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Бонды под прицелом| ФинFak LIVE #39

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Бонды под прицелом| ФинFak LIVE #39

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2426 segments

0:00

It says "Going live". Live. It will

0:04

turn on now. Oh, looks like it's

0:10

started. Good and wonderful evening,

0:14

everyone. Drop a plus if you can hear

0:19

me. And, as usual, we’re going to beg

0:24

someone to run an AI and make timecodes

0:27

for us,

0:28

>> so someone—anyone—does our work.

0:32

>> Yes, my hands just aren't wired for

0:34

that, and honestly, I'm too lazy to

0:36

deal with it. So, we’ll ask for help.

0:40

But at least there are no donations. So

0:43

>> for now,

0:44

>> for now. Yeah, when this all crashes,

0:47

we’ll ask for donations. We can. Yeah

0:51

.

0:52

>> So. Are there pluses? Can you hear us,

0:55

guys? Let's check. Got it. Chat. Aha,

1:09

everything is fine, looks like the

1:11

pluses are coming in. Well, my friend,

1:14

I welcome you to the first—to the 1st

1:18

of October.

1:20

>> Thank you.

1:21

>> A wonderful month is beginning.

1:24

Starting right off with a career

1:25

question. Did you buy TLT today, or

1:27

yesterday?

1:29

>> Waiting, still waiting.

1:31

>> Do you think we’ll go even higher?

1:34

Well, we easily could, I think,

1:39

>> because already some...

1:41

>> I’m not betting on it, per se, but to

1:43

say that this is the limit to buy the

1:46

ten-year, I think it’s too early,

1:50

>> because, you know, 5.3. Our friend

1:53

Gromin was shouting about 4.8, half a

1:55

percent higher. Volatility, by the way,

1:58

isn’t that horrible yet, like 109,

2:00

110. No, well, 110 is much higher than,

2:03

I don’t know, 70. We were at the

2:06

bottom, yeah, this,

2:08

>> I think, no, well, this guy, what’s

2:11

his name, Bassman, right?

2:13

>> Who invented that V-index.

2:15

>> Harley. Harley.

2:17

>> Harley, yes. He says himself that at

2:21

around 130, I think, he has this

2:23

breaking point level

2:26

>> for this volatility. So we’re not

2:28

there yet, but we’re heading there,

2:30

right? I mean, volatility isn’t just

2:33

in one direction; these are

2:35

fluctuations in both directions. Well,

2:39

there might be a trend, yes, but you

2:42

know, that’s why it’s growing. I

2:48

don’t know about today, but this

2:50

volatility is rising, which is

2:52

naturally a problem for liquidity. And

2:57

most importantly, considering the

2:59

structure of those holding Treasuries

3:02

today, it’s a big problem because a

3:05

large part of the investors are hedge

3:08

funds, and many of them are in the

3:11

basis trade, as you know,

3:14

>> which, to put it mildly, doesn’t like

3:17

volatility. Volatility is kryptonite

3:21

for the basis trade because your

3:22

derivative portion starts to be valued

3:25

differently since it’s grown.

3:27

>> Yes. Well, basically, in a nutshell,

3:31

what a basis trade is: regular

3:33

allocators or, as they’re called,

3:35

asset managers usually enter this

3:37

market via futures, while hedge funds

3:39

play the opposite game. They buy spot,

3:43

sell futures, and play the narrowing.

3:45

So, well, as this spread narrows over

3:48

time, they earn money on it. But for

3:50

this, you need some massive leverage

3:52

for it to generate any real profit at

3:53

all. And there’s a discussion about

3:55

just how huge these volumes are. I mean

3:58

, there’s talk—and what I’ve seen

4:01

, at least what Gromen often writes—

4:04

that a very large chunk of all these

4:07

Treasurys being pushed into the market

4:10

ends up with these guys, who are

4:13

extremely sensitive to volatility

4:16

movements. And I was reading

4:19

CrossBorder yesterday; they wrote that

4:22

this shadow banking, which is floating

4:24

around all over the repo markets, has

4:26

seen a slight, though minor,

4:28

contraction in liquidity for about a

4:30

couple of weeks now. I mean, there’s

4:34

no serious stress, but it is sort of

4:35

present. Although

4:37

>> Yes, sorry,

4:38

>> Go ahead, keep talking.

4:39

>> Please.

4:40

>> No, well, there are liquidity problems

4:42

in general, right? I mean, it's not

4:44

like there’s a lot of it. Plus, a lot

4:47

of what comes in is being gobbled up by

4:50

the real economy as well. Yes, all

4:53

these buildouts and so on—power grids

4:57

, everything related to energy

4:59

generation or whatever—that takes

5:02

money that is being injected into the

5:05

economy as well. So,

5:08

>> But you’re speaking from the theory

5:10

that Meta doesn’t care about paying 8

5:12

or 9%for all of this. And so they suck

5:15

up liquidity that would otherwise have

5:17

gone into the Treasury market, and they

5:19

absorb it for themselves at higher

5:21

spreads.

5:23

>> This is also just competition for

5:25

capital, right? And it’s clear

5:28

there’s more of it because these data

5:31

centers are being financed more and

5:33

more through debt, right? So that’s

5:36

the competition. Plus, competition from

5:40

the Gulf countries has actually grown.

5:44

They are actively financing themselves

5:47

there because, well, their revenue and

5:49

cash flow aren't terrible, but they are

5:52

worse. They are definitely worse. And

5:54

you just, well, you know, need the

5:56

money to plug some budget gaps. But

5:59

that is, again, competition for

6:00

Treasurys, right? I mean, if you buy, I

6:03

don't know, a bond, you didn’t buy

6:05

Treasurys with that volume, so to speak

6:06

. So, yes. Uh, but I’m talking more

6:10

about liquidity in general, yes. I mean

6:14

, if you look at it, Europe is

6:16

basically sucking out liquidity, right?

6:20

I mean, those ridiculous programs are

6:22

still running, plus they’re raising

6:24

rates. The Americans, yes, they sort of

6:32

finished QT, started QE in some form,

6:34

plus there are those Treasury buybacks,

6:36

right? So there’s some management of

6:41

this going on, and it is flowing in,

6:44

but the growth level isn't enough to

6:46

talk about any real upside for

6:48

financial markets, let me put it that

6:50

way. So, what is this more about? And

6:55

the fact that you have additional

6:57

competition in the dollar for yield

6:59

only makes it all worse. Well, from the

7:01

perspective of the Treasuries market.

7:03

Ah,

7:04

>> yes. So you have less demand for dollar

7:07

assets that are fundamentally similar,

7:10

right. Well, again, like Saudi

7:12

sovereign debt, right. Well yes, it

7:17

gives you a premium of some percent,

7:19

sure, but the essence is the same,

7:21

it’s still sovereign debt; the Saudis

7:23

can’t print dollars, hence the

7:25

premium. But, you know, again, if you

7:30

bought that debt, you didn't buy

7:32

Treasuries. Well, on the other hand, if

7:36

you look at the same, let's say, TIPS,

7:39

right, when you have real—real yield

7:42

>> touched a nerve there, yeah,

7:44

>> yeah, your real yield is over 3%. Uh,

7:47

but that’s kind of—

7:49

>> I don’t buy it, man, I don’t

7:50

believe in TIPS. I think it’s

7:52

absolute. Well, listen,

7:54

that’s enough. I also had a question,

7:57

you know, I’ve always viewed those

7:59

break-evens with, well,

8:02

>> with no enthusiasm, let’s say, right.

8:06

I looked at those five-year break-evens

8:09

over time, well, during COVID and all

8:12

that. During COVID, break-evens showed,

8:15

I don’t want to lie, but something

8:17

around 4.5%. A five-year break-even in

8:24

2020. So, even in some sort of

8:27

retrospect, this is a bull indicator,

8:30

it has absolutely nothing to do with

8:33

reality. Therefore, when people talk to

8:36

me about positive real rates, I don’t

8:39

really understand what they’re

8:41

telling me. I don’t, well, right now

8:44

the five-year break-even is at, what,

8:46

2.3%.

8:49

>> No, I’m saying, going out to the long

8:51

end, somewhere into the twenty or

8:53

thirty-year. Uh, well, look, if you

8:56

take the perspective, say, right now

8:59

this fellow Biyanku popped up and said

9:01

that, like, now at these levels bonds

9:04

look really sweet. It's clear that

9:08

Rosenberg is getting a massive thrill

9:11

seeing yields like these. And basically

9:16

, if you look at it, well, that

9:18

discussion that, you know, Mike Green

9:20

is leading about passive flows: when,

9:23

due to rising yields, you get an

9:25

automatic under-allocation to this

9:27

sector, meaning the bond drops in price

9:30

and less capital goes there, and

9:32

consequently, this underweighting just

9:34

keeps on going. And, from the

9:39

perspective of looking at a reversal,

9:41

plus if we add that everyone is

9:44

currently sitting in shorts on rates,

9:46

and you've got rates at some 95th or

9:49

98th percentile historically for shorts

9:52

. So, it practically begs for a

9:56

potentially good, nice short squeeze

9:58

when tomorrow some negative NFP comes

10:01

out, like minus 200,000. Yeah, yeah,

10:04

that could happen.

10:05

>> And we'll fly in the opposite direction

10:07

, because,

10:07

>> well, by the way, by the way, I think

10:10

there's a non-trivial probability that

10:12

this NFP is going to be pretty lousy. I

10:15

even saw something in the data that

10:17

points to that. I don't even remember

10:20

which release that was. Listen, uh,

10:23

well, how long have we been discussing

10:25

this long end with you, like, the whole

10:28

time. For as long as we've been

10:31

rambling, you know, we keep discussing

10:33

it, and rates just keep going higher

10:35

and higher. Yes.

10:36

>> Yes. Maybe, uh, maybe there is some,

10:40

you know, if you are trading on, like,

10:43

short timeframes or speculatively, yeah

10:45

, well, maybe there is some opportunity

10:49

there, but I don't do that, as you know

10:52

. I don't trade those ranges. For me

10:55

and for us as a business in general,

10:58

the allocation is strategic. And for me

11:01

, well, for the last, I don't know, 2-3

11:04

years, our main principle has been the

11:06

short end. Well, relatively speaking,

11:10

it doesn't matter which paper you take,

11:15

it needs to be on the short end,

11:17

precisely because I thought that rates

11:19

could easily, especially on the long

11:21

end, you know, just drift off due to a

11:22

lack of demand. It wasn't a question of

11:25

, like, some problems with funding or

11:28

liquidity or anything like that. It was

11:30

purely that kind of story. Moreover, we

11:33

even shifted some of the long-term

11:36

securities we held into the short end.

11:39

Well, all sorts of them, yeah, it

11:40

doesn't really matter,

11:40

dollar-denominated ones.

11:41

>> No, well, the logic here is quite

11:42

simple. If you're betting on a

11:44

potential drop or reversal, it's better

11:46

to stick with two-year notes and wait

11:48

for the first one.

11:50

>> Exactly, in any case, you'd want, you

11:54

know,

11:55

>> Yeah. That's...sorry, go ahead. No,

11:57

don't say that, we're just start...

11:59

>> No, you go ahead now.

12:00

>> We haven't talked in a long time, and

12:01

now everyone needs to catch up with

12:03

each other, right? No, I'm just saying

12:06

that from the perspective of...I'm

12:09

actually, right now, even though things

12:11

are shaky, we're forgetting one thing:

12:14

there's always a "September effect" in

12:17

bonds where sell-offs occur; for the

12:19

last 7-8 years, it has always been very

12:22

pronounced. The second thing is that...

12:25

...

12:26

>> the fiscal year, right, is ending

12:27

around this time.

12:28

>> Well, possibly. I mean, I haven't seen

12:31

a single decent explanation for why

12:32

this happens, but there is this sense

12:34

that in September, there's always some

12:36

kind of outflow. Maybe it's related to

12:38

that. And the second topic is why I

12:42

remain quite bullish on the market

12:45

outlook, because raising rates—what

12:48

comrade Vorse did, which in my view is

12:52

a suicidal move—actually, contrary to

12:55

expectations, when you raise rates,

12:58

financial conditions are supposed to

13:01

tighten. But in reality, because the

13:06

yield curve is flattening, you get the

13:10

opposite effect. Meaning, your

13:13

financial conditions remain easy

13:15

because for all allocators, it makes no

13:18

sense to hold duration. And you're

13:20

driven into this damn private credit,

13:22

you're driven into those meta-bonds,

13:23

you're driven into the S&P itself. And

13:27

it turns out that, given the huge

13:29

deficit and the trillion in interest

13:32

payments being pumped into the market,

13:34

that money is flowing precisely into

13:37

risky assets. If you even look at

13:40

indicators like cross-border flows,

13:43

basically everyone is sitting in risk.

13:47

I'm not saying it's good, but simply

13:49

when we say that a rate hike should

13:51

lower or tighten positions, we actually

13:54

have an inverse dynamic due to high

13:56

debt and high interest payments, which

13:58

is likely supporting these markets

14:00

quite well.

14:02

>> Well, yeah. Well, about the rate, you

14:07

know, I think that needs a separate

14:09

session about the Fed, the rates, and

14:11

why they do it. It's a big one. Well,

14:16

listen, I think that with the rate,

14:19

like, uh In general, this whole logic

14:26

that you raise the rate to fight

14:28

inflation is so strange to me, because

14:31

it's very important which inflation

14:34

you're talking about, what kind of

14:36

inflation it is. And in the classic

14:39

example, why raising the rate works is

14:42

because the inflation is natural. Yes.

14:46

Meaning the economy is performing so

14:48

well, it's so great, you know,

14:50

everything, or some segment of it is

14:52

growing so much that, well, you know,

14:54

people are being hired, their salaries

14:57

are rising, they start spending, buying

14:59

goods, goods get more expensive, and so

15:01

on, right? So, at that moment, if that

15:06

is the reality, then you can raise

15:08

rates to actually slow down this

15:10

consumer boom a little bit. Well, like,

15:14

you know, to show society: don't spend

15:16

too much, don't take on debt, and so on

15:18

, and just calm down, right? So

15:20

that’s the idea, that’s the idea.

15:23

Today, the inflation we are seeing is

15:26

absolutely man-made. I mean, it's

15:30

various kinds of wars. And it's the

15:34

American tariff policy, which is

15:37

absolutely inflationary. Well, no

15:40

matter how you spin it, in the end,

15:42

it’s inflationary. If you keep them

15:44

as they are and don't change them, you

15:46

still have higher customs duties. You

15:49

pass that cost onto the goods, you get

15:52

this hoarding dynamic, right, you start

15:54

buying in advance. I think there is a

15:58

lot of that right now too. You can

16:01

clearly see it in GDP, you know, those

16:03

estimates, that the growth in

16:04

inventories is, like, higher,

16:06

>> yes,

16:07

>> and all that. So people are starting to

16:09

expect this inflation. And in that

16:13

sense, a breakeven of 5%, 2.3%per annum

16:16

looks stupid. Yes, return

16:18

>> I don't know, I disagree, because I...

16:21

you’re right when you mention that

16:23

classic theory, the so-called

16:25

wage-price spiral, where inflation

16:27

leads to an increase in income. If you

16:30

look at the charts, yes, we...if you

16:32

look back at the seventies, that’s

16:33

what happened. If we look at wage

16:35

growth and inflation now, they are

16:37

moving in two different directions. So,

16:40

by and large, the chair that the entire

16:42

middle class is sitting on is being

16:44

kicked out from under them.

16:46

>> The very idea, the very idea of

16:47

fighting inflation through the rate,

16:49

you know, you're killing that idea

16:51

because it works differently now. And

16:54

also, you know, I was thinking, if you

16:57

compare the last rate hike cycle to

16:59

today's—well, the last one was

17:01

post-COVID, right—basically, they

17:04

gave out cash to everyone, people went

17:07

out spending, buying, investing, and

17:09

all that. And, well, it was a situation

17:14

where the consumer had a surplus of

17:16

money, you know, just savings, whatever

17:19

. But now it’s the opposite: you have

17:23

a situation where, yes, there is

17:24

inflation, but it’s man-made; it’s

17:26

because of what you’re doing yourself

17:28

. And people, on the contrary, don't

17:31

have money. Well, a large part of the

17:33

population doesn't have that money. And

17:36

, you know, if you recall all the

17:38

promises from this administration, like

17:40

, "I'll give you a bonus on tariffs,""

17:42

I'll give you this,""I'll give you that

17:44

." Now it's like, "Elect me, the right

17:48

party, and I'll give you money too."

17:51

Yeah. In reality, nothing is being

17:53

given, only promises are being made.

17:55

Yes, nothing is actually landing in

17:57

people's pockets. So I would say this

17:59

is the opposite situation to the

18:01

previous cycle. Naturally, if you raise

18:05

rates in a situation like the current

18:07

one, you're just hitting the consumer

18:09

over the head even harder. You're not

18:12

helping them at all. You're just making

18:14

a man-made situation even worse. You

18:17

created it yourself.

18:18

>> Absolutely. Yeah. Well, you see,

18:20

there's another factor at play here.

18:22

When we talk about the 2022 period,

18:26

when the Fed started raising rates,

18:29

inflation had already begun to slow

18:32

down automatically. So they started

18:36

raising rates into slowing inflation.

18:39

Plus, if we talk about why inflation

18:41

started to slow down, well, the

18:43

economic growth we've had over the last

18:45

20 years has been, let's say, anemic;

18:47

if you look at the long-term ten-year

18:49

moving average, we keep going lower and

18:52

lower. We’ve reached some kind of

18:56

peak, the peak of globalization, and

18:59

this peak keeps reducing the growth

19:01

rate, while the level of total debt in

19:05

the system keeps growing. And that is

19:08

where your first imbalance occurs.

19:12

Accordingly, right now, through

19:13

artificial intelligence and the

19:15

trillions being poured into it, you

19:17

have some kind of artificial support.

19:19

But it's so narrow that if you look at

19:23

a chart—Hussman did this very well—

19:26

it shows record profits for all

19:29

corporations, while at the same time

19:32

you look at private sector and

19:34

government debt. And you end up with

19:37

these two pincers closing in. So, your

19:40

corporate profits are basically an

19:43

inverse function of the ever-increasing

19:46

debt levels at both the consumer and

19:49

government levels. And it's clear that

19:53

this trend cannot continue indefinitely

19:55

. And that's why we're observing—guys

19:57

, what wage spiral are we even talking

19:58

about? Instead of having growth, you're

20:02

just busy extracting every last bit you

20:05

can from the customer until they drop

20:08

dead. I was watching a documentary

20:11

about Uber, about how it used to be

20:14

such a dump, how many trillions or

20:16

billions they burned through, not

20:18

knowing how to run anything. And then,

20:21

all of a sudden, super profits. And now

20:23

they've looked at what's actually going

20:24

on there. Basically, you have a 70-

20:26

dollar ride, and the driver gets 25.

20:29

Out of those 25, they take insurance

20:31

from them, another 25 for this and that

20:33

. So, they say they take 20%of the ride

20:36

, but in reality, they're taking 60%.

20:39

And so, this Uber thing becomes

20:40

completely unprofitable for you. And

20:42

everyone is saying, "But people don't

20:44

have any work." So it's like a gig

20:45

economy where, you know, you're just

20:47

trying to stay afloat on anything. They

20:49

have a massive supply. And all these

20:54

guys who want to be drivers, they just

20:55

squeeze them for every last drop of

20:57

juice. Yeah, the whole economy is

21:00

really built like that. They try to

21:04

bend every person over just to squeeze

21:07

out one extra drop from you.

21:12

>> Yes, but it's always been that way.

21:13

It's just very obvious now.

21:16

>> Now it has just become very obvious

21:19

because the rebalancing mechanism is

21:21

completely broken. And everyone

21:23

realizes that something is seriously

21:25

wrong. And what's most interesting is

21:28

that most people have plans, you know,

21:30

plans too.

21:31

>> There's some hope that something will

21:32

happen, we'll go back, and everything

21:34

will be wonderful. Well, I don't know,

21:36

I see a lot of people like that,

21:38

although...

21:39

>> No, listen, we started with whether

21:42

it's a good idea to speculate on the

21:44

long end of the duration, or...

21:47

>> Yes, but in that logic, it is a good

21:49

idea, because if you have a contraction

21:51

, you know...

21:52

>> I didn't finish, our concept for many

21:56

years, well, for several years, is like

22:00

2-3, maybe 4 years, I'd say the average

22:04

, a weighted average maturity, well,

22:08

maybe 3 years. And again, that applies

22:13

to all bonds. Well, our reality is such

22:16

that we have many separate accounts; we

22:19

don’t take money onto our own balance

22:21

sheet—that’s our approach. We use

22:25

power of attorney to make allocations

22:27

in our clients 'accounts, at brokers,

22:30

or at banks. Accordingly, I have a

22:34

dilemma: to get into the long end, I

22:36

need to do it systematically and

22:38

strategically. I can't just do it in

22:42

one account and not in another, right?

22:47

I’m an honest person, so if I do

22:49

something, I do it for everyone.

22:51

Accordingly, I need a very good reason.

22:55

And not just to speculate because the

22:57

yield is low or high, but why I am

22:59

doing this systematically. And I

23:02

don’t see that systemic nature yet,

23:05

in the sense that to buy the long end

23:07

—theoretically, there is no limit to

23:10

the yield there. Well, if you look at

23:12

it philosophically. But there is a

23:15

limit to patience. There is a red line,

23:17

some figure that nobody knows. Even the

23:21

participants at the highest levels

23:22

don't know this figure. This is the

23:26

level of long-term yield, say, ten-year

23:29

, at which the system breaks in the

23:32

sense that systemic selling begins,

23:34

because of a lack of liquidity, because

23:37

of a hole that needs to be plugged. And

23:41

in this sense, the basis trade is very

23:43

important, because I actually checked

23:45

who has the most basis trades. Do you

23:49

want to guess who it is?

23:50

>> Citadel.

23:52

>> It’s Citadel, yes. But Citadel is a

23:55

good example because they don’t just

23:57

have the basis trade, right? So if they

24:00

lose on this thing, which is supposedly

24:03

low-volatility and super-predictable,

24:06

they will have to cut something else.

24:10

You know,

24:10

>> Is Citadel run by Cohen or who is it?

24:14

>> I always forget his name.

24:16

>> I always get it mixed up. Well, never

24:17

mind, it's not the point. Griffin is

24:19

that bug-eyed guy. I saw him in

24:21

Florence this summer, actually. I

24:22

thought about approaching him, but

24:24

decided it wasn't worth it.

24:25

>> To shake his hand.

24:27

>> Yes. Yes. I didn't want to,

24:30

>> I didn't want to ruin the guy's day,

24:31

clearly. He was on vacation and looked

24:34

so happy. I think, yes, I didn't

24:36

approach him after all. But yes,

24:38

Citadel is, you know, the king of hedge

24:41

funds, right? Meaning they have all

24:44

sorts of things, and if they have a

24:46

hole in something like that, well, they

24:48

have to cut something else then. And

24:52

this is where the mechanics begin; like

24:54

, I will definitely jump into the long

24:56

end at some point, you know, 10, 15, 20

24:58

years—I’ll definitely buy that

25:00

eventually. Uh, but I want the American

25:04

government to tell me they’re in

25:07

trouble, you know, that they’re

25:09

borrowing at such and such a rate. Well

25:13

,

25:13

>> yeah, well, as usual, the front end

25:16

will twitch first. Well, again, we can

25:19

argue about how high it will go, but

25:21

ultimately,

25:23

>> I’ll even—sorry, let me add—I

25:25

wouldn’t even be surprised if the Fed

25:28

, for example, cuts rates, the Feds,

25:30

and the long end rises at the same time

25:33

. I wouldn't be surprised by that at

25:35

all,

25:37

>> because

25:38

>> they’ll have to, they’ll have to

25:41

tell the market where the limit of the

25:43

long-end yield is. They’ll have to.

25:45

Well, you see, I think that’s part of

25:48

what we’re seeing now; I don’t know

25:52

how pronounced it is, but we’re

25:54

seeing it in French bonds right now.

25:58

Plus, you have to consider that Comrade

26:01

, that Comrade Bessent, literally—I

26:03

don’t want to call him a total d-word

26:05

, you know. But there is that photo,

26:10

right, where he’s in those pilot

26:12

glasses, in front of the American flag,

26:15

like, "I’m the casino now, and if you

26:18

want to play, you’re playing against

26:21

me." But I don’t know, he worked at

26:25

Soros himself, and he’s perfectly

26:27

aware that this is just an invitation

26:29

for a bunch of people to try and crush

26:31

him. No, but you just—listen, for me,

26:36

he’s a disappointment, right,

26:39

considering his, well, his

26:42

>> complex resume,

26:44

>> yeah, there’s a beautiful word in

26:46

antiques, uh,

26:49

>> how did it go,

26:52

>> all the old stuff,

26:53

>> everything, yeah, it's gone.

26:55

>> Well, never mind. I mean, his

26:58

experience, his CV implies he’s a

27:01

super-professional and all that, but in

27:04

fact, he’s a super-fail. Well, by my

27:08

standards, you know, everything he

27:11

promised didn't happen. All those "

27:13

three arrows" of his, and all that, how

27:16

he was going to turn it all around.

27:18

>> That "well-forgotten old" stuff, those

27:20

three arrows, seem like nothing now.

27:22

>> Yeah, not a single one hit the mark. Uh

27:24

, I even checked oil this morning, and

27:26

it didn't hit the mark either, not at

27:28

all. Well, he had that oil production

27:30

thing. Uh, and I consider him an

27:33

incompetent guy. Well, roughly speaking

27:36

. Uh, accordingly, everything he is

27:40

doing, like these buybacks, well yes,

27:42

for a while it worked as a kind of

27:45

volatility suppressor, but it seems to

27:47

me it doesn't work anymore. Or they

27:51

need to increase these volumes

27:52

dramatically. And volumes can only be

27:56

increased dramatically within the TGA

27:58

account, which isn't infinite and from

28:00

which you still need to pay the bills,

28:02

you know, so, yes. But here, by the way

28:05

, on this topic, we have a little—I

28:08

understand what you want to say, but I

28:10

don't see any dramatic picture here.

28:13

For me, the fact that they climbed into

28:15

the long end. Well, first of all, of

28:17

course, the volumes we discussed there

28:20

are childish, and it’s simply the

28:22

signaling power that they will, in any

28:24

case, get in there if they need to. Uh,

28:28

we shouldn't forget here that,

28:30

>> that,

28:32

>> well, again, look: from the perspective

28:34

of buybacks, if you look at it again,

28:36

the higher the yields, the more

28:38

aggressively I would be increasing the

28:40

purchase of these bonds right now,

28:42

because you’re buying them at 50

28:45

cents on the dollar and refinancing

28:47

with the short end. By and large, you

28:50

are just burning the long end, which

28:52

gives you more control over the entire

28:54

curve, to put it mildly. I think, I

28:57

think, you know, there are two goals.

28:59

One goal is to change the term. Well,

29:03

that you have, like, more debt on the

29:05

short end. That’s clear.

29:08

>> And why not? This has no effect on,

29:12

well, you know, borrowing. It's the

29:15

same debt. You bought one, you sold

29:17

another. Well, it’s kind of a zero

29:18

effect, right? So that’s one. But the

29:22

second, which is completely different

29:24

and much more important—I believe in

29:27

this, yes, you can argue about it, but

29:29

I believe in it—is an attempt to

29:32

reduce volatility, yes, because they

29:34

are buying these "off-the-run" things,

29:37

which are illiquid, and simultaneously

29:39

providing a bid at a moment when demand

29:42

is low. Yes, even if it’s small, it

29:46

can be important because that is

29:48

exactly what is needed to, you know,

29:50

balance the market.

29:52

>> For this, for this debt, there is only

29:54

that much demand, yes,

29:56

>> and you have to cover it without any,

29:58

well, you know, third parties, let’s

30:00

put it that way. So in that sense,

30:03

it’s kind of working, but the index

30:05

is higher now, the rate is higher. And

30:09

I guarantee you, if tomorrow he comes

30:11

out and says, well, what was the last

30:13

volume he announced, or 6 billion or

30:15

something. Eight.

30:17

>> Yeah, something like that, I don't

30:18

recall.

30:18

>> He'll say something like 20 billion. I

30:21

think the market won't care. I think

30:23

the market will say: "That's not enough

30:25

, you know, give us more." How much?

30:27

>> Well, I don't think he's doing it for

30:29

no reason, because, first of all, you

30:30

...

30:31

>> Listen, three times, he increased these

30:33

volumes, clearly expecting a reaction,

30:35

because there was a reaction the first

30:36

time. But the market absorbed it. That

30:40

volume is too low. That's really not

30:42

enough. That's not what we're talking

30:44

about here. Yeah. We're talking about

30:47

deficits. A deficit of 2 plus, you know

30:50

, one could argue about it, let's see

30:52

what it is this year, but definitely 2

30:55

plus. Well, like,

30:57

>> well, I'm like, again, from the point

30:59

of view, look, okay, buybacks at the

31:01

moment, I don't know exactly what he's

31:03

buying up, but I can imagine that...

31:05

>> the curve is steep. One of the main

31:08

sellers is Bank of America, which is

31:10

still 20, which...

31:13

>> Wait, hold on, it's an auction, like,

31:15

you can come in, place a bid, offer

31:17

your bonds, and then they either take

31:19

them or not. Something like that. Well,

31:22

it doesn't matter who it is, friend,

31:24

which bank or whatever.

31:27

>> Wait, no, no, it is important, because

31:29

if you look at the structure of the TGA

31:30

, that's actually a secondary issue in

31:32

my view, because if you look at the

31:34

large banking sector, you have two

31:36

control instruments, right? On one hand

31:39

, you say: "I am easing regulation." So

31:42

they relaxed the SLR, now they'll also

31:45

relax...other credit-related things,

31:49

>> and they'll just force the banks into

31:51

it. And you need to create conditions

31:54

where banks will agree to absorb this

31:56

issuance. It's not...it's quite simple

31:59

if you look at the TGA that he's

32:01

spending, it's generally a useless task

32:03

, a useless element. Americans are

32:07

paying 40 billion dollars in interest,

32:09

so the TGA, well, roughly speaking, yes

32:11

, because it's like 800 billion, it's

32:14

all borrowed, no one needs it at all.

32:17

They could cut it in 5 days, they could

32:20

reduce this TGA to 100 billion and just

32:22

set up revolving credit lines with

32:24

those same big banks. If there are any

32:27

payments here, they can easily push

32:29

them back and forth. And there you have

32:32

700 billion that's just tied up and

32:34

sitting there like a sack on their

32:36

chest.

32:36

>> Whatever the balance of this account is

32:38

, it’s not as important as you

32:40

rightly say, but look, it’s still a

32:42

question of how much you have to pay in

32:45

bills and how much you have to borrow.

32:47

>> Yes. Yes, but we are currently in a

32:49

situation where it’s clear to

32:51

everyone that these trillion-dollar

32:52

deficits are not going anywhere;

32:53

that’s impossible. Accordingly, we

32:56

are entering this, like that Flydubai

32:58

flight where the two pilots were just

33:00

going at each other. So, you are

33:02

dealing with,

33:04

>> I still never understood if it was just

33:05

the crew, yes, those pilots or what, or

33:07

if someone...At first it was a

33:09

Ukrainian and a Russian, then it was

33:10

some guy who was shouting "Allahu Akbar

33:12

." In general, it was some kind of

33:14

>> very specific nightmare.

33:16

>> I gathered that the passengers somehow

33:19

got out of that story. Something like

33:21

that.

33:22

>> Ah, well, I stopped following it at

33:24

some point. So, anyway, I’m getting

33:26

back to my point. That’s why the

33:28

basis, in principle, it can be caught

33:30

at some point now in the initial stage,

33:33

because they introduced the Standing

33:35

Repo Facility. That is, if, in

33:37

principle, the large dealers’ balance

33:40

sheets are cluttered, which is a fairly

33:42

real risk in the current situation,

33:45

then, in principle, you will just go to

33:47

the Fed, and your refinancing is, in

33:49

principle, unlimited. And so, from that

33:53

point of view, the system is now much

33:55

more stable than it was in '08, because

33:58

these topics are actually well thought

34:00

out. But most likely, as usual, the

34:03

elastic on your underwear will snap not

34:05

where you expect and are holding it,

34:06

but somewhere else. So, it’s

34:10

interesting to see what will eventually

34:12

come of it. I agree with you. I am

34:16

ready, you know, to make a bet. If the

34:20

index hits 150, we will see some kind

34:22

of failure in the market. Someone will

34:26

be publicly dying out and liquidating

34:29

various kinds of positions.

34:32

>> Oh, that’s 100%.

34:32

>> I mean, it’s inevitable, you know. I

34:35

think that’s how it will be. I think

34:37

that’s our path. I think we’ve come

34:40

pretty close to it. And again, coming

34:46

back to the idea, this question worries

34:50

many: when to buy TLT or believe in

34:53

some story, I believe that we need to

34:56

wait for an actual

34:59

>> admission of defeat, you know, there

35:01

will be a window, it will be short, I

35:03

think a couple of days, maybe a week,

35:06

when it will be possible to do

35:08

something, but they will effectively

35:10

state that level. they’ll just say it

35:13

. And at this moment, yes, it is most

35:16

likely a super trade.

35:18

>> Yes, we agree on that. Well then, let's

35:21

move on. Uh, we won't drop by our

35:24

beloved Europe or the Baltics;

35:26

there’s nothing to see there. Uh,

35:28

it’s sad, sad, the elections are soon

35:31

. I don't know what you're talking

35:33

about.

35:33

>> It’s interesting what you all will

35:35

choose there. Will we even choose?

35:39

>> That’s how I would pose the question.

35:43

>> Wonderful. We have all these disputes

35:47

going on here, Friedrich Merz is really

35:50

catching flak. His rating is plus 11,

35:53

but the Germans are like that.

35:55

>> Well, of course, he is, you know, this

35:58

phenomenal bald guy. He is very

36:01

confident, considering his deplorable

36:03

situation. I watch his interviews,

36:06

it’s as if nothing has changed, you

36:08

know, he’s really pushing his own

36:10

narrative. It's amazing.

36:13

>> Look, the most interesting thing is

36:15

that despite his rating being around 10

36:18

%, 40%say he shouldn't leave his post.

36:21

Meaning, you're a jerk, but go ahead

36:23

and keep working—that principle. And

36:26

right now there is a huge scandal. Well

36:28

, sort of, this Friedrich Merz party.

36:31

There is a second young politician here

36:33

, Philipp Amthor. He's like in the top

36:37

five of the hierarchy there. And, well,

36:40

ARD or the German Channel One was

36:43

filming a four-part documentary about

36:46

Friedrich Merz's party. And this young

36:50

guy, he’s sitting right there in the

36:52

chancellor's building. He was showing

36:55

his office. It’s like a football

36:57

field out there on the balcony, which

36:59

overlooks the Reichstag, or it’s

37:01

located near the Reichstag. And he

37:03

shows that, like, the first thing he

37:05

did when he moved into this office, he

37:08

bought himself a so-called, uh, basket,

37:10

what is it called? A basket. A beach

37:13

basket. That is, on the northern

37:16

beaches of Germany, you have these

37:18

special seats, well, made like

37:20

armchairs, they look all enclosed. And

37:24

you sit like you're actually in a

37:26

basket. And you chill in it, look at

37:27

the sea, and all that. I mean,

37:29

seriously, it’s a rather expensive

37:31

pleasure. And he was showing it off,

37:33

talking about how wonderful, good, and

37:34

handsome he is. And then it started,

37:37

they say: "You've completely lost your

37:39

minds, we have diesel at 2.50, 2.60

37:41

here." And this guy is walking around,

37:44

in general, it's like Marie Antoinette:

37:46

"No bread? Let them eat cake." That's

37:48

how it turned out. And they are getting

37:50

slapped in the face from all sides

37:51

again now. In short, we have a lot of

37:54

fun here, but the real fun is in France

37:57

.

37:59

>> Well, it seems to me, it's the same

38:01

problems, the same story, that they are

38:04

absolutely indifferent to their

38:05

population, you know, they don't think

38:08

at all about the consequences of their

38:10

actions. Ah, well, I don't believe in

38:14

elections, if you ask me. I'm a cynic

38:17

in this sense, and I think that it's

38:19

the elites who decide everything

38:21

everywhere. The question is, what kind

38:26

of elites, what they are—party,

38:28

business elites, or some others,

38:30

cultural, religious, it doesn't matter.

38:34

>> Well, they decide everything. Uh, so

38:36

for me, for example, these successes,

38:40

uh, what is it, AfD, yes,

38:43

>> yes,

38:44

>> it's called, well, it's not the voice

38:47

of the people, it's most likely that

38:49

some elites chose these guys so that

38:52

they, well...

38:54

>> Well, it’s just an expression of

38:56

protest, because everyone understands

38:59

that everything else doesn't work.

39:01

>> No, first of all, it doesn't work, and

39:03

secondly, it's the voice of the elites.

39:05

For whom the rules of the game have

39:07

changed. You know, if their model used

39:10

to suit them, they earned more, then

39:13

it’s obvious that today these elites,

39:15

well, they were essentially told in an

39:18

ultimatum that the terms are different

39:21

now, that other people will be earning,

39:23

not you. And this is their reaction,

39:27

most likely, which isn't bad. It’s

39:31

like, well, it gives faith that, well,

39:34

market conditions, market rules are

39:37

returning, you know, you’re for

39:40

yourself, like, you want things to be

39:43

better for you. That's not bad, I think

39:48

.

39:48

>> You, my friend, are an optimist, it

39:49

seems to me, considering, well, look,

39:51

you...

39:51

>> Are an inveterate optimist.

39:53

>> Listen, if I weren't an optimist, I

39:55

wouldn't be able to do my job. Well,

39:57

it’s simply impossible. Well, I don't

40:01

know, I'm not an optimist at all, and

40:03

I'm doing fine.

40:04

>> Well, I am an optimist after all,

40:07

>> are you? Then, as an optimist, tell me,

40:09

please, what is happening and how do

40:11

you view the situation with French

40:12

bonds? What’s optimistic about that?

40:14

>> Well, it's the same thing. Well, it's

40:16

the same thing as with American bonds.

40:19

It’s a lack of demand for

40:20

long-duration. Duration. I think the

40:24

bond market as a whole understands that

40:27

we are getting closer and closer to

40:29

financial repression. And these numbers

40:33

, well, like, you know, okay, I just

40:35

don't remember how much the ten-year

40:37

French sovereign debt is yielding right

40:40

now. Well, how much, 4.5, maybe you

40:43

remember, I don't. Like, approximately

40:47

or how much? You don't know? Well, okay

40:52

, it doesn't matter, we could look it

40:54

up, but I'm incredibly lazy to do that.

40:56

The specific figure doesn't matter, we

40:59

can use the ten-year US Treasury note,

41:02

which also went up. Uh, what's the

41:05

point? These 4.5%won't cover future

41:09

inflation. That is the essence of

41:12

financial repression. That is why

41:15

>> that is why they aren't taking on

41:17

long-term debt. Yes, but you have a

41:19

different situation in France. The

41:21

Americans can manage and implement

41:24

their own monetary and fiscal policy.

41:27

The French are limited in that regard.

41:30

>> Well, Europe could do it in theory.

41:34

>> But can you imagine that in the current

41:35

situation, the Germans will bail out

41:36

the French, or will they most likely

41:38

give them the boot?

41:39

>> Yes, easily, I see it. That's easy. The

41:42

problem for both the Germans and the

41:45

French is that both France and Germany

41:47

are in the eurozone. Meaning they cut

41:51

off their own exit route by adopting

41:53

the euro. You can't even theoretically

41:58

calculate the consequences of leaving

42:01

the euro for an economy like Germany,

42:03

for instance.

42:06

>> Most likely, these would be negative

42:08

consequences, primarily for Germany,

42:11

and for Europe too, because it would be

42:13

weaker, not as export-oriented, and so

42:15

on and so forth. But it's also a myth

42:19

for Germany that it could somehow be

42:22

competitive on its own in current

42:25

reality. That would be something

42:27

impossible.

42:27

>> No way, what are you talking about? We

42:29

have all kinds of things happening here

42:30

, it's wild. Alright, right now, it's

42:33

mathematically impossible. It's not

42:36

just impossible. With some cheap energy

42:39

resources, one could still somehow

42:42

believe in it, but even then with

42:44

difficulty, because it’s not just a

42:46

matter of energy; it’s a question of,

42:49

you know, the internal system, policy,

42:52

compensation, labor costs, bureaucracy,

42:54

and regulation. Well, there are just a

42:56

bunch of problems there.

42:57

>> Yes. Yes. Well, that train has left the

42:59

station anyway, so,

43:01

>> accordingly, well yes, if you

43:02

understand that, well, listen, I don't

43:04

rule out absolute idiocy from the

43:06

authorities, right? I mean, any idiotic

43:10

decision can be made, but if you think

43:12

rationally, it's not really an option,

43:13

right? Leaving the EU is not an option.

43:17

And in principle, if you're saying that

43:19

France and Germany are clashing, then

43:20

that’s the collapse of the EU. Well,

43:23

that’s your favorite Khazin, that’s

43:25

his scenario, so to speak. Yes, Hans

43:28

Christian Leonidovich.

43:30

>> Well, "favorite" in quotation marks,

43:32

yes,

43:33

>> you just like to mention him. This time

43:35

I, you know, beat you to it.

43:38

>> Well, he is one of my favorite

43:39

conspiracy theorists.

43:41

>> He’s a good guy, honestly, he’s a

43:42

good man. Just understand the goal, I

43:44

didn't say anything.

43:45

>> You just have to understand his angle.

43:47

He seems like a decent guy to me.

43:50

>> I guess.

43:51

>> Yeah, I guess. Okay. And China, uh,

43:58

China is like, uh, shaky, the data is

44:04

poor. Fixes, I read today, Gavekal

44:08

wrote that they are starting mortgage

44:12

stimulus programs. So, apparently,

44:16

things are really bad there. And the

44:20

data, in reality, if you also consider

44:22

that they are most likely lying about

44:24

this data, then the situation there is

44:26

probably just completely dire.

44:27

>> Well, that's your old theory, that they

44:30

fake the data. Well, like, I was just

44:34

listening to Cofinas' podcast, Hidden

44:37

Forces, this week, and he had this guy

44:43

Logan W. on. He wrote the book "Broken

44:46

China," and I downloaded it, but

44:49

haven't read it yet. And he has, like,

44:53

a strictly Chinese focus, looking at it

44:56

from the perspective of political

44:58

dynamics, how the banking system

45:01

developed, and how the banking system

45:03

is funded. But what we see, say, in

45:06

China itself, is that while rates are

45:08

falling, you still have a sharp decline

45:11

in lending; consumer loans are dropping

45:13

, the speed of credit growth in the

45:15

economy is falling, and the rate of

45:17

investment is slowing sharply. In both.

45:22

And so you realize that this factor of

45:24

overproduction, which keeps this whole

45:26

structure relatively stable for the

45:29

moment, is just waiting for the moment

45:31

when all the other economies that are

45:33

supposed to absorb this start to kick

45:35

back and try to put a spoke in the

45:37

wheels. Well, like, relative to, maybe,

45:44

the US markets, maybe it doesn't look

45:47

so bad there from a long-term

45:50

perspective. But, uh, if you look at

45:54

the data, it's also a real "Oh boy."

45:58

Well, maybe the Chinese long bonds,

46:00

where yields everywhere else are rising

46:02

, but these are the only ones falling.

46:04

Well, that's super important, you know,

46:07

such a dissonance is not without reason

46:10

. Uh, a low rate is, first and foremost

46:14

, a sign of high demand for this debt,

46:16

actually. Well, if you think purely

46:21

mathematically in terms of the

46:23

price-yield ratio, well, someone has to

46:26

be buying them for the rate to fall.

46:29

You know, at that rate, someone has to

46:32

be buying them. Yes, but you have this

46:34

as an automatic allocation. If you are

46:37

a major financial player looking at

46:40

this economy, you have a complete

46:42

system of overproduction and an

46:44

extremely weak domestic consumer market

46:47

, what are you going to do when you

46:49

also have capital controls on top of it

46:51

—you can buy bonds and gold.

46:54

>> Well, it's conditional capital control.

46:57

I don't—I'm not, I don't believe in

46:59

it, that there is capital control. I've

47:02

had enough dealings with both Hong Kong

47:06

and China. Everything moves there, if

47:09

you want it to. But regarding the data,

47:14

they're not super, but they're not

47:17

terrible, right? I mean, they are, okay

47:20

, it's sort of...

47:22

>> probably not what the Communist Party

47:25

wants, but it's okay. If you look at

47:28

exports, exports are booming, right?

47:31

Whether they're booming because of AI

47:33

and all that, that's another question,

47:35

right? I mean, all that memory, all

47:39

that stuff needed to build all these

47:43

>> data centers and so on, it’s all

47:46

related, but exports are growing

47:49

regardless, and that’s pure money,

47:52

it's just pure, plain profit for China

47:56

as a state.

47:58

>> Yes, absolutely.

47:59

>> So, it’s not all negative, you know,

48:02

there is some positive too.

48:03

>> No, what’s interesting. Oh, right.

48:06

Sorry.

48:07

>> So. Yeah. And, well, listen, I like

48:11

China. We hold China. From a valuation

48:15

perspective, it's it's just that if we

48:21

had any portfolios with the yuan as the

48:25

base currency, I would buy their bonds.

48:29

Or theirs, or some state-owned

48:31

companies, you know, just because

48:34

it’s a clear story in yuan. And that

48:37

largely explains these low rates. I

48:40

mean, if you are trading with China,

48:43

you’re some big, you know, another

48:46

big country trading with China, you

48:48

have to buy everything in yuan, you

48:51

know? So, all these innovations of

48:55

theirs regarding the CIPS payment

48:58

system, bond issuances—I mean, they

49:02

regularly issue yuan bonds, right,

49:05

Hungary, or someone else, UBS, I saw

49:08

they issued yuan bonds. Why? Well,

49:12

because of the predictable monetary

49:14

policy and a large market that’s

49:17

ready to gobble it up, you know,

49:19

regardless. And from the perspective of

49:22

a financial institution, a small, small

49:25

interest.

49:26

>> Well, it’s only going to increase.

49:29

Well, if we're talking about the bond

49:31

part, yeah. I like the stocks. They

49:36

haven't moved anywhere all year. Even

49:39

down some, like minus 3-4%. But I look,

49:44

I look at these valuations, and for me,

49:47

it's just, you know, free money.

49:50

That’s what I would call it.

49:52

>> The most interesting thing is that a

49:54

report came out. And again, what we

49:57

don't think about, these huge IPOs that

49:59

are happening now, right, I mean they

50:02

have these, what do you call them,

50:04

these

50:05

>> Yeah. Yeah. And it turned out that the

50:09

financing structure of these startups

50:12

was always semi-state-owned. Meaning

50:16

the money for these startups was

50:18

allocated by these provinces. And it

50:21

turned out that one of them, I don't

50:22

remember, I always get them mixed up,

50:24

some province,

50:25

>> it worked, yeah,

50:26

>> they somehow squeezed out one and a

50:29

half annual GDPs of the entire province

50:31

from two IPOs. So all their real estate

50:35

problems quickly take a back seat.

50:37

>> Well, yeah, but the question, again,

50:39

you understand how this works. It's a

50:40

one-time expense. I mean, they'll blow

50:42

it on something now, and then it won't

50:44

be there anymore. Wait, but in fact,

50:46

they did earn it. Well, what

50:48

>> In fact, yes, of course.

50:50

>> Well, you can, like, invest in

50:51

something, infrastructure, build a

50:53

hospital there, something else. That's

50:56

cool. I personally really like the

51:00

Chinese model. The fact that it's

51:04

localized, you know, that you have

51:06

these local municipalities, it's clear

51:09

that like many countries, they are huge

51:11

, you know, these territories and the

51:14

number of people and money, but you

51:16

still have local decisions. This, I

51:20

think, is the right approach for

51:23

absolutely all countries. I am

51:25

generally in favor of everyone adopting

51:28

such an approach because it simply

51:30

makes life better. It specifically

51:32

makes your life better. You have, say,

51:35

a streetlight that isn't working. You,

51:37

you know exactly which guy to call to

51:40

get it working, you know? And that's

51:44

cool. I, I think this is a super

51:47

correct solution. I think it needs to

51:49

be implemented everywhere. Okay, I'll

51:52

say it.

51:53

>> You're a bit too kind today, my friend.

51:57

You're actually, you're raising, you're

51:59

raising, you're raising some suspicions

52:01

in me.

52:02

>> I'm causing disgust.

52:06

>> Ah, well, I don't know. I, okay, I will

52:11

change.

52:12

>> Question, question, the next question.

52:15

Then if we are talking about China,

52:16

then it's clear that all these topics

52:18

with artificial intelligence, I think,

52:20

maybe let's discuss this last and then

52:21

move on to questions. Uh, with

52:24

artificial intelligence, this whole

52:26

topic, with OpenAI. And that was the

52:32

article you sent me, right, about

52:36

>> about, about how this Son from SoftBank

52:40

, Masayoshi Son.

52:42

>> Yes. Yes. And how, and how, and how,

52:45

for the most part, the entire financing

52:48

structure is, by and large, dangling on

52:51

>> Yes, this could be such a critical

52:53

moment.

52:55

>> In a nutshell, guys, if that’s the

52:57

case, well, anyway, here’s the

52:59

article, I can post it in my Telegram

53:01

channel. The point is that the main

53:04

sponsor, or the financial backer really

53:07

pouring money into OpenAI, is

53:09

SoftBank’s Vision Fund. It’s

53:13

Masayoshi Son, who brilliantly financed

53:16

Wirecard, for which he almost got his

53:18

head torn off. But he decided that

53:21

wasn't enough, he went into AI, and he

53:24

did actually have success with Alibaba

53:27

as well. He caught Alibaba at a great

53:29

time, yes. And so it turned out that he

53:33

took out 40 billion in short-term loans

53:35

specifically for the OpenAI IPO. And

53:40

now, with the leak or the Wikileaks of

53:42

the OpenAI prospectus, which showed

53:44

some truly atrocious numbers—which

53:47

actually happened this week, right,

53:49

everyone looked at Anthropic and

53:51

scratched their heads, saying, "Guys,

53:53

what are you doing? You have 40 billion

53:57

in turnover and half a million comments

54:00

on all this." Well, it’s madness,

54:02

really. And now the situation is that

54:06

he needs to refinance this loan. Banks

54:10

are starting to experience...interest

54:12

rates have risen,

54:13

>> yes, absolutely. So right now, I

54:16

don’t know if he has refinanced or

54:18

not, but he currently has two loans on

54:21

the market at 8-9%interest, and the

54:23

banks are starting to get a little

54:25

shaky in the knees. So, if this

54:29

financing structure—God forbid—

54:31

encounters a liquidity stress and the

54:33

guy can't raise money to refinance,

54:35

this whole house of cards could

54:37

collapse. It might not collapse, but

54:40

the rates are insanely high. And

54:44

besides him, this huge private credit

54:47

industry is tied up in it, a huge

54:50

industry, with all the insurance

54:53

companies involved. These life

54:56

insurance companies. The money, when

54:59

you pay your monthly premium, is

55:02

aggregated and directed into these

55:04

private credits, into certain private

55:07

equity corporations. And by and large,

55:12

the risk there is spread out to such

55:14

levels that everything is hanging by a

55:16

thread. Defaults in private credit are

55:20

rising. The official data shows 6.3%,

55:23

but there is talk that about 50%of all

55:26

loans in this sector are in the

55:28

restructuring phase. Or, as they put it

55:32

, right now, they are, for the most

55:37

part, unable to pay interest. Loans are

55:40

being extended, and interest payments

55:42

are being reduced. So there is

55:44

definitely real stress there. The

55:45

question is when it will rise to the

55:46

surface. Last year it started with the

55:48

Blue Owl. A wonderful name for a bar

55:52

for the Latvian parliament, where could

55:56

one open it?

55:59

>> We don't need that, we have all kinds

56:02

of colorful people here.

56:04

>> Well, it characterizes it more or less

56:06

perfectly.

56:06

>> No, honestly, BL is a cool name, I

56:08

think. Why not? I can totally picture

56:11

the logo. Listen, real estate has a ton

56:15

of problems right now. Commercial real

56:19

estate, there are these constant

56:21

phenomenal stories, where something

56:23

cost 100 million in 2020 and now they

56:25

bought it for 15, you know, just crazy

56:27

numbers like that.

56:30

>> Yeah.

56:31

>> And that, I think, is the main pain

56:34

point, even if you add these AI-related

56:37

data centers, but that’s kind of meh,

56:41

yeah. Do you think they’ll drag it

56:44

out with Anthropic? Will they bring

56:47

them to market, or…

56:48

>> Well, I think they might bring them out

56:50

. It would be very in the spirit of

56:53

America to do that, you know, a final "

56:55

goodbye, America" kind of thing. Oh,

56:58

>> but who’s going to buy that? The

56:59

valuations there are absolutely insane.

57:01

>> Well, passive flows. Well, how does it

57:03

happen automatically? Well, it gets

57:05

automatically added to NASDAQ. S&P

57:07

dumped it, but NASDAQ will add it. Any

57:11

passive strategy tied to NASDAQ, one

57:13

way or another, will just buy all of it

57:15

, and that's it.

57:18

>> Well, by and large, they should pull

57:20

the stunt Musk did when he said NASDAQ

57:22

would take them in 45 days, not after

57:24

six months of profitability. And

57:26

everyone realized perfectly well that

57:28

it’s an excellent arbitrage. We get

57:29

in at one price now, and in 45 days,

57:31

passive flows will just take us out,

57:33

and we’ll be laughing all the way to

57:36

the bank. Or maybe you bought in on

57:40

some pre-round, you know, at a

57:42

different valuation. And you’re

57:44

waiting for this IPO to cash out. Yeah,

57:47

I think they might. It’s very much in

57:51

the spirit of the current American

57:52

approach, but it doesn’t change

57:54

anything. It just inflates the S&P,

57:57

NASDAQ, and the indices, but it

58:00

doesn’t make Anthropic profitable,

58:03

you know. It’s just, well, something

58:06

that’s waiting to be revalued in line

58:09

with reality. Or it will start making

58:12

money, yes, like Uber, for example. For

58:15

a long time, you know, it was there,

58:17

everyone didn't believe they’d be

58:19

profitable and so on, but then again,

58:21

you mentioned the drivers today who are

58:23

getting screwed. So again, how

58:25

profitable is it really? I mean, it’s

58:27

profitable now, but if all the drivers

58:30

died off, well, probably not. So,

58:33

>> uh, well, let's say it's just a vision

58:35

of the future. Scale is needed, then

58:37

people will start buying. I don’t

58:40

believe people will start buying this

58:41

junk en masse. I just don't believe it,

58:44

because, well, my experience—I'm not

58:47

claiming anything, I'm no "waifucoder,"

58:50

I don't make videos with it, I don't

58:52

make images, music, I don't do any of

58:55

that, you know.

58:56

>> For now, anyway. Personally, my

58:59

colleagues get into all that, you know,

59:02

they enjoy it. But I use LLMs in, well,

59:06

in my daily work, you know, for some

59:10

tasks. I use Gemini, I use that free

59:14

Google thing, and it, well, it solves

59:17

all my problems. And I believe my level

59:21

of prompts isn't, well, super high, but

59:25

it's above average, right? So, if it

59:29

solves my tasks, then it definitely

59:31

solves them for the average user. Why

59:33

would you need this ChatGPT? I mean,

59:36

you have these—and I'm not even

59:37

talking about the local Chinese models,

59:39

right? You know, the ones that are 10

59:43

or 100 times cheaper. Where is the ROI,

59:47

where is the ROI for Anthropic or

59:51

OpenAI? It doesn't exist. Objectively,

59:53

it's not there. I read last week that

59:56

Reuters is launching its own LLM.

60:01

>> So, well, you have competition coming

60:03

from everywhere, you see? It's coming

60:05

from everywhere, and you're just trying

60:07

to spin a narrative. I think all this

60:10

talk about them being, you know, some

60:13

kind of danger—like what Dario from

60:16

Anthropic was saying—that’s not

60:20

about danger at all. What kind of

60:22

danger could there be? There is no

60:24

danger, it's just a linguistic model.

60:26

It's nonsense. It's not

60:28

>> The danger is that he won't be able to

60:30

cash out in time.

60:30

>> That's his main danger. Yeah. Yeah. And

60:34

I think, well, how. What's the idea?

60:37

Let's ban some models that are

60:39

competitors, the ones that are cheaper.

60:42

And who are those? Right now, those are

60:44

the Chinese ones, yeah. And let's, well

60:48

, socialize all of this, right? So, if

60:53

anything, let the government give us,

60:55

you know, I don't know, loans or pay

60:57

subsidies, because we are very

60:59

important, necessary, and in theory, we

61:01

could destroy humanity. Yeah, I think

61:05

it's all because there is no moat, you

61:09

know, no barriers to entry for anyone

61:12

else. There's tons of competition, and

61:15

monetization isn't happening. So, well,

61:18

that's where,

61:19

>> that's where I think it all stems from.

61:21

It's more about just taking out those

61:24

guys

61:25

>> who are trying to get close to the

61:28

trough,

61:28

>> well, that's impossible. It's like

61:30

trying to fight the internet, you know.

61:32

Anyone who wants to will just install

61:35

the model themselves anyway. Well, you

61:37

can't fool people, right? You can't

61:40

force them to use this expensive stuff

61:41

of yours.

61:42

>> Wait a second, I'm being told we have

61:45

no sound. One second. That's something

61:48

new.

61:49

>> I hear you perfectly fine.

61:50

>> No, it’s just...

61:51

>> Has the chat been silent for a long

61:52

time?

61:52

>> Wait, wait. Just a moment. Oh. Don't

62:09

look, it’s not for long.

62:13

>> No, everything is fine.

62:15

>> They're lying, just turn it off.

62:16

>> No, I, I...No, I just checked the

62:19

YouTube stream. The sound is there,

62:21

>> everything is there.

62:23

>> Sounds like sabotage,

62:26

>> doesn't it? I see.

62:27

>> Who were you butting heads with? You

62:29

had some nemesis you were buying TLT

62:30

with, what was his name? That's his

62:32

doing. It’s him writing.

62:36

>> Listen, that TLT stuff ended 3 years

62:39

ago, and it just doesn't seem to die

62:41

down. You know, remember the narratives

62:45

? At first, I remember everyone...

62:48

wherever the information went,

62:50

sometimes I come across it. They used

62:52

to say 40%of companies in the Nasdaq

62:54

were zombies about six years ago. Then

62:57

we had a talk about very active zones,

63:00

>> right. Then we had a conversation about

63:03

Silicon Valley Bank and what's

63:05

happening with commercial real estate.

63:08

I was looking at this one bank in

63:09

America, and their exposure to

63:11

commercial real estate is just through

63:12

the roof. And now I see that the media

63:15

isn't covering the commercial real

63:17

estate market at all. And if you look

63:20

at it, you know, every six months, half

63:22

a year passes and everyone forgets

63:24

about it. There are no updates, nobody

63:28

cares. Everyone just ran off. Now it's

63:29

artificial intelligence. The question

63:31

is, what will be next? What's the next

63:33

topic? Well, probably,

63:37

>> you know, I think elections are

63:39

probably important in this sense,

63:41

because this administration has gone

63:44

all-in on this artificial intelligence,

63:47

right? I mean, it really gives a boost

63:50

to the GDP there. Well, there is a

63:53

clear political effect from this. I

63:57

don't know if it's true or not, but

63:58

yesterday someone was circulating a

64:00

photo on Telegram of Trump signing an

64:02

executive order on this

64:03

superintelligence.

64:04

>> Above the signature, it said "The

64:07

United". "

64:09

>> The United". Not "United", but "Unnited

64:12

States". So they managed to make a typo

64:14

in that document. Honestly.

64:16

>> Wouldn't surprise me at all. I almost

64:18

expect such mistakes from this

64:20

administration, you know, there have

64:23

been so many already, let's just finish

64:25

it off. But in the context of support,

64:29

well, say if the IPO doesn't go well,

64:32

for example, and, well, again, what

64:35

kind of IPO? You see, if they do an IPO

64:39

like SpaceX, that’s not really that

64:42

much money. So, yes, the valuation is

64:45

high, but the float is so small that

64:47

what, what does that change? It doesn't

64:50

change anything. You don't have any

64:51

more capital. You know, if we're

64:53

talking about that kind of IPO, it's

64:55

possible. If we're talking about an IPO

64:57

that has, well, I don't know, a 30%

64:59

float at this valuation, I don't

65:01

believe there's demand for that. I mean

65:03

, where would it come from? Who is that

65:05

? You need to sell something for the

65:07

public to buy it. And why? I just don't

65:11

understand why. Well, yeah,

65:14

>> that's why I'm so doubtful. But if the

65:18

elections are, say, negative for the

65:20

current administration, if there's a

65:22

Democratic Sweep or something like that

65:25

, well, I think support for this sector

65:27

will drop sharply right away. That's 2

65:30

years ahead of, you know, such

65:32

uncertainty. And these talks about them

65:36

bailing out Anthropic or OpenAI, I

65:38

think they become much more complicated

65:41

, yes, because there will be too many

65:43

questions. Why, you know, well, the

65:47

whole story seems to be getting more

65:50

complicated to me. And to what extent

65:53

do they need, if they aren't monetizing

65:56

and have some problems, to what extent

65:58

should they be supported by the state?

66:01

Well, I don't know. I believe that no

66:03

one should be supported by the state;

66:05

it should all be left to the market.

66:08

And as long as, if there's no demand,

66:10

there's none.

66:11

>> A beautiful future, that's what we're

66:13

going to talk about now.

66:14

>> Well, I would like to see a world like

66:16

that, you know, it's a better world, a

66:18

more honest world. It's just that

66:20

>> wanting doesn't hurt, as they say.

66:24

>> So,

66:25

>> let me, let me dream.

66:27

>> Yes. You are our optimist, after all.

66:30

Uh, let's run through the questions.

66:34

We've already been chatting here for an

66:38

hour, you and I. So, the first question

66:41

was—let me just write it down. The

66:44

first question was from Jeff Snider

66:46

about the yield curve. Uh, what to

66:49

expect? I wouldn't really want to get

66:53

into that right now. In general,

66:55

actually,

66:56

>> listen, sorry, let me interrupt you

66:58

right away. That was one of the few

67:03

pieces of Jeff Snider's analysis that

67:06

I've liked in his recent lectures. The

67:09

curve.

67:10

>> About the curve. It's actually true.

67:12

What he says there is a very good

67:15

observation. And the curve is lousy,

67:18

but to put it roughly, it doesn't

67:21

really signal future growth at all,

67:26

>> right. But unfortunately, Jeff has gone

67:30

a bit mainstream. And that's the most

67:34

disappointing part, because I've been

67:36

reading him back when he was at that

67:38

place in Alhambra, Florida, back then.

67:41

And unfortunately, he's just followed

67:43

the general path now. Back then he

67:44

wrote such intricate things that it

67:47

would blow your mind, it was so

67:48

interesting to read. Now he has drifted

67:51

a bit into the mainstream. But yes,

67:53

>> I was never a fan. But it's true, what

67:57

he writes about the curve. Well, listen

68:00

, if it stays like that, that's also a

68:02

question. It’s like that now, but

68:05

tomorrow everything could change, you

68:07

know. Yeah,

68:08

>> but yeah, it is interesting.

68:11

>> Gold.

68:13

>> Yeah.

68:13

>> It’s shaky, it’s shaky. People are

68:15

even asking about 3200, 3500 here.

68:18

>> Well no, I don't believe it. If that

68:23

happens, it's the opportunity of a

68:24

lifetime, if that happens. But I don't

68:27

believe that something like that will

68:28

happen. But I can easily see some kind

68:31

of test below four. Well, I don't know,

68:35

how much.

68:35

>> Well, that's the consensus. If we dive

68:38

under four, under four, then you have

68:40

to buy it all up like crazy.

68:42

>> Therefore, most likely, that won't

68:44

happen. I would say that gold is

68:48

behaving, well, unusually strongly,

68:54

considering what is happening. I mean,

68:58

if we really believe in those real

69:01

positive rates—I don’t believe it,

69:03

I’ll emphasize that again, I think

69:05

it’s absolute. But, let’s

69:09

say, if we believe that real rates are

69:13

positive, the rate hike cycle, the

69:15

dollar is strengthening a bit against

69:19

it, gold should be at 3500, but it’s

69:22

at 4200. And that, for me, is a sign of

69:27

strength. I think that, well, let's say

69:32

, this 4000-5000 range, that's

69:35

something to start from, it's what I

69:38

start from. If we see it well below

69:41

four, I will use it as a super

69:44

opportunity to buy more.

69:47

>> Well, in the long term, if we look at

69:49

the system and understand where all

69:52

this is heading, it’s impossible to

69:55

ignore gold.

69:56

>> It's impossible to pass it by. Yes, yes

69:59

, in that sense I really like the way

70:01

Triqul thinks—you know, the guy who

70:04

worked at Sprott, a well-known goldbug.

70:08

>> And he is very funny, he’s an older

70:12

guy, we’ve chatted a couple of times.

70:16

He’s cool, you know, a pleasant guy,

70:19

>> easy to talk to, he’s got a sense of

70:21

humor. And he always says, "Well, if

70:24

prices are lower, that’s great, if I

70:27

want to buy." It’s like, you know,

70:29

you get a discount at the store, but

70:32

for some reason people get upset, you

70:34

know. And he always laughs at that,

70:36

like, how can that be, you know: in a

70:38

store you're super happy about a

70:40

discount, but in the market you get

70:41

upset because you already bought it,

70:43

and now it's cheaper. You know, that

70:45

whole story starts up.

70:47

>> Well yeah. So I think that yes, if that

70:50

happens, then that opportunity must be

70:53

used somehow. I'm already ready to use

70:57

it, but I'm not sure it will happen.

71:00

Going below four is a lot to ask. I

71:03

definitely don't believe in 3200.

71:05

>> Well, you see, as an allocator, you are

71:07

more flexible. I'm just sitting with

71:09

those thousand bucks, and I have no

71:11

intention of getting out of it.

71:13

>> Well, that's great, perfect. So, in my

71:16

view, higher, higher, higher,

71:18

ultimately higher, for sure. The

71:22

question is the timeframe, how long it

71:24

will take, it could take years, and so

71:26

on. But

71:27

>> listen, I think it's the kind of

71:31

situation where you can be both; you

71:35

can be an allocator and also try to

71:38

catch these movements a little bit.

71:42

Well, we at least try, and sometimes we

71:45

succeed, though I wouldn't say always.

71:48

And I think it's easier for me to do

71:51

that because our derivative structures

71:54

force us to look at market valuation,

71:57

you know, what the market is actually

72:01

thinking, in that sense. And then it's

72:04

easier. I told you about that peak in

72:07

gold and silver,

72:08

>> but it was clear that if you were

72:10

looking in the right place, it was

72:13

obvious it was too much. It just

72:15

couldn't last that long.

72:16

>> It was clear that there had to be

72:20

>> some kind of pullback.

72:22

>> Exactly. And again, if you aren't

72:26

looking at these things, it's harder to

72:28

do and simpler just to hold. That's it.

72:31

But I wouldn't wait for 3200. 3500

72:33

might happen. Maybe.

72:35

>> What about crypto then? Crypto is

72:38

holding up well too. Bless you.

72:41

>> Yeah, it's holding up.

72:43

>> Even though with liquidity, as everyone

72:45

writes, there should be more liquidity

72:47

for crypto to fly, and here we are,

72:49

>> it's moving quite well even without

72:51

liquidity right now.

72:52

>> Well, from absolute, if we're talking

72:55

about Bitcoin, from the absolute local

72:58

low, it's higher. Yes,

73:00

>> it's higher by like, how much? It was

73:02

60, now it's 80, something like that.

73:04

>> Well, 50.

73:05

>> It depends on where you measure from.

73:06

If you measure from 120, then it's a

73:09

loss, right?

73:11

>> Yes. Well, in principle, over the last

73:14

couple of months it has really

73:17

>> bounced back nicely.

73:18

>> Well, from the very bottom, if you take

73:20

it, from the oversold, then yes, we are

73:21

like

73:22

>> But the discussion is leading from the

73:24

sun. Bottom or not a bottom

73:26

>> been and whether we will go lower or

73:28

not go lower,

73:30

>> I don't know. I won't pretend that I

73:33

know, but I still think it's a function

73:37

of liquidity. I mean, if we, well, and

73:41

again, yes, NASDAQ is at all-time highs

73:44

,

73:45

>> we can't forget about that, right? I

73:48

mean everything, all this tech stuff,

73:51

it's not like it's crashing, so why be

73:53

surprised that Bitcoin is a bit higher

73:56

on that, yeah. I don't see any

74:00

dissonance here at all. If liquidity

74:04

stays the same as it is now, I'd say

74:07

it's a negative factor for crypto if

74:09

nothing changes. It could change, sure,

74:12

they might lower the rate, I don't know

74:15

, start QE, Europe might also start

74:18

some QE, but in that case I think one

74:21

can believe in it. But again, for me

74:24

there is this NASDAQ S&P 500 factor. I

74:28

think we are somewhere at the peaks,

74:30

right? I mean

74:32

>> regarding NASDAQ, so you think the

74:34

markets

74:35

>> I think we'll have a good move to the

74:37

upside still.

74:39

>> Well yeah, you see, I have kind of two

74:42

opposing thoughts in this regard. On

74:47

one hand, I believe in debasement, I

74:49

believe that currencies are being

74:51

devalued. If currencies are devalued,

74:55

most likely productive stocks in that

74:57

base currency grow, you know, they can

75:00

be, like, tremendous, right? I mean,

75:03

you could have a negative repricing in

75:06

gold, for example, but higher in dollar

75:09

terms, but for that gold would have to

75:12

be, I don't know, 10,000, like, yeah,

75:15

that is possible. At the same time,

75:18

there are a number of metrics. that say

75:23

we are historically close to a top.

75:28

Well, for example, I'm showing you that

75:30

Investech guy there,

75:33

>> and he has this interesting indicator

75:35

of market depth. Well, internals, yes.

75:37

Like, how many

75:39

>> Winners vs Losers, yes, yes.

75:41

>> And it's at minus one, like, this

75:43

metric of his. This is, well,

75:46

historically it's a rare top signal.

75:50

And I can't ignore it, you know,

75:53

because historically it was like that.

75:56

Maybe this time it won't be, it's not a

75:58

one-hundred-percent indicator, but

76:01

>> no. The fact that we are at a top,

76:04

>> yes, that we are at a top, that's clear

76:07

, but if you look now just at, again,

76:10

some technical parameters, by and large

76:13

, the market breadth is very lousy. You

76:17

have a large number of companies that

76:22

are sort of trading at their lows, the

76:23

market seems to be holding up, you have

76:26

>> high concentration,

76:27

>> high concentration. But then again, if

76:30

you look at it from that logic, uh,

76:32

well, I'm not saying we'll know when,

76:35

sooner or later it has to crash

76:36

properly. But in the logic that if we

76:40

proceed from the fact that we've had

76:43

since about August, here, if you look

76:46

at the indices, many have seen a pretty

76:48

decent correction. And, accordingly,

76:52

one could say that a certain period has

76:54

just passed. we hit the lows from the

76:57

point of view of some technical

76:58

indicators. And in this logic, if we

77:02

don't see some super-mega stress, and

77:05

if we imagine, let's fantasize, say,

77:07

that, uh, Iran and Trumpy reached a

77:10

deal, that's a super positive thing.

77:13

And plus maybe, yes,

77:16

>> and plus, historically, those Octobers

77:19

that fell during Midterms, they were

77:23

basically all more or less bullish. So

77:27

from the perspective of the tops, it's

77:29

clear that everything is overheated.

77:31

From the point of view of this pullback

77:33

that we've seen in the last couple of

77:34

weeks, it could be just like when, in

77:36

COVID, everyone knew there would be a

77:38

vaccine, as soon as it was announced,

77:39

everything took off. So for you, in

77:43

fact, the probability that the level of

77:45

negativity already priced into the

77:47

market is so high—Rosenberg

77:49

calculated that, in principle, they've

77:51

priced in almost a 1%rate hike next

77:53

year with all these corrections. And,

77:57

accordingly, the possibility for a

78:00

reversal, a short squeeze in the

78:03

indices, or some positive momentum, is

78:06

huge. So I'm not saying it will happen,

78:09

but due to these extremes that have

78:11

formed, they could really produce a

78:13

positive picture. On the other hand,

78:17

you look at the VIX, despite it being

78:19

at its lows, with all this overheating,

78:22

the VIX is practically nailed to the

78:24

floor. And if it goes up, if the dollar

78:27

suddenly jumps, and we are at 101. So

78:32

there are many variables, which I

78:34

understand, yes, but still,

78:36

>> well, a rising dollar is hardly good

78:38

for the American market.

78:40

>> No, no, it's clear it's not good, but

78:42

in principle, everyone is long on the

78:44

dollar too.

78:46

>> Look, I'm not trying to predict where

78:49

the Nasdaq will be, or if it's a top or

78:52

not a top or anything else. I just have

78:56

, well, a dissonance, yes. I mean, on

79:00

one hand, I can easily see how indices

79:03

grow through the basement, well, your

79:06

purchasing power of currencies just

79:09

falls because it's being printed. And

79:14

history shows that in these cases, I

79:17

don't know, Weimar, Venezuela, well, a

79:20

bunch of these examples, when the local

79:23

currency crashed, and the stock market

79:25

index, well, company valuations grew

79:28

precisely because the currency was

79:30

devaluing. So that’s one side of the

79:33

story. If so, then stocks, most likely,

79:36

in dollar equivalent, if we're talking

79:38

about America, they’re growing, right

79:41

? But it’s like, you know, it’s the

79:44

same thing as financial repression on

79:46

bonds.

79:47

>> I mean, yeah, they’re growing, but

79:50

>> did you actually earn anything or not?

79:52

Well, you earned in dollars, but if the

79:55

dollar fell against some underlying

79:57

assets, then you didn’t earn a damn

80:00

thing. You lost, you know, it's the

80:02

same thing. And so, on one hand, I have

80:06

that idea, and on the other hand, I see

80:09

this overbought state, I see

80:11

concentration, I see poor depth,

80:14

breadth, call it what you want. I see

80:18

these rare, rare top indicators, right?

80:22

I mean, I see Ray Dalio, who’s saying

80:25

we need to ban everything around us.

80:28

And he has the best model in modern

80:30

times, which is not the best at all.

80:34

You know, if you compare price to

80:36

quality, and we know that it was the AI

80:39

hype that pulled this index higher for

80:43

the last two years.

80:45

>> So, there are a bunch of reasons to be,

80:48

well, at the very least, cautious,

80:50

right?

80:51

>> No, well, structurally, I absolutely

80:54

agree.

80:54

>> Well, yeah, and so I get this

80:56

dissonance. And when there’s

80:58

dissonance, well, the Solomonic

81:00

solution is, you know, don’t buy,

81:01

don’t sell, you know. I’ll watch,

81:03

I’ll watch what happens.

81:05

>> Alright. And how

81:06

>> and we, and we just started crypto,

81:08

right? I mean, if you believe that

81:11

Nasdaq is falling, well, significantly,

81:14

say 20-30%, I don't see a scenario

81:17

where Bitcoin grows. But

81:19

>> that is simply impossible,

81:23

>> unless, no, but if you don't factor in

81:24

the total dynamic that the world is

81:26

ending and people are running like in

81:28

the pandemic, something like that, I

81:30

can imagine it, but a dip will happen

81:32

in any case initially.

81:35

>> If, if during a pandemic, if they hand

81:37

out money à la pandemic, then

81:38

everything grows, right? That’s a

81:41

separate scenario, it’s not in sight

81:44

yet.

81:45

>> Okay. And how then, if we look at all

81:47

this complexity? You, your favorite

81:50

topic, oil. What, what do you think

81:53

about oil? Because, well, I see that

81:56

they aren't coming to an agreement with

81:58

Iran, some unclear signals are coming

82:00

in that something is being divided,

82:02

maybe they will agree, maybe they won't

82:05

. There’s a very serious conflict

82:08

going on between the Houthis and the

82:10

Saudis. And it seems like there’s no

82:12

end in sight to this nonsense there

82:13

either. I mean, if you look at it

82:16

structurally, uh, it's a nightmare. You

82:20

look at the spreads, diesel is over 100

82:23

dollars, uh, there's no diesel. There's

82:28

a Damocles sword over Europe that Trump

82:33

might slap an export ban on diesel. And

82:37

then what? Well, winter will be tough

82:42

regardless of what happens next, it

82:44

won’t be simple. That is already

82:47

clear today. You can make this winter

82:49

worse. It could be a warm one, just due

82:53

to weather conditions, or a lousy one.

82:55

If it's lousy, it basically makes

82:57

everything twice as bad right off the

83:00

bat.

83:01

>> It won't be a cakewalk, no, this winter

83:03

definitely won't be good. Uh, well, in

83:07

terms of heating costs and so on. And

83:11

the further north, the worse it gets.

83:13

So, if we're talking about our home

83:15

country, well, it's a total disaster.

83:18

>> Oh, I’m already waiting for people to

83:20

start posting winter utility bills from

83:22

Estonia. It’s going to be a very

83:24

amusing topic.

83:26

>> My family got lucky. I, well, sort of

83:28

shared that joy with you. We sold our

83:32

family house, and I am just so happy

83:34

that I won't have to think about those

83:36

bills, like, in the winter. I think it

83:40

will be bad. Regarding oil, well,

83:45

listen, since we started, we’ve been

83:47

talking about this oil the whole time.

83:49

You know my position on this,

83:51

>> that's what they're asking.

83:53

>> Ah, okay. Well, in principle, I would

83:58

separate crude oil from all the

84:01

distillates, because those are slightly

84:06

different markets, and they have their

84:10

own nuances. Well, like diesel or jet

84:13

fuel or something else. These are, like

84:17

, nuances of individual countries, well

84:19

, geography, or something else. I have

84:24

less enthusiasm for oil. We bought

84:28

heavily, well, to speak in direct terms

84:32

, we bought around 60-70. And in

84:38

principle, this story worked twice

84:40

since the last, well, since these

84:42

conflicts started. I think there is a

84:48

lot of manipulation in oil, both

84:51

through physical releases, well, the

84:53

strategic reserve, and so on. And from

84:58

the perspective of positioning on the

85:00

CME, it’s clearly visible how, long

85:03

before Trump's statements, someone is

85:05

shorting or doing the opposite. So,

85:08

this manipulation exists. Do you think

85:10

we've topped out on prices?

85:13

>> And I don't think we have. I think that

85:17

our floor has risen. If you remember, I

85:21

always, well, before, when we were

85:24

testing 60 and below, I always had this

85:28

idea that this was the floor, that 70,

85:31

60, 50, somewhere around here was the

85:34

floor. Simply because additional

85:38

production was impossible at those

85:40

levels. Well, roughly speaking. That

85:43

was the thesis. But I think this floor

85:46

is higher now. I think it's 70-80. I

85:50

think that to go below these levels,

85:52

well, I don't know, something like

85:54

COVID, some kind of event like that

85:56

would have to happen for us to go

85:58

significantly lower. Demand is growing

86:03

and growing. It's always growing. The

86:05

population is increasing, humanity and

86:08

the consumption of all this stuff is

86:11

increasing. I think that, and again,

86:14

returning to these three arrows of

86:17

Bessent, well, the Americans can't seem

86:20

to increase production. They seem to

86:23

have squeezed the maximum out of what

86:25

they could. And where will the

86:29

additional supply come from? I don't

86:32

see it. Refining is a whole separate

86:35

universe; there are a bunch of problems

86:37

with refining. Because of the wars,

86:40

because of all the wars. If there are

86:46

any bans from America now, well forget

86:52

about diesel, it's like the trucks

86:54

won't run. Well, this is potentially

86:58

what I was just watching on air. We

87:01

have a fellow here, Krahl, an economist

87:04

, he was painting a picture there,

87:06

saying: "Listen, we just had diesel at

87:08

2.60, today it dropped to two." Eh, but

87:15

considering that the Strait of Hormuz

87:17

is closed, and the Houthis are also

87:20

firing left and right, it means that in

87:23

Europe, we will potentially see a

87:25

diesel shortage. First, rising prices

87:28

in transportation and logistics, and

87:30

second, of course, all agriculture runs

87:32

on diesel, but it is completely

87:34

profitable under the current system. No

87:36

one knows how to solve this. As long as

87:39

Zelensky strikes refineries in Russia,

87:43

Trump sits with huge leverage. Well,

87:46

because Russia and the US are the two

87:48

largest diesel producers in the world.

87:51

>> And, one can argue whether Europe will

87:53

need to buy or not, that's a separate

87:55

question. But fundamentally, you have

87:58

your two largest suppliers and the

88:00

situation is, to put it mildly, not

88:03

very stable in both. Yes, not very

88:05

stable. One can very easily and quickly

88:08

fall into a spiral that automatically

88:10

>> He says he expects that next year in

88:13

Europe the first food riots will begin,

88:16

because otherwise this system can't be

88:18

resolved. I listen to this and say, I

88:20

can certainly imagine this,

88:23

>> but,

88:25

>> well, it's definitely some kind of

88:26

probability, right? Meaning, it

88:28

shouldn't be ignored as a possibility.

88:31

Food riots? Well no, but problems for

88:34

sure, the cost of all this stuff will

88:37

definitely go up.

88:39

>> But that’s just the market.

88:41

>> And plus, because of the fact that gas

88:43

storage facilities are filled to 70%.

88:48

In an average winter, our consumption

88:50

from storage is 40-45. Well, let's say,

88:53

in those cubic meters, yeah, not

88:54

percentages. It’s clear that, in

88:56

general, the average volume of storage

88:58

is around 105. And of those units,

89:04

there are 70 now. On average, we

89:07

consume 45-50 in Europe during the

89:08

winter. The problem is that when the

89:12

level drops, when you go below thirty

89:15

in the storage, the efficiency of

89:17

extracting that gas requires extra load

89:21

>> and pressure. So, by and large, if the

89:24

winter is very cold, we will end up in

89:26

a situation where we'll have to make a

89:29

choice: do I want to support industry

89:31

and production to keep jobs, or will I

89:34

heat households? If I don't heat

89:36

households, pipes will start bursting

89:39

with all the resulting sewage dynamics

89:42

and so on, and if I don't support

89:44

production, then unemployment and the

89:47

economic spiral will tighten even

89:50

further. So, that is what's called a

89:52

Catch-22. Are you

89:57

>> against it?

89:59

>> No, I'm just telling you that here, I

90:00

mentioned Zelinsky, and people are

90:02

already getting offended, acting like

90:04

he should be sending roses. I’m not

90:06

suggesting anything, I’m just saying,

90:08

in fact, we are talking about the

90:10

market, not about terror or politics.

90:12

Come on, guys, get lost. This is not a

90:16

question of ideology or position, right

90:18

? This is a question of economics. This

90:20

is

90:22

>> And this is probably your Erik Meizelis

90:25

from your future electorate.

90:29

>> No, look, it's understandable, it's

90:30

always an acute topic. It provokes some

90:33

reactions,

90:34

>> yes. Therefore, we are not talking

90:36

about politics here, it's purely a

90:37

statement of fact.

90:38

>> Not about politics at all, absolutely

90:40

not about politics. And it's a question

90:43

of, uh, well, supply and demand, yes,

90:46

mostly. I am regularly asked questions

90:50

about, you know, the normalization of

90:54

relations between Europe and Russia.

90:58

Well, listen, Europe is currently

91:02

buying all sorts of resources from

91:05

Russia. It is buying those resources

91:08

today. If people don't understand that,

91:11

well, that is those people's problem.

91:14

Well, ask ChatGPT, or I don't know,

91:17

Claude, Gemini, or whoever you trust,

91:20

just ask how many Russian inputs Europe

91:23

actually consumes.

91:27

>> This is not a matter of debate, right?

91:30

This is a fact of reality. And one must

91:34

accept this fact. Yes, maybe someday in

91:37

some reality it will be possible to

91:39

give up these inputs, but I don't know

91:42

when. I can't. In principle, well, I

91:45

consider myself a pretty good analyst.

91:48

I cannot say when this might happen

91:49

under the current, under the current

91:51

dynamics.

91:52

>> Therefore, considering the general

91:55

situation, one should expect that

91:57

Europe and Russia will go to war, in my

91:59

view. But let's not, let's not, wait,

92:02

let's not dive into that right now.

92:03

We'll get carried away, we've already

92:04

been at it for an hour and a half.

92:05

>> I find it hard, I find it hard to see

92:07

that, if you ask me. It's hard, but I

92:09

think they will push it that far. They

92:11

don't have a choice either.

92:13

>> Well,

92:15

>> three last questions, because we've

92:17

been chatting for an hour and a half,

92:18

and we need to wrap it up a bit. Ah,

92:21

>> the first question is about Japan. What

92:25

do you think?

92:27

>> Well, there are many topics in this

92:28

Japan. Let's touch on two. Well, bonds

92:34

and stocks. What should one do with

92:37

them?

92:38

>> Well, I think the main question

92:40

regarding Japan is not the assets. But

92:43

what is Japan in general? What does it

92:47

represent? Who is its partner? Where

92:52

does it get its energy from? Who are

92:55

they developing technology with? These

93:00

are the main questions. And the answer

93:04

is not obvious because, on one hand,

93:07

they are, well, historical American

93:10

partners, well, if we abstract from

93:13

Hiroshima and Nagasaki and so on, well,

93:17

in modern history, let's say, they are

93:20

key American partners in Asia. Well,

93:24

they are the main ones. For this, they

93:27

get a bunch of bonuses, opportunities

93:29

to develop their industries, all kinds

93:32

of American support, and so on. But the

93:36

question is, in an era of rising energy

93:42

prices, what is Japan's path?

93:49

>> I don't really see this path. I don't

93:51

understand this path. That is, and,

93:55

well, they are playing a strange game.

93:59

On one hand, they seem to coordinate

94:01

actions with the Americans, but on the

94:03

other hand, periodically they, you know

94:05

, sell Treasuries, right? Suddenly, an

94:08

intervention happens, they report, "

94:10

we're great, we're working together,"

94:12

then click, their Treasuries dropped,

94:14

you know? I mean, I have a suspicion

94:18

that they are playing their own game,

94:20

these Japanese people, some kind of

94:23

separate game that has nothing to do

94:26

with the current geopolitical landscape

94:28

.

94:29

>> Well, they cannot abstract themselves

94:31

from this, because it is clear that a

94:33

reorientation toward China cannot

94:35

happen for historical reasons. I mean,

94:37

automatically

94:38

>> it can't today, but it could tomorrow.

94:41

I think that's what it is. This Listen,

94:45

>> I find it hard to imagine in the

94:47

current environment how Japan would "

94:49

lay down" under China. Are you kidding?

94:51

>> Why would they lay down under China?

94:53

They would just be a partner to China,

94:54

just like with America. They didn't lay

94:56

down under America, did they? They are

94:58

a partner, you know, it's the same

95:01

thing. I don't know. Listen, I'm not

95:03

making any predictions. I'm just saying

95:04

that they are in a difficult position.

95:07

Exactly in terms of how to develop,

95:10

what to do, and what to do with that

95:13

foreign capital. You have to motivate

95:16

it to return home or direct it

95:18

somewhere. Well, there’s a lot of it,

95:21

they are rich.

95:23

>> A ton, yes. Well, by and large, that

95:25

defines everything—whether the money

95:28

goes home or not.

95:29

>> If it goes, then it's super, super

95:31

bullish for everything, including the

95:33

yen. Well, I would say, as I mentioned,

95:37

I would calmly put about 10%of my

95:39

portfolio into the yen, because the

95:41

potential scenario that is being drawn

95:43

so clearly looks very, very sweet.

95:47

>> I, yeah, I don't really see a reason

95:50

for 10%in yen. I don't really

95:52

understand what to buy with that yen.

95:55

Bonds aren't exactly attractive in

95:57

terms of yield. And,

95:59

>> well, I don't know, the long end is

96:01

actually yielding quite well now. Well,

96:03

listen, we're in Europe, right? I mean,

96:05

you can get, without much stress, on

96:08

the short end, for 3-4 years, like 3.7

96:11

–4%. That

96:15

>> that's easy, right? I mean, Japan

96:17

doesn't pay that much. Plus the

96:19

currency risk. Ah, well, again, yes,

96:24

>> the currency risk actually goes in a

96:26

positive direction with the yen, rather

96:29

than negative. Well, we discussed this

96:32

with you last time as well. Well, we're

96:36

at 160, just like before. Nothing is

96:39

changing?

96:40

>> Nothing is changing. Consistency.

96:44

>> I mean, again, as long as there is no

96:47

understanding of what will happen with

96:49

dollar liquidity, rates, and the

96:52

monetization of American problems. I am

96:56

not ready to make any forecasts for the

96:58

yen. For example, stocks, I think, are

97:01

expensive. I mean, what we bought many

97:04

years ago seems just crazy now. With

97:08

those valuations, I'm not holding

97:10

anything. Uh, bonds don't offer that

97:13

kind of yield either. Well, maybe real

97:16

estate in Japan is cheap, I don't know.

97:18

That could be an interesting story,

97:21

because if capital flows back, the

97:24

first thing it will do is buy real

97:27

estate and land, since there isn't much

97:30

of it there.

97:32

>> Yeah, true. Okay. Uh, two topics. One

97:36

is everything related to private credit

97:38

and these BDCs. They are asking

97:43

specifically not about ARCC, but about

97:47

Ares, which provides a 10%dividend

97:50

yield. Should one allocate 1-3%of the

97:53

portfolio to such an instrument?

97:55

>> What's it called? Ares.

97:57

>> Ares Capital Management, right? It is

97:59

one of the largest private credit

98:01

providers in the world. Well, it seems

98:07

to me that if they are paying 10%

98:09

annually, that's already a sign of risk

98:11

.

98:12

>> Why? Why? Yeah.

98:14

>> Well, look, there's no such thing as

98:18

risk-free return, so it means they are

98:21

selling something risky.

98:24

>> In that case, it's easier to buy a Meta

98:26

bond at 8%than to hold private credit.

98:29

I am extremely skeptical about private

98:31

credit. There is so much crap hidden in

98:34

there that

98:34

>> you just don't know. You can't value

98:37

that crap. Fine, if you know it's crap,

98:40

but it's cheap. I like that kind of

98:42

thing. But here it’s a black box, you

98:45

know, they don't tell you anything, you

98:47

know nothing. Meta, at least, is a

98:51

systemic thing. It has revenue and not

98:56

that much debt. Well yeah, it will pay,

98:59

like. Or something similar. Uh, spreads

99:04

have widened quite a bit there,

99:06

especially high-yield, like CCCs, these

99:09

spreads are noticeably growing, which

99:12

brings up the question of the S&P peak

99:15

and so on; well, that’s another bad

99:18

sign if spreads widen, especially in

99:21

the riskiest part. Well, again, I’ll

99:25

remind you that the bond market is

99:28

smarter than the equity market. If some

99:31

movements have started there, it's

99:34

another reason to be cautious.

99:37

>> Yes. The last question. Utilities,

99:41

because XLU, well, that index has

99:44

dipped just like TLT, looks like the

99:47

same dynamic across the board. Uh,

99:52

>> I like regulated utilities if you ask

99:55

me, because it’s a super predictable

99:58

business. Often they are systemic,

100:01

municipal, or state-run, and for them,

100:04

failing to pay their debt is, well, the

100:07

last thing they would ever do. As

100:10

stocks, it’s always about dividends,

100:13

by and large. So, expecting any growth

100:16

from an established utility company...I

100:19

mean, what are they going to do, take

100:22

over a nearby city or what, what will

100:25

they do to increase their revenue?

100:28

Cutting costs there is practically

100:30

impossible. So, it’s purely a

100:32

dividend play. I’m not a big fan of

100:35

utilities on the equity side. It can be

100:40

a defensive play. Well, you can look at

100:43

it from two different sides. On one

100:45

hand, it’s a classic risk-off asset,

100:49

and considering how bonds are moving,

100:52

it’s understandable. On the other

100:56

hand, if we look at things structurally

100:59

for the long term, I wouldn't call it a

101:02

portfolio cornerstone, but it's not a

101:05

bad part of a portfolio.

101:09

>> That’s number one. Secondly, if you

101:12

look at the global situation, there are

101:16

water problems, huge water issues, and

101:20

grid problems, basically everywhere

101:24

except China; so, basic utility

101:28

services are,

101:30

>> to put it mildly, not in the best shape

101:32

. And if we look at England, for

101:35

instance, they ruined their utilities

101:38

when they did the IPO and then

101:40

basically looted the corporation, quite

101:42

literally. And now that everything is

101:46

trashed and looks like a pile of manure

101:48

, you have nowhere to go; you’re

101:50

going to pay, my friend. And in that

101:53

sense, I understand what you mean

101:56

regarding bonds as a good kind of...

102:00

>> Total return, yes. But in principle,

102:05

you just have to consider that the

102:08

cyclical nature of this allocation is

102:11

driven by the general risk-off

102:14

narrative, rather than it being a

102:17

long-term core holding.

102:19

>> It’s like a hedge. It’s like a

102:21

hedge, you know, it’s closer to a

102:22

hedge. I like them as companies. I’d

102:27

be happy to own them because it’s an

102:29

understandable business. Super

102:31

predictable. They’ll definitely earn

102:34

that cash over the year, give or take.

102:37

You’d have to be a complete.

102:39

And, well, such cases do happen, where

102:41

you manage to kill it. But such cases

102:44

do happen. But how much do you really

102:47

want to hold this specifically in

102:50

equities? I don’t really want to,

102:53

because there’s little growth

102:55

potential there. It only grows in line

102:59

with the population and demographics.

103:04

Dividends aren't that high, and

103:06

valuations aren't that low. From what

103:09

I’ve looked at, we hold a couple or

103:12

three, but that’s not much and...I

103:18

don’t know, I don’t see it; by the

103:20

way, I do like various stories when it

103:22

comes to utility-type...things. I like

103:26

various Chinese stories. They have a

103:29

bunch of, well, I don’t know, toll

103:31

roads, some of these...geographies that

103:36

are more localized, yes, some cities

103:39

there and so on. It seems to me that

103:42

the dividends there are higher, the

103:43

valuations are better, and the

103:45

prospects are better. So, if we are

103:47

talking about utilities, I would rather

103:50

look there.

103:52

>> Yes. Or, you know, we could look a bit

103:54

broader, like with infrastructure. Uh,

103:56

besides the 10%utilities, so, uh, 10-15

104:00

%is more of an infrastructure theme.

104:05

From the perspective of, again, roads

104:07

and so on, water, electrical grids, and

104:09

so forth. And the logic is the same: in

104:14

a slowing economy, if we assume that

104:18

the status quo will be stimulated and

104:21

supported one way or another, the

104:23

simplest way to support the economy is

104:27

to invest in building bridges and roads

104:30

. Plus, the infrastructure, at least in

104:33

Europe, is falling apart. You provide

104:35

jobs for ordinary people. You start

104:38

activating or supporting local

104:40

businesses, like selling sand, cement,

104:42

or something like that. So, you can

104:45

very quickly and in the short term

104:47

inject money and at least catch the

104:50

situation so it doesn't collapse, you

104:52

know, like a stone in a river. And that

104:55

is why

104:56

>> I agree, yes, it's the best way to

104:58

subsidize because the multiplier effect

105:01

kicks in there and everything. But

105:05

that’s not really utilities, that’s

105:07

more about construction, you know, but

105:09

I’m just saying, I said that on an

105:12

expanded list, if we're taking

105:14

utilities, I would allocate some

105:16

portion to this infrastructure theme.

105:19

>> Yes, we have investments in things like

105:22

that. I like this idea of

105:25

infrastructure, and I think that’s

105:27

how it will end one way or another.

105:30

Well, in America for sure, and I think

105:32

in Europe too. So, yes, I agree.

105:37

>> On that wonderful verb "end," I suggest

105:40

we wrap up this broadcast, which has

105:42

lasted...how long, Alexander? How long?

105:46

You know,

105:47

>> it depends on what position you’re in

105:49

, let’s put it that way. Uh, what’s

105:51

that question? For what? Because who

105:56

because of this plan. Well, there you

105:58

go. Excellent. Thank you. For the chat.

106:01

Super. To everyone who watched and

106:05

endured this marathon

106:07

>> of brain dump that we’ve been pouring

106:11

out together today. Thank you all very

106:14

much. Undoubtedly, in about a month

106:17

we’ll cross paths again and continue

106:20

our brain dumps on the internet. Stay

106:23

with us. Thank you all very much. Pasha

106:26

, thank you very much. And see you soon

106:30

on the air.

106:31

>> Bye.

Interactive Summary

This video features a discussion between two market analysts covering a wide range of global financial topics, primarily focusing on the bond market, interest rate expectations, and the current state of liquidity. The speakers analyze the impact of volatility on the 'basis trade,' the competitive environment for capital between data centers and Treasuries, and the shifting nature of inflation. They also share their perspectives on the European and Chinese economic landscapes, the sustainability of the AI hype, and the outlook for assets like gold, oil, and utilities in a volatile global environment.

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