The $285 Billion Crash Wall Street Won't Explain Honestly. Here's What Everyone Missed.
641 segments
A 200line prompt just killed $285
billion in market value. That's right. A
markdown file, not a product, not a
platform, a markdown file from some
product manager at Anthropic erased $285
billion in market cap on the stock
market in just 48 hours. On January
30th, Anthropic released a set of
plugins for Claude Co-work, its desktop
AI tool. One of them handles legal
contract review. It can triage NDAs. It
can flag non-standard clauses against a
negotiation playbook and generate a ton
of compliance summaries. The kind of
work that until last week required a
parallegal, maybe a Westlaw
subscription, something that had to do
with billable hours, right? The plugin
is open source. Anyone can read it. And
when people did, they found roughly 200
lines of structured markdown prompts.
First year law school content dressed up
with some clever workflow logic. It's
basically a fancy prompt. It shipped
with a little disclaimer. All outputs
should be reviewed by licensed
attorneys. I'll bet by Monday morning.
Thompson Reuters had posted its biggest
single day stock decline on record. It's
down 16%. RELX, the parent company of
Lexus Nexus, fell 14%. Legal Zoom
cratered at 20%. You get the idea. The
selling spread to private equity from
there. Aries Management, KKR, and TPG
all dropped about 10%. If AI compresses
the cost of legal and financial
analysis, then every firm charging
premium fees for that analysis has a big
big margin problem because they can't
charge that much. Not next year and
maybe not now. But here's what almost
nobody is saying clearly enough. The
markdown file itself is not the cause.
It just revealed what has been going on
for a while. the per seat SAS licensing
model, the financial bedrock that the
entire enterprise software economy has
been built on for 20 years, it was
already cracking. The market just hadn't
priced it in yet because frankly, Wall
Street doesn't understand AI that well.
So, this crash wasn't really about
Claude. And we should be precise about
what actually happened because the
narrative has already crystallized into
anthropic crash to the software market.
And that framing, while it's fun for
headlines, misses the real structural
story. What Anthropic actually shipped
was a set of open source starter
plugins, basically templates that any
company can customize for their own
workflows very easily. The legal plugin
was one of 11. It was very competent,
but it's not by itself revolutionary.
Any decent prompt engineer could have
assembled something comparable in an
afternoon. So why did it move $285
billion? because the plugin made visible
what the market has been quietly
worrying about for months. If a text
file can approximate the core workflow
of a $60 billion revenue legal
information industry, then that whole
pricing model that the industry is built
on has a big structural problem. Not a
competitive problem, not a better
product, a structural problem. The kind
that doesn't get solved by shipping
faster or hiring better salespeople.
Thompson Reuters charges per seat. Lexus
Nexus charges per seat. Westlaw charges
per seat. The entire enterprise software
economy from Salesforce to Service Now
to Adobe runs on a model that says every
human who touches this tool must pay a
license fee. That's how these companies
make their money. That's how they
forecast their revenue. That's how Wall
Street values them. That model works
when humans are the bottleneck. It
breaks when AI agents can do the work
without logging in. And the signals were
already everywhere if you knew where to
look. The software industry's average
forward price to earnings ratio has been
compressing for months from X 8 months
ago to about 2x right when the sell-off
hit. That is the largest 4-month
valuation compression since the 2002.com
bust. Earning season has already been
ugly. Software companies are missing
revenue estimates at rates not seen
since the postcoid correction and
broader tech continues to beat. The AI
companies are fine, right? The per seat
model was under pressure before
anthropic shipped this little prompt
file. So the cloud plugin, it didn't
start the fire. It just showed everyone
the building was already burning. Now I
got to be honest, plenty of smart people
think that this sell-off is a big
overreaction. And they might be right
about the selloff, but they would be
wrong about what it means. Jensen Hang
speaking at the Cisco AI Summit a few
days before the crash offered the
strongest version of the
counterargument. This notion that the
software industry is in decline and
being replaced by AI is the most
illogical thing in the world, he said.
And do you know why? Hong's argument is
very simple. AI doesn't replace
software. AI runs on software. The more
AI agents you deploy, the more software
infrastructure you need. More databases,
more APIs, more middleware, etc. So
every AI agent that replaces a
parallegal still needs West Law's data.
It still needs a CRM. It still needs
document management. If anything, AI
should increase the total amount of
software the economy uses. Jensen's not
wrong. He's also not making the argument
he thinks he's making. Nobody's serious
is arguing that the world needs less
software. The argument is that the world
no longer needs to pay for software the
way it currently pays for software. So
Jensen is defending the product and he's
right to do so. The market is attacking
the pricing model. Those are very
different things and confusing them is
how incumbents lose transitions they
should have survived. Print media made
this same mistake. Newspapers had
content people wanted. They had local
information, investigative journalism,
weather. The internet didn't make that
content worthless. What the internet did
was destroy the access model. the idea
that you had to buy a whole newspaper to
get the one section you cared about and
that advertisers would pay premium rates
to reach readers with no alternative.
The content actually survived. The
business model didn't. And that's why so
many newspapers are in trouble. Print
media's content did eventually get
commoditized. Anybody can publish now.
software's content like proprietary
databases like structured workflows,
decades of accumulated enterprise data
that hasn't been commoditized and it
actually probably won't be. Thompson
Reuters case law database isn't
something a startup vibe codes in a
weekend. Salesforce's customer
relationship data is irreplaceable for
many of their clients. Adobe's creative
tool ecosystem has a pretty deep moat.
So the data is safe, but the per seat
access model for that data is not. And
the companies whose entire financial
identity is built around per seat
licensing, they're about to face the
hardest strategic question in enterprise
software. How do you repric your most
valuable assets without destroying your
revenue in the transition? Bank of
America's Vivic Arya published the most
revealing analysis of the crash. He
called the sell-off internally
inconsistent. And he's right in a way
that tells you something important about
where the market's head is at right now
on software and on AI. Investors were
simultaneously running two thesis.
Thesis one, AI infrastructure spending
is unsustainable and the capex boom will
collapse. Thesis 2, AI adoption will be
so powerful that it renders established
software business models obsolete. Both
cannot be true. If AI is powerful enough
to crash $285 billion in software market
cap, the infrastructure required to run
that AI is underbuilt, not overbuilt,
the SAS apocalypse is paradoxically the
strongest possible demand signal for
continued AI infrastructure investment.
And yet both trades were profitable in
different hands at different moments.
The Deep Seek sell-off punished Nvidia
last year. The SAS correction punished
Salesforce at almost the same time this
year. Wall Street does not resolve
logical contradictions. It rotates
between them. One week the market prices
in an AI winter, the next it prices in
an AI revolution so total that legacy
software can't survive it. The
contradiction persists because no single
firm needs to hold both positions. The
market as a whole holds them and the
market as a whole has no obligation to
be coherent. The incoherence is the real
story, not the crash, the incoherence.
But this is not really a story about
stocks. It's bigger. While everyone was
watching Thompson Reuters stock price, a
quieter story broke that almost no one
paid attention to. And that tells you
about where we're all headed more than
any given stock chart. KPMG, one of the
big four accounting firms, pressured
Grant Thornton UK, which is its own
auditor. Yes, the big four have to have
auditors, to cut their audit fees. The
demand was to pass on cost savings from
AI. Grant Thornton initially resisted,
arguing that quote, "High highquality
audits rely heavily on expert human
judgment and that fees reflect the cost
of people." PMG's response, "Per the
Financial Times, lower your prices or
we'll find a new auditor." And Grant
Thornton blinked. PMG's international
audit fees dropped from $416,000 in 2024
to just $357,000
in 2025. They got a 14% discount. And
that story matters to me more than
Thompson Reuters stock price. And I want
to tell you why. The SAS apocalypse was
just a market event. Traders were
repricing stocks based on a change view
of the future. They do that all the
time. The KPMG negotiation is an
operating event. A real company using AI
as a lever in a real business
negotiation to extract a real price
reduction from a real counterparty. The
stock market repricing that could
reverse tomorrow. The KPMG precedent
won't. Think about what KPMG actually
did. They didn't automate their audit.
They didn't replace Grand Thornton with
AI. They used the existence of AI. The
fact that everyone now know these now
knows these tasks can be done more
cheaply as a negotiating weapon. The
threat isn't we'll replace you with AI.
The threat is we both know AI changes
the economics. So your old prices,
they're not justified anymore. That's
the playbook and it works in every
knowledge work fee negotiation. Now if
audit fees get renegotiated on the basis
of AI cost savings, legal fees can be
next, then consulting fees, then
implementation fees, then design fees,
then every form of pro-services billing
that currently scales only with the
number of humans touching the work. You
cannot use that scaling assumption. Lean
teams are the future. The cascade
doesn't require anyone to actually
deploy AI at scale. It just requires
buyers to point at that SAS apocalypse
and say, "We know the world changed. So,
let's talk about your assumption that
the work is done per human and let's
talk about your rates." The big four are
a sign of things to come. When they talk
about not automating their own work, but
just negotiating down the cost of
services, that is a big operating
mechanism that is going to shake the
industry. It's not really the markdown
files. its fee negotiation leverage
spreading like wildfires through the
professional services economy like a
crack through an iceberg. All of those
assumptions that humans have to do the
work are shattering. The software did
not die. The data systems underneath
enterprise software, Thompson Reuters
case law databases, Salesforce's
customer graphs, SAP's resource planning
lo SAP's resource planning logic,
Adobe's creative workflow ecosystem.
Those all represent decades of
accumulated, structured, proprietary
information that no markdown file comes
close to replacing. Those data systems
will continue to exist. They must. The
economy runs on them. And there's a
second edge that the market panic has
really overlooked, the single ringable
neck. Enterprises don't just buy
Salesforce because it's the best
possible CRM. You can make the case for
a lot of other software that's better.
They buy Salesforce because when
something goes wrong at 2 am on the
night before the board meeting, there's
a phone number to call and a contract
that says somebody is accountable. That
accountability layer, the vendor
relationship, the SLA, the legal
liability, the proservices team that
shows up when the system breaks, that is
enormously valuable to big
organizations. And no amount of agentic
AI eliminates the need for it. If
anything, the complexity of AIdriven
workflows makes that accountability even
more important, not less. So, the data
edge is real. The accountability edge is
real. What died is the pricing model
that sits over the top. The idea that
you can charge every human who touches
the software a nice convenient fat per
se license fee and that your revenue
scales linearly with that headcount. If
one AI agent can do the research that
previously required 10 parallegals with
10 separate Westlaw loginins, Thompson
Reuters doesn't lose the value of their
data, they lose nine seats of revenue.
The data becomes actually more important
in an AIdriven world. It's the fuel the
agents run on. But the per seat access
model, that's just broken. Here's what
the investor thesis actually comes down
to. The markdown file represents an
existential threat if and only if these
SAS companies run business as usual. If
they just bolt AI features on top of
their existing UI, if they just add a
chatbot, then the market's right.
They're dead. The market is right to
repric them. The survival path is
actually fundamentally different. And
it's the one Thompson Reuters,
ironically, is attempting with co-consel
to pivot from a one-sizefits-all
interface that humans navigate to an
agentic first architecture that AI
agents navigate and charge for the value
of the data and the accountability
rather than the number of humans logging
in. That's not a feature update. That's
a rebuild of the product, the pricing,
and the go to market simultaneously
while your stock price is cratering.
Whether the incumbents pull it off is a
$285 billion question. Literally, they
have the data edge, they have the
ringable neck edge, and those are real.
But pivoting from UI first to agentic
first is the kind of architectural
transformation that does tend to kill
companies that attempt it too slowly.
And the clock is running at a speed that
nobody in enterprise software has ever
experienced. There's a second angle to
this that most SAS apocalypse analysis
completely misses and it might matter
even more than the pricing question.
Think about what enterprise software
companies really spend their money on.
Engineering. Thousands of developers
maintaining, updating, debugging, and
extending one-sizefits-all platforms
designed to serve every possible
customer configuration. Docuine employs
thousands of developers. That's the real
cost of enterprise SAS. Not the servers,
not the sales team, but the army of
engineers keeping a general purpose
system alive for millions of users who
each use it just a little bit
differently. Now, think about the
opportunity cost. Every developer
maintaining a legacy SAS UI is a
developer that is not building custom
agentic workflows. Every sprint spent
adding features to a one-sizefits-all
product is a sprint not spent rethinking
the product for an agent first world.
The companies that crashed this week,
they're not just facing a pricing model
crisis, they're facing a resource
allocation crisis. Their most valuable
people are maintaining the old thing
when they need to be building the new
thing desperately. And the transition
requires doing both of those
simultaneously within the same budget.
This is where Agentic software
engineering changes the math in a way
that most people haven't fully
internalized. The cost of building
software is falling to zero. Not slowly
and not theoretically. It's happening
right now. Cursor shipped a system that
generates a thousand code commits per
hour with no human involvement. Strong
DM published a production framework that
states code must not be written by
humans and code must not be reviewed by
humans. That is not laughable. In 2026,
that is what is happening. A researcher
at OpenAI spent $10,000 on codeex tokens
and automated his entire research
workflow. These aren't demos. These are
operational systems running in
production. When building software cost
starts to approach zero, the economics
of buy versus build flip for the first
time in a long time. The entire
enterprise SAS value proposition was
predicated on the idea that it's cheaper
to buy a general purpose tool than to
build a custom one. That was true when
software engineering was expensive and
slow. When an AI agent can build a
custom CRM in an afternoon, calculus can
reverse for some folks. Why pay
Salesforce per seat fees for a tool
designed to serve every company on earth
when you could have a tool designed to
serve your company? That is the promise
of vibe coding. That is the promise of
vibe engineering. Now you might wonder
is that how it actually works? The
honest answer is it depends. And what it
depends on is the hardest problem in the
entire stack. It's harder than
intelligence. It's harder than coding.
And it's harder than pricing models. It
depends on whether an AI agent can take
the vague, implicit, half-articulated
thing a human actually wants and turn it
not just into workable software, but
very quickly into workable software with
minimal sustainment costs. I've
mentioned in a previous video that I am
skeptical of this long term, especially
for enterprises. Remember how we talked
about companies hiring for a single
ringable knack and paying for enterprise
data access? Those remain edges. And
anyone who wants to engineer their way
forward into a cheaper CRM and not
Salesforce must confront them. But they
also must confront the articulation
problem. And that is a real bottleneck.
Not just for SAS companies, but for
anyone who wants to build your own
alternative. When a VP of sales says, I
need a better way to track the pipeline.
That sentence contains less than 5% of
the information required to build a
useful tool. Frankly, less than 1%. The
other 95 or 99% is buried in how the
team actually works. What the unspoken
conventions are, which exceptions matter
and which don't, how this quarter's
priorities differed from last, what
better means in context. Now, a skilled
product manager will spend weeks
extracting that information through
interviews, observation, iteration.
Whether an agent can do the same thing,
not just write the code, but understand
the need deeply enough to write the
right code is one of the biggest
questions in software right now. I am
skeptical that we're there yet, except
in a few cases where you have
extraordinary context availability
across the enterprise. But Agentic
Search is making progress on exactly
that problem. Agents can explore
context. They can ask clarifying
questions and they do now. And they can
observe usage patterns and iteratively
refine their understanding of what a
human actually needs. So, it's starting
to come, but the question is timing. For
SAS incumbents, this means the window
has not yet closed. Their data edge and
their accountability edge really do buy
them time, but only if they use that
time to pivot to Agentic first, rather
than bolting AI onto the existing UI and
saying a prayer. Here's the thing that
connects the SAS apocalypse to your
actual life. The same dynamic that is
threatening enterprise SAS companies,
the difference between bolting AI on top
of your existing approach and actually
rethinking how you work from the ground
up applies to every individual knowledge
worker that is watching this video. If
you're using chat GPT to proofread
emails you could have written anyway,
you are bolting AI on the top. If you're
using Claude to summarize documents you
could have read anyway, you're bolting
AI on the top. If you add Copilot to
your IDE, but your development workflow
is just the same as it was two years ago
or even five months ago, you're bolting
AI on the top. And just like the SAS
companies that are bolting AI features
onto their existing products and hoping
the market does not notice, you are
decorating a structural problem in your
own career rather than solving it. The
pace right now is almost
incomprehensible. 20 minutes after Opus
4.6 dropped, Codeex dropped. And Codeex
can ship entire desktop apps if properly
prompted end to end from scratch. OpenAI
isn't done with Codeex though. They also
launched Frontier in the same week as
they dropped Codex 5.3. Frontier is an
enterprise agent platform. So that means
that it you can use Frontier to deploy
enterprise agents securely across your
entire data ecosystem. Remember when I
said that context was evolving and
agents were getting better at searching
for context and learning from context
clues how to build good software?
Frontier is part of why Claude Co has
gone from an interesting demo to a $285
billion market event. If you ask an AI
model right now to help you figure out
how to use AI, you will get advice
that's 6 months out of date. Even the AI
cannot keep up with itself. This is what
hyper acceleration feels like. And that
word does sound like marketing. It
sounds like hype. I will have people in
the comments who say I'm overhyping, but
you got to live through it. And then it
sounds like another Tuesday. The gap
between I use AI tools and I've
rethought how I work around extremely
rapidly evolving AI capabilities is all
of our individual versions of what
happened in the SAS market. The first
approach feels really productive.
Bolting on AI lets you feel like you're
keeping up. The second approach
fundamentally rethinking how you work
from the ground up. That's what changes
outcomes and the window to make that
transition keeps compressing every time
there's a new update, which frankly is
every few days. If you haven't tried
Opus 4.6 and experienced what a good
million token context window feels like,
you're already out of date. If you
haven't used Cloud Co-work or Codeex or
played around with OpenAI Frontier,
please try them. Not because any one
tool is the answer, but because the
experience of using these systems
changes your mental model of what's
possible. And your mental model of what
is possible is the thing that determines
whether you are bolting on AI in your
own career and praying or whether you're
rebuilding for an AI future that is
coming like a title wave. The SAS
companies that survive the SAS
apocalypse will be the ones that rethink
their architecture before the market
makes them. The knowledge workers who
thrive through the transition will be
the ones who rethink their workflows
before the boss forces them to. It's the
same dynamic. It's the same urgency.
It's just at a different scale. The per
seat SAS pricing model is broken. The
data and accountability underneath it
are not. And the same logic applies to
you. Your skills, your domain expertise,
the thing that makes you passionate
about work, that didn't break. But the
assumption that you can just take that
to work and not use AI or only use AI a
little bit or use AI in a chatbot, that
is broken. And you're going to need to
look at how you fundamentally rethink
your workflows to get there. And that is
exactly what I'm putting together in the
exercises that go with this video on my
Substack. got a bunch of exercises that
help you think about how you can take
your unique role and essentially do the
repricing, do the rebuilding that the
SAS companies are talking about, but at
individual scale for your individual
workflows, how you think about AI, not
as a bolt-on, but as a fundamental
shift. A 200line markdown file did not
decide who wins and loses, but it did
compress a transition that everybody
expected to take 5 years into a 48 hour
repricing event. And the repricing
hasn't stopped. It's just getting
started. The clock is ticking. It's not
stopping. And I want you to make good
decisions with your career. And we'll
have to see if the SAS companies make
good decisions with their futures as
companies because by the time you watch
this, whatever the stock market price
says, the AI that you hear about in this
video will already be overtaken by some
other news. That is how fast we're
moving. AI isn't stopping, and we're all
going to have to dig in to get through
this together. I know you can do it.
Ask follow-up questions or revisit key timestamps.
A single 200-line markdown file released by Anthropic caused a significant market shock, erasing $285 billion in market value. This event, while seemingly triggered by a specific prompt, actually exposed deeper structural issues within the enterprise software economy, particularly the long-standing per-seat Software as a Service (SaaS) licensing model. The market's reaction, including stock declines in major legal and financial information companies, highlighted the vulnerability of businesses reliant on premium fees for services that AI can now significantly compress in cost. The core issue isn't the AI replacing software, but rather the disruption of traditional pricing models. Companies like Thompson Reuters and LexisNexis, built on per-seat licenses, face an existential threat as AI agents can perform tasks without requiring individual human logins and associated licenses. While the underlying data and services remain valuable, the access model is broken, forcing a fundamental re-evaluation of how these companies price and deliver their products. The trend is further evidenced by operational shifts, such as KPMG negotiating audit fee reductions based on AI cost-saving potentials, setting a precedent for other professional services. The underlying challenge for incumbent companies is not just technological but strategic: how to transition from a UI-first, per-seat model to an agentic-first architecture that values data and accountability, a transformation that requires a complete rebuild of product, pricing, and go-to-market strategies. This transition is accelerated by the falling cost of software development itself, driven by AI, which flips the buy-vs-build economics and puts pressure on existing SaaS value propositions. The ultimate success hinges on whether companies can navigate this architectural transformation effectively and rapidly, a challenge mirrored in individual careers as knowledge workers must also adapt their workflows to leverage AI fundamentally, rather than merely bolting it onto existing processes.
Videos recently processed by our community