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Versailles Memorandum, US faces Minsk Agreement dilemma

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Versailles Memorandum, US faces Minsk Agreement dilemma

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0:00

All right, Alexander, we have the

0:02

signature

0:04

of the uh memorandum of understanding.

0:07

Uh it's official. Trump signed it at the

0:11

Versailles, which I find to be very

0:15

symbolic. Maybe maybe [laughter] I don't

0:18

know if that was if that's what Macaron

0:20

was going for. I don't think Trump quite

0:23

realized the significance of it all.

0:25

Maybe he did, but uh no doubt Macaron

0:29

was trying to send some sort of a of a

0:32

symbolic message out there. But anyway,

0:35

um Trump signed it. Uh Peshkan

0:39

signed it on on Iran's uh behalf and uh

0:43

the White House published the uhou

0:47

>> I believe 14 clauses.

0:49

>> 14. Yes. And um and you know the foreign

0:52

ministry

0:54

they they somehow it leaked the foreign

0:56

ministry's copy of the MOU leaked like

0:58

three days ago and Iranian media

1:00

published it and everyone was saying uh

1:02

this is this can't be the the memorandum

1:04

of understanding because there's no way

1:06

the US would agree to any of these

1:08

points. It was pretty much exactly what

1:11

was what was uh reported from Iranian

1:13

media 3 4 days ago. And the US did sign

1:18

it and uh every everyone including

1:23

uh Israel, including

1:26

um hawks, Iranian hawks, neocons,

1:31

uh you name it, they're they're all

1:32

saying this this was without a doubt uh

1:35

an American uh a Trump administration

1:39

uh capitulation, I I guess is the is the

1:43

correct word to a retreat

1:45

>> or a retreat maybe is a better word to

1:47

use.

1:47

>> Yes.

1:48

>> U

1:50

an Iranian win,

1:52

US uh loss.

1:55

>> I don't think it's it's I don't think

1:56

it's over

1:58

>> in my opinion. And I believe we were the

2:02

one of the first channels, if not the

2:03

first uh channel to say that this is

2:06

just a memorandum of understanding

2:09

>> and what we're looking at is the

2:11

beginning of negotiations.

2:14

>> Yes. um all this effort that was uh that

2:18

was put in place was about getting to

2:20

the point where the two sides can begin

2:23

negotiations.

2:24

>> Yes.

2:25

>> And that's where we are 60 days now of

2:27

of talks are most likely going to to

2:30

begin. But uh but when you go through

2:33

the list of uh of the clauses of the

2:36

points of theou

2:38

Iran pretty much got everything that

2:40

that they wanted. Um, but what do you

2:44

what are your thoughts?

2:44

>> They did get everything they wanted. No,

2:46

but I'm going to make one very important

2:48

observation. At least I think it's an

2:50

important observation and one one should

2:52

never ever lose sight of. I think that

2:56

if you stop thinking in the way that the

3:00

neocons,

3:02

the deep state, the Israelis, all that

3:05

vast assortment of people who yearn for

3:08

war and yearn for um regime change in

3:12

Iran, if you put all that to one side,

3:16

then objectively this is a good deal for

3:19

the United States because it manages to

3:22

get the United States out of this mess

3:26

in the Middle East or at least it

3:28

doesn't manage it because we are not

3:30

there yet. And what you're saying is

3:32

absolutely correct. We're only at the

3:34

start. We're not at the end. All of

3:37

these people that we've just been

3:39

talking about are going to be working

3:41

overtime to try to disrupt and and

3:45

destroy it. But uh you know if you don't

3:48

believe in regime change wars, if you

3:51

don't believe in fact if you oppose

3:54

regime change wars, if you oppose all of

3:56

these things, if you think that American

3:59

interests really are America first and

4:04

rebuilding the United States, then in my

4:07

opinion, the United States has conceded

4:11

nothing. It is conceded nothing that is

4:15

affects in any way its own interests. It

4:20

on the contrary is a pathway to get out

4:23

of these entanglements in the Middle

4:25

East. Now I wanted to say that because I

4:28

think that's an important thing to

4:29

remember. That doesn't mean that I

4:32

expect this process to move forward

4:34

smoothly or perhaps at all.

4:37

>> Well, what you what you said depends on

4:39

who you ask. I mean, you if you were if

4:41

you were to ask

4:43

>> I'm gonna pick a name um like uh Mark

4:47

Levin or Ben Shapiro or someone like

4:48

that. Absolutely.

4:50

>> They would say what are you talking

4:51

about?

4:51

>> Absolutely. Yeah.

4:52

>> This has nothing to do with America

4:53

first. Right.

4:54

>> Absolutely. Completely correct. I mean

4:56

I'm talking about my own

4:59

I think I can say our perspective of

5:03

where American

5:05

true American interests are. If you

5:09

follow on the contrary the outlook of

5:12

the neocons and the

5:16

faction within America first that is

5:20

closer to the neocons the people who

5:23

talk about peace through strength then

5:25

obviously this is a defeat it's a

5:27

surrender we're going to hear all of

5:29

those words I would not call it that I

5:32

would on the contrary call it a big step

5:34

forward but I do accept this is a this

5:38

are, you know, this is my view. I think

5:40

I could say this is our view, but I

5:43

think it is one that people ought to be

5:45

aware of that this is, in my opinion, a

5:50

a a lifting of the burden. It is an it

5:53

is a way through towards an escape from

5:57

the entanglements in the Middle East

6:00

which have tied America down. So I

6:04

wanted to say that um this is not a

6:06

political judgment about where we're

6:09

moving forward. I'm going to say on the

6:11

contrary that I think that this is going

6:14

to be sabotaged and defeated. And in

6:18

that respect, this is a little like the

6:21

Minsk agreement of 2015, which also

6:25

provided a pathway towards peace in

6:30

Ukraine and peace in Europe as well,

6:33

which as we know perfectly well was

6:36

sabotaged and undermined completely. So

6:39

this is this is I think more likely the

6:41

trajectory that events are going to

6:44

follow. But I think we ought to just

6:47

remain

6:49

keep in mind at the back of our minds

6:52

the fact that if you are looking at what

6:57

are the best interests of the United

6:59

States objectively

7:02

then objectively I think this is

7:07

a good deal for the United States. it

7:10

provides it with a framework through

7:13

which it can get out. So that's the

7:16

first thing to say. Let's let's turn now

7:18

to the agreement itself. Everything that

7:21

the Iranians have been demanding they

7:24

have got. Now we said back in February

7:29

before the conflict began that the whole

7:33

objective was to seek regime change in

7:36

Iran. This is before the attack began.

7:39

Remember, we said that an attack was

7:40

coming and that it was certain that

7:42

there would be an attack and everything

7:44

was building up in that direction. And

7:46

Trump spoke at the State of the Union

7:49

address. And it's worthwhile, by the

7:51

way, going back and reading that State

7:53

of the Union address again and seeing

7:56

what he has to say about Iran there. And

7:59

you could clearly see if you do that at

8:01

that point it was regime change in Iran

8:04

that they were seeking. And you know,

8:06

you had the Israelis talking and all

8:08

kinds of other people, the neocons and

8:09

all of them talking and their followers

8:12

and the media, they were all talking

8:13

about regime change in Iran and and

8:16

other things. Well, we have now seen all

8:21

of that fail. And we said it would fail.

8:24

We said that if regime change did not

8:27

happen quickly, if after the attack Iran

8:32

held together, I think we said we gave

8:35

it about 3 weeks. We said that um after

8:40

three weeks if there had not been a

8:43

collapse in Iran then the balance

8:48

would shift increasingly

8:52

in Iran's favor. Well, I think you can

8:55

now see that that analysis proved to be

8:58

completely correct. Um Iran

9:01

held together. There was the last throw

9:05

which was the sea blockade.

9:09

What you I think absolutely correctly

9:11

called the waiting game.

9:14

The Americans

9:16

said to themselves if we can impose this

9:19

sea blockade then we will start to crash

9:24

the Iranian economy that could

9:27

eventually result in regime change in

9:29

Iran. I think at some point over the

9:32

last few weeks the realization started

9:34

to grow in the White House perhaps

9:37

amongst some other agencies within the

9:39

US government, the commerce department,

9:41

who knows who and they realized that

9:44

long before there was a crash in Iran

9:47

and the problems of the world economy

9:50

would grow to the level with that um

9:52

there would be a major recession and

9:55

that would not be a sustainable position

9:58

for the United States And at some point

10:02

somebody explained this all to Trump and

10:05

that's why we have the deal we have.

10:08

>> Uh as far as um you know this this being

10:11

in in America's interest, I agree with

10:12

you that uh that Trump is making without

10:16

a doubt the correct decision.

10:18

>> Yes.

10:19

>> By signing thisou and hopefully they can

10:22

begin to negotiate and they can find a

10:24

way out. I agree it's going to be

10:25

difficult and I imagine even if they get

10:28

through the 60 days of of negotiations,

10:31

I still think it's going to be difficult

10:33

for for whatever they agree on to to

10:36

hold. So I think we're far away from uh

10:38

from getting out out of this mess. Very

10:41

far away. We are just at the beginning

10:43

of of all of this.

10:46

>> But saying that, without a doubt, Trump

10:48

is making the right decision by signing

10:50

this.

10:52

>> Yes. Uh he didn't really have much

10:55

choice. He boxed himself in.

10:58

>> Yes.

10:58

>> And he even admitted as much in the

11:00

press conference at the G7. He said

11:03

>> we were down to four weeks of of oil

11:05

reserves.

11:06

>> So he blinked. The US blinked. They ran

11:08

out of time. Basically saying we ran out

11:10

of time.

11:10

>> We know they ran out of weapons as well

11:13

because that's been very well documented

11:15

that they were running low on on all

11:17

kinds of of weapons. The THADs, the

11:19

interceptors, the tomahawks.

11:22

So he he didn't have any other choice

11:25

that he he lost the waiting game.

11:27

>> Yes. Say

11:28

>> saying that signing the deal is very

11:30

good for the United States and for the

11:32

Trump administration because they maybe

11:35

they get out of this mess

11:37

>> that he [snorts] himself put the country

11:40

in.

11:41

>> Yeah.

11:41

>> Because he made the terrible decision

11:44

and he made it. He's the president. He's

11:47

the chief executive now. whether he's

11:50

he's really calling the shots or if

11:52

there's a group of people that are

11:53

calling the shots and he's just rubber

11:56

stamping stuff, he he's the president.

12:00

So, at the end of the day, the the the

12:02

buck stops with him. The blame goes to

12:04

him. He went along with this regime

12:08

change in two days. Decapitation strikes

12:11

and it's going to be just like

12:12

Venezuela. He bought into it or whoever

12:14

is making the decisions bought into it

12:16

or the team around him bought into it,

12:18

whatever.

12:19

And you can see that Trump now is is

12:22

very upset with Netanyahu and he's

12:26

taking jabs at Netanyahu

12:29

because he's finally understanding that

12:33

he messed up.

12:35

He may maybe maybe the New York Times

12:37

article is accurate. It's well sourced.

12:40

Maybe it is accurate where they say that

12:41

Netanyahu was at the White House and and

12:44

Rubio was saying don't do it and Vance

12:46

was saying don't do it and even Kaine

12:48

was saying don't do it but Trump said

12:49

let's do it. It's going to be like

12:51

Venezuela. We're going to get rid of

12:53

Kame. We're going to get rid of the the

12:55

leadership and then the people will rise

12:57

up and they'll overthrow the government

12:58

and you know this will be a huge Trump

13:01

peace through strength uh win. That's

13:04

what the New York Times essentially

13:06

reported about a month ago. He bought

13:09

into that

13:11

and and now he's he's taking it out on

13:13

Netanyahu.

13:15

>> Yeah.

13:15

>> And he's upset basically telling him,

13:18

you know, you you led me down this this

13:20

freaking path. So, I mean, [snorts] Iran

13:22

is getting stronger from this.

13:24

>> Yes.

13:25

>> The US is getting weaker from this.

13:27

>> Yes.

13:28

>> But Trump at the end of the day as

13:30

president of the United States, he

13:32

listened to Netanyahu if that's the

13:34

story that we want to believe from the

13:36

New York Times. Uh but he he made the

13:38

decision to go down this path and to go

13:41

through this this this excursion that he

13:44

called it. He called it an excursion.

13:45

Right.

13:46

>> Exactly. I remember that.

13:47

>> And Yeah. And the other day he said it

13:48

wasn't about to uh yesterday at the G7

13:51

he says it wasn't about regime change at

13:52

all. You're not fooling anybody. We we

13:55

know it was about regime change. Who

13:56

said it was about regime change? But the

13:59

admission, the big revelation that I got

14:01

yesterday was uh where he said four

14:03

weeks of of oil reserves, which

14:05

basically is is the the president of the

14:07

United States.

14:08

>> Yeah.

14:09

>> Saying we ran out of time.

14:10

>> Exactly. That is exactly what happened.

14:12

And that of course brings us back to uh

14:15

the points we were just discussing

14:16

because it when somebody has been forced

14:21

into signing a document and when that

14:23

person is the United States and he's

14:26

telling you that I was forced into

14:29

signing a document, you have to question

14:33

the good faith behind the signature. I

14:36

said that this is a deal which is

14:38

objectively

14:39

good for the United States, but Trump

14:42

himself probably deep down doesn't think

14:46

that.

14:47

>> He is probably deeply resentful of the

14:50

fact that he was forced into signing it.

14:53

And he's going to be very angry. He's

14:55

obviously very angry with Netanyahu

14:58

and all of that.

15:01

And but he's now going to go away saying

15:05

to himself, I lost to Iran.

15:09

What am I going to do now with Iran? Am

15:12

I going to continue with this process?

15:16

Um, by the way, there is no way that

15:19

we're going to get a final agreement

15:21

within 60 days. I mean, that timeline is

15:24

impossible. I mean, this is an

15:26

incredibly complicated issue. All of the

15:28

issues related to um um uranium

15:32

enrichment are not going to be solved

15:34

within 60 days. And we're we're talking

15:36

about months of negotiations. I would

15:38

have thought at the very least, not just

15:41

60 days. Um so Trump is going to say to

15:44

himself, what am I going to do? Am I

15:47

going to see this through? Am I going to

15:50

engage the Iranians in negotiations

15:54

over the long term? doing so now from a

15:58

position of weakness where it is the

16:01

Iranians who have the advantage over me

16:06

or am I going to start working very hard

16:10

to find a way to break this very same

16:14

agreement which I have so unhappily and

16:17

reluctantly signed and prepare for the

16:22

next war and that's Trump and you have

16:25

to understand that of course Trump

16:27

himself is only one party to this

16:29

process that all the other people um in

16:32

the intelligence services in the deep

16:35

state the neocons the friends of Israel

16:38

all of those people not just Israel by

16:40

the way you know people who for all

16:43

kinds of structural reasons in the

16:45

United States want to see regime change

16:47

in Iran want to see regime change in

16:49

Iran because that that's going to crash

16:52

the bricks and by the way. I have some

16:55

things to say about the bricks and Iran

16:58

which I'll say in a moment. But um all

17:00

of that all of that group of people who

17:05

are um involved in all in all of this

17:07

and who wanted more with Iran and the

17:09

crashing of the regime. They're not

17:11

they're still there. They're still

17:13

incredibly powerful. They are going to

17:16

treat this exactly as the neocons

17:19

treated Minsk as an opportunity to rearm

17:23

and prepare. Now the mistake the

17:26

Russians made after Minsk is they

17:29

thought that Minsk had been entered into

17:32

in good faith and that it made absolute

17:35

logical sense for the Europeans, the

17:38

Germans and all that the others to work

17:40

through and enact Minsk. If the Iranians

17:43

make that same mistake, they assume that

17:47

the United States is fully fully

17:49

committed to this memorandum of

17:52

understanding, which you're absolutely

17:54

right to say again, as you did at the

17:56

start of the pro program, is not a final

17:59

treaty. It is just a memorandum of

18:02

understanding. It is at most a framework

18:06

agreement. If the Iranians get lulled

18:08

into it in the way that the Russians

18:10

were lulled into Minsk and give the

18:12

neocons and the Israelis and all of

18:14

these people all the time they need to

18:17

prepare, you know, violating theou

18:21

uh deploying more troops closer to Iran

18:24

instead of pulling them back. You notice

18:26

this talk about pulling troops and

18:28

forces away from Iran. Minsk said

18:31

exactly the same that the Ukrainians

18:33

would pull their forces away from the

18:35

conflict line and they never did and the

18:37

Russians never did anything about it

18:38

except meet with Steinmeer and Merkel

18:41

and all of these people that complain

18:42

about this. If the Iranians get lulled

18:45

into that and even as the terms of theou

18:50

are broken then I'm afraid they're going

18:53

to find that they're back in in another

18:56

war very soon. probably well I say very

18:59

soon perhaps in a few years time only

19:03

the attack this time will be much more

19:06

powerful and far better organized than

19:08

the one we have just seen. So the

19:10

Iranians have not won and this is an

19:14

important thing to say they have gained

19:16

a tactical victory.

19:20

They if they're going to

19:23

gain from this and benefit from it, they

19:28

need to make certain very difficult

19:29

decisions. They need to work very very

19:32

hard and they need to move forward and

19:35

consolidate what they have gained and

19:38

they need to be very much on their guard

19:40

understanding that in the United States

19:43

and in Israel and elsewhere in including

19:45

in Europe by the way there are very very

19:48

powerful forces that want will want to

19:51

reverse this thing. Oh, I would say Iran

19:55

has won a battle or a round another

19:57

round or or another battle, but the war

19:59

is still is still there.

20:01

>> War is still ongoing. Until we get a

20:03

final agreement and see the terms of

20:05

that final agreement implemented,

20:08

>> you cannot say that Iran has won.

20:10

>> Yeah. Um I don't think Iran will make

20:12

the mistake of Russia because the way

20:14

Iran went about this war was very very

20:16

different than the way Russia goes about

20:18

things. I think I think Iran was I I

20:21

mean, if you want my my honest take on

20:24

on how I'm now now that I'm looking at

20:26

at the way Iran went through this

20:28

conflict,

20:29

>> they took big risks, but those risks

20:32

paid off and and their execution was was

20:35

very well done. They were very well

20:36

prepared.

20:38

>> One one of the reasons they're not going

20:40

to make the mistakes that the Russians

20:42

made was because they're being advised

20:44

by the Russians. Now, I I I I I was told

20:47

I was told quite a lot about the kind of

20:49

communications that took place between

20:51

Russia and Iran during the war while I

20:53

was in Russia. Um, from a variety of

20:56

sources, by the way. And I mean the

20:58

Russians, it's absolutely clear to me,

21:00

did not just provide intelligence

21:03

assistance and drone technology and

21:06

those kind of things, but they were

21:08

providing the uh Iranians with quite a

21:11

lot of advice as well and giving all

21:14

kinds of warnings. The Iranians heeded

21:16

those that advice.

21:19

I have to say this. Um, the Russians are

21:24

worried that after these events, the

21:29

Iranians

21:30

are feeling very euphoric

21:33

and um there was an expression that I

21:36

heard use dizzy with success

21:39

and the the the Russians are telling

21:42

them, you know, slow down, you know,

21:44

don't don't think this is over. It is

21:46

not yet over. So you know there are

21:49

these uncertainties

21:51

just as the Russians felt

21:54

very euphoric after Minsk and that led

21:57

them down the wrong path. There is a

22:00

faction in Iran that is feeling very

22:02

euphoric with thisou and I know that I

22:06

mean I have absolutely no doubt about

22:07

that. So um but I agree I think in the

22:11

end they won't make the same mistakes

22:14

that the Russians make. Okay, let's um I

22:18

yeah, I agree with that. I think Iran

22:20

definitely

22:22

>> does war

22:24

very differently than than than the

22:26

Russians. And when I mean war conflict,

22:29

I'm talking about enforcing red lines.

22:31

I'm talking about the information war.

22:33

>> Yeah.

22:33

>> A very different approach than than how

22:37

Russia has gone about things, whether it

22:38

was Minsk, whether it's the conflict

22:40

with Ukraine. But

22:41

>> well, I I I I I just want to say I think

22:43

they we're talking about completely

22:45

different wars. I mean there's never

22:46

been there has never been a ground war

22:49

and again it was explained to me that

22:52

there are fundamental factors that uh uh

22:55

make the kind of playing out of the war

22:58

completely different but the diplomacy

23:01

the diplomacy was different and um again

23:07

the there was and I I mean I know this

23:11

now I mean there there's no quite doubt

23:13

about this there was advice advice given

23:15

to Iran which Iran heeded. There are

23:19

people within Iran who also wanted to be

23:24

much more accommodating with the US than

23:29

the people who eventually emerged

23:33

in the ascendant. But as I said, the

23:36

Iranians overall did listen to the

23:39

advice they were given. And when I say

23:41

the Iranians listen to advice, there's

23:43

no doubt at all that there were people

23:45

in Iran also who didn't need that advice

23:48

because they already understood what the

23:50

Americans uh were going to do.

23:52

>> Yeah. Well, I agree. Two different wars,

23:55

but when I use the when I talk about u

23:58

you know, Iran was taking risks.

24:01

>> Yes.

24:02

uh that that Russia

24:04

comparing it to to Russia and Ukraine

24:06

that Russia did not take or was too

24:09

worried to take. For example, shutting

24:11

down Hormuse.

24:13

>> Yes.

24:13

>> This has nothing to do with with a

24:15

conventional war, ground war, whatever.

24:17

But

24:19

>> this was a move that was very risky.

24:21

>> Yes.

24:22

>> Very unpredictable.

24:23

>> Yes.

24:24

>> And

24:26

>> Yes. Yes. And and did could and did uh a

24:29

lot of of damage to to the Iranian

24:32

economy. I mean, it was a big risky

24:36

>> uh move for them to shut down Hormuse in

24:39

the way that they did. But it it worked.

24:41

>> Yes.

24:42

>> Where where where Russia and they could

24:44

have said no. Iran could have played it

24:46

safe and said,

24:47

>> "Let's not go down this path. It's too

24:49

much. It's it's too heavy of a response.

24:52

It's going to lead to all kinds of

24:53

unforeseen

24:55

>> uh problems and and we should just best

24:58

avoid completely shutting down

25:00

>> Hormuse. Yeah. I I don't want to get

25:03

into a discussion.

25:04

>> No, I just want to spend it approach

25:06

because because uh again there was I I

25:08

heard discussions about the something to

25:12

discuss in a program about Russia that

25:14

we'll do that in Russia. But the point

25:15

that I want to make is these are the

25:16

risks that they took.

25:18

>> They did take risks. Uh uh they did take

25:20

risks and they did respond very

25:23

aggressively against American bases. Um

25:27

and they did build up their forces. But

25:30

most important of all, they stuck to

25:34

their position in negotiations

25:37

and as you absolutely rightly say, they

25:39

won the waiting game. But I they're in

25:44

the same position now that the Russians

25:47

were in in February 2015. That that's

25:51

the point I am making. We are not in a

25:54

position yet where there is a final

25:56

agreement. So it is what Iran now does

26:01

between from this moment where it has

26:05

won this tactical success. Russians had

26:08

also won a tactical success by February

26:10

2015. If they get dizzy with success, if

26:14

they think that the battle is won, the

26:17

key thing to understand is that it is

26:20

not. If they don't capitalize

26:24

on the advantage they have gained, then

26:27

they are s simply setting themselves up

26:30

for a much bigger attack in the future.

26:34

>> Yeah. Well, I mean, okay, there there

26:36

are

26:37

>> there are differences with

26:38

>> Yes.

26:38

>> with the Minsk and how that came about

26:41

and and how this deal came about, but

26:44

anyway,

26:45

>> uh let's let's leave that to to another

26:47

video.

26:48

>> Um

26:49

>> just to wrap up this video, you you

26:51

talked about uh Trump leaving leaving uh

26:55

France maybe maybe a bit uh well,

26:59

definitely a bit upset.

27:01

>> Yeah. feeling as if he was led down the

27:04

wrong path. He was led astray, was given

27:06

bad advice. Uh Netanyahu uh betrayed

27:10

him. Maybe he's feeling betrayal. Maybe

27:12

he's feeling as if he was duped. I'm

27:14

sure these are natural, you know, human

27:17

feelings, if you want to say that. Trump

27:19

is probably feeling these things. You

27:21

know, I I I I believed that guy. I

27:24

trusted that guy. He sold me this this

27:27

big victory and look what happened. So,

27:30

so you have all these things happening

27:33

uh with Trump or with the Trump

27:34

administration

27:36

and and I go back to Versailles,

27:39

the signing of a of a surrender of a

27:43

document of capitulation

27:45

>> where the one side feels as if as if it

27:49

was it was uh duped as if it was it was

27:53

uh it was not right what what happened

27:56

>> and and where that led to.

27:58

>> Yeah. I mean there there there's

28:00

interesting not not completely I mean

28:02

definitely once again completely two

28:04

completely different you know

28:07

>> situations and wars and everything but

28:10

but there's something in in in Mron and

28:13

Trump and signing the document at that

28:17

location

28:18

which which I think should not be uh

28:21

lost on on everyone. You are absolutely

28:24

correct and um frankly um I think that

28:28

Trump was very ill advised to sign it in

28:30

Belai. I I I don't know what again

28:33

>> he probably didn't know what was

28:34

>> No, he sure he didn't know.

28:35

>> But I think Macaron would know.

28:37

[laughter]

28:38

>> Absolutely. And and that tells us

28:41

something again because we've just been

28:42

talking about Iran and why Iran needs to

28:46

be on its guard and not assume that this

28:49

is over because it is not over. Um the

28:52

there needs to be a sim there needs to

28:54

be a debate

28:56

a similar debate in the United States

28:59

but from the other side. And this is

29:01

where what we were discussing at the

29:04

start of this program about how if you

29:07

take a step back objectively this is a

29:11

good agreement for the United States is

29:15

something that people in the United

29:17

States important people and there are

29:19

such people in the United States they

29:21

need to argue about because Minsk

29:26

was objectively

29:28

a good agreement.

29:30

for Germany.

29:32

After Minsk, after Minsk, Merkel signed

29:36

for Okay, sorry. Yeah, you got me

29:38

confused when you said for Germany.

29:40

>> For Germany, Minsk was a good deal for

29:42

Germany. Germany went away. And for

29:45

Ukraine and for Ukraine, they they they

29:47

did Nordstream too, if you remember all

29:50

of that. They were able to persuade the

29:52

Russians to build Nordstream, too. um it

29:55

provided a framework for peace in Europe

29:58

which Germany massively benefited from.

30:04

The problem was that the people who

30:08

understood that in Germany and there

30:10

were some eventually lost the battle

30:14

with the hardliners

30:16

and that's why this thing has gone

30:19

completely wrong in the United States.

30:22

They need to have that same discussion.

30:24

The people who

30:28

objectively understand that this is a

30:31

good deal for the United States and

30:34

there are such people. I know there are.

30:36

They need to be much more forceful than

30:40

the supporters of Minsk were in Germany.

30:43

And they need to make very strongly the

30:45

case in the United States that this is

30:47

this really is the fork in the road that

30:50

the United States must work in good

30:53

faith to secure this deal to make a

30:56

long-term treaty with Iran that will

31:00

stick and which will enable the United

31:03

States to disengage and to free itself

31:06

from all of these entanglements in the

31:09

Middle East. The risk is that just that

31:13

just as in Germany it was the hardliners

31:17

who eventually won so that we've ended

31:19

up with mass and all of these

31:21

extraordinary people in Germany in

31:23

control. We could see exactly the same

31:26

thing happen in the United States, in

31:29

which case not only will we get back

31:30

into a war, but the United States will

31:33

find itself again in much more

31:36

prolonged, far more difficult wars in

31:39

the Middle East, which inevitably sooner

31:42

or later are going to have to lead to

31:45

the deployment of ground troops by the

31:48

United States. if the United States is

31:52

going to prevail in that war against not

31:54

just Iran but against the very powerful

31:56

forces across the Middle East that have

31:59

been on Iran's side in this conflict. So

32:02

the United States is also at a major

32:05

fork in the road. The Iranians need to

32:07

be on their guard. The Americans need to

32:11

start working in good faith in good

32:14

faith towards achieving peace. And that

32:18

means that those who support peace in

32:20

the Middle East need to win the

32:23

political battle in the United States to

32:27

make sure that that is what happens. Uh

32:30

just a final question, is there a

32:31

parallel that could also be uh brought

32:34

up with uh the Versail treaty in World

32:36

War I and how it led to World War II in

32:38

the signing of this document as well?

32:41

is is Macron aiming at

32:43

>> I mean all all the symbolism of I just

32:46

find it weird that they couldn't wait

32:48

till Friday decided in Switzerland. They

32:51

had to sign it there and and obviously

32:54

Macaron and the Europeans, they they

32:56

want this to happen because they want

32:57

that the optics of it all. Right. Uh

33:00

Iran is over now. We could focus on

33:02

Ukraine and here we all are as the G7.

33:04

We're in this thing together, united.

33:06

And Macaron is talking about sending

33:08

French ships to Hormuse

33:10

>> and and all of this stuff. Uh but I mean

33:13

you the the another good point to make

33:16

is is that you can't have the the end of

33:20

this conflict lead to a a bigger

33:22

conflict down the road.

33:24

>> That is exactly what Macroy is up to.

33:27

That is why he held he had it signed in

33:30

Versailles. Um he he wants to make it he

33:34

wants this conflict to be a staging post

33:38

towards the next bigger conflict. Uh um

33:42

Ma Mron whatever whatever we we may

33:45

think about Mron knows his history at

33:48

least he has his own version of history

33:51

but he knows exactly what ma uh what

33:53

Vansai was all about. Um he he [snorts]

33:56

basically set this thing up both in some

34:00

ways to humiliate Trump in ways that I

34:04

don't think Trump understood, but also

34:08

in order to box the US in so that that

34:12

leads on to the next big war in the

34:15

Middle East and elsewhere and at the

34:18

same time to give Trump's adversaries

34:22

in the United States an iconic image

34:26

that they could play with. So the the

34:30

again it's very unfortunate that Trump

34:33

isn't properly advised about these

34:36

things and himself doesn't have that

34:38

sense of history to understand what the

34:41

Europeans are doing. But that is exactly

34:43

what that was all about. I mean,

34:47

this is not

34:49

a decided a resolved conflict. Not by

34:53

any means. And I get to say this as of

34:56

now. I would say that the adversaries,

35:00

the opponents of peace with Iran

35:03

continue to be much stronger in the

35:06

United States, in Israel, of course, and

35:10

in Europe than those who want a

35:13

long-term peace in the Middle East.

35:16

Because and this is a key thing to

35:18

understand for the Europeans

35:22

it's keeping the United States

35:26

continuing its neocon foreign policy

35:30

line which keeps the US in the Middle

35:33

East. It keeps the US in Europe. It

35:36

prevents the US achieving

35:39

reconciliations

35:41

with countries like Russia, Iran,

35:44

wherever, which are not objectively

35:47

American enemies or really threats to

35:50

the United States, but which the

35:53

Europeans, the Israelis, all of these

35:56

people want the United States to remain

35:58

in permanent confrontation with. So, um,

36:02

this game is at its start and as of now,

36:08

the opponents of long-term peace remain

36:11

much stronger, better organized,

36:14

understanding what they are doing than

36:17

those who are the supporters of peace.

36:21

The fact that they were able to maneuver

36:23

Trump into signing this thing in Vai is

36:26

a case in point.

36:28

>> All right, we will end the video there.

36:30

the duran.locals.com. We're on X. We're

36:32

on Rumble. We're on Telegram. Go to

36:33

Duran Shop, pick up some merch. We are

36:34

also on Substack as well. All those

36:37

links in the description box down below

36:38

and go to Duran shop, pick up

36:40

>> some uh some merch. I think I said that,

36:42

but we do have a special on the Duran

36:44

shop. Uh 25% off or 20% off on all

36:49

merchandise.

36:50

>> So, definitely check that out. Take

36:53

care.

Interactive Summary

The video discusses the recent signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the US and Iran, which is described as a tactical retreat for the Trump administration. The hosts analyze the geopolitical implications, suggesting that while the MOU could be a pathway for the US to disengage from the Middle East, it faces significant opposition from neoconservatives and hardliners who may attempt to sabotage it. The conversation highlights the symbolic significance of signing the document in Versailles, the potential for future conflict if the agreement is not upheld, and the strategic risks Iran took to reach this point.

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