HomeVideos

Ex-Pentagon Official: The U.S Isn't Telling The Truth! Top-Secret UFO Encounters Finally Uncovered!

Now Playing

Ex-Pentagon Official: The U.S Isn't Telling The Truth! Top-Secret UFO Encounters Finally Uncovered!

Transcript

3018 segments

0:00

We are absolutely not alone in the

0:01

universe. And I know these things are

0:02

real because I was asked to investigate

0:05

UFO incursions into controlled US

0:06

airspace by the Pentagon. These videos

0:08

here, there's no question what you're

0:10

seeing.

0:10

And there's more videos like this that

0:12

you've been exposed to.

0:13

Oh, yeah, but they're classified because

0:15

there are a lot of people that don't

0:16

want us talking about this.

0:17

Should we be worried about this?

0:20

Luis Elizondo is a respected

0:21

intelligence officer and former head of

0:23

the Pentagon's Advanced Aerospace Threat

0:25

Identification Program, where he led

0:27

efforts to investigate UFO sightings and

0:29

unidentified aerial phenomena.

0:31

There were real things that we were

0:32

encountering over controlled US airspace

0:34

by an unknown technology that frankly

0:36

could outperform anything that we had in

0:38

our inventory. And there was a big

0:40

national security issue because there's

0:42

potential for these things to be

0:43

interfering with our nuclear equities.

0:45

There's evidence to suggest that they

0:46

turned on the nuclear facilities in

0:47

Russia, right?

0:48

Yeah, that's a big deal.

0:50

Has there ever been anyone sent to jail

0:51

because they've spoken about this

0:53

subject matter?

0:53

Worse, my life has been threatened many

0:55

times. I've taken huge risks, but I

0:57

think we deserve the truth. So, let's

1:00

go.

1:00

People say that they were abducted by

1:01

aliens. Do you believe any of those

1:03

reports?

1:03

I can tell you that we definitely have

1:04

people that are now on US government

1:06

medical disability because they were

1:07

involved in a UFO encounter.

1:09

And then one of the rumors is that at

1:11

Area 51 they found UFO materials.

1:13

I cannot comment what Area 51 might or

1:16

might not have. All I can say is that

1:17

the government is in possession of

1:18

material that doesn't look like it's

1:20

made by us.

1:21

Do you have any theories as to why they

1:22

might be visiting here?

1:23

Oh gosh, well, where do I start?

1:25

You eventually resigned. Why?

1:27

I resigned in protest because

1:32

This has always blown my mind a little

1:33

bit. 53% of you that listen to this show

1:36

regularly haven't yet subscribed to this

1:38

show. So, could I ask you for a favor

1:40

before we start? If you like this show

1:41

and you like what we do here and you

1:42

want to support us, the free simple way

1:44

that you can do just that is by hitting

1:46

the subscribe button. And my commitment

1:48

to you is if you do that, then I'll do

1:49

everything in my power, me and my team,

1:51

to make sure that this show is better

1:52

for you every single week. We'll listen

1:54

to your feedback, we'll find the guests

1:56

that you want me to speak to, and we'll

1:58

continue to do what we do. Thank you so

1:59

much.

2:03

Luke.

2:05

Steve.

2:06

Who are you?

2:08

Wow, depends who you ask.

2:10

I think to some people I'm probably a

2:14

a patriot, to other people

2:16

I'm a father

2:18

and a husband, and to other people I'm

2:20

probably the devil.

2:24

What's your professional CV? What does

2:26

your professional resume say?

2:27

Went to college, went to the University

2:29

of Miami.

2:30

I studied uh microbiology, immunology,

2:33

and parasitology.

2:35

Uh I consider myself a disciple of uh

2:37

scientific method and scientific

2:39

principles.

2:40

I then joined the army,

2:42

uh United States Army.

2:43

I went in as enlisted. I had an

2:46

opportunity to go in as an officer

2:47

because of my education.

2:49

But uh the words of my father always

2:52

rung in the back of my head, and he

2:54

said, "In order to be a leader, you must

2:55

first know what it means to follow."

2:58

And so I joined the army as an enlisted

3:00

soldier,

3:01

um spent some time in deployments Korea,

3:03

spent lived a year in Asia.

3:05

Um

3:06

was in military intelligence, and then I

3:08

was recruited very shortly thereafter

3:10

into a special program where I became a

3:12

civilian special agent in

3:13

counterintelligence running

3:14

investigations.

3:15

Um supervised investigations throughout

3:18

Latin America, South America, Central

3:19

America, and then um

3:22

spent the rest of my time after 9/11 uh

3:25

uh over in Afghanistan in the Middle

3:26

East.

3:27

Primarily uh dealing with uh terrorism

3:30

issues, uh running operations against uh

3:32

Hezbollah and and ISIS and other other

3:35

organizations.

3:37

And then um

3:39

after probably several years of that, my

3:40

wife got very tired of it.

3:42

Missed too many birthdays, missed too

3:44

many uh

3:45

holidays, and

3:47

she said, "You really need to come back,

3:49

and more importantly, I'm afraid the

3:50

next time you leave you may not come

3:52

back. Uh we are losing some people over

3:54

there quite a bit, and so

3:56

I listened to my wife. I came back, took

3:57

a supervisory job, ran uh investigations

4:00

worldwide, um

4:02

terrorism investigations. And then from

4:04

there I went to several other

4:06

three-letter agencies. I worked for the

4:08

NCIX, National Counterintelligence

4:09

Executive. I worked for the DNI, the

4:11

Director of National Intelligence.

4:13

And uh it was in 2000 uh shortly

4:16

thereafter um that I was asked to be

4:18

part of a

4:20

very interesting program in the

4:21

Pentagon. Um what my CV is, I'm probably

4:25

uh a jack-of-all-trades, but an expert

4:27

in nothing. I've done a lot of things.

4:29

Mostly national security crimes,

4:30

terrorism, espionage, um some

4:32

counter-guerrilla operations,

4:34

counter-narcotics,

4:35

uh counterinsurgency uh missions.

4:38

You said in 2000 and sort of 8, 2009 you

4:40

were asked to come back to the Pentagon

4:42

to work on a particular project. What

4:44

project was that?

4:45

So, well, it wasn't the one that wound

4:48

up being the project that everybody

4:49

knows me for. So,

4:51

uh in 2008, they asked me to run a

4:55

program to help integrate

4:58

national-level intelligence

5:01

to with law enforcement, local and state

5:04

law enforcement agencies. Now, why is

5:06

that important? Because and then to kind

5:08

of lead to the next thing.

5:09

After 9/11, people think here 9/11 was

5:12

was caused by by unfortunately some

5:14

terrorists doing some bad things.

5:17

That was an effect, that wasn't the

5:18

cause. The actual cause was us here in

5:21

the United States not being able to

5:22

share information with ourselves very

5:25

well. We had pockets of information at

5:27

the CIA, pockets of information at the

5:28

FBI, pockets of information at the

5:30

Department of Defense, but we weren't

5:32

sharing it with each other. And thereby

5:35

there was an information gap, an

5:36

intelligence gap, and the folks in 9/11

5:39

were able to do what they did,

5:40

unfortunately.

5:42

So, we learned that lesson

5:43

by trying to create um better

5:46

integration. So, how do you take super

5:48

secret information and get it down to a

5:52

level that can be consumed and usable

5:54

without compromising sources and

5:55

methods. So, that was the problem I was

5:57

asked to come back and fix.

6:00

It was shortly thereafter is when I was

6:02

visited by some individuals and had some

6:04

conversations with some other

6:05

individuals about a program that I had

6:07

no idea was that was I was ongoing, but

6:09

it was.

6:10

And it was a program involving the

6:13

investigation, the government's

6:14

investigation into UAP or in the

6:17

vernacular

6:18

you might call them UFOs.

6:21

Who approached you?

6:22

So, there were two individuals. One of

6:23

them I can talk about, the other one is

6:25

identity is protected.

6:26

It's a gentleman named Jay Stratton

6:29

uh, who at the time was another

6:30

intelligence official like me and

6:33

another one of his colleagues. And they

6:34

came to me and they started asking me

6:36

questions. They had a blue badge, so I I

6:38

knew that they were cleared. They had

6:39

the same security clearance I had. We

6:40

all worked in SCIFs.

6:42

And it's not uncommon when you need

6:44

expertise in a particular portfolio or

6:46

mission that you you outsource. You find

6:48

the right people to do this right job.

6:50

And so,

6:51

I was told they were looking for

6:52

somebody to run counterintelligence and

6:54

security

6:55

for this capability that they had. They

6:57

didn't tell me what the capability was.

6:59

Um, and I was a counterintelligence and

7:02

security guy who was an expert in it.

7:04

So, after several conversations um, a

7:06

bit of a dance if you will, you know,

7:08

kind of like

7:09

trying to figure each other out. They

7:11

arranged for me to have a meeting with a

7:12

individual and I met

7:15

uh, the what I would consider is the

7:17

premier rocket scientist for the United

7:20

States government. Now, when I say

7:22

rocket scientist, I mean literally a

7:23

rocket scientist.

7:25

This is a gentleman who can tell you the

7:29

fuel consumption rate of a first stage

7:31

solid rocket motor booster. He can tell

7:33

you the the orbital velocity of a MIRV

7:36

vehicle, multiple re-entry vehicle

7:37

coming in from lower Earth orbit. I

7:39

mean, the best of the best of the best.

7:42

He was running a program, and I still

7:44

didn't know what the program was, but he

7:45

said, "Look, you know, we've been doing

7:46

it we've been given a lot of money to do

7:48

it right, and we're looking for somebody

7:49

with me with your skill sets." And his

7:51

name was Dr. James Lacatski, and the

7:54

epitome of a rocket scientist. And at

7:57

the end of the conversation, I remember

7:58

him looking at me over his glasses, and

8:01

he said to me, "What do you think about

8:03

UFOs?"

8:05

And so, I thought for a moment, and I

8:06

said to him, I said, "I Sorry, I don't."

8:10

And he said, "Well, what do you mean?

8:11

You You don't believe in UFOs?" I said,

8:13

"No, I I didn't say that.

8:14

You asked me, what do I think of them?

8:16

And my response was, I don't, because I

8:19

don't think about them. I I'm too busy

8:22

chasing bad guys and trying to fix

8:24

problems for the government. I I never

8:25

really had the luxury to think about

8:26

them."

8:28

And he said to me, "Okay, that's fair,

8:29

fair enough, but let me just warn you,

8:32

um don't let your

8:34

analytic bias

8:36

get the best of you, because you may

8:37

learn things here that will challenge

8:39

any preconceived notion or narrative

8:41

that you have

8:43

about the topic."

8:45

And so, I left that meeting thinking to

8:48

myself, is this some sort of

8:49

psychological evaluation? Was it that a

8:51

serious question, you know, or

8:54

And it was very soon thereafter that I

8:56

learned the reality that the United

8:58

States government was absolutely

9:00

invested in a UFO investigative program,

9:03

and more importantly, that it was

9:05

legitimate. I It was real. There were

9:07

real things that we were encountering

9:09

over controlled US airspace, over

9:10

sensitive military installations,

9:13

um by an unknown technology that frankly

9:17

could outperform anything that we had in

9:19

our inventory.

9:22

So, that was my uh that was my

9:23

introduction to now what is known as

9:26

AATIP. My focus was specifically more on

9:29

the nuts and bolts investigations of

9:31

these UAP incursions into controlled US

9:33

airspace, encounters by military

9:36

aircraft of these things.

9:37

Um we weren't really focused on

9:39

civilians information, right? We This

9:41

wasn't like a grandma seeing some lights

9:43

in the backyard.

9:44

These were These were well, to lack of a

9:47

better term, close encounters by trained

9:49

military pilots, trained observers.

9:52

By the way,

9:54

who could recognize a silhouette

9:56

between an F SU-22, a MiG-25, and an

9:59

F-16 from 10 mi away and make a

10:01

split-second decision if it is a friend

10:03

or foe?

10:04

And what these pilots were encountering

10:06

were also being backed up by by gun

10:09

camera footage. And and FLIR footage,

10:12

forward-looking infrared footage. And

10:13

oh, by the way,

10:15

that was being further backed up by

10:16

radar data, airborne data, airborne

10:19

radar data, and also ground-based radar

10:21

data, and sea-based radar data.

10:23

How did you go from the project you were

10:24

working on into AATIP? Cuz that was the

10:26

first sort of meeting, right? That was

10:28

like an introductory conversation.

10:30

So, there were several meetings before

10:31

that where they were trying to vet me,

10:33

see if I had, I guess, the the right

10:35

background of skill sets. It wasn't

10:36

until that meeting with Jim Lacatski

10:38

that the word UFO was used. Um

10:42

and how did I how did I go about that?

10:44

He's the one who made the decision. It

10:46

was his program. I had nothing to do

10:47

with that. I just, you know, said,

10:48

"Yeah, I'll do it." I didn't even know

10:50

what I was signing up for until after my

10:51

meeting with him.

10:52

So, did he say to you, "Okay, well, we'd

10:53

like you to work on this program, this

10:55

AATIP program. Um the acronym that

10:56

stands for Advanced Aerospace Threat

10:58

Identification Program."

10:59

Correct.

11:00

Um and eventually you became the

11:01

director of that program.

11:02

Yeah, so it there was a there was a

11:04

natural evolution of it. Um initially, I

11:06

was just there were brought in to

11:08

provide counterintelligence and security

11:10

uh expertise.

11:11

Um but as that program, ASAP, faded

11:14

away,

11:15

the the necessity and urgency of some of

11:17

these incursions were were it was

11:18

getting to a a desperate crescendo. It

11:21

was getting really There was a lot of

11:22

these incursions happening. There was a

11:24

big national security issue that that we

11:26

were all recognizing. And there were

11:29

some elements in the government that

11:30

were trying to kill

11:32

the effort. Um and not for reasons you

11:34

might think, believe it or not.

11:35

Completely different. Um

11:38

And so, the decision was made to bring

11:39

it up to the Pentagon, up to where I

11:41

was, take it out of DIA, Defense

11:43

Intelligence Agency, and with the

11:44

authorities I had, I was the Director of

11:46

National Program Special Management

11:48

Staff. And so, that was my job. Um I ran

11:51

special access programs for for the

11:53

White House and for the National

11:55

Security Council.

11:56

And uh

11:58

we uh we put the program under that, uh

12:00

keeping it out of the the prying eyes of

12:02

some of the folks that previously were

12:04

trying to kill the program.

12:05

So, this program, Advanced Aerospace

12:07

Threat Identification Program, was

12:09

really focused on

12:10

um investigating

12:12

reports and incidents of

12:15

UAPs or UFOs um

12:17

in military environments. So, if there

12:20

was a UFO {slash} UAP in a I don't know,

12:24

in a military base,

12:26

then this project would investigate what

12:28

that was. Is that Is that correct?

12:29

Correct. That's Correct. So, it was only

12:31

military-focused.

12:32

Um it wasn't interested in civilian

12:34

data. At the time we were running it at

12:36

the Pentagon, it was really looking at

12:39

for example, nuclear carrier strike

12:40

groups that were encountering these

12:41

things all the time. It would be, for

12:43

example, an Air Force base or a Navy

12:45

base or uh there was a special

12:48

operations unit on a particular patrol,

12:50

and if they happened to encounter a UAP,

12:53

those type of reports. And

12:55

I also want to emphasize here, we

12:57

weren't looking for UFOs. You know, we

12:59

were we were always coming into a

13:01

situation

13:02

with the understanding that there's some

13:03

sort of prosaic

13:05

un- there's a prosaic answer to what

13:07

this is, right? It actually wasn't a

13:09

UFO, it was a drone, a test fire of a

13:11

missile, it was a drone, it was a

13:13

balloon, it was whatever, whatever.

13:15

Because there are certain signatures and

13:16

profiles that you can look very quickly

13:18

determine, oh, that's just conventional

13:19

technology.

13:21

But there was a guideline that we use

13:23

that al- helped us understand when

13:26

something really was anomalous. When we

13:27

really we're talking about

13:29

it's not our technology and whatever

13:31

that is, it's probably not adversarial

13:33

or foreign technology. So, now we're

13:35

getting into the real world of UAP. That

13:37

that's that's anomalous.

13:39

What's a UAP?

13:40

Unidentified anomalous phenomenon. So,

13:43

let me if I can for let me backtrack a

13:45

little bit.

13:46

For years and years and years the term

13:47

UFO, unidentified flying object, was

13:50

used.

13:51

Um

13:52

there were several reasons, but later on

13:54

the term was changed to UAP and it stood

13:56

for unidentified aerial phenomenon. And

13:59

that's probably in the last year, year

14:00

and a half, you're starting to see yet

14:02

another definition of UAP, unidentified

14:05

anomalous phenomenon. And there's a

14:07

reason for that. I'm happy to explain if

14:09

you want, but um

14:10

the decision was made to change from UFO

14:13

to UAP.

14:14

I read that it was because a lot of the

14:15

sort of military personnel stopped

14:17

reporting their sightings because

14:19

there was a stigma associated with the

14:20

term UFO.

14:22

Correct. So, it's two two reasons.

14:24

Uh there was stigma and taboo associated

14:25

with the term because the moment you say

14:27

UFO, people think tin foil hats and

14:30

They think you're crazy.

14:30

Yeah, Elvis on the mothership and you

14:32

know, nonsense like that.

14:34

Um

14:35

but the reality is is that this this was

14:37

a real issue, a national security issue

14:38

for our nation and other nations too, by

14:40

the way. But also the term UFO isn't

14:42

really accurate anymore. So, what do I

14:44

mean by that? Well, unidentified flying

14:47

object. What is flying? Well, flying

14:50

means you have four fundamental forces.

14:52

You have thrust, lift, drag, and weight.

14:55

And when you understand that, you can

14:56

create wings and create lift and that is

14:58

the definition of flying, right?

15:01

These things didn't have wings. They

15:03

didn't have rudders, elevators, control

15:05

surfaces, ailerons, cockpits,

15:07

um and yet somehow they were able to

15:10

remain aloft in our atmosphere. So, they

15:12

weren't flying, technically. So, the

15:14

name was changed to anomalous uh I'm

15:16

sorry, unidentified aerial phenomena cuz

15:18

they were being seen in the air, but

15:20

then they realized, you know what?

15:21

They're also being seen underwater.

15:23

They're also being seen in high altitude

15:24

and possibly low Earth orbit. So, to say

15:27

that they're aerial isn't even accurate,

15:28

either. So, then they said, okay, it's

15:30

unidentified anomalous phenomenon to

15:32

cover all the separate domains or

15:34

environments that these things are being

15:36

encountered in.

15:37

Before you had the meeting regarding

15:39

this project at the Pentagon,

15:42

what did you believe about UAPs and

15:44

{slash} UFOs?

15:45

I didn't. I was never interested even in

15:46

science fiction as a kid.

15:48

Did you believe they were If I'd asked

15:49

you then, if I'd come up to you and

15:50

said, "Are UFOs real?"

15:53

And I say UFOs because that's the sort

15:54

of

15:55

Sure.

15:55

social term, but

15:57

what would you have said?

15:59

Probably not.

16:01

I mean, I would have said literally,

16:02

probably not. I wouldn't say for for

16:04

sure not because I didn't know.

16:05

What about now?

16:06

Oh.

16:08

Yeah, give me. I mean,

16:09

yeah, it's These are real. I mean, don't

16:11

take my word for it. Our government's

16:12

already said it. I mean, we

16:14

You have a former director of national

16:15

intelligence

16:17

telling the world, yeah, these these

16:18

things are real, whatever they are. You

16:19

have a former director of CIA. You have

16:21

a former president of the United States.

16:23

Um

16:24

we've known for a long time they're

16:26

real. And by the way, it's not just our

16:27

country. There's other countries that

16:28

are very forthcoming.

16:30

Um there's countries in South America

16:32

that have been dealing with this for a

16:33

long time. Japan just entered into a uh

16:36

bilateral information sharing agreement

16:38

with our country for the express

16:39

purposes of sharing UAP information and

16:41

data. China's interested. Russia's

16:43

interested in this. Um

16:45

several European countries have a fairly

16:48

robust capability and have have a lot of

16:49

information on this.

16:50

Was there a moment when your belief

16:52

changed? Was there a moment that you can

16:54

remember where you thought, you know

16:55

what?

16:56

What I thought about UAPs

16:59

was wrong?

17:00

Sure. Um

17:02

And what I often tell people, there's

17:04

there's there's two types of individuals

17:05

the way that we process this

17:07

information.

17:08

In one category, you have people that

17:10

will sit there and say,

17:12

"I had this epiphany. This revelatory

17:14

moment where all of a sudden it's like,

17:15

oh my god, they're real. Right? Are you

17:17

kidding me?

17:19

And then there's another group of people

17:20

which I probably fall into that second

17:22

category, the latter category, which is

17:25

more of a slow progression

17:28

and realization of what we're dealing

17:30

with is not a conventional technology.

17:33

It's not

17:35

our technology. It's It's something

17:38

else.

17:39

Um

17:42

At some point, the preponderance of

17:44

evidence is so overwhelming. Let me give

17:45

you an example. I am

17:49

I spent my life in in investigations.

17:53

Terrorists

17:54

spies, whatever.

17:56

And um I've always been what I

17:58

considered just the facts, ma'am, kind

18:01

of guy, very very data-driven. I don't

18:03

really care about innuendos and

18:04

suppositions and your opinion very much.

18:07

I care about what the data says, right?

18:08

What does it What does the data suggest?

18:10

And in this case, this particular case,

18:14

you have

18:15

eyewitness testimony.

18:17

You have it backed up by gun camera

18:18

footage. You have it backed up by fleer

18:20

footage. You have it backed up by radar

18:22

information. You've got five, six,

18:24

sometimes seven pieces of corroborating

18:26

sensor data.

18:27

That's all reporting the same event at

18:30

the same time at the same place

18:32

under the same circumstances.

18:34

Now, if I was in a court of law and I

18:36

was presenting this as evidence,

18:39

we are well beyond reasonable doubt. The

18:41

jury would have no choice but to convict

18:43

because the evidence is the same

18:45

collection sensor suite that we use to

18:48

prosecute and win a war

18:50

and forgive the vernacular, but

18:51

literally drop warheads on foreheads, is

18:54

the same information the same same

18:55

systems we're using

18:57

to collect the data on the anomalous

19:00

vehicles we're seeing.

19:01

Um and so

19:03

you know, I know it's a very

19:05

uncomfortable conversation to have. I'm

19:07

not saying it's not.

19:09

What I'm saying is that we have to deal

19:10

with this. And it's not me just telling

19:12

you that. This is our government. We

19:14

know we've already we have laws now on

19:16

the books because this topic is now so

19:18

serious. We have whistleblowers ready to

19:21

come out and testify before the American

19:23

people because this is so serious. We

19:25

have set up an organization specifically

19:28

its sole purpose is to investigate UAP

19:32

because this topic is so serious. So,

19:35

this is not a

19:36

you know, flight of fancy here. We're

19:38

we're investing millions of dollars

19:40

taxpayer dollars

19:41

to try to figure this out. And

19:42

interestingly enough, I think when the

19:45

investigative body first came was was

19:48

realized was was created, there was this

19:50

hope that in the first report they said,

19:52

"Oh, there's these 143 incidents that

19:53

remain uh

19:55

unidentified, but we're going to whittle

19:57

them away." What happened the next time

19:59

they had a report? There was now 300.

20:01

And what happened after that? Now 800.

20:03

The number's going up, not down.

20:05

They remain unresolved. And so, um

20:09

you know, we've we've we've got to have

20:11

this uncomfortable conversation with

20:12

ourselves.

20:14

You eventually left.

20:15

I did.

20:16

Um your that project, but also more

20:18

broadly you you resigned uh from working

20:21

with the Pentagon in the role that you

20:22

were working with them. Why did you

20:24

resign?

20:25

I resigned because that's what you do

20:27

when you can't fix a problem internally.

20:29

My concern

20:31

was that

20:32

we were spending time and money

20:35

on an issue

20:37

that leadership didn't want to know

20:38

about.

20:40

That leadership didn't want to inform

20:42

the boss, the then Secretary of Defense,

20:45

General Jim Mattis,

20:47

um

20:48

the details about what was going on. And

20:50

there's reasons for that, and we can

20:52

certainly get into that if you want. I

20:53

understand them. I don't necessarily

20:54

agree with them, but I understand them.

20:56

But at least here in in our country,

20:59

when you can't fix a problem, you don't

21:01

stay and make it worse.

21:03

You leave. You resign. And then if you

21:05

still want to do something, you do it

21:06

from outside, but you don't create

21:08

problems inside. And um it's not that

21:10

uncommon, is it? Because if you look

21:11

just a year later after I left,

21:13

Secretary of Defense himself resigned.

21:15

Right? So, I resigned in protest, but

21:18

not out of disloyalty. I resigned

21:20

because of my loyalty

21:23

to this country and to this government.

21:25

And

21:26

What is that protest, sorry? Just to be

21:27

clear.

21:28

The protest is that we weren't able to

21:30

get

21:31

the information and the help we needed

21:34

with with this issue up to the right

21:37

level of people. They were happy with us

21:38

doing it, but they said, "Don't tell the

21:39

boss." But wait a minute, the boss needs

21:41

to know. We're we're having almost a

21:43

mid-air collision

21:44

with our fighter pilots. We have

21:46

captains and admirals of Navy ships

21:48

asking us, "What do we do about these

21:50

things?" Like I there's an email that

21:51

said, "Hey, Lou, we can't keep these

21:53

guys below deck forever. What do you

21:54

want me to do? They're all over the

21:55

ship."

21:57

You know, so a decision has to be made.

21:59

What are we going to do about it? And

22:01

that decision has to be made by the top

22:03

guy, the Secretary of Defense. And for

22:05

whatever reason,

22:07

the upper echelon of leadership didn't

22:08

want to tell the boss. And then the And

22:10

we weren't getting any guidance on what

22:11

to do about it. Now,

22:13

keeping in mind, these things are coming

22:15

over our sensitive military

22:16

installations as well. And there's

22:18

potential for these things to be

22:19

interfering with our nuclear equities.

22:21

That's a big deal.

22:23

And nobody wants to have the

22:24

conversation?

22:25

Now, wait a minute. Let's let's let's

22:27

put this on the backdrop of of other

22:29

national security issues, right? Like

22:30

terrorism. If you go to any airport in

22:32

the United States today or any train

22:33

station, you always hear over the

22:34

announce- ments, "If if you see

22:36

something suspicious, say something.

22:37

Report it."

22:39

Well,

22:40

that wasn't the case

22:41

with these things. In fact, people were

22:43

told not to report. Yes, if you saw a

22:45

UFO and you saw it over a sensitive

22:46

military installation,

22:48

don't report it cuz they'll think you're

22:49

crazy.

22:50

And that is dangerous. That is a

22:52

dangerous mindset because if these

22:54

things had a Russian star on the tail or

22:56

a North Korean tail number,

22:58

this would be

22:59

huge. But because these things didn't

23:01

have a tail at all and didn't have any

23:03

obvious signs of propulsion or whatnot,

23:05

it was cricket. People would know about

23:07

it. It was a worst-kept secret. People

23:08

like, "Yeah, we see them all the time,

23:09

but we don't want to report it." Well,

23:11

you have to report it. Well, there's no

23:13

reporting mechanism. Okay, well, let's

23:14

create one. Well, we can't create one

23:16

cuz we need permission to do it and this

23:17

person needs to be briefed up.

23:18

Meanwhile, you're being told, "No, you

23:20

can't. You can't. You can't. You can't."

23:21

Why wouldn't they want to

23:22

report this information? Why wouldn't

23:24

they want the public to know? Why

23:25

wouldn't they want the boss to know?

23:27

Well, I think cuz of stigma and taboo.

23:29

Well, there's several reasons, but I

23:30

think superficially stigma and taboo. No

23:32

one wants to be known as that UFO guy or

23:34

gal. I I get it, you know, especially if

23:36

you're a pilot cuz historically, you'd

23:38

be taken off flight status. You you

23:40

know, put behind a desk and you'd fly a

23:42

desk the rest of your career because

23:43

people think you're mentally unstable.

23:45

Could affect your security clearance. I

23:46

mean, there's all sorts of things that

23:48

can happen. Um and so, people were being

23:51

being reinforced not to report this

23:54

information. Even civilian pilots today,

23:56

if you talk to them, they'll tell you

23:57

quietly, "Yeah, yeah, we see things in

23:59

the sky, but we're not going to report

24:00

anything cuz I need a job, you know."

24:02

What did you see?

24:04

Oh my What day? I mean, I

24:06

videos, reports, photographs. I mean, we

24:09

have There's videos that are so

24:11

compelling in high definition that

24:13

there's no question what you're seeing.

24:15

It's not our technology.

24:17

It's not our technology and the

24:18

capabilities are beyond anything we can

24:19

do.

24:20

I mean, I can I'm happy to explain some

24:21

of those capabilities if you like, but

24:23

but you know, when you when you look at

24:24

this from a rational perspective,

24:27

you only come to one outcome.

24:29

That's only one outcome. The other one

24:30

is so remotely possible that the mental

24:33

gymnastics to get to that and we can go

24:35

into that in a minute. It's It's It's

24:37

absurd. And so,

24:39

um

24:39

let's go into a little bit about what

24:40

make these things

24:42

unique, okay? Cuz planes fly and UAPs

24:45

are in the air, so that doesn't make

24:46

them unique and you know, things go fast

24:47

and whatnot.

24:49

So, you have to in intelligence, if you

24:51

want to

24:53

filter out

24:55

data and and and only focus on certain

24:58

data. You have to create parameters.

25:00

So, we realized early on in the

25:01

government that these things had five

25:03

parameters, five observables that made

25:06

them stand out away from everything

25:08

else.

25:09

And so, the first one was instantaneous

25:11

acceleration. So, what is acceleration?

25:14

It is the change of velocity, right? It

25:16

is the ability to change your velocity

25:18

very quickly. And as a result, as a

25:20

consequence, there are inertial forces

25:22

that are experienced. So, for us human

25:25

beings, we express those inertial forces

25:27

as G-forces. So, the force of gravity is

25:29

pulling on us equally at 9.8 m/s

25:32

and that's that's that's experienced as

25:35

1 G.

25:36

A human being can withstand up to 9 G's

25:40

for a very short period of time before

25:42

you start having medical consequences,

25:44

right? You have things like blackouts

25:45

and redouts and ultimately death.

25:48

To compare that to, let's say, standard

25:50

technology, um one of our most highly

25:52

maneuverable aircraft, manned

25:54

maneuverable aircraft, let me emphasize

25:55

manned, is an older aircraft. It's

25:57

called the General Dynamics F-16, built

26:00

by General Dynamics. It's the F-16. Um

26:02

and that at an unclassified level can

26:04

pull about 17 G's before you start

26:07

having structural failure, meaning wings

26:09

snap off, right? The plane begins to

26:11

disintegrate while you're flying it.

26:13

What we are seeing are objects that are

26:15

performing in excesses of 2,000 and

26:17

3,000

26:19

G-forces. Okay?

26:21

Well beyond the healthy limitations of

26:23

anything biological to withstand and

26:25

certainly from a material science

26:27

perspective,

26:28

more than

26:29

more than we have.

26:31

It It There's an advanced technology

26:32

here.

26:33

The second observable is hypersonic

26:35

velocity. So, what is hypersonic?

26:37

Hypersonics are those speeds in excesses

26:39

of Mach 5 or above. What's a Mach? It's

26:43

the speed of sound, roughly 760 some

26:45

miles an hour at sea level. So, it's

26:48

really fast. Now,

26:49

do we have technology that can do hyper

26:51

Sure, we do. Absolutely. We have a

26:54

One of the best examples is a Lockheed

26:55

YF-12A SR-71, otherwise known as a

26:58

Blackbird.

26:59

It can get to about Mach 5, which is

27:02

really fast.

27:03

But at that speed, if the SR-71 wants to

27:06

take a right-hand turn,

27:08

takes roughly half the state of Ohio to

27:10

execute that maneuver.

27:12

We are seeing things not doing Mach 5.

27:15

We are seeing things doing in excess of

27:17

10,000, 13,000 miles an hour, and

27:20

executing immediate right-hand turns and

27:22

even 180s, right? So,

27:25

that is another observable that is

27:27

significantly above and beyond anything

27:29

we have.

27:30

Another observable, it's a bit of an

27:32

oxymoron, but it's called low

27:34

observability. Meaning, you'll hear from

27:36

the pilots, "Lou, I was there. I saw it,

27:38

but I can't describe it."

27:40

Didn't have wings, didn't have rudder,

27:42

a tail, anything. No rivets, nothing.

27:46

Uh and then also on the radar, you will

27:49

get these non-senticle returns. These

27:51

returns like uh it's there's some sort

27:53

of active jamming or spoofing going on

27:56

uh with within the radar system. So, low

27:58

observability. Now, do we have low

28:00

observable vehicles? Sure. For example,

28:02

the B-2 bomber and the Valkyrie. These

28:04

are stealth vehicles. Well, this is a

28:06

little more than that because it's

28:08

actually also with the human eye very

28:10

hard to discern.

28:12

The fourth observable is something

28:14

called transmedium or multi-multimedium

28:18

travel. So, that means the ability to

28:20

operate in multiple domains, or more

28:22

specifically, multiple environments.

28:25

Now, once again, do we have multi-domain

28:28

vehicles? Absolutely. A seaplane is a

28:31

perfect example of a multimedium

28:33

vehicle. It can fly and it can float.

28:36

But let's face it.

28:38

A seaplane is neither a really good

28:39

airplane or a good boat. And why?

28:42

Because there are design compromises

28:44

that have to be made in performance and

28:46

design in order for it to operate in

28:48

multiple domains. And that's true with

28:50

just about every technology we have. The

28:52

more domains we want something to

28:53

operate in, the more sacrifices we have

28:56

to make. That's why a submarine looks

28:57

like a submarine cuz it's designed to be

28:58

underwater and a plane looks like a

28:59

plane, and a rocket looks like a rocket.

29:02

Um these things

29:04

can operate in multiple different

29:06

domains. It can operate in air,

29:08

underwater, and possibly even space, but

29:10

they don't have that performance and

29:12

design sacrifice that we have to do with

29:15

our technology.

29:16

So, is it like a when you get this job,

29:19

do you get to see like a folder

29:21

on a computer? All right, like I'm

29:23

trying to understand what access you you

29:26

you're given to these things.

29:28

you you are you're seeing the

29:29

investigations that were done

29:32

uh previously by other members of UAP.

29:35

You're seeing video. You're seeing

29:36

photographs. You're seeing the

29:37

historical reports.

29:39

And are these classified?

29:40

Oh, absolutely. Very.

29:41

Okay, so the so the general public can't

29:43

see these kinds of things and they

29:44

haven't been published.

29:46

Correct. They have not been public made

29:47

publicly available. They are highly

29:49

classified.

29:50

Okay, so it's videos, it's photos, it's

29:52

various accounts, it's

29:54

Correct.

29:54

You know, a lot of people talk about

29:55

Area 51 when they talk about UFOs and

29:57

and such.

30:00

I think one of the sort of rumors is

30:02

that at Area 51 they've found and um

30:06

retained

30:08

UFO material, spacecraft, etc. that

30:11

they've studied to understand the

30:12

technology so that they can introduce it

30:14

to the US military. Is there any truth

30:16

in that?

30:17

You know, the US government invests a

30:18

lot of money in research.

30:20

They have a lot of test facilities where

30:21

we want to be able to test things

30:23

outside the prying eyes of um of our

30:26

enemies. And so we we we we create these

30:28

test ranges for that purpose.

30:30

We do all sorts of things at those test

30:32

ranges.

30:33

Um

30:34

you know, I I cannot comment on on

30:37

what Area 51 might or might not have. Um

30:40

I would not be authorized to to talk

30:42

about that.

30:43

Um all I can say is what is in the

30:44

public domain, which people already know

30:46

that is a

30:47

it's a sensitive test facility where

30:49

where we we experiment with with things.

30:52

Because there was a a gentleman, I

30:54

think, from that worked near Area 51

30:56

that's talked a little bit about this

30:57

publicly, Bob Lazar.

30:59

Mhm.

31:00

I I actually didn't know anything about

31:01

Bob Lazar until about 2 hours ago. So,

31:04

what is exactly is it that Bob Lazar is

31:06

claiming?

31:07

Well, to be fair, you'd probably have to

31:09

ask Bob. I I don't know Mr. Lazar. I've

31:11

never met him. I've never spoken to him.

31:13

Um his claims were that he worked at a

31:15

particular facility and he had access to

31:18

uh and privy to

31:20

one of recovered vehicles,

31:21

um crash retrievals

31:23

uh that was uh allegedly performed by

31:26

the United States

31:28

uh and acquired and and and brought

31:29

there. Um that is what is in the public

31:32

domain. Um I I I cannot and will not

31:35

comment on on Bob Lazar cuz I don't know

31:37

him.

31:37

So, when you say you can't comment on

31:39

something and as it relates to something

31:41

that's classified, um is have you had to

31:44

go through some process? You've got

31:45

There's a book in front of me called

31:47

Imminent, which is the book you've

31:48

written. It says Inside the Pentagon's

31:49

Hunt for UFOs. What is the process in

31:52

when you're writing books like this to

31:53

get information cleared so that you can

31:55

share it?

31:56

It's like birthing an elephant.

31:57

Right.

31:58

I can only imagine uh if I was ever a a

32:00

woman and had to had to give birth.

32:02

Um

32:03

Cuz they probably

32:05

don't want you talking about these

32:06

things.

32:06

There's a lot of people that don't want

32:08

us talking about this. Um but there's

32:10

also a lot that do. Um so, you go

32:12

through a process, it's called DOPSR. In

32:15

the US government, we love our acronyms.

32:17

It stands for Department of Defense

32:19

Office of Pre-publication and Security

32:21

Review.

32:22

As a former defense official, if I want

32:24

to write anything, it has to go through

32:26

a review process to make sure it's not

32:28

classified and I can talk about it. That

32:30

book went through an exhaustive almost

32:32

1-year process through the government

32:35

before they allowed me to publish it.

32:37

And even then they redacted portions

32:39

out. If you look in there, you will see

32:40

grayed-out portions

32:42

because I wanted Americans to see

32:45

what

32:46

some people don't need to see. And so

32:48

those redactions are there by the

32:50

government. Um

32:52

and it is it is a very exhaustive

32:54

process, but it's important because

32:56

that's what keeps us legal. That's what

32:58

keeps people like me not going to jail

33:00

because

33:01

you I I go through the proper

33:03

procedures. I'm I'm not a leaker. I have

33:05

never leaked classified information. I

33:06

will never discuss classified

33:08

information. An unauthorized disclosure

33:10

is something that that should be avoided

33:11

at all times.

33:13

Um I'm like I said, I'm a patriot. I'm

33:14

loyal to my country. I'm not disloyal.

33:17

So, there's a right way and a wrong way

33:18

to do things. So, if you want to write a

33:20

book uh and you want to talk about

33:22

things you're not sure you can talk

33:23

about, you go through this Doxer

33:25

process, and that's exactly what I did.

33:27

And that's how that book was able to be

33:30

published. Otherwise, right now I'd

33:32

probably be in jail.

33:34

Is there a single most compelling piece

33:36

of evidence that you were witness to as

33:38

it relates to your belief in UFOs and

33:41

UAPs?

33:42

They were they were all significant.

33:43

There wasn't one that said, "Oh, that's

33:45

it." because they were all compelling in

33:47

their own way. Whether you can go back

33:48

to the USS Nimitz incident in 2004 or

33:51

the Roosevelt incidents in 2014 and

33:53

2015,

33:54

there was so much data. Every time you

33:57

think you had one that was great,

33:59

another would come that was even better.

34:01

Um So I mean, you've put one on the

34:03

front cover of this book there, right?

34:04

Yeah.

34:05

What is this incident on the front cover

34:06

of your book?

34:07

That is known as the Gimbal incident.

34:09

That is a video

34:12

that was taken by

34:14

uh an F-18 and uh you can hear the

34:17

exasperation. If you listen to the

34:18

actual video, you can hear the pilots

34:21

um trying to discuss what it is. And

34:23

then you also hear on it the discussion

34:25

of there's a whole fleet of them. Look

34:27

at the ASA. And oh, by the way, it's

34:29

going 120 knots against the wind at

34:32

roughly 20,000 ft. So, it's not a

34:33

balloon and you begin to see this this

34:36

this vehicle orient itself in a 90°

34:38

angle. Now, if this was a plane like you

34:40

see your wings, if you go in a 90°

34:42

angle, you lose altitude, right? Cuz

34:44

that's how the principles of lift work.

34:46

That's not the case there.

34:48

I think this is the video.

34:50

Yep.

34:51

Dude, this is a drone, bro.

34:54

There's a whole fleet of them. Look on

34:56

the SA.

34:58

My gosh.

35:01

They're all going against the wind. The

35:02

wind's 120 knots to the west.

35:04

Holy dude.

35:09

That's not a that's not a missile, is

35:10

it?

35:10

That is not a missile, dude.

35:12

Well, the flares look like the same

35:13

thing.

35:15

It's rotating.

35:17

And that was shot by two US

35:20

sort of fighter pilots.

35:21

Yep.

35:23

There's a lot more of those out there

35:24

and a lot clearer, too, but they're

35:25

classified.

35:26

It The So, there's more videos like this

35:28

that you've been exposed to.

35:29

Oh, yeah.

35:30

But they won't

35:31

But they won't release them.

35:32

They will not release them.

35:33

Why?

35:34

Because of of sources and methods,

35:36

because they remain classified because

35:38

how they were taken, where they were

35:39

taken, under what circumstances, what

35:41

technological capabilities were used to

35:43

collect the information.

35:45

The US government wants to keep out of

35:47

its out of the hands of its adversaries

35:49

what our true capabilities are. So,

35:51

let's say you're flying a mission over a

35:53

denied area and you don't want the enemy

35:55

to know that you're over it, right? The

35:56

last thing you want to do is release a

35:57

video where you can look and say, "Oh,

36:00

we're in this location and now the enemy

36:01

knows or we have this capability or we

36:03

can see this this good. These are the

36:06

technologies we have." These videos

36:08

here, ironically, are probably some of

36:10

the least compelling videos. Now, people

36:11

say, "Oh, these are incredible." But

36:13

these are the ones that were

36:13

unclassified that could be released. The

36:16

other one, some of these are so clear.

36:19

The problem is is how they were taken,

36:21

the collection capabilities that were

36:22

used to take them, where they were

36:23

taken, under what circumstances, the

36:25

metadata in the video,

36:26

all that is a consideration.

36:28

Okay.

36:30

And did do do you the US government and

36:33

the Pentagon generally want people to

36:34

believe that UFOs UAPs

36:38

exist or not?

36:40

I think it's both. I think

36:42

up until recently

36:43

nobody wanted to have this conversation.

36:45

The problem is the government backed

36:46

itself up after 70 years of denial into

36:49

a corner and it it it has to figure a

36:51

way out.

36:53

There are some elements now that want

36:54

the conversation to occur. And so that's

36:56

why you see Congress getting engaged,

36:58

why the creation of AARO, but there are

37:00

still elements unfortunately in the in

37:02

the Pentagon that don't want this

37:03

conversation to occur and they will

37:04

continue doing what they can to

37:06

discredit individuals and and launch

37:08

this campaign against them. Uh one of my

37:11

colleagues, David Grusch, who was a

37:13

decorated Air Force officer and a senior

37:17

intelligence official, the moment he

37:19

broke rank and went public about this

37:21

topic, within 24 hours uh they released

37:24

his medical records trying to discredit

37:26

him and they did it illegally.

37:27

Um so there are people there that

37:29

definitely don't want this conversation

37:31

to occur.

37:31

Why?

37:32

Well, there's a lot of reasons why. Um

37:34

you know, back historically

37:37

Great question. Let's um can I unpack

37:39

that a little bit? Do you mind that?

37:41

Okay, so

37:43

let's start really at the heels of World

37:45

War II, you have these foo fighters that

37:47

are being observed by Allied pilots.

37:50

Um these these these luminous balls that

37:52

would follow them into combat areas. And

37:54

then after um particularly as we started

37:58

developing in the atomic weapons, we

37:59

started releasing a lot of UFOs over our

38:01

controlled military

38:02

airspace and over our sensitive military

38:04

installations, our research facilities.

38:06

And so at the time you have this

38:08

mindset, you have

38:10

height of the Cold War, United States

38:12

versus Soviet Union. And by the way,

38:14

they had nukes and so did we, right? So

38:16

you got a real potential threat over

38:17

there.

38:18

And then you've got these other things

38:19

over here. So as as a general in the

38:21

Pentagon, you say, look, I know these

38:23

things are real, but they're not showing

38:25

any over hostilities. Meanwhile, we've

38:27

got this real issue over here, this real

38:28

threat called Soviet Union.

38:30

Let's focus on this threat, and then

38:33

we'll worry about this other stuff

38:34

later.

38:35

The other part of that is the the

38:37

mindset of look, um

38:39

it's really uncomfortable

38:41

as a government to have a conversation

38:43

with its people

38:44

about a problem that there's no solution

38:46

for, right? We can see what they do, but

38:49

there's not a damn thing we can do about

38:50

it. That we we we can't stop what

38:52

they're doing, and so do you really want

38:53

to have a conversation

38:55

with the American people and admit a

38:57

problem for which we don't have a

38:58

solution for it? That governments are

39:00

solution-focused.

39:02

And that is not a great spot to be in,

39:04

right? And it's by the way not the first

39:06

time this has happened. Let's look at

39:07

the U-2, for example, spy plane.

39:10

When we first built that, the CIA

39:12

commissioned it through Lockheed Martin

39:13

Skunk Works, and we were flying that

39:15

vehicle in contravention to a standing

39:19

treaty we had with Russia that we would

39:20

not fly with manned reconnaissance

39:22

missions over Russia, mainland Russia.

39:24

We were.

39:25

But we built this plane to fly so fast

39:27

and so high, we thought they couldn't

39:28

detect us, right? And for a while we

39:30

thought they couldn't, because we went

39:32

unchallenged until

39:34

the Russians were able to develop the

39:36

surface-to-air missile, SA-2 missile,

39:39

and successfully shoot one down. And

39:41

then, and only then did they admit to

39:43

the world we've been tracking these

39:44

things since day one.

39:46

The reason why they didn't talk about it

39:48

is because he didn't have a means to

39:49

shoot it down. So, why admit

39:52

a problem for which there's no solution

39:53

until you have a solution? So, that's

39:54

another mindset in the Pentagon. And

39:56

then you had

39:57

several studies done that were

39:58

commissioned by the US government in the

40:00

past that asked the question if we were

40:02

to be honest and truthful about

40:04

disclosure, about we're not alone in the

40:06

universe, these things are real, what

40:08

would the consequences be? And the

40:10

studies came back unanimously said you

40:12

can't do it. The American people are not

40:14

ready to have this conversation. It'll

40:15

cause civil discord, and it'll cause

40:18

it'll upset the population and people

40:20

will lose faith in their religions and

40:22

the economy may crash. You can't do it.

40:25

And so the decision was made, okay,

40:26

we're not going to do it. In fact, we're

40:27

going to actively suppress this

40:28

information. We're going to stigmatize

40:30

the heck out of it so bad that no one

40:32

will ever want to even mention the word

40:33

UFO.

40:34

And it was very successful. That that

40:36

that campaign to stigmatize this topic

40:39

was so successful, in fact, that even

40:41

now it's hard to unwind the tape and

40:44

have the conversation.

40:45

And so therein lies

40:48

part of the problem. Why doesn't the

40:50

government parts of the government want

40:51

to have this conversation? Then you've

40:52

got a legal issue, which is probably

40:55

probably the biggest issue now.

40:58

You have elements in the government that

41:00

were making unilateral decisions not to

41:02

inform Congress and not to inform the

41:04

President of the United States, right?

41:07

That's illegal.

41:09

There are oversight committees that have

41:10

a

41:11

designated need to know on all

41:13

intelligence matters, especially when it

41:15

comes to funding, right? We're spending

41:16

billions of dollars on these projects.

41:18

You've got to inform Congress, certain

41:20

elements of the certain oversight

41:21

committees like the Senate Select

41:22

Committee on Intelligence.

41:24

They weren't being briefed to this.

41:26

There's also this fear by some people on

41:28

the inside of the government that oh my

41:29

gosh, I used to work on a secret UFO

41:31

program.

41:32

Am I going to be in trouble now because,

41:34

you know, I

41:35

we've been lying to Congress.

41:37

And so it it's a little more complicated

41:39

than than necessarily just saying, oh

41:41

well, we want the truth, be honest.

41:43

It's not that easy.

41:45

To your knowledge, has there ever been

41:46

recovered um UAP or UFO materials?

41:50

What I can say is what I've been allowed

41:51

to say, which is yes. Up until recently

41:53

I wasn't even allowed to say that.

41:55

When did that change?

41:56

When that book got reviewed. Up until

41:58

that point I had signed documentation

42:00

from the government saying I will never

42:01

discuss that, ever.

42:02

What happens if you did?

42:03

Uh jail.

42:05

Oh, yeah.

42:06

That's why that book I had to go through

42:07

the process because what I wrote in that

42:09

book I am allowed to talk about. I can't

42:11

go beyond that, but at least I can talk

42:13

about that. And in the book I talk about

42:15

Yes.

42:16

That the government is in possession of

42:17

material, exotic material that doesn't

42:19

look like it's made by us.

42:21

Has there ever been anyone sent to jail

42:23

because they've spoken about this

42:24

subject matter?

42:25

Worse.

42:27

Worse.

42:28

And that that story has yet to be told.

42:30

Yes, there are people who have had faced

42:33

uh extreme disciplinary actions and and

42:37

and potentially worse.

42:39

The death penalty?

42:42

I'm not going to elaborate right now um

42:44

because there's some things happening to

42:45

try to This is why Congress is working

42:47

hard for whistleblower protections.

42:50

Because um

42:51

we want people to feel safe to come out

42:53

and have a conversation. And right now

42:55

they don't feel overly safe.

42:57

Um they've seen some of the tactics and

42:59

techniques that were applied to try to

43:01

keep people quiet in the past.

43:03

Um let me say this in general terms.

43:05

People say, "Oh, well, the government

43:06

would never

43:07

kill anybody to protect a secret."

43:10

Try going to Area 51 and look at the

43:11

signs on that chain link fence where it

43:13

says lethal force authorized.

43:16

You cross that fence and they can kill

43:18

you dead.

43:19

Okay? So,

43:21

the government can, under certain

43:23

extreme cases, under certain extreme

43:25

situations and conditions,

43:27

they can do whatever they need to do to

43:28

protect national security and they will.

43:33

Which department is that?

43:34

I cannot go into that conversation,

43:36

unfortunately.

43:37

Because people think of it as maybe the

43:39

CIA or something, but

43:40

I I can't I can't elaborate,

43:41

unfortunately.

43:43

You know, I I cuz I I don't know very

43:45

little about American uh

43:47

governmental departments and such, but

43:49

obviously most of the world knows about

43:50

the like presidential assassinations and

43:52

things like that. So, and I've spoken to

43:54

a few CIA agents and stuff like that on

43:55

my podcast before, but um

43:58

I've never really understood

44:00

frankly who would who would be making

44:01

such an order and how those things don't

44:03

leak,

44:04

you know?

44:05

Well,

44:06

you know.

44:08

good question.

44:09

Um

44:11

Look, we we we've done it in the past

44:14

in other situations, some pretty

44:15

recently. Um

44:18

you know, let me give you a case in

44:19

point, and this is not, you know,

44:20

attacking anybody.

44:22

Um we have uh droned, used drones to

44:26

lethally kill people, Americans, an

44:29

American citizen specifically, and and

44:31

and the person's child

44:33

without due process.

44:35

In the US?

44:36

Not in the US. He was a US citizen.

44:38

Oh.

44:38

Uh he was suspected of being a

44:39

terrorist, and there's some other things

44:41

there I'm not going to go in there.

44:42

But, um

44:43

we as American citizens are are as

44:46

American citizens we are afforded

44:47

something called due process under the

44:49

law of peace.

44:50

Um and meaning you get your day in

44:52

court, no matter what. And there've been

44:54

Americans where that hasn't been the

44:55

case.

44:56

Um they didn't get a day in court. Um

44:59

someone made the decision to

45:00

uh liquidate them. Um you know, there

45:03

are examples of that happening. You

45:05

know, there's one with

45:07

with uh Rosenbergs,

45:09

the uh those who were accused of selling

45:12

uh the atomic secrets to the Russians,

45:13

actually giving it to them.

45:15

And uh if you know a little bit about

45:17

what happened with his wife, um

45:19

turns out that

45:22

sh- she was innocent.

45:23

What happened to his wife?

45:24

They hung her. Hung her and him for for

45:27

for espionage.

45:29

Uh but because of the information that

45:31

we had at the time, we was so sensitive,

45:35

we'd have to reveal a capability, so

45:38

unfortunately, uh

45:40

it looks like maybe we may have we have

45:41

done something that we maybe shouldn't

45:43

have done.

45:44

Um I wasn't around for that, so I can't

45:45

tell you definitively what happened. Um

45:47

I can only tell you what what

45:49

what my understanding of it is.

45:51

I could absolutely be wrong, and I

45:53

really hope I am.

45:54

But, it turns out that, you know, there

45:56

are extreme examples where we will take

45:59

drastic measures to to national

46:00

security.

46:02

So, in writing this book and in s-

46:04

talking about this subject, you

46:05

understand that there's some people that

46:06

don't want you talking about these

46:07

subjects.

46:08

Oh, yeah.

46:09

Oh, yeah.

46:10

So, and you also understand that

46:12

punishment for talking about these

46:14

subjects can range from jail or worse.

46:17

Yeah.

46:18

So, you're not scared?

46:19

I didn't say that. I didn't just say I

46:20

wasn't scared.

46:21

Mhm.

46:22

I mean, I'm I'm taking huge risks. I I

46:25

but I've been My life has been

46:26

threatened many times.

46:28

And it's very concerning for me. It's

46:30

the reason why I I live in Wyoming and

46:32

I'm heavily armed and have now six

46:34

German Shepherds.

46:35

Yeah, I'm very cautious and careful, but

46:37

I'm also understanding I also know the

46:39

left and right limits of the law, and

46:41

I'm not going to break the law under any

46:42

circumstances.

46:44

I didn't This book isn't a leak. I'm

46:46

authorized to talk about that book

46:48

because I went through the proper

46:49

processes of getting it reviewed.

46:51

Whether they like it or not. But yes, I

46:53

am absolutely worried. You know, this is

46:56

why I'm very careful

46:58

when I say things cuz I don't want to

46:59

stop walk up to the line. I will not

47:00

step over the line. I will not violate

47:02

my security oath and compromise national

47:04

security for disclosure. And I don't

47:07

think I have to. I think the proof is in

47:08

the pudding, the fact that it's been 7

47:09

years and we've come this far in the

47:11

conversation and I haven't gone to jail.

47:14

And I'm still here to have the

47:15

conversation. I think it's indicative of

47:17

the fact that there is a right way and a

47:18

wrong way to do it. I understand people

47:20

want disclosure and they want it now.

47:21

But I've told people before there's a

47:23

difference between doing things

47:25

right and doing things right now.

47:27

They're different and we only get one

47:29

chance to do this right. And so,

47:32

hopefully we can have this conversation

47:33

this collective conversation in a way

47:36

where we don't have to be disruptive. No

47:37

one has to be threatened. No one has to

47:39

go to jail. No one has to lose their

47:41

jobs or anything like that.

47:44

You mentioned presidents of Iran. Do you

47:46

Presidents of the United States know

47:49

about UFOs?

47:50

Some do, some do not. Unfortunately,

47:52

there's a mindset by some people that

47:54

think

47:56

that politicians and presidents are

47:58

temporary hires. They're here today,

48:00

gone in 4 years. So, why brief them up

48:02

on something, especially if they have no

48:04

military or intelligence background?

48:06

It's a risk. So, you know what? Don't

48:09

brief them.

48:09

Which presidents do you do you think

48:11

were aware of UFOs and

48:13

this sort of these kinds of programs?

48:15

Sure. Well, we know for sure there were

48:16

several, you know.

48:17

For sure, for example, Carter was. But

48:19

then

48:20

How do you know?

48:21

Well, well, because Carter was briefed.

48:23

I I know somebody who actually worked

48:24

with Carter to get information on this

48:26

topic. I can't almost say the person's

48:27

name. The person's still alive, so I

48:29

don't have permission to talk about

48:30

that. But, we know that for a fact, and

48:32

there's records of it. But, there's

48:33

other presidents like Bill Clinton who

48:35

wasn't briefed, but wanted to be

48:36

briefed, right? And so um

48:40

And again, I this this this is the crux

48:42

of the problem. Who's making the

48:43

decision on what president gets briefed

48:45

and what doesn't?

48:46

That's that's nonsense. President George

48:49

Bush Sr.

48:50

was briefed. And he was also the

48:51

director of the CIA, so he was very well

48:53

aware of this topic. But, then there's

48:55

other presidents that weren't. And so,

48:57

this is again, this is that this is

48:58

highlighting the very problem that I

49:00

have.

49:01

Who's making the decision to choose who

49:03

gets briefed and who doesn't?

49:04

What about Obama and Trump?

49:06

I can't answer for them. Um

49:08

Obama has uh recently stated for the

49:10

record that these UAP are a national

49:13

security issue, not a threat, but an

49:15

issue. That there's something there,

49:17

that these are real, whatever they are,

49:18

whatever it is.

49:20

President Trump recently uh former

49:22

President Trump said uh week and a half

49:23

ago, for the record, when he

49:25

that he would be willing to release the

49:27

UFO files, and that he wanted to do it

49:29

in the past, but he faced fierce

49:31

resistance.

49:32

Now, think about that statement for a

49:33

minute.

49:35

Who the hell is giving him resistance to

49:37

releasing UFO files when you're the

49:39

president? Right? That is that is a very

49:41

significant statement. That is what

49:43

needs to be fixed. If the president

49:45

himself can't get or herself can't get a

49:47

briefing,

49:49

who in the hell has the authority to

49:50

make that decision? Nobody.

49:53

What is that fifth resistance that

49:54

Trump's talking about?

49:56

I don't know. You'd have to ask Trump.

49:57

What do you think it is?

50:00

Uh I think there is a huge amount of

50:02

influence by the military-industrial

50:04

complex.

50:05

And they they it it is a enormous

50:08

business. Always has been.

50:10

Um

50:12

It's it's it's it's huge.

50:14

It is probably the world's largest

50:16

business

50:17

globally.

50:18

And why wouldn't the military-industrial

50:20

complex want those files to be released?

50:22

Well, because they'd have to admit that

50:24

they're part of the part of the

50:25

programs.

50:26

Some of these folks, you know, have had

50:28

been

50:29

a lot of their successes

50:31

is being able to work super secret

50:32

programs for the US government. And

50:34

maybe there's technology that they don't

50:36

want released.

50:37

Maybe there's capabilities that we had

50:38

that we don't want to tell our

50:39

adversaries. And there's a lot of

50:40

reasons for it, which are understand.

50:42

Some of them are actually legitimate. I

50:43

can understand. I don't agree with, but

50:45

I can understand.

50:46

How much do you think the average person

50:47

on the street knows about what goes on

50:49

in

50:51

the Pentagon and behind the scenes of

50:52

the government?

50:53

Rather

50:55

It's

50:55

Forget the government and Pentagon. How

50:57

many parents

50:58

they can tell you who's a quarterback of

51:00

their favorite football team, and they

51:02

can tell you their stats, but how many

51:03

parents know who their kid sits sits

51:05

next to during lunch

51:07

or in second period math class?

51:10

The government is I mean, that's

51:13

basic facts, man.

51:15

We

51:15

As humans, most of us we suck. We don't

51:18

know anything, and we're so used to

51:20

being force-fed information by whatever

51:22

outlet du jour we want to tune into, you

51:24

know?

51:25

If I'm a liberal, I watch this. If I'm a

51:27

conservative, I watch that. I'll I'll

51:28

I'll go straight to my echo chamber,

51:30

and, you know, just hear what I want to

51:32

hear, and have people tell me not only

51:34

information that I that they think I

51:36

need to know, but even my opinion of

51:37

what what it should be about.

51:39

Th- This is a much, much bigger issue

51:42

than just UFOs and UAP.

51:46

We as as as people have become extremely

51:49

lazy.

51:50

And we we no longer are

51:53

willing to ask the hard questions. We're

51:55

not.

51:57

You were part of one program, but you

51:58

also referenced a second program called

52:00

the legacy program.

52:01

Mhm.

52:02

What is the legacy program?

52:03

It is the traditional long-held effort

52:07

by the US government to study UAP.

52:09

People think AATIP was the only program

52:11

and ASAP. Before that there was there

52:13

was Blue Book and before that there

52:16

The legacy program

52:18

is the collaborative effort of

52:20

individuals over the course of several

52:21

decades that have been looking into this

52:23

topic for the US government and by the

52:25

US government.

52:27

And okay, so it's doing similar things

52:29

to what AATIP did.

52:31

Yes, and and more robust and much more

52:33

well-funded.

52:35

I wonder why they don't fund it as well

52:37

these days.

52:39

Uh

52:40

there's a reason for that too that I I I

52:42

I

52:43

I would need permission to talk about.

52:46

Um there were some distractions in the

52:49

early 2000s that

52:51

lifted and shifted resources away from

52:53

from efforts to something else.

52:55

Um

52:57

and I probably can figure out what this

52:59

what that was. But um there was an

53:01

enormous resource drain and refocusing

53:04

um

53:05

in the early 2000s to focus on something

53:07

else. And so

53:09

I I heard you talk as one about these

53:12

one of different types of

53:14

aliens per se. Cuz when we think of

53:16

aliens we think we reflect on movies

53:17

that we've seen and they have like the

53:18

big heads and

53:20

things like that and maybe they're like

53:22

like white, tall, skinny with like the

53:24

big arms and the big like legs and stuff

53:26

like that. Is that what people at in the

53:29

Pentagon consider aliens to be? What we

53:31

see in movies.

53:32

Uh I can't speak on behalf of other

53:34

people. I can only speak on behalf of

53:35

me. Um I've been very very careful not

53:38

to

53:40

to stereotype anybody or anything. I

53:43

think it's important we have to

53:44

keep an open mind because when you say

53:46

the word aliens, you are automatically

53:48

presuming that these things are from

53:50

outer space.

53:50

Mhm.

53:51

They might not be. There's lots of

53:52

different options. It doesn't have to be

53:54

from outer space.

53:55

What do you believe? Do you believe

53:57

they're amongst us?

53:58

Well,

53:59

let's

54:00

Can I Can I explore this with you? This

54:02

question? Okay, so it's it's not a

54:03

either or.

54:06

So, in the beginning of our conversation

54:08

I told you I went to the University of

54:09

Miami and I studied microbiology,

54:11

immunology, and I studied parasites.

54:13

Now, if you go to some anthropologists,

54:15

they will suggest to you that modern

54:17

human beings, Homo sapiens sapiens, has

54:18

been around roughly between 100 to

54:20

possibly 200,000 years.

54:22

So, on a 24-hour clock, right? It's It's

54:25

only the last 2,000 years

54:28

and it was the Greeks that proposed

54:30

there were two fundamental life forms on

54:31

this planet. And you were either a plant

54:34

or you were an animal. And human beings

54:35

were

54:36

an animal.

54:38

And so, the 24-hour clock, you're

54:40

probably talking maybe

54:42

I don't know, 10 minutes ago before

54:43

midnight.

54:44

Well, it was 300 years ago during the

54:46

Renaissance or the days of

54:48

enlightenment,

54:50

uh that

54:51

we discovered an entire new life form on

54:54

this planet that's been here all along.

54:56

And that And that was that it was

54:57

neither plant nor animal. It was the

54:59

world of fungus.

55:00

And we patted ourselves on the shoulder

55:01

and said, "Hey, we found a new life

55:03

form."

55:04

In this 24-hour clock, it's been

55:06

probably the last maybe 10 seconds, last

55:08

120 years only,

55:11

that

55:13

we discovered for the first time the

55:15

true dominant

55:16

alpha life form on this planet. And in

55:18

fact, if you take all the biomass of

55:20

every plant

55:21

and all the biomass of every animal and

55:24

all the biomass of every fungus and

55:25

added it all up together, it still will

55:27

not equal the biomass of this hidden,

55:31

yet dominant life form that's been on

55:33

this planet all along.

55:35

And it wasn't until we could have the

55:36

technology to curve glass and look

55:38

through a little tube and famously shout

55:40

the words "Little beasties, little

55:42

beasties."

55:43

Did we discover the world of

55:45

microorganisms? Okay? The true dominant

55:48

life form on this planet that's been

55:50

here all along. In fact, it's inside of

55:52

us. It makes us up. It's pervasive

55:55

everywhere.

55:56

And we just discovered it. So, what I

55:59

say to people, you know, but people say,

56:00

"Oh, do you think they're from outer

56:01

space?"

56:02

They can be from outer space, inner

56:04

space, or frankly, the space in between.

56:05

These things could be just as natural to

56:07

our environment as we are. Maybe we're

56:09

at the point now where technologically

56:10

we can start interacting. Maybe they're

56:12

from under the ocean. Look, less than

56:14

10% of the ocean floor has been mapped.

56:17

We know more about the surface of the

56:18

moon than we do of our own oceans. Is it

56:21

possible these things are just as

56:23

natural to this planet as we are?

56:25

Possibly. Or is it possible these things

56:27

are from somewhere else? Yes, that's

56:29

possible, too. So, we have to keep all

56:32

options on the table until they're no

56:34

longer on the table. Well, we live in an

56:35

infinitely, infinitely complex universe.

56:42

Let's see if I can And I've I've often

56:44

used this before to try to help people

56:46

wrap their heads around around this.

56:49

We perceive life through five

56:51

fundamental

56:52

five fundamental senses. And if we can't

56:54

touch it, taste it, hear it, smell it,

56:56

etc., we can't interact with it. We have

56:58

no idea it's there.

57:00

Where I live out in Wyoming, we have

57:01

these beautiful night skies, unclouded

57:03

night skies, and you can see all the

57:05

heavens, beautiful Milky Way in front of

57:07

you.

57:08

If you were to look through that at that

57:10

same night sky through a radio

57:11

telescope, you would see something

57:13

different. You would see nebula, you

57:14

would see things that you can't normally

57:16

perceive in the ultraviolet and infrared

57:18

spectrums and x-ray, right? It's there,

57:21

you just can't perceive it. It's just

57:23

like if you had cell phone vision, all

57:25

of a sudden now you can see in Wi-Fi and

57:27

5G, you would see an entirely different

57:29

reality around you.

57:31

So, we perceive light we perceive life

57:33

through a very narrow spectrum of

57:35

visible light the visible light spectrum

57:37

when reality is

57:38

most everything else

57:40

kind of lies beyond that.

57:42

And then you have a scale issue. You

57:44

have a scalability issue. What do I mean

57:45

by scalability?

57:47

We are a human being you and I are

57:49

having a lovely conversation here

57:51

somewhere in some some place

57:53

uh on this planet uh revolving around an

57:56

obscure star in an obscure part of the

57:58

Milky Way galaxy amongst the super

58:00

cluster of other galaxies.

58:02

The visible horizon from any direction

58:04

we look at of light of the size of the

58:06

universe has been estimated to be

58:08

between 13.6 to 13.9 billion

58:12

light-years. B billion.

58:14

What is a light-year?

58:15

A light-year is the distance that a

58:17

photon of light can travel in the course

58:19

of a year. And how fast is that? Well,

58:22

light travels at roughly 186,000 mi per

58:24

second or 7 and 1/2 times around our

58:27

planet in 1 second, right? Really fast.

58:30

Imagine how far that goes in a year.

58:32

And now imagine how far that goes 13.9

58:35

billion years, right? So, we're in the

58:37

middle of the universe here. Our

58:38

universal horizon in any direction is

58:40

13.9 billion light-years.

58:43

And in that direction another 13.9 so

58:45

you roughly 27 billion light-years

58:47

across and we're in the middle. Now,

58:49

scientists are estimating that's that's

58:51

less than 10% of the actual size of the

58:53

universe. The universe is actually much

58:55

much bigger than that. This is just the

58:57

universal horizon because the expansion

58:59

of the universe light this far will

59:01

never reach Earth.

59:03

So,

59:03

now you're talking about a size 100

59:06

billion light-years and as small as we

59:07

are right in the middle this

59:08

infinitesimally small speck keep in mind

59:11

in our visible universe alone, visible.

59:13

There are more stars than there are

59:15

grains of sand in all the beaches in all

59:18

the world. Think about that

59:20

incomprehensible number. And as small as

59:22

we are

59:24

now

59:25

humor me with this.

59:27

Take one

59:29

atom, one hydrogen atom, Avogadro's

59:31

number 1 * 10 to the -23,

59:34

okay?

59:35

That's roughly the same order of

59:36

magnitude

59:38

as we are to the universe.

59:41

So, we have this entire huge universe

59:44

outside and this entire little universe

59:46

inside every single human being, and we

59:48

as a human beings can only interact with

59:50

one or two orders of magnitude up or

59:52

down. Otherwise, the universe is simply

59:54

too big or too small. We just will never

59:57

be able to know.

59:58

And that is reality. That's where most

60:00

of everything lies. That's where most of

60:02

reality is. It's either up there or

60:04

inside or everything in between.

60:07

So, I guess my point is

60:09

every time when people say, "Well, you

60:11

know,

60:12

aliens."

60:13

What does that mean?

60:15

What does that mean? Because most people

60:17

say aliens in Hollywood and little

60:18

eggheads running around.

60:20

There's so much more to it. It doesn't

60:23

This is This is us imposing

60:26

a Hollywood idea of what an alien should

60:29

look like. And by the way, let's not

60:30

forget their anthropomorphic morphic

60:31

values, right? They They They look like

60:33

us, have arms like us, and heads like

60:35

us, and eyes like us. Um because we view

60:38

everything through anthropomorphic eyes.

60:40

It's the reason why we we call our dogs

60:42

human names and we treat them like

60:43

humans.

60:44

Because we treat everything as if they

60:46

have human values, human motivation,

60:48

human intent when we may be dealing with

60:50

something completely different. This

60:51

could be like artificial intelligence.

60:53

It's just binary. Input in, input out.

60:56

We don't know. And so

60:58

these are some of the questions we have

61:00

to, you know, really as we were

61:02

moving down this this pathway. This is

61:04

why I always tell people, "Look, all

61:06

options have to be on the table until

61:08

they're no longer on the table." Cuz we

61:09

simply don't know.

61:11

We also don't know what their intentions

61:12

are and why they might be here.

61:14

That's right.

61:14

Why they might be visiting here.

61:16

That's right.

61:16

Do you have a any theories as to what

61:18

their intentions might be?

61:20

Rather, there's a whole range of

61:21

theories. I mean, it could be simply as

61:23

like when we're on the African Serengeti

61:25

and we see the wildebeest and we're in a

61:26

helicopter and you know, not to make fun

61:28

of it, but you sit there and say, "Oh,

61:29

that one." We dart it. Boom. What do we

61:31

do? We land the helicopter. We come out.

61:32

We draw blood. We do tests. We want to

61:34

see its diet and its migratory patterns,

61:37

its health. And then what happens? The

61:39

wildebeest wakes up, kind of groggy,

61:41

disoriented, stumbles over to the

61:43

watering hole and he's like, "Hey Bill,

61:44

you're not going to believe this, man.

61:45

This thing came out of the sky. All

61:47

sorts of weird stuff happened. I was

61:48

being touched. I woke up and I'm like,

61:49

'What hurts?'" Right? It could be

61:51

something as simple as that.

61:52

Do you believe any of those reports? Cuz

61:53

people do say that they were abducted by

61:55

aliens.

61:56

Well, this is my point, right? So, so

61:57

that's that's one option. The other

61:58

option could be simply to monitor us.

62:02

Um it could be that we are getting very

62:04

close to being able to replicate what

62:06

they can do.

62:07

Um and if that's the case, you know,

62:09

maybe technologically we're only 100,

62:11

200 years behind. And if that's the

62:12

case, now all of a sudden we're going to

62:14

be new neighbors, right? And that could

62:17

be problematic because our species is

62:19

very violent. We do a lot of bad things

62:21

to each other. Are we really ready to go

62:22

out and meet our potential friends from

62:24

out of town? I don't know. I mean, we're

62:27

pretty horrible to each other. So, maybe

62:29

not. Certainly if I was them and we were

62:31

I knew we were getting close,

62:33

I would probably be pretty interested in

62:34

what we're doing, too. Um as far as the

62:36

abductions,

62:38

you know,

62:39

I don't know what to tell you because

62:41

I've never been abducted. Um I've had

62:44

some some

62:45

people that swear by it, but you know,

62:48

you can't have a conversation about

62:49

abduction and then say, "Oh, they're

62:50

here for peaceful reasons." Doesn't work

62:52

that way.

62:53

them, the people that swear by it?

62:54

I believe that I believe that they are

62:56

being truthful that they that experience

62:58

they feel is real. I don't think they're

63:00

lying. Um but the question is, you know,

63:04

Did it happen is the question.

63:05

Yeah, I and I I and I I can't say cuz I

63:07

wasn't there. But I can tell you that we

63:09

definitely have people that have had

63:10

experiences where they are now on US

63:12

government full medical disability in

63:15

writing because they got too close to a

63:17

UAP. Now, was it deliberate that they

63:19

got injured or was it just a a byproduct

63:21

of the technology? They got too close to

63:23

it.

63:23

What does that mean they got too close

63:24

to it? And you mentioned that there's

63:26

some people that are on US disability

63:28

allowance, so they're being paid by the

63:29

US government.

63:30

in writing because of the they had a UAP

63:33

enc- they were they were involved in a

63:34

UAP encounter.

63:34

And what does that mean UAP encounter in

63:36

that definition?

63:37

Well, so let's look at it this way. Um

63:40

Now, here's a better one. You go to the

63:42

airport, right? And I'm going to hop on

63:44

a 737 and go fly to Fort Lauderdale.

63:47

There's no real threat there. I'm

63:48

getting on a plane, it's safe, sit on

63:49

the seat, have a cocktail,

63:51

you know, watch a movie, read a

63:53

magazine.

63:54

Now, if I were to walk out onto the

63:56

tarmac, onto the runway of that same

63:58

where that same airplane is, and that

63:59

airplane decides to spool up its jet

64:01

engine,

64:03

chances are I'm going to be injured. I'm

64:04

going to get burnt, I'm going to lose my

64:05

hearing, and possibly a lot worse,

64:07

right?

64:09

There are individuals, US government

64:11

servicemen and women, and there's also

64:13

intelligence officials who have been

64:16

injured by getting too close to a UAP,

64:19

whether incidentally or or it was

64:21

deliberate or not.

64:23

The question is

64:24

was that injury sustained because it was

64:26

deliberate or was that injury sustained

64:28

because it was just a matter of being

64:31

too close to the technology. For

64:32

example, let's say

64:34

putting your head near a microwave oven

64:35

when it's on.

64:36

It's probably not very good for you,

64:38

right?

64:38

And have those people spoken out?

64:40

Absolutely.

64:42

What's like a good example?

64:44

Um

64:45

There's an individual right now named

64:47

John Burroughs

64:48

who uh who had his medical files um

64:51

classified and the US government,

64:53

thankfully because of Senator late

64:55

Senator John McCain from Arizona,

64:58

forced the Air Force to release his

64:59

files. And as a result, he was able to

65:02

get full medical disability because of

65:03

an incident that involved uh him and

65:06

another individual in the UK

65:08

uh known as Rendlesham Forest incident

65:11

or Bentwaters incident where there was a

65:13

US joint US

65:15

and UK base

65:17

and there was a UFO incident where this

65:19

thing had landed in the in the forest

65:21

and they went out to go see this thing

65:23

and

65:24

they were injured.

65:25

And they were in the military at the

65:26

time?

65:26

Mhm, yeah. Air Force special police or

65:28

police officers.

65:31

They were injured?

65:33

They were injured and that's not all.

65:34

There's a lot of people that have been

65:36

injured right now that are under medical

65:38

care by government doctors.

65:41

That is a fact.

65:45

When they give their account of what

65:46

happened, what do they say?

65:47

That's a fair question to you ask. I

65:49

mean, there's some consistency with that

65:50

within some of the stories and then

65:52

there's some divergence. You know, it's

65:54

like somebody who says they've been in a

65:56

car accident depending what kind of car

65:57

you're in and was it a multiple car pile

65:59

up and where were you sitting in the car

66:01

you're going to have a slightly

66:01

different experience. So, it's not one

66:03

size fits all.

66:04

You talk about how they there's been a

66:05

lot of UAP sightings at nuclear

66:08

technology facilities.

66:10

Yes.

66:11

That is and that is why

66:13

this is a national security issue

66:14

because

66:16

they seem to be able to disable our

66:17

nuclear capabilities. Now, people say,

66:19

"Oh, well, that's like, you know, taking

66:21

matches out of a kid's hands and it's,

66:23

you know,

66:24

well, maybe but in Russia there's

66:25

information to suggest they actually

66:27

turned them on.

66:28

So, you know, we have to be really

66:30

careful with that.

66:31

Our nuclear triad capability is really

66:34

the crown jewels of the US government

66:36

and so if a country or an adversary has

66:38

the ability to interfere with the

66:40

nuclear response, that's significant.

66:42

Is there evidence to suggest that they

66:43

turned on the nuclear facilities in

66:45

Russia?

66:45

Yes.

66:46

What is that evidence?

66:48

And when was that?

66:49

There's there's evidence that there's

66:50

actually a KGB report um that suggested

66:54

that the uh one of their their places

66:56

was actually turned on. In fact,

66:58

there's a lot Let me be careful what I

66:59

say here cuz um

67:01

So, after the Berlin Wall fell,

67:04

there was this brief honeymoon period

67:05

between the Soviet Union and the US

67:08

where

67:09

ex-KGB officers were sharing information

67:11

with us and our government. Um

67:15

I think that's about all I could

67:16

probably say about that. But there was

67:19

some very interesting um

67:21

information that we were able to

67:24

to see.

67:26

I was reading about this really

67:27

interesting incident called the Colares

67:29

incident.

67:29

Colares in Brazil, yeah.

67:30

I can't I can't pronounce that. Say that

67:32

How do you say it again? Colares.

67:33

Colares.

67:35

Which was in 1977 to 1978.

67:39

Um and it sounded like a UAP incident

67:42

that was witnessed by

67:45

hundreds, thousands of people.

67:47

It was investigated officially by the

67:50

Brazilian military under the command and

67:52

control of a four-star general named

67:54

General Uchôa.

67:56

Uh and um he had explained before he

67:59

passed away that even his own military

68:01

personnel had been been attacked.

68:05

By

68:06

By UAP.

68:08

And what did they say? What was the What

68:10

did they document say?

68:11

Oh my goodness. Uh a whole litany of

68:12

things. A lot of the locals uh recall

68:15

being terrified by these things, being

68:16

pursued by them, almost being like like

68:18

a laser blast, if you can imagine that,

68:20

or directed energy type injury. Um

68:24

very provocative. Um some of the

68:26

military personnel were injured as well.

68:28

Um a lot of medical doctors came in

68:30

afterwards to look at the locals and the

68:31

military personnel.

68:33

That validating the presumption that

68:36

there was some sort of directed energy

68:37

type

68:39

damage, tissue damage, uh to some of

68:41

these people. Um and of course then the

68:43

fear kind of escalated into some of the

68:47

other, you know, local lore of some

68:49

other things. Um but it was very well

68:51

established by the Brazilian military

68:53

who also witnessed these encounters. So

68:56

it's not like just some people in a

68:57

remote village. Um these were Brazilian

69:00

military officers who also vouched for.

69:03

And I I spoken to dozens and dozens of

69:04

military officers all throughout Latin

69:06

America and Chile and Peru and Uruguay.

69:10

And you know, they all reporting in some

69:13

cases some very very similar encounters.

69:15

Not necessarily with Colares, but

69:17

instance amongst themselves, people who

69:19

don't even know each other separated by

69:20

different countries are telling me their

69:22

same encounter. It and the same

69:24

morphology of craft and how they would

69:27

in some cases even try to engage in a

69:29

dogfight and use cannons, conventional

69:31

guns, um to no avail, of course. Um

69:34

and there's reports of that in Tehran

69:36

incident, I believe it's 1978, the

69:37

Tehran incident with an F-14 Tomcat

69:40

uh where the pilot

69:42

um his aircraft was disabled every time

69:45

he tried to engage the target. And then,

69:47

you know, I superimpose that with

69:49

here in Huntsville, Alabama, we had some

69:51

helicopters uh that we were testing and

69:54

uh something like eight out of the eight

69:55

test pilots all reported UAP uh coming

69:58

around their their

69:59

their helicopters while they were

70:01

testing them. And one even reported that

70:03

uh he believed his his um

70:07

his helicopter was disabled. And he went

70:08

into a an emergency uh situation. I

70:11

think it was an emergency auto rotation

70:13

situation. And as soon as the UAP left,

70:16

uh he was able to regain control of his

70:18

helicopter.

70:19

Should we be worried about this?

70:22

No, I don't think worried. I think we

70:23

should be concerned

70:25

because look, from a from a governmental

70:27

perspective,

70:29

to determine if something That's why I

70:30

always say this is a national security

70:31

issue, but not a national national

70:33

security threat. And and there's a

70:34

reason why. So,

70:37

there's a very simple calculus to

70:39

determine if something is a threat.

70:42

It's capabilities versus intent.

70:45

We have seen some of the capabilities.

70:47

We have no idea the intent. No clue. So,

70:49

we don't know if it's if it's a threat.

70:51

And let me give you a little analogy

70:52

here that might help kind of put this I

70:54

I I I this analogy a lot to help

70:56

illustrate what do I mean.

70:58

Um

71:00

I'm sure you live in a lovely home. Let

71:01

me ask you the question, do you lock

71:03

your front door before you go to bed?

71:04

Yes.

71:05

Okay. And you know what? I do, too. And

71:06

I think most people, we don't expect

71:08

anything bad to happen, but

71:10

just out of precaution, right? And some

71:12

folks may go the extra mile and decide,

71:13

you know, I'm going to just make sure

71:14

the windows are locked once in a while.

71:16

And you know what? I might even turn the

71:17

alarm on at night because I can.

71:19

Let's say you wake up one Sunday morning

71:22

to have yourself a nice hot cup of tea

71:24

or coffee. And you walk downstairs and

71:25

all of a sudden as you come downstairs

71:27

one bright morning,

71:29

you notice

71:30

size 12 muddy boot prints on your living

71:32

room carpet

71:33

that were not there the night before.

71:35

Now, no one's been hurt, nothing's out

71:36

of place, but despite you locking the

71:39

front door and checking the windows and

71:41

turning on the alarm, there are now boot

71:42

prints in your living room floor that

71:44

were not there the night before. My

71:46

question to you is, is that a threat?

71:48

My response is, it could be if it wanted

71:50

to be, so we should probably figure out

71:52

how it's getting into the house. This is

71:53

kind of the same analogy I use. These

71:55

things that can come in unimpeded,

71:56

unchallenged into controlled US

71:57

airspace, over sensitive military

71:59

installations, potentially interfere

72:01

with our nuclear equities and

72:02

capabilities,

72:04

we should probably figure out what these

72:05

things are.

72:08

With everything that you know in mind

72:09

and everything you've witnessed and

72:11

seen,

72:13

if you had to argue against yourself, if

72:16

you had to argue the case against

72:17

everything that you believe to make the

72:18

case that UAPs don't exist, what exactly

72:21

would you say?

72:22

Well, you can't say they don't exist.

72:23

We've already

72:24

we're beyond that they they're real,

72:25

whatever they are. But I could make the

72:27

argument that it's foreign adversarial

72:28

technology. It's Russia, it's China,

72:30

right? Uh they have leapfrogged us

72:32

technologically and have been able to

72:34

execute this this plan wonderfully. Uh

72:37

and then the other option is that's all

72:38

a grand hallucination. So, let's go down

72:40

each argument.

72:42

Let's go down the fact that maybe this

72:43

is

72:45

I don't know, Chinese technology,

72:46

Russian technology. After all, the

72:47

Chinese did send balloons over our

72:50

northern continental United States, spy

72:51

balloons and you know, for who knows how

72:53

long and we never did anything about it

72:55

and tracked it.

72:56

Um that means

72:58

that for the last 70 years

73:01

some country has been able to create a

73:03

technology in secret

73:06

that's so far advanced of anything we

73:07

have and by the way deploy it over the

73:10

continental United States

73:12

for 70 years completely not attributed.

73:16

Now, where were we 70 years ago?

73:20

Well, we are on the heels of World War

73:23

we had just broken the sound barrier and

73:25

we hadn't made it into space yet. Where

73:28

was China in the middle of a famine?

73:30

Where was Russia?

73:31

No better than we were.

73:33

So, if this was Chinese technology or

73:35

Russian technology back then cuz we have

73:38

the data to show it goes all the way

73:39

back.

73:40

This would be the greatest intelligence

73:42

failure this country has ever faced

73:43

eclipsing that of even 9/11 because

73:45

despite the billions of dollars and the

73:46

17 intelligence organizations

73:49

over 70 years, there's not a trace

73:52

that these countries were able to

73:53

develop this and and and fly over our

73:56

country and do what what we're seeing.

73:58

So, that's option one.

74:00

Also, temporally speaking

74:03

that type of technology didn't exist

74:06

back in 1950 1948. We not by us anyway.

74:10

So, that would be like going into King

74:12

Tut's tomb for the very first time

74:15

in the 1920s and looking in there and

74:18

all of a sudden discovering a fully

74:20

assembled and functioning 747.

74:23

Doesn't make sense.

74:25

Egyptians didn't have the technology

74:26

back then, right?

74:29

So, let's go to the other option. So,

74:30

that's that's that would be the huge

74:32

biggest intelligence failure that this

74:34

country's ever experienced and that's

74:35

not a good option and very very

74:37

unlikely.

74:38

So, the other option is this is you know

74:40

what? It's a mass hallucination.

74:42

Everybody's crazy.

74:44

So, let's go down that rabbit a for a

74:45

second.

74:47

So, some of the best and brightest in

74:48

our intelligence community and our

74:49

Department of Defense, our top gun

74:51

trained pilots who are who are trusted

74:54

to fly live munitions over cities,

74:57

populated cities, fight and win wars on

74:58

our behalf.

75:00

Men and women who have their finger

75:01

literally on the nuclear button.

75:03

They're all crazy.

75:05

They're all absolutely certifiably

75:07

insane.

75:10

We've got a bigger problem on our hands

75:11

than UAP.

75:13

What percentage of them have made

75:15

reports of UAP?

75:18

Um you know, it's hard to say percentage

75:20

because you don't know because the ones

75:22

that don't report, there's no way to

75:23

measure, right? You only know the ones

75:24

that do report. So, there's no way now

75:27

we can tell you that people more more

75:28

reporting cuz they feel that it's safe

75:30

that they can report, but we don't have

75:32

any metric right now that tells us who's

75:34

not reporting cuz they're not reporting.

75:36

When you when we think about this

75:37

hallucination rationale,

75:39

um

75:39

I remember many years ago, you know,

75:41

when I think it was in relation to

75:44

uh physical or hallucination, there were

75:46

ghosts and things like that. Yeah, it

75:47

was relating to ghosts. Someone said to

75:49

me, they said, "If really extremely

75:52

improbable things never happened, then

75:55

that would be

75:57

a miracle."

75:58

Because just like the nature of

75:59

probability means that most sort of

76:01

predictable things happen most of the

76:02

time, and then as you get down

76:04

probability, there's this

76:06

one side of it which is highly

76:07

improbable.

76:08

curve.

76:08

Yeah, exactly. So, like on the the bell

76:09

shape curve, this side of it is

76:11

extremely improbable things. You know, I

76:14

uh what's the thing extremely improbable

76:15

example? We start talking about

76:18

Andrew Huberman,

76:20

and then my phone rings and it's Andrew

76:21

Huberman, and we go, "Oh my god.

76:24

What are the odds of that being Andrew

76:25

Huberman? We were just talking about

76:26

him." And the issue there is we've

76:28

spoken about many people, and the phone

76:30

never rang. But on the one time it does,

76:32

we go we connect the dots in hindsight,

76:34

and we go, "That is a miracle." And we

76:36

attribute meaning to that.

76:38

Is it not possible that, you know, if

76:40

there's thousands and thousands of these

76:41

sightings, there's also

76:44

billions of non-sightings.

76:47

So, on that bell curve of probability,

76:49

there's this is these are just the

76:51

the unexplainable, highly improbable

76:55

thousand incidents of, you know, maybe

76:57

there was something on the camera, maybe

76:59

there was some

76:59

ball lightning, atmospheric anomaly, but

77:02

the problem is you we're going back to

77:03

the

77:05

to the the idea that there are multiple

77:07

sensor systems collecting the same

77:09

information at the same time under the

77:10

same circumstances, right? This isn't

77:12

just one person like your car. Oh my

77:14

gosh, I don't believe the guy calls.

77:16

You've got multiple platforms reporting

77:19

the information at the same time

77:21

simultaneously, right? So, it's not just

77:24

Oh, well, I saw an atmospheric

77:25

aberration.

77:26

The radar's picking it up. The gun

77:28

camera's picking it up. The FLIR's

77:29

picking it up. And another radar

77:31

system's picking it up. And another

77:32

radar And by the way, other

77:33

capabilities, which I can't discuss

77:34

here, are also picking it up. So, it's a

77:36

real thing. Now, could it be

77:40

a Russian rocket on reentry that

77:43

happened to

77:45

use up all its hydrazine and now the

77:46

booster rocket is burning up? Yeah, but

77:48

then you don't have these 90° turns. You

77:50

don't have 180° turns. You don't have

77:52

something coming in, sitting at 80,000

77:54

ft, then dropping up right above the

77:56

surface of the water, hovering 50 ft,

77:58

then popping right back up again

78:00

that you can measure. It's quantifiable

78:02

and qualifiable data.

78:03

Is Is that referring to the what they

78:05

call the Tic Tac incident? Is that Is

78:07

that what that is as well?

78:08

That So, the Tic Tac incident is That's

78:10

not the video from the Tic Tac, but

78:11

yeah. The Tic Tac incident are these

78:13

objects that were detected

78:15

at one point one of the operators said

78:16

it was raining UFOs. So, the Spy-1 radar

78:19

can can detect a a baseball-sized object

78:23

at 80,000 ft. Okay? It's a very, very

78:25

capable.

78:27

You had

78:28

E-2 Hawkeye.

78:29

What's that?

78:30

Uh it's a air platform. It's an

78:31

aircraft. It's a flying radar system uh

78:34

that we use to provide combat support,

78:36

air support, and and combat control for

78:38

aircraft. So, you have the

78:41

Aegis class

78:42

uh

78:43

destroyers. Basically, like a um a ship

78:46

Ticonderoga class, I think. Uh you have

78:48

the the USS Princeton with the spy-1

78:51

radar, one of the world's most pre-

78:52

premier at the time

78:54

radar systems on the planet. You have

78:56

the E-2 Hawkeye also picking it up on

78:58

radar. Then, you have the aircraft that

79:00

could pick it up on radar. Then, you

79:02

have the eyewitnesses picking it up on

79:03

radar. Then, you have the also the

79:04

footage of the flare footage picking

79:06

these things up as well

79:07

electro-optically. So,

79:10

you're talking about something that is

79:12

at 80,000 ft, then within a blink of an

79:14

eye has the ability to drop down to 50

79:16

ft and then go right back up again

79:18

instantly.

79:19

Um and it's all being verified by

79:21

various different sensor systems. Now,

79:23

in this particular case, I'm convoluting

79:25

a little bit because

79:27

the pilot's incident confirmed the Tic

79:29

Tac, but they didn't see it dropping out

79:31

of 80,000 ft. I'm so I'm kind of putting

79:33

it all together to make it a little

79:34

easier for people to consume. But, the

79:36

the Tic Tac incident wasn't really an

79:38

incident. It was incidents over over a

79:41

project protracted period of time in in

79:43

the early November timeframe. So, it

79:45

wasn't just one incident. There are

79:47

multiple incidents, but it's referred to

79:49

as the Tic Tac incident because the

79:51

pilot actually reported seeing this

79:53

white flying what's been described as a

79:55

lozenge, what's been described

79:57

historically as a white flying butane

79:59

tank. In this particular case, it was

80:01

described as a white flying Tic Tac,

80:03

like the breath mint Tic Tac.

80:05

And they saw they saw it go up, down on

80:07

radars and systems like that.

80:09

Oh, yeah. Yeah, they saw it up and down

80:10

on radar systems, and then the pilots

80:12

actually saw it zip away and bang,

80:14

disappear over the horizon, only later

80:16

on within a few moments to be picked up

80:18

on radar again 60 mi away at their cap

80:21

point, where they're supposed to

80:22

rendezvous next.

80:24

Um so, you're talking incredible speeds,

80:26

incredible accelerate, hypersonic

80:27

velocity, instantaneous acceleration,

80:30

low observability, all the anti-gravity,

80:33

all the the observables.

80:36

And that's just one that's just one

80:37

that's publicly known. There's a lot

80:38

more of these things that have been have

80:39

been happening.

80:41

How long were you with this

80:43

working on that project at the Pentagon,

80:44

A A tip?

80:45

Uh

80:46

eight years.

80:47

Eight years.

80:49

I'm an old guy. This is gray, not

80:51

blonde.

80:52

Let's talk about our sponsor week

80:53

quickly. We're now on the home stretch

80:55

of Sober October and this is where I

80:57

would normally share my key takeaways.

80:59

But as I haven't been drinking for over

81:00

a year now, I thought you might prefer

81:01

to hear from a listener who's given up

81:03

alcohol for the first time through this

81:05

Whoop Sober October challenge. Earlier

81:07

this week, Charlie from Manchester sent

81:09

me this message. The last few weeks have

81:11

been so transformative. While I haven't

81:13

given up drinking for good, Whoop Sober

81:14

October challenge has shown me just how

81:17

much my body needs time away from

81:18

drinking, especially during periods when

81:20

I really need to perform. I've slept

81:22

better and I've felt more mental clarity

81:24

and control each day. Sober October is

81:27

almost over, but your chance to learn

81:28

more about your body is not. If you're

81:30

not yet a Whoop member, go to

81:32

join.whoop.com/ceo

81:34

to start your free trial today.

81:36

Quick one. I want to tell you about a

81:37

new health product {slash} gadget that's

81:39

had a big impact on my life, but also my

81:41

partner's life. They are a sponsor of

81:43

this podcast and me and my partner are

81:44

both quite obsessed with it now. It is

81:46

the Bon Charge infrared sauna blanket.

81:49

Have you ever heard of an infrared sauna

81:51

blanket before? Infrared sauna blankets

81:53

are designed to give you the exact same

81:54

benefits of infrared saunas that you

81:56

find at gyms and spas and health clubs,

81:58

but they're portable. You can use them

82:00

at home, you can use them when you

82:01

travel, and anywhere in between. It

82:02

heats the body directly rather than the

82:04

air around you. And for me, when I use

82:06

the Bon Charge infrared sauna blanket

82:08

before I sleep, my sleep scores go up.

82:10

I'm better recovered the next day when I

82:12

go to the gym because it helps with

82:13

circulation and stiffness and muscle

82:15

soreness. But also, infrared is

82:17

associated with really improving your

82:18

skin. They are a sponsor of this podcast

82:20

and because of that, they've offered all

82:22

of you listeners a 25% discount when you

82:26

try Bon Charge's infrared sauna blankets

82:28

today. To get that discount, use the

82:30

code diary at checkout and you'll also

82:31

get free shipping and a year-long

82:33

warranty. Head to boncharge.com/diary

82:36

and get started on your infrared sauna

82:38

journey today.

82:39

What was like What's like a day in the

82:41

life of someone working in a project

82:43

that deals with UFOs at the Pentagon?

82:45

Like, you come in in the morning, you

82:47

get your coffee.

82:49

I had the two worst portfolios anybody

82:51

could ever ask for at the Pentagon.

82:54

Um

82:54

I was I was I was I was like a pariah. I

82:57

had the two most unpopular portfolios. I

83:00

was on one hand

83:02

I was working the UAP

83:04

issue, UFO issue. On the other hand, I

83:05

was also working uh Guantanamo Bay

83:09

issues. Um

83:12

very politically charged,

83:14

very untenable situation.

83:17

Um but that was my job. So, I had both

83:19

those portfolios. And so, every day was

83:22

um

83:24

It was like riding a tiger to work.

83:27

And every day that tiger just wanted to

83:28

rip you off and shred you into pieces

83:30

and you just had to hold on for dear

83:32

life.

83:33

Yeah, it was um it was stressful. In

83:35

2014,

83:37

uh I was informed that I was put on the

83:39

ISIS Al-Qaeda kill list

83:41

for my work at uh involving Guantanamo

83:44

Bay.

83:45

Um

83:47

And of course,

83:48

uh we had the UAP issue. It was It was

83:50

uncomfortable. It was uncomfortable

83:52

times. It was It was uncomfortable time

83:53

for for me um professionally. I I

83:57

wouldn't have wished it on anyone

83:58

anybody.

83:58

Did you enjoy it?

83:59

I enjoyed the people.

84:01

I enjoyed them the the the the mission

84:03

and and

84:05

doing what I thought and what I think is

84:07

right for our nation.

84:09

Um but no, I mean, if if there was an

84:12

easier job I could have had, I probably

84:13

would have done it. But most of my jobs

84:15

I tended to be handpicked to do the jobs

84:17

I had done.

84:19

I guess someone somewhere thought I was

84:21

doing a good job with other stuff and

84:22

they'd be kind of always would bump me

84:24

to new stuff.

84:25

Um

84:26

How does your work with UFOs and your

84:30

belief in these other

84:33

I was going to say life forms, but just

84:35

these other forms of I don't know

84:38

activity that we can't explain cuz I

84:39

hesitated on the word life forms because

84:41

again

84:41

Yeah, let me say it's not a belief in

84:43

life, it's a belief in possibilities.

84:45

Okay, right.

84:46

I don't know to I can't tell you

84:48

definitively

84:49

that oh, I I believe in you know

84:52

life and then looks like this in other

84:54

parts of the galaxy. I don't know. I

84:56

don't know that. I've I'm

84:57

I haven't been to space. I I couldn't

84:58

tell you.

84:59

But we have to remain open to the

85:01

possibilities and look at the data. Let

85:03

a lot of data speak for itself and then

85:04

draw conclusions based upon the data.

85:06

Did this understanding make your life

85:08

more fulfilling or

85:10

feel more insignificant? Cuz I sometimes

85:12

think of when I spend time watching

85:14

space movies and documentaries and I see

85:15

them flying and then to Mars and then

85:17

through these black holes and stuff. It

85:19

reminds me how big and vast the universe

85:21

really is and all of that then makes me

85:24

feel a few things. Two things is in at

85:26

the same time. One of them is like

85:28

totally

85:29

insignificant in the grand scheme of

85:31

what's out there and the technologies

85:33

you've described and the way you've

85:34

described them in part makes me feel

85:36

quite insignificant cuz I'm like I'm

85:38

just this tiny little grain of sand in

85:40

this never-ending beach and I really

85:43

don't matter in the grand scheme of

85:44

this. And then the second thing, which

85:46

is a positive consequence of that

85:48

feeling is

85:50

you kind of alleviates your anxiety, I

85:51

guess. Like nothing really matters.

85:53

Nothing There's nothing to worry about.

85:55

That's very insightful. Can I can I ask

85:57

you a favor?

85:58

Mhm.

85:59

So, you have the little iPad in front of

86:00

you. Type in the words pale blue dot

86:03

under Google images and I want you to

86:05

tell me what you see.

86:08

Okay, I'll type in

86:11

pale blue dot.

86:13

Do you know what that is? Take a look at

86:14

that. Blow it up.

86:15

Zoom in. What do you see?

86:18

It's a tiny little dot of light.

86:21

Um

86:22

tiny little There's this massive I mean,

86:24

it looks like kind of like the night sky

86:26

almost.

86:27

And there's this tiny little dot of

86:29

light.

86:29

You know what that is?

86:31

What is that?

86:32

That's the planet you live on. That's

86:34

Earth.

86:34

Oh, that's Earth. Okay.

86:35

Every

86:37

memory

86:38

every piece of history

86:40

occurred on that tiny little

86:42

insignificant ball

86:44

hurtling through the vastness and vacuum

86:46

of space. And that ray of light is

86:48

actually from the sun.

86:50

And that was taken by one of our probes

86:53

as it was heading out towards the solar

86:55

system and it was told to turn back and

86:56

take a picture. That's our home.

86:59

How does that picture make you feel?

87:03

Totally insignificant.

87:05

Irrelevant. Um

87:07

like I just don't matter.

87:09

But how But how about this? Yes, it will

87:11

make you feel insignificant, but do you

87:12

know what else it can do?

87:13

Make you realize just how special we

87:16

really are.

87:18

That little blue dot

87:20

the little engine that could, that's

87:22

where we live. That's our home.

87:24

And that is real and that is special.

87:29

So, to answer your question, how does it

87:31

make me feel?

87:33

You can feel insignificant and still

87:35

feel special at the same time.

87:38

And that's why I wanted you to see that

87:40

picture.

87:41

Because you're illustrating for me

87:42

exactly the question you're asking me.

87:45

And so, in order to rather than just

87:46

give you an answer, I wanted you to

87:48

experience my answer and that is my

87:50

answer.

87:52

What do your kids think of What What you

87:54

do these days?

87:56

I don't know what I do. My children are

87:58

the greatest accomplishment of my life.

87:59

There'll be nothing in my life that will

88:00

ever come close to the achievement of

88:02

being a father. Period. Full stop. So,

88:04

there's nothing I will ever do

88:06

that will come close to that. So, it

88:07

doesn't really matter

88:09

uh

88:09

what I do else in life because that's

88:12

the most important. Now, what do they

88:13

think about what I do? You probably have

88:14

to ask them.

88:16

Do they believe in UAP?

88:17

It's not belief. They They believe in

88:19

data.

88:20

I never told them to believe in UAP.

88:21

But do they believe that that we are

88:23

alone in the universe?

88:24

Ah, that's a different question.

88:26

Um

88:27

let's Well, you'd have to ask them for

88:29

that, but but let me let's let's break

88:31

that down again because it's important

88:33

that we we we love going into these

88:34

binary things, either or, okay?

88:37

Does life exist in the universe? Yes.

88:39

This is just living proof, this planet,

88:41

okay? In fact, life is abundant. Life is

88:43

everywhere on this planet. Even the

88:45

place that we think would never have

88:46

possibly exist, it is there and it

88:48

thrives.

88:49

Um

88:50

my my daughters are very open-minded,

88:52

but they're also independent thinkers. I

88:55

taught them, don't be like mom and dad

88:57

if you don't want to be like mom and

88:58

dad. If we do something stupid, don't do

89:00

it. Learn a lesson.

89:02

Um so, we've never prescribed our

89:04

children what to think or what to

89:05

believe, ever. It's been up to them.

89:08

Um they are incredibly intelligent.

89:11

Uh they both have very successful

89:13

careers.

89:14

Uh and they think on their own.

89:17

And what they think is sacred, and I

89:18

don't ever want to interfere with that.

89:20

And I have always told them, you don't

89:21

not asking you to believe anything.

89:23

Do you believe we're alone in the

89:24

universe?

89:25

We are absolutely not alone in the

89:26

universe.

89:31

We just better hope

89:32

the other life

89:34

is

89:35

kind, I guess.

89:37

Ah, see, but there we go again. Is that

89:38

me, too? But but what is kind?

89:41

Let's just hope they don't hurt us.

89:42

Ah, that's different. You're right.

89:44

Let's hope they don't eradicate us.

89:45

Right. Let's hope they're they're

89:47

they're not malevolent. I would agree

89:48

with that. Let's hope they're not uh you

89:51

know, here for their own interests and

89:52

not ours.

89:53

Why did you call the book Eminence?

89:56

Open the first Open the first page.

89:59

There uh when you get to the first

90:00

written actual words,

90:02

it's before the forward.

90:04

It's What's it say?

90:06

It says, "You may be wondering why I

90:07

titled this book Eminent. The word

90:08

itself sometimes is associated with

90:10

another word, threat. Although at first

90:13

glance, it may appear that this book

90:14

focuses on the potential threat of

90:16

unidentified anomalous phenomena, UAP or

90:19

UFOs in the vernacular,

90:21

that is not my intent. According to some

90:23

of the common definitions of the word

90:24

eminent, it usually means something is

90:26

about to happen or impending or

90:28

inevitable. This is precisely why I

90:30

chose the this title."

90:33

The invasion is an imminent threat.

90:35

That's kind of what I'm trying to check.

90:36

I know.

90:37

I know,

90:38

but that's not my intent.

90:39

We have a closing tradition on this

90:40

podcast where the last guest leaves a

90:41

question for the next guest not knowing

90:43

who they're going to be leaving it for.

90:45

And the question that's been left for

90:47

you is,

90:48

what is something you were once deeply

90:51

afraid of

90:53

that now you are no longer afraid of?

90:59

Fear.

91:04

Fear.

91:06

I'm not afraid of it anymore.

91:08

I used to be afraid of everything,

91:09

afraid of

91:11

of combat, afraid of death, afraid of

91:12

war, afraid of the health care issues,

91:14

afraid of of other people, not for me,

91:17

but for other people.

91:20

It's a little bit liberating

91:22

to not

91:24

be afraid.

91:26

It's like the old saying, the only thing

91:27

we have to fear is fear itself, right?

91:31

Um

91:32

I mean, clearly I'm still concerned.

91:34

There's concern, but actual fear,

91:37

man, I'm over 50 years old, brother.

91:39

There's nothing anybody can do to me

91:41

that at this point I've lived a full

91:42

life and I've had more than my fair

91:44

share.

91:45

Whatever, dude. You know, if I spend the

91:46

rest of my life

91:49

it doesn't matter, cuz I've lived such

91:50

an incredible life and I have an

91:52

incredible family.

91:53

So, it doesn't really matter.

91:56

Louie, thank you. Thank you for your

91:57

time and thank you for writing a book

91:59

which gives us a very, very rare view

92:02

into what happens inside the Pentagon as

92:04

it relates to the subject of UAPs/UFOs.

92:07

Um it's called Inside the Pentagon's

92:09

Hunt for UFOs, Imminent. And I highly

92:11

recommend anybody that's interested in

92:13

these subjects to read this book. I'll

92:14

link it in the description below because

92:16

it's fascinating. You know, I I'm

92:18

certainly someone that believes we're

92:19

not alone in the universe. I have no

92:21

idea what that means or what that looks

92:23

like and I think to really have a strong

92:25

view either way um

92:28

to think that we're not alone or to

92:29

think that you can perfectly articulate

92:32

who is here with us is probably some

92:34

form of naivety and ignorance. And

92:36

probably, you know,

92:37

Well, they're one in the same, right?

92:38

The true believers and the true

92:39

skeptics, they're just on opposite ends

92:41

of the spectrum because no matter what

92:43

information you give them, they're never

92:44

going to change their narrative. So, I I

92:46

I think you're right.

92:47

And I think generally, I think a better

92:48

position to take on all these subjects

92:50

is to remain open-minded. And that's why

92:52

I was keen to have this conversation

92:54

because I'm just I like to remain

92:55

open-minded to information and um

92:58

there's so many times in history that we

92:59

thought we had it figured out and we

93:00

didn't. So, to think we have it figured

93:02

out now is is is stupidity, frankly, so.

93:05

Exactly.

93:06

Lou, thank you.

93:07

My honor, privilege. Thank you. Thank

93:09

you. Thank you.

93:14

Isn't this cool? Every single

93:16

conversation I have here on The Diary of

93:18

a CEO, at the very end of it, you'll

93:19

know I ask the guest to leave a question

93:23

in The Diary of a CEO. And what we've

93:26

done is we turned every single question

93:28

written in The Diary of a CEO into these

93:30

conversation cards that you can play at

93:33

home. So, you've got every guest we've

93:35

ever had, their question, and on the

93:38

back of it, if you scan that QR code,

93:41

you get to watch the person who answered

93:44

that question. We're finally revealing

93:47

all of the questions and the people that

93:50

answered the question. The brand new

93:53

version two updated conversation cards

93:55

are out right now at the

93:57

conversationcards.com.

93:59

They sold out twice instantaneously. So,

94:01

if you are interested in getting hold of

94:03

some limited edition conversation cards,

94:05

I really, really recommend acting

94:07

quickly.

Interactive Summary

Luis Elizondo, a former intelligence officer and head of the Pentagon's AATIP program, discusses the reality of UAP (Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena) and the military's ongoing investigations. He emphasizes the importance of data-driven analysis and notes that these phenomena demonstrate capabilities far exceeding current human technology. Elizondo highlights the institutional challenges, including stigma and resistance from within government, that have historically hampered reporting and transparency regarding these encounters.

Suggested questions

4 ready-made prompts