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WW3 Threat Assessment: World War III Has Quietly Started!

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WW3 Threat Assessment: World War III Has Quietly Started!

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4520 segments

0:00

I believe that we are already at the

0:01

early stages if not in World War II. It

0:04

just doesn't look like the wars of the

0:05

past.

0:06

And people should understand what is at

0:08

stake, which is we are one

0:10

misunderstanding, one miscalculation

0:12

away,

0:13

or even one AI generated viral video

0:16

from nuclear annihilation.

0:18

Is there anything at all you're doing to

0:19

prepare? I'm leaving the United States

0:21

by 2026.

0:22

But is there anywhere on this map that

0:23

is safe in a war?

0:24

So my understanding is that there's

0:25

actually three safe zones.

0:27

You are right.

0:27

There's Hawaii. No, because there are so

0:30

many targets in Hawaii

0:33

and same with all of Europe, but there's

0:35

one tiny little place right there. So,

0:37

where do we find ourselves in terms of

0:39

conflict and warfare? Now,

0:40

it's getting worse. And in the past, it

0:41

was whoever had the strongest military.

0:43

Now, you can destabilize a government or

0:45

a society using a server farm and 20

0:48

people sitting in a room thousands of

0:49

miles away. And another real problem we

0:52

have right now is that the different

0:54

political parties inside the United

0:55

States are so intent on taking down the

0:58

other side. They do it at the national

1:00

security peril.

1:01

So now Russia or China can play people

1:04

off against one another and cause

1:05

division.

1:06

Angie, what do you think happens next?

1:07

Well, I think World War II is going to

1:09

be shaped by what we call proxy war,

1:10

where a wealthy nation state funds,

1:13

trains, and arms conflict in a less

1:16

wealthy state to decrease the capability

1:18

of your primary target. They're using

1:20

that nation to do the work for them.

1:22

Exactly. Right. That's already

1:23

happening.

1:23

Then what's the probability of nuclear

1:25

war?

1:25

So here's a terrifying detail that the

1:27

public does not know. So

1:30

wow.

1:32

Listen to my regular listeners. I know

1:34

you don't like it when I ask you to

1:36

subscribe at the start of these

1:37

conversations. I don't like saying I

1:38

don't like it being in there. None of us

1:39

like it. It's frustrating. Do you know

1:41

what's also frustrating? It's also

1:43

frustrating when I go into the back end

1:44

of the YouTube channel and I see that

1:46

56% of you that listen frequently to

1:48

this podcast haven't yet subscribed and

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get on with the show.

2:20

[Music]

2:22

I invited you all here today because I

2:25

intuitively feel like the world is

2:26

changing before our eyes. And I think so

2:28

many of us if we're on social media or

2:30

reading newspapers can feel a sort of

2:32

tension growing in society that is hard

2:34

to understand if you're not an expert or

2:37

you're not connected to these subjects

2:38

in some way.

2:41

I looked at some stats before this

2:42

conversation that kind of support this

2:44

feeling that I've intuitively had and it

2:46

shows that conflict zones across the

2:48

world have increased by 66% in the last

2:51

3 years. In December 2024, the American

2:54

think tank Atlantic Council asked about

2:57

400 global strategists about their

2:59

thoughts about what's going on in the

3:00

world. And 65% think that China will

3:03

evade invade Taiwan by force within 10

3:06

years. About 40% think there'll be a

3:08

world war in the next 10 years. About

3:10

50% think nuclear weapons will be used

3:12

in the next 10 years. And about 45%

3:14

think Russia and NATO will fight

3:15

directly. When we look at sort of

3:17

spending and what's happening there,

3:19

there's been a huge jump in military

3:20

spending. There's now 300,000 NATO

3:22

troops around the world that are on

3:24

30-day high alert readiness. 59 states

3:28

um have erupted in war since 2023, which

3:32

is the greatest number logged in any

3:34

year since 1946.

3:37

And world military spending is up by

3:39

about 10% year-over-year, which is the

3:41

highest sum ever recorded by SIPAR,

3:43

making it a full decade of uninterrupted

3:45

growth in military spending. Things feel

3:47

tense, and every time I turn on the

3:48

news, I have a mild sense of anxiety.

3:50

So, I've gathered you three here today

3:52

to help me as a muggle, as a normal

3:54

person that doesn't have an

3:55

understanding, pass through what's going

3:57

on and hopefully what we can do about

3:59

this. Benjamin, to start with you,

4:01

introductions. What's your context and

4:04

what's the perspective experience you

4:05

bring to this conversation? I

4:07

was born in Iran in 1977. I came to the

4:10

United States as a refugee under a

4:12

program that President Carter allowed

4:14

for Iranians fleeing religious and

4:16

political persecution. and my family

4:17

came here on that basis. And I basically

4:20

spent the next 40 some odd years trying

4:22

to understand why I come from a part of

4:25

the world that seems to be in sort of

4:27

continuous conflict and turmoil and

4:30

exactly what can be understood about the

4:32

forces that brought me here. I'm

4:33

incredibly grateful to be here and what

4:36

can be done to basically change or at

4:38

least better understand it to pave a way

4:41

for change and progress in the future.

4:42

What age did you leave Iran and what was

4:44

the environment like when you left? I

4:45

was just under three years old and it

4:47

was a few months after so the sha had

4:51

left in December of 79 and then um we we

4:55

left a few months after that around

4:56

March. Humeni had just arrived from

4:59

Paris on a flight in in February,

5:01

basically taking control. And there was

5:03

still a lot of anarchy and chaos as to

5:06

exactly what the new regime would look

5:07

like, what the government would look

5:08

like. But we began, my parents began to

5:10

see that there were some, you know,

5:12

there were there were definitely mass

5:13

arrests. There were protests. There were

5:15

things that were happening that look

5:16

like those who were loyal to the

5:17

monarchy would be targeted, which is my

5:19

family was a monarchist.

5:21

Annie, same question to you. What what

5:23

is the experience context that you bring

5:25

to this conversation?

5:26

I am an author uh a journalist and I

5:31

write about war and weapons, US national

5:34

security and secrets and I'm interested

5:38

in looking at the very sort of minutia

5:41

of weapons and weapons systems and the

5:44

people who use them. I've written seven

5:46

books and all of them deal with war and

5:49

weapons and all of them deal with the

5:51

Pentagon and the CIA specifically. So

5:54

all of my sources come from those

5:56

organizations, the military and the

5:58

intelligence community.

5:59

And your last book we talked about last

6:01

time you came on to this show. What is

6:04

your last book about? And what what sort

6:05

of journey did you go on to gather the

6:07

information for that?

6:08

So my most recent book is called Nuclear

6:10

War, a scenario. And in that book, I

6:14

take the reader from nuclear launch to

6:17

nuclear winter, which happens in a

6:20

period of 72 minutes.

6:23

And I interview presidential adviserss,

6:26

secretaries of defense, nuclear subforce

6:29

commander, etc., etc. People who are

6:32

very close to the chain of command,

6:34

people who have rehearsed making these

6:37

decisions

6:39

if they need to be made. And what I

6:42

learned terrified me. And from what I

6:45

the book has been out for over a year

6:47

now, still in hardback. People are

6:49

reading it in 28 countries around the

6:52

world.

6:53

This is a serious edge of peril topic

6:57

and I think we're here to talk about

6:59

that because

7:01

no no time in my life I think have we

7:04

been closer to thinking about this

7:07

reality than right now.

7:09

Andrew, there's a few subjects and words

7:12

that Annie mentioned there that also

7:13

cross over in your story. One of them

7:15

being

7:17

nuclear war uh and nuclear weapons. what

7:19

is your context and how do you what is

7:21

the sort of experience and perspective

7:23

you bring to this? What's your

7:24

experience?

7:24

Yeah, I am a former clandestine CIA

7:26

intelligence officer. Uh also a uh

7:28

decorated wartime veteran from the

7:30

United States Air Force during our wars

7:31

in Iraq and Afghanistan. Um I've lived

7:34

in this world that uh that we're talking

7:37

about, this world of conflict, the world

7:38

of nuclear threats, the world of

7:40

developing nations and uh political and

7:44

military force as a tool to shape

7:47

democracy, to shape diplomacy. Um, and

7:49

I'm very excited to get into this topic

7:50

because I think there are certain areas

7:52

here that are misunderstood, areas that

7:55

are overdramatized, and then areas that

7:57

are not being spoken about that are very

7:59

relevant and very compelling.

8:01

Wasn't there a period of your life where

8:02

you were underground and part of that

8:04

sort of nuclear chain of command that

8:06

Annie described?

8:07

Absolutely. That's where my career

8:08

started actually was with the uh ICBM,

8:10

the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

8:11

Forces of the United States Air Force.

8:13

Uh overseeing Minute Man 3 missiles in

8:16

Montana uh armed with 10 nuclear

8:18

warheads each uh understanding the

8:20

military doctrine, the strategies, the

8:22

policies for how to execute.

8:24

So you were you were underground with a

8:26

physical nuclear key,

8:27

correct? Around around my neck.

8:30

And there are uh even as we have this

8:32

conversation now, there are hundreds of

8:34

US soldiers, hundreds of of Russian

8:37

soldiers that are in very similar

8:38

positions. And they're not they're not

8:40

much older than uh than a high school

8:42

graduate right now.

8:43

Many people think we're on the cusp of

8:45

World War II, but I think you've said in

8:46

the past that you actually think World

8:48

War II has already begun in some

8:50

context.

8:50

Yeah, correct. I believe that we are

8:52

already at the early stages, if not in

8:55

World War II. The problem is that people

8:57

seem to think that World War II is going

8:59

to emulate World War II. The deployment

9:01

of nuclear technology and nuclear

9:03

weapons now would look completely

9:05

different than the deployment of nuclear

9:06

weapons looked than World War II, if

9:07

only because we have nine nuclear

9:09

capable countries right now. Not to

9:10

mention the fact that we have a

9:12

completely different information

9:13

landscape. We have a completely

9:15

different political landscape. We have a

9:17

whole different uh landscape for

9:19

alliances and for treaties. The world is

9:21

very, very different than it was when

9:23

World War II broke out. So, you think

9:24

we're in World War II now or the early

9:26

innings of that?

9:27

And I think World War II is going to be

9:28

shaped by what we call proxy war.

9:30

What is proxy warfare?

9:31

Proxy warfare is when a wealthy nation

9:34

state uh funds and trains and arms

9:38

conflict in a less wealthy state uh

9:41

where there's usually some sort of civil

9:43

disturbance or civil fight that's

9:45

already happening. Much of what we've

9:46

seen in the last 10 years is is proxy

9:48

warfare. Libya, Syria, Yemen, people

9:51

argue that what we saw even Afghanistan,

9:53

Iraq, where the US was involved was

9:54

proxy warfare. Israel and Iran is model

9:57

proxy warfare. Uh Russia and Ukraine are

10:00

also models for proxy warfare.

10:02

So there's someone else funding it and

10:04

they're using that nation to do the the

10:07

work for them essentially.

10:08

Exactly. Right. You use a intermediate

10:10

nation that's still developing to

10:13

decrease the capability of your primary

10:16

target while you yourself conserve your

10:18

own troops, your own weapons, and your

10:20

own civilians against harm. Benjamin,

10:24

what's your take on that in terms of us

10:25

being at the start of the precipice of a

10:27

of a world war and it looking like a

10:30

sort of a different um different set of

10:32

weapons, a different way that we'll

10:34

fight each other and the internet and

10:36

digital warfare being a part of that.

10:38

I don't think since the the beginning of

10:41

the Cold War, let's say let's go back to

10:42

1947 or 48, I don't think we've stopped

10:45

fighting. I just think we're fighting

10:47

wars of different kinds. I think this

10:48

idea of kinetic warfare is less frequent

10:52

especially among the major powers. So um

10:54

Israel and Iran as an example of one of

10:57

the last few gasps of kinetic warfare.

10:59

But if we look at the United States and

11:01

China, United States and Russia, the

11:03

European powers, NATO, it's less kinetic

11:06

than it is more through um use of

11:09

information, through technology, through

11:10

cyber warfare. What's

11:12

so kinetic is when I refer to kinetic I

11:15

mean using actual physical memes bombs

11:17

missiles tanks um soldiers that type of

11:19

thing and it's less now and it's more

11:22

now moving towards other forms where it

11:25

you can now destabilize a government or

11:27

a system of government or a society

11:29

using a server farm and 20 people

11:31

sitting in a room thousands of miles

11:33

away and you don't necessarily need

11:35

weapons to do that. um where information

11:38

becomes weaponized where digital tools

11:40

become weaponized and that's far

11:41

different than anything we saw in the

11:42

20th century. So I think that the rise

11:45

of the internet in the late you know

11:47

beginning late 1990s through the 2000s

11:49

we've seen now this become

11:51

industrialized at scale and I think the

11:54

threat comes now from the ability of reg

11:56

of countries and regimes to destabilize

11:59

and interfere with others in a way that

12:01

they simply couldn't do years ago and

12:03

now you don't even need to fund it

12:05

massively to do that. It's basically

12:06

warfare on the cheap.

12:08

Mhm. Before we started recording, I

12:09

expressed to you that there's a certain

12:11

tension in the world right now.

12:12

Yeah.

12:13

Where's where's that coming from and why

12:15

in your perspective?

12:16

One of the things that's been evident to

12:17

us, especially since the the 2016

12:19

elections here in the United States is

12:21

this idea that we live in a post-truth

12:23

society. And with so much information

12:25

available to everybody on every

12:27

platform, through every means and

12:28

channel, there is now no monopoly on

12:31

objective truth or fact. And so with

12:33

that comes the ability to distort, to

12:35

propagandize, to mislead, to misinform.

12:38

And people do this to aggregate power,

12:40

to bring power to themselves. And so

12:42

when we live in a world where everyone

12:43

thinks they know everything or they are

12:45

afraid that they don't know enough, you

12:47

have a constant state of tension and

12:49

anxiety and people are uncertain about

12:52

their place in society. There's a, you

12:53

know, a wealth gap comes into play. And

12:56

with that, you feel like there's threats

12:58

or perceived threats or conspiracies

13:00

around every corner. And this is why I

13:02

think lies and misinformation and

13:04

conspiracy theories take hold in times

13:06

like this when people are anxious,

13:08

frightened, uncertain about their place

13:10

in society, about what's coming next.

13:12

And that puts us in a very tense state

13:14

and very clever people can take

13:16

advantage of that and manipulate to

13:19

their benefit. So that I think explains

13:21

why we feel this tension that we do.

13:24

The tension is clearly resulting in real

13:26

changes because those stats I read out

13:28

at the start where there's more nations

13:30

in conflict now. there's more military

13:31

funding. Um, more people think we're on

13:34

the verge of of something pretty

13:35

catastrophic than any time in the last

13:38

couple of decades. That information that

13:41

which is causing attention is then

13:42

having a downstream impact which is

13:44

conflict is breaking out.

13:46

I'd say it's upstream. Um, you have

13:49

polarization happening within societies

13:51

especially in western societies where

13:53

there is no monopoly on the truth or

13:55

news or information. you have the

13:57

fragmentation of let's say major news

14:00

sources. Traditionally, you have a few

14:02

very respected trusted sources and

14:04

authorities or figureheads that people

14:05

would turn to. We don't have that

14:07

anymore. It's now been diluted to the

14:08

point that it is almost meaningless. And

14:11

so, you see the social media has

14:13

contributed to this. And so with that,

14:15

these these with these divisions, these

14:18

schisms in society have made major

14:21

industrial powers like the United

14:22

States, like let's say the Europeans

14:24

more vulnerable to manipulation than

14:27

ever before. So now if you're a

14:29

adversary like Russia or China, Iran,

14:31

North Korea, you can take advantage of

14:33

the ability to tap into this

14:35

polarization and play people off against

14:38

one another, cause division, and that

14:40

allow and that destabilizes democratic

14:42

societies. And then that in turn

14:45

enables these countries like Russia and

14:47

China and others to have more leverage

14:49

and more influence in the developing

14:51

world. In the past it was whoever had

14:53

the strongest military. Now you don't

14:55

necessarily need the strongest military

14:56

to do it. You just need to have the

14:59

strongest um information army and the

15:02

willingness to do the dirty things that

15:03

Western societies don't do anymore, but

15:05

they used to.

15:06

I want to interrupt because I think

15:07

there's an order of operations here that

15:09

we're getting at that isn't clear. I

15:12

would argue that that ignorance starts

15:15

the foundation for the polarization that

15:18

is then capitalized on through this

15:20

information warfare landscape. So I I

15:22

say that because I think it's important

15:23

for us to understand that your your

15:25

statistics are relevant and correct.

15:28

Those statistics don't come first, they

15:31

come after. The ignorance kind of comes

15:33

first. the the the willing blindness to

15:37

what's happening in the world, the

15:39

willingness to just focus in on what

15:40

your tasks are or what entertains you

15:42

and let the rest of the world kind of do

15:44

whatever it's going to do. It's that

15:47

choice first that then leads to other

15:50

countries finding an opportunity to

15:51

manipulate the masses that are no longer

15:53

informed as to what's happening outside

15:55

of their world. I don't want to speak

15:56

for you, but that's that's kind of how

15:58

CIA handles clandestine operations when

16:01

it comes to information security

16:02

operations is understanding we're not

16:04

trying to make an audience ignorant.

16:06

We're finding an ignorant audience and

16:08

then giving them messaging to get them

16:10

to take action.

16:10

The difference is, so I would maintain

16:12

we've always been ignorant. The

16:14

difference is now you can actually do

16:16

something with that ignorance and

16:17

manipulate it at scale that you couldn't

16:19

before. So ignorance has always been

16:21

with us, but before at least people knew

16:23

where they could go to find what they

16:25

perceived to be a trusted source. So now

16:27

that source is gone. That messaging is

16:29

gone.

16:30

That skill is gone.

16:31

I have I have a different take entirely

16:33

which and I focus on narrative. So I'm

16:35

really interested in who tells the story

16:38

and who gets to control the story. And

16:40

what I watch happening a lot is that the

16:42

story is controlled for a while and then

16:44

it gets hijacked over and it's someone

16:46

else's story. So, it's kind of it's like

16:48

the end of the spectrum of what you're

16:50

both saying and you have the agency

16:52

working really hard to grab it back.

16:54

You've got the White House saying we

16:55

need to get our stakeholder press, you

16:57

know, and it's this. So, you're running

17:00

essentially like a kinetic war, a proxy

17:02

war, and an information war at the same

17:04

time. And I think that the information

17:09

is what is what drives most of this

17:12

conflict, which is why it's so

17:14

interesting to me to speak to diplomats

17:17

the only people not at this table,

17:18

right? That are like because then that's

17:21

only where I see the hope of kind of

17:22

like take it down because there's an

17:25

ease that needs to happen when you can

17:26

move the people from trust to paranoia.

17:30

I love that you mentioned diplomacy and

17:31

diplomats. So I I teach courses on

17:33

diplomacy and one of the things I've

17:34

seen emerge in the last few years is

17:36

this dichotomy between private

17:38

diplomacy, which is what we were used to

17:40

when we studied the Cold War and

17:42

postcold war conflicts and now we have

17:44

public diplomacy. almost all diplomacy

17:46

take take the um Iran Israel war the 12-

17:49

day war as as Trump calls it how much of

17:51

that war was conducted via social media

17:54

this is now so you have this public-f

17:56

facing diplomacy where you have during

17:58

wartime leaders their representatives

18:00

their proxies conveying messaging both

18:03

to their enemies to their allies and to

18:05

a supposedly neutral audience all

18:08

through social media right so it is not

18:10

no so much the nuclear age but the age

18:12

of the algorithm and how that amplifies

18:15

diplomacy in a way that never ever

18:17

existed. And so this is I think this

18:19

lends to that dilution uh that then

18:22

others can take advantage of because at

18:24

the end of the day if you want to

18:25

threaten a country or you want to garner

18:27

support, how you articulate that via

18:29

social media, whether you use all caps,

18:31

whether you use images, memes, all of

18:33

these things play into how effective

18:35

that is. And you see that most on Tik

18:37

Tok and when after the um October 2023

18:41

um uh Hamas attacks against Israel, the

18:43

information warfare between the two

18:45

sides and how it played out on college

18:47

campuses. I was at a, you know, a big

18:49

one where um a lot of that was taking

18:50

place at UCLA and how that played out on

18:52

social media and even among high school

18:54

kids who I talk to and their

18:56

understanding of conflict is now shaped

18:58

by what Tik Tok, which is partially

19:00

controlled by the um the Chinese

19:03

government feeds them and chooses to

19:04

feed them and amplify.

19:06

So, here's a specific example which

19:07

might be helpful to what you're saying

19:09

with the 12-day war recently. I think

19:11

the White House wanted that to just be a

19:13

bombing run. You can correct me if I'm

19:15

wrong. Just a bombing run. we're going

19:16

to go, you know, we're so power. It was

19:18

about power. It was about precision.

19:21

Take it out. And it was the press that

19:23

wrote, "America enters the war." Yeah.

19:26

And that is a major headline. And that

19:29

probably made the White House deeply

19:31

upset because they don't want to be they

19:34

don't want to be seen as entering into a

19:35

war. And so I think another real problem

19:39

we have right now with all of this

19:41

tension ratcheting up is how angry and

19:46

I'm just talking about America now. The

19:48

political sides are at one another that

19:50

to my eye because I'm an a-olitical

19:53

writer. No one has any idea what my

19:54

politics are. I write about war and

19:56

weapons neutrally. But I can observe and

19:59

it seems to me like the different waring

20:02

political parties inside the United

20:04

States are so intent on taking down the

20:08

other side. They do they do it from my

20:11

eye at the national security peril. In

20:13

other words, a a a headline against

20:16

Trump is better for them than US

20:20

national security or world security. I'm

20:23

curious what you Well, I think we're all

20:24

saying something that's that's uh

20:27

derivations of the same thing, versions

20:28

of the same thing, right? There's a

20:30

massive information warfare landscape

20:32

happening. And it is that fog of war

20:36

that we look through that gives us that

20:38

tension about what's actually happening

20:40

at the ground level. If you think about

20:43

conflict as being what what humans will

20:46

do to each other, there's layers on top

20:48

of that that create this this distortion

20:51

of what you can expect. And there's so

20:53

much activity in the information

20:55

landscape that it's very distorted what

20:57

could actually happen. We have a term at

20:59

CIA and when we talk about uh when we

21:02

talk about covert influence activities

21:03

to shape information, we talk about

21:05

volume and speed, which gets right back

21:07

to your point about Tik Tok and social

21:09

media. We've always engaged in

21:11

information warfare, but the volume and

21:13

the speed was much less and much slower

21:16

because you had to fly [ __ ] pamphlets

21:18

and drop them out of airplanes and hope

21:20

that the people reading it were reading

21:22

the right dialect of Arabic or Spanish.

21:24

You had to hope and then once there was

21:26

a rainstorm, all of your pamphlets are

21:27

done. And if you're trying to make it

21:30

look like they're not coming from

21:31

America, they're trying There's all

21:32

sorts of other layers to that. Well, now

21:34

an algorithm that you don't even control

21:37

Yes.

21:37

is contributing to that. And then you've

21:40

got creators, content creators all over

21:42

the place that have no no added value to

21:45

the content they're creating who are

21:47

just clipping, cutting and and putting

21:49

things together and then further being

21:50

amplified, right? So the volume of

21:52

information is massive and the speed at

21:55

which it disseminates is huge and the

21:57

algorithm can dictate whether you see it

21:59

or don't see it at all. So, while I

22:01

appreciate your point of view that

22:03

there's this tension and there's this

22:05

growing concern, I honestly think that

22:07

your your opinion on that is because

22:09

you're informed and intelligent and

22:11

there are huge groups of people who are

22:13

completely oblivious to where we

22:16

actually are on a a sliding scale of

22:20

approaching conflict.

22:22

Where are we?

22:23

I think that's what we're really here to

22:25

discuss. I would argue that we are not

22:27

entering a phase of less conflict. we

22:29

are going to enter a phase 5 to 10 years

22:31

of more conflict, increasing conflict, a

22:34

willingness to engage in more kinetic

22:35

conflict to use your term. I don't think

22:37

that we're showing the various uh global

22:42

power competitors of the world that it

22:45

will not be tolerated. I think we're

22:46

showing the global power competitors of

22:48

the world that violence, kinetic

22:49

attacks, cyber warfare, weapons

22:52

development is going to be accepted.

22:54

My wish is that America could overcome

22:58

her tribal anger, you know, to to that a

23:02

lot of Americans have toward one another

23:03

that are in different political parties

23:05

because I feel like America is a leader

23:08

in terms of security and safety or can

23:10

be and should be and that all of this

23:13

amplification of the rhetoric is is

23:16

deeply dividing.

23:19

The fancy word is divisive, but it's

23:21

just dividing. And that if there's any

23:24

place that one's enemies or adversaries

23:26

or call them what you will is can take

23:29

advantage of that it is right there.

23:31

Is that wishful thinking

23:32

for me to say uh I am a very wishful

23:35

thinking person. I mean I write about

23:37

the grimmst darkest subjects imaginable

23:41

you know with a smile on my face because

23:43

I just am naturally uh I'm naturally

23:46

optimistic. I'm the mother of two you

23:48

know collegeage boys. Of course I'm

23:50

going to be optimistic.

23:52

Andrew was just saying that he thinks

23:53

there's going to be more conflict going

23:55

forward. We have nine nations now that

23:57

have these nuclear weapons that some

23:58

might argue creates stability, but some

24:00

might argue that it only takes one

24:02

individual. And you said there's what,

24:03

six nations hosting those nuclear

24:05

weapons. I don't know. Sometimes I think

24:07

I think gosh, you only need one

24:10

miscommunication or one mistake from one

24:13

person who is, I don't know, not doing

24:16

too well mentally or having a bad day.

24:18

That's kind of how I think about it. And

24:19

I'm like probabilistically if you just

24:21

stretch it out some point that's going

24:22

to happen. Some point that's going to

24:24

happen. Well, you're absolutely right

24:26

and that is why I mean it'll be

24:27

interesting if we maybe talk about Iran

24:29

just from the you know specifics about

24:32

what happened and you know why that's is

24:34

or is not important because I just

24:37

having looked at nuclear weapons so

24:39

microscopically

24:41

recently I believe that that existential

24:44

threat the global catastrophic risk of a

24:48

nuclear you know of a flame that starts

24:51

that movement toward a nuclear nuclear

24:54

use is a sort of line that must never be

24:57

crossed. And so while all war is

25:00

terrible, there is always a solution on

25:02

the other side of the war. The war peace

25:04

can be made, but not with nuclear. And

25:07

so that, you know, I look at things

25:09

right now through that lens, which is

25:10

how I saw the most recent bombing.

25:13

You mentioned uh Andrew talked about

25:16

Israel and Iran being a proxy war. So

25:17

that kind of piqued my interest. Um I I

25:20

almost reflexively want to disagree, but

25:22

I want to hear more about why you think

25:23

so, so I can better understand proxy

25:25

conflict from that angle.

25:26

Yeah. Well, the way I see it, um Israel

25:30

is ratcheting up its aggression against

25:34

proxies that Iran has been using to to

25:37

threaten it for decades,

25:38

right?

25:39

But Israel is also dependent on American

25:41

weapons to do that. It's also dependent

25:43

on American intelligence to do that.

25:44

It's dependent on American support

25:45

financially and economically. So it

25:47

needs America to wage its conflict

25:49

moving forward. If America were to say,

25:50

"Israel, we don't support you," then

25:52

Israel would take a different approach

25:54

without a doubt. So the funding, the

25:57

support, the intelligence flow, the

25:59

economic support coming from the United

26:01

States is what empowers Israel to

26:02

prosecute its conflict. Without that

26:04

support, Israel would take a different

26:05

approach to the conflict.

26:06

But then proxy would imply that Israel

26:08

is acting as an agent or at the behest

26:10

of the United States. So the United

26:11

States rather than getting involved

26:12

directly with Iran up until last week

26:14

operates through another entity.

26:16

That's the misunderstanding about proxy

26:18

war. You're looking first for some sort

26:20

of conflict that already exists. The

26:22

conflict between Israel and Iran already

26:23

exists. The proxy then the the the proxy

26:26

relationship happens when an outsider, a

26:29

third party, comes in and exacerbates

26:31

the conflict by putting more fuel on an

26:34

existing fire. It's not that that Israel

26:36

is the agent of of the United States.

26:39

It's that Israel's already wants to

26:41

prosecute some sort of conflict. We come

26:43

in and we're essentially the fuel to

26:44

help exacerbate that fight.

26:45

So, who's the proxy in this conflict?

26:47

Israel.

26:48

Okay.

26:49

Israel's the proxy for the United States

26:51

who wants to diminish Iran in the same

26:53

way that Israel wants to diminish Iran.

26:55

This specific conflict is so fascinating

26:57

because every [ __ ] buddy wants Israel

27:01

to degrade Iran. Saudi Arabia wants

27:03

that. The United States wants that. All

27:05

of the European Union wants that. Israel

27:07

wants that. Everybody wants to see a

27:09

degraded Iran. So, Israel, especially

27:12

after what it's been doing in Gaza and

27:14

the humanitarian crisis in Gaza,

27:15

Israel's desperate for anything it can

27:18

do to win back favor for the Abraham

27:21

Accords as a democratic country. You

27:23

name it, it's looking for an option. And

27:25

Iran is a very convenient option for

27:27

them to build back relationships that

27:29

they've killed along with the the

27:31

attacks in Gaza.

27:32

If the reasons are different, does that

27:34

still make one a proxy of the other? So

27:36

Iran's uh Israel's objections to Iran

27:39

and it's it's the reason it sees Iran as

27:41

a adversary might differ from the United

27:44

States and there's a ven diagram.

27:45

There's some overlap but there's also a

27:46

tremendous amount that doesn't overlap.

27:48

Same thing with the Saudis, the Gulf

27:50

States, other regional states that see

27:52

Iran as a threat. They see it for

27:53

different reasons. Does that still, and

27:54

I'm not saying you're wrong, I'm just

27:56

trying to understand, does that still

27:56

make them a proxy if their motives are

27:58

different?

27:59

I would say yes, because it's not about

28:01

the parts of the ven diagram that don't

28:04

overlap. It's about the parts that do.

28:05

It's about the convenience of Israeli

28:08

citizens dying, Israeli soldiers dying,

28:11

Israeli weapons being spent. That's the

28:13

benefit of a proxy conflict. It's not

28:16

American citizens who are at risk. It's

28:17

not American soldiers who are dying.

28:19

It's not American weapons that are being

28:21

spent. We get to build our surplus. And

28:23

if anything, we get to build extra and

28:25

sell it to Israel, which is benefiting

28:27

our economy. So this is the the

28:30

uncomfortable truth behind proxy war is

28:33

it it's all the benefits of a wartime

28:35

environment without any of the risks.

28:38

But then what also happens and you can

28:39

look at Vietnam as a great example is

28:42

the proxy wars that are supposed to be

28:44

low cost for the United States end up

28:46

blowing up into being a disaster for the

28:49

United States.

28:49

So I think of Vietnam I think classic

28:51

proxy war. Right. Right. Kruef gave that

28:53

speech I think 1963 whenever it was

28:56

about wars of national liberation and

28:58

that they would be fought in what was

28:59

then called the third world Vietnam

29:01

being a classic case there I see

29:03

absolutely right first you had the

29:05

French you know in French Indochina and

29:07

then the United States bailing the

29:08

French out arguably the French were

29:10

maybe a proxy for US interests they were

29:12

part of that firewall that were keeping

29:13

the dominoes from falling but again I'm

29:15

struggling to I'm trying to understand

29:18

the Israel United States proxy angle

29:21

here um and That's a unique definition

29:24

of proxy, I guess. Okay, so you butt in

29:27

with an example. You tell me if this is

29:29

right or wrong. Yeah. So, in a weird

29:31

way, the Iraq war was a proxy war

29:35

for the same reason.

29:36

The Iraq war the 2000 which the

29:38

George Bush and Dick Cheneyy's Iraq war,

29:40

right,

29:40

were trying to weaken Iran.

29:44

You think the Iraq war was an attempt to

29:46

weaken Iran?

29:46

I mean, you you pipe in here, but that's

29:49

how it started. That was the original

29:50

intention. And the deep tragic irony is

29:54

what we have now which is Iran is

29:56

running Iran.

29:57

Why does the United States want to

29:58

weaken Iran?

29:59

The Iran the United States the United

30:01

States

30:01

because what happened to your family in

30:02

197 but why but but why does what's the

30:05

beef the US has with Iran? I mean for

30:08

400 and something days in 1979 and we

30:10

will not let that go until that is you

30:12

know

30:13

how is that how what is what does

30:14

justice look like? I'm not saying that's

30:16

Yeah. No, but I'm saying why why are we

30:18

at war with Iran or not at war, but why

30:20

are we at conflict with Iran?

30:21

I mean, I think there's a lot of

30:22

different a lot of different valid

30:24

answers for that, but

30:26

where I would take this, especially to

30:28

keep it um really accessible to the lay

30:31

person, right, is that the United States

30:33

wants zero competition for

30:37

being this the single superpower in the

30:39

world. It wants no competition for that.

30:41

It wants to remain the single superpower

30:44

everywhere because being the single

30:46

superpower gives your civilians gives

30:48

your population uh security but it also

30:51

means that you have the lion's share of

30:53

all the resources in the world and basic

30:55

economics teaches us that all economics

30:57

is based on resources.

30:58

So Iran's goals to create a Shia state

31:02

to create a Shia crescent of power and

31:04

influence across the Middle East

31:06

is in stark contrast to what would

31:07

benefit the United States. What the

31:09

United States wants is to maintain a

31:10

Sunni majority because that's where the

31:13

oil is coming from is majority for

31:15

United States. Sunni wealthy collegi

31:17

states even though Iran's the second

31:19

largest

31:21

not for the United States.

31:22

Yeah. Not for the United States.

31:22

But it was right during the United

31:24

States greatest period of prosperity

31:26

there. It was a bipolar world. So

31:28

unipolarity is something we've had since

31:31

the you know since the '90s onward. And

31:33

yes there's been tremendous success but

31:34

arguably unipolarity has been

31:36

destabilizing.

31:36

What's unipolarity? where you have one

31:39

world power basically dominating which

31:41

has kind of been the case since the end

31:42

of the cold war and now we've seen a

31:44

rise of other sort of polls maybe with

31:46

China being one but you had during the

31:49

entirety of the cold war was a bipolar

31:50

structure you had the Soviets you had

31:51

the US and they were dictating

31:54

everything else on the chessboard that

31:55

was the globe right in front of us and

31:58

arguably since the end of the cold war

32:00

the unipolar system has not been very

32:02

stable you could say that I think the

32:04

stats you cited the number of conflicts

32:06

have almost increased

32:07

um since that time what is what what's

32:10

the take away from that from what do you

32:11

guys think

32:12

I mean this is where I think academics

32:14

and reality butt heads

32:16

okay

32:17

because academically I agree with you

32:19

okay

32:19

and on principle I agree with you the

32:22

world could be better

32:24

if it was multipolar

32:26

if we had a strong Europe and we had a

32:28

strong country in China and we had a

32:30

strong or a country in in Asia and we

32:32

had a strong United States and and if we

32:34

could find a way to cooperate

32:37

effectively and collaborate without

32:38

conflict. I mean, academically, all of

32:40

that sounds wonderful.

32:41

Well, I don't pretend that it's going to

32:42

be friendly or cooperative. I think you

32:44

can have multipolar where you still have

32:46

adversaries.

32:46

Yeah.

32:47

But the are the idea is that you're

32:48

saying that countries seek to be

32:50

unipolar. They seek to be global

32:51

hedgeimens because that gives them what?

32:53

No. No. Countries don't do that. Once

32:56

you are once you are a nearper

32:59

competitor, then you have no other

33:00

option in the reality of it except to be

33:03

the most powerful. This is why there's

33:05

only one Olympic gold winner for any

33:07

competition, for any specific Olympics.

33:09

You can't have a tie, right? It's the

33:11

reason why if there is a game that ends

33:13

in a tie, it goes into overtime because

33:15

you have to have a winner. That's like

33:17

it's it's human nature. I have to know

33:19

what my threat level is against you. So,

33:22

one of us has to be dominant and one of

33:24

us has to not be as it has to be second

33:26

to our dominance. And we can have

33:28

dominance in different areas, right?

33:30

That's why when I'm a guest in your

33:32

home, I follow your rules. when you're a

33:33

guest in my home, you follow my rules.

33:35

There's an element of that that's all

33:37

just built into our our DNA as human

33:39

beings. But what the United States has

33:42

is it has global hedgeimony. It has all

33:46

the benefits of the world's wealthiest

33:48

economy, the strongest currency, the the

33:50

lead on technology. We've diversified

33:52

our workforce so that we don't have to

33:53

rely on manufacturing. We have we

33:55

literally make money off of ideas in the

33:57

United States. Whereas a place like

33:59

China is doomed to try to have human

34:01

beings who do things with their fingers

34:03

to make money. So when you have that

34:05

level of power, you become very focused

34:07

on keeping that power. Talk to any

34:09

wealthy person out there and they'll

34:10

tell you the same thing.

34:11

But war is a zero- sum game. The

34:14

Olympics are a zero- sum game. Diplomacy

34:16

implies that others can win. Not

34:19

everyone can win equally, but multiple

34:20

winners can emerge or multiple losers

34:22

can emerge. We can all kind of share a

34:25

spot in the podium. two people can stand

34:27

in the gold section. You know, you can

34:29

split it. You can have a team sport,

34:30

right? Where everyone's getting gold on

34:32

that team if they win. Uh how is that is

34:34

that consistent with what culture? This

34:37

is where culture starts to lay in.

34:38

Yeah.

34:39

And I would say that the United States

34:40

is a zero sum culture.

34:41

I would say too.

34:42

Okay. I don't think it's pretty, man.

34:44

But I think it's the facts.

34:45

I also think it's interesting when I

34:47

hear you guys talk. It's like you can

34:49

imagine what it's like in the White

34:50

House. Imagine the president, he's

34:53

having some of his adviserss tell him

34:56

exactly this, like, you know, the the

34:57

kind of big we must dominate. And then

35:01

you have his military adviserss wanting

35:04

specifics having to do with what their

35:06

intentions are in their lane. And so I

35:10

think it's what's interesting for you

35:12

know the lay men which which I certainly

35:14

am on some level is that when you begin

35:18

the more information you get you know

35:21

this is like on the other side of that

35:22

information is actually a great thing

35:24

for all of us you can begin to

35:26

understand the context.

35:29

Okay wow that's you know Andrew said

35:31

that and that that makes sense now. So I

35:32

think then you start to see as an

35:34

individual the world makes more sense to

35:35

you. It's less threatening like what is

35:38

going on? Oh my god, World War III is

35:40

around the corner. But the president of

35:42

the United States lives in his own or,

35:44

you know, silo and has so much

35:47

incredible power. This just the longer I

35:50

report on all of this, the more I am

35:53

amazed at how powerful the president of

35:55

the United States is. And if we look at

35:57

the current president, how much more

35:59

power is being absorbed there.

36:01

And the the idea of them being in their

36:03

own silo. I mean,

36:05

no pun intended, but pun intended.

36:07

Absolutely. I mean traditional

36:09

traditional political focused

36:12

policydriven presidents they try to find

36:15

a way to reduce the silo effect. The

36:18

current president has done the opposite.

36:19

He's increased the insulation against

36:23

expertise from people who have forged

36:25

careers uh being becoming experts in

36:28

their field. Instead, he's surrounded

36:29

himself with voices that are that are

36:31

more interested in who knows media

36:35

intentions, future uh future political

36:38

benefits, but they're not necessarily

36:40

coming from an informed expertise like

36:43

what we've seen in previous presidents.

36:45

And that's where I think you use the

36:46

word context. Absolutely. I think that's

36:48

that's that's perfect to capture it.

36:51

It's the context. So, you know, content

36:53

is what the three of us are discussing

36:55

here. uh content context is what the

36:58

cameras are recording what editing is

36:59

done afterwards and then what gets

37:01

disseminated beyond there that is you

37:03

know in in in a broader uh scope that is

37:06

the algorithm that is social media that

37:08

is basically restricting the context to

37:11

whatever it the owners of that content

37:14

feel it needs to be and that I think

37:16

also contributes to this sort of

37:17

unipolar zero sum mindset and uh because

37:21

only one algorithm can win you can't

37:23

have competing algorithms we're trying

37:24

to have competing algorithms with with

37:25

with China and they're winning. Um I a

37:29

few um two years ago I designed a war

37:30

game simulation for a group of retired

37:33

military officials and we had some

37:35

prominent ex we had governors, senators,

37:38

national security staff uh role

37:40

playinging um White House situation room

37:43

and one of the things that was

37:44

interesting was my job I I designed this

37:46

game. It was meant to be what if a

37:47

second January 6th happened but this

37:49

time the insurrection comes from within

37:51

the military. you have defections from

37:52

the military,

37:53

National Guard bases, isolated bases,

37:56

right? Could the Pentagon be prepared

37:58

for something like that? What would that

37:59

look like?

38:00

And I had the White House was staffed

38:02

with this incredible social media team

38:04

that was meant to sort of signal to the

38:06

American people and to the the president

38:08

and to everyone else what's happening.

38:10

And I had four people playing the Red

38:12

Cell. The red cell consisted of

38:13

basically trolls, provocators who aren't

38:16

necessarily committed to overthrowing

38:18

but just wanted to, you know, to to just

38:21

wanted sort of the action.

38:22

It's like borrowing what what Heath

38:24

Ledger said is the Joker. Some people

38:26

just want to watch the world burn,

38:27

right? Or to He didn't say that, but it

38:29

was from Batman, right? And the havoc

38:31

that two or three people in a bar

38:34

were able to simulate or to create

38:36

versus an entire White House apparatus

38:38

staffed with experienced people. These

38:40

are people who who were on actual White

38:42

House comms teams who had the training.

38:44

We had military folks who had worked in

38:46

defense intelligence and you had two or

38:48

three trolls in their 20s who some were

38:50

veterans who were able to absolutely

38:52

cause havoc. And so that is the that

38:55

because the algorithm and I designed the

38:56

algorithm to amplify their stuff and it

38:59

and it and the White House could not

39:00

keep up.

39:01

That's fascinating. That's terrifying.

39:03

That is terrifying. That is where I

39:05

think the warfare and you know the idea

39:06

of World War II and conflict that is how

39:08

you get to zero sum that is how you get

39:10

to who emerges with the gold medal. I

39:12

think so to back to your point the

39:13

context who controls that silo who

39:16

controls the mic who controls the

39:17

aperture is going to matter more.

39:20

One of the things Donald Trump has shown

39:22

us is how much of an economy of

39:23

attention we really are in.

39:25

And just like having the most money

39:28

makes you wealthy in a fiscal economy,

39:29

having the most attention makes you very

39:31

wealthy in an attention economy. And

39:32

here's a man who even when he wasn't

39:34

president

39:35

was in the headlines every day. So it's

39:38

I think that the unpredictability of

39:42

what he's going to do moving forward

39:44

doesn't bring us closer to peace. It

39:46

doesn't bring us closer to uh proper

39:49

communications. It's I you mentioned you

39:50

know are we one miscommunication away.

39:53

If we are then we are in a very dire

39:56

place because there is a lot of

39:57

miscommunication happening. Well, I've

39:59

read the stories through history of

40:00

miscommunications nearly resulting in

40:02

nuclear war or some missile being

40:04

launched. I mean, Anna, you've studied

40:06

quite a few of those moments through

40:07

history. I was listening to one the

40:09

other day. I think it was a story of um

40:11

a Russian nuclear commander who who saw

40:14

something on the radar and he thought

40:16

the US was striking and for whatever

40:18

reason he decided to assume that it

40:21

wasn't and reported back to his his uh

40:23

sort of overlords that it wasn't a

40:25

nuclear strike and didn't press the

40:26

button. But everything on his radar told

40:28

him that the US had launched multiple

40:30

missiles. Are you familiar with that

40:31

particular story?

40:32

Y

40:32

what is that story?

40:33

He's called the man who stole the man

40:34

who saved the world. It was 1983 and he

40:38

was in a bunker in Russia. Their sort of

40:41

equivalent of we have a similar uh a

40:43

radar, you know, a system that's looking

40:46

at satellite tracking satellite

40:48

activity. And it was perceived that

40:51

America had launched missiles from the

40:54

Midwest, ICBMs,

40:56

and the, you know, you're absolutely

40:59

right. I mean, you told the story

41:00

perfectly. He decided not to raise the

41:04

the threat up the chain of command,

41:07

which would have put the entire Soviet

41:10

nuclear command and control on, you

41:13

know, massive alert. He just didn't do

41:15

it. And it was interesting because he,

41:18

you know, was sort of really bered later

41:22

by Russian command and control, but he

41:25

got the moniker, the man who saved the

41:27

world. There's a documentary about him

41:28

that's definitely worth watching. And

41:31

your point is what Secretary General of

41:34

the United Nations Antonio Gutirez said

41:36

recently, which is we are one

41:38

misunderstanding,

41:40

one miscalculation away from nuclear

41:43

annihilation

41:44

or even one AI generated viral video

41:48

that goes, you know, that the wrong

41:50

person gets the wrong idea from. Imagine

41:52

the Cuban missile crisis, how close we

41:54

came. And imagine if you had generative

41:56

AI content that made it look like the

41:59

Soviets had deployed or fired a missile

42:02

or anything to that effect. We saw

42:03

during this Iran Israel conflict, I

42:05

mean, how many videos on on X I saw that

42:08

showed devastation in Tel Aviv or

42:10

devastation in downtown Tan. I mean they

42:12

were obviously fabricated and AI

42:14

generated but the extent to which these

42:16

things were recirculated and spread and

42:18

that I saw sources who I would normally

42:21

trust sort of um amplified these not

42:23

knowing until someone else pointed out

42:24

wait a minute that's you know from a

42:26

video game or that's generative AI and

42:28

imagine if our decision makers didn't

42:30

have redundancies or self or fail safes

42:33

in place to be able to identify that

42:34

this is what that is and they acted on a

42:37

misread or something that they thought

42:39

was real. That's that's what concerns

42:41

me.

42:42

Are our intelligence forces more

42:44

sophisticated than that? Presumably,

42:45

they're not on Twitter or something

42:47

looking at videos.

42:49

Well, they are. They are there as well.

42:51

And that's that's a type of intelligence

42:53

called open source intelligence. Uh I

42:55

but the short answer is yes. Our

42:56

intelligence infrastructure is far more

42:58

sophisticated than that. The the

42:59

intelligence infrastructure for all of

43:01

the all of the for the majority of the

43:04

nine nuclear capable countries are very

43:06

very effective. France is very

43:07

effective. The UK is very effective. the

43:08

US is very effective. Even China's MSS

43:10

is very, very effective. So,

43:12

sophisticated intelligence services are

43:14

looking for corroborating evidence

43:16

before they make an intelligence

43:17

estimate. There is a challenge though,

43:20

and we're seeing it especially in the

43:21

United States where the the chief

43:24

executive just disagrees,

43:25

right,

43:26

independently, unilaterally, with what

43:28

his intelligence estimate is.

43:30

What you mean? You saw two examples in

43:32

the last few weeks, right? First you saw

43:34

um Tulsi Gabbard who's the director of

43:36

national intelligence and a position

43:37

that didn't exist until the failure of

43:38

9/11. That DNI position was born from

43:42

the fact that we needed to have more

43:43

coordination across intelligence

43:45

services. And she came out and she gave

43:46

an estimate that Iran was not imminently

43:49

capable of creating a nuclear weapon, a

43:52

weaponized nuclear device. Right.

43:55

And how would she know?

43:57

Because she's the director of national

43:58

intelligence. All intelligence. Thank

44:00

you. I'm It's It's obvious to me. I

44:02

understand. It's not always obvious to

44:03

everyone else, but all of the

44:05

intelligence services feed up. They feed

44:07

up intelligence that's been vetted,

44:09

corroborated, validated up through a

44:11

reporting system that goes to the

44:13

director of national intelligence whose

44:14

job it is to advise the president on the

44:16

current status of of the most quality

44:19

intelligence that we have. the president

44:21

as the chief executive uh is the one

44:23

person who the intelligence services

44:25

work for at the pleasure of the

44:26

president but his primary mouthpiece for

44:30

current intelligence is supposed to be

44:32

the DNI. So when Tulsi Gabbard says we

44:35

have no reason to believe the Iran is

44:37

imminently ready to prepare to create a

44:39

nuclear weapon. The president is

44:41

supposed to say thank you DNI and then

44:43

that becomes the information that he

44:44

has. Instead he disagreed with her and

44:47

then he said that's not the tr that's

44:48

not really what's happening.

44:48

Not just disagreed. shut her out.

44:50

Correct. Shut her out. Out of Senate

44:52

briefings, intelligence briefings, she's

44:54

been marginalized

44:55

and then she changed her opinion and

44:57

came back and and I want to hear your

44:59

disagreement. But then the second

45:00

example I have is after the bombing raid

45:03

uh of the three sites in Iran, the uh

45:06

DIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency,

45:08

which is charged with collecting

45:09

military intelligence from foreign

45:11

targets, came back and said that we we

45:13

may not have reached total obliteration,

45:15

Mr. President. And again, he disagreed.

45:17

and he's like, "That's completely wrong.

45:19

Total obliteration."

45:21

I have a a it's not a disagreement, but

45:24

it's more like a different POV on all of

45:27

this, which has to do with narrative,

45:28

which I'm very interested in of how

45:30

because the more people I interview at

45:33

all these different levels, I begin to

45:34

realize that we all are working from the

45:37

same set of human conditions, you know,

45:40

bias and and sort of like and really my

45:43

favorite one is the horse in the race.

45:45

you know, you have a horse in the race

45:47

of how you think and the way in which

45:51

you see the world. And I know as I get

45:53

older, what I try to do personally is I

45:55

try to notice where I am wrong and

45:58

instead of being defensive about it, be

46:00

like, I was wrong about that. That's

46:03

interesting because then you can kind of

46:05

evolve in your thinking and have a

46:07

bigger poo view. But I perceive

46:11

Tulsi Gabbert t making those decisions

46:15

from the lens in which she sees the

46:18

world and her platform is very specific.

46:22

You you could almost have discerned that

46:26

she was going to have that opinion. At

46:27

least in my opinion

46:28

she was a known commodity before she

46:30

became DNI. So this is the feeling. I

46:32

think what you're saying is we knew

46:34

yes

46:35

she was she she always saw the regimes

46:36

in that part of the world from a certain

46:38

framework

46:38

and her conclusion followed her

46:42

biases

46:42

biases her presuppos exactly

46:44

and they're just their pri priors is a

46:46

great word because because we all have

46:48

them there's nothing wrong with this per

46:49

se it's just that

46:51

because I would take a totally different

46:53

look at any of this if I was the DNI and

46:55

would be like

46:56

Mr. president. It's not as much about

46:58

these things that everyone's arguing

47:00

about did we because let's face it, no

47:02

one's going to know until time passes

47:04

the damage that was really done there.

47:06

Period. Full stop. You you know that and

47:09

we all know that. And so what you have

47:11

to say and again as a historian I would

47:13

say what's the best example of why we

47:15

should bomb this facility and the best

47:17

example would be North Korea because

47:19

Clinton all what so North Korea once

47:22

upon a time did not have 50 nuclear

47:24

warheads and the ICBMs to get them to

47:27

the United States to take out the United

47:29

States which is what I write there's my

47:31

bias my lens my point of view but I have

47:34

studied this and so it's interesting to

47:36

me that Clinton was going to bomb bomb

47:39

North Korea when they were in precisely

47:41

the same situation that Iran is now not

47:44

yet having a nuclear bomb and North

47:46

Korea promised that they wouldn't enrich

47:50

the uranium and this is in 1983 and

47:52

Clinton was preparing a military strike

47:55

and it was complex because a lot of

47:56

people in Seoul were going to die in

47:58

South Korea and then Jimmy Carter

48:01

stepped in and said I will go negotiate

48:03

the peace with the current dictator's

48:05

father and he did and everything was

48:07

honky dory Except for North Korea had

48:10

their hands behind their back and their

48:11

fingers crossed and they were lying

48:14

because that is what dictators do who

48:18

don't like America being the nuclear

48:20

superpower and being able to threaten

48:22

them. And if I was the DNI, I would say,

48:25

"Mr. President, this is the best example

48:28

of probably what is going on." That's my

48:31

bias rather than saying, you know, so

48:33

I'm but I'm interested in how the tribal

48:36

parts of America, which I find just as

48:39

dangerous as nuclear weapons. Not quite,

48:42

but um that's what I'm interested in.

48:44

And then everybody jumps on the story

48:47

that which is also true. The story you

48:50

tell is true. But what is your take on

48:53

North Korea, the bomb, Tulsi Gabbard? If

48:57

anything, North Korea is the I mean, I

49:00

never thought in my adult life I would

49:02

say this. It's the shining example of

49:05

why nuclear of why countries pursuing

49:08

nuclear capabilities will continue to

49:11

pursue nuclear capabilities because here

49:13

is a broken backwards poor [ __ ]

49:17

despicable regime that we don't touch.

49:20

No one will touch them

49:21

because they've got nuclear weapons.

49:22

They have nuclear weapons. And now they

49:24

and now that now that we have literally

49:26

bombed a sovereign nation as the United

49:29

States, we have sent in we we ran a

49:32

bombing raid of a country that was

49:34

sovereign

49:35

its own borders with no no

49:38

which is why Clinton wouldn't do it in

49:39

the because of my god that was unheard

49:41

of. You don't do that.

49:42

And now that we have done that to incur

49:44

and prevent a country from getting a

49:46

nuclear capability that's our stated

49:47

intent. Now, our state intent may be

49:50

celebrated in most parts of this map,

49:51

but to the Iranian people and to the

49:54

people who are trying to climb up the

49:56

social ladder through technology, the

49:59

message they got is our our borders are

50:01

not going to be respected unless we have

50:04

something like a weapon, a nuclear

50:05

weapon that will keep people away.

50:07

So, now they have even more incentive to

50:09

develop a nuclear weapon than they've

50:10

ever had.

50:10

Correct.

50:11

Or and or sorry to cut or they might go

50:13

a different direction. It might say,

50:14

"Look at what a 30-year policy pursuit

50:17

of funding a nuclear program brought

50:18

upon us. It brought upon us death and

50:20

ruin." North Korea is a shining example

50:23

of a failed state. The only reason that

50:26

it hasn't basically toppled is because

50:28

the oppressive nature of the regime

50:29

against its own people and against the

50:31

outside world. Who wants to be North

50:33

Korea? Iran does not want to be North

50:34

Korea. It is a priious state of all

50:37

priest states isolated beyond belief and

50:39

a miserable place by all um you know

50:42

senses to want to live and exist unless

50:44

you're part of the ruling hierarchy. So

50:46

I would argue the Iranian people will

50:47

look at this the people mind you not

50:49

people are very different than people

50:50

are different from the regime. The

50:51

regime is about survive so they're going

50:53

to emulate North Korea

50:55

except that 100%

50:56

except that all they're going to do is

50:58

sew the seeds to their own downfall

51:00

internally because yes nuclear weapons

51:02

will shield you from the outside world.

51:04

They will not protect you from within.

51:06

Iranians are not North Koreans. That is

51:09

where, you know, they have demonstrated

51:11

a willingness to to die for rebellion.

51:13

I'm not saying this generation is ready

51:15

to do that, but you know, the only

51:17

reason I'm in this country sitting here

51:18

is because there was thousands of people

51:20

that were willing to do that. They will

51:22

do that again presumably. So great,

51:25

build your walls, isolate yourself from

51:26

the world, protect yourself from the US,

51:28

but you're not going to protect yourself

51:29

from civil conflict and civil strife and

51:32

tribalism. that will persist and it will

51:35

amplify uh because you know oppression I

51:38

think this is one of the great lines

51:39

from the um andor show uh first season

51:42

right oppression requires constant

51:44

effort and that constant effort is bound

51:47

to break at some point it is a lot of

51:49

work to keep your domestic population

51:52

repressed

51:53

that is not sustainable in the long run

51:55

history has shown that you can keep

51:56

others out but you can't but

51:59

except for North Korea

52:00

North Korea is the the only exception

52:02

and the reason is because they've got

52:04

terrifying

52:04

they've got they've got a huge patron

52:07

willing to prop them up but for China

52:09

oh China

52:10

but for China and to a lesser extent

52:12

Russia where would North Korea be Iran

52:14

doesn't have a savior

52:17

hasn't had a savior

52:18

and it's not going to it's not going to

52:19

be Russia do that I don't know that

52:21

that's the case because right now

52:23

there's an incentive across the eastern

52:25

block

52:26

to support Iran right now China China

52:28

and Russia and North Korea

52:30

who were already become becoming

52:33

diplomatically and economically tied to

52:35

Iran before this have all the more

52:37

reason to do so now.

52:38

Except none of them stepped forward in

52:40

ways that mattered in the last 3 weeks

52:42

to to to do something

52:44

that we know of. Yeah.

52:45

Well, you did. Putin gave a very

52:47

disconcerting speech in St. Petersburg

52:49

on June 20th where he talked about the

52:54

Russian scientists helping out Iran and

52:56

that I found to be very an echo of a

52:59

kind of a threat along the lines.

53:00

Correct. Don't don't make the mistake of

53:02

thinking that there hasn't been support

53:04

given just because we don't know about

53:05

support given. There's quiet diplomatic

53:07

channels. There's secret intelligence

53:08

channels.

53:09

I don't disagree.

53:09

There's just foreign language channels.

53:11

I don't disagree. I just don't think

53:12

Iran is the hill that the Russians or

53:14

Chinese will die on.

53:15

No, for sure it's not.

53:16

That's that's what I'm saying. At the

53:17

end of the day, there is no NATO article

53:19

5 equivalent where any of these

53:21

countries in the Eastern block will come

53:23

to the defense of Iran's sovereignty.

53:25

They simply won't. And now we go back to

53:26

the conversation about proxy war because

53:28

Iran becomes a very convenient proxy for

53:30

Russia and for China.

53:31

But nothing is more important than Iran

53:33

not having a nuclear weapon. Muhammad

53:36

bin Salman himself said if Iran gets the

53:38

weapon, we will also we Saudi Arabia

53:41

will get a nuclear weapon. And that's a

53:43

huge I think that's a fantastic

53:46

a fantastic parallel to why the world

53:48

doesn't want Iran to be nuclear capable

53:50

because a nuclear capable Iran would

53:52

force the Sunni uh Khi states to develop

53:56

nuclear weapons as well.

53:57

And that's nuclear World War II right

53:58

there.

53:59

Or or you don't even need to be nuclear

54:00

capable. Just be nuclear threshold.

54:02

That's enough. That's what Iran what if

54:04

every country in the region became

54:05

nuclear threshold?

54:06

What does that mean?

54:07

They're on the verge of weaponization,

54:10

but they're not quite there. So in other

54:11

words um uranium enrichment. So when you

54:14

when you find uranium in the raw it's

54:16

it's very low enriched like 2 to 3% of

54:18

it is pure. You enrich it you put it in

54:20

centrifuges you separate the parts you

54:22

want from the parts you don't. You

54:23

purify it up to 20% can be used for

54:26

energy or for medical uses. That's what

54:29

the nuclear non-prololiferation treaty

54:31

allows every country except those who

54:33

didn't sign it and the the five great

54:35

powers. Right. everyone else. You can

54:37

have energy enrichment, uranium

54:38

enrichment up to that 20% threshold.

54:41

Iran went beyond that. Went up to 60%.

54:44

When you go beyond 20, you're entering

54:46

into weapons territory. Weapons

54:48

territory, you have to get to the 90%

54:50

range, right?

54:50

Clean weapons.

54:51

Clean weapons. But anything between 20

54:52

to 90 gets you a dirty bomb, a

54:54

radioactive dirty bomb. Um, and so Iran

54:57

went there and said, "Well, we're not

54:59

quite at the 90 weapon 90% weaponization

55:02

yet, but why?" But they exceeded 20.

55:04

Every other country could arguably do

55:06

the same thing. They could say, "We're

55:08

not going to build a bomb, but we're

55:09

going to come very close where if we

55:10

feel that we need to do it in a matter

55:12

of weeks, days, months, we could quickly

55:14

do it if we think there's a threat."

55:16

That's a threshold.

55:17

Do you think Trump was right to bomb

55:18

Iran?

55:20

Do I think he was right to bomb Iran?

55:21

Um, I think diplomacy with Iran has been

55:26

exhausted with this leadership.

55:28

Can you explain that to me from because

55:31

I'm really keen to just understand where

55:32

this conflict with Iran has originated

55:34

from.

55:34

So Iran up through 1979 it had a it had

55:38

various monarchies. The Pathi monarchy

55:40

that came into power in the 1920s was

55:42

was the last dominant one and it had

55:45

built at least through the cold war a

55:47

close relationship with the west

55:48

specifically the United States. Iran

55:50

served as one of the two pillars of US

55:54

power in the Middle East. The Saudis

55:55

being the other. This is before Israel

55:57

became important to the United States

55:58

national security uh system. And so Iran

56:01

and the Saudis represented really a

56:04

projection of US power in the Middle

56:05

East. With the revolution of 79 that

56:08

went away.

56:09

We supported the sha and

56:12

and the the you tell it.

56:14

Yeah. Absolutely. Right. So the United

56:15

States and the sha the king of Iran were

56:17

extremely close. I mean this peaked

56:19

under Richard Nixon and Kissinger's time

56:21

and um as a result uh the sha became

56:24

very very wealthy looked to rapidly

56:26

modernize the country but what he didn't

56:28

do Iran experienced tremendous economic

56:30

growth but not political growth to match

56:32

it. So what happens when a country

56:34

becomes wealthy and becomes more

56:35

modernized becomes more European which

56:37

is what the sha was trying to do the

56:39

people wanted other things that Europe

56:41

had. They wanted free elections. They

56:43

wanted free press. They wanted freedom

56:44

of assembly. Right? They they wanted

56:47

democracy to go with their dishwashers.

56:50

The thing is is the Shaw said, "I will

56:51

give you all of the trappings of

56:53

modernity, highrises, air conditioning,

56:56

indoor plumbing, dishwashers, electric

56:58

appliances. But this democracy that you

57:00

want, that's pushing it too far." So you

57:02

had this rapid economic growth, this

57:04

uneven political growth, and there the

57:07

seeds of revolution were planted. people

57:09

were unhappy and they said, "Wait a

57:10

minute. Why can't we have the other

57:12

things to go with this this this

57:13

growth?" So, the revolution happened.

57:16

There's a bunch of different forces

57:17

coming into play, not just the Islamist,

57:18

but the Islamists were the ones that

57:20

dominated at the end. And they cleared

57:23

everyone out. They killed them basically

57:24

marginalized them. And they have three

57:27

pillars they stand on, three like if you

57:29

want to call it their their mission

57:31

statement. Number one is independence

57:32

from the West. The this Iranian regime

57:35

believes no more dependence on the West

57:36

like the Sha did. Number two is the

57:40

destruction of Israel or hostility to

57:42

Israel. That is fundamental.

57:43

Why?

57:44

Because they see Israel as an outpost of

57:46

American power and arguably not

57:49

colonialism, but they see Israel as a

57:50

projection of US power. They also see in

57:53

their attempt to go to pillar number

57:55

three, which is exporting the revolution

57:57

to other Muslim Shia countries, they see

57:59

Israel as getting in the way because it

58:01

represents this non-Muslim

58:04

entity in an otherwise Islamic part of

58:06

the world. So it's inconsistent with

58:07

their their their goal of expanding the

58:11

Islamic revolution. You can't do that

58:12

when Israel is literally in the way. So

58:15

it has to go or it has to be diminished.

58:17

And they've said that.

58:18

Oh yeah. This is this is Humeni, the

58:19

founder of the republic. The these these

58:21

are his three his his three principles.

58:23

So you have these three principles. You

58:25

take any one of them away, the whole

58:27

edifice, the whole thing falls down.

58:28

It's like a tripod. Break one of its

58:30

legs, it's got it doesn't have enough to

58:32

stand on. So diplomacy with the US means

58:34

ending hostilities with the West and it

58:37

means acknowledging Israel in some way.

58:40

This government cannot do that.

58:41

Otherwise, it loses all credibility. It

58:44

it spent 40 plus years saying these are

58:46

the things we stand for. If they all of

58:47

a sudden abandon those principles,

58:50

they're going to have no credibility

58:51

with the public. Then why why why should

58:52

they still be in power?

58:54

It's not because the public wants

58:55

hostility with Iran and Israel. The

58:57

public wants relations. But this

58:59

government is saying, "We oppress you.

59:01

we terrorize you all because we're

59:03

keeping you safe and we're adhering to

59:05

these three principles.

59:06

And that's 40 years of brainwashing as

59:07

well.

59:08

Absolutely. Of indoctrination. So

59:09

diplomacy had reached its end. To answer

59:11

your question, a long answer to a good

59:13

question. Was Trump right to bomb it?

59:15

Trump had reached the limits of

59:17

diplomacy. And with Iran being a nuclear

59:19

threshold state and with Israel after

59:22

the 2023 Hamas attacks realizing it

59:24

could no longer tolerate this degree of

59:27

a threshold Iran, the time to act, the

59:31

pressure was there. So I think um

59:33

and the opportunity of the way it had

59:35

weakened

59:36

the defense systems, the proxies,

59:37

their true proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas,

59:39

right? So I think there was a window of

59:41

opportunity and there's Iran simply was

59:42

not going to abandon its nuclear program

59:44

on its own. Diplomacy was not going to

59:45

get us there. They don't want to. It

59:48

gives them too much leverage

59:48

and it's never going to abandon its

59:50

nuclear program.

59:51

I've learned to not say never anymore in

59:53

in in

59:53

but with a regime change I think that's

59:55

a different story. But in the existing

59:57

regime they will the regime will keep

60:01

um itself in power that's my point about

60:04

nor you know that's the analogy to North

60:06

Korea. We can that you we all kind of

60:09

agree on is that you know their

60:11

perception is if we have a nuclear

60:13

weapon then the west really can't mess

60:15

with us. And and you mentioned something

60:16

else I liked. You said that you know you

60:18

I think when you were saying if in the

60:20

role of the DNI or the president you get

60:23

information you were wrong. Okay. You

60:25

have to reassess. Our leaders and this

60:27

goes back to sort of the topic of this

60:29

this book I'm working on. Our male

60:31

leaders especially suffer from cognitive

60:33

dissonance. Right. Cognitive dissonance

60:34

is when you have a set of beliefs and

60:37

you get information that is inconsistent

60:39

with how with your beliefs that makes

60:42

all humans incredibly uncomfortable. All

60:44

right. What do you do with that? Well,

60:46

there's multiple ways that we

60:47

psychologically try to neutralize that.

60:49

One of them is you change your view. You

60:51

say, "You know what? I was wrong." This

60:53

is the correct way to see things. Most

60:54

people won't do that. That's

60:56

embarrassing. Most men won't do that.

60:58

Most men in positions of power

61:00

absolutely won't do that. If they admit

61:01

that they're wrong, then what does that

61:03

what does that say? Right? So, instead,

61:05

they double down. They reinforce. They

61:07

become stubborn. And they end up then in

61:09

order to justify that have to act

61:11

aggressively. So we suffer from

61:13

basically men

61:15

I'm right problem I told you so exactly

61:19

so you have to reinforce your false

61:21

belief because if you don't it means you

61:23

were wrong

61:24

and if you're Donald Trump if you're

61:25

Kame if you're Benjamin Netanyahu and

61:28

you were wrong how bad does that look

61:31

you're you're out your credibility is

61:32

gone in this culture that we're in

61:35

right so that leads to the other problem

61:37

the cognitive dissonance that that these

61:38

world leaders can't seem to handle

61:40

you think we were right to strike like

61:42

Iran.

61:43

I think that we did the right thing at

61:45

the wrong time. And and I will say that

61:47

because the president of the United

61:49

States is the president of the United

61:50

States. He's he's earned the seat. We

61:52

wanted him there. We voted for it. He

61:54

gets to do whatever he wants. But

61:56

considering the politics between Israel

61:59

and Iran at the time, considering the at

62:03

least at the very least inconsistent

62:05

intelligence that we have about the

62:07

actual status of the weapons that Iran

62:10

was developing. And then uh the the

62:14

political position inside the United

62:15

States being where it was with failed

62:17

tariffs, being where it was with uh an

62:20

inability to negotiate peace in Gaza, an

62:22

inability to negotiate peace uh in

62:24

Ukraine, where it was, if it was the

62:27

right thing to do, we we certainly seem

62:29

to have done it prematurely along with

62:31

preemptively.

62:32

When would have been a better time? And

62:34

I'm not I'm not a proponent of war. I'm

62:36

just wondering, there is never a good

62:37

time. When would have been a better

62:39

time? I mean, if you want to if you want

62:41

to speak like a parent, then you're

62:42

right. There's never a good time, right?

62:44

But, um, first of all, I think a limited

62:46

bombing run,

62:48

that's that's not how you eradicate

62:50

that's not how you totally obliterate a

62:52

country's nuclear capability. You have

62:54

to commit to either multiple bombing

62:56

bombing runs, you have to coordinate

62:58

attacks. Um, and in this particular

63:00

instance, Israel made an offer to the

63:02

United States and said, "Hey, we would

63:04

like for you to come in and use your

63:06

bunker buster bomb, this technology that

63:08

only you have, but if you don't, we have

63:12

other options." I would have loved to

63:14

have been like, "Let's see those other

63:16

options. Let's see how far you can take

63:18

this on your own because you're the one,

63:20

Israel, that has an existential threat

63:22

from Iran. You're the one who's dealing

63:25

with and had phenomenal success with the

63:27

proxies in your area in your region. And

63:30

we are the country that currently can

63:32

continue to say that we don't violate

63:35

sovereign borders for now, right? We we

63:38

obviously invade Iraq. We invade

63:39

Afghanistan. We've had our history with

63:40

this and and we've had our history of

63:42

breaking international law and we we

63:44

always have the option to stop, you

63:46

know, bombing across borders. But

63:48

instead of waiting, instead of letting

63:50

Israel kind of exhaust all of their

63:52

options, we went in. And why? And did we

63:56

go in because it was in our best

63:57

interest or did we go in because it was

63:59

somebody else's ven diagram bigger

64:02

benefit and our ven diagram smaller

64:04

benefit?

64:05

I have a theory about that. But first, I

64:06

want to ask you a question about your

64:08

subject, you know, matter expertise,

64:11

which is when you said, "Let's see let's

64:14

see Israel play out some of the other

64:15

options because and I'm talking about

64:17

the covert action that they had planned

64:19

because boy was did you I mean the

64:22

leaked tapes that were on the Washington

64:24

Post, Israel's covert action teams, that

64:27

was pretty stunning to me." Absolutely.

64:29

And I think it's best if you explain

64:31

maybe what we're talking about because

64:34

the we're as close to your I'm as close

64:36

to you as the vein on your neck.

64:38

Absolutely. So, one of the things that

64:40

we're seeing in the headlines now and in

64:42

the near future for sure is going to

64:43

continue to be this this ousting this

64:46

collection of suspected spies within

64:49

Iran because now Iran Iran has been a

64:51

Swiss cheese of spies of MSAD agents uh

64:55

informants for MSAD inside of Iran for

64:58

MSAD. MSAD is the uh is the Israeli

65:01

external intelligence collection

65:02

service.

65:02

Their version of the CIA.

65:04

Okay. So, the Israeli CIA

65:05

Israeli CIA. Correct. One of the major

65:07

differences between MSAD and CIA is that

65:10

MSAD is essentially exclusively focused

65:13

on one major enemy to Israel and that's

65:15

Iran. So a 100 almost 100% of their

65:18

effort goes into protecting against this

65:20

one existential threat where the United

65:22

States CIA is collecting on everybody.

65:23

Right? So with that kind of intelligence

65:26

focus plus the budget that Israel has

65:30

plus its partnerships with the West and

65:31

the technology that it can collect from

65:32

the West, it it has a far superior

65:34

intelligence advantage over Iran. So

65:37

cutting in for a second here, these are

65:39

the trigger we're talking about what we

65:42

were talking about earlier with

65:42

groundbre. These are trigger pullers.

65:45

These are covert action operators that

65:47

go in and kill people.

65:49

We have multiple types of infiltrations

65:51

inside Israel or inside Iran. But to uh

65:54

to the point that she's making um the

65:56

the covert action arm of MSAD inside

65:59

Iran is massive. That's how they were

66:01

able to go in across borders and launch

66:04

drones. They're finding now thousands of

66:08

prefabricated drones inside Tan that

66:10

were being built by by assets of MSAD

66:15

that were being controlled by AI within

66:17

Thran. So that Israel could essentially

66:19

at a press of a button fly hundreds of

66:21

homemade drones built inside the capital

66:23

of Iran like fabricated inside Iran. So

66:26

this

66:26

by Iranians

66:27

by Iranians.

66:28

Yeah. So this

66:29

and the level of deception and sort of

66:32

paranoia that comes with all of this

66:34

territory is shocking and stunning and

66:38

correct and and Iran has suspected this

66:41

for a long time has known that it exists

66:43

but maybe never to what extent because

66:45

it wasn't a a imminent threat. it wasn't

66:47

an eminent concern and then it became it

66:49

became one with this run with this uh

66:52

series of activities against Iran.

66:55

I was reading about the pages the other

66:57

day and I had no idea. I'd kind of seen

66:59

something on my feed but I thought I'd

67:01

I'd research it and essentially Israel

67:03

had managed to get the Iranian forces to

67:07

wear pages that they had manufactured

67:09

with bombs inside them and then they

67:11

exploded exploded all the pages. I mean,

67:13

even more impressive than that, they

67:15

didn't get anybody to wear a pager. They

67:17

found the model and type of pager. They

67:19

found the supply chain. They found the

67:21

fabricator for that. And then they

67:22

infiltrated infiltrated the fabricator

67:25

to make sure that they input those

67:27

explosive devices into the same make and

67:28

model that was going to end up in the

67:30

hands of Hezbollah. And then

67:31

that was in Lebanon by the way.

67:33

Oh yeah, that was okay.

67:34

Lebanon. Yeah.

67:34

But that's a proxy army of Iran. The

67:37

other thing I want to point out is

67:39

Western intelligence, the CIA

67:41

especially, completely missed 1979. It's

67:44

one of its biggest biggest failures in

67:46

the modern era. Um, the United States

67:48

and other Western agencies, even Israel,

67:50

are notoriously ineffective when it

67:52

comes to, I think, fully understanding

67:54

what's happening in Iran. What the

67:56

Israelis accomplished with their Mossad

67:57

agents is remarkable. But in terms of

67:59

the sentiment, the mood on the street

68:01

and the people's appetite for this group

68:03

or that entity for whatever reason,

68:06

maybe you can shed light on this. I am

68:08

trying to understand why the United

68:10

States has such a poor history of

68:12

understanding going all the way back to

68:13

the 53 coup, a classic case.

68:16

Even MI6 doesn't get it right. How is it

68:18

that they're so bad at this there, but

68:20

they can seem to do it everywhere else?

68:22

You can't expect any intelligence

68:24

organiz You can't expect any

68:25

professional intelligence organization

68:26

to be right 100% of the time.

68:28

Intelligence is this is something that

68:30

people often misunderstand, right?

68:31

Intelligence isn't when you know

68:33

something to be true. When you know

68:35

something to be true, it's a fact. Even

68:36

if it's a secret that you know to be

68:38

true, it's a fact. Intelligence is your

68:42

estimation, your guess of what you don't

68:44

know because if you knew it, it would be

68:47

a fact.

68:48

How does something like October 7th

68:50

happen when there is so much

68:51

intelligence in the region and there's

68:52

these MSAD forces, there's the CIA. How

68:54

does was it hundreds of people stormed

68:56

the border of Israel and did this brutal

68:59

attack presumably they had intel that

69:01

that was going to happen?

69:02

Correct. I mean the the the findings

69:04

since the the day of the attack have

69:06

shown that there were multiple reports

69:08

there were multiple operators and

69:10

officers who escalated this problem. The

69:13

one of the downsides of democracy is

69:15

that when you have a bureaucracy that

69:19

has kind of has channels of command and

69:22

and people have to agree and and

69:25

collaborate and validate each other's

69:26

information, everything moves much

69:28

slower. So what uh and anybody can

69:31

contribute to this, but um for October

69:33

7th, the IDF was in charge of border

69:35

patrol, border security. The IDF meaning

69:37

the Israeli Defense Force, which is a

69:38

military unit. They were in charge of

69:40

the the location

69:43

where the attack happened and they saw

69:45

evidence of rehearsals and practice

69:47

attacks and they saw an an escalation of

69:50

conflict and they reported up through

69:51

the bureaucratic chain of command but

69:53

somewhere in that chain of command

69:55

somebody saw it differently.

69:57

Yeah, exactly.

69:58

And then Shinbet which is the

70:00

essentially the FBI equivalent uh in

70:03

Israel

70:03

internal security

70:04

internal security never got the complete

70:07

accurate memo from IDF. And then MSAD's

70:09

information on what may or may not be

70:11

happening was was obviously never uh

70:14

part of the finished intelligence that

70:15

did make it up to the policy makers. So

70:18

there were pl there was evidence that

70:19

was only really identified postfact

70:22

which is exactly what happened with 911

70:23

too. There was information that was only

70:25

identified after the effects.

70:27

And I think it's also the good old

70:29

cliche you know hindsight is 2020

70:33

applies in all of these situations

70:35

whether it's Pearl Harbor or 911. I

70:37

mean, intelligence failures are what

70:40

change the trajectory of history. But if

70:42

you do interview a lot of CIA people, as

70:45

I do, I often hear this, and it may or

70:47

may not be true, which is, Annie, no one

70:50

ever hears all the attacks we stopped.

70:52

And then I say, well, tell me about

70:54

them. They're still classified. You

70:56

know, so I mean that's why narrative is

70:59

so interesting to me because uh first of

71:02

all it it feels personal because you can

71:05

relate to it. Even if we can't relate to

71:07

being in the White House, we can

71:09

certainly relate to being stubborn about

71:11

not wanting to change our opinion or,

71:13

you know, putting together a certain set

71:15

of facts and saying we all probably do

71:17

this in our own home. Oh, this,

71:19

therefore, or that. And then we're

71:21

wrong.

71:21

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71:23

backed many more. And there's a blind

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71:27

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71:29

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71:31

they're reckless or they don't care.

71:33

It's because they're obsessed with

71:34

building their companies. And I can't

71:36

fault them for that. At that stage,

71:37

you're thinking about the product. How

71:39

to attract new customers, how to grow

71:40

your team, really how to survive. And HR

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72:29

What happens next with Iran with this

72:32

whole tension with with you know they've

72:34

said that there's this ceasefire but it

72:36

doesn't look like a great ceasefire.

72:37

There's a crisis of legitimacy that this

72:40

current Islamic government has to re

72:43

reckon with domestically. They have to

72:45

now look look at their people and say,

72:47

"Okay, we we've basically failed to

72:49

defend you." That they're trying to spin

72:51

that narrative saying that they did

72:52

defend the homeland. And they're trying

72:54

to use nationalism as a sort of a salve

72:57

as a as a as a as a treatment to justify

73:02

or to explain or to sort of wash over

73:04

what happened. There's going to be new

73:06

leaders. The Supreme Leader right now

73:08

is, you know, frail. He's been frail.

73:10

He's been on the verge of death for

73:11

years now, setting aside attempts to

73:13

kill him. um and the the crisis of

73:16

succession, who comes next is going to

73:18

be now amplified much more, a greater

73:20

sense of urgency, and then whether or

73:22

not the next leaders of the revolution

73:25

of the revolutionary guard, which is

73:26

sort of Iran's um so just to explain

73:28

something, Iran has two militaries.

73:31

There's the Iranian military that

73:32

protects its borders and domestic

73:34

security, oddly enough, and then there's

73:36

the IRGC, the Islamic Revolutionary

73:39

Guard Corps, which is protecting the

73:40

revolution. The R in IRGC stands for

73:44

revolution.

73:45

The I does not stand for Iran. It stands

73:48

for Islamic. In other words, they are

73:50

protecting what happened in 79. They are

73:52

not interested in the country. That's

73:55

what the army does. The army protects

73:56

the country. The IRGC protects the

73:58

movement. And so the IRGC is the most

74:02

powerful entity in Iran. and what who

74:04

their next generation of leaders or next

74:07

level of leaders that rise up, what

74:08

their views are. Are they willing to

74:10

cooperate with the rest? Are they going

74:11

to double down on nuclear enrichment?

74:13

Are they going to take things

74:15

underground? Are they going to kick out

74:16

the IAEA permanently? Are they going to

74:18

pull out of the NPT? We don't know the

74:20

answer to these questions.

74:21

And what's the public unrest going to be

74:23

like? Can somebody emerge? Because you

74:26

cannot have resistance without a

74:28

movement led by, you know, a figurehead

74:31

of some kind. And this regime has been

74:33

incredibly good. In the last few days,

74:34

they've executed three or four potential

74:36

people who they think could emerge as as

74:39

I didn't know that they killed three or

74:40

four people.

74:41

About three, I think. Three. Three for

74:42

sure. There's a fourth. I'm waiting to

74:44

get confirmation. Yeah. People that

74:45

they're that they're afraid of

74:47

who could use this period of instability

74:50

and um uh and um deregulation to ferment

74:54

rebellion and insurrection. It's the

74:55

last thing. And that's where I'm going

74:57

to butt in here, and you're going to

74:58

correct me if I'm wrong, but if we were

75:00

in a different presidency and a

75:03

different era, like you know, this is

75:05

where the CIA would be in Iran and would

75:08

be fermenting

75:10

change because that is ultimately what

75:12

the American goal is,

75:14

which is absolutely should not be doing

75:16

ever. It did it in 53,

75:18

but I didn't say it should or shouldn't.

75:20

I'm just saying it would have meaning

75:21

not not should or shouldn't from a moral

75:23

perspective. It just simply doesn't.

75:26

This is it doesn't work. For this to

75:28

have legitimacy for decades to come, it

75:31

has to be organic, homegrown, freerange,

75:34

you know, grass. It

75:36

can sometimes hide itself so

75:38

dramatically that it's not even known

75:40

it's there.

75:40

Iran is not want

75:43

Iran is and again I say this as a as a

75:45

very proud Persian. Iran is different

75:47

than I think other theaters of conflict

75:50

where the CIA has operated. You know,

75:52

Iranian civilization and nationhood goes

75:55

back thousands of years. It's very

75:57

different. It does not take wealth. It's

75:59

not like Iraq, which is a fabricated

76:01

state. Didn't exist until 1917, 1918

76:04

after the Sykes Pico agreement or, you

76:06

know, the modern Middle East is very

76:08

different. So, you want the medal in the

76:09

Middle East, fine. But Turkey, Egypt,

76:11

Iran, these are nations that have

76:13

existed for thousands of years. That's a

76:15

game that the United States intelligence

76:17

agencies, and I would add, MI6, the UK

76:19

hasn't figured it out either. Andrew,

76:21

what do you think happens next in this

76:23

region? Are we going to reach peace? Are

76:25

they going to form an alliance with the

76:26

US?

76:27

So, I I'm I'm smart enough not to not to

76:31

debate um because I am largely ignorant

76:33

on the political divisions and internal

76:36

politics of Iran and I know that CIA has

76:39

very little idea of what's going on in

76:41

Iran most of the time also. And and I I

76:43

am suspicious that a big part of why we

76:45

went in at all was because Netanyahu in

76:48

Israel said, "Here's the intelligence

76:49

that we have." It's a very common game

76:51

in the world of intelligence. If you

76:53

have 80%, if you have 100% of of

76:55

knowledge, you're only going to share

76:57

20%. And you're going to share the 20%

76:59

that benefits you.

77:00

Do you think that's potentially what

77:01

happened?

77:02

I absolutely think that's

77:03

So you think Netanyahu in Israel could

77:04

have given selective intelligence to the

77:06

United States to provoke them to get

77:08

involved?

77:08

That's it. It only makes sense. It's

77:10

what a professional intelligence service

77:11

would do. It's it it's exactly what the

77:13

United States does.

77:14

And you don't think the US knows that

77:15

though that they're only getting

77:16

titrated amounts of information?

77:18

No. I I think I think even if they did

77:20

know that Netanyahu understands the the

77:23

Trump mentality of of horse racing.

77:26

That's Yeah.

77:27

Right. And and there's the world of

77:30

intelligence is a nasty nasty game. We

77:33

call it a gentleman's game,

77:34

but it's not at all. It's a it's a game

77:37

of of twisting people's distortions and

77:39

cognitive dissonance and playing into

77:41

biases and politics and and it's a nasty

77:43

nasty game.

77:44

So, what happens next?

77:47

What what I think we need to be prepared

77:49

for is that nuclear weapons are now

77:53

becoming less likely to be used. I think

77:55

the traditional World War II nuclear

77:58

weapon, the ICBM that's targeting a

78:00

civilian population, that is less likely

78:03

to be used. that is possibly full-on

78:06

unlikely to be used. But a dirty bomb,

78:09

what's that?

78:09

A dirty bomb being a 60% enriched

78:12

uranium deposit that's triggered through

78:14

some kind of explosive device that's

78:17

dropped off in a car trunk or dropped

78:18

off in a suitcase that

78:20

it doesn't have a weapon system,

78:22

but it just radiates the air.

78:23

You drive a truck in and you just

78:24

explode a a you know, it became

78:29

it causes like a like a radiation cloud

78:31

to hover above a city or a small area,

78:33

right? What about

78:34

that's what terrorists would have

78:35

What about tactical nukes?

78:36

And tactical nukes, I think, are also

78:37

something that we're very likely to see.

78:38

Since the end of World War II, what

78:40

we've seen is an increased investment

78:41

not in intercontinental ballistic

78:43

missile warfare, but in tactical nuclear

78:45

warfare. Tactical nuclear warfare are

78:47

warheads that are as small as 50 pounds.

78:49

And those can sit on the end of a short

78:52

distance rocket, a medium-range rocket.

78:54

Uh they can I mean they can be put in a

78:55

backpack and put on a put on a um a

78:58

drone for all intents and purposes. And

79:00

those tactical nukes have a very small

79:02

contained explosion, but it's still a

79:04

nuclear explosion. And the reason the

79:06

tactical nukes are so valuable is

79:08

because now you can use them against

79:09

military targets. So what we

79:11

I have a I have to totally I got to take

79:14

like can be used against should never be

79:18

said. Right. So that's my line in the

79:20

sand. Tactical nuclear weapons are not

79:24

are no longer in the US arsenal for

79:26

precisely that reason because they

79:28

cannot be used because the escalation to

79:32

strategic weapon nuclear weapons which

79:34

is one continent to the next big systems

79:37

big delivery systems is inevitable. But

79:39

keep going.

79:40

You're saying it's a slippery slope.

79:41

It's a

79:42

it's not a slippery it's it's a dividing

79:44

line. You can't even enter into the

79:46

slope. It's like if you get pushed off a

79:48

cliff there's no going back. It's not a

79:50

slope. It's a cliff in in my

79:52

understanding of nuclear war games and

79:54

everyone at the Pentagon knows that no

79:56

matter how nuclear war begins, it ends

79:59

in total annihilation. Which is why

80:02

America no longer has tactical nuclear

80:04

weapons in its arsenal. We used to we

80:07

used to have small nukes that you could

80:09

put in a backpack and jump out of a of

80:11

an aircraft and I know people who

80:13

rehearsed that during the Cold War.

80:14

You can definitively say the US has none

80:16

in its arsenal or none that we know of?

80:18

No, no, no, we don't. Now you can det

80:20

you could say that the ones on bombers

80:23

because we have a certain kind of one

80:24

nuclear weapon that that is on a that

80:27

can be flown in and it can be d its size

80:30

can be dialed down

80:32

and that makes it tactical.

80:34

Why have we got nuclear bombs then at

80:35

all if if we can ever use them?

80:38

That's the saying we can't have tactical

80:40

nuclear bombs because if we have we

80:42

would never use them and if we did the

80:43

world's over basically. So why do we

80:45

have nuclear bombs? Because the same

80:46

principle applies.

80:47

We do have nuclear bombs.

80:49

We might as well have the tactical one.

80:50

Absolutely. No. And I do believe that's

80:52

one of the wise the wise moves of the US

80:56

nuclear command and control

80:58

because the tactical ones will lead to

80:59

the big ones.

81:00

A thousand% not even 100%.

81:02

But if that's true, then why have the

81:03

big ones?

81:04

Well, that's the bigger question. But

81:06

our position on why we have nuclear

81:09

weapons is one word. It's called

81:10

deterrence. we are going to deter you

81:13

from using your nuclear weapons against

81:15

us because we have an arsenal and you

81:18

have an arsenal. It's this bizarre

81:20

catch22 paradox of why we can't get rid

81:23

of nuclear weapons.

81:24

We're now seeing we're seeing where

81:26

reality and policy butads

81:28

because Annie's right. The policies on

81:31

this are clear as mud, but they are

81:35

stated and restated over and over again

81:37

in order to get the American populace,

81:39

the American people to be able to

81:41

stomach the fact that we have all these

81:43

nuclear weapons. Right? The fact that we

81:45

put our nuclear weapons in five other

81:48

countries around the world, right?

81:50

Belgium is sitting there holding our

81:52

nukes. Italy is holding our nukes,

81:55

making them a target

81:57

and giving them a nuclear weapon in

82:01

their own border,

82:02

which they can't use, which they cannot

82:04

use without the president of the United

82:06

States authorizing it. So, it's very

82:08

precarious.

82:09

But who who would be able to use it if

82:11

they wanted to?

82:12

So, here's the every weapon is

82:14

different. Every weapon is different.

82:15

And and I I say this because the truth

82:18

of nuclear weapons is far scarier than

82:21

the average person understands, which is

82:23

a big part of why I believe like you,

82:26

they will never get used at a strategic

82:30

level because because the people who

82:31

actually handle the weapons, the people

82:33

that you're talking to, they understand

82:35

the devastating consequences of these

82:36

weapons, but the lay person gets very

82:38

very confused sometimes. So, a a small

82:43

warhead,

82:44

let's just say 30 kilotons of of

82:47

explosive power, right, which is still

82:49

twice what we dropped on Hiroshima.

82:52

A small warhead does an immense amount

82:55

of damage. It annihilates 10 square

82:57

miles, let's say, of of whatever it

83:00

wherever it explodes. If it's a surface

83:02

explosion, if it's an altitude

83:04

explosion, it doesn't destroy really

83:06

anything. It leaves an EMP footprint

83:08

that destroy that that shortcircuits

83:11

wiring, right? And that can be a huge

83:13

EMP. Thank you. An EMP uh pulse that

83:16

destroys everything beneath it.

83:17

What is an EMP?

83:18

An EMP is an electromagnetic pulse. It's

83:20

a it's a um electrical discharge that

83:25

comes from a nuclear detonation or other

83:27

sources that uh infiltrates through

83:30

technology, wiring, etc., etc., and it

83:31

shorts it or burns out the wiring. So,

83:33

think of like a massive surge. Like a

83:34

massive power surge. Yeah. Or you can

83:36

you can detonate them underground

83:37

underwater to create natural effects.

83:40

You can create earthquakes. You can

83:41

create tsunamis. You can create vapor

83:43

bubbles that are just destructive. So

83:45

there's lots of different ways that you

83:46

can use a weapon. But the thing that

83:48

concerns me is that because the US

83:50

policy is so black and white as it's fed

83:52

to the American population, it's that

83:54

much more inviting for one of these

83:56

other countries to use a nuclear weapon

83:59

in a specific way to create uh chaos to

84:03

create um a lack of clear acquisition.

84:07

For example, if a small Russian nuke

84:10

which lives in Bellarus because Russia

84:12

puts their nukes in Barus finds its way

84:14

into Tel finds its way into Kiev and

84:17

explodes in the back of a truck. Who do

84:20

you blame? Does the US blame Russia?

84:22

Does the US blame Barus? Does Russia

84:25

take responsibility for it? Does does

84:27

Europe say that it's an attack from the

84:28

Russians? What do you say? Because now

84:30

you just had a nuke go off and the

84:32

world's confused. And the same thing

84:33

happens if if China uses a tactical nuke

84:36

to destroy in the ocean in the South

84:38

China Seas. If China uses a tactical

84:40

nuke to blow up five Filipino ships,

84:44

what is that? It was a small nuclear

84:46

device that was used in a latoral

84:48

situation that was only attacking, you

84:51

know, military forces that were that

84:53

were quote unquote violating some sort

84:54

of uh free free space. What do you do

84:58

there? Do you That's not when you

84:59

launched ICBMs. So what do you do? What

85:03

happens there, Annie?

85:04

That's the nightmare situation. I mean,

85:06

attribution or rather nonattribution of

85:10

a nuclear weapon

85:11

figuring out where it came from.

85:12

Yes. When you don't because if a

85:15

strategic nuclear weapon is launched, an

85:17

ICBM, we the United States knows

85:20

precisely where it came from because we

85:23

see it from our satellite systems in

85:25

space in the first second after launch.

85:28

So that is the fundamental of

85:30

deterrence. Not only can you not launch

85:32

at us, but we will know in one second

85:34

and we will be back at you before yours

85:37

even get to us. That's how that works.

85:40

But what Andrew is saying is deeply

85:42

troubling. And another reason to our

85:46

conversation about why Iran should not

85:48

have the bomb or anyone for that matter.

85:50

It's dangerous enough that you have nine

85:52

nuclear armed nations um who could as

85:56

you say you know someone could in Barus

85:58

could wind up with something that's

86:00

incredibly dangerous but you do not want

86:02

anyone else into this mix

86:05

including non-state actors which which

86:07

would be Hezbollah Hamas the Houthis if

86:10

you're Israel the concern is not so much

86:12

that Iran will use it but Iran will

86:14

provide it to a non-state entity that is

86:17

not bound by any international law or

86:20

rules of warfare and Iran can claim

86:22

deniability that

86:24

and that's why President Trump bombed

86:27

for that's that's why

86:28

so imagine imagine Israel is one of the

86:31

nine

86:32

one of the nine nuclear capable

86:33

countries imagine this MSAD that is

86:36

absolutely capable of incurring across

86:37

Iranian borders smuggle in a 50 lb

86:41

tactical nuke and they take it and they

86:43

put it inside one of the testing ranges

86:46

or they put it inside one of the

86:47

facilities inside Iran and then they put

86:49

it on a time detonator and 13 hours

86:52

later it goes off. There's a nuclear

86:54

explosion underground in Iran in an

86:56

Iranian facility that we in this

86:59

simulation we know it's triggered by

87:01

Israeli covert action but the whole

87:04

world sees an explosion go off in Iran.

87:06

So now the president wonders did they

87:09

just run a nuclear test? Iran raises

87:11

their hand and say we did not run a

87:12

nuclear test. Somebody put a nuclear

87:14

weapon in our territory. Who believes

87:16

who? Right? What does Saudi Arabia

87:18

believe? [ __ ] Iran has nuclear

87:20

capability. We're nuclear threshold.

87:22

Boom. Let's get it going. Japan nuclear

87:25

threshold. They start get their program

87:26

going.

87:26

And how bad does it look for Iran if it

87:28

admits that Israeli commandos or agents

87:30

made their way into one of the most top

87:32

secret facilities

87:33

right under their nose.

87:34

Right.

87:35

So I have a I have a curiosity which you

87:40

might know possible theory.

87:42

Some sick curiosities. I we we should

87:44

share a drink.

87:45

No, this is this is like a terrifying

87:47

one is that after October 7th,

87:51

President Biden

87:53

went to Israel himself. He did not send

87:57

Blinken. Remember that?

87:58

This was in our

87:59

That was a big deal. That was a big

88:00

deal.

88:01

This is in ours. This was not a man who

88:02

was, you know, out playing football.

88:04

Okay. He goes to the heart of the battle

88:10

zone. Why? My theory is that he said to

88:15

Netanyahu,

88:16

"There's one line you may not cross. And

88:20

if you cross it, we are not friends

88:22

anymore, ever again." And that's the

88:25

nuclear line.

88:26

That is my theory. No one's ever

88:28

Whenever I've asked anyone, they just

88:32

don't have an answer. Their lips get

88:34

very

88:34

get pursed.

88:35

Get very pursed and no one says

88:37

anything, which leads me to believe that

88:39

is precisely what happened. There's so

88:41

much going on around this map that sits

88:43

in front of us that is it all seems to

88:45

be happening at once with, you know,

88:47

Russia and Ukraine and you've got China

88:50

and with Taiwan. You've now got the

88:52

Middle East going off with Iran and

88:54

Israel and everything happening in Gaza.

88:58

It doesn't feel like this is going to go

89:00

the other way. It doesn't feel like this

89:01

is going to retract anytime soon. It's

89:03

funny because when Trump got elected, he

89:04

promised to like end these wars and

89:06

under his reign, it seems like there's

89:08

more wars popping up. And actually a lot

89:10

of this causes cover and distraction for

89:12

other people to start, you know,

89:14

invading countries that they they've got

89:16

a problem with. And we talked a little

89:17

bit about international law being

89:19

violated and new precedences being set

89:21

in terms of what you can do. We're now

89:23

at a point where it's kind of okay to

89:24

bomb a sovereign country. It's kind of

89:25

okay just to roll across the border and

89:27

just take what you want. So I think

89:29

that's where my concern starts. And I'm

89:31

looking over at the other side of the

89:32

map here with Russia and Ukraine and I'm

89:34

asking myself, how does that end? you

89:37

know, Putin can't just roll out of there

89:39

because then why why did he ever roll

89:41

in? I mean, it doesn't look like Ukraine

89:43

are going to hand are going to allow him

89:44

to take a part of their country. That

89:46

war is going to carry on. And then you

89:48

got China and Taiwan where the tension

89:51

has increased. And I think I read that

89:52

there's been more murmurss of conflict

89:55

or invasion going on with China in

89:57

recent times, which would probably be

89:59

now would be a great time. If you're

90:00

China and you want to take Taiwan, now

90:02

would be a pretty good time to do it.

90:03

Trump is busy. Not just busy. There's a

90:06

military test happening in Taiwan in the

90:08

next few days where they're practicing

90:09

or pre prepping for a amphibious

90:12

invasion from the Chinese People's

90:14

Liberation Army onto the the coast of

90:16

Taiwan. And so what have has the Chinese

90:18

government done in the last few days?

90:20

They have uh jammed GPS signals. They

90:22

have launched drones that are

90:24

interfering with radar uh basically and

90:27

um and and blocking shipping lanes um

90:30

legally within where they can be. But

90:32

the point being is that if you're

90:34

Taiwan, you're prepping for this

90:35

amphibious invasion that may not need to

90:37

happen because China can do plenty to

90:39

disrupt and make life for Taiwan

90:41

miserable without even setting one

90:43

soldier's foot on Taiwanese soil. So u

90:46

absolutely this is and and meanwhile the

90:48

US is is busy elsewhere. Look at the

90:51

missiles that were used to provided

90:53

Israel the THAAD missiles that were used

90:54

to defend against Iranian ballistic

90:56

missiles. Um it's been depleted, right?

90:59

So we're So if you're the US now, you're

91:01

at a at a weaker state of being able to

91:02

defend Taiwan than you were a month ago,

91:06

six months ago.

91:07

And there's also sort of a public

91:08

fatigue, right? Because now the the

91:11

public in the United States, they're

91:13

more polarized. There's even on the

91:14

right, there's some people that think we

91:15

should be going to war. On the left,

91:17

they think we shouldn't, etc. It's

91:18

getting quite murky. There's a lot of

91:19

backlash. And I'm sure Trump feels that.

91:21

Some of his closest media allies like

91:24

Tucker Carlson and half my Twitter feed

91:26

are saying he shouldn't have dropped the

91:27

bomb. shouldn't go to war. And I'm sure

91:29

that stuff gets to him. But Benjamin,

91:30

you believe I think that if there were

91:33

to be a trigger for World War II, it

91:35

would come from that region.

91:36

I think so. I think I think uh we would

91:38

see it in the form of a what we're

91:40

seeing now trade war, supply chain

91:42

crisis issues. We saw during COVID what

91:44

happens when the supply chains

91:45

disrupted. That was a sort of a a

91:47

nonhuman event, meaning it was, you

91:49

know, it was a virus. But imagine China

91:51

now banning the sale of all rare earth

91:54

minerals to the west, right? Um, these

91:56

are minerals that are used in the

91:58

construction of lithium ion batteries,

92:00

uh, microchips, processors, things of

92:01

that nature. And then imagine if China

92:03

says, "Look, we're simply not going to

92:04

sell these things to the United States

92:07

and its Western allies. Done. We're not

92:09

going to." What happens then? So, I

92:11

think a major conflict will be

92:13

precipitated by an economic and trade

92:15

war, which we're now basically in for

92:17

all intents and purposes. And until the

92:19

US can and western allies can diversify

92:21

by getting these resources elsewhere, I

92:23

don't know if occupying Greenland is

92:25

going to be the answer or making Canada

92:27

the 51st state will give us that. But

92:29

this is where the Chinese are very

92:31

effective. They have a large amount of

92:32

these minerals within their borders. We

92:35

know that there's a good amount in

92:36

Ukraine, which is why President Trump

92:37

wanted to make that deal with the

92:38

Ukraine to secure those mineral rights.

92:41

But these sort of this all goes back to

92:43

trade and technology. You don't need to

92:45

control territory for territory sake.

92:48

Now you need territory that has

92:49

something that's vital. Whether it's

92:50

oil, less so these days arguably, but

92:53

now it's rare earth minerals and access

92:55

to trade routes. That is where you start

92:57

messing with that, you are then lighting

93:00

the fuses of war,

93:01

which are already being messed with.

93:03

Everything that you just rattled off is

93:05

already in motion. It's already

93:07

happening. It's part of why I make the

93:08

claim that World War II is already

93:09

happening. If China invades Tyrron, if

93:11

if China takes Taiwan administratively,

93:15

judiciously, militarily, however they

93:18

choose to go in there, because we keep

93:19

thinking that they're going to like send

93:20

warships in and and and uh weaken the

93:23

the battlefield with missiles or

93:25

something. That's that's not how they

93:26

took Hong Kong. They took Hong Kong

93:27

administratively and then just moved in

93:29

the police after saying we have legal

93:31

right. That's exactly what they're doing

93:32

in Taiwan. They even have a a parliament

93:34

in Taiwan that's majorly uh pro-China,

93:38

right? So they meddled with the

93:39

elections in January enough to win a

93:41

majority in the parliament even though

93:43

they lost the presidency. Right? So I

93:46

actually and I think we're seeing the

93:47

same messaging coming out of Europe. If

93:50

China moves on Taiwan, the world kind of

93:52

does this and Taiwan's alone. Not only

93:56

because the president's distracted, but

93:58

also because NATO is distracted, Europe

94:00

is distracted, and the last thing

94:01

anybody wants is to fight over there

94:04

when there's so much [ __ ] happening

94:06

over here. But the thing is they don't

94:07

even need to move in and invade. All

94:08

they have to do is block shipping

94:10

routes, which they can do.

94:12

No one's going to challenge them on

94:13

that. And basically stop selling these

94:15

rare earth minerals to every country

94:17

that wants them. What do we do then?

94:18

Russia's not selling us what it has. You

94:20

know, Russia can choose to do the same

94:22

thing.

94:22

Well, that's not going to turn into a

94:23

kinetic war. The United States,

94:24

right? Exactly.

94:25

It'll turn into more of what we're

94:27

already seeing. More tariffs and more

94:28

threats and more trade and more more of

94:30

the same stuff that we're already

94:31

seeing, which is a big part of why I

94:33

think we're already in the middle of

94:34

that is I agree. That is the war we're

94:36

in right now. It just doesn't look like

94:37

the wars of the past.

94:39

I think it was Biden that said or

94:41

suggested that if China were to invade

94:44

or take Taiwan, then there would be in a

94:47

war. We'd be in a war.

94:48

But it doesn't need to. It doesn't need

94:50

to. For China to win, it doesn't have to

94:52

set foot on Taiwanese soil. All it has

94:55

to do is basically isolate Taiwan

94:57

economically, trade-wise, and then dare

95:01

anybody else in the West or elsewhere to

95:02

do anything about it.

95:03

Will they do anything about it? That's

95:05

really difficult to see.

95:06

Even France, even uh even the president

95:08

of France just came out recently and was

95:10

like, "Yeah, you know, if uh if China

95:12

takes Taiwan, I don't think France is

95:14

going to get involved."

95:14

Yeah. All if if if we in the West can

95:17

find our minerals elsewhere, I think

95:19

we'll throw Taiwan under the bus.

95:21

And under the Biden Chip Act, that's

95:23

exactly what we're trying to do is find

95:24

our diversified routes.

95:26

Haven't we got some like sworn promise

95:27

to protect Taiwan?

95:30

Yes. the officially. Yes, we have a

95:32

sworn promise to def to protect Taiwan.

95:34

I think that the wild card in all of

95:36

this is the current president.

95:39

No one knows how he is going to behave.

95:42

And I don't really believe that there's

95:45

such a thing as him being distracted.

95:47

I think that he will put his focus on

95:50

whatever it is he chooses and then

95:52

that's becomes the attraction.

95:54

Yeah. Xiinping also knows that he needs

95:57

a win right now and he also knows that

95:59

there's a huge economic benefit by

96:02

ingesting Taiwan and Taiwanese

96:04

semiconductors and Taiwanese

96:06

infrastructure and Taiwanese

96:07

capabilities because all of the United

96:09

States IP for semiconductors was

96:12

developed here and it's all being built

96:15

there. So when you take that you get

96:18

everything there that's a physical

96:20

infrastructure and everything here

96:21

that's intellectual property.

96:24

Has the probability of nuclear war ever

96:27

been higher in the last couple of

96:30

decades?

96:31

I think the Russia Ukraine the Russia's

96:34

invasion of Ukraine a few years ago um

96:37

and the immediate first few months I

96:40

should say the first year was the peak

96:43

of the last few decades. I think we've

96:45

we've backed away from that a little

96:46

bit, but I think that was the peak. I

96:48

don't think more today than let's say a

96:51

year ago, but I think a year and a half

96:52

ago more so than you know the 20 30

96:55

years prior.

96:55

And do you think if Iran had developed a

96:57

nuclear weapon, they would use it based

96:59

on those three pillars you described

97:01

earlier?

97:01

No,

97:01

you don't think they would?

97:02

No, because the regime is not suicidal

97:04

because if they had used it and we'd be

97:06

able to track it, um they'd be

97:08

destroyed. And they are they are a lot

97:10

of things. They might be crazy. They

97:11

might be irrational in some ways. They

97:13

are not suicidal. They're not willing to

97:15

die for this. They want they want like

97:17

Hitler and the thousand-year Reich. They

97:19

want this to endure and it's not going

97:21

to endure with the develop which is why

97:24

they why Kam the Supreme Leader

97:26

maintained a threshold of

97:28

nuclearization. If you cross that

97:29

threshold to being a nuclear weapons

97:31

state, then all of a sudden he has a big

97:33

target on his back either from within or

97:35

from without. And his goal is to have

97:37

the regime endure for a thousand plus

97:39

years, not to have it be sacrificed at

97:42

the altar of nuclearization.

97:44

Andrew, what do you think in terms of

97:45

probability? Higher, lower?

97:47

I mean, I I will give you a number. I

97:49

think there's a 30% chance that we're

97:50

going to see a nuclear detonation

97:53

in our lifetime. And here's why. Here's

97:56

why. Because

97:57

tactical or does it matter?

97:59

I'm saying any detonation.

98:00

Any detonation. Okay.

98:01

The last known nuclear detonation was

98:04

2017. Unless unless I'm mistaken, 2017

98:07

when North Korea did a test underground.

98:10

That wasn't that long ago. And there

98:12

were a series of tests that they did

98:13

before that in an environment where

98:16

testing is not supposed to happen

98:17

anymore.

98:19

We are now entering a season of more

98:22

conflict. We're seeing more and more

98:23

strong authoritarian type leadership.

98:26

Even if it's in in the lead of a of a

98:29

democratic country, we're still seeing

98:30

strong man type of of shamebased

98:33

leadership. this cognitive dissonance

98:35

where people were leaders will go

98:37

contrary to where their what their

98:39

advisers say. Leaders will go contrary

98:40

to what's in the best interest of the

98:42

people's opinion in pursuit of some sort

98:44

of strategic or even uh tactical

98:47

political aim

98:49

with more advanced weapons with more

98:51

transnational threats than ever before.

98:53

Transnational threats are threats that

98:54

don't derive from a national identity.

98:57

they derive from something else like a

98:58

drug cartel or a radical Islam or

99:02

radical Catholic for all we care. With

99:04

the rise of transnational threats, the

99:07

opportunity for someone to get their

99:08

hands on something that's nuclear and

99:10

then detonate that nuclear device

99:12

somewhere is just too great and it's

99:15

only getting greater. It's only getting

99:17

more with new cryptocurrencies. People

99:19

can pay for things and and financial

99:20

transactions can't be tracked as easily

99:22

as they were in the past. We are

99:23

definitely in an era where it's getting

99:25

worse. And I remember people asking me

99:27

this question two years ago and I put

99:29

the chances at 15 to 20%. So in just a

99:32

year, a year and a half, I've literally

99:34

seen us move the dial in my opinion

99:36

closer to we will see a nuclear

99:39

detonation in our lifetime

99:42

than we have in the past.

99:43

Can I ask you just qualify something?

99:44

Sorry. Is it um state or non-state

99:48

actor? You think more likely? Because I

99:50

I I will I don't think it will be a

99:52

state I don't think it will be a clear

99:54

state actor.

99:54

Got it. Okay, I have a couple couple

99:56

thoughts on that where I may actually

99:58

answer the question. So, this goes back

99:59

to your terrifying point about

100:02

miscalculation or mistake. So, I think

100:06

that the mistake is where the real

100:08

threat lies.

100:11

People at this table may remember in

100:13

November the UK gave, and I'm talking

100:16

about the Ukraine Russia conflict right

100:18

now. The UK gave the storm shadow. Yes.

100:21

To Ukraine. We gave the attackums. These

100:26

are systems like missile systems

100:28

essentially to be able to you know go

100:31

further into Russia with for allow allow

100:33

Ukraine to fire further into Russia. And

100:36

Russia was pissed off and in response

100:40

they fired an intermediate range

100:43

ballistic missile capable of carrying a

100:46

nuclear warhead. Okay, this is the first

100:49

time in history that a ballistic missile

100:51

was used in this kind of a kinetic war,

100:54

a hot war. And I was on an airplane

100:57

leaving London to and I went, "Oh my

100:59

god, is this that situation where I'm

101:00

not going to land because there's a

101:02

nuclear war?" Because that is precisely

101:04

the kind of thing I write in nuclear war

101:06

scenario where something's launched and

101:10

the United States because we have a

101:11

launch on warning policy launches before

101:15

it lands because we're not willing to

101:17

wait to see what was in that warhead.

101:20

Now what was in the warhead was nothing.

101:23

The Russians launched an interrange

101:26

ballistic missile into Ukraine with

101:28

nothing in the warhead. Why? I mean this

101:32

is so terrifying. Well, we learned later

101:33

when Lavough went on television, he said

101:37

that he had notified his American

101:39

counterparts

101:41

in advance. I was taken to the State

101:45

Department to see where that advanced

101:46

notice came into. And it's called the

101:48

NERK, the National Nuclear Security

101:52

Center in the State Department. I'm

101:54

messing up the name, but it's known as

101:55

the NERK. It's inside the State

101:57

Department. And it's basically uh hello,

102:00

we're not at war.

102:02

room, meaning every 90 seconds you hear

102:06

bing

102:07

bing

102:09

bing and that's all you hear. And I was

102:12

with the assistant secretary of state

102:13

who said, "Annie, that's the Russians

102:15

telling us we're not at war."

102:19

and Lav and she explained to me that

102:21

Lavrov

102:22

who's the Russian foreign minister

102:23

the Russian foreign minister when he

102:25

said on TV which went over everybody's

102:27

head including mine oh we notified our

102:30

American counterparts what did that mean

102:32

well what Mallalerie Stewart the

102:34

assistant secretary of state told me was

102:36

what it meant was that Lavaros rang up

102:38

the NERK and said you know we're

102:41

launching and it doesn't have a nuclear

102:43

warhead

102:44

that was such a big deal and I don't

102:46

think the average person understands how

102:48

big a deal that was when I think it was

102:50

called the Archnik.

102:51

It was called the Arashnik.

102:52

The Archnik was the newest, most modern

102:55

version of an ICBM, intermediate

102:57

ballistic missile, IMBBM,

103:00

that the Russian inventory had. We had

103:01

never seen it deployed. It's never been

103:03

it's never been seen before.

103:04

And it reminded the whole [ __ ] world,

103:07

you do not want to go down this road. A

103:10

a ballistic missile is a terrifying

103:13

terrifying tool.

103:14

Why? It launches into the atmosphere

103:17

where it splits into three parts. The

103:21

rocket, the booster, and then what's

103:22

known as a MV uh almost like a you

103:26

imagine a revolver. Take out the piece

103:28

that holds the bullets of a revolver and

103:30

it's called a multiple re multiple

103:33

independently targeted re-entry vehicle

103:35

MIRV. A warhead sits in each one of

103:38

those canisters of the revolver and then

103:40

it on its own can move in space and then

103:44

drop warheads in different trajectories.

103:47

And then those warheads as they come

103:48

down from space, not propelled, as they

103:51

just fall from space, they reach speeds

103:52

between Mach 2 and Mach 20. And then

103:55

they come in contact with whatever

103:56

they're targeted. when there's a warhead

103:58

on there, that warhead also it's it's

104:01

scheduled to um to explode at altitude

104:04

at surface level or underground,

104:05

whatever they choose. But there's no

104:08

stopping that [ __ ] weapon once it

104:10

drops the MV. Once the MV drops the

104:12

warhead, unless you have some sort of

104:15

tech that can intercept a Mach 20 to

104:17

Mach Mach 2 to Mach 20, which

104:18

no one has,

104:19

right? We claim that we have it, but

104:21

we've never actually tested it, right?

104:22

We try to in we try to intercept the

104:24

missiles on their trajectory or at least

104:27

when they're at their at their arc at

104:28

their precipice.

104:29

I don't think we've ever claimed to have

104:31

that you can that in terminal phase you

104:33

can take something out.

104:34

So um I I would want to fact check it

104:36

but either way but my point is when I

104:38

saw those lines of Mach 20 fire just

104:43

coming down into Ukraine I mean that's

104:45

the kind of when I went through nuke

104:46

school

104:48

that's the [ __ ] that that kept me up at

104:49

night. I was like, we can't live in a

104:51

world that does that. And not only did

104:53

Russia show us we can do that, but they

104:55

said we can do this with a new weapon

104:57

system that you've never seen.

104:58

We can do it with a new weapon system.

104:59

And we're gracious enough to tell you

105:03

through the NERK, this tiny little

105:05

pathway of diplomacy 30 minutes before

105:09

we're doing this and you're going to

105:11

take us at our word that it doesn't have

105:13

a nuclear weapon so that we didn't

105:15

launch on warning. It's such a game of

105:17

chicken. It's nuclear chicken. It's so

105:20

dangerous. What if the Nerk hadn't

105:23

intercepted that signal properly? It's

105:26

incredibly dangerous. Now, one more

105:28

thought if I may, on Andrew's prediction

105:31

of a of a radiological bomb, a dirty

105:34

bomb going off, which may or may not be

105:36

true. Unfortunately, that's a tough

105:38

number. And I wouldn't necessarily

105:40

disagree just given how rogue nations

105:41

work, given that terrorists have, you

105:44

know, expressed a desire to use weapons

105:47

of mass destruction against the United

105:49

States, which a dirty bomb is. But in my

105:53

thinking, a dirty bomb, as horrible as

105:56

it is, and it's going to kill people and

105:58

make land, you know, unusable for

106:00

thousands of years, it's not strategic

106:04

nuclear war. In other words, that's not

106:06

going to cause the United States to

106:09

launch on warning. First of all, it's

106:12

it's it's immediately not attributable.

106:14

You don't know who who left it in the

106:16

truck and exploded it. And so, it's a

106:19

different set of terrible.

106:21

And I believe that a country like Iran,

106:24

if they had a nuclear bomb, has the full

106:27

capacity to do something like that

106:28

because look at look at the different

106:30

terrorist tactics that they've used for

106:32

the past 50 years. I want to ask if

106:34

something else concerns the two of you.

106:36

Um, I read this morning that uh it was

106:39

recovered in Ukraine, a Shahed

106:42

autonomous drone. Uh, these are drones

106:44

that the Iranian government manufactures

106:46

and and provides to Russia. They're used

106:48

in the Ukraine theater. And what they

106:50

found on there was that there was a

106:52

Nvidia processor. Nvidia is a western

106:56

company, tech company. They're known for

106:58

being advanced on their AI development.

107:00

And basically that this drone, this AI

107:02

had autonomous capabilities, meaning you

107:05

could completely jam it, cut off any GPS

107:07

communications to satellites and this

107:09

thing would think for itself, deciding

107:11

when and where to go and what to do. Is

107:14

that a bigger because that is here with

107:16

us. It's being used actively in warfare.

107:18

Is that a bigger concern than a nuclear

107:21

armed um a nuclear armed ballistic

107:24

missile or or re-entry missile of some

107:26

kind? Something like this that would

107:28

have a tactical nuke on it. Is that of

107:30

a drone with a nuke?

107:31

A drone with a nuke or a drone with

107:33

Exactly. A a drone that is a autonomous

107:35

drone.

107:36

Yeah.

107:36

Yeah. That's terrible.

107:37

This is fascinating. I mean, this is now

107:39

this is now they now have these drones

107:40

that are thinking for themselves in

107:42

Ukraine because they're anticipating

107:43

that they can't communicate with

107:45

whatever

107:46

to put a drone to put a nuclear weapon

107:47

onto a drone, you have to have the

107:50

nuclear weapon, which is the just the

107:52

circular discussion of why

107:53

which the Russians have,

107:55

right? But the Russians I don't see

107:57

putting a nuclear weapon on a drone.

107:59

No, but if they put radiological if the

108:00

Iranians put a radiological bomb, a

108:02

dirty bomb,

108:02

the Iranians, that's a different story,

108:04

right? All right. This is this is an

108:05

Iranian made drone using an American

108:08

microprocessor with Chinese

108:10

anti-GPS, you know, jamming uh techn. I

108:13

mean, it was I mean it was fascinating.

108:14

This thing is a is a is a is a

108:16

autonomous flying computer that can just

108:19

think for itself and decide in the

108:20

moment, okay, I'm going to do this

108:22

instead of that. There is no more human

108:24

real life human feedback or control

108:26

mechanism.

108:27

I think there's two really fascinating

108:28

things about your question, right? first

108:30

is that you just described a drone that

108:33

was a bastard child of Chinese, Iranian,

108:38

and Russian tech

108:39

and American tech

108:41

stolen American tech. But but my point

108:44

is when we think about the the future

108:46

landscape that's a perfect example of

108:49

this rising

108:52

power in the east this this

108:53

collaboration in the east that is not

108:55

based on ideology because those three

108:57

countries have nothing in common

108:58

ideologically but they have so much in

109:00

common pragmatically with the idea of

109:02

combating the west. So that's the first

109:04

that was really interesting to me. Now

109:05

the second thing, this idea of an

109:06

AIdriven weapon. I I am going to be

109:08

wildly unpopular. I promise you by all

109:11

the sci-fi geeks out there. I think that

109:15

AI powered weapons are the next like

109:18

logical evolution and a good evolution

109:20

for us because I would rather trust an

109:24

AI that's been programmed appropriately

109:27

with the rules of warfare and what's

109:29

properly engagement law and all. I would

109:31

trust that over an 18-year-old with a

109:33

gun who's been indoctrinated by like the

109:36

American like crazy [ __ ] that we do to

109:38

get people ready for war. I would much

109:40

rather have some AI device that can't be

109:43

altered except by its own logical

109:45

process.

109:46

If the AI becomes self-aware and it's

109:48

preserving itself and can't so if

109:50

that's a huge if.

109:51

Yeah, that's the line. But that there's

109:53

a lot of ifs that have now slowly faster

109:55

than I realize are coming to fruition.

109:57

That's but that's the other concern.

109:58

Right. A

109:58

self singularity. Right. Right. a

110:00

singularity that becomes hellbent on its

110:03

own preservation, right? Which

110:05

again, that's those are two big ifs, the

110:06

singularity and then preservation, its

110:08

own self-preservation.

110:09

If if an AIdriven drone is meant to

110:12

target a specific enemy and it is um

110:16

noticing that it is being targeted,

110:18

it'll try to avoid being shot at or

110:20

taken down. Right.

110:21

It'll have countermeasures.

110:22

Exactly. And if it does so, if it has to

110:23

make the choice of, let's say,

110:25

detonating or going into a civilian area

110:27

and risking harm to a civilian

110:29

population that is contrary to its

110:30

mission objective, but to do so would

110:32

preserve its capabilities. It wouldn't

110:34

do that. That's what I'm wondering.

110:35

I mean, you're getting that self that

110:37

self-awareness.

110:37

That's what would most likely happen is

110:39

an AI an AI device like what you're

110:41

describing.

110:42

Yeah.

110:42

Would be would be programmed at the

110:44

mission set. It would come under fire.

110:46

It would be it would use its own best

110:48

judgment for counter measures. If those

110:50

counter measures were ineffective and it

110:52

was starting to to be to go down, the

110:54

next priority that it would have would

110:56

be to eradicate anything that's

110:58

intellectual property that it has on

111:00

board. Got it. So that's something that

111:02

we don't currently have. That's why it's

111:03

so dangerous when a B2 gets shot down

111:05

overseas. Everything

111:07

and also those systems from what I

111:09

understand are no longer going to be

111:11

single predator drones, single reaper

111:13

drones. They are drone swarms.

111:16

And so they work, which is its own set

111:18

of terrifying

111:20

Right. Drone swarms and kamicazi drone

111:22

swarms, no less at that where they're

111:23

they're designed to be destroyed, you

111:26

know, to hit their target and not come

111:28

back. The day that we see AIdriven

111:30

weapons is, I think, a day that most

111:32

veterans are probably looking forward to

111:34

because if you've seen the horrors of

111:36

war, if you've lost a friend, if you've

111:39

worn a [ __ ] medal for shooting other

111:41

people, like it's it's a horrible

111:44

horrible thing.

111:45

But how does that change the friction of

111:47

going to war? because it makes going to

111:48

war much easier, right?

111:50

It does. It absolutely

111:50

much more digestible.

111:51

And that's I think part of why we're

111:53

seeing this appetite for conflict moving

111:55

forward, right? I think we we would be

111:58

doing a disservice if we didn't talk

111:59

about the complacency of the world in

112:02

accepting this rapid evolution of

112:04

conflict.

112:05

What do you mean the complacency of the

112:06

world?

112:07

We're all just sitting here watching it

112:08

happen. It's almost in a sick way. I

112:12

think there are people watching the news

112:16

in anticipation of the next conflict.

112:18

It's almost turned into a giant NASCAR

112:20

race. Who's the next what's the next

112:22

thing that's going to happen? The horse

112:23

race effect that you were talking about.

112:25

We want to know what are the body

112:27

counts. We want to know who's winning.

112:28

We want to know what's the newest

112:29

weapon. It's become almost almost

112:33

TV. Well, it made me when you were

112:35

speaking of the war game that you

112:36

designed and you were talking about two

112:39

trolls in a bar, you know, it's like

112:42

that's like

112:43

that's my band name, by the way.

112:45

Okay. But it's literal and it's

112:46

figurative and it's narrative. So, it's

112:48

very interesting to me and it's

112:50

terrifying because it really does speak

112:53

to what you just said where

112:55

the body count from far away on

112:58

television is not the same thing as the

113:01

horror of the person experiencing it.

113:03

Indeed.

113:05

Is there anywhere on this map, Annie,

113:07

that that is safe in a war? Because you

113:10

know I think as a way of dealing with

113:11

the angst of this in our group chat me

113:14

and my friends we when these things

113:16

start kicking off all the time I think

113:18

this is a coping mechanism we all like

113:20

share the fact that some of us are you

113:22

know down here on the map and one of us

113:24

is in Australia but then my other friend

113:26

unfortunately he's in like Dubai and

113:28

we're always looking at a map and when

113:30

the bombs are going off. Is there

113:31

anywhere on this map that is safe in in

113:33

the event of a nuclear war?

113:35

Mhm. There's one tiny little place, New

113:37

Zealand, and a little bit of Australia.

113:40

And that has to do with, if you follow

113:41

the idea of nuclear war, that

113:43

agriculture fails when we have a nuclear

113:46

winter and the sun gets blocked out and

113:48

there's no more. You know, there's large

113:50

bodies up in the mid- latatitudes are

113:52

frozen over in sheets of ice. And when

113:56

you have all the billions of people

113:58

dying, it's because agriculture fails.

114:00

And it is said by those who study this,

114:02

the authors of Nuclear Winter, that

114:04

there are some areas in Australia and

114:05

New Zealand which would remain viable.

114:08

But you're talking about kind of hunter

114:10

gatherer type people. Now among the

114:14

stranger conversations I have had since

114:16

nuclear war scenario published was with

114:20

several billionaires who actually have

114:23

bunkers in New Zealand.

114:25

No. Oh yeah,

114:26

they will remain nameless. But they were

114:28

very

114:29

I will not name them. I will not name my

114:31

sources. But they but what was

114:33

interesting to me it was that

114:35

um these individuals were

114:38

the response to reading my book and

114:41

realizing the world could end in 72

114:44

minutes wasn't let's all get together

114:47

and make sure nuclear war doesn't

114:49

happen. Or maybe it was and I just

114:51

didn't hear that part of the

114:52

conversation. But it was more about how

114:54

fast can I get my G5 um loaded so I can

114:58

get to New Zealand because a G5 can an

115:02

aircraft a person a private aircraft can

115:03

take you from Los Angeles to New Zealand

115:06

without refueling. And so I think what

115:10

I'm saying on a narrative level and it

115:13

speaks to the watching of TV or the

115:15

trolls in the bar is like and this is me

115:18

the parent speaking. It's like I really

115:20

believe in diplomacy. I really do

115:22

believe in communication. Um I'm often

115:26

accused of sounding polyianaish here,

115:29

but I will cite I I spoke of the Reagan

115:33

Gorbachoff

115:35

joint statement nuclear war cannot be

115:38

won and must never be fought. But what

115:40

preempted that was these two individuals

115:43

Reagan and Gorbachoff, you know, arch

115:45

enemies, the United States and the

115:47

Soviet Union. This is in 1983.

115:50

Ronald Reagan saw the movie The Day

115:53

After, A Great Narrative, uh, an ABC TV

115:56

movie about a nuclear war, and it so

115:59

upset him. He was Reagan being a nuclear

116:02

hawk. It so upset him that he reached

116:04

out to the archeneemy,

116:07

the Soviet Union, Gorbachev, and said,

116:10

"We need to have a dialogue and we need

116:12

to reduce our arsenals.

116:15

We're not going to live forever." And

116:16

when we think about all the existential

116:18

threats that are in front of us, some

116:20

people say the sun's going to explode or

116:21

some AI is going to get out of control

116:23

in pest control um scenario where it

116:26

just kind of takes us out or whatever.

116:28

But but it appears to me that the

116:30

greatest existential threat we have is

116:32

ourselves in this regard and that and

116:34

these weapons of that can wipe out this

116:36

planet in a couple of minutes are

116:37

clearly the greatest existential threat.

116:39

And there doesn't seem to be any way

116:40

back from that

116:42

which is a great opportunity to realize

116:46

you know this is the the pathway of more

116:49

wars is not the only way.

116:53

I have a a strangely more optimistic and

116:56

fatalistic um perspective here. So when

116:59

I look at this map, I think there's lots

117:01

of places that are safe in the event of

117:02

a nuclear conflict, especially if you

117:06

consider traditional nuclear conflict,

117:07

which is going to come from the the nine

117:09

states that are nuclear capable. You're

117:12

going to see whatever exchange of

117:14

strategic or tactical warheads happen.

117:16

You're going to see trade winds take

117:18

whatever debris comes specifically from

117:21

surfacebased detonations because uh

117:24

seedbased uh detonations and uh air

117:28

based detonations will not create the

117:29

same amount of fallout. So you'll see

117:31

trade winds do what they do. But in

117:33

large part you're going to see two

117:34

centers of the map firing at each other.

117:37

So South America is going to get spared,

117:39

Africa is going to get spared. Europe is

117:42

going to be absorbing bad winds

117:44

depending on what the trade winds look

117:46

like. Uh like Southeast Asia and

117:49

Australia largely these are going to be

117:51

spared locations depending on what

117:52

Pakistan and India do. Right? But my

117:56

concern isn't the nuclear factor. It's

117:58

the human factor after that. When Russia

118:01

or China and the United States and

118:03

Israel and and and Iran, when all these

118:05

countries are just destroyed by their

118:07

own conflict and whatever fragmentaryary

118:10

governments are trying to reset

118:11

themselves, you've lost all of that GDP,

118:14

you've lost all of that infrastructure,

118:16

you've lost all of that that world

118:18

order. So now people are just going to

118:22

get worse. African warlords are just

118:23

going to get worse. Latin American

118:25

warlords are just going to get worse. I

118:26

mean, it's going to be the age of the

118:27

warlord again. I don't know if that's as

118:29

much a fatalistic view as perhaps it is

118:31

a naive view because when one of the

118:35

components that you left out are the

118:38

fires that will be burning after the

118:39

nuclear detonations and the fires

118:41

burning are what lofts the soot and that

118:44

is what causes a nuclear winter. And if

118:46

you look at the climate modeling, even a

118:49

small air quotes nuclear war between

118:52

India and Pakistan is enough to cause a

118:55

mini nuclear winter. And so there will

118:58

be no African warlords because they will

119:01

starve as well. There will be no

119:03

resetting of any of these governments.

119:06

In my understanding,

119:08

interviewing the experts on nuclear war,

119:10

looking at the the climate models that

119:13

now tell us this very factually that

119:18

humanity

119:19

dies. And so I don't think it's a reset

119:22

at all, unless a reset is like us going

119:25

back to our huntergatherer state from

119:29

12,000 years ago trying to figure out

119:31

how to kind of evolve again. I mean

119:34

that's I don't think that human I don't

119:36

think that all human beings will be

119:37

lost. There will be human beings that

119:39

make it through that. And if there's if

119:41

there's modeling then the modeling is

119:44

based on averages. And I I I would love

119:46

to see how a nuclear winter spreads

119:50

across the globe. But the idea that

119:53

humanity would end meaning the last

119:56

human being would be lost. The

119:58

probabilities of that just seem

119:59

unrealistic.

120:00

No, I don't think it's an extinction

120:01

level event. I think it's a near

120:03

extinction level event. I mean that was

120:04

an idea that was first proposed by Carl

120:06

Sean based on the climate modeling that

120:09

was available in the 80s which was

120:11

pretty you know how the computers were

120:13

but now you're looking at this the

120:15

modeling and again this is just p based

120:17

on like soot going into the atmosphere

120:20

that you maybe you with your training

120:22

would be one of the survivors but the

120:24

rest of us

120:25

I'll tell you exactly what my training

120:27

when I lived underground in a silo

120:30

we knew that if a nuclear weapon went

120:32

off above ove your head.

120:36

Take your life while you can

120:37

because trying to survive what's left

120:39

behind is going to be worse. Dying as

120:41

your as your organs melt is far worse

120:45

than shooting yourself in the head

120:47

today. And that may sound terrible, but

120:49

what we're talking about is terrible

120:51

times.

120:52

What we're talking about is terrible

120:53

times. And nobody wants to try to It's

120:56

not like the movies and the TV shows.

120:58

Nobody wants to try to live through

120:59

that. You either get spared because you

121:01

are luckily on vacation in Patagonia

121:04

when it happens and then you just have

121:05

to figure out how to live off of [ __ ]

121:07

weeds and and sheep or you're somewhere

121:11

where you can't avoid it. We often joke

121:14

in a in a dark kind of way. If you see a

121:17

mushroom cloud, run towards it because

121:21

you will much prefer the sunburn than

121:23

the survival rate afterwards.

121:24

My takeaway from what you said was

121:26

Middle Earth indoors. See, that's why I

121:28

said New Zealand. I was thinking I was

121:30

like, Benjamin,

121:31

Middle Earth indoors. Narrative. There's

121:32

your narrative.

121:33

I thought it was So, my understanding is

121:34

that there's actually three safe zones.

121:36

You are right.

121:37

There's Hawaii. No,

121:38

I thought it was Hawaii. Uh, correct me,

121:40

but I thought it was Hawaii, Greenland,

121:41

and New Zealand

121:43

because there's so many targets in

121:45

Hawaii,

121:47

Pacific Fleet.

121:48

It would be

121:49

a target

121:49

a target of nuclear catch. And same with

121:51

all of Europe

121:52

because I don't and you know when I talk

121:54

about a full-scale nuclear exchange I I

121:57

certainly in my book I'm talking about

122:00

thousands of warheads

122:00

you're talking about Russia and the

122:02

United States being involved in a

122:04

full-scale nuclear exchange.

122:05

How does that what's the sequence of

122:07

events that leads us there? Because

122:08

you'd think just launching one nuclear

122:10

warhead would would have a pretty big

122:11

impact. How big are our biggest nuclear

122:13

warheads in terms of the radius and

122:15

impact they can have? I'm thinking of

122:16

the movie War Game. Remember in the 80s

122:18

which kind of had a visualization of

122:20

that?

122:20

And in at that point in time we had

122:22

70,000 nuclear warheads. Now we have

122:24

12,300 appro approximately between the

122:27

nuclear armed nations approximately

122:30

10,000 of which are in the US and

122:32

Russia. So we each have 5,000.

122:35

Why do you need that many?

122:37

That's my point. That's that is the

122:39

point. That was the point that Reagan

122:40

and Gorbachoff began. And they it is

122:43

because of their initial work that the

122:46

world has moved in the direction of arms

122:49

reduction which I believe is the hopeful

122:52

the only hopeful direction that we must

122:56

move

122:56

when it comes when it comes to nuclear

122:58

strategy the this the sense behind the

123:00

weapon is that uh the average warhead I

123:04

believe is about 300 kilotons right now

123:06

a modern-day ICBM can carry about 10

123:09

warheads sometimes between three and 10

123:10

but they they try to minimize the number

123:12

of missiles by maximizing the number of

123:14

warheads. So the detonation from a 300

123:18

kg detonation is a specific amount of

123:21

space. I think it's like 50 miles orund

123:23

110 miles of blast radius and like 15 to

123:25

30 miles of of fireball.

123:29

So, when you are targeting the MV on

123:31

your destination,

123:33

the MV,

123:34

the multiple independently targeted

123:35

re-entry vehicle, the little um revolver

123:38

in the sky,

123:38

when you're targeting that, when you're

123:40

programming that to release, you're not

123:42

trying to hit the same place with 10

123:43

warheads. You're trying to spread your

123:45

warheads so that the blast radiuses

123:48

eradicate everything in the footprint.

123:51

So, you need 12,000, 10,000, 5,000

123:54

missiles per country. You need 5,000

123:56

warheads so that each warhead can cover

123:59

what 300 square miles and you can

124:01

blanket it across multiple strategic

124:04

targets and completely eradicate your

124:07

opponent's ability to wage a

124:09

counterattack.

124:10

And Russia are pretty paranoid of the

124:12

nuclear program and the United States.

124:14

So they created this dead hand system.

124:16

Mhm.

124:16

What is the dead hand system?

124:17

The dead hand system is exactly like it

124:19

sounds. It's from the Cold War. And it

124:21

was this idea, the paranoid sort of

124:24

pullet bureau was thinking, what if

124:27

those Americans do a preemptive nuclear

124:31

strike and kill us all before we even

124:35

have a chance to launch? We want to be

124:37

able to make sure that we end the world

124:40

and kill all of them. That's kind of the

124:42

idea behind it. And so they came up with

124:44

this system which is now known as the

124:45

dead hand because you could literally be

124:48

dead and have it launch anyways. And the

124:51

way it goes is that there are ground

124:53

sensors across Russia that would, you

124:57

know, sense the bombs going off and this

125:01

is kind of like early AI, if you will.

125:05

The computer would know that and would

125:08

then launch all of Russia's nuclear

125:11

weapons. all of them at the United

125:14

States, even if everyone were dead.

125:17

With time, probability increases.

125:18

Probability of something occurring. And

125:20

it's funny, I've seen there's been a few

125:22

people in the public eye at the moment

125:24

that have gone through sort of mental,

125:25

cognitive decline. They've experienced

125:27

bipolar and and um schizophrenia and

125:30

things like that. I just wonder if one

125:33

of these individuals who has these

125:35

nuclear weapons, these nine men around

125:37

the world, if they had some kind of

125:39

cognitive issue, could they could they

125:41

in their delirium or whatever

125:45

without anybody being able to stop them

125:48

tell their army to launch nuclear

125:50

weapons and that army would follow those

125:52

orders?

125:53

Don't you need two people to turn the

125:54

key?

125:55

They're following orders.

125:56

They're following orders.

125:57

I think that I think that your question

125:59

the answer might be yes. I think the

126:01

answer is actually yes.

126:03

And what's interesting is like there are

126:05

certain countries nuclear arsenals that

126:07

we don't know about. Now I happen to get

126:10

my information on the most current

126:12

nuclear weapon systems from the

126:14

Federation of American Scientists has a

126:16

group of people led by a man named Hans

126:19

Christensen that lead a group called the

126:21

nuclear notebook and they gather the

126:25

most current information that can

126:27

possibly be known by anyone. and prepare

126:30

it for the rest of us to read and it

126:33

changes every year and they do a

126:35

phenomenal job but for example they will

126:38

tell you that we don't really know much

126:40

about Pakistan's nuclear command and

126:43

control we simply don't know we don't

126:45

know much about India's nuclear command

126:47

and control

126:48

is Russia's Russia's command and control

126:50

when I was in the silo at least was

126:52

still decentralized which it gave almost

126:54

autonomous launch decision to the

126:56

commanders at the silos themselves

126:58

what does that mean

126:59

so in In the United States, it takes a

127:00

validated order to clear a computer

127:03

system before the controlling officers

127:05

can launch the system.

127:06

So the president has got to say launch

127:08

and then

127:09

and then he gives an actual validation

127:11

code that gets carried in the nuclear

127:14

notebook and then any system that

127:16

validates the same code is now armed to

127:19

launch. Nobody can just launch.

127:21

So the president has what's called um

127:24

sole authority. He doesn't ask

127:25

permission of anyone. not his sect

127:27

staff, not the chairman of the joint

127:28

chiefs of staff. It's his alone. He may

127:31

ask their advice, but it's his decision.

127:33

He reads in the black book of the inside

127:36

of the football.

127:37

What's the football?

127:38

So, the football is that satchel that

127:40

goes around with the president 24/7 365.

127:43

Also, the vice president. Inside of that

127:46

are is a black book. That's what it's

127:49

nicknamed. It's called the black book, I

127:50

was told, because it involves so much

127:52

death. And inside of that are

127:54

predetermined strikes for all of our

127:57

enemies or adversaries who might ever

127:59

launch against us. So it's not a

128:01

decisionmaking. They're not sitting

128:03

around, okay, here's what happened. What

128:05

do you think we should do? It's do you

128:06

want to choose A, B, or C? And do you

128:09

want to go with subset D, E, F, or Q? It

128:13

was once described by a man who carried

128:15

that football as a comparable to a

128:18

Denny's menu. Each of those line items,

128:22

I'm I'm going to give it to you in

128:23

painful detail. Each of those line items

128:25

is followed by an authentication code.

128:27

And the authentication code is then put

128:29

into the football. That authentication

128:31

code is then sent to every nuclear

128:34

capable site across the United States

128:36

and any nuclear capable sites in Europe.

128:39

The authentication code will only work

128:41

to authenticate with missiles that have

128:43

the predetermined target set that was in

128:45

the black book. Now that the emergency

128:50

action message, the EAM that is received

128:52

by the missile crew, they can't

128:54

determine what it means. They just get a

128:56

message, an encrypted message. Then they

128:59

turn it and then they check the

129:00

authentication code against a bank of

129:02

authentication codes that they're given

129:03

every morning. A whole new bank that

129:05

recycles that changes every morning. If

129:07

it if the two codes match, only the

129:09

system knows. The crew does not know.

129:11

And then the crew the crew will follow

129:14

the action steps of an authenticated

129:16

message. If and then part of those

129:18

action steps literally include unlocking

129:20

a safe, pulling out a plastic wrapped

129:23

piece of paper that you crack open and

129:26

then from within that that piece of uh

129:29

plastic. You crack out another code and

129:32

that code is a specific arming code that

129:35

will arm the weapon system that you are

129:37

at. And then you go through the whole

129:39

check. It's a huge checklist of items

129:41

until you get the checklist item that

129:43

says insert your keys and the checklist

129:44

item where you have the commander of the

129:45

capsule count to three and then you both

129:47

turn your keys.

129:48

That's you're just following orders.

129:50

You're the whole time.

129:51

Did you ever turn your key?

129:52

We turn our keys probably five or seven

129:54

times a week because Eam are always

129:56

coming through and we never know what

129:58

they say.

129:59

EM

129:59

the emergency action message.

130:01

So you're they've set that system up so

130:03

that you don't know what you're doing.

130:05

You're just following orders. be nobody

130:07

who's

130:07

It's like a firing squad where

130:08

everyone's shooting, but you don't know

130:10

who shoots the fatal bullet.

130:11

Yep.

130:11

And by the way, everything that he just

130:13

described can happen. Not always, but in

130:15

as little as 60 seconds.

130:17

The terrible joke is they don't call

130:18

them minute men. That's the ICBMs for

130:21

nothing.

130:21

Based on everything you know, do you

130:23

think that if Russia launched a nuclear

130:24

weapon now, do you think the the US

130:27

would respond?

130:29

Not even a question.

130:30

But do you think they would even know?

130:31

Do you not think the person the

130:32

president for example would think? Not

130:35

even a question.

130:36

Really?

130:36

Not even a question.

130:37

Do you not think they would think it was

130:38

something else? I mean, there's been

130:39

times in history where they thought,

130:40

"Maybe that's something else. Maybe

130:41

we've made a mistake." They hesitate.

130:43

I think that your question is valid

130:46

because it's not truly instantaneous.

130:48

There are interceptors, there are

130:50

counter measures, there are second and

130:52

third order uh intelligence sources that

130:54

could be checked within just a few

130:55

seconds, right? One satellite

130:56

corroborates with another satellite kind

130:58

of thing. But all in, you have maybe

131:01

seven minutes to decide if you're going

131:03

to counteratt attack or not.

131:04

Seven minutes

131:05

because that's between when you pick up

131:07

the first satellite signature of a

131:10

launched ICBM or a launched submarine

131:12

weapon. depending on whether it's going

131:14

into the atmosphere or whether it's a

131:16

cruise missile that's coming straight

131:17

for your shore. Like at most you

131:19

probably have about seven minutes before

131:21

a counter code, a counter order has to

131:23

happen

131:23

because the nuclear bomb is going to get

131:25

from one continent to the other in

131:27

approximately 30 minutes. It's actually,

131:29

if you do the math like I did, it is 33

131:32

minutes from Pyongyang to Washington DC

131:35

and it's 26 minutes and 40 seconds from

131:38

Russia to Washington DC.

131:41

You know, we all kind of know Donald

131:43

Trump's ideology because we he's so

131:44

public. Do you actually think that he

131:46

would sit there and say see something

131:48

come and get the intel in and he would

131:50

listen to the intelligence? We just said

131:51

earlier that he doesn't listen to the

131:52

intelligence.

131:53

He might not. I mean that's that's the

131:54

that's the prerogative of the president

131:56

and it's and then I mean the other sick

131:59

part of this and Annie you can correct

132:01

me if any of this is stated. Even if we

132:04

don't react right away and everything is

132:07

destroyed, we have airborne assets that

132:10

will launch all of our systems after

132:12

complete annihilation of the United

132:13

States.

132:14

Okay? So even if we were wrong, the

132:16

submarines and the airborne assets will

132:18

still

132:18

That's why we have a trial. Again, this

132:20

always comes back to the to the

132:21

deterrence part of it, which is this is

132:23

why we must have all of this force just

132:26

in case because all of these

132:28

war games have been practiced and

132:31

rehearsed so often. this all.

132:32

But I'm going to tell you a terrifying

132:34

detail. I interviewed the commander of

132:37

the nuclear sub forces, Admiral Connor,

132:40

for my book. Not someone who normally

132:42

talks to journalists. When the book

132:45

published, he rang me up and asked me to

132:48

have lunch. Not something that often

132:50

happens to a journalist. I thought, am I

132:53

in trouble? Okay. I met with Admiral

132:55

Connor and he said to me, "You never

132:58

asked me about my time in the nuclear

133:00

bunker under the Pentagon." And I

133:01

said,"Well, how would I have known about

133:02

that?" And he said, he was curious that

133:06

I had reported that the public does not

133:09

know how often the Pentagon practices

133:12

nuclear war. We don't know. Andrew may

133:16

know. We don't know. It's classified.

133:20

And what Admiral Connor said to me was,

133:22

"You never asked me what I was doing in

133:24

the nuclear bunker beneath the Pentagon.

133:26

And you never ask me how often we

133:28

practice

133:30

preparing to tell the president that he

133:33

needs to launch

133:35

to your question. I mean, I'm at the

133:37

edge of my seat. And I said, he said,

133:40

"Guess." And you know, I started with

133:43

once a year, right? Because what do you

133:45

think? I mean, that's like terrifying.

133:48

And you know what the answer is?

133:50

Three times a day. They practice three

133:53

times a day telling the president that

133:55

there's a nuke coming into shore.

133:56

Three times a day. And I said, "Admal

133:58

Connor, why do they practice three times

133:59

a day?" And he said, "There are three

134:01

shifts at the Pentagon in the bunker."

134:03

And I I think the terrifying point that

134:05

we're making is to your question, which

134:07

is a normal human question. Like, wait a

134:10

minute, someone really wouldn't do this.

134:12

I mean, you would stop and think this

134:14

can't be right. You know, all of that.

134:16

That's the movies. That's that's not the

134:19

defense department. That's not the

134:21

system of nuclear command and control.

134:23

The system of nuclear command and

134:24

control is rehearsed for precisely

134:29

go at minute 7

134:31

and that is terrifying.

134:34

I also think that's why we're not moving

134:37

closer to strategic nuclear war because

134:41

you're you're capable you're nuclear

134:43

capable nuclear ready countries have

134:45

been doing this three times a day and

134:47

they all know what the [ __ ] are we

134:49

fighting for if we if we do this

134:52

what's it all for like we're not we're

134:54

not going to win tomorrow there's not

134:56

going to be Putin on a pedestal or Trump

134:58

on a pedestal saying we won everything

135:00

will be destroyed

135:01

mutual assured mutual assured

135:02

destruction

135:03

so it makes much more sense for them to

135:06

hold their weapons and continue using it

135:07

as a as a deterrent. Not just a

135:10

deterrent for nuclear conflict, but a

135:11

deterrent like Russia's using it right

135:13

now. Nobody will get involved in Ukraine

135:17

and nobody will support Ukraine

135:19

incurring further into Russia because

135:21

everybody's afraid of what if. That's

135:23

the that's a huge ace in the hole. Every

135:27

single one of you watching this right

135:28

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135:30

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that means you have value. Standstorm,

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136:21

What are you doing about all this

136:23

information and how you feel about the

136:25

global conflicts at the moment on a

136:26

personal level? Is there anything at all

136:28

you're doing to prepare or anything

136:29

you're doing to try and prevent it on a

136:32

personal level? Benjamin,

136:33

outside of my teaching, I mean, when I

136:34

do media appearances, I just try to talk

136:36

about this as much as I can. And I

136:39

design curriculum on media literacy. I

136:42

think teaching I I teach high school

136:44

kids, middle school kids how to consume

136:46

media. And at least if you can't learn

136:49

about it to be able to separate

136:51

information from misinformation and just

136:53

to and whoever I can get in contact with

136:56

and here's how you how you understand

136:58

and that involves understanding the use

137:00

of rhetoric, the use of political

137:01

persuasion or propaganda and just so at

137:04

least we can try to be better informed.

137:06

And is there a central concern you have

137:08

about the world we're heading into and

137:09

the new technologies and AI and all

137:10

these things that sits above all other

137:12

concerns? It's a breakdown of civic um

137:16

literacy that we don't understand how

137:18

governments work. We don't understand

137:19

how our government works on a local

137:21

level, on a broader level. And we lose

137:24

the civic connection with our literal

137:25

neighbors. We we don't care. We're not

137:27

invested in them. Their well-being is

137:28

not our well-being. And so it's every

137:30

person fights for themselves and I'm

137:32

going to vote for the person who yells

137:34

and screams the loudest. So I think um a

137:37

civic breakdown it leads contributes to

137:39

that polarization. That's what I concern

137:42

about.

137:43

Same question to you, Annie. Anything

137:44

you're doing to prepare and what's your

137:46

central concern above all others?

137:48

Well, on a on a hopeful pop, you know,

137:51

optimistic uh point, I would say that

137:54

one of the most fascinating moments for

137:56

me in this past year was being asked to

137:58

come to the Vatican to speak to the

138:01

cardinals about nuclear war, a scenario,

138:05

so that they could talk to the pope. And

138:09

this was Pope Francis when he was still

138:11

alive about his effort him about his

138:14

efforts for peace. So, how's that for a

138:16

paradox? Talk about nuclear war to think

138:20

about peace. And what I learned in that

138:24

process was that a lot of the hope lies

138:29

in getting individuals like the Pope,

138:32

like the United, you know, the United

138:34

Nations, these third parties that are

138:36

not government specific to help

138:40

engagement for these different nations

138:44

diplomats to have better conversations.

138:47

Mhm.

138:47

And so you have world leaders who in

138:51

essence I loved your point about civics

138:53

like just this idea about your neighbor.

138:56

I got the sense from the Vatican and I'm

138:58

not a Catholic but I got a sense of the

139:01

neighbor as a concept you know the

139:03

people and that you know yes we want to

139:07

have a really strong defense in the

139:10

United States. And I think that's an

139:11

important part of national security if

139:14

not the most important part of national

139:16

security. But you must also have a care

139:19

about your neighbor, others on the

139:21

planet. And I was really inspired that

139:24

this whole world exists out there that I

139:26

was not privy to before at the United

139:28

Nations, at the Vatican, and elsewhere

139:31

to get people to communicate.

139:34

And Andrew, I'm leaving the United

139:36

States, brother. I'm I am I am fully

139:42

engaged in relocating and immigrating

139:44

with my family. um finding one of those

139:47

safe havens around the around the world

139:49

where we can just plug in and become

139:52

part of a community, become part of a

139:55

globe uh understand and raise my

139:57

children as global citizens and global

140:00

citizens who are American rather than

140:04

American citizens who reject the globe.

140:06

Where are you going to go and when are

140:08

you going to go

140:08

or is that classified? Uh, so I'm not

140:10

going to tell really anybody where. I

140:12

might I'll tell you personally where,

140:14

but uh we had a plan to leave by 2030

140:16

and we're currently on track to to

140:18

execute that plan by 2026.

140:20

2026.

140:21

Yeah. So, um,

140:23

next year.

140:24

Yeah, next year. So, my I I already have

140:26

plans to change my appearance

140:28

significantly in December and then uh if

140:31

we if we have everything lined up

140:33

appropriately, then we'll be we'll be

140:35

leaving the country by spring of next

140:36

year.

140:37

Why change your appearance? cuz I don't

140:38

want to be identified anymore. I don't I

140:41

can't legally change like my name, but

140:43

uh but I don't have to be the guy that

140:45

looks like this all the time anymore.

140:46

I've changed my appearance before.

140:48

Well, I imagine it was your it was your

140:50

job, right? But but you have a YouTube

140:51

channel. You you you do a lot of sort of

140:53

public education, so you're going to

140:55

shut down the YouTube channel and all

140:56

those things.

140:57

No, I think what I'm probably going to

140:58

do is is only start serving my audience.

141:01

Like right now, I do a lot of serving

141:02

other audiences. It's why I love I love

141:04

contributing to your show. I love

141:05

contributing to other shows. Um, but you

141:07

know what I've found is that civil that

141:09

civic breakdown, just for anybody who

141:12

wants to do a thought experiment, if you

141:13

look my name up and go on any other

141:14

interview other than the ones here with

141:16

Dary CEO, what you will find is

141:18

thousands of ignorant, hateful comments,

141:22

questioning everything from my

141:23

intentions to my credibility to whatever

141:26

else. And that's not just me it's

141:28

happening to. It's happens to all of us.

141:29

I mean, you're mir your name is smeared

141:31

on a daily basis and it's because I am a

141:34

fan of you that my algorithm feeds me

141:36

all the [ __ ] about you two.

141:37

That's the world that we live in. So, I

141:40

don't have to continue to feed

141:41

everybody. I can just feed my audience

141:42

and my audience won't care what I look

141:44

like. My audience won't care if I teach

141:46

them from behind an animated AI image of

141:48

myself, right? But I can continue to

141:51

teach without having to be the CIA guy

141:53

with the hair. if you were to make a

141:56

case for others to follow in your

141:57

footprints because I'm I'm somewhat

141:59

curious. You know, sometimes I have

142:00

dreams of running away and going to

142:01

like, I don't know, Bali or something

142:02

and just

142:03

New Zealand,

142:04

laying low or New Zealand. What would

142:06

that case be to someone like to someone

142:08

like me or to anyone listening as to why

142:10

they should maybe consider getting out

142:12

of this very polarized algorithm driven

142:16

reality that we live in?

142:17

I mean, you can get out of the polarized

142:19

algorithm without leaving the without

142:20

leaving your house, right? It just takes

142:22

a little bit of uh practice for your own

142:25

information security, for your own

142:27

information kind of insulation. Uh but

142:30

the case that I would make for for

142:33

really radically changing your life if

142:36

you're an American citizen is understand

142:38

that the United States is an is a

142:40

country of decreasing influence around

142:43

the world. And in many ways, the actions

142:45

that we've been taking recently are to

142:47

try to rapidly expand our influence

142:49

again. But we are declining influence.

142:51

And we should be. We should be. Our

142:54

strategy post World War II was to become

142:56

the world's bully and to benefit off of

142:58

all the economic benefits that come from

143:00

being the world's weapons supplier,

143:02

financial tools supplier, uh medical

143:06

supplier. Like we we wanted that

143:07

benefit. Well, now we find ourselves in

143:09

a position where we have no strong

143:10

allies. Like we have countries that like

143:12

us, but those countries that like us are

143:14

not strong on their own. So we have a we

143:17

have a weak Europe that's artificially

143:19

weak because we've kept them weak. We

143:21

have a weak Latin America that's

143:22

artificially weak because we've kept

143:24

them weak. So the only way to really

143:27

understand the existence of people

143:30

outside the United States is to get

143:31

outside the United States and not just

143:33

to tour outside but to live outside to

143:35

actually see what it's like to live on

143:37

the local economy, learn the local

143:39

language, understand the local culture.

143:42

I mean, you can walk around Porto,

143:43

Portugal, and you'd be depressed because

143:46

you see Soviet era buildings and

143:48

everybody's over the age of 50 and

143:50

they've all got their eyes downcast and

143:51

they look just totally defeated. But

143:54

only after you've been there a month,

143:56

two months, and you make a friend do you

143:57

actually get into a house and you share

143:59

a bottle of of amazing port and then

144:01

they light up because culturally they

144:04

don't get to be animated on the street

144:06

like we get to be in New York City. And

144:08

if you only live in the United States,

144:10

you have a perverted view of what the

144:11

rest of the world looks like. And you

144:12

have to get outside of the United States

144:14

to really appreciate what you have

144:16

inside of the United States. So you got

144:17

to get the [ __ ] out to understand what

144:20

you're fighting for back at home. All

144:22

the people who are here who are just

144:24

spouting nationalistic dril, they don't

144:27

have any idea what they're actually

144:29

fighting for.

144:30

So the reason why you're taking your

144:32

children out of the country is so that

144:34

they know what they're fighting for. so

144:36

they understand and appreciate what it

144:37

means to be American, not what it means

144:40

to be polarized, not what it means to

144:43

be, you know, whatever whether whether

144:46

you're uh New Yorker or whether you're

144:49

Colorado or whether you're Fidian, but

144:51

to actually understand like, hey, we

144:54

have a democracy that we need to

144:56

nourish. We should be proud to serve.

144:59

The men and women in uniform are making

145:01

a genuine sacrifice. There's there's

145:03

something special about the United

145:04

States. Unfortunately, the people inside

145:06

the United States don't understand that

145:07

for the most part.

145:10

Benjamin, you talk a lot about deep

145:12

fakes and AI and stuff. And as Andrew

145:13

was saying there, it's um especially as

145:16

someone like me who's a podcaster and

145:18

I've built an audience. And so when

145:20

something goes on the internet, it gets

145:21

more clicks than it used to get.

145:24

So there's this whole like like deep

145:26

fake war that we're much of my team

145:28

actually that are in the back there, my

145:29

chief of staff etc. spends most of her

145:31

time fighting at the moment, which is

145:32

every single day there's a new deep fake

145:35

ad video. They'll take videos from this

145:38

podcast conversation, change slightly

145:40

how my lips are moving and get me to

145:42

promote WhatsApp groups or uh various

145:45

other things. And there's there's a

145:46

spectrum to this. The one end of the

145:48

spectrum is so horrific that I probably

145:50

actually couldn't say it on this show,

145:51

but there's a really horrific spectrum

145:53

to this. And it's um it's it's almost

145:55

emerged out of nowhere in the last I'd

145:57

say six months. Like in the last six

145:59

months is really when it took hold to

146:00

the point that every single day it is

146:02

some it's part of my day. Every single

146:04

day I'm emailing this one thread that I

146:06

have with Meta in Facebook telling them

146:08

this is a new one. This morning I

146:10

emailed them. Just a screenshot of a

146:12

lady who lost £3,000. She's a single

146:14

mother. Um she loves the show so she

146:17

listens to me and something came up in

146:18

her feed and it was me telling her to

146:20

join a group and she joined the group

146:21

and she's lost £3,000. And she was

146:23

saying she said to me in the message I

146:25

can actually read it out. She said,

146:26

"I'll never trust anything on the

146:27

internet ever again." And it was sad

146:29

because she's a single mother that tried

146:30

to do something for herself to help her

146:32

family. Interesting digital times. And

146:35

you talk about this quite a lot, the

146:37

impact. Is there any way for us to

146:38

prepare? Is there anything that we can

146:40

can do?

146:42

One of the the big takeaways from the

146:44

the war game that I did uh and um there

146:47

was a documentary film that was made on

146:48

it called War Game. And what I noticed

146:50

was that it comes to all this is a

146:53

crisis. So regardless of the crisis, the

146:55

best you can do is manage it. You're not

146:58

going to win it. You're not going to

146:59

defeat it. You will not overcome the

147:01

forces of u misinformation and and

147:04

generative AI manipulating you or what

147:07

you're saying and your followers. The

147:09

best you can do is manage. And you

147:11

manage by educating

147:14

people as much as you can on how to on

147:17

on understanding how rhetorical

147:20

manipulative influence works,

147:21

understanding what, you know, Aristotle

147:24

taught us these techniques a very long

147:26

time ago and they're still in force

147:28

today. And it's the use of, you know,

147:30

um, appeal to emotion, appeal to reason,

147:32

appeal to credibility. I I the I the

147:35

curriculum that I develop teaches

147:37

beginning with kids so that when you by

147:39

the time because by the time they get to

147:40

college at university, it's too late. I

147:43

need to teach them and we need to teach

147:44

them young enough to understand. If

147:45

someone is asking of you something on

147:47

the internet, someone you think you

147:48

trust, pay attention to their tone, what

147:51

words are they using? What what are they

147:52

are they appealing to you emotionally

147:54

and know right away that that's a clue

147:55

that that might be where you're

147:56

vulnerable emotionally. You're

147:58

susceptible to someone who says this or

147:59

to this cause or to that issue. That's

148:02

the best we can do. When I say manage,

148:04

and I'm sorry, I don't have a better

148:05

answer, but the best you can do is just

148:07

say,

148:08

"Let me let me teach you how

148:09

manipulation works and how uh and how

148:13

misinformation works so that it

148:14

hopefully you can recognize it or it or

148:17

it strikes a chord." So, if you ever

148:19

come across something, you'll say,

148:20

"Okay, I've seen this before."

148:23

That's that's the best. And it's and I

148:24

don't and it's not enough and it's

148:26

incredibly frustrating.

148:27

But I I actually read about a study

148:28

recently where they take young children

148:30

and they do exactly that. they just they

148:32

show them adverts and they get them to

148:33

point out how it's trying to influence

148:35

their emotions. They ask them to try and

148:37

track the source of it etc. And just

148:39

that practice um increased their

148:41

awareness and therefore reduced their

148:43

likelihood of being impacted by a

148:45

scammer ad.

148:46

So I go one step further and it's

148:47

controversial and I've gotten some some

148:49

push back on it. I actually teach kids

148:51

how to create bad content. I teach them

148:54

how to be trolls not so that they can

148:56

become professional trolls so that they

148:57

can identify when those tools are being

148:59

used against them. I do this where I

149:01

have them simulate a um let's say for

149:03

example I'll have them simulate a Senate

149:05

campaign um like a political race and

149:07

I'll say I want you to f to take uh

149:10

existing Instagram and Tik Tok videos

149:12

and absolutely deep tweak them modify

149:15

them pull them out of context make the

149:17

other person say things that they never

149:18

said take positions that they didn't and

149:20

then the students do this and then I had

149:22

one that actually made its way to the

149:24

Senate Democratic National Committee and

149:26

they thought it was a real campaign I

149:28

said it wasn't it was done through my

149:29

students, they had marked it clearly as

149:31

educational, but what the students

149:33

learned was, "Oh my god, if it's this

149:34

easy for me to create it, how what about

149:36

things content that's coming at me

149:39

that now made them aware that made them

149:41

the equivalent of leaving the United

149:42

States to see what is it like in other

149:44

parts?" When you see what it looks like

149:46

from the other side, when you actually

149:48

create it, you realize how what it might

149:50

look like. That's one tool. And I'm not

149:52

trying to teach them again how to, you

149:54

know, it's like not I'm not trying to

149:56

teach you to steal a car so you can make

149:57

a life out of stealing cars, but to

149:59

teach you to design a safer car.

150:01

Closing comments then

150:03

to sort of encapsulate again for the for

150:06

the listener at home, how they should be

150:08

thinking, what they might do in their

150:09

own lives to live a better life to to

150:12

result in a better outcome for

150:13

themselves, their families, and for

150:14

everyone else. Um, starting with with

150:17

you, Annie, what would you say? I think

150:19

that more information is good. More

150:22

information sources allow a person to

150:26

figure out what it is that's meaningful

150:28

to them. But I think you have to be

150:29

disciplined about how you get

150:32

information. I mean, I do a thing with

150:34

myself where I I time the amount I

150:37

actually set a timer for the amount of

150:39

time I'm on X or wherever because and it

150:43

always goes off and invariably I'm like,

150:45

I must have missed the timer, you know?

150:48

And yet, if I'm reading something

150:50

analog, a book of poetry, as I sometimes

150:53

do, or a book of non-fiction or fiction

150:56

as I often do, you know, that's a

150:58

different kind of time. And so, I think

151:01

it's very valuable to be aware of that.

151:03

And so, my two things and my takeaways

151:05

just off the comments about like where

151:07

you can be really become dissatisfied

151:09

with the state of the world and the

151:11

speed of information. For me, it's just

151:14

like father time and mother nature. I

151:16

spend a lot of time outside or as much

151:19

as I can rather given how much writing I

151:22

do. But like I just go out and connect

151:25

on go on a walk in the winter. I ski, I

151:28

hike, I'll go do a yoga class. I mean

151:30

this may sound like what does this have

151:32

to do with any of this but it does

151:34

because I really believe the human

151:36

condition doesn't change even though all

151:38

this technology does and that we have to

151:41

have this balance in our own self of all

151:44

this stuff coming at us and just

151:46

existing in the world and then you

151:49

figure out how you want to change evolve

151:52

and in my case report

151:54

Benjamin

151:55

the biggest thing I would say is to and

151:56

I tell this to my students all the time

151:58

I don't care what position position you

152:00

take, what views you have. I don't care

152:01

what you end up doing with your life.

152:03

Promise me you will stay curious.

152:05

Promise me you will ask questions.

152:06

Promise me you still want to learn and

152:08

you don't become complacent. And that

152:10

means being active in your community on

152:13

a small civic scale, understanding who

152:15

you're electing for, who you're electing

152:16

on a small scale, but not just being

152:19

apathetic because if you don't make

152:21

decisions about what is going to happen

152:22

to you, others will make them for you.

152:24

And I promise you won't like the

152:25

outcome. I think curiosity is the first

152:28

line of defense towards protecting um

152:31

what you value.

152:33

Andrew,

152:34

I would tell everybody to be very

152:35

diligent with where they learn and

152:40

frankly as far as the people that I've

152:42

met, uh Steve, you are a phenomenal

152:44

source of information and the people

152:45

that you vet to bring on this show are

152:47

fantastic. So, if people don't know

152:49

where else to start, this is a fantastic

152:51

place to start. If anybody's still

152:52

listening or for all of them that are

152:54

still listening, they already know this

152:56

to be true. Um, and then the the other

152:58

thing I would say on top of that is if

153:00

you don't want to radically change like

153:02

I am so willing to radically change for

153:03

my family, small steps are where it all

153:06

begins. Just small steps and

153:08

understanding what are your kids

153:09

watching on their screens? What is your

153:11

wife watching or your husband? What are

153:13

they reading on their screens? What do

153:14

they think about the world? Because

153:16

we're not going into a world that is

153:19

going to inform us on its own. So, we

153:21

must inform ourselves and the only way

153:23

to trust the information that you have

153:25

is to be very diligent with what it is

153:27

that you're consuming.

153:30

Thank you. Thank you so much. Um, I

153:32

always come at these conversations from

153:34

a selfish perspective because I somewhat

153:36

think that's the maybe the more selfless

153:40

thing to do. And um, I had so many

153:42

questions about the nature of the world.

153:43

And through the gauntlet of subjects

153:46

that we've been through today, I've

153:47

found many many of the of those answers.

153:49

I feel more hopeful in a way, but I feel

153:53

more prepared against the things that

153:55

I'm hopeless about. One of the things I

153:58

don't think about enough is, as you've

154:00

said, the information that I'm getting.

154:02

And it feels almost wrong in the world

154:03

we live in to put barriers and systems

154:05

in place to filter the information we're

154:07

getting because our natural state is

154:08

just to open up our phones, just to look

154:10

at the news, look at the screen. Um, and

154:13

and it's almost against, I guess, human

154:15

cognition to to then try and apply

154:17

another filter between that. And then

154:19

you worry about the filter you might

154:20

apply and do I mute people? Do I block

154:22

certain words? Do I not look at that

154:24

news channel? But then I'm just in this

154:26

echo chamber. So, it's it's quite a

154:28

complicated situation to be in. What I

154:30

return to most of the time is I um I

154:32

return to kind of what Annie said, which

154:34

is my Maslovian needs of connection and

154:37

and loving someone and having a good

154:39

life um are maybe my refuge amongst all

154:43

the angst. But then again, I have I have

154:45

a conflict because I don't want to be

154:46

ignorant and I don't want to be in a

154:48

suspended state of disbelief where these

154:50

decisions happen without my choosing and

154:52

with my knowledge. So I maintain my

154:53

curiosity and maybe that is the answer.

154:55

Maybe it's a complicated mix of

154:57

everything all of you have discussed.

154:58

And I thank you all for being here today

154:59

and being um um civil and respectful and

155:04

disagreeable in a certain areas with

155:06

your opinions because I think that's

155:07

exactly what we're missing so much of.

155:08

It's a difference of opinion but a

155:10

respect for the same outcome. So, thank

155:12

you so much.

155:12

Thank you.

155:13

This has always blown my mind a little

155:15

bit. 53% of you that listen to this show

155:18

regularly haven't yet subscribed to the

155:20

show. So, could I ask you for a favor?

155:21

If you like the show and you like what

155:23

we do here and you want to support us,

155:24

the free simple way that you can do just

155:26

that is by hitting the subscribe button.

155:28

And my commitment to you is if you do

155:29

that, then I'll do everything in my

155:31

power, me and my team, to make sure that

155:32

this show is better for you every single

155:34

week. We'll listen to your feedback.

155:36

We'll find the guests that you want me

155:37

to speak to and we'll continue to do

155:39

what we do. Thank you so much.

155:46

[Music]

Interactive Summary

The video features a discussion with three experts regarding the current state of global conflict, the threat of nuclear war, and the influence of information warfare. They suggest we are in the early stages of a new type of world war, defined by proxy conflicts, cyber warfare, and the weaponization of information via algorithms. The experts discuss the terrifying prospect of nuclear escalation, the fragility of international relations, and the dangers posed by a post-truth society where polarization is easily manipulated. They emphasize the need for individual responsibility, media literacy, and maintaining curiosity in an increasingly unstable global landscape.

Suggested questions

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