[Music]

Sequoia is the most soughta name in the

venture capital business.

>> The firm has made over a thousand

investments now worth in the trillions

in public market value.

>> There's a list of five VCs who I think

can really transform a company and

you're one of those five.

>> When I joined Sequoia, it was clear that

if I wanted to make it as a partner, you

needed to produce meaningful games.

YouTube, Instagram, Square. This is a

list of amazing amazing startups. Our

ambition is to build a partnership that

endures and that means we need to leave

it in a better place than we found it.

>> Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome

Seoia Capitals Rolloff Botha.

See you. See you. What's up, bro? How

are you? Good to see you.

>> Welcome,

>> Ralph. There's a question.

>> What's that? Where did Saxs go?

>> Get to pee pee. He had to make a weiw

wee.

>> Come on.

>> You Yeah, exactly. You guys did work

together

>> for 25 years ago and he just abandons us

right now.

>> He's had enough of you. Um, everybody

wants to know who's your favorite

Sequoia scout of all time.

>> Let's go through it.

>> Jason Calakanas.

>> It is hilarious. Um, when you think

about it, you came to me, gosh, 15 years

ago, and you said, "I have an idea for a

program. It's called Sequoia Scouts.

We'd like to, um, have you go around and

invest in some companies."

And, uh,

>> no good deed shall go unpunished.

>> Absolutely. Created a monster. Um, but

that program

>> Sorry, before you ask your question, how

far are you going to insert your head up

Roloff's ass?

[Applause]

We sat him that far away for a reason. I

mean, um, sorry, bro. Jesus Christ. Go

on with your question.

>> That's

>> Let me land the question.

>> What's your question, D?

>> That program, um, had some that first

cohort of individuals

um, wound up being a pretty interesting

group of folks. Maybe you could tell

everybody just a little bit about that

program you conceived of and then who

were some of the first folks in it and

the first investments. We conceived of

this program as you mentioned in 2010

when we launched it and the idea was

that there were a bunch of contemporary

founders who had very interesting access

to upand cominging founders who are

turning to them for advice but these

founders didn't yet have money at the

point that you became a scout. You

didn't have the net worth you have now

where you could write a check on your

own. And so we thought it'd be a great

program for us to provide the capital

for founders like yourself to be able to

invest in those companies and hopefully

we would get an introduction to those

companies for us to be able to make an

investment too. So uh you were in that

program you helped us with the

investment in Uber. Sam Alman was in

that group as well. He helped with an

investment in a little company called

Stripe.

>> They did. Okay.

>> So at this point that that fund is a 26x

fund at this point.

>> Wow. That's up there in the

>> It's pretty good. What's the best fund

in the history of Sequoia? Was it the

Google fund, the WhatsApp fund? Which

one has the highest multiple in history?

>> Uh the highest multiple in history is uh

I think Venture 12, which has Airbnb,

Dropbox,

Nera,

ADM Mob and a couple of other companies.

And then venture 13 which is the fund

right after that has stripe and square

now called block and a bunch of

other companies. So those were both

north of 20x funds. Tell us about the

venture industry actually. So we're at a

point in the cycle where there's been a

lot of specialization both maybe at the

stage level at the sector level. There's

been all kinds of experimentation and

approaches in strategy. Can you just

level set on

what you've learned and what the

industry's learned and where we are?

>> I'm glad you called it an industry, not

an asset class. Um, I listened to one of

the shows you guys had recently and I

think there's a huge problem with the

venture industry that there's too much

money and you guys have talked about

this before. Uh, venture industry as a

whole invests right now between 150 to

$200 billion a year was the last numbers

I saw. If you think about reasonable

assumptions for returns, let's just say

12% peranom net, which isn't great.

Might as well invest in an index fund,

the math basically implies that you need

three and a half to 4x funds to make

that math work over a reasonable time

frame. So if you're investing, let's

just say $200 billion a year. The

industry needs to give back 7800 billion

a year. VCs don't own 100% of the

company last time I checked. So that

means that the aggregate exit value is

north of a trillion a year.

So Figma went public recently. They're

worth 25$26 billion. You need 40 Figmas

a year for the industry to make the

returns work, which means that they

don't. So in my opinion, investing in

venture is a returnfree risk. You

shouldn't. They're basically only about

20 companies.

>> You said return

>> return free risk.

>> risk.

>> Exactly. If you look at every single

decade, there are only about 20

companies that end up getting exit

values north of a billion dollars.

Actual IPOs or M&As north of a billion.

Not the paper writeups, only 20

companies. More money doesn't create

more great ideas or more great founders.

So, I think there is way too much money

in the industry. The industry does

provide a lot of value. It provides some

of the knowhow for entrepreneurs to

succeed and obviously leads to job

creation and all the attendant benefits

for America. But there is too much money

and too many people who want to be

investors.

>> How does the money get level set then

and right sized for what is needed?

>> I've been wondering that for 20 years.

Uh this problem is a problem 20 years

ago. It is only

>> it's an incredibly sexy asset class. I

mean look, Jason writes a bestselling

book. It doesn't, you know, dissuade

people. It incentivizes more people to

say, "Oh, I can try this. I'll be like

it." I mean, it's just a self-fulfilling

prophecy. The more successes there are,

there's just um

>> Yeah. Everybody wants to go to Vegas

and, you know, strike it rich. It

doesn't happen.

>> Yeah.

>> That's part of the dynamic is that you

get a firm that has one success in their

fund and then they attract more capital

because people think it's repeatable and

it's not.

>> And you don't know you don't know that

till fund three or four. Like often they

raise fund three before they've even

>> oh they've raised fund two, three, four,

and five before even fund one is really

fully distributed a lot of times. So

what could change for one one of the

things that I thought was transparency

but nobody wants to publish their

returns. You could publish your returns.

I publish my returns but you know I'm

not taking outside capital but would

that help? Like is it working with

people like Cambridge so that these

things become more public and more

understood? It seems like there's an

education element here that's missing on

behalf of the industry to the potential

LPS. I think people will still hide

behind the J curve effect and they'll

say yeah my fund is only at 1.5x right

now but it's only four years in and you

know the winners are going to emerge and

so I think this this hope springs

eternal dynamic and such a long time

period of gestation before the companies

get realized that I don't think that uh

will change that dynamic unfortunately

>> there's also been this really

interesting effect where it's been this

industrialization of venture capital I

will call it so if you look at the

organization that has built the

organization that General Catalyst has

built. It's about this girthiness,

right, across many different things.

How has Sequoia reacted when they've

seen those movements? And I'm sure

you've had to sit down as a partnership

and say, are we matching this? Are we

copying this? Are we going to do the

same thing? Are we doing something

different?

>> That is a great question. The industry

has changed a lot since I got into

venture just over 20 years ago. If you

go back to the proverbial 1990s venture

firm, it was, you know, a dozen people

sitting around a table making investment

decisions with very lightweight staff.

Uh, and it was much more of a cottage

industry. I think the industry is

professionalized and really the founders

are the ones who benefited from it

because all these firms have built

larger operating teams to be able to

help those founders with talent, with go

to market and so I think it's really

helping founders. That's probably the

main takeaway I have from that. We've

decided to not build as big an

organization. Most of the operating

teams we have at Sequoia help us. So we

have about as many developers at Sequoia

as we have investors and they're

building products for us so that we are

much more effective and productive than

we might have been 20 years ago.

>> What's an example of that that they're

building for you?

>> Uh so you know my phone I can pull up an

app that I if you give me any company

name I'll be able to tell you who my

team last met, how we rated it. I'll

give you uh data on what's happening

with their hiring. Uh how many vouched

employees they have, how good do we

think their engineering team is based on

their history, their academic profiles,

etc. All this information is at my

fingertips. Uh if we get business plan

submissions, we have an AI system that

will summarize it for me. So I get a

very quick read on the company, a quick

summarization of the quality of the team

and a very quick analysis of the

competitive dynamics and the other

companies I should consider alongside

them. So these are just small examples

of the things we do. We just had Joe

Saiion on. We're talking a bit about the

relationship between America and China.

You had a fabulous business in China for

two decades, I believe,

>> with Neil.

>> Yeah.

>> And it did absolutely fantastic. But

then the government of the United States

said, "Hey, we cannot as venture

capitalists invest in China anymore."

>> So, what are your what's your take on

the the opportunity in China? Will that

return? and and just the the experience

you had with all those incredible hits

at the time.

>> When we first went into China, it was

2007 I think. Uh the world was flat was

the moniker at the time. China gained

admission to the World Trade

Organization in I think 2001

and we all believed that it would

integrate into the global economy. That

premise proved wrong. And so we had a

period where it was really interesting

to be able to share knowledge and share

ideas and sort of figure out how we can

build a globally interconnected set of

systems and companies. Uh and life just

got too hard for that honestly and we

saw just more division between the two

countries. So we embarked on global

separation just over 2 years ago and

what used to be China is now an

independent business called Hongchan and

they're off to the races. I think

there's a real challenge in China right

now. Uh some stat I got recently in 2018

there were 51,000 companies started in

China. In 20123 it was 1,200.

>> Wow.

>> How many?

>> 1,200. You had a 98%

reduction in the number of companies

founded in China. Cuz if you're an

entrepreneur in China, why would you

want to start a company when the

government regulations are so uncertain?

Which by the way is an interesting

warning sign for me for us in America as

we think about AI policy and AI

regulation. The more uncertainty we

create for founders, the more difficult

it is for them to actually take that

risk, take that leap to start a

business. So, but Chinese

entrepreneurship is still strong. So,

you see many Chinese entrepreneurs now

operating in Latin America, they move to

Singapore, they're in uh Japan, they're

moving to Europe. I mean, you can't

repress that spirit. Rolof, there's a

interesting dynamic that I observed

which is you have the early early stage

venture companies who have had an

incredible track record. you guys,

Benchmark, Kosla,

and then what happens is you have these

latest stage firms, but many of the

companies that they fund need so much

money that the latestage firms can't

service them. So, you have to go direct.

You go right to Saudi, you go right to

the Qataris, you go right to the

Amiradis, you go right to Norway, you

know, these sovereign wealth funds that

are writing these big checks. And so, it

creates this really weird dynamic where

you almost become this kind of glorified

placement agent almost. So there's this

part of the curve and then there's all

this money that goes over here. How do

you adapt the business in the face of

that dynamic?

>> Well, we stick to our knitting. Uh the

funds we operate today, our seed venture

and growth funds today are no bigger

than they were 5, six, seven years ago.

We we realize that there's money to be

made for some people writing very large

checks and very latest stage companies.

But uh our aspiration is to be the

number one investment manager for our

limited partners. We literally want to

be the best net IRRa and net multiple

for our LPS and we're not interested in

maximizing fees or maximizing share of

industry value creation.

That's the game we've chosen to play.

>> And so there's no path where Sequoa for

example tries to go public or take the

you know that's like it's just not in

the strategy of the business. No,

actually we've structured ourselves to

be a private partnership in perpetuity

to the extent possible under California

law. We have the sense of stewardship.

You have to leave the partnership in a

better place than you found it. Don

Valentine didn't call it Valentine

Ventures when he started it. He handed

the partnership over to a next

generation with Mike Meritz and Doug

Leone and Jim Gett. And you know, we're

now part of a third generation, our team

currently running the partnership. We

didn't have to pay to get the

partnership from the previous generation

and nor will we charge the next

generation. That's that's our motto.

>> How would you describe the culture

that's driven the success rolloff? So

when you select partners, what do you

look for? How do you value those

partners? How do you assess the

performance of those partners? And how

do you guys operate that kind of defines

the culture?

>> So I think the probably the most

important characteristic we look for is

an insatiable curiosity in the

individual. We look for people who are

extremely driven, but they need to have

a heart of gold. So one of the things we

talk about at Squay is um we cherish

individualism and teamwork. You need an

individual to be able to have a keen

insight and propose an investment but

you've got to work with a team and that

the whole teamwork aspect is really

important for us. So when you make

investment decisions at Sequoa it's a

consensus decision which blew my mind

when I first got there. I

>> meaning everybody has to agree.

>> Everybody has to agree.

>> So if one person says no it doesn't

happen.

>> Correct.

>> So one person can veto an investment.

>> Correct. And that happens often or

>> it has. Sometimes it was a good decision

and sometimes not.

>> What do the statistics tell you?

>> What's the worst uh thing somebody

killed?

>> Oh jeez.

>> It's okay. We're all friends here.

>> What is that list called when you have

that?

>> Yeah, you would call it your anti

portfolio.

>> Anti portfolio.

>> But in this case, somebody

wasn't just an anti portfolio. It's like

everyone agreed we should do it except

the one.

>> Yeah. Yeah. And so you think about that

responsibility uh

and it weighs on people,

>> but it means that you need to show up

with your best game every single day.

>> And you know, part of what we've done is

we look at the vote distribution these

days and look, if somebody shows up and

everybody's really positive, there a

bunch of people that are eight nines out

of 10 and there's one person who clearly

woke up at the, you know, in a bad mood

and is a three, you know, at some point

that person will probably say, "Listen,

maybe I just don't get it."

>> This actually happened to me. We

listened to a company in late November.

This company is thriving right now.

They're in the it's pretty sax isn't

here because this company's benefiting

from stable coins with the genius act

that he helped put in place is really

benefiting from that and I didn't quite

get this company at the time and I was

the only person who was below the line

and I said listen there's something I'm

missing in this particular company. I

think we should proceed with the

investment even though my intuition

walking in was that we shouldn't

>> and I'm really glad that we proceeded.

So

>> can you tell us about the holding

company transition that you underwent

and the role of being a venture

capitalist in making an exit decision?

So we did this conversation on the show

a few weeks ago. Pulled up some

analysis. The biggest winners continue

to compound as public companies. 99% of

the returns are as a public company or

whatever it is. So it looks like an

amazing exit goes public.

>> But that's not the end of the value

creation. True compounders compound for

decades. Especially founders are still

in the seat. Amazon, Nvidia was a

Sequoia investment. I think Google, I

mean, these are multi-trillion dollar

companies that if you guys held your

position to today, I'm assuming things

would look a little bit different.

>> It would. Yes. So, so we backed a bunch

of very interesting companies over our

50 years. Uh, the companies in which we

were private investors when they were

little companies

today account for over 30% of the total

value of the NASDAQ.

>> Wow.

There's no other 30%

>> over 30% of the combined value of the

NASDAQ.

>> Apple, Nvidia,

>> Apple, Cisco, Nvidia, Google, Pala

Network, Service Now, uh I mean the list

goes on. So

>> pretty pretty good.

>> So So one of the things we realized,

what you're alluding to is in 2022, we

launched something called the Sequoa

Capital Fund. And so we realized that

the great companies continue to compound

as you talked about in that episode. It

was it was an excellent episode

obviously. Um, and by the way, even in

more recent memory, if you look at the

last 10-ish years, Palto, Service Now,

HubSpot, MongoDB, these companies have

all been 10 X's as public companies. And

so, we've realized that when we

distribute shares prematurely to LPs,

they don't know any better because, you

know, they run a big endowment. They

suddenly get $5 million worth of company

ABC. They don't know any better. They

sell the shares. So, what we've decided

to do is for the companies that we

believe have the ability to compound

longer term, we have a different fund

structure. And so 6 12 18 months after

the IPO, we can move those shares into

this fund called the Sequoa Capital

Fund. And this now becomes the vehicle

through which we fund all our next

underlying investment vehicles. Now to

give you a sense, since we launched this

3 and a half years ago, we've

accumulated another 6.7 billion in gains

>> by doing nothing except being patient.

>> $6.7 billion in gains that our LPs would

not have seen if we had just distributed

those shares outright.

>> Yeah, you're making him moan. He's

moaning.

>> I like it. I'm getting I'm getting

getting warm and he's getting emotional.

But what is but what is the So the

counterargument is as a public company,

you as venture capitalists who are

excellent at interrogating early stage

technology, early stage metrics, founder

personalities, all the things that might

make a good venture capital investor.

Maybe as a public company, quarter to

quarter, are they growing 12%, 14%.

There's a different analytical skill set

some might argue like you know that that

belongs in that investment domain and

frankly very hard to beat the indust

indices doing that. What's the argument

to be made to the counter and why would

you counter that argument?

>> So see one of the things for us is that

the I mean most of these cases we're

involved with these companies literally

at inception. I mean Palo Alto Networks

was incubated inside our office with one

founder and my partner Jim Gates. So,

we've known these companies since the

earliest of days. Why should that

relationship end at the IPO?

And in most of these cases, as you

pointed out, the founders are still

there and there's so much more

innovation taking place. Um, Jack

Dorsey's one of Jack Dorsey's favorite

quotes to me was companies have multiple

founding moments. And so when you're in

a company where the the founder keeps

reinventing the business, you know, a

company like Square, half the revenue

today comes from a product called Cash

App that hadn't launched for the first 5

years in the company's life. And so if

you can find these companies, these

special companies where the founders

keep pushing the boundary on innovation

and they are relentless, then it works.

>> Google buying YouTube.

>> Don't remind me.

Do you think it would have been the

same? Would YouTube still have had the

same outcome if it wasn't acquired? To

be clear, RUF wrote in his first year or

two at the company, the deal memo to

invest in YouTube and it got bought for

1.6 billion. Standalone business today

would be worth 400500 billion.

>> And then Google then invested quite

significantly in infrastructure and

enabling scalability and building out a

team and building out an ad revenue

system, etc. We've got Neil here

tomorrow to talk about the current state

of YouTube, but do you think it could

have taken the same? It's hard to say.

>> Hard to say. Uh I think a lot of credit

should go to Google for the way that

they managed YouTube after the

acquisition, both in the resources they

provided, the leadership um and they've

enabled it to thrive. This is one of my

favorite things that Peter Thiel says is

uh you know when you make it when an

acquisition like this happens one side

was orders of magnitude off like it was

just a zero or it was 100 more than what

they paid. Something is always off.

Anyway,

>> Don Valentine um the founder of the firm

drew a four quadrant chart at one point

to explain the founders

that uh perform extremely well in terms

of returns. Maybe you could explain that

to the audience.

Yes. Uh Don pulled me aside in the early

days when I joined Sequoia and he said

2x2 matrix uh people are exceptional not

exceptional easy to get along with not

so easy to get along with. Ruof we

normally make money in one of those four

quadrants. Your job is to figure out

which one

>> and it's the exceptional people who are

not so easy to get along with.

>> Uh so then let's talk about the next

generation.

>> I'm sorry. Can we just double click on

that? Why do you think that is?

>> These people change the world. They

don't take no for an an for an answer,

right? They are

>> How does it Why does that make them hard

to get along with, per se?

>> Well, I think he was he was saying that

a little bit tongue and cheek, right?

But this is a guy who backed Steve Jobs

when Steve would walk around Sand Hill

Road without shoes. He'd come back from

a trip to India. Allegedly, he didn't

smell too great. Um, and he was unusual

and nobody wanted to back him. And you

know, Don wanted to find these

underdogs, these unknown

>> Atari.

Well, apparently some of the Atari board

meetings took place in hot tubs.

>> Yes.

>> Uh he told,

>> by the way, that's how he got to Steve

because Steve had worked at Atari.

That's how Don got the introduction to

Steve. So, so I think part of the point

he was trying to make is don't look for

the people that, you know, went to all

the right schools and wear the right

clothes, all the conventional stuff.

Founders are unconventional. These

people change the world. I mean, most of

us encounter challenges every single day

and we accommodate. you know, this thing

isn't quite to your liking, you adapt.

Founders don't. Founders see things and

go, hm, I think the world can look

different and then they go and try to

fix it. They just don't take no for an

answer.

>> So, let's fast forward to your two

mentors, Michael Moritz and Doug Leone.

Two very different characters when the

story gets told, maybe a rivalry there

um between the two of them. What did you

learn from each?

>> Sure. From Doug, I learned heart.

Unpack it. Doug has an incredible heart.

>> When did you see that most? What was the

moment that's coming to your mind right

now that you probably shouldn't talk

about?

>> Well, the I'll give you two examples.

One was in 2009 when I was in a funk. I

nearly quit the business. Um

>> I didn't know this really.

>> Well, we'd had the YouTube was a great

success. Uh and I felt very good about

that. And then you in venture after a

few years you val you walk through the

valley of despair and you start to

realize the things you should have

invested in that you didn't and the

lemons start to drop the things that you

did invest in that are not working out.

So yes there was the one great quick

exit but then a bunch of other things

and I was really having a lot of

self-doubt and Doug showed up at my

house with a homemade pesto jar

and he didn't need to. It was on a

Saturday afternoon. He knocks on my

door. Who's this person at my house? and

he just wanted to tell me that he was

there to support me through this dark

period. That was one example. Another

one was when uh my son was in hospital

and Doug showed up.

Didn't have to. Um that meant a lot to

me. So,

>> and Michael,

>> Michael's imagination.

Michael just has an unbelievable ability

to imagine how a company can succeed.

And when I thought about my mistakes as

an investor, by the way, every single

time it comes down to a failure of

imagination, that I didn't think big

enough. I didn't think about how this

company could uh progress from where

they were. You first introduced me to

Twitter 2007.

>> I have the emails

>> before smartphones launched and it was

an SMS app. I got tired of getting all

your I'm having cappuccino messages on

Twitter at the time. I remember

>> on your Blackberry. Yeah.

>> And I didn't quite imagine that it could

be what it is today. And so that to me

was an example. Uh, I remember an early

meeting with Yelp with Jeremy Stppleman

and Max Lechin in our offices and I mean

Yelp hadn't launched a web app that were

going to be an email newsletter thing

and Michael in this meeting said I

imagine that one day restaurants will

put a Yelp sticker in the window just

like a Zagat or a Michelin star. And he

saw that.

>> He saw that.

>> He saw that. I mean 10 years before that

became a reality he had the imagination

to think about that. That to me is

amazing. So now Doug is still there and

Mike has transitioned out. Is that the

what is

>> Yes, Michael has transitioned out

completely. Doug has stepped back from

day-to-day investing. So he's no longer

in partner meetings routinely, but he

continues to serve on several boards.

>> And you're in charge.

>> I'm the leader of a team and I think of

more like being captain of the team. You

play team sport. We play team sport at

Sequoia and you know we are equal

partners and you know it's

>> Was it hard to see those two guys go

just seeing how legendary they were?

to succeed them? No.

>> Well, both to succeed them, but also

just to see them walk out the door.

Like, is there a tendency to want to

keep them around as long as possible? I

>> understand the question. Um, well, well,

firstly, it is very hard to succeed

them. I think every single person in

Sequoia feels this enormous burden and

responsibility to try to match the

performance that we've been known for,

you know, but we have this great

generational transition at Sequoa. So,

Michael stepped back from day-to-day

activity in 2012

>> and he was

>> Morris did in 2012. of Michael stepped

back. He had personal health reasons and

he stepped back. He continued to serve

on the boards that he was on and we we

had him for another decade where I would

ask him for advice. You know, as we were

going through global separation that we

talked about earlier, I would ask Doug

and Michael, you know, what do you think

should we you know, what should we be

doing here? Do you have advice for me?

And so it's a we have this benefit of

intergenerational uh knowledge transfer.

Uh Doug was on a call earlier today.

Actually, we had a difficult

conversation. I wanted his input on an

important question and it's not because

he has the authority to tell me what to

do. It's because I seek out his advice.

>> You were investing in traditional

software, internet services for years

and then a couple of years ago you

started investing in some life sciences.

Does life sciences kind of work as a

venture investment today? And what's

been the challenge in biotech and life

sciences investing generally over the

last few years? There's a lot of

notoriety about the collapse of the

market and even Dave Ricks today was

saying most public biotech companies are

trading below cash. What's your

observations on the business model, what

you've seen, the types of businesses

you've invested in there? So,

>> so the business we invested in uh that

has done really well is a company called

Nater. Uh and we made a seed investment

of a million dollars in 2007 in this

company.

>> It's 20 billion now, right? Market cap.

>> $22 billion market cap. It was a million

dollars. two people uh with a a very raw

idea and today they're the leading

provider of prenatal testing, oncology,

recurrence monitoring, organ transplant

projection testing. And so that

company's been a huge success.

Diagnostics, genetic diagnostics, has

been a huge success. And you think about

the the dividend we're still collecting

from the human genome project 25 years

ago. It's incredible. And you've

obviously seen that in some of the

businesses that you've helped build as

well. uh we did make an investment in a

company called Bridge Bio which is

helping with rare genetic disease drug

development. Uh but other than that I

think we're we just don't have the

expertise for biotech. You know we don't

have any M

>> but there are still winners.

>> There are still winners but we have no

MD PhDs on our team at Sequoia. And I

think you know it's very dangerous when

people think that your success in one

domain just naturally makes you uh gives

you the right to compete in other

domains. I think I have tremendous

respect for the people who understand

that. I do not.

>> I learned that one the hard way.

Ladies and gentlemen, Roloff.

>> Thank you.

Thank you.

Thank you so much. Thank you, sir. I

appreciate you coming out. Thanks.