All right, Alexander, let's uh talk

about the situation with uh Project

Ukraine.

We had a big uh missile strike from

Russia into into Kiev and into Ukraine

uh yesterday and and today and we also

have drone strikes from uh from Ukraine

into into Russia as well. It looks like

Russia is targeting

military facilities,

uh, storage facilities of drones of, uh,

of air defense missiles, maybe even

those Patriot missiles that Poland

secretly gave to Zilinsky without

parliament approval. Looks like those

have gone up in smoke. A lot of

secondary explosions as well. So, so you

know, Russia's hitting hitting something

significant. They're also targeting uh

Portoenko's chocolate factory, which

Portoenko was posting about uh that

factory producing drones. That's where

the money is at if you want to get the

big Ursula funds. You you produce

drones. That's how you get into her uh

her safe funds and and the peace the

peace fund that she put together. But um

that's the situation in Ukraine. You had

a Putin Trump phone call as well.

Uh is uh is Putin

uh going after decision making

facilities in Kief as they talked about

a month ago? Is his policy of maximum

restraint and appeasement of Trump

finally coming to an end?

>> Well, I think these are good questions.

I uh for the moment I do not get the

sense that this these two the two big

strikes that we've just seen are coming

after the decision-making centers. The

Russians have said, and they said this

about two months ago now, that they

would come after the decision-making

centers, and if you remember, they said

that uh Western diplomats should start

thinking about packing their bags and

leaving Kief, but they haven't attacked

in a serious way the decision-making

centers yet. And um well, there could be

all kinds of debates as to why. Um,

Lavrov has said that the Russian war

warnings to the diplomats to the western

governments remain in place and that

those attacks will come. Um, my own view

and I think this is a I mean I've made

it previously. I think that that Russian

warning and that very big strike that

followed which used the Arashnik system

against a satellite town of Kiev and

another Archnik as it turned out on the

same day um to attack what was called a

fortified center in uh Donbass. I think

all of those things that all that was

part of an organized military campaign,

but the timetable for that particular

strike and the warning were brought

forward because of what happened in Star

Bellsk, the Ukrainian attack on the

dormatory. And I think that the Russians

in when they carried out that big attack

with the arrestics and all that back in

uh May were not yet ready for the major

um campaign

involving the um centers decision making

centers in Kiev because the um archnik

are still not I think fully perfected.

production is only really beginning in a

big way and um I don't think the timing

on the front lines um everything in

Russia in terms of the military campaign

seems to be fairly carefully

synchronized. I don't think all of these

things yet were brought together um to

make it happen in that way. I'm fairly

sure, in fact, I'm very sure that we

will be seeing attacks on the

decision-making centers later this

summer. In the meantime, what the

Russians are doing is that they're

pounding Kief. I have no doubt, by the

way, that these are carefully

pre-prepared, pre-planned attacks. There

is a meeting between Putin and the top

military leaders. Gasimov was there.

Gasimov reported to Putin about the uh

general military situation, but he

described the strikes on Kiev itself.

Virtually nobody noticed a particular

phrase he used. He said that these

strikes are taking place in accordance

with a plan of the general staff. So

there is a military plan. I think

they're pounding away at Kiev. Uh

they're softening up Kiev. They're

coming after what's left of its air

defenses. Eventually the point will

become when the strikes on the

decision-m centers will happen. Uh

probably as I said um later this summer.

>> Uh the Trump Putin phone call, the

Zalinski Trump phone call, Ushakov in

his readout said that the phone call

lasted 85 minutes and was initiated by

the United States.

>> Yes. Uh we don't know how long

Bizilinsky Trump phone call lasted. I

haven't seen any references as to as to

who initiated it as well. Uh we are

getting reports that Trump will be

meeting with Zalinski on the sidelines

of the NATO summit. Ukraine is going to

be present at that NATO summit. Um

getting asking for weapons and money and

and getting weapons and and money but

significantly less

>> than uh Zitzky had wanted. Yes,

>> wanted uh well, there were reports that

he was going to get 150 billion from

NATO and then there were reports that

he's getting 70 billion,

>> but he's actually only going to get 10

billion because part of that 70 billion

is coming from the EU uh gift, the 90

billion EU gift

>> that that they're giving to to Ukraine.

So, so he's really going to leave with

with 10 billion.

>> Yes.

>> In new money. Anyway, uh the phone call

between uh the US president and both

sides uh Ukraine and Russia. Is Trump

once again the neutral uh mediator in

all of this? Financial Times ran an

article saying that it is the United

States that is uh that is helping

Ukraine attack

Russia. I believe they went a step

further. Not so even even further than

than the United States is helping

Ukraine uh attack Russia. The United

States is is effectively running these

attacks

uh against Russia, at least American

intel.

>> I have the Financial Times really

implicates uh the United States in in

the attacks against Russia.

>> I have absolutely no doubt whatsoever

that that is the case. And I got to say

something else. the telephone call from

Trump to Putin and you're absolutely

correct. um it was Trump who initiated

the call um is absolutely at part of all

of this and it explains what's going on

and it also explains to some extent this

big narrative uh construction that we've

been hearing over the last few months

about how the um um situation on the

front lines in Ukraine in general um has

turned against the Russians that um the

Ukrainian ians now have the initiative

in the war. In fact, in some ways, it

reminds me of some aspects of the um US

um war with Iran that took place in fe

in in March and early April. Anyway, let

let me unpack that. Um clearly what

happened after Anchorage and we go back

to Anchorage. I'm increasingly coming

around to the view that Anchorage was an

attempt by Trump, Witoff, uh, Kellogg,

all of them to try to get the Russians

to agree to a ceasefire, not an

immediate ceasefire on the existing

front lines, dangling to them some uh,

prospect eventually of a Ukrainian

withdrawal from Donbass. This is what

Lavough is hinting at. I think that was

what it was all about. It didn't work

out that way. Putin came along. He said,

"Look, I'm very happy with the proposal

that you're coming up with u that the

Ukrainians withdraw from Donbass and we

do all of this sequencing." But Putin

again said no ceasefire. There's not

going to be a ceasefire until the

Ukrainians start to withdraw.

And that left the American strategy

based, you know, up in the air because

they hadn't got the ceasefire that they

were looking for. So, in the autumn of

2025,

the decision is made, start the drone

offensive, get attacks going against

Russia itself,

um try to escalate the pressure on the

Russians, um impose sanctions on Rosenef

and Luke Oil, put pressure on India to

stop buying Russian oil and so that was

the big switch in policy and also tried

to scare the Russians with talk about

Tomahawk missile deployments again try

to get the Russians to agree to a

ceasefire on the existing conflict lines

and this continued right out through the

autumn and then eventually we got to the

situation in December when um there's

discussions in Washington. There's

discussions in Europe. There's

discussions in Ukraine. Who why aren't

the Russians

doing what we want? Why aren't they why

aren't they buckling under all this

pressure? And the idea is, well, maybe

it's Putin. Putin is the problem. So, we

have the attack on Valdi, the attempt to

basically remove Putin from the scene.

That doesn't work. So then we have the

escalation of the drone war, the

harassment of the tankers, the Russian

tankers, the shadow fleet tankers that

follows.

There's the narrative about the

situation being in stalemate on the

front lines and there's all the

excitement and euphoria across the west

including in the United States that the

drone war is starting to have an effect

on the Russians. So things now are

starting to look like it's not quite

like that. So there's the announcement

last week from the Russians that they've

captured Constantinfka.

There's Putin's message to Trump, which

is an absolutely standard message. Putin

always sends messages to leaders of

states congratulating them on their

national holiday. So there's the message

from Putin to Trump congratulating the

US on the 4th of July. So Trump then

goes off the bat on that. He calls Putin

and they talk for 85 minutes. [snorts]

And if you pass

Ushakov's

summary of the conversation

closely, which I've done, you see all

sorts of words like business-like,

candid

appear in that commentary. There's

nothing about warmth. There's nothing

about sincerity.

Ushakov says that it was a constructive

discussion. But what contradicts that is

that there's no sign of agreement about

everything, anything. What you come away

with is Trump again putting enormous

pressure on Putin, not just to agree a

ceasefire, but also to accept Wickoff

and uh Kushner in Moscow. And Putin's

saying no. There's even a section where

uh Trump says to Putin, you can have

Wickoff and Kushner coming to Moscow

whenever you choose. It's up to you. And

um there's no sign that Putin for the

moment is agreeing with all of this. So

I think this is what happened. I think

that was how the meeting went. For the

moment, Putin

is still talking to Trump. I mean, he

probably will continue to do this in all

the time, but that last telephone call,

it looked to me, what as Trump trying to

put verbal pressure on Putin to agree

some kind of ceasefire. You see all the

commentaries appearing all over the

media. There's a fork in the road. Putin

has to make a decision. Does he want

peace? Does he want further war? All of

this kind of thing. and the Americans

piling on the pressure with a drone

offensive and all of these things and

very very baffled that at one of the

same time Vladimir Putin is talking to

them but is not giving them what they

want. And I think that this is this is

actually u where we are at this point in

the conflict at the moment. And I think

on top of that, we now have news from

Donbass of places like Constantinfka

being captured. And whether the

Americans are able to absorb this,

whether they're able to assimilate this

information, I'm not absolutely sure,

but I do get the sense that it's making

both them and the Europeans increasingly

uneasy. So that's that's I think where

we are. Um it it's you know the pieces

are starting to come together but this

has been in my opinion the strategy the

Trump administration has been following

all along. In other words they've been

trying to freeze the conflict from the

moment Trump was elected. The the

tactics change. Sometimes we have

persuasion like they did in Anchorage.

Other times it's pressure like with the

drone offensive. But one way or the

other, they're getting very frustrated

that Putin isn't doing what they want.

>> The the Europeans and and the Trump

administration, they're going to head

into the NATO summit. Um and they're

just not going to accept that

Constantino has been captured.

>> No,

>> I've been reading article after article

from the collective west and they and

they are running with the with the

stalemate narrative.

>> Yeah.

>> They continue to say a US official

actually just the other day said that uh

that Russia has made no gains.

>> I do. Yes. on the front line. Yes.

>> This is as as Costantinoka has been

captured.

>> Yes.

>> Uh Zalinski refuses the the fallen

soldiers for for two reasons. He refuses

to to to receive the fallen soldiers,

which is what the Russian Ministry of

Defense has offered to Zilinski. About

13 they claim 13,500 uh casualties

Ukraine suffered trying to hold on to

Constantino. This is coming from the

Russian

>> Ministry of Defense. uh they offered

Zilinski uh and Ukraine to uh to create

a a few hours window where they will

return the the fallen soldiers.

>> Zilinski refuses because one, he doesn't

want to to pay the money.

>> That's reason number one. And reason

number two,

>> uh it would destroy his narrative about

Constantinoka um not being captured.

that that is that

>> I mean he could disprove he could

disprove uh what the Russians are saying

by accepting the fallen soldiers and and

no fallen soldiers or or a few fallen

soldiers are returned to to Ukraine and

Silinski could say you see they haven't

captured Costantinovka but he knows it's

going to be the the reverse so he

doesn't accept it. Um, so so in NATO

they're going to to just ignore

everything and and Trump is going to to

be mesmerized and dazzled by Macaron and

Mertz and Maloney and he's going to

continue to to push uh Ukraine to

escalate with uh with Russia. The the

interesting part to what you said is not

the US's policy of trying to get Russia

to to agree to ceasefire. The

interesting part, the weird part is

Russia, Putin's policy of of maximum

restraint and appeasement. I've has has

there ever been a case in in the history

of war where one side throws everything

it has at its opponent which is the

collective west all the money all the

weapons everything they have they've

thrown at at Russia and the other side

holds back

uh as much as they can in order to

please

the the leader of the opponents. Has

there ever been such a situation in

history before? Strangely enough, many

times it it's it's far from you. Uh you

could argue that something rather like

that happened during the American Civil

War when Lincoln was constantly saying

uh appearing to take a much more

moderate position than ultimately he

did. Um you could argue something

similar happened during the Vietnam War.

There's that that is not unusual in

itself. where I think the problem comes

and this is where Putin I think is um um

you know completely wrong is that he

seems to think that him coming along and

telling Trump look these people are

lying to you um my army is actually

winning

advancing this narrative that you're

being sold about things being in

stalemate is uh wrong. I I I which is

something that happens now in meeting

after meeting telephone conversation

after telephone conversation Putin going

to extraordinary length one census to go

through what's happening every part of

the front line and thinking that Trump

is actually listening there I think that

is where I think Putin is um is

completely wrong. It is very very like

Vladimir Putin as I said many times in

some respects he's a very rational man

and his own rationality

um sometimes leads him into false places

because he assumes that the other side

is as rational and as fact-based as he

imagines himself to be. So he did this

with the Europeans over the Minsk

process and he's doing the same with the

Americans over the

situation in Ukraine. And now I come

back to my point that in some ways it

reminds me a great deal of the US Iran

war in the sense that throughout that

war we were hearing about how Trump was

you know watching videos uh two or three

minute videos he was being provided in

which he saw lots of bangs and he came

away from them convinced that the United

States was winning and he was making one

statement after another about how the US

was doing well and how Iran was in

crisis and all of that kind of thing.

And um it seems to me that what we're

looking at is something very similar. So

Radcliffe

or Hegs, all of these people, um the uh

Ukrainians, the Europeans, they're

presenting him with these images of, you

know, uh drones hitting refineries,

smoke rising in Moscow, all of that. And

they're telling him, "Look, this is, you

know, the Russians are taking real

damage. The this is the evidence.

There's all these lines of people at gas

stations. There's problems in Crimea.

There's all of these things. The

pressure on Putin is unbelievable."

And he's buying it. And here and Putin

comes along and he lectures Trump. Putin

has a tendency to lecture, lectures

Trump for, you know, 30 minutes or

whatever it is, going through

everything. And of course, what what

Putin doesn't realize is that this goes

completely over Trump's head. Trump

isn't listening to any of this and never

will. It will take a much more dramatic

situation than the fall of a place like

Constantin

to shake Trump out of the narrative. Of

course they will deny that Constantineka

has fallen just as they will deny that

Slavansk and Kamadorsk have fallen when

they eventually do. Um I it it needs

something much bigger like the Russian

army to arrive at the gates of Kiev to

make Trump realize that the that you

know the narrative he is being told is a

false one. And um I I don't think Putin

gets this. And I think that

this is the the gap if you like in

Putin's understanding of Trump and

indeed of understanding of the West and

of information war that Zalinski, the

Europeans, the the deep state in the

United States, the CIA, all of these

people are are taking advantage of.

doesn't make any sense because Putin

once upon a time said that it doesn't

matter who the president of the United

States is. It's the same people in the

black suits that come along and

>> and they make the decisions. I mean, he

knows how things are done in the United

States. He knows that that ultimately

>> Trump is not the final decision maker.

>> Yes.

>> I mean, he must know that that that

Trump is is not interested.

>> Yeah. Yeah.

>> In what's happening and and and is not

able to to absorb Putin's lectures or or

Putin's history lessons. He must also

know that Wickoff and Kushner are not

able to absorb his his uh his lectures

and his history lessons whenever they

fly to to Moscow. I I doubt that that

Wickoff and Kushner can even name the

the four regions.

I doubt it. We said

>> yeah. Um Trump definitely has no idea.

Uh, so I mean Putin knows how things

work in the United States. He's been

president for 20 years. He knows how

things work.

>> So, so why does he continue with this

this policy? And it's a failed policy.

There's no doubt about it. It's a failed

policy.

>> Well Well, I I

>> I mean, are people telling him that it's

a failed policy?

>> The first of all, is it even actually a

policy? Exactly.

>> Well, it's because because

>> it's it's a policy. Maybe it's not a

written policy, but I mean

>> I I I'm not sure that it even is in the

end because um if Putin

changed the way in which the the

military are conducting the war in

Ukraine,

if he started to make concessions

to the Americans, if he started to make

concessions to the Europeans,

then it it would indeed be extremely

dangerous. But of course he he doesn't

he didn't do that when Trump

straightforwardly asked for an

unconditional ceasefire at the start of

last year. He made no concessions of any

substance in Anchorage. I think that is

becoming increasingly

>> he did make I mean he said he made some

concessions but the bigger concessions

were made by the Americans and the

Americans of course never acted on them.

So Anchorage never went anywhere. Putin

never conceded in Anchorage anything

that changed the entire direction of the

war and he's never made any concessions

of any substance since. And he made that

clear in the call yes in the call that

took place that again he's made no

concessions. Um there's even again a

passage in Ushakov's um readout where he

says you know we're talking about

negotiations and Putin said that Russia

is absolutely up for negotiations

provided they are on the basis of

Russia's principles is well known

wellestablished terms and principles

which is of course exactly what the

Americans the Europeans the Ukrainians

are trying to get him to move from what

they call his maximalist demands.

They're not maximalist, but um Putin is

sticking with them. So I if if Putin

were making concessions,

substantive concessions which changed

the course of the war and affected the

direction of events, then I I I agree it

would be a it would not just be a

policy, it would be a disaster.

But that is something which he

absolutely refuses to do. So he has a

policy of engaging with the Americans,

of talking to Trump, but that's all it

is at the moment.

>> Well, inaction

>> is also a type of of action. I I mean by

allowing your ships to be seized.

>> And I know these are not Russian flags.

I know I know the arguments are not

Russian flagged and all of these things.

But still,

>> you're allowing shadow fleet as they

call them.

>> We all know what that means. We've

talked about it many times. U but still

you're allowing ships

that are considered to or or perceived

to be Russian aligned or carrying

Russian oil or Russian energy. Those get

seized. It's not a lot. It's a small

amount. And I also understand it doesn't

doesn't make a big a big uh dent in in

the overall transport of energy. But but

still you're allowing Macaron and and

Stalmer and all these guys to get away

with it. Um

by by showing in inaction over the many

many months of the drone strikes and

there was a type of inaction. I mean

Putin disappeared for a good period of

time especially after Valdai. I mean, he

disappeared,

you know, you you you you

send a message when you show in action

and constantly allowing the the red

lines to be crossed or at least allowing

the big red line to be crossed. Now,

let's not forget how all of this

started.

>> Biden launched attacks into Russia.

Putin specifically said missiles into

Russia, long-range missiles into Russia

or missiles into Russia are a red line.

>> He said that

>> pre204 Russia. He said that's a red

line.

>> Trump as he was campaigning,

he put out a statement saying there is

no way that I'm going to to greenlight

missile strikes into Russia. When I

become president,

>> that policy is going to be going to be

cancelled.

>> That was what Trump said on the

campaign.

Putin

decided to to not act on the missile

strikes into Russia in the hopes that

when Trump becomes president

then he can engage with Trump and Trump

is going to reverse the the missile

policy into Russia. That that was how

all of this went about.

Trump obviously was lying on the

campaign trail. Obviously, right?

What we got is is more more strikes into

Russia.

>> Is is is Putin finally starting to to

understand the games that are being

played or or or not? I mean, it's it's

it every it's

it's not a policy, the restraint,

but it is a a direction of a a guide.

It's a directive of of the Kremlin.

>> I I I think what what It's the correct

Maybe it's the correct decision. I'm not

saying maybe it's the correct decision,

maybe it's not. I'm just I'm just

throwing it out there.

>> I think I think what there is is a

policy within the Kremlin

>> or on Putin's part not to engage in

counter escalation

that could widen the war and which might

jeopardize

firstly internal stability within

Russia. Secondly, the military progress

in the war itself which continues and

thirdly which might lead us into a

situation where we could find ourselves

in a direct conflict between Russia and

the West. So I I think that that is a

policy decision and I think it's a a

policy decision that Putin looks

determined to stick to even as he

continues with the war in Ukraine and

has his army continued to make gains

there. Now

that there are however things that I

think need to be said also. Firstly,

with the Shadowfleet tankers, I I would

actually push back quite strongly on

this. I mean, we perhaps because, you

know, I live in Britain, we've now had

Russian warships very close to Britain.

We've had Russian frigots warning off

British warships from approaching um

Russian tankers. Um this has caused

or or at least shadow fleet tankers.

This has caused great dismay and alarm

here in Britain. We've also had an

incident which just happened a couple of

days ago um in which apparently a

Russian ship warship uh warned off the

Germans uh a German coast guard which

also was approaching a shadow fleet

tanker. The one thing the Russians have

said repeatedly that they are not

prepared to do is they're not prepared

to protect ships that aren't properly

sorted out legally themselves. At one

point I thought that it was only ships

which carried the Russian flag that the

Russians would prepare to protect. In

fact, they're clearly prepared to

protect ships that carry other flags.

But ships that have no flags,

that have not sorted out their legal

status, the Russians are not prepared to

protect in the same way. We're talking

about the odd one or two here, probably

owned by very dodgy ship owners.

I I don't think this makes any

difference in the great in the great set

of things. um the vast majority of

tankers get through and they are now

being protected by the Russian Navy.

About the missile strikes, yes, I do

think the Russians were fooled by Donald

Trump. He went out of his way to say he

gave a I remember a very very big

article in time interview to time

magazine after he was elected say that

he vehemently opposed strikes on Russia.

He then as we see resumed strikes on

Russia but then again is it really the

case that the Russians have not reacted?

I think they have taken reciprocal

action. I think they've provided um

assistance and military technology to

Iran and if American bases across the

Middle East have been severely damaged

and there's been attacks on British

bases by the way in Iraqi Kurdistan as

well. Well, that may be partly because

um that may partly be blowback from the

attacks that we have seen happen against

Russia. So I don't think the Russians

have been completely passive in I I

think they have reacted. Where they

continue to fail is in the information

war which I've discussed so many times

that I don't really think I need to

repeat what I've said there. Um but um

they may have taken counter action but

because they don't talk about it it's as

if in you know the wide

discussion of things um this

counteraction hasn't happened.

>> Poland provided

>> uh air defense missiles Patriot missiles

to to Russia. The reports claim that

this I mean to Ukraine, sorry. The

reports claim that that this was done

>> on the orders

>> of Ptorius. Ptorius is not in the Polish

government. He's the defense minister

for Germany.

>> These missiles were not um

were were not uh um

missiles in in like stockpiled or or

missiles just just hanging around. uh

these were missiles that Poland was

going to to use as as part of their

their defense network. So these were

these were actually missiles in Poland's

inventory that were uh to be used to to

provide uh air defense for Poland

>> and instead it looks like if you go by

these reports without parliament

approval of Poland that these missiles

were handed over to uh to Zalinski.

>> Yeah. on the orders of uh Germany.

>> Yeah.

>> Um

Russia's

deputy foreign minister Mikall

>> Galuzen

>> told Ria Noveasti, "We have verified

information that Latvia and other Baltic

republics have already provided their

air corridors for Ukrainian drones that

attacked our country's civilian

infrastructure."

>> Yes.

>> What What does this mean? It's it

definitely sounds like

uh NATO and Europe.

>> Yeah.

>> Uh is is in conflict with uh with

Russia.

>> Well, it doesn't sound like it. It's I

mean, if if you go by just these two

reports over the past 24 hours, this is

just 24 hours of of we have

>> I I I think these are two distinct

things. I mean, the the air defense

missiles are um you know, defense

weapons. the offense, the drones are uh

weapons that are carrying out strikes

against Russia. I Let's talk about the

Patriot missiles. I think this was an

extraordinary decision. Uh um a terrible

decision. um Poland

going behind its own parliamentary

bodies,

breaking its own laws in order to supply

air defense missiles which are now

desperately in short supply on the

instructions of the German defense

minister who is in turn almost certainly

getting his instructions from Brussels

and by the way Washington because the

United States must approve all transfers

of air defense missiles. Now that tells

me a number of things. Firstly, that the

situation in Poland is becoming

politically very fragile and the um

Polish government was very nervous about

taking this to the Polish Parliament to

get approval there. that there might

have been serious push back in the

Polish Parliament if this decision had

been made publicly and legally in the

way that it should have been. And we can

see that there is at the moment a major

conflict an argument going on between

Poland and within Poland and between

Poland and Ukraine. So I mean this this

is already a very bad thing but also

again stripping Europe even more of what

air defense assets it has so that

Zalinski can throw them away because the

big story of the whole Ukraine war is of

the West giving weapons to Zilinski,

lots and lots of weapons and lots and

lots of money to Zilinski and it what

invariably happens is that those weapons

are used up, burnt up, the money is

wasted.

Zalinski comes back for more and he

invariably gets more. He may be only

getting 10 billion out of this meeting

in Anchora, but he wanted 70 billion.

Now they're saying it has to come out of

the loan. But remember the loan, the 90

billion euro loan. I mean, there are all

kinds of legal problems with it. Um, it

looks as if to me this 70 billion euro

uh I think it's euro uh um payment is

actually going to step outside the loan.

I've already I've said many many times

that I had doubts that um if they

floated bonds on the international

markets they would get people to pay

those to buy those bonds. It looks to me

as if what this is all about now is

gradually

changing the original 90 billion euro

loan that was agreed in December into

direct payments by European governments.

In other words, it's it's it's changing

the entire character of the loan. And

it's doing so in a way that means that

European governments are now going to

start paying money again directly to

Zilinski. In other words, he's getting

money and he's getting money fast. It it

it is um a sign still of the way in

which for Europe despite everything,

despite

talk of rearmament,

despite economic crisis,

keeping Zilinski with the money and the

weapons that he wants continues to be

the overriding priority that trumps

everything, legal procedures, constit

institutional mechanisms,

concepts of accountability,

financial stability, it does everything.

So, you know,

what we see is that this grift, as

you've correctly described it, of

keeping Zalinski and Project Ukraine

funded and running continues unabated.

Now, the drone attacks through the

Baltic States, it's a completely

different story because this is an

offensive attack. Uh, it's well

understood, it's been universally

acknowledged in international law that

sending an armed man across a country's

border is an act of war. um the drones

passing through Baltic airspace, NATO

airspace with the agreement of the

governments of those countries uh and

attacking targets inside Russia is an

act of war. No question about this. The

Russians would be entitled to retaliate.

Now, this is where we come back to what

I said at the start of the program that

the Kremlin has a policy of avoiding an

expansion of the war and an escalation

beyond

um the conflict in Ukraine itself.

The drone strikes on Russia I are are

not as effective as the West imagines.

And I think the cumulative evidence of

the last few weeks

confirms this. So they're saying to

themselves, the Baltics, the NATO powers

are doing all of this. It's an act of

war against us. Is it doing us so much

damage? Is it hurting us so much that we

must respond?

No, it isn't. It is there. It is in our

interests that we maintain this policy

of non-escalation for the moment. So,

we're not going to react to it in that

kind of way. So, these are two different

things.

>> All right, I'll I'll end the the video

there. My my only comment to that is I

don't think the West sees it in the way

that the Kremlin sees it.

>> No, I understand that.

>> I think the West sees it as you know

what, we can we can ramp up even more

now.

>> Yes.

>> into Russia. Well, that's that's the way

the western leaders look at Russia's

restraint.

>> Yes. Well, and and this is where we come

back to my point about Putin because of

course Putin comes along and explains

this all for hours to Donald Trump. And

I think you know this in Putin's mind

this is all about controlling escalation

trying to get Trump to understand that

he's not being told the truth and Putin

not understanding

the Russians perhaps not understanding

that the Europeans don't that the

Europeans the Americans all of them

don't see these things in the way that

they do. Um,

it's worth pointing out the Americans

and the Europeans here are impacting

irrationally

and recklessly

and dangerously for themselves. It

doesn't make sense to give what Patriot

missiles you still have to Ukraine and

to have them all burnt up and um do so

at a time when there's a masses massive

shortage of air defense assets and these

systems can't be replaced. So why do it?

It makes no sense to go on giving

Zilinski money when all all that happens

is that he comes back and demands more.

It makes absolutely no sense to conduct

drone strikes inside Russia when the

effect of all of that is to have your

your bases across the Middle East burnt.

Um, so the Russians tell themselves

these things and of course what they

don't perhaps ever quite understand is

that the other side doesn't work

within that world of rational thinking

and calculation that the Russians do.

>> I think it makes a lot of sense if

you're if you're a Western leader.

>> Keep keep Ukraine fighting Russia.

You're not fighting Russia.

>> Ukraine is fighting Russia.

>> Keep [clears throat] them fighting until

the last Ukrainian, which they've said

many times, right?

>> Keep it going for however long it can

go. And and all of these contracts at

the end of the day, it comes back to us

anyway.

>> Oh, absolutely. I mean, for them, it

makes perfect. I mean, if if you're if

you're a a European leader, if you're

the United States, you're not fighting

in this conflict. you know, you're

you're you're letting the the Slavic

people fight, right,

>> in Ukraine, let them fight,

>> keep on funding it and and a good

portion of those funds are are coming to

us anyway. I mean, the 90 billion EU

loan,

>> which as we've said in many videos in

the past,

>> uh was always going to come from the EU

member states. There was no chance in

hell that they were going to be able to

float a

loan. Of course, the EU member

[clears throat] states are going to pay

for that money directly.

>> But uh but of the 90 billion or or the

60 billion that's actually a weapons

program of that 90 billion

>> that's weapons programs for for us. Yes.

And for and for Western military

companies. So at the end of the day, if

you're a politician,

>> it works out well for you. I have not

seen a single article

in the Russian media that mentions or

discusses the extent to which this is a

grift. I I I I don't think that the

Russians have any ability at the moment

to compute this fact. Uh th this is

something that is so completely alien to

their way of thinking that you you're

you're giving money to Zalinski so that

the money comes back to you and that he

just goes around sloshing around the

system and that you don't actually

produce weapons as a result because

that's not even your priority. This

isn't something that as I said the

Russians are are are able to compute

because they work in a completely

different way. So this is they live in

they live on Mars and we live on Venus

or whatever it is you know people say.

Um I I I just don't think the Russians

get this. I certainly don't think Putin

gets this at all that there are very

very powerful financial interests in

Europe that um actually like this that

Matt's massive debtfueled weapons uh

program and infrastructure

program that the purpose of it is not to

generate weapons but to generate debt.

Russia of course as we know has an

aversion to debt. It's something as I

said that they just cannot get their

minds around and um this I think

very very difficult to get to get them

to see that see it in that way because

for them this is a question of war and

peace and they take these things war and

peace very very seriously and assume

that if you fight a war you you fight

that war in order to win it. Yes, lots

of Slavic people are dying in this war.

But if you look at this in purely

geopolitical terms, um the Russian

military is getting bigger. Russia's

getting technologically advanc more

advanced. It's economy is growing and

it's deepening its alliance with China.

It doesn't make geopolitical sense

either.

>> Yeah. I mean, I know it's hard to

understand. Trump says it. I'm going to

sell weapons to NATO. I mean, he says it

I'm gonna sell I'm not going to give the

weapons. I'm gonna sell the weapons. I

mean, he says it, you know, right right

there. So, I mean, it's a pretty it's

pretty much in your face what's what's

happening.

>> Yes. I as I said, I I've never seen a

single commentary about this looking at

this in the kind of way that you've

discussed anywhere. As I said, on the

Russian side, I mean, maybe there are

such places. I mean, I don't really I

I'm not able to read the entire Russian

media, but the the the the idea that

this is all ultimately a grift, as I

said, is something which I think they

find all I mean, I I don't think it's

something they have ever properly

understood.

Right.

>> All right, we'll end the video there.

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