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What Happens When the AI Boom Runs Out of Money

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What Happens When the AI Boom Runs Out of Money

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2399 segments

0:00

I think it would be very problematic for

0:02

the US to win. Let's say we take the

0:05

most sort of fantastical scenario where

0:07

if you control AI, your military is

0:09

better than anyone else in this world.

0:12

What is the game theory optimal response

0:15

of China to blow up TSMC? If we get to a

0:19

place where we have a meaningful

0:23

superiority, particularly from like in

0:25

terms of a military national security

0:26

perspective, I think that's very

0:28

dangerous for the world.

0:41

So Ben, if you can believe it, how long

0:43

it's been since we last did this. The

0:44

world was very different. No AI at the

0:46

time. Uh we talked about aggregation

0:48

theory mostly, which I'm sure we'll hit

0:50

at some point today. I thought a fun

0:51

place to begin since the world has

0:52

changed so much is to hear what you

0:54

think it would mean for the US to win

0:57

the AI race. I think it would be very

1:01

problematic for the US to win. Let's say

1:03

we take the most sort of fantastical

1:05

scenario where if you control AI, you

1:08

basically your military is better than

1:09

anyone else. You can like somehow it

1:11

fixes our manufacturing all these like

1:14

things that I don't think AI is

1:16

necessarily going to do because they

1:17

sort of deal with the real world. But in

1:19

this world, what is the game theory

1:23

optimal response of China to blow up

1:25

TSMC? like it and to me this is like

1:28

game theory can get very sort of

1:30

convoluted and complex. To me this one

1:32

actually isn't that complicated. Uh so I

1:35

there's a just a fundamental disconnect

1:38

that I have with a lot of the rhetoric

1:39

coming out of Silicon Valley coming out

1:41

I think of one of the labs in particular

1:43

where if we get to a place where we have

1:46

a meaningful superiority particularly

1:49

from like in terms of a military

1:51

national security perspective I think

1:53

that's very dangerous for the world. But

1:54

in that state, how how much does it

1:57

extend beyond TSMC being blown up?

1:59

Because in that state, I would assume we

2:01

figured out how to build fabs here in

2:03

the US, you know, to some degree and are

2:05

less reliant on that one choke point. I

2:08

think there's a little bit of magical

2:11

thinking which I just invoked in terms

2:14

of manufacturing and whether it be fabs

2:17

whether that be actuators like all these

2:19

sort of precursors like the I think the

2:22

degree to which we are dependent on

2:24

China is underappreciated

2:27

and is not something that is going to be

2:30

fixed outside of a conflict just because

2:33

fixing so many of these things is going

2:35

to be dramatically like dumb. Like if

2:38

your competitor is sourcing from China

2:40

and you're going to start sourcing or

2:42

getting things from the US, you're going

2:43

to be at such a disadvantage relatively

2:45

speaking that you're just not going to

2:46

do it. So you do it when you have

2:48

literally no choice. And that works for

2:52

like very big headline items like you

2:54

can browbeat Apple to move some of their

2:56

iPhone manufacturing to India for

2:58

example. But even that is a good example

2:59

because Apple is not moving truly moving

3:03

out of China. like they're diversifying

3:04

to an extent, but the problem it would

3:08

just cost so much and it's like paying

3:10

an insurance policy that if you don't

3:12

have to pay it and it's astronomically

3:14

expensive, you're just not going to pay

3:16

it. It's one of those sort of hypotheses

3:19

that I just have a hard time even

3:21

gawking because in what the only world I

3:23

see where we truly

3:26

pull out and have no dependency on China

3:29

such that if they want to blow up

3:30

Taiwan, who cares? has no impact on us

3:33

is seems pretty fantastical to me and I

3:36

think there's a bit of facing reality in

3:39

this regard that is not present in these

3:43

conversations.

3:43

>> So put yourself put yourself in their

3:45

shoes like what do you think the

3:46

motivations are?

3:47

>> Everyone

3:49

can use a good bogeyman. I think from

3:51

the AI trade perspective nothing works

3:55

better than we have to be China. And I

3:58

do think we need to be China. We need to

4:01

be competitive. I despair at the extent

4:04

to which over the last few years in

4:05

particular so many of our responses for

4:08

particular from a political perspective

4:10

has been to like try to be like China. I

4:12

think we should be going the other

4:13

direction. Uh more openness, more

4:16

innovation, less top down control, less

4:18

restrictions on speech and things along

4:21

those lines. America succeeds by being

4:24

on the leading edge and by leading into

4:26

that. You said probably the US being

4:28

purely dominant and AI is not the right

4:30

end state for the world. What is your

4:32

ideal equilibrium for how this goes

4:34

worldwide? There's a bit where AI right

4:36

now is kind of like the Taiwan situation

4:39

in that it feels

4:42

the current status quo actually doesn't

4:45

seem so bad. And the question is how

4:48

sustainable is it? But maybe it's

4:50

sustainable for longer than we think. So

4:53

the the way I think about it right now

4:55

is I think OpenAI and Anthropic are

4:58

clearly on the frontier. Who knows

5:00

what's happening with Google and then

5:02

Grock and Meta are chasing them.

5:04

Meanwhile, the Chinese are very capable,

5:08

very smart, and also definitely

5:10

distilling these models to sort of stay

5:12

about 6 to9 months behind. And it feels

5:16

like a pretty good equilibrium that I

5:18

think is generally favorable to the US.

5:21

Now the question is how long can it stay

5:23

this way right and there's lots of

5:24

questions out there like can the Chinese

5:26

actually pull ahead I'm still a little

5:28

skeptical that you know for various

5:31

reasons getting to the leading edge I

5:32

think that last 6 to9 months is very

5:34

difficult I think we'll see how it's

5:37

going to be instructive how meta and gro

5:39

do in terms of actually actually

5:41

catching up is that sort of because

5:43

especially as we get to the world of AI

5:45

improving itself using AI to make the AI

5:47

better which I think is definitely a

5:49

real thing I think you see a real

5:50

acceleration

5:51

from both uh OpenAI and Anthropic

5:53

recently which and that was sort of

5:55

theorized and it seems to be coming true

5:57

and to the extent that's true can you

5:59

actually catch up and I think the other

6:01

question about this by the way is to

6:03

what extent does that apply to cost to

6:05

serve to marginal costs if you can apply

6:08

AI to optimizing your stack to figuring

6:10

things out to analyzing all the data can

6:13

is your cost to serve sort of

6:15

structurally lower than anyone else this

6:17

is the thing about the the open- source

6:19

models the talk about them being free is

6:21

bizarre to me because it's marginal

6:23

costs, right? You still have to run

6:26

inference like GLM or Kimmy. Kimmy is

6:29

very expensive to serve. The cost per

6:31

answer is significantly higher. So the

6:33

everyone referring to these as free. It

6:36

feels like in the narrative it's in

6:37

people's head that free is free. Now I

6:39

can use AI for free. No, you can't use

6:41

AI for free. You're not paying

6:42

necessarily the R&D to

6:44

create the AI, but you're definitely

6:47

paying the inference to sort of run it.

6:49

So right now I kind of like where we are

6:52

and the push back would be oh that's

6:54

right now it's not going to stay that

6:55

way. Um which I think is fair push back

6:57

but I don't know if you can learn

7:00

anything about the future of how this

7:02

will go to be more confident in like

7:04

where where the equil equilibrium will

7:06

end up. What is it? Is it like the

7:07

length of the S-curve? Like how far up

7:09

the S-curve we are of at some point

7:10

these things presumably will level out,

7:12

maybe not. What would be the thing you'd

7:14

want to know that would give you a

7:16

better sense of what the future might

7:17

look like? I am concerned that with like

7:21

the scare around like people freaking

7:24

out about mythos and like this hugging

7:27

face incident that the actual

7:31

implication of that is not that we

7:34

reduce these dangers but we just stop

7:38

releasing stuff and we on the outside

7:42

>> start to lose any sense of like where

7:44

exactly what is actually the frontier

7:46

and where it is And it and there becomes

7:50

sort of a false sense of security

7:53

because like right now everyone's basing

7:55

their understanding of mythos on fable

7:58

but how good is fable actually relative

8:00

to mythos right like that sort of gap is

8:03

only going to I think increase over time

8:07

and so I think that that's that's a real

8:09

question that that I'm not sure about

8:12

this question of the AI the

8:14

recursiveness and AI sort of making

8:16

itself better like does that lead to

8:19

sort of some sort of takeoff? And at the

8:22

end of the day, there's timing questions

8:24

in lots of different ways. I'm worried

8:26

about the timing mismatch in terms of

8:29

the actual return on investment

8:31

producing enough revenue to fuel

8:34

investment. Like we're we we're working

8:36

our way down the capital curve. Like we

8:37

we started with free cash flow, then

8:39

like the speed with which the tech

8:41

companies blew through the debt markets

8:42

is kind of incredible. like it took like

8:44

a year and now Google's issuing equity.

8:47

Nvidia's putting together the you know

8:49

the these

8:49

>> this $500 billion thing

8:50

>> this $500 billion thing to tap into like

8:52

pension funds and insurance floats and

8:55

things like that and the what's after

8:58

that? Where's the money come after that?

8:59

Well, ideally we actually flip back to

9:02

free cash flow funding this. But if

9:05

there's a gap there, if we don't get

9:06

there soon enough, then we could have a

9:09

big blow up, right?

9:11

But at the same time, even if we have

9:14

this blowup, the AI is not going away.

9:18

It's not going to stop improving. It's

9:20

going to keep sort of progressing and in

9:23

a way that we look back on the dot era

9:25

or we look back on the railroad era or

9:27

we look back on whatever bubbles through

9:28

history ultimately immaterial in terms

9:31

of the broad scope of humanity even if

9:33

they were very devastating to lots of

9:35

people.

9:36

>> What did the railroads teach us? Do you

9:37

think

9:38

>> it's now the last bigger buildout,

9:39

right? In terms of percent of GDP or

9:41

getting

9:42

>> I think we might be bigger at this point

9:44

or it's like it was the biggest

9:45

>> in the ballpark. Yeah.

9:46

>> Yeah. You know, the railroads had a real

9:48

duration mismatch. It like to build a

9:52

railroad and make money off it was a

9:55

decade or multiple decades long

9:58

endeavor.

9:59

and the so whereas you had to issue

10:03

money to pay for it in the short term

10:06

and the world ran out of money right and

10:09

I think that is that's probably the the

10:11

aspect I think that's why people reach

10:12

for the railroads because everyone talks

10:15

about are we going to have enough

10:17

compute are we going to have enough

10:19

electricity maybe the nearest term

10:21

question is are we going to have enough

10:22

money which is kind of a bizarre thing

10:25

to think about like that's what happened

10:27

in in the 1870s like we the world just

10:29

ran out of money. But the the the funny

10:31

thing is is the railroads kept operating

10:35

and they expanded the west and they the

10:37

the their contributions to GDP was

10:41

astronomical. They're still contributing

10:42

to GDP. Railroad money is what's going

10:46

into Google right now from Bergkshire

10:47

Hathway. Like like

10:49

>> very funny.

10:50

>> It's it's quite literal.

10:52

>> It's literally Bergkshire Hathaway has

10:54

this problem to me. This Nvidia deal is

10:56

very much paired with the Google equity

11:00

issuance which I thought was was that I

11:02

mean that one was shocking what had

11:03

happened.

11:04

>> Why was it shocking?

11:05

>> Because it's Google they can't raise

11:06

money like why are they issuing equity

11:08

right? Like the the why are they giving

11:10

away the their you know reducing their

11:13

upside if they believe so strongly in

11:15

this. But the Bergkshire the Bergkshire

11:16

Hathway comparison is interesting

11:18

because

11:19

in to a rough approximation they make

11:22

they have seized candies famously right

11:24

tremendously high high margin business.

11:26

The problem with a lot of high margin

11:28

businesses is you can your your the

11:31

percentage profit you can make is very

11:33

high but the absolute profit you can

11:35

make is reinvestment runway.

11:37

>> That's right. Like you just you're just

11:38

accumulating cash. And so the brilliance

11:41

of the BNSF railway thing was basically

11:45

they took the seas candy profits and

11:48

said here's another industry whose

11:50

margins are way worse but the absolute

11:55

dollar amounts are so large that those

11:57

way worse margins result in absolute

11:58

profits that are much larger. like BNSF

12:01

in 2025 or something, their the amount

12:04

of free cash they've threw off in one

12:06

year was more than Candies had thrown

12:08

off its entire lifetime. Even though

12:10

you're talking about a low margin

12:11

business compared to a very high margin

12:13

business and there's a I think there's

12:15

an aspect from Bergkshire Hathway where

12:18

if you're once your capital gets so

12:20

large, you start operating in a world of

12:22

like absolute numbers as opposed to

12:24

percentage numbers. And the reason why I

12:26

thought that was so interesting that

12:28

story is it seems to capture where

12:32

Google itself might be going. And so it

12:34

was very symbolic for them to invest in

12:36

Google. Google has this unbelievable

12:38

high margin business of search. One of

12:40

the most perfect beautiful business

12:42

models of all time and the purest

12:44

aggregator of them all. Like scales in

12:46

every direction. Doesn't have to invest

12:48

any money to do it. Everything's zero

12:49

marginal cost. It's amazing. And

12:52

meanwhile there's this AI opportunity

12:55

which requires just astronomical it's

12:56

just a cash incinerating cash but you

13:00

can imagine if AI is intelligence and

13:04

it's TAM is basically all white collar

13:06

work

13:08

>> and eventually with robotics more

13:10

everything potentially like why like the

13:13

absolute profits available here even if

13:16

the margins are lower is so much larger

13:20

that

13:22

will we look back and Google search was

13:24

seized candies and I it feels like

13:27

that's what's happening and and in that

13:29

world even yeah you use all your free

13:34

cash flow they've done that you tap the

13:36

debt markets to the tune of hundreds of

13:38

billions of dollars they've done that

13:41

you issue equity because like the what

13:44

is what does an equity issues do it

13:45

dilutes your interest in your interest

13:47

your shareholders so you have a smaller

13:49

percentage of the pie Well, if you have

13:50

a smaller percentage of an

13:52

astronomically larger pie, at the end of

13:53

the day, no one's going to be

13:54

complaining. And I I just thought it was

13:57

very symbolic. Bergkshire being the

13:59

symbol of that equity issuance in that

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15:31

I'm curious setting aside the commercial

15:34

and competitive components of this like

15:35

you're describing how AI pill on the

15:39

pure technology would you say you are

15:41

relative to other people thinking about

15:44

this space I have a view that is both

15:47

super bullish and less bullish in some

15:50

respects so

15:53

I am not fully convinced about the

15:56

generalizable argument like AI is

16:00

clearly incredible at coding. It kind of

16:02

blows my mind that people were doing

16:05

this a year ago, like actually like

16:08

writing out code. It's very good at math

16:10

obviously, but the obvious a you know

16:13

repost is that these are sort of

16:14

verifiable do domains and what is the

16:19

evidence or where is the compelling

16:21

evidence of being very good at

16:23

verifiable domains

16:26

cleanly translates to being very good at

16:28

sort of unverifiable domains or domains

16:30

that take have a very long sort of

16:31

verification loops and I think that's

16:34

still a little bit to be determined and

16:37

it's interesting because I raised this I

16:38

raised this question and there were some

16:40

people at the labs that were on a panel

16:42

and I was kind of annoyed at the answer

16:44

cuz the answer took me for an AI bear

16:48

and they're like oh well people thought

16:49

we couldn't solve chess or we couldn't

16:50

solve go and we solved those easy enough

16:53

and I'm like I thought we could solve

16:55

chess I thought we could solve go

16:56

because they're knowable domains and you

16:58

know scale was the answer to both of

17:01

those but also both of those were

17:03

bounded right what what is the go-to

17:06

example that's not chess that's not

17:08

That's not go that is genuinely in a new

17:12

space that's sort of an unknowable space

17:14

where it's doing things that were not

17:15

not possible. So that is sort of the I'm

17:19

not fully convinced sense. However, AI

17:24

trained

17:25

at a rough approximation trained on all

17:27

the data of the internet. All the data

17:29

of the internet that is like that's dist

17:32

distillation. It distilled all of human

17:35

thought.

17:36

>> No it didn't. It distilled all of the

17:39

end state of human thought, the actual

17:42

typing it on on Reddit. It doesn't have

17:44

the traces, right? It doesn't actually

17:46

have the thought, the emotion or

17:48

whatever that went into typing that

17:50

comment or typing writing that essay.

17:54

What if we like say neural link whatever

17:57

what if the actual payoff from neural

17:58

link is actually capturing the traces of

18:01

of human thought that actually

18:03

dramatically expands the capabilities of

18:06

these models in this world. My concerns

18:09

about verifiability is like well we

18:11

solve verifiability by getting more

18:12

data. My sense is that a huge number of

18:16

jobs, a huge amount of economic activity

18:20

does not exist in these domains that I'm

18:21

not convinced that AI is good at.

18:23

Actually, there's a lot of people in the

18:25

world who are kind of like sentient AIs

18:27

to a certain extent. They operate very

18:29

well in verifiable domains. They're

18:31

given jobs. They do them. And that

18:36

it's almost like a somewhat pessimistic

18:38

view of humanity uh to a certain extent.

18:40

But I think that market is so huge and

18:42

so large that if the models did not

18:45

improve at all from where they are right

18:46

now, the economic opportunity is

18:49

actually massive. I wrote an article a

18:51

while ago, you know, there's the whole

18:52

like accelerationist movement and I what

18:54

I call myself was a reluctant

18:56

accelerationist.

18:57

I think we need to push forward because

19:01

we can't go back and the worst thing we

19:03

can do is get stuck where we are. So I'm

19:07

very AI peeled in terms of its impact on

19:10

the economy its sort of upside in terms

19:13

of monetization. I'm not sure about the

19:16

timing. What would be like the gradient

19:18

towards it? Like imagine law or medicine

19:21

where I don't know whether or not you

19:22

would consider those verifiable like law

19:24

is like a code of some sort. Medicine we

19:27

have a certain state understanding of of

19:29

things. I mean, I think medicine is like

19:31

by far one of the biggest opportunities.

19:33

Yeah. Like it's both one of the biggest

19:34

opportunities and also one of the most

19:36

challenging ones because of all the

19:39

regulations and all the access. Like if

19:40

you could turn an AI turn machine

19:43

learning onto all the medical records,

19:46

the number of discoveries and improved

19:48

treatments we could come up with in a

19:49

very rapid amount of time would be

19:51

unbelievable. So that is a very

19:53

optimistic view. On the flip side, like

19:56

when is that gonna happen, right? I

19:58

think the the the

20:00

optimistic frame I put on humans is our

20:03

capacity to create needs is sort of

20:05

unlimited. So I think we'll do a very

20:08

good job of creating new opportunities

20:09

and jobs sort of in the fullness of

20:10

time. The sort of more pessimistic way

20:12

to put it is our ability to create red

20:15

tape and muck is also fairly unlimited.

20:18

And you know how much of our economy is

20:21

actually we've managed to create more

20:24

and more jobs that is just sort of like

20:27

make busy and make slow to a certain

20:30

extent. If I go back to the early 2010s

20:32

or you know maybe the aggregation theory

20:34

was stewing in your brain and then you

20:36

published it in 2015. I think it's fair

20:38

to say like that theory that idea maybe

20:40

you could just quickly remind people

20:41

what it is defined the winners and

20:44

losers of that era of technology. I'm

20:46

really curious how you're thinking about

20:48

what theory or or principles will define

20:51

this era of winners from like a

20:53

financial perspective and market cap

20:55

perspective.

20:55

>> It's a good question. I go back and

20:57

forth even just on the question of of

21:00

aggregation theory itself. How much does

21:02

that ex you know apply in this current?

21:05

>> Yeah. Cuz like like a push back that

21:07

people have is one of the key components

21:10

of aation theory is zero marginal cost

21:12

and zero marginal cost uh shows in lots

21:15

of ways. The one that I sort of focused

21:16

on the beginning was distribution. Like,

21:18

and people say, "Oh, I don't have

21:19

distribution. I have to pay Google for

21:20

friends." Like, "Well, no, you have a

21:21

website. Your problem isn't that you

21:23

have distribution. Your problem is you

21:24

don't have demand." And you're paying

21:26

for demand when you're paying for ads

21:28

and things on those because the

21:29

aggregators control demand. And they

21:31

control demand because in a world of

21:33

abundance, the hard problem is not

21:35

distribution, it's discovery. How do you

21:37

actually find what you're interested in?

21:38

So, the companies that solve discovery

21:40

in their domain come to dominate that

21:42

market. They get a virtuous feedback

21:44

loop. that sort of aggregation theory in

21:46

in a nutshell.

21:48

And the other thing is transaction

21:49

costs. There's no transaction cost.

21:51

Google can scale to the whole world. And

21:52

they can scale to the whole world. Not

21:53

just on the user side, but also on the

21:55

monetization side. The vast vast vast

21:58

majority of advertisers on Google or

21:59

Meta never inter never talk to someone

22:02

at Google or Meta. They just go up and

22:03

they buy ads. It's all done by

22:04

computers. And those computers from a

22:07

business perspective

22:08

>> cost zero dollars. AI obviously that

22:11

changes significantly like be their

22:13

inference costs are real. Uh but then

22:16

again sort of how real are they?

22:18

>> They're real right now.

22:20

>> They well how real I don't know are they

22:23

>> depends on the company but they're

22:24

they're way more real than the those

22:26

prior examples.

22:26

>> Well like if you look at gross margins

22:28

or something

22:29

>> for sure but but you have this

22:31

incredible spread. So you have people I

22:34

think the vast majority of people who

22:35

are using ad today are using it as

22:37

basically a Google substitute or like a

22:39

recipe maker or whatever it might be.

22:41

And my suspicion is that the cost to

22:44

serve those people is extremely low and

22:47

low in the basically similar to serving

22:50

them a web page like I would imagine

22:52

it's it's marginally higher but not not

22:54

that much higher. Then you have on the

22:56

other extreme people who are actually

22:58

leveraging test time scaling right. So

23:01

it used to be we just scale by making

23:02

the models bigger and bigger. Now you

23:04

can scale as far as time. How long do

23:07

you think about the answer? Well, you

23:08

could think about the answer for days or

23:11

weeks or months. And that is a d that is

23:14

directly marginal cost. Like every

23:16

second longer you're thinking is costing

23:18

more money which speaks to like we think

23:22

about AI and inference as this one

23:24

question. And that's I was sort of being

23:25

a bit, you know, pushing back on you.

23:27

But actually the marginal cost question

23:29

for the different user, the user using

23:32

free chat GPT and the user trying to

23:34

solve a a math theorem. They're not even

23:37

remotely in the same universe. And and I

23:39

think you see this challenge actually in

23:41

the enterprise in a very interesting

23:42

way. So Microsoft recently, you know,

23:46

they they are shifting their enterprise

23:48

plan, right? So they come out with like

23:49

an E7 plan, $100 per user per month that

23:53

includes some amount of usage, but then

23:55

they also are charging for usage on top

23:59

of that. And this is kind of a really I

24:01

think this is a kind of a fraught

24:03

position for Microsoft to an extent

24:05

because the positive way to think about

24:08

Microsoft is they do everything you need

24:12

as a business. Every individual

24:14

component might not be the best, but you

24:16

get it all for one price and they all

24:18

mostly work together. And if you're, you

24:20

know, particularly a small or

24:21

mediumsized business or even a large

24:22

enterprise, there's real value in that.

24:24

That's right. It makes life easy. The

24:26

moment you start having to think about

24:29

how much you're paying, it's not just

24:32

that that's a new decision. Number one,

24:35

that is untethered from headcount,

24:38

right? Microsoft got the benefit is when

24:39

you were hiring a new employee, you

24:41

would think about the cost of that

24:42

employee and baked in the cost of that

24:44

employee is $100 a month or $50 a month

24:46

for their their license. It was kind of

24:48

a thoughtless

24:51

revenue stream for Microsoft. Now, if

24:53

you think about usage, you have to think

24:56

every single month, how much do I want

24:59

to spend? And that introduces two

25:02

problems. Number one, most companies

25:04

aren't set up to do this. They make

25:06

budgets like once a year. This idea

25:08

we're going to be thinking about through

25:09

our budgetary aotment on like a monthly

25:12

basis doesn't compute. There's an aspect

25:17

where they're used to thinking about

25:19

capex decisions or one-time costs. And

25:22

there's a bit where what I'm talking

25:23

about this employee like the loaded cost

25:24

of employee. It's not capex but it's

25:27

kind of like capex. It's like you make

25:28

the decision up front then you don't

25:30

think about it anymore if the decision

25:31

is sort of already made. But if you're

25:32

thinking about usage you're doing it

25:34

again. But the the final thing is if

25:36

you're every month you're looking at

25:37

your Microsoft bill and how much do I

25:39

use? You start thinking about what am I

25:41

paying for? Like how good is each of

25:44

these products? Should I actually just

25:46

start thinking about and spraying this

25:47

out? And I think they had to do it

25:50

because

25:51

that extreme of user who uses a ton of

25:54

tokens and is actually leveraging AI

25:57

costs way more to Microsoft than $100 a

25:58

month. They can't support them. But they

26:01

want to hold on to the set cost for the

26:04

vast majority of employees who can fit

26:06

in that because they need to ask their

26:09

customers to think a little bit for

26:11

those extreme employees, but they don't

26:12

want them to think too much because that

26:14

sort of breaks the model in very sort of

26:17

surprising ways. surprised at all that

26:18

the the recipe builder user that is very

26:21

low cost to serve that there hasn't been

26:24

a great business model that's emerged

26:25

around them just yet like you know

26:27

business Google and Facebook are sort of

26:29

business perfected in this in this prior

26:31

era. They haven't seemed to figure this

26:33

out at all. I'm frustrated but not

26:35

surprised.

26:37

This is obviously a market that should

26:38

be supported by advertising like that.

26:40

That is why advertising is always the

26:43

consumer business model. Consumers don't

26:45

want to pay there. So there's two things

26:47

to understand about consumers that

26:48

Silicon Valley has to relearn about

26:51

every 10 years. Number one, consumers do

26:54

not want to pay for software. And number

26:56

two, consumers do not care about being

26:57

productive. And this is like we went

27:00

through this in early SAS. Like the the

27:02

canonical company for this in my mind is

27:04

Dropbox.

27:06

>> So Dropbox, unbelievable product. Like

27:08

especially when it first came out in

27:10

business school, I was one of the first

27:11

people to use Dropbox and that was went

27:14

off like crazy. I have so much storage

27:17

still like my free Dropbox cuz I gave

27:19

out of my code to like so many people.

27:20

So Drew Hston makes his amazing product

27:22

so easy to use, just absolutely

27:24

seamless. And I think very clear about

27:27

this. He wanted to build a consumer

27:30

company and there's that famous story of

27:32

him meeting with Steve Jobs and I think

27:35

you know Apple was interested in

27:37

acquiring Dropbox and they're like oh we

27:39

want to build a company and Steve's you

27:41

know your feature not your feature not

27:44

not a company and you know which that

27:47

plain Jane just file sync Apple did make

27:50

a feature as far as like sort of iCloud

27:52

drive and Dropbox they grew very fast

27:54

and then they had like a 2-year lull and

27:56

in that 2-year year low. What they had

27:58

to do was basically completely rebuild

28:00

the app from the bottoms up because the

28:03

people not enough consumers are going to

28:04

pay for it. They needed enterprises

28:07

could see the value, they would pay, but

28:08

if you want enterprise, you need

28:10

permissions. You need control. You need

28:11

someone else to be able to set all these

28:13

sorts of things. And their app wasn't

28:14

even created to do that at all. So, they

28:16

had to rebuild the whole thing and

28:18

realize the only way we're going to make

28:20

money is by selling to companies. Why do

28:23

companies pay? Because companies are

28:26

paying employees. So to the extent they

28:29

can make their employees more

28:31

productive, they're getting a greater

28:32

return on their investment. It's the

28:34

complete inverse of a consumer. A

28:37

consumer is like, I spent all day

28:39

working. Why do I want to come home and

28:40

be more productive? I want to sit on the

28:41

couch and watch reals. And and the the

28:44

and you see that with AI and you also

28:46

have this overarching just skepticism of

28:49

advertising. You know, I've gotten so

28:52

much traction on trajectory by being an

28:54

advertising appreciator. And I go back

28:56

and read my early articles about

28:58

advertising that were kind of

29:01

directionally correct, but also like

29:04

were not very good at all. But I got so

29:07

much traction doing it because I was the

29:10

only person writing about advertising.

29:11

In a world of everyone want to have a

29:12

blog in Twitter, no one want to talk

29:14

about advertising. But even now there's

29:16

in Silicon Valley there's this sort of

29:19

embarrassment about the fact that the

29:20

valley is in many respects monetized by

29:23

advertising and particularly during the

29:25

last sort of eight years there was a

29:27

Facebook's icky and like all these best

29:29

engineers don't want to go work on this

29:31

problem

29:32

>> and so you literally had open AAI

29:34

replaying the Dropbox story but at like

29:37

100x size being like no we're going to

29:40

sell subscriptions to consumers and they

29:44

did. They sold a lot, but they didn't

29:47

sell enough. If you're going to be in

29:49

the consumer market, you have to be

29:50

doing advertising. And now they're doing

29:53

advertising now. It's a little weird

29:55

they finally pivoted to doing

29:56

advertising. At the same time, they're

29:58

like, "Oh crap, we need to go for the

29:59

enterprise cuz Anthropic is kicking our

30:02

so quite sure what they're doing there.

30:04

They have been rolling out ad features

30:06

very rapidly like things like like copy

30:09

and the the connections with retailers

30:11

so you know if a purchase went through

30:12

so you can do all the tracking and

30:14

things like that. So I'm very interested

30:16

to see how that goes. There's a bit

30:20

where had they leaned into advertising

30:23

immediately as soon as Chat GPT was a

30:25

hit, I think they would have a killer ad

30:28

product right now. I think that Google

30:30

would be in much bigger trouble. I think

30:31

meta would be in much bigger trouble

30:33

because if you have this flywheel, the

30:36

thing about advertising with consumers

30:38

is your ability to monetize the consumer

30:40

>> goes up in because the advertisers

30:44

bearing the price increase. So there's

30:46

zero elasticity issues. If you're

30:48

charging consumers a price, if you want

30:50

to raise the price, like Netflix, this

30:52

is their problem with with the

30:53

subscription plan. They have to be how

30:54

much can they raise prices before

30:56

consumers rebel and drop drop a tier or

30:59

give up the service entirely, right?

31:01

Charging people money is hard.

31:04

>> Giving people things for free is easy

31:07

and it's very frustrating that OpenAI

31:09

did not pursue this sooner. I know

31:11

you've been spending time with, you

31:13

know, some of the big money firms and

31:14

sources of capital. What is your sense

31:17

of their appetite right now and how

31:19

they're thinking about the future?

31:21

Because I think this year it's going to

31:22

be 800 billion or something that we're

31:24

going to spend in capex. Next year it's

31:25

supposed to be 1.3 trillion I think is

31:27

the current estimate. It's going to

31:28

keep, you know, keep going up from

31:30

there. We're burning through all the

31:31

compute that gets installed like

31:32

basically immediately. It's such a

31:35

strange circumstance that we can use the

31:37

capacity right away as soon as it's

31:39

online.

31:39

>> Well, that's the thing though. So

31:41

there's a few timing mismatches that are

31:42

happening right now. All the bulls on

31:44

Twitter is always like we're we don't

31:46

have enough comput. We don't have enough

31:47

compute. Well, we don't have enough

31:49

compute because there was insufficient

31:51

investment made in 2023 and 2024, which

31:55

yes, absolutely. And by the way, if you

31:57

think there's not enough compute, TSMC

32:00

decreased their rate of growth in 2023

32:03

and 2024 and 2025. So like we're our

32:06

shortage of compute is going to get

32:08

worse in the next few years because a

32:11

fab the lead time is even greater than a

32:14

data center. So all today when we say

32:16

there's not enough compute, it's not

32:17

like all the money that the companies

32:19

are putting in today

32:20

>> manifest in comput. No, it all manifests

32:23

in compute in 2028 and 2029. So you have

32:27

like on the calls you have both Andy

32:29

Jasse and Sadella are out there saying

32:32

look we're just building data centers

32:34

like these are the shells. We might not

32:36

use them now, maybe we'll use them in

32:37

the future and we only buy GPUs when we

32:40

know there's demand for them. That is a

32:43

great story to tell. I'm not sure how

32:46

much that I think is a lot of BS because

32:50

the reality is is if you've built the

32:52

shell that money is sitting there.

32:55

You're not going to let it just sit

32:57

there. Like if you have if you invested

32:59

a fixed cost and this is the whole logic

33:01

of commodity markets. I think tech in

33:03

general doesn't understand commodity

33:04

markets. tech is by and large focused on

33:07

if I produce a highly differentiated

33:09

product and that differentiation could

33:10

be like you know software it could be uh

33:14

a network in terms of developers it

33:16

could be a social network sort of thing

33:17

where peerto-peer where I'm highly

33:19

differentiated then my ability to charge

33:21

higher prices provides sort of my profit

33:24

margin so the the classic example is

33:26

like Apple right they have their

33:27

ecosystem and they have their software

33:30

and they have third party and all those

33:31

sorts of things and so they can charge

33:33

they have 50% margins is on their

33:35

iPhone. Everyone looks at Apple as like

33:37

the ideal business model. That's how you

33:38

run a business. But in a commodity

33:40

market, the price is set by the marginal

33:42

supplier.

33:43

>> Cost to serve is all that matters.

33:44

>> That's right. And so I had a good friend

33:47

in Taiwan who was in shipping. Um

33:50

fascinating industry. It's kind of like

33:51

the airlines too. Another industry that

33:52

I love to look at, but like you you you

33:55

buy a ship and the cost of that ship is

33:58

depreciation and your marginal cost is

34:01

actually quite low. It's the fuel to run

34:03

the ship and the cost of the crew and

34:05

like your port fees. Not that much. What

34:08

that means is you are going to run that

34:11

ship

34:11

>> as full as human

34:12

>> basically. No, you're going to run it no

34:13

matter what. And you're going to bring

34:15

down the price of a container as low as

34:17

it needs to be to cover your marginal

34:19

costs. Now, your paper losses in this

34:22

situation might be very large because

34:24

your accounting loss includes

34:25

depreciation, but the depreciation is an

34:28

accounting figment. you already paid the

34:30

money and so you're you're going to run

34:33

that ship at whatever the market will

34:36

bear and the container the beauty of the

34:38

container is it is a pure commodity and

34:40

so the cost of the market is going to be

34:42

the marginal cost now if it gets low

34:44

enough at some point people will exit

34:47

because their marginal cost actually

34:48

can't like they're actually losing money

34:52

on a shipment right uh not just paper

34:54

money but like actual real money they

34:56

will exit but then the supplies

34:58

diminished So then the price the price

35:00

will go back up and you get this

35:02

interplay of sort of coming in and off.

35:04

But then let's say the market's very

35:05

high like it was during co it's like wow

35:07

we're making so much money right now cuz

35:09

there's not enough supply. There wasn't

35:11

enough supply of ships. So containers

35:14

went from like usually being like $3,000

35:16

$4,000 to 17,000 $18,000. Like the the

35:20

amount of money that these shipping

35:21

companies made in a very short amount of

35:23

time was insane. And so what happens

35:26

though? Well, more ships.

35:27

>> Imagine if we had more ships, right? The

35:29

problem is it takes 2 years to build a

35:32

ship.

35:32

>> So by the if everyone makes this

35:35

decision simultaneously, then the ship

35:37

you suddenly have a lot of ships, price

35:39

plummets, etc. Where we see this is in

35:41

components, in memory in particular.

35:43

Memory very famous for boom and bust

35:45

cycles. Uh people entering the market

35:47

late. But to what extent are data

35:50

centers

35:52

going to be memory makers where right

35:55

now everyone can see we don't have

35:57

enough compute. So everyone's like we

35:59

absolutely have to be investing because

36:02

there's so much money to made and look

36:04

at our payback period. The problem is

36:05

you're measuring your payback period in

36:07

a time of scarcity. Is that payback

36:09

period going to hold in a time in a time

36:11

of abundance? Uh and and the sort of the

36:14

bulls would say there's never going to

36:15

be a time of abundance. AI short time

36:18

scaling we're going to be short forever

36:20

which maybe we will be my concern is

36:21

even if that's right we could still have

36:24

an air gap

36:25

>> in that there's so much money going into

36:27

it right now and not enough has come

36:30

online to actually make sufficient

36:31

revenues to cut to handle the situation

36:34

where we run out of capital that like I

36:37

again I believe in AI I think it's a

36:39

real thing I think the economic impact

36:41

is going to be astronomical I think all

36:43

the concerns about societal impact are

36:44

very real and are going to come to bear

36:47

in a major way. You can believe all that

36:50

and still be worried about are we going

36:53

to make the bridge to this actually

36:55

generating the level of returns

36:57

necessary to continue to fuel this sort

37:00

of going forward. Can can you zoom in on

37:02

TSMC and the and the maybe the some of

37:03

the component makers where fabs are

37:05

involved and so far at least my

37:07

understanding is that they've been quite

37:09

conservative in their willingness to

37:10

expand capacity, build new fabs, meet

37:13

the market's demand with similar growth,

37:16

which they have not done. And if that if

37:18

that just rate limits this whole thing

37:19

and prevents us from getting one of

37:21

these giant overbuilds.

37:22

>> Well, we can talk about a few different

37:24

ones like we'll start with memory.

37:26

memory used to have tons and tons of

37:29

memory makers and every time there'd be

37:32

sort of a boom memory makers sort of

37:34

like reenter the market um or like new

37:37

countries would come in like Taiwan used

37:39

to have like a memory market and but you

37:41

would get these exact dynamics if

37:42

there's a shortage of memory there's so

37:44

much money to be made because no one you

37:46

can't bring capacity on immediately

37:47

we're like it's the same as shipping

37:48

it's the same as what we're seeing right

37:50

now and so what would that that would do

37:52

is that would spur sort of people to

37:55

come in the market, you get too much

37:57

capacity, prices would plunge and people

37:59

would just get blown out cuz the issue

38:01

is the upfront cost for these is so

38:03

large. Just like buying a ship, like

38:04

building a fab is even more so. And

38:06

memory now, like the leading edges of

38:07

memory are using things like EUV

38:09

machines. So the costs are getting into

38:11

the billions of dollars for these lines.

38:13

And what happens is every time these

38:15

boom bus cycles, some people would

38:17

enter, more people get washed out. You

38:19

go through there's like these these

38:20

famous historical moments for these

38:22

memory cycles and like companies just

38:23

get blown out. One of the most

38:25

interesting actually memory stories is

38:26

how Samsung sort of took over memory was

38:29

they saw it as an opportunity and they

38:32

had studied history and they realized

38:34

that actually the way to take over the

38:36

market is to invest into downturns so

38:38

that you're ready when the next cycle

38:40

comes around which requires a ton of

38:42

guts and a ton of discipline and a ton

38:43

of money but they did that and basically

38:45

wiped out the Japanese. That's when the

38:47

sort of the South Koreans generally took

38:49

over the market in a major way. But it

38:52

got down to three. And the problem is

38:54

three, it's not a monopoly, but it's

38:56

kind of an oligopoly. And they all got a

38:59

lot more discipline about let's not make

39:02

the mistakes of the past. And we're not

39:05

colluding, but we all are on the same

39:07

page about let's not do that. And I

39:10

think that dynamic sort of ran head on

39:12

to the current moment where it just took

39:15

a while for them to realize no there is

39:18

a secular shift in memory demand that

39:22

didn't exist for for a very long time.

39:24

And so I I think the memory solution

39:27

will be solved eventually. The other

39:29

thing they the risk they run is Apple

39:32

like Apple's lobbying to get Chinese

39:34

memory, right? uh and what is the number

39:37

one focus of like al algorithmic

39:39

changes. How can we use less memory? I

39:41

think the memory makers probably screw

39:43

themselves in the long run by creating

39:46

such a massive target on their back.

39:47

I've analogized memory makers to Iran.

39:50

Like the issue with the straight of

39:51

moose is it's very effective.

39:55

It's more effective if you don't use it

39:57

cuz then it's always hanging out there

39:59

as something you could do. Now they did

40:01

it. Turns out it worked. But like the

40:05

UAE and Saudi Arabia, they're going to

40:07

build pipelines. They're going to build

40:08

new ports. They're not going to let this

40:10

happen again. It's very painful right

40:12

now. But say Iran wants to close the

40:15

straight of our moves in 2035. It's not

40:17

going to have any effect because it will

40:18

have been built around. My concern for

40:21

the Merry Makers is they might have done

40:22

the same thing. Like no one's going to

40:24

let themselves get in this situation

40:25

again as far as memory goes. TSMC is

40:27

arguably worse because there's only one.

40:29

Uh there's one company on the leading

40:30

edge. Um, obviously Intel and Samsung

40:32

are trying to get there and it's the

40:35

same thing like like the all markets

40:39

carry risk and a lot of the question is

40:43

who ends up holding the risk and what I

40:46

think a lot of the tech companies didn't

40:48

fully appreciate is the extent to which

40:51

TSMC has offloaded risk onto the big

40:55

tech companies. And the way they've done

40:57

that is the risk that TSMC is worried

40:59

about is over capacity. If we build too

41:01

much, it's not just that we built too

41:03

much and we have all these fixed costs

41:06

that are not being fully utilized, but

41:08

if we build a fab, we expect that fab to

41:10

run for 30 years. We've like baked in

41:13

too much capacity into the system for

41:15

years and years and years. So, they are

41:17

very biased towards being much more

41:19

conservative. And there's a little bit

41:22

of a culture component to this too. One

41:23

of the most interesting TSMC stories,

41:25

it's kind of analogous to that Samsung

41:26

story was Morris Chang retired in like

41:29

the late 2000s and new leadership took

41:33

over and there was the great recession

41:35

and so they pulled back their plan

41:37

spending. He comes in, fires everyone

41:40

and he's like, "The iPhone just

41:42

launched. This is the biggest

41:44

opportunity we've ever seen. We need to

41:46

be investing, not cutting." And they

41:49

invested through the Great Recession and

41:51

through that downturn. That's what laid

41:53

the foundation for them taking over sort

41:55

of leading edge semiconductors in that

41:57

time. Morschang is what a one of one

41:59

like on the Mount Rushmore in my mind of

42:03

the greatest sort of and most impactful

42:04

tech executives of all time. The entire

42:06

fabulous model is so critical to to what

42:09

tech is and what it does and also just

42:11

the guts to do that right at that time

42:14

particularly in you know someone who

42:16

lived there a culture that doesn't

42:18

necessarily tend to make those sorts of

42:20

bets. TSMC, they were pretty

42:23

conservative to be totally honest. And

42:25

so what happens though? Where' the risk

42:27

go? TSMC's like, "Well, we we don't want

42:29

to take the risk." Risk doesn't

42:31

disappear. It just moves. The risk is

42:35

right now where you have every single

42:39

big tech company realizes if we had more

42:42

compute, we could be making more money.

42:45

So there's lots of foregone revenue and

42:48

foregone profits. That is the

42:50

manifestation of the risk that TSMC

42:52

handed off to them. Risk doesn't

42:54

disappear. It just gets handed off. And

42:56

sometimes that risk doesn't manifest in

42:58

losing money. It manifests in not making

43:00

money. And there's money not being made

43:02

right now because what happened was they

43:06

were very excited about 5G. They did a

43:07

big like wave of like investment um in

43:10

expanding their fabs in around 2020,

43:12

2021, 22. And they're like, "Okay, we're

43:14

good." And like I said, 2024

43:17

like Chri 2022 big thing in tech in

43:21

2023. In 2024, their growth rate went

43:24

down. In 2025, their growth rate went

43:26

down. In 2026, it's up now. It was very

43:29

funny because I, you know, I was writing

43:31

about this a while ago and then I think

43:34

it was like one or two earnings calls

43:35

ago. Suddenly uh CCway the the CEO and

43:38

chairman is talking about like the use

43:42

cases for AI like the whole earnings

43:44

call in a way he never had before. This

43:46

is the problem with the why the makers

43:47

are scared. Usually there's like a bull

43:49

whip and they're worried about being at

43:51

the end of the bull whip where the

43:52

demand happens and it works its way down

43:54

the chain and they're at the end and

43:56

then they double down. It's already too

43:57

late and they're they're wasting all

43:58

their money. And I think the thing with

44:00

AI is if it's a bull whip it's like the

44:02

longest bull whip of all time. like

44:04

there's still so much to be built and it

44:06

just took a while for Asia to get the

44:09

message where these sort of companies

44:11

are. Uh but I think I think they've by

44:14

and large gotten it but them getting the

44:17

message it then takes several years for

44:19

that to actually materialize.

44:21

>> Do you have a sense for like how long

44:23

you think it will take given the extreme

44:25

shortage of compute?

44:27

>> Well, the interesting thing is what this

44:29

means for Intel and and Samsung sort of

44:31

the logic business. So, I've been

44:34

writing about the problem of this

44:36

dependency on TSNC for years. Um,

44:39

actually, one of my first articles in

44:40

2013 was exhorting Intel. You I say you

44:44

have to build a fab a fab business. You

44:46

you like you're not going to be this

44:47

desire anymore. You like there's a huge

44:49

business in manufacturing chips. And I

44:52

thought I was late writing it then.

44:54

Their stock goes to the moon throughout

44:57

the 2010s as they're riding the sort of

44:59

cloud wave. And it wasn't until like

45:01

2020 where they finally realized and we

45:04

fell behind. By the way, there's this

45:06

huge opportunity. We're totally

45:08

unprepared for it. We don't have a

45:09

customer service mindset or culture

45:11

organization or all the IP building

45:13

blocks and all these things that TSMC

45:14

has. And they need a customer. They need

45:18

customers to help them actually build a

45:20

real foundry business. And so I would

45:23

write about this problem and I'd write

45:24

about like the China issue like you're

45:26

dependent on on a a company that is 60

45:30

miles offshore of our greatest political

45:33

you know opponent who thinks it's

45:35

theirs. So I these are big problems and

45:38

that's where I came to appreciate this

45:40

insurance issue for a big tech company

45:43

to go to Intel and say Intel you make

45:45

our chip and by the way the biggest

45:48

benefactor of this is going to be you

45:50

cuz you're going to learn how to work

45:51

with a partner and the biggest pain is

45:54

going to be us cuz we're going to have

45:56

to figure out how to work with you. We

45:57

could just go to TSMC. They are awesome.

46:00

They are so great to work with that we

46:02

know they're going to do a good job. It

46:04

just never made rational sense for

46:06

anyone to go work with Intel. That was

46:09

their fundamental problem. In a in a

46:10

world in a unchanging world, TSMC would

46:13

just win forever. But this is where TSMC

46:15

in some respects made the same mistake

46:16

as the memory makers made the same

46:18

mistakes as I ran. If I can continue the

46:19

analogy because they didn't invest the

46:22

last few years. The shortages are going

46:25

to be so acute. big 10 companies that

46:28

we're foregoing so much revenue and so

46:31

many profits because we don't have

46:32

enough compute. We will go through the

46:34

pain of getting Intel of getting Intel

46:36

up to speed of getting Samsung's logic

46:39

up to speed. The scarcity

46:42

is what ultimately saved Intel. Um, and

46:45

I expect at some point in the near that

46:47

they're going to announce like some

46:49

major partner for the first time. It's

46:51

going to be a big deal. But it was

46:53

ultimately TSMC brought it on

46:54

themselves. It's the cure for high

46:56

prices is high prices thing where we're

46:58

going to route around them. Yep. And

47:00

like and it's just like there's all

47:02

these things as like an analyst sitting

47:03

on the side. You can write these things

47:06

and it it was one of those things I sort

47:08

of learned like no one's going to pay

47:09

insurance they don't need to pay when

47:11

that insurance expected value is is

47:13

negative. The way to solve the

47:15

geopolitical problem of dependence on

47:18

TSMC

47:20

is to come up with a compute use case

47:22

that is so massive that everyone is

47:24

economically incentivized to bring other

47:27

people up to speed and then we get the

47:29

sort of geopolitical insurance for free.

47:31

>> If you think about the let's say top 10

47:33

or 15 technology companies, which ones

47:35

do you think have the most interesting

47:37

setups today for their business?

47:39

>> The answer is always Amazon. Um and the

47:42

reason because what Amazon is so

47:43

compelling is the extent to which they

47:46

build for them. They are their first

47:48

best customer like they provide the

47:51

scale to get basically anything off the

47:52

ground which they then sell to other

47:54

people. AWS is the most obvious example.

47:56

AWS contrary to sort of popular thought

47:59

was not spare Amazon capacity. Actually

48:02

it took a long time to get amazon.com

48:04

onto AWS. But the re what it drove was

48:07

the understanding that we need to have a

48:09

scalable. We can't be having so many

48:11

meetings like we need to have just

48:13

compute that you can plug in purely API

48:16

surface. You don't need to talk to

48:18

anyone. It's just there. And oh by the

48:20

way if we do that for our internal

48:22

retail teams we could do that for

48:23

anyone. And turns out the retail is so

48:26

big we have to start with everyone else.

48:27

AWS actually started serving external

48:29

customers before it served internal

48:30

ones. But now it serves them all. You

48:33

got other products like say the

48:35

logistics right where it was the

48:37

opposite like right now we're using

48:39

external providers for logistics UPS and

48:41

FedEx and USPS we need to build this up

48:43

ourselves and now they built up

48:46

themselves they're offering it to third

48:48

parties right now other people can use

48:49

their use their delivery services and

48:52

you see this in market after market like

48:54

they're talking about things like some

48:56

of their AI products that they're or

48:57

their chip products right what's the

48:59

beauty of the graviton or the tranium

49:02

particular the early versions. The early

49:03

versions were terrible. But if you're on

49:06

Amazon and you're using some of their

49:08

managed services, like say the Redshift

49:10

database service, they don't tell you

49:12

what the processor is underneath that.

49:13

You're just buying a managed service.

49:15

>> So they can put all their crappy

49:17

processors underneath the services

49:19

they're selling and that gives them the

49:22

volume and the capacity to iterate them

49:24

and get better. And they get to the

49:26

point where they can actually sell them

49:27

externally. And so because they were the

49:29

first best customer for Graviton,

49:31

Graviton got better because they were

49:32

the first best customer for Tranium.

49:34

Tranium got better and now Trrenium is

49:36

obviously, you know, running anthropic.

49:37

They're doing the same thing. They're

49:38

doing the same with AI products. We'll

49:40

see if any of them take off. They have

49:41

call center software. Their call center

49:44

or their customer experience is going

49:46

through AI. By the way, it's pretty

49:48

good. I don't I don't know if you like

49:49

>> I haven't tried it.

49:50

>> Well, because I you know, moving back to

49:52

to America, I've been buying lots of

49:54

stuff and well, every summer I'd buy

49:55

lots of stuff in a very brief amount of

49:57

time. sometime in like the last year or

49:58

so, you can go on and you're clearly

50:00

talking to a chatbot, but the chatbot

50:01

does a great job and and it actually

50:03

does take care of the problem. So, you

50:05

could see that actually starting to work

50:06

in that in that regard. But they're

50:08

going to they're building up these AI

50:10

services for their own business that

50:12

they're going to make broadly available.

50:14

And some of them will work, some of them

50:16

won't. But this is it's such an elegant

50:18

sort of approach and given they have so

50:23

many investments in the real world.

50:25

Their core business feels so impervious

50:28

to AI for like the model version of AI.

50:32

It will benefit from AI but their their

50:34

moat feels deeper than anyone as far as

50:36

their core business and their ability to

50:39

just sort of generate new business lines

50:41

organically is is very compelling.

50:44

>> What about Apple? They've sat this whole

50:46

thing out. It seems

50:47

>> it feels like it might be a situation of

50:49

better be lucky than good to a certain

50:51

extent.

50:53

>> I mean, Apple has their whole has their

50:56

whole ecosystem and

50:58

at the end of the day, they do own

51:00

access to customers. So, they can sort

51:03

of get suppliers. This is the classic

51:05

aggregator play. If you own access to

51:07

customers,

51:09

suppliers come to you, not the other way

51:10

around. and and so they can get

51:12

suppliers for their AI sort of as as

51:14

needed. And by the way, you know, to the

51:19

extent it's true that people don't want

51:21

to be productive, they just want a sort

51:23

of a chatbot.

51:25

Not only can they serve them a chatbot

51:28

and with, you know, finally getting a

51:30

Siri that works, but you can see a

51:32

future where this absolutely can work on

51:34

device and they actually don't even need

51:36

to pay for inference costs either

51:38

because they, you know, they're using

51:39

the customers electricity. I mean, I I

51:41

don't think we're quite there. There's a

51:43

reason they're using Google Cloud and

51:44

and Nvidia chips, but you can certainly

51:46

imagine a future where where that's the

51:48

case and they're in physical goods. Like

51:51

actually making phones is is hard,

51:54

right? and having retail, having

51:56

distribution for physical goods is is

51:58

good. So, they're they're more

51:59

insulated. The smartphone is so perfect.

52:01

It's small enough to fit in your pocket.

52:03

It's big enough to watch basically

52:04

anything on it. You can run your whole

52:06

life on it. All your entertainment is

52:07

there. Like when we talk about customers

52:09

just want to be entertained. The TV is

52:11

now an accessory. It's all on your

52:13

phone. And you know, I don't see anyone

52:17

taking over the phone. The question is,

52:19

is the phone always going to be the

52:21

center or is there a bit where

52:23

particularly in the home, this is where

52:25

I'm very, you know, open's efforts here

52:26

are very interesting, uh, where you want

52:30

sort of an ambient AI where you can just

52:32

talk to the AI and it tells you what you

52:34

need. Apple is the best position to

52:36

provide that, but can they provide that

52:40

without having leading edge models? Can

52:43

they provide that if they're so phone

52:45

centric or is it like a Microsoft

52:47

situation? Microsoft didn't miss mobile.

52:50

They were very early to mobile. The

52:52

problem is their mobile was a small PC.

52:54

They assumed the PC would always be the

52:56

center and their phones were going to be

52:59

something that was off that Apple

53:00

realized no we the f we need to reset.

53:03

The phone is not going to be accessory

53:04

to the Mac. The phone is going to be the

53:06

phone. The iPod helped them realize that

53:08

and going with Windows and all that. But

53:10

will they fall into a Microsoft like

53:12

trap like assuming the phone's so good

53:14

it's always going to be the center and

53:16

then let's figure out around it or is

53:17

this finally the time when actually

53:20

ambient the cloud just in general AI

53:23

being everywhere it can manifest through

53:25

your phone it can manifest through a

53:27

device can manifest on your computer is

53:30

actually better and is actually

53:33

disruptive to them I think it's possible

53:36

I also think it's totally valid for

53:39

Apple to double down on what they do.

53:43

The other thing about the AI stuff is

53:46

on what basis should we expect Apple to

53:48

be good at this?

53:50

Like just in like at the most crude

53:53

level, AI is this probabilistic

53:55

endeavor? Apple is the king of

53:58

deterministic products. like a physical

54:02

product. You ship that iPhone, you ship

54:05

it once and it's got to be it's got to

54:08

be good. If it's bad, it costs you

54:10

billions and billions and billions of

54:11

dollars. Apple's never had an iPhone

54:13

recall, which if you think about it is

54:16

actually it's amazing. And that the sort

54:18

of care and decision-m and diligence and

54:23

you know fierceness in terms of your

54:25

supply chain and like making hard

54:28

decisions is very very different than

54:30

everything that goes into like making

54:32

great AI and I'm generally prefer

54:36

companies to do what they're good at. So

54:39

from my perspective I'm fine with Apple

54:40

not doing AI. I I want them to keep

54:42

making great devices. of the five, let's

54:44

call it five potential frontier AI

54:47

winners. So, OpenAI, Ananthropic,

54:48

Gemini, let's put SpaceX AI, you know,

54:52

Grock, and Meta in that pile. Which of

54:54

those firms do you think has the most

54:56

interesting setup? Open Eye and

54:57

Anthropic obviously are the riskiest,

54:59

but also have the biggest upside. You

55:01

know, they're just the never discount

55:04

number one, the power of belief. They

55:06

think they're creating God. like like

55:08

the the most impactful things in history

55:11

have usually been fueled by religion and

55:14

the two religious organizations in

55:16

Silicon Valley are the sort of like open

55:20

kind of like mainline like they go to

55:22

church every Sunday they're sort of like

55:23

evangelicals is like that's anthropic

55:26

like they're they're all in uh it it is

55:29

core their belief that goes a long way

55:32

the fact you need to make a business

55:34

work for you to survive goes a very long

55:36

way Google just needs like search to not

55:39

die too quickly, right? Meta has the

55:42

huge advertising business in in a world

55:45

where Meta was run by anyone other than

55:47

Mark Zuckerberg. They would not be on

55:49

the leading edge. That is the one of the

55:51

purest manifestations of founder sort of

55:54

energy for better or for worse. Their

55:56

business is so amazing. You see them

55:57

just easily sort of doubling down on

55:58

that. Like Google, there's a bit where

56:00

it it made sus.

56:04

They've been doing research in this.

56:06

It's like it makes sense why they're

56:08

pursuing this meta being like actually

56:11

we're going to hire a completely new

56:13

team and we're going to start from

56:14

scratch. This all again is pretty

56:15

insane. So credit to Mark Zuckerberg in

56:18

that regard. Again, you could decide

56:19

whether that's a good idea or not. And

56:21

then SpaceX AI, I mean the

56:26

data centers in space is like that is

56:31

the theory is there like do they have to

56:33

own their own model though to do that?

56:35

They'd get better margins if they do. Um

56:38

then again if we actually run out

56:40

whether through political opposition or

56:42

power or whatever it might be if we run

56:43

out of data centers on Earth like they

56:45

can run whatever model they want as

56:47

we're seeing with their sort of you know

56:50

selling their capacity to anthropic

56:52

right now. So they're all pretty

56:53

interesting. I think um probably the

56:56

case for SpaceX AI is probably the

57:00

weakest because the data center and

57:03

space play is so highly differentiated.

57:07

Like if that plays out, it I'm not sure

57:10

to what extent they need to even have

57:11

their own model. So why are you wasting

57:13

billions and billions of dollars in the

57:15

meantime? Um that's a fair question.

57:19

From a tactical perspective, I love the

57:21

cursor acquisition. like that makes so

57:23

much sense for both companies and so I'm

57:25

intrigued to see what they do. Um, Meta

57:27

is probably the most interesting just

57:28

because you've written a lot about this

57:30

recently.

57:31

>> The

57:33

I think there's a very good case to make

57:35

that it is actually more reckless to not

57:39

be on the frontier if you're a digital

57:41

company. Right? So the the counter to

57:44

the counter to Meta is actually

57:45

Microsoft. Microsoft is not on the

57:47

frontier. The reason why Microsoft has

57:50

$20 billion of free cash flow last

57:51

quarter, Microsoft paid a $10 billion

57:53

dividend last quarter, right? Like

57:55

there's there's some money, but their

57:57

play is, okay, we're going to play all

57:59

these off each other. We're going to

58:00

provide middleware. We're going to

58:02

provide the platform that enterprises

58:03

will build on us and we're going to sort

58:04

of inter, you know, disintermediate

58:06

disintermediate the models. And I think

58:08

it's a I think it's a rational play.

58:11

It's the IBM play of the '9s. Like

58:13

there's, you know, history sort of

58:16

echoes. Everyone talks about Google,

58:18

Google like following Microsoft.

58:19

Microsoft follows IBM and you can see

58:22

that uh to an extent. Uh

58:24

>> what did IBM do? What's the what what's

58:25

now?

58:26

>> Well, so IBM um so IBM had this

58:28

dominant, you know, we talked about it

58:30

in the 70s. Uh and then you fast forward

58:33

to the '9s and IBM is this very sort of

58:35

distressed asset and the thought was IBM

58:38

needed to break up and all these

58:40

different pieces they had. So Lou Gerson

58:41

comes in, he takes it over. And I think

58:44

Gersonner's real key insight to IBM is

58:48

actually everything. We're pretty

58:50

mediocre at everything. It's kind of

58:52

like what I told Microsoft before. And

58:54

that's the price of Monopoly. Once

58:56

you've been a monopoly, you kind of lose

58:58

your capacity to be good because you're

59:01

you didn't need to compete anymore. And

59:03

I think a lot of tech incumbent

59:05

companies have this problem. They it

59:08

didn't matter what they did, they were

59:09

going to rake in money. And if you don't

59:11

have the pressure, if you don't have the

59:13

incentive, if you don't have the fear of

59:15

death or the fear of God as we talk

59:18

about these mono companies, then you

59:20

don't do your best work. And the problem

59:22

is that you once you lose that muscle,

59:24

it's gone. You're just sort of fat and

59:25

flabby. And so what Gersonner realized

59:27

is actually the worst thing IBM could do

59:30

would be to break it up into component

59:31

pieces cuz all those component pieces

59:33

are actually not very good.

59:35

our biggest asset is that we're big.

59:38

It's like what? No. What does it mean

59:40

we're big? We can It's the '9s. This

59:43

internet thing is coming along. There's

59:45

all these companies that kind of know

59:47

they have to figure out the internet and

59:48

they don't know what to do. They need

59:50

someone who can come in, understand

59:52

their business, and help them get

59:53

online. That's basically what IBM did.

59:56

So they built out and this is an echo of

59:58

what's happening now huge consultant

60:00

force and they put all their time into

60:03

building basically it was middleware

60:04

where they would go in and they put this

60:07

layer between a company's old school

60:09

mainframe like which all these companies

60:12

had and then modern web services on the

60:14

other end so they could have websites

60:15

and e-commerce sites and all this sort

60:16

of thing. It gave IBM a 30year lease on

60:19

life. Yes, in theory you could go get

60:21

point solutions from all these hot

60:22

Silicon Valley startups but you you

60:24

don't understand that. you don't know

60:25

how to do that. You know us. We'll come

60:27

in. We'll create all this middleware.

60:29

We'll give build this big consulting

60:31

force to help you implement it and

60:32

you'll get online. And IBM basically

60:35

brought all of corporate America online.

60:37

And that's what Microsoft's playbook.

60:40

Microsoft is um will help you figure out

60:43

AI. It will help you figure out in a way

60:44

where you're not giving away the crown

60:45

jewels to these companies. We're going

60:47

to build this platform, this harness,

60:50

this sort of middle layer where you can

60:52

we're dependable. We're stable like you

60:56

know us we we have backwards

60:57

compatibility to the 80s like you can

60:59

build on us and then we'll manage all

61:02

the changing models and what's updating

61:04

and do all those sorts of things and

61:06

does that mean you'll get the absolute

61:07

best experience no middleware sort of

61:10

saws off the sharp edges right like you

61:12

you sort of get a lowest common

61:14

denominator capacity but if you value in

61:17

this the oldest enterprise sales motion

61:20

how did Oracle go to market Oracle went

61:22

to market in the 198 the 80s Larry

61:24

Allison with this you know another

61:25

technology taken from IBM or just IBM

61:28

didn't want it relational databases and

61:29

they're like you don't want to be locked

61:31

into IBM you want to be able to

61:34

relational database you could run

61:35

anywhere come come with us the the

61:38

reason this is a joke is cuz Oracle

61:40

locks you in more than anyone right but

61:42

the the the all of enterprise sales is

61:46

companies whose long-term goal is to

61:48

lock you in getting you on board by

61:50

trying to make you scared of being

61:52

locked into somebody else, right? Like

61:54

all the cloud companies are like, "Oh,

61:56

portability and whatever. You can be

61:57

whatever." And then they're like, "Oh,

61:59

just use our service that only runs in

62:01

our cloud and now you're locked in." Um,

62:04

so that that that's Microsoft's playbook

62:05

and it's a very rational playbook and I

62:08

think it makes sense and that is the

62:10

opposite. That's why they have extra

62:11

money because they're not on the

62:12

frontier. They are building massive data

62:14

centers, but they're building data

62:15

centers for inference. They're not

62:16

building it for training. And their

62:17

story about we're investing in time in

62:19

response to customer demand is more

62:21

believable in that regard. they're not

62:22

having to tell a fungeibility story

62:24

where we're building big data centers

62:25

for training that will be used for

62:26

inference down the road maybe. But go

62:28

back to this notion that it's reckless

62:29

to not be in the frontier as a

62:30

>> digital. Well, so so the the reason why

62:32

that's concerning though is at the end

62:34

of the day, why are we using Microsoft

62:36

products again?

62:37

>> Cuz we did before.

62:39

>> Like to what extent does it actually

62:41

make sense to have all these artifacts,

62:44

all these documents, all these like

62:47

email inboxes? Can't AI just do that?

62:50

Like there there's a real threat here

62:52

where to Microsoft's software business

62:56

the whole systems of record thing is

62:57

it's kind of funny because one reason

62:59

why systems of records are so powerful

63:01

is it's so hard to move them to

63:02

somewhere else because it's a very

63:04

tedious repetitive job.

63:06

Oh AI is actually surprisingly good at

63:08

that. I'm not sure how good the systems

63:10

of record Microsoft isn't so much

63:11

systems of record. They do have some

63:12

like the dynamics business. It's user

63:14

interface. It's like where you actually

63:16

interact with the computer. That's the

63:18

part that is like when you see codeex or

63:22

when you see uh you know claude co-work

63:25

or whatever it is like aimed like an

63:28

arrow to the heart of what Microsoft h

63:31

of what Microsoft has and in the long

63:34

run all digital companies are but

63:35

Microsoft is very much like there

63:37

there's a re their strategy is sound

63:39

it's also

63:41

desperate in a

63:45

existential way and also in a they might

63:48

pull it off because they're desperate

63:50

sort of way. Meta is not threatened

63:53

immediately. But if this is where my

63:57

bullish view of AI comes in, I think all

63:59

digital

64:02

companies are threatened and meta is a

64:04

digital company like they they they have

64:05

software. Now the sort of one worry is

64:09

AI takes up more and more time and that

64:10

like time ultimately is is meta's

64:13

currency. We saw opening I tried the

64:15

sora thing didn't really take off.

64:16

Social network is actually pretty hard

64:18

also cost a lot of money like it's kind

64:20

of really interesting. This came up with

64:22

the creator payments stuff. So YouTube

64:26

very famously as paid creators kind of

64:28

from the beginning and that's a much

64:29

bigger drag on the business than people

64:31

appreciate because

64:33

YouTube has marginal cost to their

64:35

content. Now unlike a Netflix they don't

64:39

have to put pay that cost upfront. They

64:41

pay it after the fact. So they're

64:43

sharing revenue. So it's a much it's a

64:45

better model than a Netflix model.

64:47

Netflix is to pay upfront for content

64:48

and then ideally make more money.

64:50

YouTube pays along the way. But but

64:53

Facebook or Meta

64:54

>> pays nothing.

64:55

>> They pay nothing. People are like

64:58

Instagram is this unbelievable product

65:00

that generates all this money for which

65:02

Facebook pays zero dollars for content.

65:04

It's unbelievable. And so it's funny

65:06

because you could see a world where for

65:08

YouTube AI generated content could

65:10

theoretically be a positive because the

65:12

inference cost to generate content could

65:13

be less than what they're sharing with

65:14

creators. For meta AI generated content

65:18

to the extent they're the ones

65:19

generating it is actually a worse margin

65:22

profile than what they have today. What

65:24

they have today is free. So they have

65:25

attention. Um there's a bullish world

65:28

where meta is actually very well placed

65:32

because in a world where we're

65:33

interacting with AI all the time the

65:35

desire for a human connection becomes

65:36

greater and it's sort of like a Meta

65:38

going back to their roots. Meta one of

65:41

their biggest mistakes actually Meta was

65:42

always a social network company. They

65:44

killed Snapchat or stop Snapchat's

65:46

growth by realizing Snapchat has a great

65:48

product. Let's layer it onto our

65:50

network. They they took their they

65:52

brought their network to bear to kill

65:53

Snapchat. uh where Tik Tok the reason

65:56

why Tik Tok is just a blind spot for

65:57

them is Tik Tok is classified as a

66:00

social network and it's not a social

66:01

network at all. Tik Tok is an

66:03

entertainment product. You it doesn't

66:05

matter who you follow on Tik Tok. What

66:07

you see on Tik Tok is a function of what

66:09

you watched and you're going to get more

66:11

more of the same, right? And the it's a

66:14

userenerated

66:16

content network. And the the insight

66:20

from Tik Tok was the way to get the best

66:22

content to limit it to your social

66:25

network is an artificial constraint.

66:26

We're going to give you the best content

66:27

from across the whole network. And the

66:30

vast majority of content is going to be

66:31

crap. But this is like the absolute

66:33

question before. Like you don't think

66:35

about margins, you think about absolute

66:36

numbers. The absolute amount of great

66:38

content, even if the margin for great

66:40

content is infantessimal, if we have an

66:42

a ton of content, the absolute amount of

66:44

great content is going to be very large.

66:46

And so the then Meta is like we're a

66:49

social network. And so Meta is serving

66:51

you content from your network of people

66:54

you know and Tik Tok serving you the

66:56

best content from around the world.

66:57

That's why they took a huge chunk out of

66:59

them. Meta had to shift. That's what's

67:02

happened with with Instagram and with

67:04

reals is it's not really a social

67:06

network. It is a entertainment product

67:08

that pulls from the entire network. And

67:10

social networking is like the group

67:12

checked. it's possible in AI actually

67:14

social network is important again

67:16

because like we actually want humans we

67:17

want to have some sort of connection to

67:19

them that'll be interesting to see how

67:20

that plays out then the other thing with

67:21

with the models is they're so impactful

67:23

on advertising biggest impact of the

67:25

models the biggest monetization right

67:26

now is probably not anthropic openi it's

67:28

it's the incremental gain that is

67:30

happening for Google and meta and most

67:33

of that most of most of the stuff is

67:35

prel but we're getting to LMS whether it

67:38

be generating advertising content like

67:42

they are the bad like what do we want

67:44

want verifiable domains. How do you

67:45

verify if a generated image is good for

67:47

an ad? Does the ad sell or not? Like

67:50

they can they actually can validate

67:52

their image creation and their text

67:55

creation in a way no one else can. And

67:58

their validation is the ad marketplace.

68:00

Like running a gazillion AB tests on all

68:02

these different things, see what works,

68:03

see what doesn't. Most ads are a

68:05

throwaway. It's fine. Um like the vast

68:07

majority of ads don't convert. So they

68:09

have this they have this massive

68:10

advantage, this huge liquid market that

68:12

is a verification machine where the

68:15

verifiers are humans deciding whether

68:17

they click on that ad and make a

68:18

purchase or not, but they're doing it at

68:19

global scale. That can actually have a

68:21

feedback loop to make their products

68:23

better. You're also going to get a world

68:25

where ad matching is actually still

68:27

fairly crude. It's like here's the

68:29

qualities of the person, here's the

68:30

qualities of the ad. And it's like you

68:32

create an embedding like a a vector

68:34

calculation uh and see what numbers

68:36

match and then you sort of match an ad

68:38

to the person. What do LM do? LMS

68:41

predict like we're going to move to this

68:42

world where Meta is going to look at

68:45

people and say this person probably

68:47

wants to see this next and they're going

68:49

to go find that thing and show it to

68:50

them. the potential upside in terms of

68:53

just showing people better ads that are

68:54

more relevant to them. They only need to

68:57

increase like a few percentage points

69:00

for the returns to be billions and

69:01

billions of dollars. This alone is worth

69:04

them investing in being on the leading

69:06

edge in in having these amazing models.

69:09

I think a big problem Meta has is they

69:11

don't tell this story. Like it's weird,

69:14

but Mark Zuckerberg has the same problem

69:15

Sam Alman does. He doesn't love ads.

69:17

They have the best ad business in the

69:19

world. They have an ad business that I

69:20

think is a societal positive. Like you

69:23

and I have set up these little content

69:25

businesses that make great money, but

69:28

we're content is kind of you get a ride

69:30

on social media, right? I grew up on

69:32

Twitter, people sharing my links. It was

69:34

amazing. If you're selling some product,

69:37

like the beauty of the internet is there

69:41

is a niche out there that wants that

69:43

product. The question is how do you find

69:45

the niche?

69:47

Facebook advertising. That's what it

69:49

does. It it connects. It helps products

69:52

find the people who didn't even know

69:54

they wanted that product, but when they

69:55

get it, they're so happy they got it.

69:57

And that is tre that's a huge societal

70:00

positive. You have new business from a

70:02

new entrepreneur making a new product.

70:04

You have customers who are happy they

70:05

got something that they didn't know they

70:06

would get otherwise. Those customers, by

70:08

the way, got lots of free entertainment

70:09

and they didn't have to pay for it along

70:10

the way. And Meta made a bunch of money

70:12

for themselves and their shareholders,

70:13

which is basically everyone in the

70:14

world. Like that this is why advertising

70:16

is great. And Meta's advertising in

70:18

particular is awesome. And I get

70:20

frustrated that Meta doesn't talk about

70:23

that. Mark Z has never really talked

70:25

about the societal benefits of

70:27

advertising except in passing.

70:28

>> I see. in 20 years. Like he's handed it

70:32

off to other people to take care of. And

70:34

maybe there's a bit where him not paying

70:35

attention is why

70:37

there is a certain like

70:40

grit and grind that goes into building

70:42

advertising business like and like you

70:44

know all the Facebook people get

70:46

frustrated or have questions about as

70:48

far as data and all those sorts of

70:49

things and maybe there was a bit where

70:51

he didn't want to be involved in it and

70:52

wipe his hands of it. But you saw this

70:54

like when when Apple passed ATT app

70:56

tracking transparency was one of the

70:58

most

71:00

one of the worst antitrust violations in

71:02

the history of technology like just

71:04

Apple unilaterally

71:06

obliterating all these business models

71:08

while they're simultaneously building

71:09

their own as far as advertising goes and

71:11

doing like doing all this tracking. Why

71:13

trust us? And meanwhile they're running

71:15

these advertisements. So remember that

71:16

advertisement of people on the bus like

71:17

overhearing everyone around them what

71:19

they're saying. That was such a

71:20

dishonest representation of how

71:22

advertising works on the internet. You

71:23

had Tim Cook in Congress talking about

71:25

companies selling data. Facebook's not

71:27

selling your data. That's value to them.

71:29

Why would they sell the D like and Meta

71:31

was not prepared to respond because

71:35

they I think you got this with Cheryl

71:37

Sandberg back in the day. She when every

71:39

call would talk about advertising, how

71:40

great it is and have a bunch of case

71:41

studies of like people who are

71:43

benefiting from advertising and these

71:44

new entrepreneurs and then she left and

71:46

it's kind of like that never hole never

71:48

got filled and you you it feels like

71:51

it's a company that's kind of like

71:52

embarrassed. Yeah, we make a lot of

71:54

money from ads but we got glasses and uh

71:56

we're doing AI. It's like you have ads

71:58

and ads are awesome. And

72:01

I think if they had made that,

72:04

communicated that more consistently,

72:07

they would be in a better place

72:09

generally from a PR perspective. They

72:11

would be better place relative to Apple.

72:13

And I think they would have an easier

72:14

time right now convincing Wall Street

72:16

that

72:18

let us invest. The other problem is they

72:21

spent

72:23

cumulative hundred some billion dollars

72:25

on Oculus which I dated all along. Uh

72:30

and so there's a bit where why like why

72:33

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74:07

The one major player and company that we

74:09

haven't talked about much is Jensen and

74:11

Nvidia. And I'm curious how you would

74:12

tie this back to the notion of like not

74:14

understanding commodity markets in

74:16

Silicon Valley. Whether or not you think

74:17

compute ultimately is a commodity, I'm

74:19

curious whether or not you think

74:20

intelligence will ultimately be a

74:21

commodity. It's interesting that

74:23

intelligence and compute which seem to

74:26

be by far the most interesting and

74:27

important topics in tech both might be

74:30

commodities and less differentiated than

74:32

>> well that's always the most interesting

74:33

thing about the internet is free

74:35

distribution

74:36

>> like bandwidth is a commodity

74:39

>> the the fact that I can pull out my

74:41

phone right now and connect to any

74:43

information source in the world for free

74:45

>> um free on a marginal cost basis is

74:46

because it's a commodity it changed the

74:48

world commodities change the world

74:50

>> like the there's a aspect of

74:52

differentiated products by definition

74:54

have lower TAMs because you're like not

74:57

there's a elasticity aspect to it. Not

75:00

everyone can afford to pay for it.

75:01

People's willingness to pay is going to

75:02

differ. Your market is going to be

75:03

constrained. Apple's never going to

75:05

serve the whole world by having by

75:07

selling a device whereas a Google can

75:10

because it's free, right? That matters.

75:12

And commodities, you know, you're paying

75:14

for a commodity, but to the extent it is

75:16

available to everyone is the extent it

75:19

is impactful. Yeah, the internet is a

75:21

commodity I would say and it changed the

75:24

world. So I don't think it'd be weird

75:25

that intelligence ends up a commodity

75:27

and changes the world.

75:27

>> But but still so so commodities often

75:30

are not thought of as as good a

75:32

businesses as these differentiated high

75:34

high margin products. So curious for

75:36

your thoughts on yeah that Jensen and

75:39

Nvidia specifically

75:40

>> Nvidia's position is I think definitely

75:43

unnatural. It's like they've maintained

75:45

all their margins. Isn't that amazing?

75:47

It's 2026 and everyone's coming for them

75:49

and they're still charging, you know,

75:51

however much money for for for a chip.

75:53

Um but they're actually not maintaining

75:55

their margins because who is buying like

75:58

this whole question of circular

75:59

financing is people talk about Lucent

76:02

and things like that and you know this

76:03

whole deal and Nvidia's providing 25%

76:05

back stop but if you actually uh ascribe

76:08

a value to that to Nvidia's taking

76:12

equity in the Neo clouds or whatever

76:14

like they guarantee they're going to buy

76:16

all their compute to 2030 right and why

76:18

do they do that so that the entity in

76:20

question can get a lower cost of capital

76:22

so they can buy more GP views etc. But

76:26

implicit in that why do they get a lower

76:28

cost of capital? They get a lower cost

76:31

of capital because Nvidia assumed risk,

76:34

right? This is my point before. Risk

76:35

never disappears. It just sort of

76:37

appears somewhere else. Taking on risk

76:40

has a price. Like so Nvidia like now

76:44

there is a world where AI takes off. It

76:47

never stops and everything is fine. And

76:49

Nvidia captured all the upside of their

76:51

risk. But there's also a world where say

76:55

that this Neo cloud they backed up a ton

76:57

of compute comes to market. The

76:58

hyperscalers have plenty of comput. They

76:59

don't have enough comput. Nvidia is

77:00

paying for a computer that no one wants.

77:02

They just lost a bunch of money. So, if

77:04

you think about it, there's an expected

77:06

value of that investment. That expected

77:09

value has it's not zero. It's not 100%.

77:13

It's somewhere in the middle. But that

77:16

is a diminuation of Nvidia's

77:19

profitability. If you actually look at

77:21

their business holistically, what that

77:23

is is a price cut,

77:24

>> right? Like they now the price cut

77:26

didn't show up in margins. didn't show

77:27

up in what they're offering. But a lot

77:29

of what Nvidia is doing is how can we

77:32

maintain our margins even if the

77:36

wide view sort of discounted cash flow

77:38

expected value holistic view of our

77:40

company people do discount cash flows

77:42

but are you actually considering all

77:43

these pieces right the reality is is

77:45

that moving stuff off the balance sheet

77:46

by and large works right and so uh but

77:49

they're doing all these all these deals

77:52

to maintain what feels somewhat

77:55

unnatural and

77:58

So I would say like we have seen disc

78:00

price cuts. They're just manifesting in

78:02

these very bizarre sort of ways. Now in

78:04

the long run I think the challenge is

78:06

the the challenge Nvidia faces is

78:10

their ultimate competitors are the

78:12

hyperscalers particularly Google and

78:13

Amazon. So Google and Amazon aren't just

78:16

building their own chips but they're

78:18

also looking to sell those chips

78:19

externally. Google already made a deal

78:21

to sell sell like 20% of their TPUs to

78:22

anthropic. On the last earnings call,

78:25

Andy Jasse practically confirmed that

78:27

they'll be selling tranium 3es or maybe

78:29

tranium four or those tranium chips sort

78:31

of eventually externally, which makes

78:33

sense. That gives them a long-term buy

78:35

into these companies. There's a huge

78:37

amount of R&D that goes into developing

78:38

chips. They get more leverage on their

78:39

spend. It it it all makes sense. And by

78:42

the way, they're not selling their chips

78:43

on differentiation. They're selling

78:45

their chips as commodities. Nvidia is

78:46

the one selling differentiation. People

78:48

aren't going to Amazon to use tranium.

78:51

So they're not cannibalizing like the

78:53

attractiveness of their cloud by selling

78:54

tranium outside. So they're Nvidia's

78:57

biggest problem. It uh because what's

79:01

the number one advantage that the

79:03

hyperscalers have?

79:04

>> Lower cost of capital. It's a capital

79:06

fight. They have a lower cost of capital

79:09

than the Neoclouds do. The Neoclouds are

79:12

they'll buy Nvidia left, right, left,

79:14

right, and center. And by the way, it

79:15

also makes total sense that like why

79:17

SpaceX like Elon's out there. we will

79:19

always buy Nvidia because they're the

79:20

best. No, you'll buy Nvidia because

79:21

they're the most funible. You like

79:24

Nvidia is true. It is the most funible.

79:25

CUDA's mode is dramatically diminished

79:28

because the models don't care what they

79:30

run on and that's what actually matters,

79:32

what's built on top of the models, but

79:33

it still matters. It It's still

79:35

something of a mode. It's so if you're

79:37

going to be if you want to play the game

79:39

SpaceX is doing where we're going to

79:40

build a lot and rent it out but reserve

79:42

the right to pull it back, of course

79:44

you're going to be on Nvidia because the

79:45

easiest way to rent it out is to be on

79:46

Nvidia. And you saw this very early by

79:48

the way. You go back to 2024, 2023.

79:50

Nvidia starts talking about all these

79:52

sovereign clouds. They start talking

79:53

about they tried to come out with these

79:54

neo they had the neotron models, but

79:56

they had all these they had this thing

79:57

in 2024. I remember it was the first one

79:59

where was like the rockstar GTC at San

80:01

Jose and like the huge coliseum and just

80:04

one comes out. It was a very boring GTC.

80:06

The old ones used to be Nvidia

80:07

demonstrating like 50 gazillion things

80:09

cuz they're throwing stuff at the wall.

80:10

They knew they had something with GPUs

80:12

and they're trying to like

80:13

>> find the use. Once LM showed up, it's

80:15

like, "Oh, we have the use case." But

80:17

they were coming up with all these

80:18

enterprise offerings. I can't remember

80:19

what they were called, but they were

80:20

like these modules basically that of

80:23

course they were free, but they only ran

80:24

on Nvidia. And you could see what they

80:26

were doing is they were trying to lock

80:27

people in. They were and and Intel is a

80:30

good example here. Intel got AMD cleaned

80:35

them out in hyperscaler sales because

80:37

the hyperscalers would put in the effort

80:39

to get stuff working on AMD versus

80:41

Intel. There are still small differences

80:42

even though they're they're they're x86

80:45

because they're buying at such scale the

80:47

investment to do it is worth it to get a

80:49

better chip or a lower price or whatever

80:51

it might be. Where Intel the part of

80:53

Intel's business that never floundered

80:55

was selling to government and selling to

80:57

enterprises because you're like they

80:59

don't have the resources of a

81:01

hyperscaler. They're not buying at that

81:03

scale. They're just going to keep buying

81:05

what they had before. That's why Nvidia

81:07

talks about selling to sovereign clouds.

81:08

That's why they talk about selling to to

81:10

enterprises because they want to get in

81:12

these markets where they're not going to

81:14

be balancing this chip versus that chip.

81:17

The hyperscalers have always been the

81:19

threat to Nvidia for that reason just to

81:22

like because they're the they're

81:23

actually they're actually bigger. So So

81:25

you have this issue where they the

81:26

hyperscalers are the threat. The

81:28

hyperscalers have a better cost of

81:30

capital than the other companies wants

81:31

to buy them. That's how you get this

81:33

deal this week. I see this deal as a

81:35

response. That's why it goes with the

81:36

Google deal. Google can just issue

81:38

equity like it's not shareholders don't

81:41

love it but their their monetization

81:43

capacity is at the end of the day like

81:46

it's it's much higher than than than

81:48

Nvidia or Nvidia's customers are. I

81:50

think what Nvidia is hoping for, maybe

81:53

they wouldn't say this in so many words,

81:55

but if we get to a world where we

82:00

actually run out of power, that's

82:02

probably good for Nvidia because in a

82:05

world where we're totally constrained on

82:07

power,

82:08

>> everyone want the best.

82:09

>> We have to get the best efficiency, the

82:11

best token efficiency. And I think

82:13

Nvidia is still the most token

82:14

efficient. Um, and so that is a good

82:17

world for them. I think it's been

82:18

probably the biggest problem for Nvidia

82:21

over the last couple years is I think

82:22

the US has actually brought a lot more

82:24

power online than

82:26

expected. They surprised me like whether

82:29

it be what Elon did sort of behind the

82:31

meter which has been been replicated

82:32

West Texas and natural gas and but even

82:35

like restarting nuclear plants like the

82:37

extent to which we've

82:39

>> you love how the US responds to these

82:41

things.

82:41

>> It's it's awesome. It's actually one of

82:43

the biggest like

82:46

encouraging signals about the US is I

82:50

was writing early on like what's going

82:51

to be the long term like assume this is

82:53

a bubble. You want there to be a

82:55

long-term payoff, right? The.com we got

82:56

fiber in the ground. Google like and by

82:59

the way Google has played this game

83:00

before. Google built its business by

83:02

buying up dark fiber. They had the

83:04

killer search engine, but they so much

83:06

of the the power what they do is because

83:07

they bought up all this dark fiber that

83:09

was basically free after the.com era.

83:12

Like our core internet still runs on

83:14

worldcom fiber, right? Like uh like the

83:17

and so that was a lasting benefit. The

83:20

railroads BNSF is is throwing off money

83:23

that's going to Google from Northern

83:26

Pacific and Jay Cook selling bonds to

83:28

retail investors. like the the you you

83:31

want a bubble that produces something

83:33

that lasts. And very often it's like

83:35

what's going to last from from AI? The

83:37

GPUs don't last that long. Like data

83:40

centers, yeah, okay, fine. But what is

83:42

it going to be? It's like power. It has

83:44

to be power. If we have if we're in a

83:47

world where this all blows up and we

83:49

have way too much power, that is an

83:50

amazing world to be. We've always been

83:52

energy constrained. Energy undergurs

83:54

everything. What would it be like to

83:56

live in a world of energy abundance?

83:58

Like it's it's hard to even imagine

83:59

because our minds are so constrained by

84:01

the fact we've actually always been in

84:03

energy scarcity. I think we've done an

84:06

unbelievable job. Like power for sure is

84:10

a constraint. It's going to be a

84:11

constraint, but I think it has taken

84:14

longer to be become a constraint than

84:17

anyone expected. And I wouldn't be

84:19

surprised if that includes Jensen Hong.

84:21

Like I think he thought a power

84:25

insufficient power was going to be

84:28

Nvidia's moat sooner than that than that

84:31

that that it happened. And it turns out

84:34

that the longer we have enough power,

84:36

the more time Amazon has to make Tranium

84:38

better, the more time Google has to to

84:40

make TPUs competitive from a efficiency

84:43

standpoint. And if we get in a world

84:45

where just a world where those margins

84:47

seem very hard to sustain.

84:48

>> I love hearing your takes on just

84:50

everything going on. It's the most

84:51

interesting time I've ever observed in

84:52

this world that you love so much. So,

84:54

thank you so much for your time.

84:55

>> Thank you very much.

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Interactive Summary

The transcript features a discussion on the AI landscape, focusing on market dynamics, the competitive strategies of major tech firms, and the geopolitical and economic implications of AI. The participants discuss the 'aggregation theory' in the context of AI, the challenges of semiconductor supply chains, the impact of AI on advertising models, and the sustainability of high-capex investments in compute infrastructure. They also touch upon the roles of key players like OpenAI, Meta, Google, Amazon, and Nvidia, emphasizing the importance of infrastructure, power availability, and the shift from consumer to enterprise-focused models.

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