that I talked about. You would

105:11

jack your phone into it. You would open

105:13

your phone and then it would start

105:16

carving um the binary of your f the the

105:18

the everything in your phone. It would

105:20

start you could create a onetoone

105:22

emulation of your phone if you wanted to

105:24

and then you would be able to get under

105:26

the hood and examine the apps. You would

105:28

be able to examine the binary. You

105:29

what's the executable code? You'd be

105:31

able to look at all of those things and

105:33

then determine because Android open-

105:35

source project is published, you could

105:37

do a one for one and say, well, you

105:39

know, at the kernel level, there's this

105:41

weird code that's not in the Android

105:44

build. So, what is this code? And then

105:48

with a neural network, you could pro I

105:50

don't I've never done it, but I'm sure

105:51

you could figure out what the intent is

105:53

of that code, even for a lay person. So,

105:55

I could take that information, I could

105:57

put it into Perplexity, and Perplexity

105:59

would lay out what's going on with it.

106:01

>> Ostensively, it would be able to. Yes.

106:03

Unless it was some type of weird code. I

106:05

don't know if I haven't used Perplexity,

106:06

so I don't know if they have something

106:08

like chat GPT's codeex, but um

106:10

>> sort of just tried just to be like, can

106:12

you help me examine my Android phone is

106:14

doing looking for any malicious actors?

106:16

>> Yes, I can walk you through structured

106:17

non-destructive check for malware or

106:19

other shady activity on your Android

106:20

phone. A first. What are you noticing

106:23

before tools commands? Quickly check for

106:25

common warning signs. Sudden big battery

106:27

drain. You're not using the phone.

106:28

Unusual data usage particularly in the

106:31

background. Apps you don't remember

106:32

installing or icons briefly appearing

106:34

and then disappearing. Lots of pops

106:37

popups, redirects in browser or new

106:39

default search launcher, strange calls,

106:42

SMS messages you didn't send yourself.

106:44

If any of those ring a bell, we'll focus

106:46

on them in later steps.

106:47

>> Yeah. Just asking like why do you want

106:49

to do? So, this is just something that

106:50

you could do with an Android phone that

106:52

you just can't do with Apple.

106:53

>> Yeah, Apple's not open. So,

106:54

>> what other reasons you don't trust

106:55

Apple?

106:55

>> Well, could I ask can I do one thing

106:57

before we remember that question cuz I

106:58

don't want to forget it. Could I give

107:00

you a prompt?

107:01

>> Sure.

107:01

>> Um because I want to answer your first

107:03

question that we've already gone past.

107:04

>> Uh if you can you bring perplexity back

107:06

up, please.

107:07

>> You want to go in addition to that or

107:08

start a new one?

107:08

>> No, this is fine. Um just say uh my

107:11

friend helped me carve

107:14

an EO1 file. EO echo Oscar EO1 file

107:22

and he says

107:26

that there is code in there

107:29

that doesn't comport with the rest of

107:31

the Android system.

107:33

>> Yeah. Pt

107:35

>> with

107:36

>> the rest of the system.

107:39

Could I dump that code here and could

107:41

you tell me what it means? I'm sure the

107:44

answer is yes, but I just didn't want to

107:45

answer it because I've never done it.

107:49

>> Could you tell me? Could you tell me,

107:51

Jimmy?

107:52

>> Could you tell me what it means? Yeah.

107:55

>> Figured that out probably though.

107:57

>> Get the U out. Get the U. Tell me you.

108:01

Could I have some of your coffee,

108:02

please?

108:03

>> Yeah, absolutely. It's for you. Okay,

108:05

let's see what it says.

108:09

Uh yes, you can paste suspicious code

108:11

here and I can help explain what it mean

108:13

what it appears to do line by line and

108:15

whether anything looks malicious. Before

108:17

you paste, a few important notes. Remove

108:20

or redact anything that looks like

108:21

private data. Usernames, passwords,

108:23

keys, tokens, IPs, email addresses,

108:26

phone. Perplexity is our sponsor.

108:28

>> I love that because you'd never get that

108:29

from chat GPT. You'd want all that

108:31

information.

108:32

>> Perplexity is the [ __ ] Um, and so

108:35

you're not sharing personal or

108:37

case-sensitive information.

108:38

>> Wonderful perplexity.

108:40

>> If it's very long, send in chunks and

108:42

tell me chunk 1-3, chunk 2-3, etc. So we

108:46

can help keep track. I can do static

108:49

analysis here, read and reason about the

108:51

code, but I cannot actually execute it

108:53

in a sandbox. Right?

108:54

>> So this is more like a careful forensic

108:57

read through than a full dynamic malware

108:59

analysis. Go ahead and paste the code

109:01

snippet your friend flagged as not

109:02

fitting with the rest of the system and

109:04

tell me in a sentence or two where in

109:07

the EO1 it came from. Example app folder

109:11

system partition random file path.

109:13

>> Y exactly. So yeah I I I thought that

109:16

would be the answer. I've just never

109:17

done it. And so you can do a forensic

109:19

examination of an Apple by the way. I I

109:22

I'm sorry if I misspoke there, but you

109:24

can't do it to the level that you can

109:25

with because the Android open source

109:28

project publishes all of the code.

109:30

>> I can get an understanding of the very

109:31

inner workings. So if something's being

109:33

done for for instance at the kernel or

109:35

you could think of that as like the

109:36

lowest level of the phone, something

109:38

that wouldn't normally uh get caught in

109:41

a forensic um examination. I wouldn't be

109:44

able to do that with Apple, right? All

109:45

right. So, and the nation state actors

109:47

are doing are doing things at very low

109:49

levels in the code framework for that

109:52

exact reason because most people who

109:54

aren't very deep into forensics um would

109:57

miss that. It would be like the

109:58

fingerprint under the couch cushion or

110:00

something like that.

110:01

>> And what is the difference between what

110:04

what someone can do with an Android for

110:06

phone with the standard Android

110:08

operating system versus graphine? Uh, so

110:12

that gets into, you know, if you wanted

110:14

to war drive or sample um Wi-Fi networks

110:17

in an area or if you wanted to run a um

110:20

barrage um attack on a Wi-Fi um

110:23

endpoint, you could work that in there

110:25

to do things with the phone that you

110:26

couldn't otherwise do with a standard

110:28

app um um with a standard Android

110:30

operating kit.

110:31

>> But as far as on a consumer level, like

110:33

what protections do you have by running

110:35

graphine that you don't have by running

110:38

Android? um you're you're much more in

110:41

control of the ecosystem. Um you're

110:43

you're you have a firmer understanding

110:45

and again you could use a large language

110:47

model to do this to understand exactly

110:48

what's being run on the phone. Um you

110:50

control the background services that can

110:52

be run on the phone. So if you're

110:53

getting hot micdike or if your camera's

110:55

taking pictures of you when you're not

110:56

looking or it's listening to you for

110:57

advertising content stuff like that you

111:00

you would be in control of all of that

111:01

in a way that you're not control of on a

111:03

native Android app. in control like how

111:05

so would it alert you that this is

111:07

happening

111:07

>> or or just the functionality wouldn't be

111:09

there for it to take place

111:10

>> right because the functionality is it's

111:12

only designed for the standard Android

111:14

operating system.

111:15

>> Yep. And I haven't installed graphine in

111:17

a while. So a lot of all of this updates

111:20

and I could be saying things that are

111:21

incorrect. My data I stopped doing this

111:23

about 3 years ago.

111:24

>> Well I know that there was uh I forget

111:26

what country it was but they were

111:27

focusing on people who use Google Pixel

111:30

phones for example. Yeah, cuz that's

111:32

>> because that's one of the phones that

111:33

are more commonly rooted.

111:35

>> Yeah, it's easy to do

111:36

>> and you could do it with a large

111:38

language model. You could sit there and

111:39

be walked through on how to do it, which

111:40

is a great, you know, part of that.

111:42

>> Is it complicated like for a person like

111:44

me that's not that astute?

111:46

>> Uh, no. It's not something I would do

111:47

with a phone that you care about the

111:49

first few times, right?

111:50

>> Because you're going to jack things up.

111:51

You have to, you know, get the

111:52

bootloadader and uh essentially the

111:55

starting, you know, the starting

111:56

mechanisms of the phone that launches

111:58

all of the other things. You have to get

111:59

down to a level and unlock that so that

112:02

you can um

112:02

>> Is that available for all Android

112:04

phones?

112:04

>> No, not all Android phones. A lot lots

112:06

of them lock it down. So, you can't do

112:08

that.

112:08

>> Is that available for Samsung phones?

112:10

>> Uh, no, not this one. You can't. So, the

112:12

question has to become, can you lock

112:13

unlock the bootloader? And that is the

112:16

starting think of it as the starting

112:17

engine of the rest of the phones.

112:18

>> Why is that only available on Google

112:20

Pixel phones?

112:21

>> I'm not sure why they do it that way. I

112:22

haven't looked into that. It's just

112:23

pixels and the older an Samsung's um

112:27

made it available older Galaxy S7s,

112:30

S10s.

112:31

>> You could do more than you can with

112:33

like, you know, I've got the Galaxy Fold

112:35

here and you can do almost none of that

112:37

on here.

112:37

>> That is [ __ ] sweet though.

112:39

>> Yeah, I love this phone. But um like I

112:41

said, I went away from doing all that. A

112:42

because it was work. B because I'm not

112:45

working in national security anymore and

112:47

I'm not, you know, I haven't written an

112:49

exploit in years. um I I don't do this

112:52

type of work anymore and I need to sell

112:53

a product and uh it just you know

112:55

working with other employees like that

112:57

run my Instagram or you know assistant

113:00

going through my email and all those

113:01

other types of things it just it wasn't

113:03

pragmatic anymore for me to keep doing

113:05

that and I had to give up that part

113:06

>> forge your app work run on graphine

113:09

>> yeah well it could yeah it would we you

113:11

have to sideloadad the app but again a

113:13

large language model could walk you

113:15

through doing that so um we haven't

113:17

gotten to that level of

113:18

>> does it make sense here that this That's

113:20

easier because Google makes it easier.

113:22

>> Yeah, they he was just asking me why

113:24

they make it easier and I don't know

113:25

that answer.

113:26

>> That's I mean

113:27

>> so the process is officially supported

113:28

in the Android settings under developer

113:30

options allowing users to toggle OEM

113:33

locking simple fast boot method. Pixels

113:35

use standard fast boot commands

113:38

>> uh that work consistently across all

113:40

models to unlock the bootloader

113:42

accessibility. Yeah,

113:44

>> that's what I was talking about. So um

113:46

yeah, I don't know why they do it. might

113:48

be people can well well the Android open

113:50

source project exists. So it would stand

113:53

a reason that you would want a way for

113:54

someone because what you want is people

113:56

interacting with that code and redteing

113:58

it and making the code better and then

114:00

offering you know bug bounties uh so

114:03

that you can tell Android like hey

114:05

you've got a critical flaw in your

114:06

system architecture here and then

114:07

they'll pay you 20 grand for that.

114:09

>> I've got friends who do that. So um

114:12

>> you and I talked about uh Eric Prince's

114:14

phone.

114:14

>> Yes. that which is

114:18

so the the narrative is that that is an

114:21

unhackable phone.

114:23

>> Yeah. It's just by virtue and look

114:24

Eric's a wonderful guy and uh he's he's

114:28

the principles that he used

114:31

for for the first instantiation of that

114:33

phone are the correct principles which

114:35

is we need to get if you want if you're

114:37

security focused at all you should get

114:39

away from these big large conglomerates

114:41

because none of your data is private.

114:43

That's a correct principle. An incorrect

114:46

principle, and I'm going to get [ __ ]

114:47

about this, but I told you in the

114:49

beginning I care about the truth, and I

114:51

do care about the truth, is that when

114:52

you're using a PKI um subsystem that

114:56

relies on Microsoft, then you're not in

114:58

control of the PKI certificate signing

115:01

and Microsoft could cause a bunch of

115:03

problems and they were using that. Um,

115:05

so the other thing being if you're

115:07

building on the Android open source

115:09

project, that means the code that you're

115:11

using as the engine, let's just call it

115:13

that of your phone is examinable by the

115:16

public. So you're relying on Android to

115:19

publish these, you know, updates to the

115:22

phone and you're relying on those things

115:24

to be as good as possible. Now, you

115:25

might harden it some more, but as long

115:27

as the code is out there, it can always

115:29

be mucked with. As long as people have

115:31

to interact with the device and type and

115:33

you have to see what you're typing, a

115:35

phone's going to be it's going to have

115:37

Swiss cheese. So, when people say

115:39

something is unhackable, as you said,

115:42

that's just not true.

115:44

>> Yeah, it didn't make sense to me. I

115:47

talked about it.

115:47

>> Yeah, we talked about it quite a bit.

115:49

Um, I have, like I said, great guy, done

115:52

lots of great things for the country and

115:53

uh uh it's just if they had just said

115:56

something along the lines of it's

115:58

hackable as any phone is hackable

115:59

because by virtue of you having to

116:01

interact with it, it's hackable. It just

116:03

just like if I inst if I came up with an

116:06

app that had a you know look at the Tik

116:08

Tok terms of service on the first Tik

116:10

Tok

116:10

>> was bonkers

116:11

>> with those terms of services I will own

116:13

your phone and I'm not saying you can

116:15

install Tik Tok on his phone but what

116:16

I'm saying is by virtue that you have to

116:18

interact with the phone and see what

116:20

you're doing and type passwords and

116:22

you've got those kinds of terms of

116:24

service. I could easily put a key logger

116:26

in that and now I know your signal

116:27

password or your signal pin or or you

116:30

know I get you you know you're going to

116:32

China so I stop you in secondary and

116:34

while you're in secondary I've got a

116:35

CCTV on you and you unlock your phone.

116:38

Now I know how to unlock your phone and

116:39

now I'm going to lock you up in sec

116:41

secondary uh at at customs in China or

116:44

in Canada and uh I'm going to separate

116:47

you from your phone and I've seen you

116:48

unlock it. Well, now I'm going to get in

116:50

there with Nase or I'm going to get in

116:51

there with FTK or I'm going to get in

116:53

there with uh Celbrite and I'm going to

116:55

dump your phone and and just by virtue

116:59

of it being built on the Android open

117:01

source project, that's a great thing.

117:03

It's a good thing. Just don't call it

117:05

totally unhackable because a guy like

117:07

me, we I don't need but a week or two to

117:10

tell you on this current build like here

117:12

are here's the hole in this Swiss

117:14

cheese. Now, is it far better than

117:17

having a Google phone with standard

117:20

firmware and standard OS or an Apple

117:22

phone? I I don't know about Apple

117:24

because again, you asked me about Apple

117:25

and I said, I don't know Apple. I don't

117:27

know what's happening at the top of that

117:28

company, but I know that they like to

117:30

monetize people and that's pervasive in

117:33

my mind and using data that people don't

117:35

know is getting used even though it's in

117:37

a 40page terms of services document is

117:39

pervasive. So, I just don't know at that

117:41

high highest level of analysis. And

117:43

that's why I said to answer your

117:45

question about the safest phone, I would

117:46

ask you what you're using it for, who

117:48

you are, and what are you doing in the

117:49

world, um, is the best way to answer

117:52

that question.

117:52

>> So, me, like, what would you recommend I

117:55

use?

117:56

>> I mean, I wouldn't want to I mean, okay,

117:58

I'll I'll tell you generally what I

118:00

would say because you might ask me that

118:02

question one day because we go back and

118:03

forth about a lot of tech. Um, I know

118:06

specifically what I would recommend for

118:07

you to do and I'd even tell you to hire

118:09

someone else to do it, not me. um

118:12

because that just that checks and

118:14

balances is what I would want. But um

118:16

for you, I would say you should take

118:18

something like a um a a Raspberry Pi and

118:21

you should run WireGuard on your phone

118:23

and you should route all of your

118:25

internet traffic through something like

118:26

a home terminal at your house through a

118:28

Raspberry Pi using something like

118:30

WireGuard. Um which is a a VPN that I

118:33

use that's very good. Um and uh you know

118:37

everything should be routed through that

118:39

and uh if you trust Apple continue using

118:42

Apple. If you don't trust Apple then you

118:44

know use Android and uh you could do you

118:48

could use a Pixel and do graphine and

118:50

you could use Signal on there and those

118:52

other things and you're going to be

118:52

relatively safe. But again, if I'm a

118:55

nation state actor, I can create

118:57

circumstances where I'm going to get

118:58

access to your [ __ ] and I'm going to

119:00

lock you down. Um, and they're some of

119:03

them are more expensive than other

119:05

methods to do it, but I'm a pragmatist

119:07

and you can always come up with a method

119:08

to get a hold of somebody's [ __ ] You

119:09

can always create the circumstances,

119:11

especially if you're a nation state

119:12

actor, to get a hold of somebody's

119:15

stuff. That would be the very high level

119:17

of things that I would recommend to you

119:19

um uh just out the gate.

119:24

>> Yeah, it's uh very concerning because it

119:26

seems like these things keep getting

119:28

stronger and more capable.

119:30

>> Yes. like the Pegasus 2 being a

119:32

non-click exploit.

119:34

>> Yes. So, all they have to do essentially

119:35

is just know your number.

119:37

>> Yep.

119:39

And that's, you know, uh you just make

119:42

yourself a difficult target would be my

119:44

best recommendation. When you're going

119:47

to answer questions about password

119:48

reset, don't answer them honestly. Write

119:50

down in a physical journal or something

119:52

how you answered those questions. Don't

119:53

answer them honestly. Um you know, all

119:56

of these things we think are added for

119:58

layers of protection. For instance, you

119:59

used to get that popup on your phone

120:01

where it said, you know, there'd be like

120:03

blocks of pictures and it would say,

120:05

"Click all of the pictures,

120:07

>> right,

120:08

>> with a uh

120:09

>> with a traffic light in it."

120:10

>> I was just going to say that, a traffic

120:11

light in it.

120:12

>> Yeah.

120:12

>> Part of that might be for security. The

120:13

other part of it is they're using the

120:15

information of what you're clicking to

120:16

train neural networks.

120:18

>> You're a product at that point,

120:20

>> right? You think you're getting security

120:21

out of it, but you're a product at that

120:23

point because you're helping to educate

120:25

a neural network on what traffic lights

120:26

look like. Yeah.

120:27

>> And how they can look and all those

120:29

different instantiations of traffic

120:30

lights. So, and again like we have to

120:34

separate causality and intention and

120:36

outcomes in that the companies might do

120:39

this because they want to create the

120:40

greatest AI ever, but when you're g

120:42

issuing someone a 40page terms of

120:44

service document on everything they can

120:47

do with your thing that you paid $2,000

120:49

for, it's just, you know, we need more

120:52

ethical people. At least what Eric

120:54

Prince was trying to do was right, which

120:56

was we need to offramp from some of

120:58

these big things because the way that

121:00

this government is going, I'm very

121:03

worried about the rights of the

121:04

individual now um and going forward

121:07

because we have an uneducated class of

121:09

people for all of the reasons in the

121:12

world. Like if you want to just focus on

121:14

your family and you're not thinking

121:15

about these things, I don't hate that

121:16

for you. But the idea of individual

121:19

autonomy and rights has been so [ __ ] on

121:22

in in recent years that where this go

121:26

when we get more uneducated and we rely

121:28

large language models are great but

121:30

they're not a foundation of learning. In

121:33

other words, um we have a lot of people

121:35

with access to information but no

121:36

wisdom. It's like when your parents

121:38

would say learn how to do addition and

121:40

subtraction on paper before you use a

121:43

calculator. like understand how to do

121:45

research and site sources and understand

121:48

you know how to do conduct really good

121:50

analysis before you just use a neural

121:52

network for everything because as we

121:54

lose focus of our civics and and and

121:57

what our founders were trying to do and

121:58

the uniqueness of it which is truly

122:00

unique which is you know when I joined

122:02

the army I joined the army to get out of

122:03

North Dakota when I reinlisted in the

122:05

army it's because I believed in the

122:06

experiment and that's a another five

122:08

hour podcast but um the the the the

122:12

foundation of the experiment is good,

122:14

but we've eroded it in so many ways over

122:16

the years and given up so many

122:18

individual rights in the name of

122:20

security. I'm sure it's been said on

122:22

here before, but Franklin said, "Anybody

122:24

who gives up their individual rights in

122:25

the name of security deserves neither."

122:27

Um, your freedoms in the name of

122:29

security deserve neither. Um, and it's

122:32

some of the ways that they've done it

122:33

have been really above the surface. And

122:35

it it frankly blows my mind that we let

122:39

the government get away with some of

122:41

these things that we let them get away

122:42

with where you even explain it to

122:44

people. They're like, I don't see it

122:46

like I don't see how that was a big

122:47

deal. And I'm like, it was a total

122:49

recalibration of the system that allowed

122:52

the Democratic party and the Republican

122:54

party to usurp your rights in a way that

122:57

if you knew any better, you'd probably

122:58

be protesting. like some of the ways

123:01

that we they've done this, you know, we

123:03

can go with the easy stuff like the

123:04

Patriot Act, right? In the name of

123:06

security, we're going to start

123:07

collecting on Americans, you know, and

123:09

the Biden and Obama administration. I

123:12

will say this

123:14

at risk of, you know, getting in trouble

123:16

cuz I used to have a clearance.

123:19

They had a massive vacuum cleaner and

123:21

they knew what it was vacuuming up and

123:23

they kept vacuuming it up anyway in the

123:25

name of security. I'm not saying they

123:27

were going after American citizens, but

123:29

they certainly knew they were and they

123:32

just vacuumed [ __ ] up and collected it

123:34

and stored it in a database

123:36

>> in case they need it.

123:37

>> In case at some point we needed to, you

123:39

know, come up with a narrative or get

123:41

rid of somebody who's inconvenient or

123:43

whatever else that just flies in the

123:45

face of individual American rights and

123:47

American autonomy and uh is really in my

123:51

mind um the antiattern to freedom. It's

123:54

just really really bad. I mean, I'll

123:56

give you one that people always crap on

123:58

me whenever I talk to them about it, but

124:00

there's two that really bother me. One

124:01

of them being like the 17th amendment.

124:03

Do you know the 17th amendment to the

124:05

constitution?

124:06

>> So the 17th, so when the founders when

124:09

you read the federalist papers and the

124:10

federalist papers, I really love reading

124:12

the federalist papers. I love reading

124:14

how they informed the constitution, the

124:15

bill of rights, um the declaration even

124:18

um John J. James Madison wrote these

124:21

documents explaining the framework and

124:23

the 17th amendment essentially how the

124:25

Senate the Senate right the 50 people

124:28

there that are supposed to be

124:29

representing us was originally

124:31

constructed was a state would have

124:32

legislators and the state legislators

124:35

and the governor would appoint the

124:36

senator. The reason that the founders

124:38

did that was because they the state

124:41

governments had to give power to the

124:43

federal government to exist there back

124:46

with the articles of uh um articles of

124:49

confederation. Confederation. Is that

124:51

right? Articles of I think it's Articles

124:54

of Confederation. I'm blowing a Sorry,

124:55

I'm going nuts. Back before there was a

124:58

strong centralized American government,

125:00

um we had problems with money. We had

125:01

problems with interstate commerce and

125:03

those types of things. And those

125:04

articles eventually turned into what is

125:07

the constitution? But the states had to

125:08

grant that power and the and the signers

125:10

of the declaration of independence and

125:12

the constitution knew that the states

125:14

needed to be those small projects that

125:16

we talked about before where if

125:17

California wanted to go nuts, let them

125:19

go nuts. But it shouldn't impact what's

125:21

happening in Texas. It shouldn't impact

125:23

what's happening over in New England. It

125:24

shouldn't impact what's happening in the

125:25

Midwest. But if if that goes nuts and it

125:28

fails, it needs to fail. So the state

125:30

senators, I'm sorry, the state um

125:33

legislators would come together and they

125:35

would vote for a senator. They would

125:36

elect a senator and that senator's job

125:39

was to go to the federal government and

125:41

protect the rights of the state. Not to

125:43

protect the rights of individuals per se

125:46

and certainly not to embolden the

125:48

federal government. But with the 17th

125:50

amendment, what happened was the the

125:52

House of Representatives function was to

125:55

be the petulant children of government.

125:58

So their job was to come up with crazy

126:00

ideas, crazy laws, all of those things.

126:02

The more liberal version of government

126:04

juristp prudence would be the the House

126:07

of Representatives or crazy ideas. And

126:08

then you had state senators who were

126:10

supposed to be between the House and the

126:12

President who would say, "Well, here's a

126:14

good idea, but the rest of this is

126:15

[ __ ] AOC, like we're not doing all

126:17

this. That's crazy." Or whoever else.

126:20

Name a Republican who's ash hat as well.

126:22

Um we're not doing these things. And

126:24

that's because it would erode the

126:26

state's rights and the state's

126:27

constitution and what made this state

126:29

great. Because what the legislators

126:31

would do is say, "Hey, Joe Rogan, we

126:33

you've made a lot of money and you've

126:35

got a big podcast and a big voice and

126:36

you've learned some lessons around the

126:38

way and you're able to do that in Texas

126:39

and you decided to come to Texas because

126:41

we had all of these things that

126:42

California didn't have. We need you to

126:45

go to the Senate for three years or six

126:48

years or seven years, whatever it was

126:49

back then, and represent those same

126:52

principles." So when Obamacare comes

126:54

through, you can say not only no, but

126:55

[ __ ] no. Like I'm not voting for this

126:57

thing. And it was to protect the state.

127:00

But what the 17th amendment did was it

127:03

it re it was redundant with the House of

127:05

Representatives, which was in the

127:07

founders's eyes the only popular vote

127:09

part of the constit of the of the

127:11

American government was the popular

127:13

vote. And then you had, you know, the

127:15

way the president gets elected through

127:17

electors, but you had the state senate

127:18

which was appointed by the states. So

127:20

the legislators and I'll I'll use North

127:22

Dakota where I'm from. You'll have one

127:24

big city, two big cities, Fargo and

127:26

Grand Forks, North Dakota. It's where

127:29

the universities are. It's where your

127:31

crazy kids are. Crazy thought exists.

127:34

Hyper crazy ideas, but some of them are

127:36

useful. The rest of the state's

127:38

agriculture, right? So all of those

127:40

legislators from all those counties or

127:42

those legislative districts would get

127:44

together and say, "We're going to put

127:46

Bill Thompson, that would never happen,

127:47

but in charge of he's going to be at the

127:49

Senate representing North Dakota." But

127:51

he has to rep represent the whole state.

127:54

In other words, you can't do things that

127:55

will that will help Grand Forks or Fargo

127:57

because that's where the universities

127:59

are. That's where all the crazy politics

128:00

are. You also need to be thinking about

128:02

the guys out in the western counties,

128:03

Lamore County in North Dakota or way out

128:06

west. You have to protect agriculture.

128:07

You have to protect small businesses.

128:09

You have to protect families.

128:11

What the 17th amendment under Woodro

128:14

Wilson and how they really usurped the

128:15

Constitution and made the Senate a

128:17

redundant. They made it a redundant

128:19

house of representatives and using the

128:21

popular vote. So now we use popular vote

128:24

for that. But if you want the popular

128:26

vote in North Dakota, 85% of the

128:28

population is in Fargo and Grand Forks.

128:30

So now you've got if I want to run for

128:32

Senate in North Dakota, I'm just going

128:34

to spend all of my time in Fargo and

128:35

Grand Forks

128:36

>> because if I can repeat back to those

128:38

people all the ideas that they want to

128:40

hear, I'm going to win that vote and I

128:42

don't have to represent those people out

128:44

in the rest of the state in anything.

128:45

>> Right?

128:45

>> So they created a redundant House of

128:47

Representatives. But another reason why

128:49

it happened was they wanted popular vote

128:51

because there is no amount of money that

128:53

you could stick into a legislature out

128:55

in the western part of North Dakota. You

128:57

can't bribe these people. But the DNC

128:59

and RNC now can say, "Look, these two

129:01

senators are running. We like this guy,

129:03

so we're going to this guy will do

129:04

whatever we tell him to do." And it's

129:07

that has nothing to do with the state or

129:08

representing the state's rights or the

129:09

rest of those legislative districts.

129:11

We're going to pick this senator and

129:12

he's getting $300 million for his

129:15

election bid. And this other guy who's,

129:17

you know, a slower moving constitutional

129:19

conservative who might be a free, you

129:21

know, market absolutist and a classical

129:24

liberal, he's not being funded.

129:27

But under the state architecture, you

129:29

might have been a better representation

129:31

of the state. And that's why the

129:33

legislators had to vote for you to put

129:35

you in as a senator. You had to

129:37

represent the whole state. But now all

129:40

that someone who wants to be a senator

129:41

needs to do is go to the Republican

129:42

National Committee or the the the

129:45

Democrat National Committee and say,

129:46

"I'll do all the things you tell me to

129:48

do, fund my campaign, and I'm going to

129:50

go stump in Fargo and Grand Forks, North

129:52

Dakota, and the hell with the rest of

129:54

the state." It's very important. is a

129:56

very important slide of hand. And when

129:58

that happened, you made a redundant

129:59

House of Representatives and the state

130:02

no longer was uh protected at the

130:04

federal level. And what happened was all

130:07

of the power from all of these states

130:09

and these legislatores and these

130:10

individuals got sucked up into the

130:12

federal government. And then after that,

130:13

you see all of these things that would

130:15

never have been passed by a state

130:16

getting passed. things like Obamacare,

130:18

things like the Patriot Act, certain war

130:21

resolutions, um all kinds of things

130:24

where it just further erodess the power

130:26

of the state. And federal government

130:29

wants that because it puts all of the

130:30

power up in the federal government. And

130:32

people always say, "We need to get money

130:33

out of politics." No, we need to get

130:35

power out of politics. that power that

130:37

they've taken, you know, over the last

130:40

130 years or so used to exist at the

130:43

state and local levels because they

130:44

wanted these thought experiments

130:46

happening where we could pluck the best

130:47

things out of them and forget the rest.

130:49

But all of that power has now gone up to

130:51

the federal government and the federal

130:52

government um uh won't ever release that

130:56

power and they only want more budget and

130:57

more spending to execute that power. And

131:00

that's also because the interest groups

131:01

that want to go, they don't want to have

131:03

to go and convince a whole state of

131:04

whether or not something is good that

131:06

people are going to vote on, they just

131:07

want to go take a lobby and go up to the

131:09

federal government because they want all

131:11

of the power up there as well. And the

131:13

federal government wants all the power

131:14

up there as well because they make

131:15

$300,000 a year before they become a

131:17

politician. and they're worth $30

131:19

million when they're done being a

131:20

politician because all of the money has

131:22

to go to the federal government because

131:24

they're in charge of light bulbs we can

131:26

use, computers, we can use, flush

131:27

toilets we can have, how our roads are

131:30

going to look, what our medical care

131:32

looks like that none of those powers are

131:34

explicitly written in the Constitution

131:36

in the United States. And they use

131:38

things like the commerce law and other

131:39

things in order to create things like

131:41

Obamacare where really we want competing

131:44

states. If Texas comes up with a great

131:46

way to do healthcare and North Dakota

131:49

isn't so great, they can look at that

131:51

experiment, they can adopt the

131:52

principles and they can have it at that

131:54

level. But it's much easier to get

131:56

change at the local level when the power

131:58

is derived from the state and the

132:00

individual because if I want to change

132:01

the way that my state does healthcare, I

132:03

have one of two options or three

132:04

options. I can run for office, I can

132:06

support someone who is going to go into

132:08

office and do what I want or I can move.

132:10

But when everything's centralized at the

132:12

federal government and everything flows

132:13

from the federal government, all of the

132:15

money power and gravity is up there and

132:17

the individual, the 300 million of us or

132:20

so have real really no power now to

132:23

exercise either states rights or

132:25

individual rights at the higher level. I

132:26

hope I'm elucidating this correctly, but

132:29

it's a real usurppation of individual

132:30

and state autonomy

132:32

>> that really got rid of state power,

132:34

which was, if you read the federalist

132:36

papers, was so important to the founders

132:37

that there was this state that the

132:39

state's needs were organized because the

132:42

state was where the founders wanted

132:43

these thought experiments. You you read

132:46

Thomas Hobbes Leviathan or John Lockach

132:48

or Montescu, all of them talked about

132:51

this great experiment that was being set

132:52

up and how it was built on all of this

132:54

western politics and everything that had

132:55

came before it on how we could have a

132:57

government that was forced to respect

132:59

the rights of individuals and allowed

133:01

for these competing think tanks of ideas

133:04

and that the power would never rest at

133:05

the federal government. But the 17th

133:07

amendment um was a way that a lot of

133:09

that power went from the state level and

133:12

the state legislatures. And now to

133:14

become the president, they want to do a

133:16

popular vote. And under a popular vote,

133:18

you would just have to campaign in New

133:19

York and LA,

133:21

>> right?

133:21

>> You would get the popular vote out of

133:23

the likely voting people and now the

133:26

rest of the country is not. And that

133:27

would be another you hear all these

133:29

people saying we need a popular vote. We

133:30

can't have the electoral college. We

133:32

can't have all of these things.

133:34

Everything needs to be pure. do pure

133:36

democracy allows 51% to rule 49%.

133:41

And that was another thing the founders

133:42

were working fervently to get away from.

133:46

And that's why we had an electoral

133:47

college. And it and it's actually quite

133:49

beautiful when you actually read about

133:50

it and examine it. It's why we had the

133:52

state senate and state legislatores. And

133:54

it's why we had the house. You had all

133:56

levels of the things of government that

133:58

the founders cared about being

133:59

represented in this body politic. And it

134:01

was a beautiful thing. And I could go on

134:03

for 15 more things about that. I won't

134:05

do it for the sake of your listeners

134:06

because I'm I doubt this is what they

134:07

wanted to do. But similar things

134:09

happened with the uh Supreme Court

134:11

Marberry v. Madison and allowing the

134:13

Supreme Court to have judicial review.

134:15

That was never a thing that was in the

134:16

Constitution. And the Supreme Court, if

134:18

you like the Supreme Court being able to

134:20

have the power to describe everything as

134:21

being either constitutional or

134:23

unconstitutional, then you're not ruled

134:24

by a democracy. You're ruled by an

134:26

oligarchy. You've got eight people in

134:28

robes that are going to tell you whether

134:29

or not laws are good or bad. And that's

134:31

not the founding of this country. It's

134:32

not how it was intended to work. And

134:34

that all started back in Marberry

134:35

Marberry v. Madison with Thomas

134:37

Jefferson um and these rits of mandamus

134:40

that where the sup Supreme Court long

134:42

story short essentially granted itself

134:44

the power to conduct judicial review

134:46

under the old system or the system old

134:48

system the system that was ratified and

134:50

that the founders approved was if a law

134:53

was deemed unconstitutional

134:56

um it would go before the Supreme Court

134:57

and they just wouldn't rule they would

134:58

rule in favor of the person and then

135:00

eventually the government would figure

135:02

out oh this law doesn't work but it was

135:04

never on the Supreme Court to say

135:05

constitution utional, unconstitutional.

135:07

You would get arrested for some law.

135:09

You'd go and it would get appealed to

135:10

the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court

135:11

would say, "We're not punishing this

135:13

person. This is against the

135:14

Constitution." But the government would

135:16

have to keep arresting people and it

135:18

have to keep going in front of the

135:19

federal government. So what I'm saying

135:21

is, and I'm sorry to go off on this, we

135:22

can go back to tech, but all I'm saying

135:24

is the core of the American experiment

135:27

and individual rights and what makes

135:29

this c country so great and why I was

135:31

willing to die for it after my initial

135:33

enlistment and why I have such love for

135:35

this is because it was the only

135:36

experiment where the value of the

135:38

individual was held at the top of the

135:40

hierarchy and that people could truly be

135:42

allowed to flourish. And in 250 years,

135:44

we did more than any society could have

135:46

hoped to have achieved in tens of

135:48

thousands of years. Or not that it's

135:50

been around that long, but in thousands

135:51

of years. Everything tends towards um

135:55

disorder and everything uh power always

135:57

gets centralized. And we had a framework

136:00

to do that, but we were willing

136:01

participants in our own demise. And now

136:03

we're scratching our heads and wondering

136:04

why there's no individual and why

136:06

there's no individual autonomy. Why a

136:08

guy can't smoke weed on the weekend or

136:10

why a guy can't do X Y or Z because we

136:12

have centralized the authority and the

136:14

power and the decision-making structure

136:16

and we're allowing them to be there

136:18

would be no problem with money in

136:19

politics if the federal government had

136:21

only the powers that were outlined to it

136:23

in the constitution.

136:25

>> I think that's very well said and I

136:28

could have never said it the way you

136:29

said it and I think there's a lot to

136:31

absorb here. I'm sorry.

136:33

>> No, no, it was great, dude. It was

136:34

great. Um, this is one of the things I

136:36

love about you. You're very thorough.

136:38

>> Yeah, thorough is one thing. My friends

136:40

always say, Bill's tism is starting to

136:42

show.

136:42

>> Ah, you got a touch of the tism, but I

136:44

think that's good. Like I said, just

136:46

like ADHD, I think it's a superpower.

136:48

Lot to absorb. So, I think we'll wrap it

136:51

up right here. But thank you. This was

136:52

an awesome conversation. I really

136:54

appreciate it. It was really great.

136:55

>> Yeah. Um,

136:56

>> we could do this again, too. I'm sure we

136:58

could probably have 30 or 40 of these.

136:59

>> We didn't even get to AI. I wanted to

137:01

get to AI cuz I I think I have a very

137:02

anti pattern to AI and how you

137:04

understand it. But um we if you want we

137:06

can save that for another time.

137:08

>> Yeah, we'll do that for our next one cuz

137:09

I think that's another four hours.

137:10

>> Yeah, probably.

137:11

>> Yeah, for sure. Um

137:13

>> and by then who knows where it's going

137:14

to I mean Jensen Jensen Hang from Nvidia

137:17

recently declared that we've reached

137:19

AGR.

137:20

>> Yeah. So I would I would Yeah, I I could

137:24

Yeah. I just couldn't disagree more and

137:26

I think I could in the same way I just

137:28

elucidated.

137:28

>> You're not the only one. Quite a few

137:30

people. Yeah. Yeah. I mean it's

137:31

consciousness projection and I'll sum it

137:33

up in a minute. At the end of the day um

137:36

neural networks are mathematical

137:38

functions. They rest in you know waiting

137:40

neurons based on training data and

137:43

applying power to train models. It's all

137:45

mathematic. Um there's no sense of

137:47

knowing there in that um you know I

137:50

Penrose I've read a lot of um on is ORC

137:53

O if people want to read about that I

137:55

won't explain it um um or orchestrated

137:58

objective reduction and how the mind

138:00

works and these fleets of consciousness

138:02

that we have these shimmers of

138:03

consciousness that we have based around

138:05

what you know he describes in the

138:06

microtubial

138:08

um we get conscious thought and that

138:10

conscious thought we project into things

138:12

AI is very good conscious projection but

138:15

will it will have consciousness or

138:17

knowing because it has no system of

138:18

values. And if we were to instill values

138:20

in it, it would still be consciousness

138:21

projection. You saw my dad's cabin. My

138:25

dad died when I was five, but I bought

138:26

it back and was working on it. And

138:28

inside of his cabin, um I got to learn a

138:30

lot about my father by working on the

138:32

cabin that he built. Like we would

138:34

measure things or cut things right on

138:35

walls and that type of stuff. That's all

138:38

consciousness projection that allowed me

138:39

to get to to know him a way I might not

138:41

have even known him if he were alive.

138:43

But I got to reexperience and understand

138:45

my father and his thoroughess through

138:46

that cabin. AI is consciousness

138:49

projection. It's projected

138:50

consciousness. It's getting very good.

138:52

But on a calculator, you could get the

138:54

same thing out of a neural that you get

138:56

out of a neural network if you had

138:57

sufficient time. I could present you a

138:59

question just like you did on

139:00

perplexity. I could sit here with a rule

139:03

book and I could type in a calculator.

139:06

It might take me a million years, but I

139:08

could do it and I could get give you the

139:09

same answer that a neural network would

139:11

give you. That doesn't mean

139:12

consciousness or knowing or AGI is

139:15

presence is present. It relies on its

139:17

training data. It can only give you what

139:19

the training data gives it. It can it

139:21

needs human consciousness projection

139:23

like we talked about with the captures

139:25

or we talked about with uploading photos

139:27

to Google Drive. It needs that training

139:29

data and and to me it's just really

139:32

fancy clever math. and having trained

139:35

these networks from year dozens of year

139:37

or a dozen years now and working with

139:39

them um they're just really clever

139:41

consciousness projection and so yeah

139:44

that that is four hours and we can do

139:45

that next time

139:46

>> we'll do that next time definitely

139:48

>> but if people we you mentioned the app

139:49

>> by the time we do it next time who knows

139:51

what the [ __ ] is going to be going on

139:52

with AI too

139:53

>> yeah but uh if people want to learn more

139:55

about me or my company it's if I can say

139:57

that

139:58

>> yeah please

139:58

>> uh it's spartanforge.ai AI, we're built

140:00

under the rubric of individual freedom.

140:02

I want people outdoors. I want people

140:04

hunting. I want people experiencing

140:05

nature. I want people um providing for

140:08

their families. The best part of my day

140:10

is when my kids are eating a backstrap

140:12

of an animal that I took. And I want to

140:15

enable people to go out and do that.

140:16

Even though it's paradoxical through an

140:18

app, you can get lost. You got to

140:19

conserve time. You got to ecout. You got

140:21

to learn things before you go out there.

140:22

So, we built this company under that.

140:24

It's one of my I've got three other

140:26

companies that I'm doing, but Spartan

140:27

Forge is the one that I'm really

140:28

>> That's an awesome app.

140:29

>> Really working on Well, I really

140:30

appreciate that. We've put a lot of work

140:31

into it and we've got a lot more coming

140:33

over the summer. So,

140:34

>> if people want to support us or want to

140:36

get out there and and get some hunting

140:37

done, please check it out. And I answer

140:39

all the Instagram DMs. So, if you want

140:41

have a question for me,

140:42

>> good luck with that now.

140:43

>> Well, I I try to. I spend about two

140:45

hours every morning doing it.

140:47

>> But, uh, good luck.

140:48

>> Thank you, Joe, for having me.

140:49

>> Thanks, brother. Appreciate you very

140:50

much.

140:50

>> Yeah, I did.

140:51

>> All right. You, too. Bye, everybody.

Interactive Summary

This episode of the Joe Rogan Experience features a conversation with someone who was a military intelligence officer. The guest details his experiences with historical reenactments, specifically

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