This is [music] Bloomberg Law with June

Graasso from Bloomberg Radio.

Six-year-old Eton Pates was the first

missing child to appear on milk cartons.

His disappearance in 1979 sparked a

nationwide campaign to find missing

children. But Pates was never found and

his case went unsolved for more than a

decade. It wasn't until 2017 that Pedro

Hernandez was convicted of his murder

and kidnapping and sentenced to 25 years

to life in prison. But the case didn't

end there. New York appellet courts

affirmed his conviction. But last year,

the Second Circuit Federal Appeals Court

reversed and ordered a new trial for

Hernandez because of the way the trial

judge had answered a question from

jurors. But today, the Supreme Court

reversed the second circuit and

reinstated the murder conviction against

Hernandez, finding federal courts

shouldn't second guessess state courts.

My guest is former Manhattan prosecutor

and criminal defense attorney Paul Kalen

of councel at Adelman and Adelman. Paul,

tell us about the disappearance of Eton

Pates. The six-year-old was kidnapped

off the streets of New York in 1979 and

he became the poster child for missing

children. I think to this day,

>> you're absolutely right about that. As a

matter of fact, I think this case has

altered child rearing in the United

States permanently. You know, it used to

be mom would send kids out the back door

and say, "Go play, come back for

supper." Now, the parents follow them

around, follow them to the bus stop.

They were all terrified. the kids are

going to be kidnapped. And it all

started with Eton Pates who was going to

catch a bus to his school in Soho in New

York. And he was kidnapped and

apparently murdered. And only recently

have we had a final resolution of the

case in terms of who committed the

murder, an individual named Hernandez,

whose conviction was now reaffirmed by

the Supreme Court.

>> Tell us about the confession because

there were some troubling things about

the confession. Yes, there were. His

brother-in-law reported to the police

that Hernandez had confessed to the

murder of Eton Pates. And of course,

Eton Pates murder has been a very, very

famous case throughout the United

States, ever since it happened back in

1979, long time ago. In any event, the

brother-in-law reports to the police

that his quote low IQ relative has

confessed to the murder and Camden

County, New Jersey police pick him up

and they start questioning him, but they

don't give him his Miranda warnings. He

confesses that he was working in a

bodega in Soho when Eton Pates came in

to buy a drink as he was on his way to

the bus stop and that he murdered Eton

Pates and disposed of the body,

presumably throwing the body into a

dumpster behind the deli. Full

confession to the murder. The police

then who have not given him his Miranda

warnings now say we should give him the

Miranda warnings and videotape this

confession. And that's exactly what they

do. They give a Miranda warnings,

videotape the confession, and then they

call the district attorney's office in

New York and say, "You better come out

here. We have somebody confessing to the

murder of Eton Pates." Now, this was a

case that had gone cold for a long time.

So, obviously, the Manhattan DA's office

was very interested in that. Apparently,

while all of this is going on, Hernandez

also talks to his wife and his daughter,

Rosemary and Becky, and he confesses to

both of them that he's in fact the

person who killed Eton Pates. He's then

picked up by the Manhattan DA's office,

taken back into New York where he

confesses again to the murder, this time

again on videotape. So, we now have two

videotaped confessions. Later on during

pre-trial proceedings, he meets with a

psychiatrist, he confesses to the

psychiatrist that he's the murderer. And

while giving that confession, he also

tells the psychiatrist that he admitted

this to a prayer group at one point over

the last 20 years. So by my account, I

think he's confessed now seven times to

the murder. All right. So the case goes

to trial in New York. The first trial,

by the way, ends in a hung jury. He's

retrieded and the second jury comes back

with a jury question. And the jury

question is this. If he was not given

his Miranda warnings properly and

therefore did not voluntarily confess,

is it okay for us to consider the other

confessions that occurred after this? In

substance, that was the question that

was asked by the jury. The way they

phrased it was the jury said, "Do we

have to disregard the subsequent

confessions if the first confession was

not voluntary?" The judge says one word,

"No." Okay. No, you don't have to

disregard the the subsequent

confessions. And after that, the jury

deliberates for another week and they

find Hernandez guilty of the kidnapping

and murder of Eton Pates. So that's the

story in a nutshell up until we get to

subsequent court decisions.

>> And I want to note it was a five-monthl

long trial with 66 witnesses. So it

wasn't just based on that confession. So

through the state, the state appellet

courts affirmed the conviction and then

the federal appellet court, the second

circuit in a 100page opinion last year

reversed and ordered that he get a new

trial. So, what was their reversal based

on?

>> The decision was based on the judge's

instructions to the jury when they came

back with a question. That question that

I just repeated, do we have to disregard

the subsequent confessions where the

judge just said no? That was the focus.

It was a petition for habius corpus

which you know is an elaborate procedure

that happens in most serious criminal

cases where an appeal has gone through

the whole state system and the defendant

is still in jail. He keeps losing and

then he finally goes to federal court

and says my constitutional rights were

violated. You the federal courts should

order my release and it's called the

habius corpus action. And there's been a

law that's been passed making it very

difficult to bring a habius action

because what was happening was every

criminal case in the United States was

winding up in federal court and the

Supreme Court now in this case makes

specific reference to that particular

law. It's called the Adepa law that

places limitations on habius corpus

actions. So when the second circuit,

which is a federal court, you now bear

in mind this went to the appellet

division in New York, the state court,

they looked at it and they said, you

know something, it's all right. The

question of whether a confession is

voluntary or involuntary, by the way, is

generally decided by a judge. It's not

usually decided by a jury. And so the

appellet division said under New York

law, the way this confession was

evaluated was perfectly proper. Okay. So

then they go into federal court with

this and the second circuit looks at it

which is the appellet court on the

federal side after the district court

looks at it first and they say well we

think there's a problem here. The judge

should have explained in more detail

other than saying no to the jury that

there could be a problem with the

confession that there was insufficient

what we call attenuation between the

initial confession and the subsequent

confession which also gets us back to

another rule which is the Mitchell

versus Sabbert rule that came about when

the cops were misusing Miranda warnings

and what they would do is they would

bring you into the station, get you to

confess to a crime, and after you gave

the complete detailed confession, they'd

walk out of the room, and then they'd

come back in and give you your Miranda

warnings and say, "By the way, that

confession, can you repeat that, please,

for the record, and now they videotape

your confession." All right. Now, when

the federal courts looked at this, they

said, "This is completely improper. It's

an attempt to get around the Miranda

warnings." And once somebody has been

possibly coerced into giving a

confession because they haven't heard

the Miranda warnings, of course they're

going to repeat the confession. So this

Missouri versus Sebert case said

basically this is an improper method of

administering the Miranda warnings. And

if it's done deliberately by the police,

the confession has to be thrown out. So

this comes up now in the Hernandez case

because does that violate the Missouri

versus Sbert rule? Well, the court in

New York said no, there was no violation

of that in our opinion. But when it goes

over to the federal court, the federal

court says yes, there was a violation of

that.

>> So the second circuit reversed the

conviction and ordered a new trial for

Hernandez, but the Manhattan District

Attorney's Office took that decision to

the highest court.

>> The state, and this is very unusual, now

goes to the Supreme Court to try to get

a conviction reinstated. You know,

usually you see a defendant who's been

convicted going to the Supreme Court to

get his case thrown out. This is the

opposite. The prosecutors looking for

justice now. So now when they go to the

Supreme Court, the Supreme Court says

no, there was no violation here because

the state looked at it under state law.

The administration of Miranda warnings

was done properly. There was proper

attenuation. And that's a question for

the judge, not the jury. The Sabbert

case never said anything about jury

instructions. So this is an overreach by

the second circuit and there was no

right for a habius corpus to be brought

here. So we're reinstating the

conviction.

>> Paul, did the Supreme Court reverse

because the second circuit didn't

properly follow federal law or because

state law should have applied here?

Well, it's a complex question because

they're saying that in this situation,

the state had the right to evaluate

whether there was a proper attenuation

of the confession. In other words,

whether the secondary administration of

Miranda warnings by the Manhattan DA and

by the police violated New York law. And

New York said, "No, that doesn't violate

our law." And in New York, a jury can

sometimes decide whether a confession is

voluntary or not. Under federal law,

that's generally a judge determination

that's been made. So the Supreme Court's

looking at this overall said, well,

we've looked at this and there's no

violation of federal law as it exists.

And if there was a violation of state

law, the state has already made a

decision here that there was no

violation of New York state law. So the

federal government has no business

interfering in how the state of New York

interprets the administration of the

Miranda warnings and the confession is a

voluntary confession. So it's kind of a

question of how you evaluate due process

under state and federal law and whether

there's a conflict between the sovereign

entities. And here the Supreme Court was

saying, you know, there are certain

things that we leave to the state. And

the federal habius corpus act says we

should leave most of those things alone

unless it's an absolutely egregious

violation of somebody's constitutional

rights. And let's step back and look at

this case. June, the guy confessed seven

times to the murder. All right? So, I

think the Supreme Court was looking at

it saying, "Well, you know, we're not

worried about whether we have the right

guy or not. We're just looking at some

technicalities here." And the New York

courts looked at those technicalities

and said, "There's no violation of New

York law here. So, we're not going to

set it aside because there's no

violation of federal law." I mean, the

second circuit basically wanted the

judge to start explaining to the jury a

concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy in

a case from more than 20 years ago. I

mean, it just seemed ridiculous to put

in legal terms.

>> That's exactly what the U second circuit

said. And by the way, people should know

this is what's called a perurium

decision by the Supreme Court, which

means a decision by the court. We don't

know who authored this opinion, but we

do know that the three liberal justices

on the court voted against. So it was a

6-3 decision by the court.

>> Nothing from the liberals about why they

were dissenting on this.

>> Very unusual because you know these

procurium decisions are usually very

very short. But this was I think an

11page very very detailed decision by

the court. And you would think that the

three justices who were dissenting would

have weighed in as to why they disagreed

with the other six members of the court,

but no, they said nothing. They just

said, "We dissent." So, I don't know

what the basis of their dissent would

be, and we'll never know because this

case is for all practical purposes over.

I mean, it'll go back to the to the

state court and the sentence will be

reimposed and and that'll be the end of

it. For all practical purposes, if the

Manhattan District Attorney's Office had

to retry this case, I mean, would they

have been able to put together a case

after all these years?

>> Well, that was one of the things they

raised in their briefs, saying it's

patently unfair to try to force us to

retry a case as old as this case, and to

try to put it all together. So, I think

they would have had trouble. But of

course, on the other hand, the case

primarily depends upon these

confessions, and it's easy enough to put

the confessions into evidence, you know,

through the psychiatrist and through the

Camden Police and through the Manhattan

DAS. Now, if he's going to offer an

insanity defense, yeah, that could take

a lot of time to put in and uh you know,

we don't know what would happen on a

retrial. I mean, the defense would

reassess and figure out a new way to

approach the case to try to put an

effective defense in play. And I will

say this, defense attorneys were very,

very adamant in saying he's innocent and

this is a really terrible decision to

reinstate this conviction.

>> Well, I remember Eton Pates's parents

were very unhappy when the second

circuit reversed the conviction, as you

might expect. It's been great having you

on again, Paul. Thanks so much. That's

former Manhattan prosecutor and criminal

defense attorney Paul Kalan. Turning now

to upcoming decisions at the Supreme

Court. Tomorrow, starting at 10:00 a.m.,

the court is going to announce decisions

in cases that have been argued. The

justices have 17 cases left to decide

before the term ends, which is usually

at the end of June. Seven are

high-profile cases and four of them

involve President Trump. Joining me is

an expert in constitutional law, Harold

Krant, a professor at the Chicago Kent

College of Law. Hal, so many cases left

in the last about week and a half of the

term. Among them, the most high-profile

cases of the term, including, for

example, the birthright citizenship case

or Trump's effort to fire a Federal

Reserve governor. I always hear that

well these are complicated cases and it

takes longer and there are more

concurrences and dissents but some of

these cases date back to December. So my

question is are they waiting to issue

all these important decisions together

to try to diffuse the impact of any one

decision?

>> I think that's plausible. I mean

obviously the Supreme Court does tend to

hold cases of great national importance

towards the end so they can make their

way into the night. So that has been a

tendency but again if they want to mute

some kind of reaction to their decisions

being both proTrump administration

anti-Trump admin administration bundling

them together is not a bad strategy and

I think the way these cases lay out it's

very likely that there'll be a split.

>> Yeah. So, let's start with some of the

most high-profile birthright

citizenship. President Trump's bid to

roll back automatic birthright

citizenship to babies with at least one

parent who is a US citizen or green card

holder.

>> Well, the issue is there is the 14th

amendment suggests that there is

citizenship to anybody born within the

jurisdiction of the United States. And

the question is what does jurisdiction

mean? But in terms of the history, in

terms of how we've interpreted the 14th

amendment and in terms of a

congressional statute that uses similar

language and the Supreme Court's

president in the Lu King Arc um decision

uh you know 100 years ago or so, they

all point to the direction that the

Trump administration is going to lose

and that we believe that anybody born

within the territory of the United

States with certain defined exceptions

such as the Indian tribes are citizens

and I can't believe the Supreme Court

restra from that in this case.

>> Well, as you say, there's a Supreme

Court case directly on point. All the

federal courts who ruled on this found

that the executive order runs against

the citizenship clause as well as

federal immigration law, Supreme Court

president. And when this case was

argued, it seemed like justices across

the ideological spectrum were dubious

about Trump's order. So why didn't this

decision come out fast then? Are we

expecting some kind of narrowing or

limited interpretation?

>> I can't imagine in this case. Some of

the other cases I can imagine a very

limiting perspective that the court will

take. Uh but this seems to be teed up as

a big Trump loss. And I could be

deceiving myself, but it seems like

that's going to happen. And again, as

you pointed out, maybe the court decides

it'll try to temper the sting, if you

will, to the Trump administration by

combining this case with the one in

which it looks more favorably upon what

President Trump has done.

>> Okay. So, now another one that appears

from the oral arguments, we knew the

answer to Trump's effort to fire Federal

Reserve Governor Lisa Cook over unproven

mortgage fraud allegations. So again,

oral arguments, it seemed like the

justices were, you know, of one mind

that he couldn't do this. Tell us about

the constitutional issue here.

>> Well, the constitutional issue is is

really twofold. Um the first is if the

president does not have the right to

remove Lisa Cook, who is a Federal

Reserve governor of will, um then he has

to find cause. And the Supreme Court has

never defined what cause is. And the

cause in this case was the allegation of

a mortgage fraud from seven, eight years

ago, something like that, before Alisa

Cook was governor. So there's really two

three parts of this in which the court's

not going to tackle all three. One is

what does cause mean? We don't know.

Does cause extend to conduct

pre-appointment? Uh we don't know. My

guess is it does. I agree with the Trump

administration in that. but also what

kind of process is due and can it be

reviewable. So those are the three

issues and I think the court will

probably uh rule against the Trump

administration on the ground that at

least there has to be an informal

opportunity for the officer to give her

in this case her side of the story that

she did not engage in any kind of

mortgage fraud. She was not given that

opportunity. So I think a narrow due

process ruling can leave the officer in

place and then leave for another day.

The very important decision about if we

can only remove an officer for cause,

what is cause? Is it neglective duties?

Is it wrongdoing? You know, what does it

constitute?

>> So that case was argued in January. And

now another case related though not the

same that was argued at the beginning of

December is where Trump wants to remove

Rebecca Kelly Slaughter who's a federal

trade commissioner despite a law that

says commissioners can only be fired for

specific reasons.

>> Yeah. And this has been in the

crosshairs of the Trump administration.

This is part of the whole unitary

executive movement saying that the

president must be able to closely manage

his uh subordinates in the executive

branch and the administration as several

before him as well has attacked

Humphre's executive which protected

Congress's decision to in fact shield

the some officers from Atwell Removal

Authority. And so that's been a target

for many administrations. He picked the

exact target, the same Federal Trade

Commission that was in the Humphrey's

executive decision. And I think the

consensus is largely that the Supreme

Court will overrule Humphrey's executive

at least in part if not in whole. And so

giving the Trump administration a big

victory. But the question in my mind is

how far will the case go? Will they say

all executive branch officials? Will

they say all superior executive branch

officials? Will they say only some with

certain types of enforcement

responsibilities? So for instance, there

are executive branch agencies that

engage in adjudication would their

membership also have to be removable at

will by the president. So the the scope

of where the president under the

constitution under article 2 must have

this close authority to supervise

subordinates is is at stake here. I

don't think the court will reach out to

think about all of those contexts, but

it will at least contain the decision

will contain some hints about why the

Federal Trade Commission heads must be

removable at will and what other similar

agencies must be conformed to that same

structure.

>> So, do you think that they might

announce these two decisions together?

Do you think that one is waiting on the

other?

>> They could. I mean, there'll be a nice

pair both because it's really about the

same issue um in different forms of the

same issue and one will probably go

against the administration and one will

go for the administration.

>> Coming up, more on the upcoming Supreme

Court decisions, including a seeming

divide on election day ballot deadlines.

You're listening to Bloomberg.

Tomorrow, the Supreme Court will be

announcing decisions in argued cases.

There are 17 cases left to decide before

the justices leave for their summer

vacations. I've been talking to

Professor Harold Krent of the Chicago

Kent College of Law. How Let's turn now

to the court's decision about a

Mississippi law that allows mail-in

ballots to be counted as long as they

arrive within five business days of

election day. As many as 29 states have

similar laws. Oh, so the issue is when

Congress has designated election day as

the first Tuesday after the second

Monday, if I remember correctly, in

November, what does that mean? Can you

then count votes after election day

itself or must all the votes be tallied

by election day? Um, and obviously in

Mississippi and 2020 in the pandemic

allowed for counting ballots after

election day as does over half the

states. And so it's a really interesting

both because Mississippi uh is a

Republican state and it's the one that's

going against the Trump administration

and it's interesting um in addition be

because of the fact that if you think of

federalism uh this is a

effort really to limit the rights of the

states visa v the federal government. So

it's some odd sign to bet fellows in

this case. Uh but you know I think it's

just a kind of a more narrow focus on

what does election day mean and do we

need to have decisions or votes counted

at least by election day if not

decisions in order to conform to what

Congress had in mind by saying there

should be one election day in the

country. During the oral arguments, the

Chief Justice and Justice Barrett raised

some questions about, well, if we don't

allow these late arriving ballots, does

that does that have an effect on early

voting? Because early voting, it's

before the date that Congress set.

>> Yeah, it depends. I think they could get

around that by saying that election day

means votes have to be tallied as

opposed to saying that it's not a

prohibition on votes being tallied

beforehand, at least some votes. So I I

think there is a distinction there, but

you know, you could say that a broad

definition of election day would really

limit the discretion of the states to

have early voting and late voting. And

again, think about military voting,

voting during wars. We've never been

able to count all the votes on election

day because, you know, individuals in

our country are dispersed for work, for

military reasons, and others. So it's

it's a very it's a practical matter.

It's a very important decision, but one

in which is right now, I think, too

close to call.

>> Yeah. Maybe a division down ideological

lines, which I'm expecting several of

those.

>> My only prediction on this case is it

will not be strictly on ideological

lines because I think the issues really

do cut across the ideological spectrum.

>> Okay, we shall see.

>> Yes, we shall.

>> We won't [laughter]

we won't place a bet on it, but we'll

see. So now there are federal caps that

limit spending by political parties in

coordination with candidates. Have the

conservatives on the Supreme Court ever

found a restriction on campaign

contributions

that they agreed with?

>> I think this one will be decided on

ideological grounds. Um and obviously

the the idea that money is speech

resonates greatly with a certain

ideological part of the Supreme Court.

did Citizens United. And here in this

case, they're looking at what's called

political coordinated spending, whether

the political parties can coordinate

with the campaigns of various individual

candidates to evade the limits set by

Congress. And so this really at the

heart is can Congress limit at all the

types of expenditures that are made to

influence campaigns for Democrats or for

Republicans. And obviously the Democrats

would benefit from this as well if the

caps are stricken though they have not

attacked the theory in this particular

case.

>> Why with campaign finance contributions

is it Republicans that want to get rid

of them and Democrats that want to keep

them?

>> I think it's a sense that even though

Democrats would benefit, they know that

they need to be sort of consistent with

their base and their base tend to be

smaller donors. At least that's

perceived to be the case even if it's

not true. And so they want to be seen as

people not wanting big money to rule

everything. And that's a message that

resonates with at least a large segment

of Democratic voters.

>> Let's turn now to transgender issues in

sports. State laws in Idaho and West

Virginia ban transgender girls and women

from competing on female athletic teams.

And I mean there are 27 states with

similar laws. Give us the arguments on

both sides of this case.

>> Sure. I mean the opponents of the ban

say that this is a violation both of

title 9 which limits the conduct of any

kind of school district that accepts

federal money and violates the equal

protection clause of the constitution.

So, it's an echo of the case that the

Supreme Court decided just recently in

Scrati when the case rejected similar

claims against Tennessee's ban on

hormone treatment for minors. In this

case, though, it's it's participation in

sporting events in high school. People

have more of a visceral reaction to it,

I think, than the use, for instance, of

of different bathrooms. And you know, I

think that the conservatives will

probably win on on this one on the

theory that there's at least a rational

basis for school districts to decide

either because of safety or because of

fairness uh not to allow trans kids on

women's teams, but to allow trans kids

on on men's teams is obviously a lack of

symmetry. But then the only way I think

for the challengers to win is if they

get some kind of increased protection

due to the claim either that this is

masquerade of sex discrimination that

this is like the title 7 case in Boston

because where the Supreme Court held

that any kind of discrimination on the

basis of of appearance or gender or

being trans was a violation of title 7

though you know Justice Gorsuch signaled

that he views title N differently as

title seven even though they were

modeled on the same thing. So, you know,

there the the question really is I think

most people have a consensus that this

would pass any kind of rational basis

test, but if the scrutiny gets more

strict, then it's more difficult to

justify the ban. Um, and we don't have

good statistics on what is the risk of

having trans kids play on high school

sports teams. we don't know them and the

risks are more theoretical and so any

kind of heightened attention that is

paid would I think result in a victory

for the challengers not predicting that

but that would be the case if the

scrutiny is raised

>> the woman in the Idaho case tried to get

the case dropped because she was no

longer competing Idaho didn't want the

case dropped in the West Virginia case

there was an argument that the young

woman had puberty blockers, so she never

really had those hormones that would

have given her an edge. Male hormones,

you know, I wonder if that they're not

going to get that deeply into it and

just base the decision on the plaintiffs

being transgender.

>> You know, you know, my sense from

looking at the transcript of oral

argument is that the court could get rid

of this case, as you suggest, but

unlikely to. The court seems to want to

address these issues just as it did in

Scrati last term and sort of widen the

areas in which states if they so choose

can rule against trans kid equality.

That's my sense. But there are the seeds

there that this the court wants to duck

it. It can duck it and probably with a

good face. if it doesn't duck it. This

is one of the cases where I say I will

fall off my chair if they actually rule

in favor of transgender rights because

since the Bostock case they have ruled

consistently against transgender rights

and LGBTQ rights. I mean it's just

pretty obvious.

>> Yeah. Bosto was the high point if you

will the pinnacle of protection for

people who are LGBT and trans. And there

has been a startling decline after that

and I you know you know predict that

that trend will continue.

>> So then we have Bayer. The company says

that federal regulators didn't require a

cancer warning and so state regulators

shouldn't have been allowed to require a

cancer warning either. This is only

about one suit involving failure to

warn. But there are so many suits

against Bayer. I think it's about

60,000. So the under the federal

regulation statute, it it seems that the

FDA decides, you know, what is safe,

what is not safe, and has only approves

warnings or not warnings on labels of

this case Roundup, which is a well-known

was a well-known fungicide, um, which

obviously had bad repercussions and

leads to cancer. And so the question is

was could states or warn about Roundup

without any kind of federal blessing.

And you know I think here the

administration is on pretty strong

ground to have some kind of uniform

regulation that you know to have ground

up being okay in one state or have a

warning in one state not in the other.

and what about runoff, you know, in

terms of the environment is not a a kind

of crazy way to think about regulation

that seems to need a uniform approach.

So, it's the federal regulation from

Congress that's at least directed from

Congress seems to contemplate

one-sizefits-all regulation of any

chemicals coming within the purview of

this particular regulatory scheme. Um,

and so I think that on average, again,

we're going to have see a split. I think

in ideological leanings amongst the

justices. I think there'll be a

coalition both of of conservative and

liberal judges going both ways. But I if

I had to predict, I would predict that

the federal government would win as

against the states simply because it

seems that this regulatory scheme is

focused on the need for uniformity. And

in this case, the FDA did not require

any kind of more stringent uh regulation

or roundup despite what we unfortunately

have found out is about it its true

costs. So the interesting thing about

these cases is we're not going to see

uniform I think ideological bands of the

court and I don't think we're going to

see uniform Trump administration wins.

So it's really going to be a mixed uh

set and then we'll have to see in each

particular case um how the court uh

resolves it.

>> And we will see that starting tomorrow

at 10:00. Thanks so much for getting us

ready for what's coming up, Hal. That's

Professor Harold Krent of the Chicago

Kent College of Law. And that's it for

this edition of the Bloomberg Law Show.

Remember, you can always get the latest

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