The Moral Cost of Trump’s War | The Ezra Klein Show
1636 segments
At 8:03 a.m. on Easter Sunday, Trump
posted this to True Social. Tuesday will
be power plant day and bridge day all
wrapped up in one in Iran. There'll be
nothing like it. Open the straight, you
crazy bastards. You'll be living in
hell. Just watch. Praise be to Allah.
President Donald J. Trump. That is even
crazier when you read it aloud. But
Trump followed it up with another post
on Tuesday that began, "A whole
civilization will die tonight. Never to
be brought back again." I don't want
that to happen, but it probably will. It
didn't happen. Trump backed down,
agreeing to a twoe ceasefire with Iran.
Then on Wednesday, he wrote, "The United
States will work closely with Iran,
which we have determined has gone
through what will be a very productive
regime change."
Trump has oscillated in the course of
days, even hours, from threatening an
apparent genocide to then excitedly
musing about partnering with Iran to
charge tolls to ships passing through
the straight of Hormuz and giving them
relief from sanctions and tariffs.
This is not the art of the deal. This is
behavior that should trigger a wellness
check. And look, maybe you'd expect a
liberal like me to say that, but listen
to some of the Trumpier voices, or at
least traditionally Trumpier voices on
the right. Here's Tucker Carlson. It is
vile on every level. It begins with a
promise to use the US military, our
military, to destroy civilian
infrastructure in another country, which
is to say to commit a war crime, a moral
crime against the people of the country,
whose welfare, by the way, was one of
the reasons we supposedly went into this
war in the first place. Look, I don't
agree with Carlson on all that much. I
do appreciate the register he found
there because he's right about what that
was a moral crime. To even conceive of
erasing Iranian civilization, much less
threaten it in public. It is a horrific
act on its own. Just imagine being an
Iranian parent that night, unsure if you
could protect your child. Imagine being
an Iranian living here, worried about
your family back home. What Carlson
correctly centered is something Trump
forgot or didn't care about as soon as
it was convenient. Iranians are human
beings. To annihilate them, to salvage a
war you started is a crime against
humanity. It is the act of a war
criminal. It is the act of a monster.
And I know there are those who say this
is all just a negotiation.
This was Trump pressing Iran to fold.
There are two problems with that. The
first is that Iran didn't fold. We did.
Trump appears ready to accept a level of
Iranian control of a straight of Hormuz
that would have been unimaginable 2
months ago. You have now JD Vance saying
that Iran might not even give up its
right to nuclear enrichment.
This is what it looks like when you lose
a war, not when you win one. The second
is that this is an immoral way and a
dangerous way even to negotiate because
what it does is it commits you to war
crimes if your bid is rejected. Megan
Kelly said this well.
>> This is completely irresponsible and
disgusting. This is wrong. It's wrong.
He should not be doing it. I don't care
that it's a negotiate. His negotiation
tactic is to kill an entire country full
of civilians, men, women, and children,
an American president, so that the
straight of hormuz will be opened. I
It's just wrong. A list of the Trumpy or
formerly Trumpy figures who just seem
appalled here could go on. You had
Marjorie Taylor Green calling for the
25th Amendment and Trump's removal from
office. She said what Trump was doing
was quote evil and madness. You had Alex
Jones agreeing with her. How do we 25th
amendment his ass?
>> You had Candace Owens calling Trump a
quote genocidal lunatic.
I am glad and relieved that Tuesday
night brought a ceasefire rather than a
war crime. The Iranian people have
suffered plenty. They do not deserve to
be buried in rubble to salvage Trump's
pride. But I am not sure that what Trump
said was wrong exactly. I am worried a
civilization died that night or at least
is dying. But it's our civilization.
It is very hard to see Donald Trump,
listen to him, watch him, and not think
that this grand experiment in
self-governance is falling into ruin in
just the way the founders feared. We've
entrusted tremendous power to a
self-deing narcissist and demagogue
who's becoming more dangerous and
erratic as he ages and as his presidency
fails.
What we saw over the last week was how
dangerous Trump becomes when he feels
himself losing. When he feels that
control is slipping from his grasp.
Donald Trump is a 79year-old man in
uncertain health in the final years of
his presidency. He is hideously
unpopular even now. He is very likely
going to lose midterm elections and then
he and his family and associates will
face a raft of investigations. How much
Gulf money has made its way into Trump
family pockets? Who's bought all that
crypto from them? What kind of deals got
made with the Trump family before
countries saw their tariffs knocked
down? The next few years will for him
carry the potential of terrible loss.
And so I don't think this is the last
time Trump is going to endanger a
country in a desperate gamble to avoid
the consequences of his own failures.
But that country often times is going to
be our own.
Joining me now is Fried Zakaria, the
host of Freed Zakaria GPS on CNN, a
columnist for the Washington Post, and
the author of, among other books, The
Age of Revolutions. As always, my email
is Kleinshowny Times.com.
Fred Zakaria, welcome back to the show.
Always a pleasure. So, I want to start
with Trump's now infamous post on
Tuesday morning where he wrote, quote,
"A whole civilization will die tonight,
never to be brought back again."
What did you think when you saw that?
I mean, I was horrified, but it goes
beyond that. It it felt like that tweet
was the culmination of something that
had been going on for a while, which was
that the president of the United States
was simply abandoning the entire moral
weight that the United States had
brought to its world role ever since
World War II. I mean, not to sound too
corny about it because of course we made
mistakes and we were hypocritical and
all that, but compared to every other
power that be that gained this kind of
enormous uh enormous uh uh dominance,
the US had been different. You know,
after 1945, it said we're not going to
be another imperial uh hegeimon. We're
not going to ask for reparations from
the countries that uh that we defeated.
We're actually going to try and build
them and we're going to give them
foreign aid. We invented the idea of
foreign aid. Basically that whole idea
that the United States saw itself as
different, saw itself not as one more in
the train of great imperial powers that
when it was their turn had decided to
act rapaciously to extract tribute to
enforce a kind of you know um brutal
vision of dominance.
All that was in a sense, you know,
thrown thrown away. And I realized it
was just one tweet, but there was the
culmination of something Trump has been
doing for a long time. And it it just
left me very sad to think that the the
United States, this country that has
really been so distinctive in its in its
world mission. uh and a country that I
looked up to as a kid and came to as an
immigrant
that the that the leader of that country
could literally threaten to annihilate
an entire people. When when you say
something like that, it sounds very
abstract, right? Civilization.
What we're talking about is, you know,
the the lives and and aspirations and
culture and dignity of a whole people. I
mean, you're talking 93 million people.
One thing that has always felt to me
core about the moral challenge
that Donald Trump and his view of
geopolitics poses
is it feels to me on a deep level
like a throwback to the
18th, 19th, early 20th century
when
individual
lives, individual human lives.
We're just understood as pawns
in the greater game of
dominance and strength and rivalries and
conquests.
As you say, I'm not saying that there's
not been disrespect or disregard for
human life in the post-war era. That
would be absurd.
But there was a commitment and a a
structure of values in which
you didn't
threaten
mass annihilation of civilians
simply because you were trying to
salvage face in a war you had started
for no reason and were losing that that
you know and you see this in Doge and
its approach to USAD that there is
something about
how you treat or don't treat how you
weigh or don't weigh
the lives and futures of the people who
are caught within your minations
that he just wipes away um as I think a
kind of weakness or
liberal piety.
If you watch um or listen to George W.
Bush when he is essentially losing the
war in Iraq. What is striking is the
difference. Bush for all his flaws and
you know and he made many many mistakes
in Iraq but for all his flaws always
looked at it as an essentially
idealistic aspirational mission. We were
trying to help the Iraqis. He never uh
demeaned Islam. He always tried to sort
of see this as part of America's great
uh uplifting mission.
And you almost miss that because even in
our mistakes, even in our errors, there
was always that sense that you know we
were we were trying to help this country
uh do better. We were trying to help
these people do better. And what you're
describing, I think quite accurately, is
Trump approaches it not just from the
point of view of the 19th century,
because sometimes people talk about, oh,
he loves McKinley and he like tariffs
and and he's like McKinley in in in that
imperialism. No, Trump is more like a
rapacious 18th century European
imperialist who did not have any of McK
you know McKinley said he went to the
Philippines because he wanted to
Christianize the the the place and there
was none of that sense of uplift or most
of it was just brutal and it was as you
say the the individual was never at the
center of it human life and dignity was
never at the center of it was all a kind
of self-interested short- term term
extractive game and Trump is hearkening
back to that. Um, and it's interesting
to ask where he gets it from because it
really is probably fair to say that
nobody else on the American political
spectrum if they were president would
speak like that. I don't think JD Vance
would speak like that. I I don't think
um Marco Rubio would speak like that. So
there's something that he brings to it
which is uh a a kind of callousness and
a contempt for any of those uh of those
those kind of the expression of those
values for him that's all a sign of
weakness. That's that's you know the
kind of [ __ ] people say. Um but the
reality is the way he looks at the
world. Here is what you will hear from
Trump's defenders. That this is all
today and it was on Tuesday liberal
hysteria.
That what we were watching was a
brilliant negotiating tactic that Trump
frightened the Iranians. He frightened
the whole world. He put forward a
maximalist and terrifying and immoral
position
and forced the Iranians to capitulate
into a deal they would not otherwise
have accepted. That night he did not
destroy civilization. That night there
was the announcement of a twoe
ceasefire.
Are they right? Is that what happened?
So let's just evaluate it on the on the
merits in the sense of you know if the
genius negotiating strategy
what we have ended up with is in a
situation where we began the war with a
country whose nuclear program had been
completely and totally obliterated.
Those were Trump's words but those were
words by the way echoed by the head of
the IDF in Israel. uh Israel's atomic
agency said is Iran's nuclear program
has been destroyed and can be destroy
kept destroyed indefinitely as long as
they don't get uh access to nuclear
materials which we were actively denying
them. So that was the reality of of
Iran. It had been pummeled. Its nuclear
program had been destroyed. Um that was
the the the what we started with. What
we have ended up with is a war in which
Iran has lost its military and its navy
and things like that. But it was, you
know, to be honest, it was not it was
not using those to attack anybody. What
it has gained is a far more usable
weapon than nuclear weapons. It has it
has gained it has realized and shown the
world that it can destroy the global
economy that it can block the straight
of hormones and that that would have a
cataclysmic follow followon effect. It
now seems poised to not simply be able
to hold the gust the Gulf States and
much of the world hostage because of
that pivotal position it has, but it's
now going to monetize that. Um,
presumably giving it $90 billion of
revenue every year, which is, by the
way, about twice as much as it makes
selling oil. Um, it has weakened the
Gulf states which now sit in the shadow
of this tension that they have to worry
about and navigate. It has brought China
into the Gulf, we learned because the
Chinese had to get the Iranians uh to
agree to this. It has weakened the
dollar because these payments that are
being made through the straight of
Hormos are now being made in crypto or
in yuan Chinese China's currency. It has
strengthened Russia because uh Russia is
now making something on the order of
four to five billion dollars extra per
month because of the in the price of oil
which will probably stay elevated for a
while and and it's almost wrecked the
Western Alliance because Trump in his in
his frustration and desperation when he
realized he wasn't getting his way has
decided to blame all of it on on all
America's allies as if they if they had
somehow joined in. this would have made
any difference when you don't when you
have a bad strategy with unclear and
shifting goals. It doesn't really matter
how many people you have cheering for
you on the side. But you take all of
that and you say those are the costs and
the benefit as as far as I can tell is
quite close to zero in the sense that
Iran already had a nuclear program that
was that was largely defunct. Israel was
already far more powerful than Iran and
could easily defend itself. Um, I I see
it as an absolute exercise in willful,
reckless destruction, a destruction of
lives, destruction of massive amounts of
American military hardware, a
destruction of America's reputation. But
I also think, you know, the what the
president of the United States says
matters. Um, and you can't just excuse
something on the basis on the argument,
oh, it's a clever negotiating strategy.
First of all, it was a stupid, lousy
negotiating strategy that has ended up
with the United States much weaker than
it was. But even if it were, I don't
think that, you know, the ends justify
the means in every in in the situations
like this. Not and certainly not when
the things you say
deeply erode your your credibility, your
moral reputation, your you know, the
core of your values. I think those
things are real and and throwing them
away uh for momentary gain in some in
some poker-like negotiation uh isn't
worth the price.
I think among
among the tells in all this to me was
that Trump in announcing the ceasefire
deal
said that he had gotten a 10-point plan
from the Iranians which he described as
quote workable basis on which to
negotiate. He also said that we're
dealing now with a change regime that
was much more reasonable.
Uh, the Iranians have released a plan.
It includes Iran continuing to control
the straight of Hormuz. It includes the
world accepting an Iranian right to
enrich uranium. It includes lifting all
primary and secondary sanctions against
Iran. It includes payment of reparations
to Iran.
I am not saying Trump or America or
Israel will agree to all or to any of
this.
But if this is the reasonable basis for
talks,
that is an Iran that has ended up in a
stronger position than it was. A
position where it will now have it will
have negotiated out control of the of
the strait and as you say that's a
revenue source. It is demanding payment
and relief.
It to
for Trump to describe that as that plan
is something he has won through this
war. That plan would have been
unthinkable as a negotiating start two
months ago. This is the key point. If if
if this is a workable basis for
negotiation,
why the hell didn't we negotiate on this
basis 2 months ago, 3 months ago, 5
months ago? Why did we need the war? The
Iranians would have made would have been
comfortable with seven of those demands
by which I mean there are three that are
more demanding than they would have ever
3 months ago. They would have never said
that they have the right to control the
straight of hormones. Right? So they
have added on additional demands if
anything. You would have gotten a skinny
version of these demands three months
ago. So we could have easily negotiated
with no war.
the straight of Hormuse. Trump said
something that was striking. He mused
about the US and Iran
jointly controlling the strait and the
way he described it clearly meant the US
taking a cut of those tolls as well.
Well, when you talk about the extractive
nature of Trump's view of geopolitics
and and and foreign policy,
whether that is where it ends up,
the idea that somebody said that to him
or he came up with it and that that was
compelling, that the end goal of all
this is
instead of America making sure that the
tradeways and waterways are clear for
global trade and the international
order, we will start extracting a rent
as part of our payment for a war we
chose to start because Benjamin
Netanyahu talked us into it. Apparently,
that too struck me as quite wild and
more divergent from what you could have
imagined America doing at another time
than I think is even being given credit
for.
>> I I totally agree. I think that is one
of the most telling uh comments that
Trump has made. And to give you a sense
of how divergent it is, the United
States's first military action in 1798,
something called a quasi war with
France, was over freedom of navigation.
The war with the Barbar pirates was
about freedom of navigation. The US has
literally for its entire existence stood
for the freedom of navigation and since
it became the global hegeimon after
1945, it has resolutely uh affirmed and
defended that right. Uh it has put in
place huge protocols about it and I
think it was 1979 Carter put in a whole
program for for it. Um, and it gets to
this whole idea that the United States
has always taken the view that it was
trying to create the open global
economy, the rules-based system, the,
you know, the the global commons. It was
trying to provide public goods for
everybody, not seek short-term
extraction for itself. And Trump's
entire worldview
is the antithesis of that. He hates that
idea that America is this benign
long-term
uh you know hegeimon that looks out for
the whole system. No, what he wants to
do is look at every situation and say
how can I squeeze this situation for a
little bit of money? You know, how can I
if I see a tariff uh a country and I see
there's a slight divergence in tariffs,
I don't think about well the whole point
was to create an open trading system.
No, I say I can squeeze you. If I see
that you're dependent on me for military
aid, I I wonder how how can I squeeze
you? His whole idea is the short-term
extractive uh I get a win for now. I've
talked to a couple of foreign leaders
about this and they also picked up on
this remark. Uh it would be stunning to
the world if the United States, the
country that has for example constantly
warned China that the straight of
Malacha through which more energy goes
than the straight of hormones I think uh
has to remain open and free that freedom
of navigation is a right not a privilege
conferred by anybody. um if we were to
now adopt the position the Iranian
position that no no no it's ours and we
get to do what it I mean it's a it is a
complete revolution in the way we have
approached the world
>> the foreign policy scholar Steven Walt
had an essay recently where he described
what America is becoming or attempting
to be as a predatory hegeimon
do you think that's the way to
understand it
>> yeah that's a very good that's a very
good phrase because you know it is this
predatory attitude towards everything,
but we are still the hedgeimon, right?
So, it's a it's weird. You see countries
like Russia acting in predatory ways,
but you think of them as the sort of
spoilers of the global system. They're
the ones that are trying to shake things
up, disrupt things. They don't like the
the rules-based international system.
They want to they want to destroy it or
erode it in some way and allow for the
freedom of the the strong to do what
they can and the weak to suffer what
they must in Thusidities's phrase
the US has never done that and the US as
hegeimon has been very careful to try to
have that longer term more enlightened
view again with lots of mistakes and
lots of hypocrisy
um but compared to other hegeimons it
really has played that role
And now it is it is it is trying to
extract for short-term benefit. And I
emphasize this because it's actually
terrible for the United States in the
long run. We have benefited enormously
from being the at the center of this
world. But so we're getting these
short-term uh gains at enormous
long-term loss to our position, our
status, our influence, our power. I
think this war has been a disaster for
the United States, been a disaster for
Donald Trump in part because we actually
never knew what we wanted out of it.
I think Israel did know what it wanted
out of it. And if you, you know, look at
the new reporting from my colleagues
Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan, it's
pretty clear that Trump was talked into
it after meeting with Netanyahu and the
MSAD.
seems that there are a lot of parts of
his own administration raising doubts
that he simply wiped away.
Has this war been good for Israel? Do
they get what they want out of it?
>> Look, I think for from from for a
particular view of Israel which has
viewed Iran as this absolute existential
threat uh which is clearly BB
Netanyahu's view uh Iran is destroyed
militarily. There's no question about
it. I mean, remember Netanyahu in that
opening video says, "I've been dreaming
about this for 40 years." He's always
been obsessed with Iran even before
there was a credible nuclear issue. Um,
and
so for for him and for people like that,
yes, you can make the case that a failed
Iran, a crippled Iran, even if it
descends into chaos the way that Syria
did for 10 years, uh, has its
advantages. It takes it takes a kind of
adversary off the field. Um I would
argue that Iran had been contained in
many significant ways particularly after
the Obama nuclear deal. Remember no
enrichment. 98% of its enriched uranium
had been taken out of the country. The
Mossad, Israeli intelligence, American
intelligence and the International
Atomic Energy Agency all said that the
Iranians were following the deal. Um,
and you had the the the reality that you
had the most intrusive inspections
regime that you had ever had in the
history of nuclear test. So, it was it
possible they could be cheating a little
bit on the side? It's possible. Very
very few serious observers of it think
that that was going on. So, there was a
way to contain Iran without the the the
extraordinary destruction. But I think
that what Israel has done has has come
at a cost. I mean, I I look at BB
Netanyahu's long reign as prime
minister, and I wonder if in the long
run, what people will will notice is
that his legacy was to to split apart
the alliance between the United States
and Israel. Um, he began by politicizing
it in a poisonous way when Obama was
president. He went and did an end run
around Obama, went and addressed
Congress. um he openly
sort of fought with Obama and tried to
to turn the issue of Israel into a
partisan issue and then has unleashed so
much firepower. Israel is this is the
superpower of the Middle East. Israel is
currently occupying 10% of Lebanon. Uh
it has it has uh displaced 1 million
people. Uh and this
>> and said 600,000 of them may never be
allowed to come back to their homes.
>> Right. Exactly. And and you put you look
at all of that and
>> I mean that on scale is a second knockba
>> right and you and you and just remember
you know we these 600,000 human beings
that's that's women that's children who
did nothing who were in no way involved
in Hezbollah's you know rocket campaign
against against Israel. So you you you
you ask yourself is the price that now a
majority of Americans have an
unfavorable view of of is Israel that a
majority of young people have a very
unfavorable view of Israel and if you
look beyond America it's not just
America I think the Dutch just joined
the South African case in the
international court to look at what's
happening even in Germany which for
obvious historical reasons has a very
strong you know moral urge to to always
see things from Israel's point of view.
Um, in in Germany, the young are being
increasingly alienated by what they see
and what they So, so, you know, is that
really good for Israel in the long run,
you know, and for what? Um, for it was
already the most powerful country in in
the Middle East. It was able to defend
itself. It was able to deter. Again, in
a kind of short-term narrow sense, yes,
BB Netanyahu has has found a way to push
back against a lot of Israel's enemies.
And some of it, like Hezbollah was a a
really nasty organization doing bad
things in terms of the way it was it was
attacking Israel. But you put it all
together, I mean, Bengorian said Israel,
you know, when it was founded should be
a light unto nations. I think for most
people in the world today
that's that is not the way they look at
Israel and that is a huge loss and that
is a huge moral loss because Israel had
a moral claim when it was founded.
>> I want to go back to where we began
which was Trump's threat to wipe out a
civilization. And in a way I thought
that wasn't entirely empty. It's just
that it might have been our own.
I think Trump has
wiped out the sense that America is a
civilized nation. I think that it is
actually core to his politics and in a
way his appeal
that he routinely violates
what we might have at another time
called civilized behavior. The way he
talks, the way he tweets or put things
on truth social, the way he goes after
his enemies.
And you know, you talk a lot about the
rules-based international order that
Trump is destroying.
And I always think that language sort of
obscures that beneath the rules or
values.
And what Trump has gleefully done from
the beginning of his time in politics is
to try to violate those values in such a
public way as to show them to be hollow,
uninforcable, that these things we
thought were boundaries or moral guard
rails or nothing. And I think it it it
forces some, you know, reckoning with
what those values really were.
So when you talk about that order, when
you lament the way Trump has undermined
it,
aside underneath the rules, what do you
feel is being lost?
I think at at heart, you know, the the
enlightenment project that the United
States is the the fullest expression of,
it's the only country really founded as
a as almost a political experiment of
enlightenment ideas. That at the core of
any value system had to be the
individual the dignity and and life of
an individual human being. that those
that that those were not porns in some
larger struggle. And when you when you
read I've been reading a lot about
Franklin Roosevelt recently because
Roosevelt is probably the man most
responsible for dreaming up that
post-war order. What you see is you he
goes at one point to to Casablanca and
he meets with the the Moroccans and he
said he came to realize just how
savagely the French had ruled over these
people and he said we are not going to
have fought this war to allow the French
to go back and do what they've been
doing for these past centuries and we're
not going to allow the British to go
back and do what they're doing that if
we are going to get in this war and save
the West as it were it there's going to
be a different set of values and much of
that post-war order comes out of that.
Why did he want free trade and openness?
Because he thought there had to be a way
for countries to grow to wealth and grow
to feel you know their power without
conquering other countries. So I do
think I think you're exactly right that
it comes out of a very deep moral uh
sense that there is a way to structure
international life differently than it's
been done for centuries. And the thing I
worry most about is that what Trump is
doing is irreparable. Because even if
you get another American president in
the world will have watched this this
display and said, "Oh, America can
America can be just another imperial
rapacious power and we need to start
protecting ourselves and we need to
start buying insurance and we need to
start freelancing in the same way and
protecting ourselves
and then you know you get into a
downward spiral, right? Because if you
think the other guy is going to defect,
you going to defect first. And that's
what I worry is going to start
happening. The Canadians, you know, you
look at what the Canadians did over the
last 30 or 40 years. They basically made
a single bet that their future was with
a tight close integration with the
United States uh politically,
economically uh in every way. and they
now look at the way in which the United
States used that dependence to try to
extract concessions from them and
they're now saying to themselves well we
need to buy insurance we need to have
better relations with China and with
India and and once you start going down
that path
that that it's that becomes difficult to
to reverse even if you know a a
wonderful more internationally minded
more valuebased president comes into
power the Indians the the same way have
been thinking to themselves, oh, we need
to course correct and we need to take
care of our own situation.
And if everyone does that, you're you're
at some point you're in a very different
world than the world that we created
after 1945.
You know, I remember during the Bush era
when people said that Bush had done
irreparable damage to America's standing
in the world, its global leadership, to
international institutions.
Then came Obama and it turned out the
damage wasn't irreparable. Let's go to
the first Trump term and you know again
you hear the same things and then comes
Joe Biden as thoroughly a liberal
internationalist. I think too much
frankly but as thoroughly a liberal
internationalist as you could get and it
turns out much of the world is very
happy to to welcome America back into
the same role.
I can't tell if the two Trump terms, the
the going back to it, the sort of
erraticness of American leadership now
has made this something different where
the structures are changing around us as
you were saying in a way that makes this
a structural change or in fact, you
know, if Trump is succeeded by a more
conventional figure or a more
allianceoriented figure,
this all snaps back into something more
like its its previous place.
>> Yeah. Some of it will depend on whether
is there an election that is a kind of
complete repudiation of Trump and
Trumpism in in 28 and the world would
would read that in a particular way.
Look, there's a demand for American
leadership. I mean, look at the
Europeans who are very reluctant allies
at various points during the Cold War
and now are desperate for an America
that will simply commit to the to the
alliance. The more the world imagines
what a world without American leadership
and without American power looks like,
the more they want it. The problem is
the world has changed. you know, in in
in during the Iraq war, China was a very
was nothing near not nearly as powerful
as it as it is today. Russia was neither
had not been able to revive itself
through all the oil revenues,
consolidate power as Putin has. Um, and
so, you know, the the world is different
today and America is different. Look,
Bush, for all his flaws, you know, he
was he always tried to appeal to broader
principles. the Iraq war. He went to the
UN. He tried to get UN resolutions. He
went to Congress. He he articulated it
as part of a much larger uh issue of
terrorism. Uh he got assembled in
alliance of whatever 45 countries.
Trump, you know, with this with this
Iran war basically
revels in the unilateralism of it. He
revels in the fact that he does it all
by himself. He doesn't want uh the you
know to bother with Congress, to bother
with the UN, to bother with uh with
allies until, you know, things are going
badly and then he starts screaming that
he wants them. But if Trump represents
something in in America that is deep and
lasting, uh then it's very different
America. It's an it's an America that
really has uh not just tired but soured
on the role that it has played as this
kind of longer you know this country
that had an enlightened self-interest
that looked long that that was willing
to forgo the short-term extractive
benefits. Um I hope that that America is
still around. But as with everything
that's happened with Trump, there are
points at which I've watched Donald
Trump
success and thought to myself, I can't
believe that Americans want this. I I I
just, you know, and I still have
difficulty with that. There's also
always been this leftist critique that
the story you're telling, something that
we're telling here about America where
we say it had this humanitarian vision
and these ideals and sometimes it didn't
live up to them but broadly did that
that's always been false. That Trump is
America with the mask off. Trump has
brought what we've done elsewhere home
and he has
given up on ways we hid what we were
actually doing. Was his promise to
destroy civilian infrastructure and
bridges and power plants to destroy
civilization.
Is that so different than what we did
when we napalmed Vietnam?
So there is this idea that that Trumpism
actually isn't different. it continuity
and its explicit and aesthetically
brutish but honest. What do you think of
that?
>> I totally disagree. I mean, I think that
you can only compare a hegeimon to other
hegeimons. In other words, yes, the
United States looks like it's it's it
has its hands much dirtier than Costa
Rica, uh, which doesn't even have an
army, right? But um let's think about
the last 3 or 4 hundred years. Is the
United States been qualitatively
different as the you know the the
greatest global power compared with um
the Soviet Union, Hitler's Germany, the
Kaiser's Germany, Imperial France,
Imperial Britain, imperial
uh Holland. Yes, th those were all
rapacious colonial empires. Um, if you
think about the Soviet Union and Nazi
Germany, obviously much much worse. And
the United States used its power to
rebuild Europe to bring uh Asia, East
Asia out of poverty. I it created, as I
said, foreign aid. Um, and you know, of
course, we made lots of mistakes. And
what tends to happen is when you have an
ideological conception of your foreign
policy and you think you have to you
have to save Vietnam for from these evil
uh communists you you end up destroying
villages to save them. But that doesn't
change this basic fact that I'm talking
about which is in the broad continuity
of history when you look at other great
global powers what did we use our
influence for? What did we use our power
for? until World War II, every every
power that had had won extracted tribute
from the powers that lost, including in
World War I. People forget. So I I just
don't I I I see the argument about, you
know, American hypocrisy because we do
have done many many bad things. But I
think when you step back and think about
it in a in a broader historical sense,
the the United States has a lot to be
proud for of. Let me try a thought on
you that I've been
wrestling with for bigger reasons, which
is that I've been thinking a lot about
why liberalism in its various
manifestations
feels so exhausted
and uninspiring
here at this moment when what so many
people are afraid of and reacting to is
liberalism. achievements being wiped
away, right? How has that not created a
revival of its strength or a recognition
of its moral ambition? And and I think
one of the reasons is this that that
liberalism begins with, you know,
profoundly ambitious moral ideas about
the dignity of the individual and what
it means to be free.
Over time and particularly in the
post-war period, it encodes those ideas
and ideals into institutions,
laws, rules. We keep calling it the
rules-based international order.
And then it becomes the movement, the
philosophy of the people who staff and
lead those institutions.
And institutions fail and they fall
short and they bureaucratize.
And the problem liberalism has, the
problem the ideas that you're voicing so
eloquently
have right now in acting as an answer to
to Trump is that
what we are left offending are
institutions that don't really work as
opposed to values that really do.
And I don't really know where that goes
because of course in the real world you
need to do things and act through
institutions. But as an answer to what
he is, I don't think you can go back to
where say Joe Biden was talking
endlessly about NATO and its importance.
It's not a like a a stirring call for
more participation in the UN that Trump
challenges something deeper. And I think
liberals fall back on a defense of
institutions
in a way that makes me feel like there's
been a a either a losing of touch with
or a loss of faith in like the the moral
concepts that once animated the creation
of those institutions.
There's a lot in there. So let me let me
try and respond um to several elements
of it because it's it's a that's a very
you put a lot into that.
One part of what
liberalism's problem and and we both
mean liberalism small L you know the
kind of liberal enlightenment project is
it's one too much um over the last two
300 years think of everything that
liberalism has advocated from you know
the emancipation of slaves to women's
equality to racial equality to child
working laws to minimal work you know
Everything has happened. And if you look
at the things that you know the
classical conservatives argued for
>> religious toleration
>> right radical in its time right you
think about all the things the classical
conservatives argued for you know for a
powerful king for powerful church for uh
you know the the domination of the of of
a certain church-based morality over
life for women to be kept in their place
all all those things have lost. Right.
So at one level the problem is as you
say that liberalism not only has won but
then institutionalized itself and those
institutions inevitably become fat and
corrupt and nonresponsive and I think
this is a real problem and and what
Trump can present is the kind of fiery
insurgent spoiler uh which always has a
little bit more drama to it. you know,
in the in the 60s that came from the
from the radical left. Now it's coming
from the right. But there was always
that ability to, you know, to kind of
say, I'm going to upset the apple cart.
And that, you know, there's a certain
energy there that the the people holding
the the card together aren't able to
aren't able to exercise. And I think
that's a real problem. And you know I
mean somebody like a Mamani has a way of
infusing it with a greater sense of um
passion because maybe he goes directly
to the values and even though some cases
I don't agree with his his policies I
think he has a he's a master
communicator and he has solved in a way
the that problem that you're describing
but I think there are also two other
problems. Liberalism has always been
somewhat agnostic about the ultimate
purpose of life. You know, the whole
idea because it came out of the
religious wars was um you get to decide
what what the best life what your best
life is and we're not going to have a
dictator or a pope or a commisar tell
you that. But that leaves people
unsatisfied. I think there's a part of
people that want to be told what is a
what is a great life? What what you know
what is this cause greater than
themselves? Um, and you know the the the
conservative answer is well it's it's
God, family, traditional morality and
those are the things that that that
matter a lot. If you listen to Vance and
Hungary, you know, he says go out there
and bring back the gods of our fathers
uh the god of our fathers. Trump
represents something different in some
ways that that that there you know Vance
and John McCain have more in common in
their critique of liberalism. the the
kind of the empty center of liberalism.
Trump is appealing to the most naked
selfishness in people. He's saying, you
know, what's in it for you? Uh why why
aren't we getting more out of this? You
know, that's one of the reasons I think
that he is so comfortable with the most
the kind of open corruption that he
represents because in a sense he's
saying look those guys had a whole
system and you know it looked very fancy
and meritocratic but they they they got
the spoils now I'm going to get the
spoils in a way he's I think thinks of
himself representing his people but in
any case they seem they seem comfortable
with him getting them but there is this
sense of an appeal to naked selfishness,
self-interest, short-term extraction.
And that's to me much more worrying
because the the problem with liberalism
not having this this answer for the
meaning of life, that's an old problem
and it's a hard one to solve because the
whole point of liberalism is that human
beings get to decide that and it's not
being forced on them. I I am more
skeptical than some that the absence of
meaning at the center of liberalism is
the problem that the post liberal right
wants to make it out to be and that that
it's a problem here. But maybe to boil
down what you actually said about Trump,
I think Trump's core argument
is that didn't work. This does. Now the
thing that he is doing is proving that
this doesn't work. what he is attempting
doesn't work. His uh administration is
not going well. People do not like the
tariffs. They don't like the war. They
don't like him.
That will probably be enough for, you
know, Democrats to win the midterms.
But, but philosophically, in this moment
of rupture, it's not enough to build
something new. That Trumpism doesn't
work. Doesn't solve the problem of
people think that what you were doing
doesn't work either.
You know, I was reading this thing that
Jusome Demsis, who's the the editor and
founder of the publication The Argument,
wrote, and she was writing about the UN
and and and and liberal institutions and
and the ways they've both failed often
to live up to their moral commitments,
but also the way that that that Trump
makes you miss them anyway. and she
writes, "Watching the Trump
administration rip up even the pretense
of caring about liberal internationalism
is a reminder that sometimes virtue
signaling and hypocrisy are a preferable
equilibrium."
And and that I agree with her in the
sense that that realism is true. I would
much prefer imperfectly trying to live
up to real values than this. And also
it's a political message that I think
liberalism is kind of settled into. You
know, our institutions suck, but you
should defend them anyway. It sucks.
>> But I think it's is I can't remember who
said, but hypocrisy is the homage that
vice play bas. But but I guess this is
the the the point I I'm pushing not
because I think you know have the
answer, but because I think it's
something people need to they need to be
replying to this challenge more on on
the level it's actually being posed. A
movement that has adopted the
institutional view can only ever really
be a movement of the status quo and
modest reform.
And I think it's not about like having
the meaning of life, but it is about
some mission about interest. And what
Trump says is your interest is purely
economic, extractive, power, domination.
It's a very old vision of interest.
Interest can also be values. They can
also be moral. They can also be about
identity. But th this question of what
is the answer to Donald Trump's way of
describing what you should be interested
in, what is in the national interest,
what is in your interest is I think a
pretty deep one because I don't think to
say you know you know recommitting to
alliances.
I don't think that's enough for it.
That's not a moral mission. That's a
procedural tactic. So I think you're
getting at something very very important
and I was trying to get at it when
saying you know if you looked at the
social democratic party of Germany which
was probably the most advanced social
democratic party uh in Europe in say
1905
almost everything that it had on its
party platform is now been been adopted
by every western country. So in some
ways what has happened is liberalism has
succeeded and these societies that have
come out of them out of it as a result
are wildly successful. People will often
say that you know there was a great
clash in the 20th century between
communism and capitalism and capitalism
won but actually in the political
scientist social Sher Burman makes this
point very very well. What actually won
at the end was was social democracy was
a mixture of the welfare state and
capitalism everywhere even including the
United States. We have a ve vast uh
welfare state. And so once you have
created that once the basic conditions
of creating a middle class democratic
society uh in which there are
protections for the poor, for the
unemployed, you know, there is health
care of some kind.
Where do you go? And part of what
happened is I think the the left in some
areas went too far left and in an
illiberal fashion. you know the the
emphasis on quotas and DEI and all that
kind of thing in other areas it decided
it wanted to go even further left right
so the challenge is I see the problem
with saying okay you know we've arrived
at this stage and a lot of people I have
to confess like me thought and maybe
this is cuz I grew up in in you know in
in India this is pretty amazing what you
have been able to achieve and you look
at the historical achievement of being
able to have these stable middle class
societies in which individual rights are
protected, where poor people are are
taken care of. This this is amazing.
Now, let's try to get it right. Let's
try to get the the the Rube Goldberg of
American healthc care to work better so
that you actually cover that last 20
something million or however many it is.
But that is unsatisfying as a you know
nobody writes poem poems about expanding
Obamacare. No, you know so I see the
problem. But you know I think that that
is the reality and when you start trying
to find things to write poems and hymns
and and fight battles for you're often
going in dangerous places. Now that's
the liberal in me. You know I I'm I I'm
suspicious of that much passion uh put
into into politics. and look at what the
passion on the right looks like. So I
don't have a good answer, but I do think
that the fundament I'm sure that the
fundamental critique that Trump comes at
this from which is that the United
States has done terribly over the last
30 or 40 years is just nonsense. The
United States has done extraordinarily
well over the last h 100red years and in
particular over the last 30 years with
one big caveat where we have not been as
good on distributional issues but which
we could easily have done that that
there was
>> yeah if Donald Trump and the people in
this party would have let us would have
>> exactly I'm wary of saying that the left
needs to go somewhere where there's
going to be a lot of drama and energy
and people are going to be singing songs
and because that often leads you in in
bad places. And there I do think look,
liberalism was born out of this distrust
of all that passion that religion and uh
and and hierarchy came from with with
the state and the church telling you
this is the right thing to do the the
you know here are the values. So there
is a a moderation romanticism in
politics is something to be taken to be
viewed with a certain certain degree of
skepticism. I think I've been coming to
a a more opposite view, but uh I'm I'm
going to pick that thread up with you
another time.
>> You're going to go back to the 60s and
and uh and start some some new new new
cult movement.
>> I think that the
I do not think that in the way politics
and attention works today.
You can have a political movement that
is afraid of inspiration
and afraid of passion.
I was reading Adrien Waldridge's new
book on liberalism and and he he sort of
has this paragraph early on. It's really
his thesis paragraph where he,
>> you know, talks about both liberalism's
radicalism, it's it's sort of radical
imagination, but then also exactly as
you just were, the importance of its
moderate temperament that distrusts the
passions and and wants to keep a a lid
on things. And I I just don't think
those two things hold together that
well. Now I can come up with balances of
things. I do believe liberalism to be
fundamentally a balancing act and I
think of it as a balancing act between
moral imagination
sort of plurality or what I often think
of as liberality
and um
institutions and your relationship to
institutions. So you are balancing
things if they come out of alignment I
think push liberalism into failure
modes. But I do think as liberalism
became the party of people for whom
institutions have worked, its
temperament has become too institutional
and too afraid
>> of things that could upset
>> the structures.
>> And so then if people don't believe the
structures are working for them, then it
really has nothing to say to them
because it just fundamentally disagrees.
>> No, I agree with that. And I and I think
you know what the where I would like to
see the radicalism and the and the and
the kind of reform is you know when I
look at the issue of of affirmative
action to me I I was always very
uncomfortable with it. I always thought
Lyndon Johnson's explanation of why you
needed it to help formerly enslaved and
and black people who had then lived
under 100 years of Jim Clo Jim Crow made
perfect sense. But then it starts
getting expanded and it starts being
expanded to all kinds of people, you
know, like people like me, people who
came which I thought made no sense. I
mean, America has been particularly bad
to African-Americans. It has been
particularly good to other immigrants.
That's why people from all over the
world have tried desperately to come to
America for hundreds of years because
the United States is unusually good at
welcoming and and accepting. So there
shouldn't have been affirmative action
for people of color, whatever that
means, or you know, things like that.
And then it becomes, it goes from being
affirmative action to quotas, and then
it becomes, you know, diversity
mandates. And you know I I I I feel as
though there should have been some some
moment of reckoning and saying why wait
have we have we completely lost track of
what the the core of liberalism which
was about as Martin Luther King put it
judging people by the content of their
character not the color of their skins.
And those are the kind of things where I
think you know liberalism gets so
institutionalized and conventional
wisdom forms and it becomes impossible
to to to course correct. What I worry
about is you kind of romanticism for
romanticism's sake. The people who run
around today are they call themselves
the principalists because they believe
they are they are adhering to the
original ideals and ideas of the 1979
revolution unlike the terrible
pragmatists who have been who've been
trying to find a way to compromise with
the west. There's another dimension of
all this that is not philosophical that
I want to touch before we end which is
one way of understanding the predatory
hegeimon moment is that it is the gasp
of a dying hegeimon that only has a
limited amount of time left in which it
can extract these kinds of rents.
Now, I would like to believe that that
is not true, but there are ways in which
it often seems to be how Donald Trump
acts personally. He's only got so much
time left on this earth and only so much
time left in this presidency. And he and
his family are going to try to like pull
out everything they can from it. And
he's always been very obsessed with the
rise of China before that, the rise of
Japan. And you know, you could
understand him as trying to monetize
America's power while it still has it
and in doing hastening America's loss of
it. You you wrote a piece that said like
the post American world is coming into
view. What did you mean by that? I I
think that you are seeing countries
around the world find ways to make
accommodations around America. So it's
not purely a kind of question of
American decline. is that we are no
longer leading. So you take something
like protectionism. Yeah, we've become
very protectionist. And what you notice
is very interesting. Other countries
regard the United States as okay, you're
the problem we have to deal with and
we'll cut some deal with you because we
you're too important for us not to. But
but outside of that, countries are
making more free trade deals with one
another. you know, the Indians with the
Europeans, the Europeans with the with
the Latin Americans, the Canadians with
So, in other words, the one thing that
the US had going for it was this agenda
setting power and that's gone. The US
has viewed as off on its own weird
track. Everyone has to has to deal with
it because it's too important. Uh, and
so they're they're they're doing things
and that is a sign of a certain kind of
decline. and and the other one is this
obsession to to have enormous
geopolitical control. You know, one of
the the the haunting parallels for me is
to think about the British Empire in its
last 30 40 years. Um people forget, but
after World War I, the British Empire
expanded to its largest state ever, to
its largest size ever, um only 20 or 30
years before it collapsed. And the
reason was that the Brit British elites
got very engaged and enamored with the
idea of controlling Iraq and controlling
Afghanistan and controlling, you know,
they would find these there was this
wonderful book um called Africa and the
Victorians by Robinson and Gallagher in
which they talk about how why the
British annexed FODA uh you in the south
of Sudan. Well, because they thought you
needed to control the sewers canal to
control the route to India. Well, if you
needed to control the Swiss Canal, you
needed to control Egypt. But if you
needed to control Egypt, you needed to
control uh upper Sudan. But to control
upper Sudan, you needed to control lower
Sudan. So, boing, there you were taking,
you know, sending troops to forod, which
nobody in in anywhere in Britain would
have any idea where it was and why were
they doing that. Meanwhile,
what they were neglecting was the
reality that Germany was becoming much
more productive. America was becoming
much more productive. And I look at what
we're doing today. I mean, you think
about it, right? This is the third
Middle Eastern war we have fought in 25
years. I do worry that this imperial
temptation to have the so much of the re
of the focus and the resources of the
country placed in these far away parts
of the world where it's not clear we're
actually gaining much. We're expending
enormous energy and we're expending a
lot of our our moral capital, our
political capital, our actual financial
capital. That part is very similar to
what happened to Britain. And I don't
know whether it's exhaustion or whether
it's a kind of imperial arrogance or
maybe a combination of the two. Uh but
that feels that feels it feels
hauntingly reminiscent.
>> I saw a Gallup poll that was coming from
their world survey. So polls, people all
across the world and approval of Chinese
leadership had passed approval of
American leadership. Neither was that
high. It was 36% to 31%.
But that the world now prefers Chinese
leadership to ours struck me as
if we were trying to do is make America
great again. I mean, that might be one
of the indicators you would look at to
see if it was working or failing. And
it's actually mostly a vote against us
because nobody actually wants Chinese
leadership. I think they don't know what
it would mean. Uh the Chinese for the
most part don't seem to want to offer
it. Look at what has happened with the
with this recent crisis. They got
involved a little bit. Mostly what
they're involved in is trying to see
that the currency settlements are made
in in Chinese currency. The Chinese are
a free rider. They want to they want a
free ride on, you know, the benefits of
American hijgemony while all the all the
while criticizing it. They don't have an
alternate conception. So what people are
going to find is unfortunately a world
without American power is going to be a
less open, a less liberal, a less
rule-based world. It's but it's not
going to magically re reconstitute
itself around a Chinese hedgeimon
because that is not China's conception
of its world role. It's not going to be
able to do it. It does not have the
trust. Uh we we still for whatever
reason uh for for good reasons have an
enormous amount of trust because we
built it over 80 years. Um you know look
at we have I don't know 55 treaty allies
in the world. China has won North Korea.
Um you if you want to add uh Russia and
Iran fine three you know so the the the
truth is a world without American power
will be a worse world for for for the
rest of the world as well and I think
many of them feel a certain nostalgia
for the for the old American power that
they used to denounce. I have somewhat
rosecolored glasses about these things
but I think America was very special in
its world role and I don't think China
will be able to do that. I noticed the
was in that.
>> It certainly was. Right. Right now, we
are definitely speaking in the past
tense. The the United States is
currently not exercising its world role
with the same level of strategic
thought, with the same moral vision, and
with the same humanitarian impulse that
it has done, albeit imperfectly.
I hope that that can come back. But my
great worry as I said is some of these
things uh are very hard to you know
they're very hard to reconstitute. The
world moves on the world changes people
your reputations take a lifetime to
build and it it's very easy to destroy.
It's true for human beings and it's true
for for nations maybe.
>> That I think is a good place to end. And
now it's our final question. What are
three books you would recommend to the
audience? So, one book I thought since
we do often talk about the rules-based
international order and it does sound so
wonky that I would I would suggest a
wonky book that explains it. The best
scholar who's written on this is a guy
named John Iikenberry at Princeton and I
think the book is called a world safe
for democracy and encapsulates what is
this thing the rules-based international
order the liberal international order
that the US uh created. The second is a
book by Rhynold Neber called the irony
of American history. And it's really all
about the great danger when you are
powerful of believing you are virtuous
and believing that uh you know might is
right. Um and the the call for humility.
Um it ends with a call for kind of
Christian realism in American foreign
policy. and the Christian there really
refers to the humility at the heart of
Christianity which sometimes we forget
when listening to Pete he hexath um and
the final one on similar vein is uh
Graham Green's book the quiet American
uh I think that one of the one of
sometimes novels do it better than than
anything else is a novel set in Vietnam
through the eyes of a sour despectic
world weary uh British journalist who
sees this very idealistic American who
believes that America is going to be
able to, you know, bring peace, justice,
and virtue to Vietnam. And you can
imagine it doesn't quite work out that
way.
>> Fred Sakaria, thank you very much.
>> Thank you, Ezra.
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Ezra Klein and Fareed Zakaria analyze Donald Trump's erratic foreign policy toward Iran, characterized by genocidal threats followed by sudden concessions. They discuss how this behavior signals the abandonment of the post-WWII rules-based international order in favor of a 'predatory hegemon' model focused on short-term extraction. The conversation explores the negative strategic outcomes for the US, the impact of Benjamin Netanyahu's influence, and historical parallels between American overextension and the decline of the British Empire.
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