The “Sell America” Trade | Andy Constan on Why Rest of World Stands to Outperform U.S. Assets
1870 segments
when you look at it and say where do you
want to own a 60/40 portfolio? I see
lots of options that are a hell of a lot
better than the United States at this
point. That's been my biggest call for
the year. I've been getting out of US
assets for a long time. In fact, today I
will have gotten out of 100% of my US
assets. If you look at relative value of
the US asset portfolio versus the rest
of the globe right now, it's just lousy.
Do we have a economic slowdown as
promises that have been made become too
expensive to finance? And that's when
you get a sort of cascading slowdown and
that's I guess what I'd be concerned
about at this stage.
>> I'm joined by Andy Constant of
Dampspring Advisors. Andy, it's great to
see you. Tell us about this thesis you
have about the demands of investment
that the world is going to have o over
the next five years and just where that
money is going to come from and your
your relative concern about where where
that money is going to come from. I
think the issue is that you know for the
last five years most of the the money
creation
and investment has been driven by
deficits by the public sector financed
initially by QE then QT didn't really
quite withdraw it because it really was
done with bills
that money creation and so we're left
with a fair amount of public sector
money creation that's slloshing through
the economy and that was obviously I
think key to any edge I had at least
over the last 5 years is understanding
those flows
and the transference of risk from one
party to another and the changes in the
Fed's
balance sheet and I think those had
meaningful impacts on risk premium this
is a new phase while the governments
broadly speaking are continuing to run
high deficits to GDP, something around
6% in the US and growing in the rest of
the developed market, developed world,
particularly to deal with things like
defense. Those aren't going away.
They're not being financed by any
meaningful balance sheet increase. And
so they have to trickle through the
private economy and get financed by the
private economy while at the same time
the private economy is making massive
capex investments particularly in AI and
AI infrastructure
roughly at a trillion dollars a year.
And on top of that, we have this other
form of transfer that's going on in
which
foreign nations to avoid tariffs are
being asked to make investments in real
property, factories, car plants,
whatever it might be. That is an
onshoring flow. That's been a very key
postcoid desire is to onshore
manufacturing. Biden did it with the
chips act. It is what it is. Trump is
doing it with using tariffs to negotiate
productive investment. Now
the big thing about that is all of these
promises are extremely important to
deliver the type of growth that the
economy expects and that is priced into
markets. And it needs to have financing
And so that whole dynamic to me is the
most important dynamic over the next
five years which is by and large when
the private sector does a financing they
create credit whether it's along with
money meaning a bank creates credit or
just the selling of corporate bonds
things of that nature where one where
savers lend to to private sector
individuals to invest in the real
economy.
And that self finances
eventually in that when Oracle borrowed
a whole bunch of money this this fall to
build data centers,
investors
gave them the money.
Now Oracle has the money and needs to
invest it. They buy a bunch of stuff.
They pay construction workers. They buy
micro they buy semiconductors. They buy
energy. They buy energy production. They
buy all these things and all that income
becomes so all that spending becomes
somebody else's income which ultimately
becomes savings which loops around and
finances this debt. So you can you can
this can all work but right now we're in
the period of time in which the
borrowing is happening and the spending
will take time before it recycles into
savings. And that generally
is bad for asset prices.
And that speaks to whether
asset prices will can finance today the
sort of promises that are needed for the
future because if the price the rate at
which the financing occurs is too
expensive, people will stop doing the
investment. And so that dynamic is
really important. And I'm not I don't
have concerns. For instance, if the
Treasury market can absorb all of the
issuances from the deficit,
if the corporate bond and equity market
can absorb all of the financings that
corporations are doing for spending, and
if the foreign investment, which is
likely to come from the selling of
treasuries to raise dollars, to buy
factories, can be absorbed by the
Treasury market without any price
concern. recession, we're going to have
a very strong run it hot style economy.
And so that dynamic is very important.
If you want run it hot, you need
accommodative
issuance,
absorbed issuance. If you don't, if you
can't get that, you can't run it hot.
And so that dynamic is the thing that
I'm focused on right now. And the
numbers are large.
>> What what powered the economy last year
was investment. And you're saying that
in order to have robust growth, which is
what market prices are expecting, that
we we need to have very large
investments. And you have some questions
about how that money is going to be
raised. Is it going to be through the
bank channel? Is it going to be through
the the capital markets, which requires
the investors who invest in those new
assets to sell sell their old assets?
How are you thinking about the the the
change in asset prices that is going to
be impacted by all of this uh uh money
raising? You know, why can't it be the
case that, you know, easy half a
trillion dollars of hyperscaler debt is
is issued and the market can absorb it
super easily? Why why isn't that going
to happen?
>> It could. I'm not I'm not saying it
can't. I'm saying that that is the thing
to watch and we saw it with Oracle and
we saw it with the hyperscalers this
fall. What I think is important to
notice is that is what's changing. For
one, the consumer continues to do well.
It's maybe a K-shaped economy, but by
and large the consumer has continued to
consume and you're growing at around a
3% real rate just from consumption. So
the rest of it's investment and
obviously government that determines
whether the GDP is going to do well. Of
course net exports matter too, but those
are the four four components of the
economy. We can get to the consumer
later, but I'm focused on the investment
bit. And so it's possible that we could
get all this issuance absorbed and it's
but I think you have to notice some
changes. And the big change that I've
noticed is that the investments from
last year, which were sizable, were
largely financed out of free cash flow.
The hyperscalers didn't need to raise
debt and they certainly didn't need to
raise equity. And that's because they've
absorbed through the last five years,
they've locked in extremely low
financing that they were able to lock
in. And this includes homeowners in the
2021
2020 2021 period. And that still is
providing large margins for what is
otherwise an inflating economy. They
haven't had much need to finance because
the government injected this large bolus
of the ability for individuals to
consume by spending and the national
debt rising significantly. And so free
cash flow has been the way that all of
this AI capex has been funded. That's
changing so far and I expect this will
change further at so far what happened
is that the amount of capex relative to
free cash flow has gotten to a point
where it's close to all free cash flow
is being used for investment. What's
next? Well, what's next typically is
where are you spending other free cash
flow? And in Microsoft and Google and
Nvidia's case, less so with Amazon.
Apple's not really part of that cohort,
but Apple certainly, they buy back a
tremendous amount of shares with their
free cash flow. They could stop.
That should have an impact on equity
prices. If the major share buyback
entities stop buying back shares and
start spending it in the real economy,
that should have a stimulative effect on
the real economy and a negative impact
on the equity price.
Obviously, they can also issue corporate
debt and they also can issue bank debt.
They can borrow from the bank. And so to
notice that change from a free cash flow
generated investment channel, financing
channel to something that's not that is
I think the key thing to watch. And I
think what we saw in the fourth quarter
in the in the second half of last year
is there's some you know with credit
spreads where they are
there's just not much juice to convince
investors to buy those types of assets.
And that applies to corporate bonds and
it applies to equities.
It could,
but so but we've transitioned from a
period of time in which the government
part we're still running $2 trillion
deficits, $1.7 trillion deficits. So
it's not like they're not continuing to
increase the size of of the national
debt, but they're not growing the
increase. And so, you know, that's a
change.
QE QT is basically flatlined. So that's
change. And so when I look at all those
things, I said, yeah, it's a pretty much
of a transition year in 2025 and 2026
and the future. These promises need to
get funded. And the big trick
is and so every promise gets funded if
there's a good return available for it.
And when you lend money to or either
give by by buying their equity or buying
their corporate debt or if you're a bank
by lending them money, you want a return
and your return is dependent on whether
that was a good whether the company is
making a good investment. And so just I
want to characterize the investment
types. We know AI is one of the
investment types. And I think there's a
we've seen this over the last few months
now. There's a certain regurgitation of
whether these for whether whether it's
energy, human capital
that are tight that don't allow these
companies to scale up their effort or
the business model of selling AI related
services which includes cloud but it
also includes the AI models etc just
aren't paying much. And so you look at
that and say, well, okay, you know, one
day there's going to be a business model
where all this compute is profitable.
It's possible that it becomes
profitable. I'm not and I'm not going to
bet my in in my world on whether AI is
going to work or not work. I'm just
going to watch to see if it is working
and to see if there's hope that it does
work. And that will inform whether these
are good financings or bad financings.
The other financings, the roughly $2
trillion of promises that have been made
to the Trump administration regarding
deficits, those are bad spends. There's
just no possible way that
building factories in the US
is an economically intelligent thing to
do.
Now, there's other reasons to do it and
those are very important reasons.
None of us want to go through the supply
chain disruptions we had in during
COVID. We'd prefer not to. We'd also
prefer to have strong national security
and have critical industries built in
places that we think are allies.
The best ally being our own home.
Those are important reasons to national
security. And there's this other one
that seems to think that manufacturing
jobs are somehow better jobs than
equally paying service jobs. So there's
this sort of populist
reason to bring jobs home that doesn't
have much economic rationale but does
have a psychological rationale. And it
sure seems like that's the direction
we're going and have been going for a
number of years. But now we have all
these promises.
The effect of the tariffs has created $2
trillion of promises to invest in the
US.
I think it's really important that those
investments occur because if they don't
occur, you're not you're going to get
poor growth. But also having them occur
creates excess capacity at a high price,
which is a bad investment. So the people
that are making the investment
are going to be on a very short leash, I
suspect, on whether they're going to
actually commit to these investments.
And certainly if prices start the price
of financing
starts rising I think those promises
fall away relatively rapidly. And so
those are the sort of things that to me
are the the big case. Do we have a
economic slowdown as promises that have
been made become too were never
particularly great to begin with and
become too expensive to finance. And
that's when you get a sort of cascading
slowdown. And that's I guess what I'd be
concerned about at this stage
>> to define just a term hyperscaler is uh
building data centers at scale and uh
the these are Microsoft, Amazon, Oracle,
Meta, Google uh as well. The end
customers aren't that the hyperscalers
but the the end customers are a lot of
these AI companies.
>> Yeah, exactly. I don't I don't honestly
know how I mean I lived and worked at a
senior very senior level during the
internet bubble. It's different but and
I've looked through centuries of major
productivity enhancing technology in
innovation. I don't know how this one's
going to turn out, but we do know that
at some point the investment needs a
return
and
the timing of that return when it comes,
how big it is, and what it does to the
rest of the GDP. Like one of the big
questions I have in life right now is
whether where does the
return for AI
come from?
Does it come from is it a does does AI
actually grow the GDP
or does AI steal shares from other share
from the GDP? That dynamic is extremely
important. If it steals share, there's
going to be winners and losers
>> if it just takes people's jobs is what
you're saying. Yeah.
>> Yeah.
>> I mean, they're gonna be winners and
losers, but that's not that's not
necessarily healthy.
>> Andy, this this issue we we've been
talking about now. I I think that your
view on assets, risk assets, and risk
premia basically how how much investors
demand to be compensated. So, as risk
premia go up, asset prices go down.
how your view on risk premia is hinges
on the degree to which the increase in
supply equity issuance debt issuance is
going to impact prices and I want you to
share your view on that but first to
start out could you talk about what over
the course of your you you know long
successful career you you've seen that
play out because you know you you were
at Bridgewwater as you write in your
damn spring memos you have a
Bridgewwater framework which is you know
quite rationalist list uh quite a
implies b implies c imp implies d. Um,
and that's one school of thought. And
then the the other school of thought uh
is kind of a little maybe a little more
psychological of activity begets
activity. Liquidity begets liquidity.
And you know when you were in uh in your
senior role in 97 and 98, I'm sure there
were a lot of horrible deals that were
coming to market to to fund telecom
expansion. And you know, did that huge
surge in issuance of of debt and debt
creation, did that cause risk premiers
to expand or was it kind of everyone got
paid on that deal and then they brought
the next deal and then that deal caused,
you know, you know, these companies to
spend more money and it was super
exciting and obviously it, you know,
blew up in 2000.
>> Yeah. I mean, the answer to that is
it was volatile. Looking back,
a lot of money was invested
that was destroyed in rapidly rapidly
destroyed. And that's very typical of
what people talk about as a bubble. But
generally the business cycle is
literally caused by animal spirits
bidding up financing and that money
getting spent in the real economy in
unproductive
assets in assets that net of the funding
costs can't make a profit and so I think
it's true and as it looks to and as you
think about extreme extremes. Certainly
2000 was an extreme and then the housing
boom was certainly another extreme where
there were periods of so you know 2005
67 that was there was some great stuff
getting created and people were bidding
it up 98 99 2000 same all the way into
2000 with and one with credit that's a
regular course of business the question
becomes does
pay off rapidly? Does the high financing
cost investors paying up for equities
which are yielding negative have
negative yields relative to treasuries
that continues until it doesn't. And so
we know how it's going to play out. It's
just going to where it's going to play
out at what and what's going to be the
catalyst to do that. And so again, I'm
looking at are the promises going to
occur.
So there, you know, they may not
that for many reasons. Trump loses
leverage, for instance, on tariffs that
may reduce investment. Trump gets a
bunch of tariffs, which causes the need
for U for the deficit funding to drop.
That could be have an impact. the
promises simply could have been
misunderstood that the negotiation
doesn't pay off and then there's the
returns whether it's AI or any other
form of significant investment that's
planned right now they have to generate
returns and returns can be are are
affected by the cost of financing and
are affected by the way the real economy
works and as I said for as I I think
it's true that for the promise of the
one trillion of AI to pay off in returns
and have those returns im be imminent
growth has to be very high because if
it's just taking share
that doesn't create high growth and
doesn't create high returns doesn't
allow the people that are selling the AI
to compute to
you and me you and me can't afford it
because we're out of jobs so that that
I'm just focused on. So I don't believe
that there's an obvious turn that's
occurred. Like I'm not pounding the
table on on much right now. I'm watching
how the promises are going to evolve,
how the cost of financing has changed,
who's providing the financing through
what vehicles, and what's the future
supply look like. And you know for me if
if Microsoft decides to well Microsoft
already has if Google decides to and
Meta decide to reduce instead of
reducing their share count every year
stop reducing their share count that's a
signal to me. So that's the type of
thing I'm looking for.
>> And how do you think this AI expansion
is going to impact growth? You have a
lot of of of charts and data. I mean
there are people who think you know 5%
nominal growth or you know 3 4% real
growth because we're going to live in
this golden age of if not you know an AI
golden age and AI data center
development golden age that is going to
make the numbers look ridiculously good.
Where are you on this?
>> So I mean I think you
the promises are substantial like these
promises get delivered growth is going
to be hot as hell. There's just and the
promises are, you know, they're
promises, but they're also in contract.
Like the money's coming. You know, that
trillion, if you told me a year from now
that the trillion dollars didn't show up
in 2026, these trillion dollars of AI
capex, I'd be shocked. Like that money
is coming. And so that's going to be
very strong short-term growth
without a doubt. But the way this
happens is all these promises just stop.
They don't fund in 2027 or they just
reduce funding a little bit and that's
enough to cause a economic slowdown. So
what I would say is that yeah I mean you
look at the I mean I look out at the
next quarter if you want to be so short
term and say all these companies are
going to report big capex. They're all
all the receipts the recipients of capex
the semiconductors are going to show
spectacular cash flow spectacular
earnings. The OBBB impact on on
individuals tax returns is going to be
significant in terms of who's going to
get refunds, who's going to pay less
when they actually write the check.
Quarter one looks pretty darn good. And
it'd be surprising to me that quarter
two would turn over like that. So you
look at that and say,
are you getting much what you deserve
for bonds?
I don't think so. And you look at the
bond market generally. We're in the
midst of this episode's being recorded
in the midst of a pretty meaningful bond
selloff around the globe because of all
these financing needs.
Not because of growth and inflation, but
just you look out and you say, "Who's
going to buy all these bonds?" And
somebody's going to buy them. Don't get
me wrong. All bond markets clear all the
time. When anybody says, "Who's going to
buy these bonds?" I say, "The same
people that always buy bonds." It's just
going to be price. And so, right now,
we're in the midst of repricing. And
that's causing all interest rates to
rise. It's causing all discount rates to
rise. And it should because we're going
to have a run it hot economy
in the near term.
>> Yeah, the Japanese bond market is is
melting as we record. I mean, it's
amazing. The Japanese 40-year Treasury
yield was at what 15 basis points in
2019 and now it's over 4%. That was a
nice short owned the I looked at the
half% of 59 which was issued in 2019 and
that thing was issued at par and it's
trading at 40 today. So yeah, it's been
rough for the long end of the Japanese
market. Now, the fact is nobody owns
those things. I mean, somebody does.
It's small. They're small in total. Like
the total amount of 40-year bonds, even
30-year bonds in Japan, it's very, very
low. It's very, very low everywhere, but
it's particularly low in Japan.
>> And and you point out that the majority
owner is the Bank of Japan, but that has
ceased to be the a net marginal buyer,
right?
>> Yeah. So yeah, the the important thing
is that what's happening is they're
searching for a bid. It's not like all
the people that own these things are
underwater and getting killed. That was
the story of who the people who own TLT
and the US bond market in 2021 and 2022
and SVB banks all you know we we talked
about that years ago. Banks owned a
bunch of duration. That doesn't that's
not what's happening in Japan. There
isn't a forced seller. there's just no
bids.
And so you ask yourself, they the Bank
of Japan is shrinking its balance sheet,
not pursuing QE anymore, and they're
doing it by reinvesting less proceeds
than they get from maturities,
which means that the BO the the Ministry
of Finance, the Treasury there has to
issue more bonds to the public just like
normal QT mechanism.
and there are no bids. And so where this
where's the bid going to come from?
Well, one thing is Japan is a massive
saver. Like there's they are they've
been a surplus country for as long as
I've lived and they are they have
massive savings and
but they're overinvested in US bonds and
US stocks. So you look at that and say,
"Huh,
are they going to start buying these
things?" And you know, right now it's
we're in the rericing phase, but the
steepness of the Japanese curve is
becoming extremely compelling. And for
for long only global beta investors, the
combination of relatively high
relatively low Japanese equity
valuation, hey, the market's done great,
but the valuation remains quite low
relative to the US. and a very steep
yield curve in Japan
to me is really attractive from a beta
standpoint
unlike the US where you know risk
premiums are a little wider than they
were during QE but they're still
extremely tight and equity any sort of
equity measure you know these these
aren't things you can trade markets on
but any sort of equity measure whether
it's PE level or earnings yield minus
treasury bond yields
are
rich valuations. That combination of
things to me means that there is going
to be a bid for Japanese bonds. It may
not be tomorrow, but there is going to
be a bid and it's going to have a
capital flight that's going to drive
people who are already overweight, US
stocks in particular, but US assets in
general home
or US folks are going to say, hey,
there's good opportunity to diversify in
your in the rest of the world. And
that's been my biggest call for the
year. I've been getting out of US assets
for a long time. In fact, today I will
have gotten out of 100% of my US assets.
I'll still be long beta,
but a year ago today, I was 100% long US
assets, US stocks and bonds.
>> For your alpha portfolio, beta never
changes. But for your alpha portfolio,
>> this is beta.
>> Okay,
>> this is beta. My alpha portfolio, I got
to tell you, I don't have big strong
views right now. I'll tell you why in a
second. But just looking at beta,
the American exceptionalism story, the
over deficit
spending that the US did relative to
everybody else during COVID, the very
high monetary action that happened
during QE, relative to any other
country, you had to be in US assets.
And so my portfolio in terms of beta is
stocks and bonds, inflation bonds,
commodities, and gold. And I'm I've
always been as a Bridgewater person, you
can't not be long gold. And so I'm
always long gold, long 10%. And it's
been a lifesaver. I mean, it's just been
unbelievable for good reason we can come
back to. But if you take gold and
commodities are sort of global assets
and so what's left is really a bond
stock portfolio.
And I was 100% in US stocks and bonds
until the beginning of this year,
beginning of 2025, middle of 2025, early
thankfully, I got out of half of my US
assets and went to a developed market
basket that was about 50/50, which by
the way, that's the way most investors
should be. diversified in currency,
diversified by country, long stocks and
bonds of both of many countries. That's
sort of the Bridgewater
and most funds global beta portfolio. I
was massively overweight
today.
I'm going to be completely out of US
assets
because it's not and it's nothing to do
with the politics. The politics are what
they are. I saw today uh the the Danish
a Danish pension fund is getting out of
all their treasuries. Hate selling is
not a strategy.
But if you look at relative value of the
US asset portfolio, 60/40 portfolio
versus the rest of the globe right now,
it's just lousy.
And so I've
>> sorry, performance or valuation or what
was the metric you just said? a future
expected returns is the or risk premium
if you want to use my my lingo the risk
premium available in US stocks and bonds
relative to any other 6040 construct is
just awful
>> but wasn't that true a year ago or two
years ago as well
>> no not really and the real reason is
because
until very recently until this year
basically
European
UK
and Japanese bond long-end bonds were
uninvestable
and the real
>> well because the yields were so and what
does that mean the yields are so low
that means when you have an anti-growth
outcome meaning growth doesn't meet
expectations stocks are down and bonds
are up but if the yields are so low
already bonds don't protect a stock
portfolio
the US has had it great for beta for a
while because as early as 2022, our long
end was quite elevated. And so that
provided a hedge for anybody who wanted
to own equities, but outside of our
outside of the US, that portfolio just
didn't exist.
And so, not surprisingly, when that
portfolio doesn't exist, nobody wants
euro assets, no one wants Japanese
assets. What happens? The currencies
fall. And so, they did. Now, Europe
bottomed sooner than Japan, but Japan is
in the process, I think, of a meaningful
bottom. It's not there yet. And the and
listen, the government bond market is in
freef fall. I see see that it's a knife
cut catching knives. But when you look
at it and say, where do you want to own
a 6040 portfolio?
I see lots of options that are a hell of
a lot better than the United States at
this point. And so that's the that's the
beta portfolio I have always long long
assets just not US assets in the at the
moment
>> and there's the assets US assets
European assets and then there's the
currency US dollar euro and within
assets we could say stocks or bonds so
are you bearish on US stocks US bonds or
are you bearish on the dollar or are you
bearish on both and the positive way
asking the question is what are you
bullish on in terms of the countries in
terms of their assets, stocks and bonds
and as well as the currency.
>> Right? So currencies are tricky. What
I'm what I'm isolating is not whether
I'm alpha long or short the currencies.
What I'm isolating is that there is
significant pressure for the US dollar
to depreciate due to the newfound
attractiveness
of non US assets.
So that's that's the big picture now.
That can change rapidly and the US
dollar has been terrible for a while.
>> Like a little over a year, right?
>> Yeah. About a year.
>> Yeah.
>> Yeah. I mean, can it bounce 3 4%? Of
course it can. But does that change what
I think is a secular flow out of US
dollar assets? No. Now, of course,
relative to hard money,
gold, silver,
and currencies that are closer to hard
money than others like Swiss Frank and
things like that.
US dollar and the yen and the yuan and
the pound and the euro have all been
trash. So, it's still a dirty shirt sort
of thing. But right now for me, the US
has the most dirty shirt instead of the
least dirty shirt because asset prices
are just less attractive.
>> And a lot of people look at the US
dollar index, but the the dollar index,
a decent chunk of it is the yen. So the
yen has been like the only currency
that's weaker than the dollar. So it's
like the the low the low yielding
currencies have been doing worse and
it's been the carry currencies that have
been doing really well as well as the
euro,
>> right? Yeah. I mean, from a short-term
standpoint, the yen hasn't really is is
weak relative to the dollar for a while
now, but really hasn't done much in the
last few few years. It's sort of in the
140 to 160 range, closer to 160 now. But
also, we're still in this transition
phase. It's not like people are rushing
to buy Japanese bonds right now. They're
doing the opposite. They're not buying
Japanese bonds, and the Japanese bonds
are in freef fall. So the question is
what do you think a year from now? Are
the B is the Japanese bond market going
to continue to underperform the global
bond market or is it going to recover
relative to the global bond market and
my view is it's going to recover
relative to the global bond market and
that's going to generate positive flows
into the yen strengthening the yen. It
may not it may not happen this week.
Yeah, I I understand your uh extreme
lack of enthusiasm towards US investment
grade corporate bonds. I I definitely do
not share uh I didn't have any
enthusiasm and I think probably a lot of
our viewers don't as well. I mean the
the spreads are just so low. But just
because you know we probably have a
maybe a hurdle rate that's a little bit
higher than that doesn't mean that the
spreads could widen. I mean I' I would
have thought that they they would have
widened more and uh
>> I've traded corporate bonds for 38
years.
I'm not a bear on corporate bonds.
They have no return,
>> but they're better than stocks and or
they're bet. So, a corporate bond is
simply a put on the assets of the
company. And stock puts are puts on the
assets of the company. a corporate if I
was going to be betting against
corporate bonds, I would be better off
buying equity puts right now than being
betting corporate bonds. The, you know,
you you get these things on Twitter and
around the world about this financing
wall
of corporate bonds.
Corporations are flush.
They have incredible financing. Now, not
every corporation and there is this pro
these promises that are going to create
supply,
but existing credits are just in great
shape. I'm not I'm not I'm not super
bearish on corporate credits except to
the extent that I think they will slowly
repric. To make money on alpha on
corporate credits,
you need bankruptcies. You need it's not
just financing pressures that are gonna
it's people failing to get deals done
>> or an extreme change in expected
bankruptcy like a shock.
>> Sure. Yeah. Yeah. Exactly. And and
you're not going to get that without
equities cascading down. And even if
equities cascade down, it's not clear to
me that the higher tier corporations are
going to face any near-term problem in
the next five years. Of course, there's
going to be bankruptcies every day.
There are bankruptcies every day, but
the by and large I wouldn't pound the
except I wouldn't own corporate bonds in
the US because of the supply issue and
there's no serious return, but I don't
hate them like thinking that their the
credit spreads are going to explode. I'd
much I think equities fall first.
>> Okay, thank you for for clearing that
up. Yeah, I I I have been tricked many
times before by this this corporate
credit wall and all it always looks as
if there's a corporate credit wall, but
surprise surprise refinanced. You know
the you know four years ago the
corporate credit wall of 2025 it got
refinanced and it got refinanced at
probably lower spreads than uh when
whenever I saw that chart. The funny
thing about that chart is it's very easy
to take the maturities of all companies
and total them up by m by maturity
bucket. You can do it on Bloomberg. It's
trivial to do. And then you got these
bars, these refinancing bars.
And I worked with corporations for
corporate issuance for half my career.
There's a whole team of people
that's sole job
is to know what financing they're going
to need when and to plan for it. These
things don't just show up on people's
radar and say, "Oh,
we better refinance today."
They're well planned. Um
and so for me it's always been about
what are the characteristics of the
credit market. Is there a credit market
explosion likely to occur? They have
happened. Is there an equitydriven
stress that might cause credit exposure?
But by and large
you have to be so right and we saw this
for decades now. You have to be so right
to win being short high-rade credit.
It's just it's so far out of the money
put.
>> You better be otherwise you're just
going to bleed and bleed and bleed. And
I don't see any reason why that's going
to change in the near term. Where it
changes is when deals can't get done.
And so just watch the deal flow. You
know, I think it's just as simple as
that. And watch the economy. And for
now, there's no sign of the economy
turning over. The economy is doing fine.
I think it should turn over.
>> Why?
>> But well, I don't know how the tariff
thing is going to play out. So, let's
call that a wild card. I don't know if
tariffs are deemed illegal and money is
paid out into the economy, the economy
is going to roar. Now, Trump thinks it's
going to get crushed, so I don't know
how the hell it's going to react to a
tariff being declared illegal. But what
I do know is that the
fiscal side
is essentially in gridlock. That there
is just no lever meaningful lever for
the administration to pull to increase
or decrease the deficit. And so
generally growth is something that
benefits from an increasing deficit. And
that's mostly in gridlock. We're going
to get something. We're going to get the
OBB2
come late probably the the summer again.
Though there's no debt ceiling to cause
it to have to happen, so it's hard to
say. But that reconciliation could be
show a tax reduction. And that's a
little bit, but even the Trump
administration
is going to struggle with its own party
to get a meaningful deficit increase.
Now, if they get to keep tariffs, maybe
they can get they can pass some of that
money back and it's just this circle
where we tax our citizens and then we
pay them back. And that could be a small
impact, but there's no pound the table
impact.
And I'm suspicious about the ability for
the promises to get financed and the
companies that are responsible for this
promises to actually execute in 2026.
And then we get down to consumers.
The job market needs to reacelerate. And
I don't see the drivers for that
reaceleration. In fact, I see the
opposite.
So, but is my view extreme? No. You
know, people get on these shows and want
to pound the table on a recession or a
massive boom. And
>> true. I'm more of like 50 basis points
less than expectation,
not 300 basis points less than
expectation type of guy. And
expectations are pretty lofty. So even
if I'm right and it's 50 basis points
lower than expectations, equities can
sell off, bonds can bear steepen,
maybe even bull steepen depending on who
the Fed chair is, etc.
But we're not having a recession.
That's not that's not on my crystal ball
for the next year.
>> So you you like steepeners of of both
flavors.
Why do then you know did did you write
admittedly a few weeks ago that you
think easing more than is priced in is
justified for the Fed? No. If there's no
recession, how come the Fed should ease?
>> Let's talk about what we're talking
about which is there's 25 basis points
of cuts priced in to the next four
meetings. really only 10. If you look at
some forms of pricing, terminal rate is
like three and a quarter.
>> Three and a quarter is what
40 basis points away. So the whole
cutting cycle that's priced into markets
is another 40 basis points. I think
it'll be more
>> because it's merited or because
>> because putting pressure
>> I think it's because it's merited. Now,
there are others that think, "Oh gosh,
you know, inflation staying high."
Again, I think we're going to be 50
basis points lower than market
expectations for than sort of consensus
expectations for both inflation and
growth. And that's enough to cut an
extra 25 to 50 basis points from here
versus what's priced. That's all I'm at.
>> So, you think inflation's headed lower,
too?
>> Yeah. Yeah. I mean, there's no there's
limited fiscal. It's whatever fiscal is.
Everybody on the planet knows that
there's going to be a positive and I
mentioned at the beginning there's going
to be a positive flow from OBBB.
Everyone knows this. Like people have
spent that money perhaps. They know it.
That said, it'll still be an influence
and so keeps expectations and the actual
economy stronger. But then that's over.
And so that's the fiscal side.
And the tariff side remains
disinflationary because unless Trump
gets
tariffs are completely legal like a
complete validation of his pro policy.
Tariffs aren't going up this year and if
tariffs aren't going up that's
disinflationary.
>> Why?
>> Tariffs have to go up. like staying the
same is not is zero inflation due to
tariffs.
>> Yes. But that so that's that would be
neither disinflationary nor
inflationary, right?
>> No, it would be well
>> disinflationary relative% target. It's
disinflationary. It's zero inflation.
>> Yes. Yes. Yes.
>> And we're running at 2.7ish%
inflation.
>> Energy prices. The Trump administration
has done a good job maintaining low
energy prices. I expect that to
continue. It's a big voter issue.
And so, you know, asset prices have been
stimulative
through the wealth effect. If you
believe in that, I believe in it a
little bit. Not not not pounding the
table. It's all there is. A little bit.
>> Asset prices have been flat for a while.
Unless you're in gold.
Unless you're in gold.
Equ NASDAQ is you know is down for the
last three months. S&P is flat for the
year for the you know the la from its
it's below its highs. So there isn't
this sort of new wealth effect going on
and bonds have sold off. So there isn't
a you know a big stimulus coming from
that.
Yeah. So I think we're going to slow
we're going to slow a little bit. I'm
not pounding the table. We're going for
a recession. We're just, you know,
expectations are very, very high and I
think they can be disappointed modestly.
>> And because of that, the Fed's going to
cut. Now, I've also done a very clear
outlook for what the Fed is likely to be
composed of. I don't think it matters
whether it's Waller Worsh writer right
reader or
a lot of people care a lot about that.
What it what it matters is who's the guy
and will Pal stick around past
May as a governor. If he does and Cook
survives her trials,
two of the other middle ground people
are going to have to be convinced to
cut. And I think they can be. So, you
know, I think the and I guess the real
question I have regarding So, I think
there's upside for cuts partly because
of Trump's desire to get rates lower and
his ability to do that. That's not why I
want to be long steepeners and why I'm
long sofur, but it doesn't hurt. What
would hurt is if the Trump
administration said, "No, no, you've
been right all along, pal.
rates are too hot. Too low.
We don't want rate cuts.
Now, that would be a hell of a thing.
>> That would Yeah, that's pretty low
probability, right?
>> It'd be a hell of a thing. You've got
Myron who is 100% we need to cut 150
basis points immediately still and has
said that recently.
And every other thing we're reading is
that Trump wants rates lower. But I
guess it's possible that they could
pivot and say, you know, inflation's a
problem now.
But I don't see it. So, you know, I
think it could be pretty. And right now,
twos are free. You know, twos are
yielding essentially Fed funds.
>> They're not yielding not lower than Fed
funds, which they had been. And so,
yeah, I think he can I think he can own
the front pretty easily. And then the
question is does the back come down with
it
or does it underperform? And I think the
odds are that it needs to underperform
given what the rest of the world looks
like. So yeah, that's a a steepener is
one of my alpha trades right now.
>> You like and you like little painful the
last like middle of last week when
Waller sorry when Worsh became the the
front runner, but that's all reversed in
the last 24 hours.
So, we're recording at at noon on
January 20th. So, Andy, tell us about
gold. It's threequarters of the way to
to $5,000. Just a, you know, over the
past year, just a 65% return. Silver's
been flirting with, you know, $96.
What's going on?
>> Yeah, I don't trade silver. Just not my
thing. I don't trade natural gas. There
just some stuff things I don't trade
mostly because they're hard to figure
out. But gold is a great asset and it's
been a great asset for as long as I can
remember and it's proving it's exactly
what it it's doing exactly what it
should do which is it's dealing with
fiats that are borrowing too much,
spending too much relative to their the
the economic conditions that they have
and essentially debasing at a fairly
rapid rate. back in the back in the
Ukraine war when Biden seized the
Russian assets. That was a big signal.
Didn't actually pay off till this year
though, right? Gold's done did fine
during since then. But certainly this
idea that central banks are the drivers
of gold because of the weaponization of
the reserve currency.
Sure, they've bought, but I don't think
that's the principal driver. I think
it's a portfolio rebalancing that's
happening on a relatively small asset
>> where portfolio rebalancing everywhere
or or in Asia, Europe, US
>> lately. I think it's primarily the US.
>> Okay. Lately, yeah.
>> But it's but it's the whole portfolio
rebalancing has been a ongoing thing
that's just accelerated to an
unsustainable level. Like
today, as I said, I got out of I I twe
tweaked my beta portfolio today to no
longer own any US assets and have no
exposure to US dollars, which is unusual
because I'm a US person. But I also
reduced my gold. I had been overweight
for a while and in particular got very
overweight in early December when the
Fed decided to buy a lot of tea bills.
That was a signal to me. should have
bought silver, but gold has done fine. I
lightened. I got back to equal weight,
which is my sort of 10% of my a in beta
is in gold, and I'm back down to that.
It's gone a long, long way. But
fundamentally,
it's a small market.
Those portfolio rebalancing flows can
continue for far longer than you might
expect. And so I would wouldn't short it
on a dare, but I'm happy to take some
profits at this stage. Silver
talk. Have you did you recently talk to
Alex Campbell?
>> I I uh I haven't. I I've looked into
silver a little bit.
>> Yeah. So, Alex work on it.
>> Alex is my guru on silver. Focus on what
he has to say. the industrial bit I
think it's probably overdone but the
monetary bit is and the momentum bit is
you know hard to hard to go against. I
I'm desperate to want to trade silver
and be be short it. But I've learned
that you just don't do things that
you're not any good at. And I've never
been good I've never traded silver. I'm
not going to jump in today. But gun to
my head I'd have to short it.
Yeah,
I I I see what you mean. Gold though I
is it is so you think it's not the
central banks that are the dominant
driver of the price because for a while
central banks were seller and maybe 10
years ago they they became a net buyer
maybe a little bit longer than that and
that just seems like an anchor because
you know they're they're not going to
sell whereas if someone you know
watching this podcast buys gold like
they could sell it the next day where
they just seems central bank just seems
so sticky.
>> Yeah, I've done a lot of work. I have
it's probably on my website free. I did
a DSR when I actually did a short gold
into this rally. Got super lucky and got
out of it before it ripped my face off.
Made some money. But I did one that
really did an analysis of what the
central banks have done over the c over
the decades.
I think central banks are on pause.
They don't sell. So I think that point
is right. But when central banks are on
pause,
the
direction is not as bullish. And so take
a look at
>> they started going on pause. Sorry.
>> When do I think they went on pause? I
had it for early 2025.
>> Okay.
>> Like there was just no reason to buy
more gold into what was happening in 20
toward the end of middle of 2025. Just
no reason.
We are in negot every central bank was
in negotiation with Trump regarding the
tariffs. Trump was giving
after
liberation day. It's been give give give
taco taco taco. That's not a time where
you need to worry about your Trump
weaponizing the currency. He's doing the
opposite. And so I think they paused
around then and have and are still on
pause. But that's not what's been
driving gold. I mean that central the
funny thing about central banks
particularly the big ones
and sovereign wealth funds particularly
the big ones like Norway like
Switzerland and certainly the Middle
East
is they care about price.
They have a mandate to increase their
gold holdings perhaps but they don't pay
every price. They're not inelastic. And
I think that's the big misunderstanding
of central bank flows is that they are
somehow inelastic.
And for that reason, I think they're
paused.
>> Okay. Interesting. I I I totally would
have agreed with you that sovereign
wealth funds care about the price. But I
actually I was of the view that central
banks are reasonably price inelastic.
You know, I mean, just because looking
at the chart, I mean, they were selling
it at $200 in 1999 and now and now
they're buying it, you know, at $4,000.
>> No, I think take a look at my glittery
DSR. I I've had some experience with
that
from knowing exactly when people paused
and didn't pause, how they bought, what
they were thinking about when they
decided to pause their buying.
You have to have some experience with
the actual central bankers that are
actually doing it and how they think.
Now, I think the big problem is the
central bankers change. Like the central
bankers that I that my firm dealt with
during the 2015 pause or 2013 pause are
different folks
than the current central bankers.
And so, it's possible that I could be
wrong and that these guys have become
dopey monkeys buying at any price. But
my experience was they're pretty
sophisticated investors with a real
mandate to manage their reserve
portfolio for the optimal outcome of the
state.
>> By the way, just a little How's your
How's your Labrador?
>> How's my
>> Labrador?
>> Oh, she's great. Daisy is she's a
Labrador and so you put her in this the
the ocean and
she's very very happy. Great dog.
>> That's right. I I asked cuz I I know you
have one and my Labrador, she's black.
She actually she woke me up at 3:50 in
the morning, you know, hungry
>> today.
>> Yeah. Yeah.
>> Sorry to hear that.
>> Andy,
how do you track and what are you seeing
in the non- central bank flows of gold?
The only real visibility that I have is
just looking at the inflows into US
ETFs. And for a while, even though gold
was skyrocketing,
inflows into those ETFs were flat to
down. They admittedly have started to go
up, but I'm not seeing anywhere close to
like everyone and their, you know,
everyone's grandpa is flooding into ETFs
and there being some sort of huge gold
fervor. Maybe it's in the early stages,
but I'm curious when you look at the ETF
data that I just referenced as well as
globally as well as other private sector
sources, what are you you you seeing and
in your analysis when you said that you
thought there was a rebalancing,
>> right? So you have to think about all
the ways you can own gold. And the one
thing I can't track very well, though
there's data on it, it's just very slowm
moving, very poorly reported, is the
ownership of physical gold. That's
tricky. I look at it, but you know, it's
mostly modeled by sort of interpolating
price with data and trying to figure out
how gold physical gold holdings change.
It's not great. And it's just not it's
not a short-term signal. But there's
millions of there's millions of public
vehicles a handful of of public vehicles
for owning gold, owning commodities in
general. There's miners which have a
inventory of gold and I just basically
track them all. And then you have to
also adjust for the fact that they're
futures on gold, paper gold of many
different sorts. And so
I add that up to say the marginal buyer
is a US person. Does that mean they're
the only buyer? No. Does that mean some
of them are sellers? Of course. But as
over the course of this year, that's how
I add it up
>> over the past one year.
>> Yeah.
>> Okay. Interesting. And so again data
doesn't pro prove this yet because all
data is lagging
and flows data some are fastm moving
like ETF outstandings is fairly fast
moving you get it with a one to two day
lag
>> but all data lags and so
you have to have a model to say well
what's happening if you want to look
forward and I would say based on what I
look at
the last few months
have also been US speculating.
That doesn't mean I'm right, but that's
the odds are.
And so you can't prove it. I And what
I'll do is I'll look back six months
from now. I'll look at my data and say,
"Was I right with that that model of
what flows were?" I could be wrong. And
then I'll say, "Why was I wrong?" And
then look at ways to do it better. But
right now, my signal would be US
Speculative re portfolio rebalancing
broadly speaking is the principal driver
of gold and silver.
>> But as as gold goes up, wouldn't that
cause people to sell their gold
to rebalance out of it?
>> No. Okay. So that's a different thing.
That's like indexing.
>> Yeah.
>> Rebalancing.
That's a different topic. I think it was
it's particularly relevant because a lot
of people were talking about gold being
size to sell in the Bloomberg commodity
index rebalancing
>> and that never manifested
or undoubtedly it did manifest but the
those who are hard benchmarked just
simply were small relative to the
overall flows.
So that's always a flow though, like
every month indexes rebalance. People
look at their statements and say, "Oh,
I'm out of balance. Let me lighten up
the things that are doing well and cover
the things that are doing badly." Those
all interact with CTA flows, momentum
traders, all of those sort of things.
So, you know,
every flow has an opposite side.
And so I can make the case that
retail might have been the principal
driver of the gold rally,
but what's US retail? But what's
important is somebody else sold it,
right? Why did they sell it? And what I
would say is that it doesn't matter
who's selling or buying. What matters is
how elastic they are.
And so the rebalancing into gold from
the from other assets has been inelastic
buying relative to the selling. Every
trade was a buy and a sell. So the price
went up. This is not a thing that has a
lot of value. The price went up. Clearly
demand increased relative to supply.
Okay, so the demand curve moved and the
elasticity was significantly less
elastic buying relative to selling. So
the sellers just said, "Come and get me.
I'm going to just keep walking away from
you. You come and get me." And the
aggressors came and bought. And that's
the way markets work. But you know, so
it doesn't matter just who. It matters
why. And it matters why are they acting
in an ill inelastic way.
>> What do you think about US stocks here,
Andy? And who is inelast who is elastic
the the buyers or the sellers?
>> Right? What I said is I think that rest
of world stock as I said I've been
getting out of rest of world out of US
assets into rest of world assets for a
while. Still the same still the same
view.
Shortterm
I own some out-of-the money calls and I
sold out of the money puts that are
closer to the money today. But I'm not
taking a big bet either way. I think
rest of world stocks are better deal
than US stocks and that's the big
takeaway and
as it relates to US positioning. I think
I do a little bit better if we sell off
5% than if we rally 5%.
And I do a little worse if we just sit
here.
But I don't have a big bet right now.
I'd like to have a big bet, but the
Supreme Court decision to me is a
unhedgeable
uncertainty.
The Fed chairman, though I don't think
it matters a lot, is unhedgable and
uncertain.
And so, I'd like a real opportunity,
whether it's to buy stocks or to sell
stocks. Right now, it's just not that
interesting to me. And so, I don't know
how anybody can be particularly certain
today. And at the same time, V is pretty
elevated. You know, we're running a sort
of three-month VIX at around 18, 19 to
20 sort of sticking around there. The
front can dive when you have the holiday
week and short-term views and then it
can rip when you have a day like today,
but multimo
month V pretty rich given realized like
>> Yeah. Yeah. Like so 20 is pricing in
slightly more than a 1% move every day
and we had a 1% move today and it felt
like a huge wave.
>> OH MY GOD, IT'S A STOCK MARKET CRASH
today and we're we're we're down 1.3%.
>> The Bloomberg headline was like a
blizzard of selling as Japan and
Greenland shock investors.
>> Nothing's nothing's happening. So that
tells me geez, everyone expects
uncertainty
positioning.
We know uncertainty is coming and
uncertainty is priced.
I I think it's time to sit on your
hands.
>> Andy, what do you think about this
Greenland thing and particular the asset
implications I suppose that are being
implied are that the rest of the world
should be so angry they're going to sell
their dollar assets which is basically
the redux 2.0 argument of the liberation
day argument which I believe to be
honest which is that these tariffs are
going to cause foreign investors to sell
their dollar assets. I think you foreign
investors have been and domestic
investors have been leaving US assets
and going to rest of world assets and
gold and silver for since the Trump
administration took office and it has
nothing to do with Trump. It has to do
with the value of these assets relative
to each other and
the existing positioning in which the US
investor who's always underinvested
versus the rest of the world was
particularly underinvested and the rest
of the world was too heavily invested in
the US and that's the big picture and
that's not changing and the rebalance
hasn't even come close to concluding.
So
you know I own this ETF called VA which
is a is an index of rest do de developed
market world MS I think it's MCI anyway
developed market world XUS
and it's denominated in the do domestic
currency that thing's up 30 40% over the
last year and massively outperforming
the US market
those flows are happening and they're
not going to stop happening. Now, could
they stop tomorrow for a little bit?
Could we bounce on the dollar? Of
course, we could, but
I I don't think it has anything to do
with Trump or
loss of the reserve currency. Those are
things that could matter, but right now
it's just why would you own US? You you
already own every all you're already
levered to the gills in US assets. Why
would you own more?
>> But hasn't hasn't the rest of the world
and US investors just been extremely
long US assets for 10 years? And all of
those arguments you said were true. And
you know,
>> well, that's not true. All the arguments
were not true. When Japanese bonds were
yielding 15 basis points, you couldn't
own Japanese stocks because you couldn't
diversify. when the euro when the
European bonds were at 1% and the US
bonds were two two and a half% you
couldn't own European equities. Now
global risk par
is balanced. You can own more of the
rest of the world simply because it's
less risky than it used to be.
Owning Japanese stocks with interest
rates at 1%. How do you hedge that?
There's no hedge.
you can't diversify away growth away
from the J Japanese equity investment
and that no longer is true and it has
become less and less true mostly over
the course of the last year
in which the global bond market has
adjusted to a point where it actually
provides diversification benefit versus
their domestic stock markets and that's
a big thing that makes That's a big
difference
also. But I think the other part of that
is while that was true and so Japan and
Europe were uninvestable from that
standpoint and the US was investable,
the US was also flooding the market with
spending and QE.
Like
how can you not? I owned 100% US assets
during that until just this a year ago
because that was true. And things have
changed
>> because now yields are sufficiently
high. It's interesting. Mo most people a
lot of people think of low yields on
bond yields as a catalyst for oh my god
compared to these ridiculous overvalued
bonds stocks are so cheap. You're saying
that for institutional allocators, you
need bonds to be at a sufficiently non
ridiculous over level in order to
attract diversified portfolios
>> to attract net invest to
>> Yeah. Yeah.
>> It's just
regardless of the price, an equity
investment that can be hedged with
bonds, you can be bigger in than an
equity investment that can't be hedged
with bonds.
And so that's what we have now and we
haven't had that in years. And the
stimulative impact of spending has that
the as my friend Lynn likes to say the
train is not
what is it? What's her saying?
>> Nothing stops this train.
>> Nothing stopped this train. The train is
stopped.
Fiscal is not
generating growth anymore. It's stopped.
and everybody else's train has just
gotten started.
>> What what's a beautiful bill? You're
saying fiscal the fiscal deficits is
still going to be big, but it's not
going to be as big.
>> The growth of government expenditures,
the growth of expenditures, not the
level of expenditures, the growth of
expenditures has flatlined
>> expend. So the deficit is actually going
to go is going down in 2026.
>> Slight that's the OBB thing. slight
increase. If you look at the any any
projections of the impact of OBB, it
said a slight stimulus in '05 in 2025
and a slight stimulus in 2026, but not
anything like the stimulus from 20 to 25
that we've the stimulus is still
positive. It's just not as big and isn't
as big as trend. Like it's not running
at 3% GDP. If G real GDP is running at
3% and government is only increasing at
1 and a.5%.
That's a drag.
>> Government's only increasing the nominal
deficit by one and a half. Even though
the debt as deficit as a percentage
>> G if the G
GDP is
consumption plus government plus
investment plus net exports
if the G portion is growing less than
the total it's drag.
>> And to me that's the train has stopped
not the train keeps going. And my point
is forget Let's just talk about the
relative speeds of the various trains.
>> Sure.
>> Every train.
>> Yeah.
>> Elsewhere is going faster than the US
train. That's bullish assets, bullish
growth, and you're compensated for
owning bonds now where you hadn't been.
And so to me, that just lays the case
for
non-American
exceptionalism. Not because we're worse
people or we have a worse president or a
better president. It has nothing to do
with that. It has to do with the flows
that Gflows are positive elsewhere and
they're not in the US. that monetary
policy is done tight easing and is
leaning toward tightening everywhere
else and US is no longer easing through
QE
versus others that are have eased a lot
but frankly monetary in all cases pretty
neutral
but not like it was in 2012. 20 to 2025
where US monetary was way easier than
everybody else.
And so to me that says
okay it's been a nice run.
>> It has
>> it's been a nice run. I again own my
beta had 100% US assets. It's been
great.
Now it doesn't.
So you you have a pretty high confidence
that the rest of the world international
assets are going to outperform US
assets.
>> I do in in again when brought back to
home currency.
>> So it's a combination of the assets
outperforming and their local currency
outperforming.
>> That that makes sense. Yeah. You
mentioned one ETF. Actually, a new
sponsor of ours is PICE. And so they
have an international ETF that the
ticker is PQNT, which is international,
but using AI to to attempt to to
outperform. And that is that is very
interesting. Andy, let's let's end where
we began. So this massive investments
binge that the the US is on, how it's
going to be financed,
we we we talked for at length about the
significance of of that to growth, but
push comes to shove in simple terms, in
layman's terms, what are the asset
implications of the fact that trillions
and trillions are going to need to be
borrowed to fund AI expenditure as well
as foreign direct investment from the
rest of the world that President Trump
has secured in these agreements, not not
formal deals, but agreements.
>> Yeah. So, it's a headwind for assets,
long-term assets, a headwind for
corporate bound prices, a headwind for
equity prices, a headwind for treasury
prices, long-term treasury prices, and
that's all it is. And I mean that from a
standpoint of it's a headwind now while
the financing is being done. And then
once the financing has been completed,
it actually becomes a tailwind as the
spending that is financed rolls into the
economy. And so for now, progrowth
is created by the the eventually created
by this the borrowing, but the borrowing
is anti-asset.
That makes sense. Andy, thanks thanks
for joining us. People can find you on
Twitter at dampedspring. Your your
research at Dampspring is excellent.
Tell us about the work you do there. And
tell us about Two Gay Beards and how it
it differs.
>> Well, I'm really playing the part on
Two,
>> which I need to get a trim. It's
complete. I I have a Rick Rubin vibe
that I'm trying to work on. I don't know
if you know who that is.
>> Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah.
>> That would be my direction, but it's
getting ridiculous. And my family is
saying, "You got to do something about
this." So, I'm that's going to come it's
going to get trimmed. Anyway, my other
grow beard is Nick Giovanic who is a an
Old Solomon fixed income trader and we
provide weekly videos for our clients
subscription model who just need help
understanding what's going on in the
world and can't spend a lot of time
are misinformed broadly by the the the
mainstream media, CNBC, etc. don't have
time to or skills enough to understand a
podcast and just want a quick 20inut
view of what's important in the world
and how does it affect their portfolio.
So that we provide it's at
twogybeards.com and then damp spring is
principally designed for institutional
investors or high netw worth or other
for investment advisors or other
sophisticated do-it-yourselfers who want
to understand sort of institutional
investment hedge fund quality
understanding of what's going on in the
world and is a hightouch thing where me
and my team interact daily with clients
to try to meet them on their personal
learning curve to understand what's
going on in the world and to rapidly
move up that learning curve so that they
can understand what we've learned over
our careers. And my goal is to just pay
that forward. It's a limited I don't
want a lot of subscriptions for that
because I want to retain the ability to
have a hands-on thing and it's not
scalable. It's not a substack. I'm not
looking to get a million subscribers on
my Substack. I'm looking to interact
with people and pay forward my
understanding. And so that's available
at dampspring.com.
>> Although you say you also have a
Substack which is completely free,
right?
>> I do have a Substack because sometimes
things just need to be said and that
will always be free. It's got, you know,
quite a bit of subscribers. Occasionally
I'll jump in the chat and talk about
things, but that's mostly just to be
what I think Substack is, which is a
blog, not a something to monetize.
>> Makes sense. Thank you everyone for
watching. Please leave a rating and
review for Monetary Matters on Apple
Podcast and Spotify. It really helps the
show. Until next time.
>> Thanks, Jack.
>> Thank you. Just close the door.
Ask follow-up questions or revisit key timestamps.
The speaker discusses the potential for an economic slowdown due to the increasing cost of financing large-scale investments, such as those in AI and onshoring manufacturing. While past investments were often financed by free cash flow, future investments will likely require significant debt and equity issuance, potentially leading to higher borrowing costs and reduced asset prices. The speaker also notes a shift in global investment flows away from the US towards other markets, driven by better relative value and diversification benefits. The analysis covers the impact of these trends on various asset classes, including stocks, bonds, gold, and currencies, and suggests that while short-term growth may be strong, long-term sustainability depends on the successful and affordable financing of these ambitious investment plans.
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