All right, Alexander, let's do an update

on uh Project Ukraine.

Uh on the front lines, the situation is

looking very, very bad for the Ukraine

military. Uh my understanding of things

is that uh the Russians are clearing out

Constantinoka. I don't believe they

fully captured Constantinfka.

Uh there are pockets of Ukrainian uh

military in in the city that still

remain in the city, but the Russians are

are clearing all of that out. That'll

probably take a couple of weeks, maybe

tops. I don't know if I'm reading the

situation correctly. In Leman, you have

a very similar situation. The the

Russians are are moving fairly quickly

to to capture Leman. I didn't expect

them to to be capturing Leman at the

same time. No,

>> that uh that they're winning and uh and

capturing Constantin.

>> But you could have two very big cities,

>> which will be captured by Russia. Uh

they're 15 kilometers outside of Sunumi

and 15 kilometers outside of Karamaturk.

So Karamsk is now becoming a frontline

city. And just a reminder to everyone

that's watching, those are the two last

big uh settlements, Kamatsk and

Slavansk. Yeah.

>> Once those are wrapped up, Donbas is uh

is wrapped up.

>> Yes.

>> Uh you had Putin speaking to the to the

military cadetses.

>> Yeah.

>> You had Lavro. I'm not I'm not sure what

the event was where Lavro was speaking,

but he said some some interesting

things.

>> And um

and you have the narrative

uh which is that Ukraine is from the

collective West media because they don't

want to talk about anything that's

happening on the front line. They don't

mention anything that's going on in the

front line. One article from the BBC,

one article from the New York Times,

that's about it.

>> Yeah.

>> But their narrative is that Ukraine is

winning because the collective West is

able to send drones into Russia. So that

equates to to a win. Yeah.

>> Okay. Um and and the Financial Times

once again,

>> yeah,

>> is talking about the Russian economy

>> in near collapse. They're saying it's a

slow it's a slow collapse, but it is

collapsing. Yeah.

>> So anyway, I think I've rounded I've

given a round up of everything that is

happening around project Ukraine.

>> I think you provided a masterly summary

of everything that's happening over

project Ukraine. I'm going to explain my

I I'm going to set out what my own view

about Constantine and Leman is. I think

the fighting in these two cities is

essentially over. I I think that in

Leman certainly the Ukrainians are

retreating from Leman. Uh there's been

actually a fairly detailed u um

description of the fighting in the

Russian media in Leman, more detailed

than we usually get, but that the

Ukrainian garrison is trying to withdraw

from Leman. Um in Constantine

there there is still a presence, an

organized presence of some Ukrainian

troops in one small area of Constantiner

in the very northeast end of it. But

what do you basically read that the

Russian defense ministry says you know

that you know they've um cleared um you

know 150 buildings um in one place 150

buildings in another. What people need

to understand if you haven't been to uh

Russia or to the former Soviet Union is

when they talk about buildings

they mean apartment buildings and

apartment buildings in Russia and in

Ukraine in the Soviet Union could can be

very big places indeed. So mostly I

think that there is no actual fighting

going on. But if you're talking about

Constantinfka, you're talking about a

town which before the war had a

population of around 80,000 people.

There are large you know these places

are very very big. Um you Russian troops

enter them. They have to search through

them to find if there are any Ukrainian

soldiers hiding in them. They have to

clear booby traps because the

Ukrainians, like all armies, by the way,

good armies, leave behind booby traps.

So, they have to clear out the booby

traps. And this takes time and probably

it will take a couple of

days, weeks, who knows how long, but

eventually we will be there. So both of

these two cities about to fall as you

rightly say or have realistically

already fallen and everywhere else on

the front line the situation is very bad

as you absolutely rightly say the

Russians are um literally a few

kilometers now from Kamatsk. They're

closer to Kamats than 15 kilometers.

I mean, and and seek and and they they

occupy the high the high ground so that

they can look down on Kamatsk too. And

Kamatsk has been badly bombed and the

Ukrainians have evacuated the civilian

administration. and the military command

the military headquarters of the

Ukrainian army in Donbass was located in

Kantosk and apparently it's also been

withdrawn. So um that's the situation on

the front lines in Dombbass and then

there's the other two big towns that the

Russians are edging towards. One is Oreo

south and it's a very complicated battle

there. The Russians are advancing

towards Oracle from the east and the

west. There's a kind of pins movement.

Sometimes the Ukrainians try and

counterattack in one direction which

opens the way for the Russians to attack

faster from the other direction. It's

complicated battle. But steadily

gradually the pences on are closing and

even more important is what you said

about Sunni in northeastern Ukraine. A

big place 250,000

people. I mean a regional capital. The

Russians are now very close to it and

the

fortified lines to the north of it have

fallen. So an absolutely critical

situation on the front lines and as you

absolutely correctly say the western

media is telling us absolutely nothing

about it. An article in the BBC which

hardly anybody reads. an article in the

New York Times which is very ambivalent

and really doesn't tell you very much.

Um, a major effort to deny the military

realities and a concerted effort by the

West in the Western media to focus

instead on the drone attacks. The drone

attacks on Russia and the drone attacks

on Crimea. Now, the drone attacks on

Russia, we've discussed in many places,

hundreds of drones involved. They have

to travel enormous distances. They're

relatively small, light constructions.

The explosives that they carry very

light. The damage they do very limited.

Most of the drones, the vast majority of

them get shot down. They don't in the

end do very much damage. There was this

big attack on Moscow that took place a

week ago. There was a lot of smoke. It

looks like this was mostly done on

purpose. There were some of the drones,

maybe not all of them, were carrying

kerosene sacks to create an appearance

of smoke. An attack on a refinery

outside Moscow. Lots of talk about the

enormous damage that was done to this

refinery. six months out of action.

According to Reuters, based on the usual

anonymous sources, I've been told by

somebody who's in the oil industry on

the ground in Moscow, more likely more

likely it will be back in service in a

week.

The drone offensive against Russia, in

other words,

does not have the military, industrial,

economic effects that people say. So

what you have seen in order to create an

appearance of a genuine crisis

with electricity cut offs, gasoline

shortages, a renewed focus on attacking

Crimea, the distance the drones have to

travel to reach Crimea is much shorter.

They can carry a much bigger explosive

charge. the um um

uh warning times for the drones before

the drones reach their targets is less.

And you can see that Crimea this summer

is having is getting the bulk the the

worst part of the attacks. And that's by

the way a recurring thing. It it happens

regularly each summer, but it's

happening on a particularly big scale at

the moment. So you focus on that. You

talk about the crisis

that the Russians are facing. You talk

about the Ukrainian drone wars. You talk

about gasoline shortages, which are, you

know, an inflated story always um in

Russia. You talk about those things, but

you don't talk about the situation on

the front lines. And at the same time,

the Russians themselves. Um we we can

talk about this in a moment but the

Russians themselves are having their

very interesting internal discussions.

>> Yeah. Uh the the focus is is now back on

CRMA and the economy. Yeah.

>> Yes. This is the pattern and and we've

seen this before.

>> Uh which is

which is actually a a bad reflection of

of Putin and the Kremlin in a way. I

mean, you know, this happens

not every summer, almost every summer,

but

>> definitely at the start of the of the

SMO and also the 2023 uh counter

offensive and all of that, it was it was

Crema.

>> That's how you defeat Russia. We're

going to focus on Crema, the Kirch

Bridge. We take out Crema, we capture

Crema. What did Bhutanov say? We're

going to be swimming in Crema. All of

that stuff. All of that nonsense. And

that's how they win this one. That was

that was the shortcut, the cheat sheet

to defeating Russia.

>> Yes.

>> Was to go after Crimea. And then in

parallel, you have all the stories about

the Russian economy. Well, we're back to

that again.

>> Yes.

>> Right. We maybe we had about a year's

break. I don't I don't think last year

there was so much focus on on the

Crimea.

There was some there was some, but not

energy shortages, but not to the

intensity,

>> not like this or in 2023 with the with

the counter offensive and and all of

that stuff,

>> right? Which was directed at at cutting

off the land bridge.

>> Yes.

>> To Crema.

>> Yes.

>> So now we have the drones and CMA and

and we have the Financial Times, the UK

media. Yes.

>> Put it pumping out the stories about

Russia's slow economic collapse. I mean,

the Kremlin should have gotten on top of

this and they should get on top of this.

You know, when going to the to Putin

speaking to the cadetses

when he was asked about the drones, my

my sense of it listening to Putin

was was that he showed a a level of of

uncon of ambivalence maybe of just not

concern. I mean, his his answer to the

question for drones was a bit odd in

that he said, you know, I've given a

directive to the military to the

Ministry of Defense to deal with it.

Well, you know, that's that's not a an

adequate response. And then and and then

he made the statement about if if the

drones were coming from NATO territory,

>> they then we would retaliate, but

they're not coming from NATO territory,

>> so we're not going to to retaliate. The

the interesting part is when you went to

the uh to the collective west u ex

accounts Yeah.

>> that that grabbed on to Putin's

statements, they ran with the narrative,

you see, it was Kremlin propaganda that

was saying the drones were using the

airspace of uh of Europe or using

territory of Europe to hit Russia.

>> Yes,

>> they're coming from Ukraine. Putin has

just confirmed all of this.

>> Yeah. So, so I guess I guess going off

of Putin's statements, the drones that

go up to St. Petersburg or Moscow,

>> I guess are traveling

>> through the entirety of Russia. They're

not using Baltic airspace or North

Finley Finnish airspace or anything like

that or Romanian and you know the whole

>> the whole news uh a couple of months ago

about the drones falling in Romania, the

drones falling in Estonia, all that

stuff.

I guess they weren't using the airspace

and and they were using the Russian

airspace and Russia was directing those

drones back back into Europe. If you go

off of Putin's uh statements from the

cadet,

>> yeah,

Putin's messaging is terrible. The

Russian government's messaging is

absolutely terrible. And let me first of

all start with Crimeir. Um I mean you're

absolutely correct that by now the air

defense situation in Crimea really ought

to have been organized and reorganized

properly. Um one gets the sense that the

Russian uh um focus has been so much on

protecting the heartland that they've

never really got on top of providing

adequate air protections for Crimeir

itself. And um this is a major problem.

The head of the Russian air defenses, a

man called Zalof was sacked about 6

weeks ago and there's been actually

quite a lot of criticism about him that

he didn't really prepare for this all

properly. But anyway, whatever whether

it was of Zalov or somebody else, you

know, the buck stops with Putin, he

ought to have made absolutely sure that

your Crimea was properly defended. Now

having said that,

beyond all of this,

Putin never acts

in these kind of situations

as he should, as you would expect a war

leader to behave. I mean, let's let's

talk about the attack on Moscow, the big

attack on Moscow. The fact that there

was all these kerosene drops. Why didn't

the Russian government say that

immediately? Why didn't they actually

have television crews going out there

talking to people discussing the fact

that he was kerosene, pointing out that

the actual physical damage done was

slight? Why wasn't that narrative put

out immediately? Why didn't they send

journalists and reporters to the

refinery that was attacked in Moscow as

well? uh showing that the damage was not

as extensive as Ukraine is saying and uh

giving regular updates about the fact

that the refiner is going to be repaired

in a week or wherever. Why do they never

do these things? Um obviously the media

in the west will either not report or

misreport

these statements. We'll have probably

campaigns in the Western media saying

that this is false information that the

Russians are providing and that the

situation is far more critical um than

the Russians are really saying. But

forget about the West. What about

Russians? What about the actual people

in Russia themselves who deserve to be

told what is really happening to their

city and what is actually happening in

this refinery that was actually attacked

near Moscow. Why not provide them with

much more clear-cut information about

what is taking place there? And it it it

amazes me that, you know, in the fifth

year of the war, the Russians seem to be

so

complacent about this. So Putin comes

along and he tells the military

cadetses, he tells them that all of

these attacks are intended to distract

from the fact that Ukraine is losing on

the front lines. And that is true. He

tells the military cadetses that um the

war is actually going well for Russia

and that the West isn't talking about

the Russian advances on the front lines.

>> True.

>> Which is also true, but it is not

enough. It's nowhere near enough. Um you

know, maybe you don't need Putin himself

to be saying these things. Maybe you can

have other Russian officials do it. But

why why not have someone go to the um to

the refinery, you know, a minister, an

official have a press conference there,

something of that kind. Just as we

talked about the attack on Starbell, the

dormiatory in Starbells in Lugansk

region where all those uh children were

killed. Not a single senior Russian

official went there. Now, I I I do not

understand

why um this is simply not being dealt

with properly in the way that it should

be. And I'm not, you know, we're not the

only people who say this. Um, I I'm

going to disclose the fact I had a um

email from a former US official who

himself told me that he's incredulous

that the Russians run their media

operations so badly. And Putin just

doesn't seem to get this. He gets all

the information. He has it in the

Kremlin when uh things happen on, you

know, the drone war. Um, Pescov says,

you know, it's nothing to do with me in

the Kremlin. Why did you go and speak to

the defense ministry? You could talk to

them. And

this sort of

way of handling a media operation in a

war is is hopeless and disastrous. And

on the question of the drones and

whether they are actually um using

NATO airspace, Putin actually did say

that they do use NATO airspace. I mean

he he he actually said that. But then of

course he fluffed his own message which

opened the way for the media in the West

to misinterpret what he was saying.

>> How did he fluff?

>> Well, he fluffed it. I mean, he said

what he basically said was that, you

know, they're so frightened of launching

drones from their own territory that

they're now admitting that these

Ukrainian drones that are passing

through um um their own airspace are

Ukrainian drones. And they when that

happens, instead of blaming Ukraine,

however, they blame us. So they say

we've diverted the drones onto Ukrainian

territory or there's been a glitch or

something of that kind. So he's making

in effect the case for them instead of

saying you know the the West is

admitting that the Ukrainian drones are

passing through NATO airspace. He and

stopping there he he he goes and talks

about other things which he he just

doesn't as I said understand the

importance of this. So of course you get

all of those comments on X which take

his words twist them a little

>> and convey a message which is completely

different from the one that he wanted to

convey.

>> Yeah. I mean there's there's no excuse

for for for the way they're the terrible

way they're handling the the information

war. I mean, look, with with the drones,

um,

they they have they have to get on on

top of it in a way of

of showing that the collective West

simply cannot direct drones into Russia.

>> U, this is reestablishing deterrence.

Call it whatever you want.

>> It doesn't mean that they have to strike

at the collective west. That's not what

I'm saying. But they have to start start

saying or or doing something in a in an

a asymmetrical way. It doesn't have to

be symmetrical. Um you know that where

are the drones, you know, um the weapons

that are coming in through through the

west?

Why do you continue to allow the weapons

to move in to Ukraine? How come you're

not knocking that out? Yeah.

>> Um

>> you still have all the Western media

access.

>> Yes. in in Russia while you know your

media has been banned throughout

>> yes

>> the the collective west you still have

you still allow the western media inside

of Russia to operate including the BBC

um you know the the we've said this over

and over again the the oil the gas I

mean it doesn't have to be a direct

symmetrical response but you have to

start showing some movement

you there you can use the information

space to send a message to the

collective west and say we know what

you're up to. We know what you're doing.

You better cut it out.

>> Iran's handling of the information war

is of a at a completely different level

to the Russian. I mean, uh where the

Russians have been abysmal. The Iranians

have been superb. And if the Russians

want to see how it can be done, they

should just go and ask the Iranians

>> on a shoestring budget. on the

shoestring without having any of the

resources without having any of the

resources that the uh uh Russians by the

way also have just a sec. Um um you see

what makes this all incredibly

frustrating is that I think the Russians

have taken asymmetrical steps. Um I I I

have absolutely no doubt. In fact, I I

mean we we've had information, we've had

people tell us that the Russians have

indeed provided, for example,

significant technical assistance to Iran

with drones, with guidance systems for

missiles, satellite data, all of those

sort of things. Why not why not

publicize that fact? Why constantly

pretend that you haven't done it? Why

not say straightforwardly, look, you um

you help uh Ukraine in this way. You

help Ukraine conduct attacks on um our

um country. We help Iran to conduct

strikes against American bases.

>> Why not why not just

>> He doesn't want to anger Trump. He

doesn't want to anger Trump even when

even when there are attacks on uh

British bases in Iraqi Kurdistan the

Russ which were carried out with drones

and the British said that the Russians

were involved and everybody could see

that at some level there was some

exchange of expertise at the very least.

What did the Russians say? They say no

we weren't involved.

And again, I mean, I it

everybody knows

that this assistance is being provided

by the Russians to the Iranians, but it

loses its deterrence effect because, of

course, it's not publicized.

>> Yeah. He wants to he wants to please

Trump. I mean,

>> well, he he's got,

>> you know, you're the first one that

knows it that there is the guidance that

has been given out

>> to to please

>> to to not go hard.

>> Yes.

>> Against Trump. not Europeans.

>> It is don't upset Trump.

>> It is not not going hard on Trump. It's

worse than that. It is don't criticize

Trump.

>> Don't criticize Trump. Don't criticize

the United States. That is the message

that the Kremlin has given to the media

in Russia. And um this even as the

Russians themselves, Lavrov, other

officials, even Putin are admitting that

all negotiations

to end the conflict in Ukraine involving

the Americans have stopped. So yes, no

doubt there is a longer game maintaining

dialogue with the Americans. I've

discussed this in previous programs and

I think this is what this is really all

about. I think it's about negotiations

to end the war in Ukraine. I mean some

Russians are now med has just done a

speech in which he's talking about the

various different ways in which regime

change in Kiev can be managed just to

say I mean he's giving he's going into

all those details now and Lavough has

also said you know anchorage we forget

it and Ushakov has said anchorage let's

forget all of that let's focus on the

war. I I I I don't think it is about

negotiating an end to the war. It is

about going long term, trying to find

some way in the long term to develop

some kind of an understanding with the

Americans to um end or or or to to to

reach some kind of det.

And in the meantime to use the Americans

to try to keep the Europeans under

control. Well, you know, one could see

that but frankly at the same time as you

know this very complicated diplomatic

game is being played which may not

succeed.

The information war is being

comprehensively lost.

Ukraine

is far the one area where Zalinski and

the Ukrainians

beat the Russians cont comprehensively.

Not on the battlefield, not in the sky,

not in intelligence gathering, not in

all of those technical things, certainly

not in technology, but it is in

information. Um the even I say even

Zalinski u Zalinski and his team in Kiev

are far better at this than the Russians

are.

It's almost as if

Putin was was was doing better with

Biden.

>> Yeah.

>> Because he understood that Biden

wanted to destroy Russia and had no

interest in talking with Putin or any

kind of dialogue.

>> When Trump came along, Putin built this

architecture

>> to accommodate Trump.

>> Ushakov Ditrif. I mean, he he built an

entire team

>> Yeah. of people to do business with

Trump and to please Trump and to to and

to leers with Wickoff and and Kushner. I

mean, Putin did that. He put that all

together and and it seems like this this

this pull of of perhaps unlocking Yeah.

uh

a business deal with the United States,

unlocking some sort of of diplomatic

reprosh with the United States

>> is

is creating moments of

of of not clarity like with Biden there

was clarity.

>> Yeah.

>> This guy hates us. He doesn't want to

talk to us. He wants to destroy us.

There's no there's no use to even call

him.

>> There's no use to discuss anything.

>> Let's just do what we need to do. But

with Trump, there's there's all of this

this well, you know, let's not let's not

criticize him because we have to think

that maybe in two or three years,

>> yes,

>> you know, we'll bring him we'll bring

him to our side. We'll get him on board

with with how we see things,

>> let me call him and tell him not to

listen to the G7 leaders. Give him a

heads up. Well, you gave him a heads up.

And what happened?

>> We saw what happened at the Oval Office.

Zilinski is doing great. Um, we directed

Ukraine to smash the the refineries in

in Moscow and we're the ones behind Cre.

I mean, we see what happens. Uh,

he's

good. It's good that they're speaking

with the United States, but it also

seems as if the dialogue with the United

States, the constant dangling of of

Repmo with the United States has

considerably moved Putin off course.

>> Well, off course. Do you understand what

I'm trying to say?

>> I know Biden, it was crystal clear.

Biden, it was it was, you know, this guy

hates us. There's no use in talking to

him. He doesn't want to talk to us

anyway. So, let's just do our business.

>> This is where I think the fundamental

problem is. I I think that Putin

is so uninterested

in the information side of the wall.

He puts such little weight on it that he

thinks that he has the political space

to try this long-term diplomatic

strategy with Trump. Um, I don't know

how optimistic he is about what its

ultimate prospects for success are, but

he says to himself, "Well, there's a 1%

chance maybe that it will succeed, so I

might as well try." And as a result he

because he doesn't take the information

side of war at all seriously

he loses it comprehensively by default

because as a result of exactly what you

said of trying to maintain this dialogue

with Trump in the way that he does um

the messaging

gets totally lost. lost and totally

fluffed. Um I I think it is profoundly

wrong. It it is in this and I have to

say this in this Putin is absolutely a

man of his generation. He's uh taking

with him the worst habits of the brush

era Soviet Union which is the Soviet

Union of course in which he was brought

up. I mean they didn't take the

information war at all seriously and nor

does Putin. He at some fundamental basic

level he thinks it doesn't matter and

that Russia getting itself involved in

it is is somehow beneath

him as Russia's president and beneath uh

Russia itself. that what really matters

is what goes on on the battlefield, what

goes on in the sky, what goes on in the

world of diplomacy,

what the newspapers write, what the

television cameras show, that really

doesn't matter in the end. I I think

he's profoundly wrong about this. I

think that um obviously you mustn't

sacrifice everything to information,

which is what Silinsky to a great extent

does. But I think to to treat this with

such extreme disdain as Putin does um of

opens him and Russia up to all kinds of

problems.

>> You're right. It it does matter.

>> I mean ultimately, yeah, sure, Russia's

going to win in Ukraine. They're winning

in Ukraine. They're demolishing the the

the the Ukraine NATO uh military.

>> They are advancing. There is no

stalemate. That's fiction.

But the fact that he doesn't get his his

messaging down on on specifically the

the drones and the missile strikes into

Russia, he doesn't put out the the

correct messaging, the correct warning.

He he kind of hints at red lines, but

they're not really red lines. He kind of

says that they're going to we're going

to hit decision-making centers, but then

they kind of walk it back and we're not

going to hit decision-m centers or they

kind of confuse things in in the

messaging. It leaves the collective

west, especially the Europeans just

ignoring what Putin says. I mean, the

media definitely ignores it.

>> Yes.

>> And and and the leaders just kind of

they they brush it off whatever he says.

They don't really take what he says

seriously anymore. or it and it and it

does embolden them where with Iran they

had their messaging down ve very clear.

Their messaging was was crystal clear

>> and and I believe that that actually

deterred

much of the uh of the collective west

especially the Europeans from from fully

joining

with Trump in in the war. the the the

Europeans were were saying, "Yeah, we we

support you. Uh absolutely, uh President

Trump,

we're not going to go against you in the

in this war. Whatever you whatever you

think you have to do, Iran's in the

wrong, you're in the right."

>> But do we really we don't really want to

get too involved in this conflict

because, you know, Iran's kind of they

they kind of mean business, right? I

mean,

>> well, indeed.

>> That was the message.

>> This is the difference.

>> Well, indeed. And it does make it and it

does and it does lead to real life

consequences.

>> Absolutely it does. Of course it does.

Um can I just say something? We've

talked about Iran, but um after I came

back from Russia, I just reinformed

myself about how the Soviet Union

handled the information war during the

Second World War. And they had a

specific spokesman who was there every

day to give information to the media

about what the latest military

developments were. They had an whole

information bureau set up to do that.

They had uh um um um regular updates uh

which were broadcast from Soviet radio

including to the Germans. And of course

they also had a specific spokesman who

when there were particular battles which

went a particular way and went out on

the radio and informed the Soviet people

about this. in the second world war

that remember was Stalin Soviet Union

they ran a far more professional media

operation than Putin does today and you

know this isn't um the kind of

lockdown authoritarian

state that the Soviet Union was at that

time but they understood the importance

of information then and Putin just

doesn't seem to understand that today um

I will never forget As I said, that

exchange with Tucker Carlson in which

Putin said, "Well, you know, we're not

going to waste time with the information

war because America is always going to

win it." I mean, surrendering the battle

before it's even fought, which the

Iranians, as you rightly say, have shown

that that is completely wrong.

>> Yeah. Okay, let's wrap up the video uh

with Lavough during his speech. He he

hinted at

>> um Alaska being a way to buy time.

>> Yeah. the Trump administration. What did

you make of that statement?

>> Well, absolutely. Well, I mean, I think

Lavough, who's never, I think, been very

enthusiastic about this whole diplomatic

process. I mean, that was as much a

message to Putin as it was to every to

other people. He said, "Look, you know,

you you you talk about Minsk all the

time."

How was Anchorage ultimately different?

You went to Anchorage. um you came away

thinking that you'd got an agreement

with Trump and where did that go? I mean

it it it achieved nothing in the end. So

I think this is I think this is again um

Lavrov who I think has I mean Lavrov has

had many more interactions bear in mind

with the Americans and over a much

longer period than Putin has. I mean, he

was um you know, he's been in New York.

He's worked at the UN. He's uh met many

American officials over a very very

extended period. I don't think he has

any illusions about the Americans at

all. And I don't think he shares

whatever illusions he has about um about

um Trump. But there's been another thing

which is not getting the attention that

perhaps it should do which is that a

couple of days ago uh they all met all

the top people in Russia met at a

security council meeting and uh Lavough

gave a report and it was all very very

secret and we won't tell what it was all

about but I think we can now see because

Lavough said and he said in these public

comments he made and I say he makes he's

made them in two places. One was to the

diplomatic academy in Moscow where they

train diplomats for the Russian foreign

ministry and he then said very similar

things to the Primacov Institute which

is Russia's premier foreign policy think

tank. Basically what he's saying is that

the Europeans are preparing for war and

that the mood not just amongst the

Europeans but across the collective west

is starting to resemble what

the what was the case in Europe before

the second world war and specifically

before the attack on the Soviet Union on

the 22nd of June 1941. one and as I said

Lavough made that report to the security

council it's clearly had an effect even

Putin repeated some of that some of

those warnings when he spoke to the

military cadetses I mean he came very

close to saying to them look um we are

now in a potential warcoming situation

the Europeans are clearly not just the

Europeans the collective west is clearly

preparing for war against us and we have

to be ready for that. So you could see

that even as Putin I ultimately is Putin

completely fluffs the information war.

Um, the Russians, the the Russian

government as a whole, Russian officials

as a as a whole are hardening their

views. They think that the situation

with the West is in fact deteriorating.

Putin may think that he might eventually

achieve something with Trump, but I

don't think anybody else in the Kremlin

does.

>> Do you think that Putin is listening to

to Lavough? Do you think that Putin by

creating this type of of

government or or maybe non-government

group I'm not sure how to categorize

them the I mean Pascov government

Ushakov his presidential aid do you

think by creating this these envoys or

this group that is liazing with the

United States he's confused things with

regards to Lav and the foreign ministry

>> that maybe it was a a mistake to to

create this this group

>> because it's it it confuses is what what

lav and the foreign ministry should

ultimately be be doing does doesn't it?

I think that the sense within the

foreign ministry is that all of this

private diplomacy that is being

conducted um violates every every

diplomatic rule and it is leading

nowhere and it is

again modeling the message about Russia

being in confrontation with the west and

a very serious and dangerous

confrontation with the test which

message should be made much more clear.

So I I I think that's absolutely Love's

view. I suspect it's also the view of

the military as well

>> and I suspect it's alo the view of most

of the people in the security council.

What I'm going to say is this. I think

Putin himself

um

does listen to Lavrov, does take Lavrov

seriously, but he says to himself, well,

given how dangerous the situation has

become,

as Russia's president, it falls upon me

to do whatever is in my power to try to

keep diplomatic doors with Washington

open to maintain the dialogue with the

Americans to talk to them as far as I

can to explain to them the realities so

that the risk that we do end up in a war

which would be a catastrophe for

everyone is avoided. So you you could

see this but to repeat again he's going

about it in a way which fluffs the wider

message the bigger message which is the

message that Lavro Mvved the military

all want to convey to the Russian people

that you know this is a dangerous

situation and we must treat it as such.

Well, I mean, we, you know, we always,

uh, criticize, many people criticize

Trump's creation of these envoys to

handle diplomacy,

>> right? You know, Rubio is just kind of

doing his thing,

>> and really Trump's diplomatic team

>> is Wickoff and Kushner

>> and everyone always asks the question,

you know, who are these guys?

>> Yes.

>> You know, what's their what's their role

within the White House? What are they up

to? uh you know why are they handling

all of these very complicated uh

negotiations whether it's Gaza, Iran,

Russia. I mean, Putin mirrored he

accommodated Trump and he mirrored

Trump's actions in a way by by creating

his own team of envoys

>> where he I would have thought that that

the best route for Putin to to have gone

down and

>> and this is what they were doing about a

year ago was was to say look there's a

proper way to do diplomacy there's a

proper way to do negotiations and it's

handled by the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs. So if you want to speak to us,

well then you tell Marco Rubio who is a

secretary of state to speak to Lav and

that's how we do that. I think Putin is

very typical about these things.

>> Yes.

>> Why why did he do such an atypical

unorthodox maneuver?

>> Well, I mean that that's the part that I

think is is is very very is very

confusing in all of this

>> which points to the fact that he really

wanted to accommodate Trump.

>> He did. Absolutely. I I and I think

perhaps

possibly he thought last year that it

would re it would result in a in a

diplomatic resolution. I'm not sure how

far he really believed it, but anyway,

he he thought that he would go the extra

mile with Trump to see whether it would

come to anything. And I think he still

says to himself, well, Trump's pulling

troops out of Europe. his uh um reducing

the American military footprint in

Europe, which I think will continue. By

the way, um he's downscaled US help to

Ukraine anyway.

And ultimately, we're going to need to

develop a long-term dialogue with the

Americans. So, if Trump wants to do it

this way, we'll do it this way. I think

that was a serious mistake. By the way,

I I think in and I I again maybe what

shouldn't be too hard on Dimmitrif maybe

Dimmitrif should not have been chosen by

Putin for the role that he did but if he

was going to have meetings with with

Goff and Kushner he didn't need to put

Dimmitrif as the person to talk to. He

should have had proper people from the

foreign ministry, Ariabkov and people

like that, Galuzin and people like that,

real diplomats. The Iranians noticed

didn't make that mistake. Um um in all

interactions with Wickoff and Kushner,

they were represented by the foreign

minister who was a

>> and buff the speaker of the

>> All right. All right. We'll end the

video there. The duran.local.com. We are

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