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Silicon Valley Thinks TSMC is Braking the AI Boom

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Silicon Valley Thinks TSMC is Braking the AI Boom

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451 segments

0:02

Ben Thompson of Stratecery has a recent

0:04

piece out titled TSMC risk in which he

0:07

calls out TSMC's conservatism has

0:10

costing the American hyperscalers

0:12

hundreds of billions in revenue. Before

0:15

we continue, I want to disclose that I

0:17

work with Ben. The Asianry newsletter

0:20

runs on his platform Passport and I am

0:22

friendly with him. I'm not trying to

0:25

flame him, but I'm hearing many similar

0:27

views in the Silicon Valley Borg that

0:29

TSMC is the break or limiter on the AI

0:33

boom as if they're the reason why we

0:36

don't have AGI yet. Because they didn't

0:38

and still don't believe.

0:42

If we can ever say that a company that

0:43

spent 41 billion on capital expenditure

0:46

in 2025 with another 53 to 56 billion in

0:51

2026 planned is sitting on its hands

0:54

doing nothing. Now TSMC is a trillion

0:58

dollar company. They don't need some

1:00

random YouTuber defending them. Though I

1:03

reckon people will still accusing me of

1:06

Taiwan bias in the comments. And to be

1:09

clear, I largely agree with Ben's final

1:11

message. TSMC having 90% share of the AI

1:15

chip market looks pretty unhealthy. That

1:18

should go down and it will. Samsung

1:20

seems to be doing well so far. The point

1:23

I want to make concerns the nature of

1:25

hardware. What Ben and others in Silicon

1:28

Valley are diagnosing as quote shortages

1:31

signify TSMC's failure. end quote is

1:34

really quote semiconductors are hard and

1:37

their supply chains are long end quote.

1:40

Having more foundry competition wouldn't

1:43

have averted this compute shortage. The

1:46

cold hard reality is that shortages are

1:48

a fact of life in semiconductors as are

1:51

horrific gluts. I was supposed to be

1:54

working on a video about bananas, but I

1:57

had to do this first. In today's video,

2:00

a few scattered thoughts on TSMC taking

2:02

away the AI punch bowl. I want to talk

2:06

about the beer game. No, it has nothing

2:08

to do with drinking beer, nor does it

2:11

promote drinking. Because this is Asian,

2:14

I will rename it to the boba game. It is

2:16

a game developed in the 1950s by the

2:19

famed MIT professor Jay Forester who

2:23

also did pioneering work on core

2:25

memories to demonstrate the concepts of

2:28

system dynamics. I was introduced to it

2:30

by a TSMC manager and friend. In the

2:34

game, people operate in a marketplace

2:36

for Boba. The game's players cosplay as

2:40

boba sellers in one of four divisions:

2:42

retailer, wholesaler, distributor, and

2:45

the factory. The players must work

2:47

together to minimize costs and maximize

2:50

revenue. A deck of cards represents

2:53

weekly customer demand for boba.

2:56

Retailers supply boba to the customers

2:58

pulling out of their inventory.

3:01

Retailers want to keep inventory levels

3:04

as low as possible because it costs

3:07

money to hold inventory, but also want

3:09

to avoid stockouts because that's lost

3:12

revenue. These incur a penalty in

3:15

negative dollars. The retailer refills

3:18

low inventories with orders from the

3:21

wholesaler. The wholesaler in turn must

3:23

go to the distributor to reload, who

3:26

then in turn purchases from the factory.

3:28

At each step, we have time delays for

3:31

order processing, shipping, or

3:33

production. At the start of the Boba

3:35

game, customer demand is steady. But as

3:38

the game progresses, the cards start

3:41

showing unannounced spikes in demand.

3:44

This simple boba supply chain has to

3:47

scramble to adjust, creating delays and

3:50

shortages or overreactions and overp

3:54

production and everyone thinking someone

3:57

else other than themselves messed up.

4:01

What we are flippantly labeling as TSMC

4:04

we really mean is the AI supply chain.

4:08

And that supply chain is as complicated

4:10

as you can possibly imagine. Like an

4:13

iceberg, it looks big enough on the

4:15

surface of the water, but goes way far

4:17

deeper underneath. TSMC has thousands of

4:21

suppliers in two categories. Equipment

4:24

like the famed ASML lithography tools

4:26

and materials like photoresist, silicon

4:29

wafers, acid etch gases and so on. These

4:32

are not generalized tools and materials.

4:35

They are not fungeible like AWS compute

4:38

units. Just within the bland term of

4:41

deposition, we have wild variations

4:43

between tools like low pressure chemical

4:46

vapor deposition, molecular beam

4:48

epitexi, atomic layer deposition and so

4:51

on. These are not interchangeable and

4:54

each need their own multi-million dollar

4:57

tool. And each tool category/niche

5:00

has maybe three major equipment players

5:03

like maybe applied lamb tell or so on. I

5:07

also have to mention the non

5:09

semiconductor stuff too. Power, water,

5:12

land and labor. Both Taiwan and the

5:14

United States have issues providing all

5:16

of this. Time is needed to build out the

5:19

infrastructure to provide it. And then

5:22

there are the memory guys. You cannot

5:24

ship an AI system without memory. DAM

5:27

and NAND. Nvidia's AI chips use a

5:30

special form of DRAM called high

5:32

bandwidth memory and they use quite a

5:34

lot of it. The memory industry is just

5:37

as consolidated as the logic industry

5:39

with the major players being Samsung,

5:42

SKH Highix and Micron. There are also

5:45

the Chinese memory makers, but they're

5:47

not being used for AI chips for the West

5:51

because they are so deep down. The chip

5:53

guys are last to know when the party is

5:55

getting started. But first, they get

5:57

batoned in the face when the police shut

6:00

things down. Batoned, I mean bullhipped.

6:04

The bullhip effect is an effect of the

6:06

boba gain that says that a demand signal

6:09

tends to amplify as it travels up the

6:11

various levels of the supply chain. From

6:14

1961 to 2006, electronics consumption in

6:18

the United States grew positively but

6:20

with wild volatility swings between 0 to

6:23

20%. But for the semiconductor makers,

6:26

that translates to swings anywhere from

6:29

- 20% to 40%. And for the equipment

6:32

makers, it is amplified even more, plus

6:35

or minus 60%. The whip hits particularly

6:39

hard in the semiconductor industry

6:41

because of the industry's long lead

6:43

times. It takes 4.5 months to fabricate

6:46

and package a chip. It takes 18 months

6:49

to 2 years to build a fab. Meaning from

6:52

shovels down to producing chips, and it

6:54

takes 12 to 18 months to produce and

6:57

install something like an EUV machine

6:59

into the fab. Another 6 months before

7:02

that machine actually starts patterning

7:04

wafers.

7:06

Long lead times mean having to make very

7:08

long demand forecasts which leads to

7:11

extreme volatility swings during up and

7:14

downturns even if those up or downturns

7:17

are relatively small. ASML just reported

7:21

2025 earnings and we see the bull whip

7:23

in full effect. TSMC raised capital

7:26

expenditure 35% but ASML announced 13.2

7:31

billion e of net new bookings. analysts

7:34

had expected just 6.32 billion. This is

7:37

because ASML collected orders not just

7:39

from TSMC but also Samsung, Intel and

7:43

the memory guys. When it rains it pours,

7:46

right? Again, this is why I fear that

7:49

another AI foundry would not mean our

7:51

compute shortage is solved because

7:54

ultimately when those foundaries start

7:56

scaling their capacity, they all go to

7:58

the same suppliers. Those suppliers then

8:01

go to their suppliers and everyone gets

8:04

slammed. We literally just went through

8:07

all of this a few years ago during the

8:09

COVID PC and remote working boom. Did we

8:12

not forget? Remember when the New York

8:15

Times, Wall Street Journal, and the Blog

8:17

Boys ran headlines about how the

8:20

American economy was grinding to a halt

8:22

because they couldn't get these little

8:24

trailing edge microprocessors,

8:26

that the car factories are all shutting

8:28

down. Asometry was around at this time.

8:32

I remember how tortured the supply chain

8:35

was. The car makers canled orders during

8:37

the first lockdowns, but then the

8:40

economy came back to life over the

8:41

summer and everyone needed their chips

8:44

back. TSMC was trying to discern between

8:47

double booked orders and real demand,

8:50

which is not an uncommon experience for

8:52

them. Customers lie about their own

8:55

demand all the time, or at least we can

8:58

say that they are eternally optimistic.

9:01

TSMC tried to respond in 2022. The

9:05

Taiwanese giant poured $36 billion into

9:08

capital expenditure. They went to their

9:10

suppliers and pushed like no tomorrow.

9:13

Mark Hyink's excellent 2024 book focus

9:17

details an extremely tense interaction

9:19

with the TSMC R&D SVP who is now at

9:23

Intel by the way. They even announced

9:26

new trailing edge fabs. For instance,

9:29

the original plans for the FAB in

9:31

Gaoong, as announced in late November

9:33

2022, would have it run a 28 nanometer

9:37

process node, a trailing edge process

9:40

node. How weird is that?

9:43

Well, it turned out those customers

9:46

really were double booking orders and

9:48

artificially inflating demand. When the

9:50

macro environment turned in 2022, the

9:54

automotive, smartphone, and PC chips

9:56

that were so hot during the COVID era

9:59

fell out of vogue and customers started

10:02

cutting orders. By the end of 2022,

10:05

Silicon Valley people though had already

10:07

moved on to the next shiny thingy, chat

10:11

GBT. People losing their minds over bots

10:14

writing poems and code. and the

10:16

hyperscalers started to figure that they

10:18

needed a bigger boat/data center.

10:21

Meanwhile, deeper down in the supply

10:23

chain, TSMC and the rest of the

10:25

semiconductor industry were getting

10:27

bullhipped by COVID hangover.

10:30

Utilization at TSMC's multi-billion

10:32

dollar N7 fabs crashed. Semi analysis

10:36

wrote in April 2023.

10:39

Now, semi-analysis data indicates that

10:42

the 7nanmter utilization rates were

10:44

below 70% in Q1. Furthermore, Q2 gets

10:49

even worse with 7 nanometer utilization

10:51

rates falling to below 60%. This is

10:54

primarily due to weakness in both

10:56

smartphones and PCs, but there is a

10:59

broader weakness in most segments.

11:03

A FAB's break even utilization rates are

11:06

about 60 to 70%. So those N7 TYON fabs

11:11

were taking financial losses potentially

11:13

on the order of hundreds of millions,

11:16

maybe even billions. The financial

11:18

burdens of low utilization are another

11:21

reason why I'm skeptical another AI

11:23

foundry could have rushed into the AI

11:25

chip fray to save the day. Having slack

11:28

advanced node capacity means taking

11:31

massive depreciation losses. Having such

11:34

pricey non-performing 7nanmter fabs

11:37

could have been crippling. The TSMC

11:40

stock in 2022 and 2023 looked pretty

11:43

precarious. But TSMC pivoted to AI and

11:47

survived. It's an indication that their

11:50

product diversification strategy works.

11:53

There was another semiconductor company

11:55

that did not do so well during this

11:57

time. Intel. Between 2021 and 2023, they

12:02

hired 20,000 people, announced billions

12:05

of dollars of fabs and expansions around

12:07

the world, and set forth an

12:09

ultraaggressive process node rollout

12:12

schedule. Then the COVID PC and remote

12:15

working boom abruptly ended. And then

12:17

the hyperscalers started buying GPUs

12:19

instead of CPUs. As a result, tens of

12:22

thousands of layoffs, executive turmoil

12:25

with CEO Pat Gellzinger being forced

12:27

out, and Intel took themselves

12:30

competitively out of the market for what

12:32

seems like years. A situation that

12:35

eventually required Japan style state

12:37

intervention and the mustering of market

12:40

players to try and reverse the slide. We

12:43

shall see if such efforts do better than

12:45

Japan's efforts to save Alpeta.

12:49

Ben points the TSMC's stagnant capital

12:52

expenditure in 2023 and 2024

12:56

and makes a gentle criticism. ChatBT was

12:59

released in November 2022 and that

13:02

kicked off a massive increase in capex

13:04

amongst the hyperscalers in particular,

13:07

but it sure seems like TSMC didn't buy

13:10

the hype. That lack of increased

13:13

investment earlier this decade is why

13:15

there is a shortage today and is why

13:18

TSMC has been a de facto break on the AI

13:21

buildout/bubble.

13:24

It is true that the hyperscalers started

13:26

growing their capex in late 2022.

13:30

But remember the boa game again. When

13:32

does that filter down to TSMC and the

13:35

rest of the industry? And when could

13:38

they have known? They certainly didn't

13:40

know in 2023. In the April 2023 earnings

13:45

call, which took place some five months

13:47

after Chat GPT's release, CC says he

13:51

noticed Chat GPT's growth, but repeats

13:53

multiple times that he has no idea what

13:56

AI's impact on TSMC will be.

14:00

He also mentioned getting what seems to

14:02

be the first orders from presumably

14:05

Nvidia for more co-ass capacity. quote,

14:08

"Just recently in these two years, I

14:10

received a customer's phone call

14:13

requesting a big increase on the

14:15

back-end capacity, especially in the

14:17

co-as. We are still evaluating that."

14:20

End quote. At the next earnings call in

14:23

July 2023, he says that AI accelerators

14:26

were about 6% of TSMC revenue and

14:29

projected to grow to quote low teens

14:32

percent and quote over the next few

14:34

years. Wall Street was looking for such

14:37

numbers. So I presume they got those

14:39

projections straight from customers.

14:42

TSMC also projected their overall 2023

14:46

revenue to decline 10%. Citing the

14:49

revenue declines due to macro postcoid

14:52

and China issues to be bigger than AI.

14:55

Of course this changed by the end of the

14:57

year as AI surged so much. So nobody

15:01

knew or thought to scale in early 2023.

15:05

But what about 2024?

15:07

Well, that year had all the technical

15:09

issues. I recall news in mid 2024 of

15:12

TSMC struggling with co-ass capacity

15:15

bottlenecks and yield problems,

15:18

including one design issue that caused

15:20

cracks in the Nvidia chips packaging.

15:23

Nvidia stock dropped when the news came

15:25

out and everyone thought that we were so

15:27

over. A former TSMC packaging engineer

15:31

told me a frantic late night experiments

15:34

to figure out the right tweaks to fix

15:36

the problem. And Nvidia going so hard as

15:39

to tell them to take every tweak option

15:42

and run them on live wafers, the

15:44

semiconductor version of pushing direct

15:47

to prod. I also recall news in late 2024

15:51

noting how the vendors in charge of

15:53

making the server racks for Nvidia's

15:55

Blackwell servers struggled with

15:58

overheating, liquid cooling leaks,

16:00

software bugs, and connectivity issues.

16:03

Such technical difficulties delayed

16:06

server deployment until early to mid

16:08

2025,

16:09

creating a weird situation for several

16:12

months where TSMC was pumping out chips

16:14

that just went into storage. So that

16:17

gated things because you don't scale

16:19

until you first fix the technical

16:21

problems. I also want to add that in

16:24

2024, TSMC and the rest of the chip

16:27

industry did not know if those buying AI

16:30

chips would make money on them. Recall

16:32

those famous Seoia Capital articles AI's

16:35

$200 billion question and then the $600

16:38

billion question. Those came out in

16:41

September 2023 and June 2024,

16:44

respectively. I don't think any sensible

16:47

foundry would have then committed

16:49

billions to new fabs.

16:52

So I argue that the optimal time for

16:55

TSMC and the rest of the semiconductor

16:57

industry to really scale capex was 2025

17:01

where upon the boba game kicked into

17:03

effect. Some things just take time.

17:08

Ben writes that it is chips not power

17:10

behind the shortage of compute capacity

17:13

that the hyperscalers are complaining

17:15

about. He points the comments from CCway

17:18

as support. CC said talking about to

17:21

build a lot of AI data center all over

17:24

the world. I use one of my customers

17:26

customers answer. I asked the same

17:28

question. So they say that they work on

17:31

the power supply 5 to 6 years ago. So

17:34

today their message to me is silicon

17:38

from TSMC is a bottleneck and asked me

17:40

not to pay attention to all others

17:42

because they have to solve the silicon

17:45

bottleneck first. I don't interpret

17:48

those comments the same way Ben does.

17:51

TSMC is not a power company. I read that

17:54

as basically meaning quote TSMC should

17:57

be focusing on what they can do and they

18:00

make chips not power. End quote. Also,

18:03

CC Way doesn't speak as carefully as

18:06

Morris does, but there is no way he is

18:08

going to say on an earnings call, "Yeah,

18:11

dude, they can't get the power

18:12

connection, so they don't need TSMC

18:14

chips right now." And if this customer's

18:18

customer is making electricity

18:20

parameters based on assumptions from

18:22

five to six years ago, then they

18:24

definitely got a power shortage because

18:26

AI data centers suck way more power than

18:28

a CPUcentric data center specked out in

18:32

2021.

18:34

And if you want to hear words from a

18:35

TSMC executive, I point to you to a

18:38

deleted LinkedIn post from TSMC

18:40

Arizona's CFO. I don't have a screenshot

18:44

because she scrubbed that fast, but the

18:46

URL reads, "AI's real bottleneck isn't

18:49

chips, it's power."

18:52

In the end, I think the power shortages

18:53

are real and way more serious than the

18:56

silicon ones. Elon is bringing in

18:58

truckmounted gas turbines to his data

19:00

centers, and new gas turbines aren't

19:02

available until 2029.

19:06

At least the semiconductor people are

19:07

trying. semi analysis said in report

19:10

that the various legacy gas turbine

19:12

makers will not greatly expand their

19:14

factory footprints. They seem a bit

19:16

grumpy that the turbine boys aren't AGI

19:19

pled.

19:21

I want to close with a thesis that's

19:23

been percolating in me for a while. The

19:25

gap between the hardware and software

19:27

worlds are wider than ever before. I

19:30

reckon that it's been a good 30 years

19:32

since Silicon Valley was actually about

19:34

making silicon and there's still many

19:36

Silicon people living in Santa Clara,

19:39

Sunnyville, Palo Alto, but they tend to

19:41

be older, retired even. I often go to

19:45

the Bay Area to talk to people, software

19:48

people and AI people on occasion, and I

19:51

ask them how much they know about how

19:53

their hardware is made. For almost all

19:57

of them, even the smartest in their

19:59

domain, they know virtually nothing. It

20:02

is a hard silicon line. I feel like both

20:05

sides know so little about the other. My

20:08

message to Silicon Valley is this. I'm

20:11

sorry that claude code is a little slow

20:13

for you right now, but the chips are

20:15

coming. People are torturing themselves

20:18

to make them, put them into racks, and

20:20

start up the data centers. Let's

20:23

exercise a little patience. All right,

20:25

everyone. That's it for tonight. Thanks

20:27

for watching. Subscribe to the channel.

20:29

Sign up for the Patreon. And I'll see

20:30

you guys next time.

Interactive Summary

The video discusses the perceived bottleneck in AI development, attributing it to TSMC's conservatism and supply chain issues. It uses the "Boba Game" analogy to explain how demand signals amplify up the supply chain, leading to shortages and overproduction. The speaker argues that semiconductor manufacturing is inherently complex and prone to cyclical shortages and gluts, and that simply adding more foundries would not solve the problem. The video also touches upon the critical role of memory chips, the long lead times in semiconductor manufacturing, and the challenges faced by companies like Intel. It highlights that power supply might be a more significant bottleneck for AI data centers than chip availability, and concludes by emphasizing the widening gap between hardware and software expertise in Silicon Valley.

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