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Is It Time to Break the Two-Party System? | The Ezra Klein Show

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Is It Time to Break the Two-Party System? | The Ezra Klein Show

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2018 segments

0:00

Go back a couple of weeks and Democrats

0:01

thought they were drawing nearly even

0:04

with Republicans in the gerrymandering

0:05

force. Yes, Texas had tried this

0:08

aggressive midcycle redistricting, but

0:10

California countered them. And that was

0:12

the pattern we were seeing. For every

0:13

red state that was doing a big

0:15

redistricting, there was a blue state

0:16

now trying to match it. But then over

0:18

the past couple weeks, Democrats caught

0:20

a series of very bad breaks. One was a

0:23

Supreme Court decision in Calala which

0:25

gutted the Voting Rights Act, gutted one

0:28

of the last boundaries on what you could

0:30

do in terms of partisan and racial

0:32

redistricting. And the second was that

0:34

Virginia, which had paused their

0:37

commission and drawn new maps, had its

0:39

new maps thrown out by their courts. And

0:42

so now Democrats are going to be down,

0:44

depending on who you talk to, something

0:46

like 7 to 10 seats from these

0:48

redistricting fights. So I think there

0:50

are two questions here. One is what this

0:52

means for this midterm and the fights

0:55

over gerrymandering that will come after

0:56

it. And the second is how can we

0:59

actually put an end to this because this

1:02

is a disaster for our democracy. This is

1:05

exactly how our system is not supposed

1:07

to work. Lee Drutman is a senior fellow

1:10

in the political reform program at New

1:11

America. He's the author of the 2020

1:13

book breaking the two-party doom loop,

1:15

the case for multi-party democracy in

1:17

America. He writes a newsletter under

1:19

current events and he is one of the most

1:21

persistent and thoughtful advocates for

1:23

something you see in a lot of other

1:25

countries. Something that might be an

1:26

answer we need to turn to here which is

1:28

proportional representation.

1:31

As always my email Ezra Kleinshown

1:33

times.com

1:40

Lee Drman welcome to the show.

1:42

>> Hey it's real treat to be having this

1:43

conversation Ezra. So before we get into

1:45

everything that has happened with

1:47

gerrymandering over the past couple of

1:49

weeks, months, years, what is

1:52

gerrymandering?

1:53

>> What is gerrymandering? That that is a

1:56

great question that nobody has the

1:58

perfect answer to. Gerrymandering

2:01

is an old word. It it goes back to 1812

2:05

when the Boston Gazette coined the

2:07

phrase for Elbridge Jerry who was uh

2:11

actually one of the signers of the

2:12

Declaration of Independence. and he was

2:14

a a big puba in Massachusetts politics

2:17

and he drew these maps that looked like

2:19

crazy shapes and one of them looked like

2:20

a salamander. So the Boston Gazette

2:22

called it a gerrymander and we've used

2:26

that term for over 200 years to describe

2:30

sort of messing with district lines for

2:32

partisan or incumbent advantage. But I

2:36

mean it's a good question because nobody

2:38

has has a clear definition of what

2:41

counts as a gerrymander.

2:43

But I think we know what is being

2:45

attempted with with gerrymandering and

2:47

and I think it's worth walking through

2:48

that. So you imagine a state where you

2:51

have a 6040

2:53

Democrat Republican split in the

2:55

electorate. You know if you have

2:57

whatever it is 10 House districts in

2:59

that state. You might think well that

3:01

should give you a distribution where you

3:02

get some Republican ones a little bit

3:04

more Democratic ones right

3:06

>> but it turns out if you're smart and

3:07

you've got computers and you've got

3:08

algorithms you can cut that up. So

3:11

functionally there are no Republicans or

3:14

very few who get elected in that state,

3:17

>> right? And you can be an even bigger

3:18

state like California and be a you know

3:21

roughly 65 35 Democratic state and cut

3:25

up 52 districts in a way potentially

3:27

that gives you 52 Democrats. So th this

3:31

to me is what is a problem and somewhat

3:33

offensive about gerrymandering which is

3:36

it is an act of of effective

3:38

disenfranchisement at least in house

3:41

elections that the that the people in

3:44

power are choosing their voters rather

3:46

than the voters choosing the people in

3:48

power right and so there have been

3:51

efforts to say isn't this illegal or

3:54

unconstitutional in some ways a couple

3:56

of years ago there were a series of

3:57

cases brought to the Supreme court that

4:00

basically wanted the court to hold that

4:03

there were levels of partisan

4:05

gerrymandering right

4:06

>> that were unconstitutional. What

4:08

happened in those cases?

4:09

>> So that that series of cases culminated

4:11

in the Russo decision of 2019 in which

4:15

the conservative majority said we can't

4:19

find a standard that would be

4:21

justiceable uh to declare what is

4:23

partisan gerrymandering and anyway it's

4:26

not our role. it's up to the states and

4:29

it's not something that we should be

4:31

ruling on. And that cleared the way for

4:33

more aggressive partisan gerrymandering.

4:35

I think now there are also state states

4:38

have their own constitutions and some

4:40

challenges are brought under state

4:41

constitutions. But broadly in the 2019

4:45

decision, the Supreme Court gave a green

4:47

light to partisan gerrymandering.

4:49

>> And it's worth noting this thing on the

4:51

states that there were a bunch of states

4:52

where this was unpopular. People do not

4:55

like gerrymandering. So places like

4:57

California and Virginia had created

4:59

independent commissions to make the maps

5:01

nonpartisan,

5:02

>> right?

5:03

>> Okay.

5:04

>> And then there is this other thing

5:07

happening in the political system,

5:09

>> right?

5:10

>> Which is that Trump and Texas kick off

5:14

what's called a midcycle redistricting,

5:16

>> right,

5:16

>> effort that then begins to ping pong

5:19

back and forth between red and blue

5:20

states. So explain to me what has been

5:22

happening just in the past year,

5:25

>> right?

5:26

>> And how it's different than what we

5:27

normally see,

5:28

>> right? So usually districts are drawn

5:32

after a census. So there's a a every 10

5:36

years there's a census and so if a state

5:39

grows and another state shrinks, maybe

5:42

some congressional districts shift

5:43

between states and that means that the

5:46

uh states get to redraw the maps. And

5:50

you know there are various approaches to

5:52

how states have done that over the years

5:53

none of which are are great. Uh but the

5:56

the sort of standard was you you do it

5:59

once those maps last for the decade and

6:02

then after the next census you get

6:04

another turn to to draw those maps. But

6:07

what President Donald Trump does last

6:09

summer is he says, "Hey, I'm looking at

6:12

Texas and you know, I think if they were

6:15

a little more aggressive in their maps,

6:18

Republicans would win even more seats.

6:20

So, hey Texas, why don't you do this

6:23

thing that is pretty outside of of what

6:26

we normally do?

6:27

>> Not a legal,

6:29

but outside the norms, right? I mean,

6:31

this is an important distinction. You

6:32

know, a certain amount of restraint. and

6:34

why why don't you get a little bit more

6:36

aggressive and redraw the map. So, this

6:38

is a big fight. Uh eventually Texas does

6:41

this. They they they get about five more

6:44

Republican seats. And so in California,

6:47

Gavin Newsome says, "Hell no. We're

6:50

going to run a ballot initiative. We're

6:53

going to get rid of our redistricting

6:55

commission, at least for the time being,

6:57

and we're going to redraw maps that give

6:58

Democrats more seats." So then that

7:01

passes. There's also a a challenge in

7:05

Indiana where actually some Republicans

7:07

in the state legislature say, "Actually,

7:09

we're not going to do what Trump wants

7:11

us to do. We're not going to redraw the

7:13

maps to give us an extra Republican

7:15

seat." Then Virginia passes this uh

7:19

ballot measure where they narrowly

7:21

approve also overriding their

7:24

independent redistricting maps that were

7:26

fair to give Democrats 10 out of 11

7:29

seats. Although then the state court

7:32

says actually you violated some obscure

7:34

procedure about what counts as an

7:36

election. So we're invalidating that

7:38

that that is now as we speak the Supreme

7:41

Court will rule on who's right there.

7:44

>> The Virginia Supreme Court

7:45

>> the Virginia no the the US Supreme

7:46

Court.

7:47

>> They've brought a challenge to the US

7:48

Supreme Court. the Texas move and the

7:51

fight for House control leads to a

7:54

situation where blue states are one

7:55

after the other now destroying their

7:58

independent uh redistricting

8:00

commissions. Uh whether or not there's a

8:02

holding like in Virginia, you know,

8:04

we'll see. But it's a allout

8:09

redistricting war. Which means if you

8:11

are a voter in the minority, and here I

8:16

mean the minority party,

8:17

>> right,

8:18

>> in a state, you are functionally you are

8:21

becoming more likely to be functionally

8:22

disenfranchised, right? It is becoming

8:24

more likely that you will just not have

8:25

a voice in house elections because they

8:28

will have drawn your district in a way

8:30

where you don't matter. And this is true

8:32

for Democrats in red states, true for

8:35

Republicans in blue states,

8:36

>> right?

8:38

>> Then there is a series of fights around

8:39

the Voting Rights Act,

8:40

>> right?

8:40

>> Uh culminating in this Klay case that

8:44

just came before the court,

8:46

>> right?

8:46

>> What is that set of I guess previously

8:50

restrictions on jerrymandering that are

8:51

now gone? So section two of the voting

8:54

rights act basically said that

8:58

there are prohibitions against racial

9:01

gerrymandering. So partisan

9:03

gerrymandering is okay as of 2019, but

9:06

racial gerrymandering, which is

9:07

basically depriving minority voters of a

9:10

chance to elect their candidate of

9:12

choice, uh is is still illegal. And so a

9:17

state like Louisiana couldn't draw

9:20

districts that prevented black voters in

9:22

Louisiana from being able to elect their

9:25

candidate of choice. And so there's no

9:28

like one standard. It's been litigated

9:30

on and off over the years. But basically

9:32

what the Supreme Court said in the Klay

9:34

decision is that unless you are wearing

9:38

a KKK mask and saying I don't want black

9:42

people to be allowed to vote like a high

9:45

standard of intentionality, racial

9:47

gerrymandering is not something that's

9:50

able to be proved. You can just draw

9:52

maps however you want.

9:53

>> It's worth noting that the part of the

9:55

case here was ba was an argument that

9:57

this was illegally disenfranchising

10:00

white voters. Yes.

10:01

>> Who would be I mean straightforwardly

10:04

more powerful if they could jerrymander

10:06

out these minority districts.

10:09

>> Yes. And also that racism was no longer

10:11

a problem in America and therefore the

10:12

Voting Rights Act had outlived its

10:14

usefulness. I mean you can argue with

10:18

the logic of this case from any number

10:20

of directions. But the Supreme Court

10:23

gets to decide because they're the

10:25

Supreme Court. And we are left with a

10:29

landscape in which there are no

10:31

prohibitions on partisan gerrymandering,

10:33

no prohibitions on racial

10:35

gerrymandering, and

10:38

it's just a a free-for-all.

10:40

>> So any guard rails that might have come

10:42

from the Constitution or the courts are

10:44

bulldozed over the past decade.

10:46

>> Gonzo. So, walk me through what's likely

10:49

to happen in part of the southern states

10:51

in this post clay era.

10:53

>> Okay, so we've got Louisiana where the

10:56

governor had immediately said we're

10:58

going to redraw the districts, forget

10:59

about the primaries, postpone them, and

11:02

uh it looks like they've they've settled

11:04

on a map that's probably 5 to one

11:07

Republican. So, they they didn't go for

11:09

the most aggressive gerrymander. Uh

11:11

Mississippi currently 3-1 Republican.

11:15

um they will

11:17

probably wind up eliminating that one

11:20

black district, one Democratic district,

11:22

and go four-0 East Alabama. Uh currently

11:26

5 to2 Republican, you know, they could

11:30

they're going to redraw their maps. Uh

11:32

you know, whether it's 6 to1 or 70, see

11:36

how aggressive they get. Florida. Uh, D

11:39

Santis already had it ready to go and

11:42

they have redrawn their maps to go from

11:45

expected 20 to 8 Republican to 24-4

11:49

Republican. Pretty aggressive. Uh, South

11:52

Carolina just announced that they're

11:54

going to 70 Republican. Tennessee is

11:58

going all Republican. They eliminated

11:59

the one Democratic district that was

12:01

Memphis. Georgia could could go more

12:04

aggressive. That's that's uh you know

12:08

uncertain. There are some estimates that

12:10

Republican controlled legislatores

12:12

across the South could target as many as

12:14

19 majority minority districts all held

12:17

by Democrats. I don't know they may be a

12:20

little cautious in some places given

12:21

that it's not a great year for

12:22

Republicans, but it's basically

12:25

eliminating a lot of majority minority

12:28

districts. They're going

12:29

>> which means eliminating a huge amount of

12:30

black representation in Congress.

12:32

>> Yes. So the the term that Hakeem Jeff uh

12:34

has been using is quote maximum warfare

12:38

everywhere all the time. What does that

12:40

mean to have maximum jerrymandering

12:42

warfare everywhere all the time?

12:43

>> I mean it basically means we're turning

12:45

the the house into the electoral college

12:47

which is that whichever party controls

12:49

the state legislature uh and is the

12:51

majority party in the state no matter

12:53

how narrow you know they're going to

12:56

maximize

12:57

the the seats that they can get. And I

13:00

mean that basically means we'll have no

13:03

competitive elections. I mean we basic I

13:05

think the latest analysis suggests we'll

13:07

only have 15 meaningful toss-ups in this

13:10

November election out of 435. So what

13:14

was that like 20 years ago?

13:16

>> 20 years ago you know it was closer to

13:18

like 50. Uh

13:20

>> that's amazing. So we've gone from house

13:21

elections where routinely you'd have 50

13:24

competitive house elections in a cycle

13:26

>> to you said 15. 15. And you know, some

13:29

of that is gerrymandering. A lot of it

13:31

is partisan sorting. I mean, you think

13:34

of two, you know, 20 20 years ago, 2006,

13:36

right? I mean, you had blue dog

13:37

Democrats who were winning in a lot of

13:39

districts that are now completely safe

13:42

Republican districts. And so there's

13:45

been, you know, this increasing uh

13:48

nationalization of partisanship. I think

13:49

I remember a book by a guy named Ezra

13:51

Klein who wrote a book about this this

13:53

uh polarization thing that that has been

13:56

happening to to America. Great book gets

13:58

>> more relevant every day unfortunately.

14:00

>> Uh but I mean so so that's so so part of

14:03

it is just the geography that that

14:05

Democratic places have become more

14:06

democratic. Republican places have

14:08

become more Republican and because we

14:11

have these placebased districts that

14:13

means just a lot of them are safe

14:16

naturally. And then gerrymandering is

14:19

another level on top of that.

14:20

>> So in your best guess, what does this

14:23

mean this year for the midterms when

14:26

everything shakes out given where things

14:29

would have been if nothing had changed?

14:31

So if nothing had changed, I would say

14:34

Democrats easily take the house, right?

14:36

I mean, Donald Trump is unpopular.

14:39

Enthusiasm among Republican voters is

14:41

down. Enthusiasm among Democratic voters

14:43

is up. And every incumbent president

14:48

loses his party loses seats during a

14:50

midterm unless there's a war or some

14:52

extraordinary circumstance like like

14:54

that is just how the electorate moves.

14:57

Uh with the latest shifts in the maps,

15:03

it's

15:04

>> I mean how many seats do you think this

15:06

has taken away from Democrats?

15:10

>> I mean probably

15:12

10 or so. I mean, it's hard to hard to

15:15

say for sure where we we don't know

15:17

where things are going to wind up, but

15:18

you know, best estimates, you know,

15:20

around 10.

15:21

>> Yeah, it's interesting. So, I've seen uh

15:23

estimates around nine and then I've

15:25

talked to Democrats who sort of run me

15:27

through the way they think about it and

15:28

and they've sort of pegged it closer,

15:30

they think, to seven, but it's a

15:33

significant number. Yes. Whichever those

15:35

you're looking at.

15:36

>> Maybe not enough to keep them from

15:37

taking the house, but it

15:40

>> it it shifts the math of the

15:42

competition. It does significantly. Now,

15:44

I mean, the one thing about about

15:46

spreading out your advantage,

15:49

as Republicans are trying to do in

15:51

states like Florida, is

15:54

>> like that could backfire.

15:55

>> I know Democrats who think they were way

15:56

too aggressive in the Florida

15:58

gerrymander specifically. Yeah. And and

16:00

these maps that they're putting out now

16:01

that it's going to be all red, they're

16:03

going to break that map,

16:04

>> right? So, you know, if if you think,

16:06

well, I want to have a bunch of 55 45

16:08

Republican seats, uh, well, if it's a

16:12

really bad year for Republicans,

16:14

those could all go Democratic. I

16:17

>> I want to draw something you're saying

16:18

here. When you're gerrymandering, there

16:20

is a choice you have to make as the

16:22

gerrymandering party, right?

16:24

>> Which is that you can draw extremely

16:26

safe districts, right? a 60/40

16:30

Republican Democratic district

16:32

>> or you can try to draw more districts

16:35

where you have an advantage, right?

16:37

>> But maybe that means you're drawing 45

16:39

555 districts or, you know, 53 47

16:42

districts. And so the more you are

16:44

spreading your voters to to to make sure

16:46

you have the maximum number of

16:47

districts, the less safe you are making

16:50

every individual district. Now, if

16:52

you're in an incredibly lopsided state,

16:54

>> that may not matter, right? But if

16:56

you're in a state that you know is in

16:57

any way competitive in a bad year, you

17:00

might lose a bunch of those elections.

17:02

>> And this is this is what's sometimes

17:05

known as a dummy mander where in trying

17:07

to maximize your gerrymandering

17:09

advantage, you you do a a thing that is

17:12

a thing that dummies do, which is you

17:13

over

17:15

overreach and then that that that

17:18

backfires.

17:19

>> Okay. So there is then a question of

17:22

what happens after this election,

17:24

>> right?

17:25

>> There's only so much that that Democrats

17:27

and Republicans can do before 2026. So

17:29

you can tell me if you think this is

17:30

wrong, but the forecast here from people

17:32

I talked to is this doesn't end in 2026

17:36

absent changes. If nothing changes, this

17:38

goes on into 2028. This goes on into

17:41

2030 as people keep torquing the maps

17:43

for more and more

17:45

>> advantage. Because if the other side is

17:47

doing it, aren't you an idiot to not do

17:49

it as well?

17:51

>> Yes, you would be an idiot. Uh and now

17:55

that that's that's the logic of our

17:57

trench warfare politics. And so

18:00

absolutely unless Congress outlaws mid

18:02

decade gerrymandering, which I I doubt

18:04

they will do. Uh there will be a whole

18:08

bunch of other attempts after the 2026

18:11

midterms to redraw the maps and

18:13

>> get rid of the independent commissions.

18:15

rid of the independent commissions like

18:16

Colorado is an independent commission.

18:18

You know, that's a Democratic state that

18:20

will probably be gone. There's also

18:22

reality that after the V, the Voting

18:24

Rights Act, there are blue states that

18:27

were maintaining minority districts. And

18:30

I think this is like an undernotic way

18:31

this might play out, but it like

18:35

Jeffrey's and others been talking about

18:36

look like we need to maximize partisan

18:38

advantage here. And so like the end

18:40

result of this might be much more

18:42

partisan maps and and less minority

18:44

representation in Congress

18:45

>> because one way to get more more

18:46

Democratic maps is to split up majority

18:48

minority districts

18:49

>> in blue states. Yeah.

18:50

>> In blue states. Yeah. And that's a real

18:52

tension within the Democratic coalition.

18:54

>> Okay. This system, I'm just going to say

18:57

it is a disaster and broken. I know

18:59

people who are deeply involved in the

19:03

effort right now to do counter

19:05

gerrymandering to gerrymander the blue

19:07

states and they they will tell you that

19:10

this is bad for everyone. Like they have

19:12

to do it but they think this is bad.

19:14

They think it is bad for America's

19:15

politics. They think it is bad to be

19:17

disenfranchising these voters and being

19:19

like locked into the system where they

19:20

don't see a choice is not what they

19:22

want.

19:24

I don't see a way to repair the system.

19:26

It is fundamentally broken and so the

19:29

question is what could be built to

19:31

replace it? You are an advocate for

19:34

something called proportional

19:34

representation,

19:35

>> right?

19:36

>> What is that?

19:37

>> So proportional representation describes

19:39

a a family of voting systems widely used

19:42

throughout the world in which the party

19:46

gets seats in the legislature

19:50

in direct proportion to the vote chair.

19:53

So I mean this is your intuitive sense

19:55

of proportionality which is that a party

19:57

that gets 40% of the votes in a in a

20:00

state should get 40% of the seats. Now

20:04

in a proportional representation system

20:07

proportionality is generally achieved by

20:11

having larger districts that elect

20:13

multiple members typically through party

20:15

lists. And so you could imagine New York

20:19

State uh instead of being 26 districts

20:22

maybe being three districts, you know,

20:26

split between the the north, the mid,

20:27

and the the the New York City area. So

20:30

you might have an eight member district

20:32

and nine member district and nine member

20:33

district. And then parties would put

20:35

forward lists of candidates. And you

20:38

know, say in a mid-state eight member

20:40

district, if you know, Republicans get

20:42

50% of the vote, their top four

20:44

candidates on their party list go to

20:47

Congress. And Democrats get 50% of the

20:49

vote, their top four candidates go to to

20:52

Congress. Now, under the current system,

20:55

you know, if you get 51%,

20:58

you get 100% of the representation.

21:00

under a proportional system, if you get

21:02

51% of the vote, you get 50% of the

21:06

representation, which seems intuitively

21:09

fair. And there there are a bunch of

21:11

different ways to do proportional

21:12

representation. And there are better

21:13

ways to do it and worse ways to do it.

21:15

But the the big thing that people should

21:19

know is that this is a system in which

21:22

we are mechanically doing what we think

21:24

is fair, which is that parties should

21:26

get seats in the legislature in direct

21:29

proportion to the share of votes that

21:32

they get in the election.

21:33

>> Okay. But but walk me through this at a

21:36

deeper level of granularity. So, let's

21:38

say that we do we we do the Drutman

21:41

proportional representation plan

21:43

>> and I'm here in New York City and I'm in

21:46

an eight member district right now. You

21:49

know, if I when I walk into the voting

21:52

booth,

21:53

>> right,

21:53

>> I have a choice between a single

21:55

Democratic representative um a single

21:58

Republican and then sometimes some other

21:59

parties and and so on.

22:01

>> But but really there are two candidates

22:03

who I'm deciding between. And really,

22:05

there's only one candidate. You're

22:07

deciding.

22:07

>> Well, I could vote for the the the

22:09

Republican, but they're just probably

22:10

not going to win here in New York City.

22:11

>> Yes.

22:12

>> Okay. What am I looking at? And then and

22:15

then am I just, you know, marking

22:18

Democrat or Republican or working

22:19

families or whatever it might be? Or am

22:21

I voting for individual candidates on

22:23

these lists? Like, how is this working?

22:25

>> So, the the most commonly used form of

22:28

proportional representation is an open

22:30

list party system. And I I think that's

22:32

probably the best system that that would

22:35

be the one that I would choose. And what

22:37

that means practically is that you go

22:40

into the voting booth and there's a

22:42

Democratic party uh and they have a list

22:44

of candidates. It's a Republican party

22:46

and they have a list of candidates and

22:50

you can choose the candidate from the

22:52

party that you like. And all of the

22:54

candidates are essentially running

22:56

together. their votes get tallied

22:58

together, added together, and that's the

23:00

party's vote share, and then the party

23:02

gets seats in the legislature in

23:04

proportion.

23:05

>> But am I marking a box for the Democrat

23:08

versus Republican party, or am I

23:10

individually voting for candidates or

23:14

>> under under an open list system, you're

23:16

voting for a candidate on a party list?

23:20

So, you're So, you're getting to choose

23:22

the the party and the candidate,

23:24

>> but I still only have one vote. But you

23:26

still only have one vote, right? Okay.

23:27

Exactly.

23:28

>> So, I have a couple of questions about

23:30

this.

23:30

>> Yeah.

23:31

>> First, who is choosing this list of

23:34

party candidates? If Democrats are now

23:36

running uh, you know, in this nine or

23:40

eight eight seat district, I assume

23:42

they're running eight candidates,

23:43

something like that.

23:44

>> Yeah, they probably run eight

23:45

candidates, maybe fewer.

23:47

>> Is there a primary those candidates get

23:48

decided? Is it just up to party bosses

23:51

now? Like, who is choosing? So there are

23:53

a few ways that parties under this

23:56

system choose their candidates. One is

23:58

to have some sort of convention. Two is

24:00

to have some sort of, you know, where if

24:03

you're a party member, you get to vote.

24:06

Uh but you could have a primary in which

24:09

like the the top seven or eight

24:11

finishers go on to the general election,

24:14

but this sort of obviates the need for a

24:16

primary.

24:16

>> I don't understand at all why this would

24:18

obviousate the need for a primary in in

24:20

the situation you're talking about. It

24:21

seems incredibly important who ends up

24:24

on the party list and who is choosing,

24:27

right? If there's no primary and I'm

24:29

just expecting, you know, the local

24:30

Democratic Party convention to do it or

24:32

the local Democratic Party bosses, I

24:34

mean, that's a lot of power moving to

24:36

the party structure, which which maybe

24:38

you think is a good idea, but it really

24:41

matters who we're voting for,

24:44

>> right? Like I'm in a district where Dan

24:46

Goldman and Brad Lander are running

24:49

against each other, right, to be the

24:51

Democratic Party's nominee for the House

24:54

and they are different candidates who

24:56

have different views on on things and

24:58

like it is meaningful which one of them

25:01

advances in the in the primary. So how

25:04

under these systems do you become the

25:07

nominee?

25:08

>> So

25:08

>> or get on the list. So you would

25:11

participate in your local Democratic

25:13

party and there would be a convention

25:16

for example and you know candidates

25:19

would put themselves forward and then

25:20

whoever is part of that convention would

25:22

say these are the candidates we want.

25:24

Now if I'm the if we're sticking within

25:27

the two-party framework for now and I'm

25:29

the local Democratic party and I want to

25:32

appeal to a lot of different people. I

25:35

want somebody who's going to appeal to

25:36

progressives and somebody who's going to

25:38

appeal to moderates. So, I don't want to

25:40

load it with just moderates or just

25:42

progressives. I want to run candidates

25:45

who are going to appeal to different

25:47

groups within the electorate because I

25:50

want to maximize the total vote for the

25:52

party. Okay. So, I want to go through

25:54

some of the arguments for this and then

25:55

I want to go through some of the

25:56

arguments against it.

25:58

Let's just start with where we began

26:00

this conversation. What does this do

26:03

about gerrymandering? If the thing we're

26:04

trying to fix here is the maximum

26:09

warfare gerrymandering world we've

26:10

entered, what is the proportional

26:13

representation

26:15

answer to that?

26:16

>> Well, the the thing that we don't like

26:18

about gerrymandering is that it's highly

26:20

disproportional. Take Louisiana, right?

26:22

You have six districts. So you can draw

26:25

them in a whole lot of different ways to

26:27

maximize your advantage if you're the

26:29

Republican state legislature.

26:32

If you make Louisiana one six member

26:35

proportional district, there are no

26:38

lines to draw.

26:40

There's no possibility for

26:42

gerrymandering.

26:44

>> Okay. So what happens in a state like

26:46

California where you have more than 50

26:48

currently you have more than 50

26:49

districts.

26:50

>> Let's say you're doing five member

26:52

districts. you now have, you know, 10ish

26:56

districts.

26:57

>> You got to draw those somehow. Can you

26:59

just gerrymander that?

27:00

>> I mean, you can. Um, but now if you're

27:05

drawing a five member district where

27:06

Republicans have 40%.

27:08

>> Well, they they still have two seats.

27:11

So, the whole idea that anything over

27:14

50% gives you 100% and everything under

27:17

50% gives you zero goes away. So, the

27:20

results are going to be proportional

27:22

within those districts. So you can't

27:24

marginalize the opposition party. So So

27:29

even though there are lines to draw and

27:30

somebody have to draw those lines and

27:32

probably they should be drawn by an

27:33

independent redistricting commission,

27:35

the the consequences of drawing those

27:37

lines becomes less predictable and less

27:41

clearly partisan.

27:43

>> All right. So then I want to get to the

27:44

second major implication here, which if

27:47

I'm just being blunt about my own views,

27:48

this is why I support proportional

27:50

representation.

27:52

in this world. Let's say you're the

27:55

Democrats in California,

27:57

>> right?

27:58

>> Right now, you have to worry in every

28:00

single district about getting to 51%.

28:03

>> Right?

28:03

>> But it doesn't actually benefit you at

28:05

all to get to 60 versus 51, to get to 70

28:10

versus 60, etc. And same thing for say

28:13

Republicans in Louisiana. But all of a

28:16

sudden here it does begin to matter

28:19

whether or not you appeal to people who

28:21

are skeptical of you, who are not

28:24

totally sold.

28:26

And conversely, the minority party is

28:30

not competing ineffectually.

28:33

It actually matters for them if they get

28:35

30% of the vote, 40% of the vote, 45% of

28:38

the vote.

28:39

And so it creates competition

28:43

for voters

28:45

who are just currently disenfranchised.

28:47

So how because we do have proportional

28:51

representation all all over the world in

28:52

other countries. How do we see political

28:54

parties acting competing differently in

28:56

places where they have to compete for

28:58

these votes versus in the United States

29:00

where you know in many of these red and

29:02

blue states like Texas Republicans don't

29:05

really have to worry about doing

29:07

anything to moderate to win over Texas

29:08

Democrats

29:09

>> right so one thing we know comparatively

29:12

is that systems of proportional

29:14

representation have much higher voter

29:17

turnout uh and that is for a couple of

29:20

reasons and the perhaps the most

29:22

important reason is that parties are

29:24

actively seeking out different parts of

29:26

the electorate because every vote

29:28

matters equally. So right now in our

29:31

current system, votes only matter in

29:33

swing districts essentially. So if I'm

29:35

the

29:36

>> 15

29:38

or a handful of states. So you know if

29:40

I'm the majority party in the you know

29:42

if I'm the the Republicans in Louisiana

29:45

like you know what what do I need to to

29:47

expand my electorate? they already have

29:49

the the majority and people are just

29:51

voting for for partisanship. And voters

29:53

are not stupid. They know that in these

29:56

lopsided districts, their vote doesn't

29:59

matter. And the idea that we're just

30:00

going to tell people vote harder when

30:02

there's all these districts where

30:04

doesn't matter how hard you vote, you're

30:06

still the minority party, that that is

30:09

just insulting to voters. When elections

30:12

are competitive, voters are more engaged

30:14

and parties are more engaged and that

30:17

brings a larger share of the electorate

30:19

in. It brings more under represented

30:22

groups into the electorate because

30:25

parties are going to look and say who

30:27

who where are the underserved groups?

30:29

And when you look comparatively actually

30:31

parties that control their nominations

30:33

do a much better job of elevating

30:37

diverse candidates because they have a

30:40

strong incentive to try to appeal to

30:43

different groups in the electorate.

30:44

Whereas in our current system of primary

30:47

elections, which are very

30:48

candidacentric, it's often the loudest

30:51

and brashest and most overconfident

30:55

folks who who advance as opposed to

30:58

folks who are just maybe good team

31:00

players. So I think there is a problem

31:02

with our current primary system. I I I

31:05

wonder.

31:05

>> But do you think it would be better if

31:06

people were just good team players

31:07

advanced?

31:09

>> Yeah.

31:10

>> I mean, what do you say to somebody who

31:12

says, "No, no, no. I prefer a Zoran

31:14

Mandani to a Bradlander. I prefer a

31:18

Graham Platner to a Janet Mills. That

31:20

what you're describing here is going to

31:24

charge up the power of party

31:26

establishments I already don't trust.

31:28

Well, that's because the there is only

31:30

one party on the left and only one party

31:34

on the right. There's no competition. So

31:36

I think the the point that you're

31:38

getting at here is like Graham Platner

31:42

and Janet Mills are not really in the

31:44

same party. Brad Lander and Dan Goldman

31:46

are not really in the same party. Maybe

31:49

Brad Lander and Zoran Mani are in the

31:51

same party. Uh but politics is a team

31:54

sport ultimately and if you want to get

31:56

anything done you need to be part of a

31:58

team and parties are really the

32:00

essential institutions of modern

32:03

democratic governance and they are

32:05

absolutely broken

32:07

in the United States right now. But the

32:10

idea that we're going to give up on

32:12

party democracy is like saying we're

32:13

going to give up on Congress. So this is

32:16

this gets into another big point about

32:18

proportional representation,

32:20

>> which is we are not a two-party system

32:22

in America by accident,

32:24

>> right?

32:24

>> We are a two-party system in America by

32:26

structure,

32:27

>> right?

32:27

>> And proportional representation, at

32:29

least at the House level, might break

32:30

that structure,

32:31

>> right?

32:32

>> So why is proportional representation

32:34

friendlier to a multi-party system? Why

32:36

would it break the two-party system,

32:37

>> right?

32:38

>> Uh compared to what we have now. Well,

32:40

the reason we have the two-party system

32:42

is not because Americans want just two

32:44

parties. And you see in poll after poll,

32:46

Americans say, "I'd like to have more

32:48

choices." But the structure of single

32:50

winner elections is such that third

32:53

parties become spoilers and wasted

32:55

votes. So all of the energy concentrates

32:57

in both of the major parties because

33:00

they essentially have a monopoly on

33:01

opposition to each other and there's a

33:04

lot of pressure to join one of the two

33:07

teams. We also have a a primary system

33:09

to be in the primaries where if you're a

33:11

denter, it's better to run as a Democrat

33:14

or a Republican. Like Bernie Sanders

33:16

could have run as a third party. He's

33:18

not even a Democrat, but he's going to

33:20

run in the Democratic primary. Donald

33:22

Trump ran as an as a reform party

33:24

candidate the first time he ran for

33:26

president. Uh then he realized I can run

33:29

as a Republican and I can control the

33:31

Republican party if I win. So under a

33:34

proportional multi-party, under a

33:36

proportional system, uh you don't need

33:39

to get 51% of the vote to represent a

33:43

district. If it's a five member

33:44

district, 20%. And that allows

33:48

>> would give you a seat

33:49

>> would give you a seat. And

33:50

>> so you could have a situation where you

33:52

have the Republicans winning most votes,

33:54

Democrats coming in second, and a third

33:56

party coming in third, and the third

33:57

party has a seat in Congress as opposed

33:59

to just made the Democrats lose.

34:01

>> Right. Exactly right. So 20, you know,

34:04

you could in theory have have five

34:07

different parties winning a seat in a

34:08

five member district.

34:10

>> So Donald Trump wins the Republican

34:13

nomination in 2016. There was at that

34:14

time a fairly large faction of

34:17

Republican voters who are dissatisfied

34:19

with that choice. But really they are

34:22

then offered a choice between um

34:24

particularly at the House level uh

34:26

voting for Republicans which is their

34:28

party or voting for the Democrats on

34:30

whom they sort of disagree with on

34:32

everything. Now, you could have imagined

34:34

a conservative party emerging saying,

34:37

"We're the real conservatives and, you

34:38

know, we hold traditional Republican

34:40

party views on a bunch of different

34:41

issues and, you know, vote for us at at

34:44

the House level and, you know, we'll

34:47

represent you in Congress and sort of

34:48

work with Republicans and Democrats as

34:50

as needed." The issue right now is to

34:53

vote for that party would be to throw

34:54

your vote away because it would get, you

34:57

know, even if it did really well, if it

34:58

got 10% or 15% in say Utah, it wouldn't

35:01

get any representation. and it might

35:03

have just made Democrats who you really

35:05

disagree with win the election. But the

35:07

theory now is that new parties could

35:09

emerge because getting, you know, 20% of

35:14

the vote somewhere is actually enough to

35:16

begin building a party and have power

35:18

and maybe get 30% next time and and it

35:21

it creates a sort of different, you

35:23

know, dimension of uh possibility.

35:26

>> Yeah, that's that's exactly right. And

35:28

but but I mean it's even worse than

35:30

that. It's not that you're throwing away

35:31

your vote. It's that that part, you

35:33

don't even have the choice of voting for

35:34

that party because that party doesn't

35:36

exist because nobody's organizing that

35:38

party because they know that it is a

35:42

fool's errand under our current system.

35:45

There is uh a dimension of this I think

35:47

is interesting for the the major parties

35:49

too. So something I've covered on the

35:50

show before is the degree to which

35:53

Democrats have been annihilated in rural

35:55

areas of the country. Now, if you

35:57

imagine a proportional representation

35:58

system, you they would be getting at

36:01

least some rural seats, which would mean

36:02

there would be rural representation

36:04

inside the Democratic party, which would

36:06

at least in theory make the Democratic

36:08

party more able to continue thinking

36:11

about what it needs to do to appeal to

36:13

rural voters. That there is a a way in

36:16

which it it makes sure you have members

36:18

from the kinds of places where you are

36:21

overall losing,

36:22

>> right? And it means you don't get quite

36:24

as out of touch with what it means to

36:26

compete in those places. And I think

36:27

that's actually important. I think that

36:29

it is a bad thing Republicans are so bad

36:31

at competing in urban areas right now. I

36:33

think it's bad the Democrats are so bad

36:34

at competing in rural areas. And you

36:36

can, you know, name this down for a lot

36:38

of different forms of American division

36:41

and difference. Whereas if you're able

36:43

to do this, you know, kind of system

36:46

where you get you get something for

36:47

getting 35% of the vote, then you still

36:49

have representation inside your party

36:52

from those kinds of places.

36:54

Yeah, that that is that is a tremendous

36:56

benefit and something that you see in

36:59

multi-party democracies throughout the

37:01

world is that there is a party of the

37:03

right that competes in urban areas and

37:05

in most multi-party countries and a

37:07

party of the left that competes in rural

37:09

areas and that makes the coalition

37:12

broader. It makes the government also

37:14

seem more legitimate to folks in these

37:17

places. And that that is part of the

37:19

this animosity and this sense that

37:22

Americans view each other as immoral. I

37:24

mean, it's not just that Democrats are

37:26

the party that Republicans disagree

37:27

with. It's that like Democrats are

37:29

dangerous communist Marxists who want to

37:32

turn everybody transgender and let

37:34

immigrants get all the the social

37:35

benefits.

37:36

>> Yeah, but that bill hasn't passed yet.

37:38

>> Well, yeah, not yet. We're working on

37:40

it. So the we've been making here what I

37:46

would call the the minimalist case for

37:48

proportional representation which is to

37:49

say that it it reenfranchises people who

37:54

are being disenfranchised by

37:55

gerrymandering on the one hand and by

37:57

winner take all districts on the other.

38:00

uh you make what I would call the

38:01

maximalist case for proportional

38:03

representation which is that we are in a

38:05

a two-party doom loop in which the form

38:09

of competition between the parties has

38:10

become toxic

38:12

and it has collapsed what you call

38:14

dimensionality

38:15

>> right

38:16

>> in the electorate in a dangerous way. So

38:19

walk me through that argument.

38:21

>> Okay. So, you know, if if you if you

38:24

went back to say 1965 when the Voting

38:27

Rights Act passed, you had a a coalition

38:32

of Democrats and Republicans supporting

38:34

this. And you had liberals in both

38:36

parties. You had liberal Republicans who

38:37

were supporting the Voting Rights Act.

38:39

You had liberal Democrats who were

38:40

supporting the Voting Rights Act. You

38:41

also had a lot of conservative Democrats

38:43

who were opposed and some conservative

38:46

Republicans who were opposed. And what

38:48

you see in that is there is a a way that

38:52

people thought about social issues, the

38:54

way that people thought about states

38:56

rights issues that was different from

38:59

the way that the parties were

39:00

structured. And it was a it was a

39:02

contentious time in US politics, but we

39:05

had a party system in which both parties

39:08

contained multitudes and both parties

39:11

contained broad geographies. And so you

39:14

could fight out some of these issues

39:15

both within the parties and between the

39:17

parties in a way that

39:20

did not collapse everything into

39:23

Democrats versus Republicans. And really

39:27

over the last three decades we have lost

39:29

that that you used to have conservative

39:32

Democrats, you used to have liberal

39:33

Republicans, you had Republicans from

39:35

New England, you had Democrats uh from

39:37

the West and and some of the plain

39:39

states and they were really different,

39:41

right? Barry Goldwater was in American

39:43

politics was really different than what

39:45

George Romney was, was different than

39:47

what John Lindseay, the the liberal

39:48

Republican mayor of New York was

39:50

>> or Jacob Javitz

39:51

>> or Jacob Javitz in the Democratic party.

39:53

You know, Lynden Johnson and Hubert

39:56

Humphrey were just extremely different

39:58

politicians before they served on a

40:00

ticket together.

40:01

>> Kennedy and Johnson were very different

40:03

politicians. Like you really did have, I

40:06

think, a I mean, this is the whole story

40:07

I tell in my book, Why We're Polarized.

40:10

I don't think today we have any

40:13

intuition

40:14

for how wide the parties were. That's

40:17

right. Yeah. It was just a completely

40:20

different party system. And you you see

40:22

that in in the way that that a lot of

40:24

bills pass with these broad Republican

40:27

uh Democratic coalitions. And now you

40:30

you the only legislation you you see

40:32

that looks like that is the stuff that

40:34

nobody cares about. When you talk about

40:36

the way in which the these differences

40:38

in the parties collapse down, one place

40:39

you really see it is in how closely

40:44

the way people vote for House and Senate

40:46

candidates now tracks the way they vote

40:48

for president.

40:49

>> Right.

40:50

>> And this is something that that I've

40:52

paid a lot of attention to and even

40:54

paying a lot of attention to it. You put

40:56

up a series of charts on say the way

41:00

people voted for the Senate candidate

41:02

and the president in 2000, which is, you

41:04

know, a while ago now, not that long

41:06

ago, and the way they did it in 2024.

41:09

Can can you just walk me through what

41:11

has happened in in in that kind of

41:14

voting, what it means for the the

41:16

system?

41:17

>> Yes, I would love to. So one way to

41:19

think about it is to to think of a data

41:21

point which is Jim Jeffs running in 2000

41:25

as a Republican in Vermont and Jim Jeffs

41:30

wins overwhelmingly gets like 70% of the

41:32

vote or Lincoln Chaffy as a Republican

41:34

in Rhode Island. But those states go

41:37

very heavily to to Gore. You cannot

41:40

imagine a Republican winning statewide

41:44

in Rhode Island or Vermont for the

41:46

Senate now. And what you see between

41:49

2000 and 2024 is the disappearance of

41:53

the Jim Jeffs and the Lincoln Chaffies.

41:55

You

41:56

>> They both switch parties.

41:57

>> And they both switch parties. Yes. As a

42:00

as a good example of that. The the sort

42:02

of last

42:04

dot that is off is Joe Mansion. And you

42:07

know, he's a Democrat who wins in a very

42:10

Republican state. Although not that long

42:11

ago, West Virginia had been a pretty

42:13

Democratic state. Uh, and so even a

42:15

candidate with the with the generational

42:16

talent of John Tester in Montana cannot

42:22

outperform the Democratic party. And

42:24

that is just just a tremendous collapse

42:28

in the effect of individual candidates.

42:30

>> The numbers here though, so you have

42:32

this chart and and I just want to

42:34

describe it. It's like you see all the

42:35

bubbles of the different Senate

42:36

elections and then the line that is

42:39

showing, you know, the the correlation

42:41

between,

42:42

>> you know, how people are voting for the

42:43

Senate candidate and how they're voting

42:44

for for the president.

42:46

>> In 2000, according to your data, the

42:48

correlation is 0.2. It's 20%. Pretty

42:52

weak correlation.

42:52

>> It's a pretty weak correlation. So,

42:53

knowing how a state is voting for

42:56

president does not really tell you how

42:59

they're going to vote for Senate.

43:00

>> Yes.

43:01

>> And by 2024, it's over 90%.

43:03

>> Right. So that that whole ability

43:07

I mean this is a argument you made is

43:09

like we have we're having in the the in

43:11

in politics right now and particularly

43:12

among Democrats this debate about how

43:14

much moderation is worth and and you're

43:17

some a point you make which I find

43:18

compelling is that moderation might be

43:21

worth a couple of points but what's

43:23

really happened is that the whole

43:25

ability to diverge from your party has

43:29

weakened tremendously like how much a

43:31

shared brown a John Tester

43:33

um you know a liberal Republican can

43:35

diverge. I mean still you can get like

43:37

in high cases you know a 6 to 8 point

43:40

overperformance against the party but

43:42

compared to what you could do in 2000 or

43:44

2004 and 2006 which is like fairly late

43:47

into polarized American politics.

43:50

It's just we just vote yes

43:53

>> with the presidential level

43:56

>> and and it's even more extreme at the

43:57

house level. the the the correlation

43:59

there is now 98 which is like basically

44:02

100%.

44:03

>> So you're the the reason I'm bringing

44:05

this up is that one of the arguments you

44:08

make is that we just need to have more

44:10

parties

44:12

that in the two party system when it's

44:14

become this rigid and people hate the

44:17

other party so much that there's no

44:19

other way to have real political

44:21

competition except to make it possible

44:23

to form new parties. Make that case for

44:26

me. Well, you just made it excellently,

44:29

but a lot of people are dissatisfied

44:31

with the Democratic party. A lot of

44:33

people are dissatisfied with the

44:35

Republican party, but they have no other

44:38

options because our system of single

44:40

member districts limits those options.

44:43

And what happens every election is we

44:47

just keep swinging back a little bit

44:49

towards Democrats, a little bit towards

44:50

Republicans because there's some portion

44:52

of the electorate that's just

44:54

disaffected, just wants change. And

44:56

there's a lot of people who just not

44:58

voting alto together. And Democratic

45:01

Party is a big coalition. There are a

45:03

lot of fights within the Democratic

45:04

Party. And the way that the Democratic

45:07

Party holds that coalition together is

45:09

they say, "Well, do you want Republicans

45:11

to win?" No, they are fascists. You

45:14

cannot deviate. You got to get on with

45:16

the party line. Republicans are a big

45:18

heterogeneous coalition. And Donald

45:21

Trump's political genius is that he

45:24

brought that coalition together by just

45:27

owning the libs, just hating the

45:29

Democrats. The Democrats are the enemy.

45:31

Whatever you think of me, I I may have

45:33

done something weird on January 6, but

45:36

if you don't defend me, you're helping

45:38

Democrats. and everybody gets locked

45:41

into that binary psychology and that is

45:44

the thing that keeps holding these

45:45

coalitions together and it just traps

45:48

our political system into this spiral of

45:52

demonization or what I have called the

45:54

two-party doom loop.

45:56

>> But is proportional representation

45:57

enough to do anything about that?

45:59

Because that would really just affect

46:00

house elections.

46:02

>> Um so proportional representation would

46:04

elect would impact house elections. Now,

46:07

for Senate elections, you could use

46:09

fusion voting, which is a system that

46:12

was once widely legal in the US. It it

46:15

exists in New York. And what that allows

46:17

for is you can have multiple parties

46:20

basically forming a proportional

46:22

coalition on a single candidate. So,

46:24

minor parties could play in those

46:26

elections. You could also do that for

46:28

presidential elections and gubernatorial

46:30

elections. So this would be something

46:31

like imagine in Michigan where there's

46:33

this you know Abdul El Sayad is running

46:35

and and if he wins a primary you could

46:38

have a Michigan progressive party right

46:40

>> where people voted for him through that

46:42

party and so the Michigan progressive

46:45

party is running in house elections it's

46:47

able to be on the ballot and in Senate

46:49

elections so it's just building strength

46:51

that's basically the argument

46:52

>> it's building strength and it's also

46:54

signaling the coalition right like if if

46:56

if he wins and

47:00

but he only gets like 12% of of the the

47:03

general election vote from the

47:04

progressives, then says, "Oh, maybe my

47:07

progressive support is is less than I

47:09

thought it was." And so, actually, I

47:11

need to represent my coalition in a way

47:14

that's maybe a little bit more moderate,

47:16

for example.

47:17

>> Or the the the converse is that, you

47:19

know, maybe the Progressive Party says,

47:20

"If you don't do X, you don't vote this

47:22

way with us, we're going to not endorse

47:24

you in the next election." And then he's

47:26

got to serve them,

47:27

>> right? Yeah. Okay. So, he he's got to

47:28

navigate that. But I mean all politics

47:30

is coalitional politics. The And the

47:33

problem is that we just have these two

47:35

coalitions that are locked in permanent

47:39

death struggle with each other when

47:42

there's actually a lot of other possible

47:44

coalitions that could happen in any

47:47

given election or any given Congress

47:49

that would perhaps offer some different

47:53

approaches to solving some of our uh

47:56

current problems. and we just get locked

47:58

into this. Well, I I I need an issue,

48:02

not a solution. So, here's where I am

48:05

skeptical that multi-party democracy

48:09

would solve the range of problems we're

48:11

talking about here. I I believe it would

48:12

solve the gerrymandering problem. I

48:14

believe it would uh actually lead to

48:15

healthier competition for voters who are

48:17

currently functionally disenfranchised.

48:20

But I look around the world and I see in

48:22

the UK a multi-party democracy is not

48:26

looking so much healthier than ours. The

48:28

center-left party there is in shambles.

48:30

Nigel Farage's party, the reform party

48:32

is probably going to win. The Tories are

48:35

somewhat in shambles. I look at Israel

48:37

and Netanyahu has a coalitional um

48:40

majority that is built on highly extreme

48:44

members and so is very unstable. It's

48:45

actually particularly unstable at this

48:46

exact moment that we're talking. But it

48:48

has not led to a healthy politics in

48:50

Israel. In Germany, the the AFD is

48:53

surging. Um, you know, in Italy, a more

48:55

far-right party one. So, if what you're

48:59

saying is listen, there is a kind of

49:02

toxic competition that is allowing a

49:04

more extreme right or for that matter

49:06

even like I guess people could worry

49:07

about an extreme left to emerge and

49:10

having a multi-party system would would

49:12

be stabilizing.

49:14

What about the international scene right

49:16

now gives you confidence that that is

49:18

true?

49:18

>> We we we we put four countries on the

49:20

table. So, let's work work through each

49:22

of them. So, the UK has a has first pass

49:24

the post. It does not have proportional,

49:26

>> but it does have a multi-arty.

49:27

>> It does have a multi-party system, but a

49:29

multi-party system in a first pass the

49:31

post system.

49:32

>> Can you describe what that means?

49:33

>> A first pass the post same system that

49:35

we have single winner elections, single

49:36

member districts.

49:38

And so I mean in some ways that's

49:42

actually the worst system is multi-party

49:44

within single member districts because

49:46

it means that the reform party could get

49:49

27% of the votes and and a majority in

49:52

in the House of Commons in the same way

49:54

that Labor won the last election with

49:56

only 33% of the vote and they got

49:57

twothirds of the seats. So Israel has an

50:01

extreme form of proportional

50:02

representation where the entire Knesset

50:05

is one electoral district 120 members

50:08

and the threshold for representation is

50:10

just 3.25%.

50:12

So if you get more than 3.25%

50:15

you get a seat in parliament. There were

50:19

a couple weird things that happened the

50:20

last elections where a couple parties

50:22

that probably should have run together

50:23

ran separately and they were just under

50:25

that threshold. But it's too many

50:27

parties and you know at an extreme end

50:30

of of too many parties that leads to too

50:32

much fragmentation and then it makes it

50:34

harder to pull together a coalition.

50:37

It's too proportional. There is such a

50:38

thing as too proportional. So what

50:40

you're saying what you're saying in the

50:42

Israel case is that you're getting a bad

50:45

outcome because there are like specific

50:48

design questions that they have messed

50:50

up that if the margin for representation

50:53

was 5% or 7% or something that would be

50:55

much better. I mean it might be it would

50:57

also be better if they had a

50:58

constitution. I think that would that

51:00

would probably help. But you know I mean

51:03

it's also a country that has a lot of

51:07

challenges of being beset by enemies on

51:11

on all sides and and

51:14

there are there are a lot of complicated

51:15

things going on in Israel that are I

51:18

think somewhat unique to Israel as a

51:20

country.

51:21

>> I guess the point I'm trying to make

51:22

here is that every country is unique.

51:24

Every country has its own factors. No

51:26

country is going to like perfectly tune

51:27

its electoral system.

51:29

>> Every country is unhappy in its own way.

51:32

>> This is true.

51:33

>> But like imagine an alternative, you

51:36

know, world in this country where in

51:39

2016, Donald Trump did not quite win the

51:43

Republican nomination or he didn't win

51:46

the election. And in our system, if that

51:49

had happened, if Hillary Clinton had

51:50

beat him, uh, you know, maybe that's

51:52

kind of the end of the Donald Trump

51:53

insurgency. But in the system you're

51:54

talking about maybe MAGA becomes a you

51:58

know proportion you know a party that is

51:59

winning like you know half or a little

52:01

bit less than half of the seats

52:02

Republicans are and rather than the

52:04

gatekeepers in Republican party being

52:06

able to hold it at the door which

52:08

obviously they did not do anyway

52:09

>> it didn't happen but

52:10

>> but it could have right I mean it seems

52:12

to me you are

52:14

>> I I have my thoughts on this but it

52:15

seems to me that

52:16

>> the system we had was relying on

52:18

gatekeepers for a long time and the

52:20

system you're talking about here allows

52:22

for much more entry of new parties.

52:23

right? A DSA party, a farright party, um

52:27

you know, all kinds of different things.

52:29

And maybe that is more representative of

52:31

the public. I think that's a fairly good

52:33

argument for it. It is not obvious to me

52:35

that it is stable in some way that, you

52:38

know, we are not or we have not been.

52:40

>> Yeah. So, you want to talk about

52:42

Germany, you want to talk about Italy,

52:43

these are good examples that there is a

52:45

a far-right party. I mean, Georgia

52:47

Maloney was of the farright party and

52:50

she became the the head of government

52:52

there and she had to form a coalition

52:54

and she had a had to move to to a more

53:00

moderate position to to build a

53:03

coalition. Uh AFD has been basically

53:05

kept out of the German government. if if

53:08

they reach a point where it's impossible

53:10

to form a government without them, they

53:12

they will have to make a a compromise

53:14

with another party. Uh and so the

53:18

problem I think is what has happened in

53:21

the US and you know maybe you could tell

53:23

an alternative history in which things

53:25

went differently in 2016 and we were in

53:27

a different place but that's not the the

53:29

place that we're in which we have half

53:32

of the electorate who thinks if the

53:34

other party wins it's illegitimate and

53:37

you can't maintain

53:39

>> or at least very very very dangerous

53:41

>> very dangerous and that leads to a kind

53:45

escalation of well, we're just going to

53:48

do everything that we can do whether or

53:50

not it's it's democratic, whether or not

53:52

it's legitimate. I mean, you you look at

53:54

the way that the the Trump

53:56

administration is really

54:01

eroding norm after norm because they

54:03

think that Democrat or they've convinced

54:06

themselves that Democrats are evil. They

54:09

want to maintain power. And a lot of the

54:12

Republican voters are like me Democrats

54:15

are evil so whatever is justified and

54:17

and that is the situation that that is

54:21

incredibly dangerous to democracy. So,

54:23

you know, you think about like, you

54:25

know, I don't know if

54:26

>> why would this make it different? Why

54:28

would this make it different to have

54:29

like you imagine this situation we're

54:31

talking about, but now there's not just

54:32

a Democratic party, there's the DSA

54:34

party, there's the anti-ionism party,

54:37

there's the, you know, the blue dog,

54:40

whatever it is, right? Probably not that

54:41

many. Probably not that many.

54:43

>> But let's say that in the world you

54:44

imagine there, I think you've said you

54:46

think we would split into something like

54:47

five or six parties. So, there are,

54:49

let's call it two to three parties on

54:50

the left. would not would maybe in that

54:54

world, you know, the Republican figure

54:56

we're talking about or the right-wing

54:57

figure is actually saying, "Look, you

54:59

can't let like this DSA party in, right?

55:01

They're really dangerous." And so, like,

55:03

how is that different? I would I would

55:05

posit that there there is a portion of

55:08

the Republican electorate who

55:11

thinks Donald Trump is not great but

55:13

thinks Democrats are worse and they have

55:16

no alternative party to vote for

55:20

in which they can say you know like I

55:22

don't like Democrats I don't like Donald

55:24

Trump but I I want something that's like

55:27

more of a traditional like an Adam

55:29

Kinzinger Liz Cheney party that would

55:32

push against some of Trump's extremism

55:34

but maybe, you know, give me some of the

55:37

just straight up conservative policy.

55:40

And you know, you do do a comparison to

55:44

Brazil, for example, and there great

55:46

piece by Zach Bechum in in Fox looking

55:49

at what why was Brazil able to put

55:52

Bolsinaro in jail after his attempted

55:55

coup. And part of the story is that, you

55:58

know, Bolsinaro built a coalition of

56:00

parties. Brazil is a multi-party system

56:04

and those parties after they saw what

56:07

Bolsinaro tried to do they said you know

56:08

what like we can move on we're we're not

56:11

tied to Bolsinaro Republican party in

56:14

the US they could have pushed back

56:16

against Trump but they didn't because

56:19

they were so tied to Trump and Trump

56:22

said whatever you think of me Democrats

56:23

are worse and in that binary condition

56:26

you cannot hold your side accountable

56:30

because it means the other side is going

56:32

to win. When things become so zero sum,

56:36

so binary,

56:38

so all or nothing that you will tolerate

56:41

even an attempted coup,

56:43

that's when things get really dangerous.

56:45

And that is the the danger of the

56:48

two-party system.

56:50

>> Here's another way of looking at at

56:52

least part of what is going wrong um

56:55

from my political perspective in in a

56:57

bunch of these countries around the

56:59

world. which is that the leftist center

57:01

parties suck and you're a big parties

57:05

guy and and you argue I think correctly

57:07

that parties are like the fundamental

57:09

organizers of political conflict that

57:11

part of the problem in our political

57:12

system is we don't have an official

57:13

place for them and so they're they're

57:15

poorly balanced against each other. We

57:16

haven't thought very hard about how we

57:18

want to relate to parties. And one thing

57:21

that that you sometimes argue is a good

57:24

dimension of of this and related reforms

57:26

would be that it would empower parties

57:27

more.

57:27

>> Yeah. I just look at the way the

57:30

Democratic party is acting

57:33

and it is making just in my view like

57:35

terrible strategic decision after

57:37

terrible not all of them right I

57:38

actually think like for instance Jeff

57:40

has done a quite good job as um leader

57:42

of the house Democrats but you look at

57:44

the DNC under Ken Martin I think it's

57:46

been a mess you look at the uh uniting

57:49

around Joe Biden in the 2024 election

57:52

before it became completely untenable

57:54

the the unwillingness also to have any

57:56

kind of like open process to decide who

57:58

would replace him. You look at the the

58:02

tendency sort of just organized around

58:04

candidates who have institutional

58:05

weight. I mean, and we're watching that

58:07

fail in place after place. Andrew Cuomo

58:09

in New York City, um Janet Mills in

58:12

Maine. And it seems actually somewhat

58:15

similar in other countries to I mean,

58:17

Kier Stormer has a again a part of this

58:19

problem as a just candid who is really

58:22

fluent at navigating institutions

58:26

more than at connecting with a public.

58:30

>> And I'm seeing that kind of failure in a

58:34

lot of left of center parties. A

58:36

preference for people who can navigate

58:38

the institutions. And the institutions

58:40

are just quite different than the public

58:41

is. They are they have different

58:43

internal voices. they have more intense

58:46

policy demands and there's a a a kind of

58:50

consistent

58:52

diminishment or discounting of the

58:53

importance of actual like what I would

58:55

call political or communicative talent

58:58

and there's just actually something

59:00

wrong in these you know left center

59:04

parties these are institutional

59:06

structures at an anti-institutional

59:07

moment and that's why they're failing

59:11

I'm curious how you think about that

59:12

>> so I I think that's right that that a

59:15

lot of center-left parties are really

59:17

struggling in this moment and

59:21

it it is a it is a moment of of

59:24

collective distemper. People are are

59:27

very frustrated with the way

59:28

institutions are working. I think a lot

59:30

of that is the hangover from COVID and

59:32

and and inflation. And you know, yes, I

59:37

share all your frustrations and

59:38

critiques of of the Democratic Party,

59:40

and I probably take that up another 50%.

59:44

Uh,

59:46

but the problem is that there there's no

59:50

alternative to the Democratic Party in

59:52

the US. In the UK, although, you know,

59:54

they do have a first pass both, the

59:56

Greens are rising. In Germany, there

59:58

there is an alternative. the that's not

60:01

the alternative for Germany, but the

60:02

Greens have also been doing better in

60:04

elections. So, if there were a

60:06

progressive party in the US, they would

60:09

have a opportunity to say, "Hey, you

60:13

know, you you you want uh left politics

60:16

and you don't like the the mainstream

60:17

Democrats, you can vote for us." If

60:19

there were a blue dog party that was

60:21

more of a populist, you know, center

60:23

center left party, they could say, "Hey,

60:25

you don't like the mainstream Democrats,

60:26

you can vote for us. We're an

60:27

alternative." So there is a sense of

60:29

dynamic competition but I agree we are

60:32

in a moment in which there is just

60:33

tremendous anti-institutional

60:38

frustration in a lot of places a lot of

60:40

western democracies and and that's a

60:42

real challenge for democracy so you know

60:47

question is how do we manage that and I

60:50

think the best way to manage that is to

60:52

create a space where multiple parties

60:56

can compete to capture that energy and

60:59

to harness that in a way that is, you

61:03

know, I think more progressive and

61:05

hopeful about the future as opposed to

61:07

the right-wing parties which just say,

61:09

"Hey, we just got to kick out all the

61:11

immigrants and and uh go back to how

61:14

things were in some Palcian lost era."

61:18

So the other question that that instit

61:22

set of institutional failures presents

61:25

though is

61:27

how would you get something like this

61:28

done?

61:30

Because there's first a question of you

61:33

know can you just do proportional voting

61:35

with a bill? But the other issue you're

61:38

facing here is

61:40

that to vote for proportional

61:42

representation as a member of Congress

61:44

or as a party in Congress

61:46

is to

61:48

ask a lot of current incumbents to

61:51

knowingly give up their seats, right? in

61:54

this fair world we're talking about

61:56

where you know California seats are

61:59

aortioned you know whatever it is like

62:01

Democrats get 65% of them and

62:03

Republicans get 35% of them and you know

62:06

something like the reverse in Texas to

62:08

vote for this for California Democrats

62:10

means some set of them are knowingly

62:12

voting away their seats

62:15

and that makes it a very it seems to me

62:18

hard push I mean there's a bill from

62:19

represent Don Byer to to do a version of

62:21

proportional representation it doesn't

62:23

have like a mass of co-sponsors. It

62:26

>> does not.

62:27

>> So, so, so talk through this. Can you do

62:29

this just through a bill? Um, right. Can

62:31

it be, can you do it in one shot? And

62:34

two, like how would you get a bill like

62:36

that passed?

62:38

>> So, yes, you can do it in a bill. The,

62:41

uh, current controlling statute is the

62:44

Uniform Congressional District Act of

62:46

1967, which mandates single member

62:49

districts. Congress could amend that

62:51

bill and mandate proportional

62:53

multi-member districts

62:56

and that would be just a law of

62:59

Congress. Uh, article 1, section 4 of

63:02

the elections clause of the constitution

63:04

gives congress pretty broad power to

63:06

decide how its members get elected. So,

63:10

Congress could pass a bill. Now, the the

63:13

the politics question of it is the

63:16

complicated one. Now you you know you'd

63:19

say well okay members would be giving up

63:22

their seats. Now there's a way to pass

63:25

proportional representation and for

63:27

members to not risk losing their seats

63:30

which is to just increase the size of

63:32

the house alongside doing proportional

63:34

representation. So if you just make

63:36

California have more representatives or

63:38

Massachusetts have more representatives

63:40

then the incumbents can keep their seat

63:43

>> and there's an argument for that. There

63:44

is a very strong argument. Do you want

63:46

to just make that briefly because I

63:47

think that's an interesting way of of of

63:48

thinking about how you might blunt some

63:50

of the initial um opposition to this

63:54

>> right and you know the argument is

63:56

basically for you know the most of our

64:00

history up until well actually all of

64:01

our history up until 1911 as the country

64:04

got bigger the house got bigger and

64:06

every decade we'd do a census and then

64:10

there would be an aortionment and as the

64:13

population grew so did the house. So the

64:15

original House of Representatives was

64:16

only 65 members. It kept growing and at

64:21

uh 435 members in 1911,

64:25

Congress couldn't agree on how to

64:26

reaportion things and eventually they

64:28

said, "Oh, we'll just keep it at 435."

64:31

Now country is a lot bigger now than it

64:33

was in 1911. It's about it's more than

64:36

three times as large and yet we've kept

64:38

that that size the same. So

64:43

given that the country is a lot bigger,

64:46

given that members now represent uh

64:49

765,000

64:51

constituents, that's very high. There's

64:54

a strong argument for increasing the

64:56

house. In fact, I I co-wrote a piece

64:58

with the American Academy of Arts and

64:59

Sciences arguing that we should increase

65:02

the size of the House by 150 uh members.

65:07

could push for even more although I

65:09

think might be a little disruptive to do

65:11

more than that but you know you increase

65:13

the house by 150 members it's increasing

65:15

it by about about a third uh and you

65:20

know that would be good I think to

65:23

better represent the diversity of this

65:24

country to bring in a bunch of new

65:26

members bunch of French members and also

65:28

it would I think ease the path to

65:30

proportional representation and make

65:32

more states benefit from proportional

65:35

representation

65:36

because there are some states that have

65:38

smaller delegations.

65:39

>> So in Iowa, Rob Sand, who is a Democrat

65:43

running for governor, who looks like

65:44

he's got a very good chance of winning

65:46

that election, which was not, I think,

65:47

anticipated. And in Iowa, which has

65:49

become quite a lot redder in in recent

65:51

years,

65:52

>> and he's running very explicitly on

65:55

destroying the two-party system. I mean,

65:56

he's a Democrat, but he's like, we

65:58

should not have this duopoly in our

65:59

politics. That's been a resonant message

66:02

in in Iowa, and I think it could be

66:04

elsewhere.

66:05

You could imagine a Democratic party

66:09

under new leadership, right? A

66:11

presidential candidate, you know,

66:12

running on some mix of aggressive

66:15

campaign finance reform. Get the money

66:16

out of politics. Um, you know, elections

66:20

reform like proportional representation.

66:22

Uh, you know, maybe Supreme Court term

66:24

limits would be another one I would I

66:25

would put on that. But you can have a a

66:28

party that is fundamentally saying,

66:29

"Look, the stakes on this have gotten

66:31

too high. People are unhappy. You're all

66:33

cynical with politics. this is not

66:35

serving you.

66:37

The problem is that while you can

66:39

imagine that as serving the interests of

66:41

like an individual presidential

66:43

candidate or an individual candidate for

66:44

governor, we are talking about something

66:46

that has to pass the house. And so I'm

66:50

curious as we kind of come to an end

66:52

here, we have seen a lot of systems

66:55

switch over to proportional

66:56

representation um you know in other

66:59

countries.

67:01

What are the politics that usually allow

67:02

that to to happen given that, you know,

67:05

oftentimes politicians are pretty

67:07

jealous about, you know, preserving a

67:10

system that they've figured out how to

67:12

benefit from?

67:13

>> That is true. Now, you know, I think

67:17

when you look at at the switchovers, you

67:19

know, there's a few things that tend to

67:21

come together. One is intense

67:24

dissatisfaction with the status quo and

67:26

just a a public that is

67:30

feeling like the system is fundamentally

67:32

broken and putting pressure on

67:33

politicians to do something different to

67:36

change the rules. Second is that there

67:40

is a clear sense of what is the

67:42

alternative right because there are a

67:44

lot of ways you could change things and

67:45

you know I think to the extent that

67:48

people say you know proportional

67:49

representation this is a fair way to do

67:52

things and we agree on that that's

67:55

important as well. So those two things

67:56

have to come together there's a sense of

67:58

what the problem is and a sense of what

68:00

the solution is. But then the third

68:01

thing and this is the thing that that

68:02

you raised is well politicians

68:05

ultimately have to vote for this and

68:07

they have to change the way they get

68:09

elected and they may not love the way

68:12

they get elected now but they know it.

68:13

They've mastered that system.

68:16

Now,

68:18

from the perspective of Democrats who

68:21

will potentially be in the majority in

68:24

2029 and have a trifecta,

68:28

2030 looks terrible, right? I mean, that

68:32

they will they will then pay the midterm

68:34

penalty. There will be reortionment and

68:37

you know the we're just going to keep

68:39

doing this Jerry Manning.

68:40

>> The post 2030 redistricting would be

68:42

terrible. You mean?

68:43

>> Yeah. But even the 2030 midterms will be

68:45

terrible for Democrats because basically

68:47

every midterm is a wipeout. That's just

68:49

how things are in our politics.

68:52

>> And so there is a there's a political

68:55

sense that, you know, we're going to

68:58

lose. So we better use this opportunity

69:00

to to end the gerrymandering wars cuz

69:02

ultimately if we keep doing the

69:04

gerrymandering wars throughout the

69:06

2030s,

69:09

that's going to be very bad for us. Now,

69:11

there's another political argument that

69:13

I would make to Democrats in Congress,

69:16

which is to say, do you think of

69:19

yourself as part of the Democratic party

69:21

or part of the Democratic coalition? And

69:24

if you talk to progressive Democrats,

69:27

they will say, "We're not the corporate

69:29

Democrats, and we think that the

69:31

corporate Democrats are just terrible

69:33

for the party. We want to make our case

69:35

directly to the voters that we're going

69:37

to offer bold progressivism." moderate

69:40

Democrats would say, you know, the

69:42

progressives are killing us with all

69:44

these crazy issues, all this big

69:46

government, all this woke stuff. You

69:48

know, we want to speak to the moderate

69:50

Democrats and we want to run

69:51

independently. And then to the extent

69:54

that there are some blue dogs say

69:56

Democratic brand is terrible, we would

69:58

just like to run as blue dogs because we

70:02

think we can connect with voters who

70:04

have written off Democrats but might

70:07

consider us and uh might support us. So

70:11

you can imagine that there are three

70:14

factions roughly within the Democratic

70:16

party and

70:18

members of Congress see themselves, many

70:20

of them inside of one of these factions

70:23

and they can be different things in

70:25

different parts of the country into

70:27

different voters rather than having to

70:30

be one thing which winds up just being

70:32

this muddle that nobody can quite figure

70:35

out what they're for and they can't

70:37

agree what they're for and then they

70:38

wind up fighting all these fights in

70:40

primaries. So I I think there is a

70:44

political case in that respect and you

70:46

know then there's just some sense of

70:48

like do we care about these basics of

70:52

voters having

70:54

representation and feeling like their

70:56

vote matters and if we care about

70:58

democracy because we are Democrats maybe

71:01

this is just the right thing to do for

71:05

the country and besides it's pretty

71:06

miserable being here in Congress under

71:09

this maximum gerrymandering where we

71:11

don't know whether we're going to have

71:12

our district next year and it's just a

71:14

miserable place to be.

71:15

>> What do you say to a Republican

71:16

listening to this saying, "Oh, you guys

71:18

are just liberals who you're you're

71:20

losing now and you're, you know,

71:22

Virginia gerrymander didn't work out and

71:24

so now you just want to change the

71:25

rules."

71:26

>> Well, I've been saying we should move to

71:28

proportional representation for a very

71:29

long time. Uh but I I think there is a

71:34

problem for the Republican party which

71:36

is like the Democrats. They Republicans

71:39

are are a heterogeneous coalition and

71:42

there are a lot of folks who vote

71:44

Republican who don't feel well

71:46

represented by the Republican party. And

71:49

I think if Republicans had a party or a

71:52

faction or a new party that was

71:54

competing in urban areas, the the party

71:57

could actually grow. And there are a lot

71:59

of uh urban areas where Democrats have

72:01

not governed well. A lot of lot of blue

72:04

states where Democrats have not governed

72:05

particularly well. and an alternative

72:09

party that maybe is not the Trump

72:11

Republicans but maybe is the growth and

72:14

opportunity party that doesn't have the

72:16

baggage of that could actually make some

72:19

valuable inroads in those places. And

72:21

you know fundamentally this is you know

72:24

I think a very msonian argument about

72:27

American democracy is that we shouldn't

72:29

have two permanent factions.

72:32

What we need is a multiplicity of

72:34

factions that allow us to constantly

72:36

argue and constantly recoales from

72:39

election to election. And I think

72:44

the the situation that we're in is is

72:45

not good for anybody, Democrats or

72:47

Republicans.

72:48

>> What about simply the the argument, this

72:50

is I guess one I find convincing, that

72:52

Republicans in blue states should be

72:53

represented too, that that it's just not

72:56

good for voters anywhere. Yeah. for the

72:58

way the system is done to be a

73:00

protection and maximization

73:03

for the incentives of the politicians as

73:06

opposed to the representation of the

73:08

constituents.

73:09

>> Right? Competition is good. Uh and

73:13

having two parties or five parties or

73:16

six parties that are competing

73:17

everywhere, it's good for America. It's

73:19

good for voters and nobody should be

73:22

shut out of power anywhere.

73:24

>> I think that's a good place to end.

73:25

Always a final question. What are three

73:26

books you'd recommend to the audience?

73:29

>> All right. So, one book that I think

73:32

people should read is Lonnie Guineir's

73:34

Tyranny of the Majority. Now, this was a

73:37

a

73:38

book that really influenced me in

73:40

thinking about the value of proportional

73:42

representation uh particularly for

73:45

minority communities. Lonnie Gwineer was

73:47

writing these law reviewview essays in

73:49

the 80s and early 90s about how

73:51

proportional representation would

73:52

actually be better for minority

73:54

communities and that sort of cost her a

73:58

job in the Clinton administration as the

74:00

head of civil rights because she had

74:02

some weird ideas on proportional

74:03

representation. But these ideas are

74:07

newly relevant. I think a lot of folks

74:09

in the civil rights community are are

74:10

are

74:12

giving these ideas a second look and and

74:14

she just writes really eloquently about

74:17

them. Uh, another book I'd recommend is

74:20

Sam Huntington's American uh, politics

74:23

promise of disharmony, which is a a

74:26

historical look at these eras of reform

74:29

in American politics. And that we have

74:31

this roughly 60-year cycle in which, you

74:35

know, every 60 years or so, Americans

74:38

get really dissatisfied with their

74:40

political institutions and they reform

74:42

them. And the last time we did that was

74:44

the 1960s. And so we're, you know, if

74:47

you take his, you know, rough 60-year

74:50

cycle, uh, as,

74:53

you know, somewhat correct, then then we

74:55

are due for that.

74:56

>> Is there a reason he thinks it is 60ear

74:58

cycles? Well, it's just sort of a

74:59

generational thing where there's this

75:01

endogenous process where people sort of

75:04

fix the institutions but not really and

75:06

then people grow dis, you know, grow

75:08

complacent and then dissatisfied and

75:11

then the gap between what we expect of

75:13

our institutions and what our ideals are

75:16

grows to a point where there is a a

75:19

sense that we need to change things. I

75:22

mean, you know, 60 years is rough, but

75:25

you know, you think about the the

75:27

American Revolution, Jonian Democracy,

75:29

the Progressive Era, the the 1960s,

75:34

and may maybe maybe it's time. Um, and a

75:38

final book, I'll recommend a book of of

75:40

fiction, The Recognitions by William

75:43

Gatis, which is a book about forgery and

75:47

authenticity and originality. And, you

75:51

know, in this era of of AI and not

75:55

knowing what's what's authentic and and

75:58

what's not, it it really resonates. It's

76:00

it's a it's a long book. It's like one

76:02

of these like, you know, thousandpage

76:04

postmodern books, but but but it really

76:07

feels fresh even though it was written

76:08

in 1955. And he's just an amazing

76:11

writer.

76:12

>> Lee Dutman. Thank you very much.

76:14

>> Thank you, Ezra.

Interactive Summary

This episode explores the concept of gerrymandering and how it serves as a tool for partisan advantage, often leading to a lack of competitive elections and the disenfranchisement of voters. The discussion features Lee Drutman, who explains the historical context of gerrymandering and argues that the current system is fundamentally broken. He advocates for proportional representation as a solution to end gerrymandering, boost voter turnout, and foster a more multi-party democratic system. Drutman also highlights the dangers of the current 'two-party doom loop' and suggests that proportional representation, combined with other potential reforms like increasing the size of the House, could lead to a healthier, more representative political system.

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