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Top IPO Scholar on Unprecedented IPO Wave & Why IPOs Underperform the Market | Jay Ritter

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Top IPO Scholar on Unprecedented IPO Wave & Why IPOs Underperform the Market | Jay Ritter

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1064 segments

0:00

Six is unique. Three companies with the

0:04

largest IPOs in the history of the

0:06

world. The total proceeds being raised

0:10

are big. Although as a percentage of US

0:12

market cap in the same ballpark as

0:16

during 99 and 2000 and 2021, there are

0:21

very good reasons to be really excited

0:23

about AI. But what's the right price?

0:27

There haven't been all that many

0:28

companies with significant revenue and

0:32

really high price to sales ratios, but

0:36

on average they have underperformed.

0:39

And I've got that concern about SpaceX.

0:42

A lot of money has flowed into venture

0:44

capital and private equity. Prices have

0:47

gotten bit up. When you buy high,

0:51

expected returns are lower. And I don't

0:54

see any reason to think that a free

0:56

lunch is sitting there. Welcome to Other

0:59

People's Money. I'm Maxi and I'm joined

1:01

today by Jay Ritterder, director of the

1:03

IPO initiative at the University of

1:04

Florida's Warrington College of

1:06

Business. Jay, thank you so much for

1:08

joining the show today.

1:09

>> My pleasure. People call you Mr. IPO and

1:13

we are in the midst of what feels like a

1:15

historic run of IPOs with the potential

1:17

for three IPOs of trillion plus dollar

1:21

valuation companies. Of course, we in

1:23

the media love to talk about these big

1:24

nominal numbers, but there's many ways

1:26

you can slice it. You can look at it

1:28

relative to the overall market cap, the

1:30

total issuance, combining even more IPOs

1:32

than just these three, and then of

1:34

course there's inflation. So, how

1:36

historic is this period that we're in

1:38

given your research? It

1:40

>> it is historic uh even after adjusting

1:43

for inflation. uh in nominal terms uh

1:48

until uh this month uh the world's

1:51

largest IPO had been that of Saudi

1:53

Aramco in 2019

1:56

raising about $29 billion in

1:59

inflationadjusted terms that the biggest

2:01

IPO ever was actually back in 1987 when

2:06

Japan privatized NT uh Nepon Telegraph

2:10

and Telephone the government-owned

2:13

telecom company. Uh in inflationadjusted

2:16

terms, that was about a $45 billion

2:19

deal. Uh and and so the SpaceX IPO was

2:23

approximately twice as big. Uh so uh

2:27

that uh definitely uh whether nominal or

2:31

inflation adjusted uh blows away the

2:34

previous records. And uh if it wasn't

2:37

for SpaceX, it's very likely that

2:40

Anthropic and Open AI uh might be the uh

2:45

first or second biggest IPO ever. As it

2:49

is the case, they'll probably be the

2:51

second third biggest ever. So, Japan

2:53

1987,

2:55

uh I know the market, the NIK peaked in

2:58

1989 and entered a very long bare

3:02

market. We just actually in the last few

3:03

years crossed back over that peak from

3:06

1989 in the Nikkay. When you look out at

3:09

the market environment, so many people

3:11

are questioning whether uh these types

3:14

of big IPOs tend to signal market tops.

3:17

Do they tend to mark market turning

3:19

points?

3:20

>> Yes. And like most market predictors, uh

3:23

you know, there's about 51% accuracy for

3:26

for the predictions. Um so so uh you

3:31

know lots has been written and

3:32

deservedly so about how the valuations

3:37

of US equity markets uh my my preferred

3:40

measure is the Schiller uh cape ratio uh

3:44

are at at very lofty levels. Uh but uh

3:49

in 1996 when uh Bob Schiller uh made his

3:53

famous irrational exuberance comment

3:56

which uh was presented uh at a Federal

4:00

Reserve Board meeting and a couple of

4:03

days later Alan Greenspan used the same

4:05

term. Uh that was uh late 1996 more than

4:10

three years uh before that the US market

4:13

peaked at a much higher level. So as

4:17

with all predictors uh uh while on

4:20

average it it might be correct uh

4:24

calling the market peaks and troughs is

4:26

really difficult. I guess another

4:28

question people have is are these

4:30

valuations fair. So you've done a lot of

4:33

looking at how IPOs are valued. I think

4:36

maybe we should just get into how IPOs

4:38

come together, how the price is

4:40

determined normally and then we can look

4:42

at this new wave of IPOs. on average uh

4:46

IPOs underperform after a first day jump

4:51

uh during the next three years or so. Uh

4:54

but uh that's an equally weighted

4:56

average. uh that the evidence is that

4:59

bigger companies and and my preferred

5:01

measure is inflationadjusted sales uh

5:04

that that companies that go public where

5:07

they've got annual revenue of at least

5:10

$und00 million on average they don't

5:13

underperform. institutional investors

5:16

are dominating those IPOs and typically

5:20

they're valuing the company relative to

5:23

other similar companies and on average

5:26

they get it right. Now obviously some

5:29

companies are going to underperform and

5:31

others are going to outperform. So if we

5:34

just look at uh revenue uh all three of

5:38

these mega IPOs are way over that 100

5:41

million mark. Uh I I've also cut the

5:44

numbers for billiondoll revenue

5:46

companies and and the the pattern is is

5:49

similar there that the market largely

5:51

gets it right. But we can slice uh the

5:55

data other ways as well. In particular,

5:58

what about companies going public at

6:01

really high price to sales ratios?

6:04

and with SpaceX that they went public at

6:07

a price to sales ratio of over 90. Uh

6:11

there haven't been all that many

6:12

companies with significant revenue and

6:17

really high price to sales ratios, but

6:20

on average they have underperformed.

6:24

Uh and and I've got that concern about

6:26

SpaceX. uh when you've got a a a company

6:31

that's already demonstrated that they've

6:33

got uh goods and services that people

6:36

are willing to buy, uh they've got

6:38

substantial revenue, but uh the the

6:41

company is being valued uh at such a

6:44

high ratio. A lot of things have to go

6:47

right for the revenue to grow and the

6:51

company to become very profitable in in

6:54

the future.

6:56

uh sometimes it happens but on average

6:59

historically it it hasn't happened and

7:02

with SpaceX

7:04

uh uh they've got uh you know a a

7:08

worldass uh rocket launching business uh

7:12

their Starlink satellite business is

7:15

very profitable very successful when

7:18

they get Starship uh lowering launch

7:21

costs even more that's going to allow

7:23

them to lower the price that that

7:27

Starlink internet service is available

7:29

at, that market can potentially expand

7:33

enormously

7:35

and uh have very attractive profit

7:37

margins. But when the valuation is in

7:42

the vicinity of $2 trillion,

7:45

uh, a lot has to go right, you know, to

7:47

to justify a valuation like that, uh, at

7:51

at a price earnings ratio of 20, the

7:54

company has to have future annual after

7:58

tax profits of hundred billion dollars a

8:01

year. Only a handful of companies in the

8:04

world have achieved that. A lot has to

8:06

go right. Uh it it could um with uh

8:11

SpaceX, anthropic, open AI, uh private

8:16

and public markets wouldn't be willing

8:18

to give them such high valuations if it

8:21

weren't for the case that uh in certain

8:26

verticals uh narrowly defined industries

8:29

in in tech companies like Meta

8:33

Platforms, Apple,

8:36

uh Alphabet, Micros Microsoft, Nvidia

8:39

have demonstrated that either due to

8:43

network effects or or doing or or due to

8:47

really complicated technology

8:50

uh that's really expensive.

8:53

uh a company might own a vertical and

8:56

and if the total addressable market is

8:58

big enough, you you can justify big

9:01

upfront costs uh because there are going

9:04

to be huge

9:06

profits in the future without

9:09

competition eroding those profits. Uh

9:12

tech is not the restaurant business

9:15

where where profits uh are going to be

9:19

limited by competition. if you own a

9:22

space, uh, it it can be very profitable.

9:26

>> On top of the the profit side, another

9:28

interesting thing about SpaceX was

9:30

they're acquiring another company for

9:32

$60 billion sort of around the IPO, this

9:35

acquisition of Cursor, because so much

9:37

of their addressable market is actually

9:40

not even in some of those businesses

9:42

that you listed. It's in these other

9:43

businesses that are actually much more

9:45

nent for SpaceX in terms of their AI

9:49

business. How common is it to have a

9:52

company where the TAM and the revenue

9:56

are so disconnected? Right? They they

9:58

even said in the S1 that that a lot of

10:01

the TAM was from these these businesses

10:03

that are not even generating the

10:05

revenues and profits that you're talking

10:06

about. In the prospectus, there's

10:08

discussion of total addressable market

10:11

of uh like $29 trillion.

10:16

Um and and a lot of that from the AI

10:20

infrastructure area uh you know data

10:23

centers in space uh and uh uh SpaceX is

10:29

actually spending a lot of money on data

10:31

centers on Earth. Now data centers on

10:35

Earth are much more of a competitive

10:38

business. It's a growing area but I I

10:41

don't see enormous profit margins there.

10:44

Uh I I'm not an expert on the

10:47

technology, but everything I I've read

10:49

is for data centers in space. Maybe

10:53

that'll become a big source of revenue

10:57

and profits, but the technological

11:00

hurdles are are pretty substantial. Uh

11:03

so that that's much more speculative. Uh

11:07

with Starship and Starlink, uh it's much

11:10

more dependable.

11:12

uh wi with uh the acquisition of cursor

11:16

um that's a big acquisition

11:19

uh but uh you know Grock w was uh

11:25

largely and also ran maybe this will

11:28

will be the important acquisition that

11:32

that that makes them a serious player

11:34

when Facebook went public in 2012

11:38

uh controversial Mark Zuckerberg went

11:40

out and bought Instagram program right

11:42

before the IPO and Mark Zuckerberg

11:45

didn't even ask the board to approve it.

11:48

Uh at the time it was very controversial

11:51

as as it's turned out great investment.

11:53

So there is uh history for a major tech

11:57

company buying another company for what

12:00

seems like a lot of money relative to

12:02

the the valuation of the of the existing

12:05

business. Um but that was in the social

12:08

media space, right? that was a

12:09

competitor to Facebook.

12:12

So much interest in SpaceX has been

12:14

about the launch business. Uh Starlink,

12:18

you know, Curser is is by and large and

12:21

and Grock even XAI in general is by and

12:24

large like a very different business

12:26

than what got people so excited about

12:28

SpaceX and the vertical of space. And so

12:31

I I'd be interested in in sort of these

12:34

conglomerate businesses and is there any

12:36

anything different about uh businesses

12:38

that don't have sort of a a straight

12:40

vertical when they IPO and come out?

12:42

>> Well, I I think with SpaceX uh it is

12:46

indeed a little different that than many

12:48

of the other big tech companies in that

12:51

uh it is more of a conglomerate. the uh

12:55

AI business and the Starlink business uh

13:00

are somewhat different whereas OpenAI,

13:04

Anthropic uh you know for that matter

13:07

Nvidia uh are are pretty much focused on

13:12

uh a much narrower business. On the

13:15

other hand, Alphabet, while um their

13:18

search engine is is the the big driver

13:21

of revenue and profits, uh they've got

13:24

some other things going on as well.

13:26

Whimo, for instance. Now, what about

13:28

just overall net issuance? know the size

13:31

of these three particular IPOs, one of

13:34

which only one of which has actually

13:35

come to fruition um are historic, but

13:39

then overall you have to compare to just

13:41

the the sum of all of the issuance that

13:44

come that came about. I I took a look at

13:46

your uh some of your data last night and

13:50

was just stunned at the number of

13:52

companies that went public in 1999 and

13:55

and just the late 90s in general. And it

13:57

feels like we haven't seen that. 2021

14:00

felt it wasn't even close, I think, to

14:02

in terms of the total number of

14:04

companies, but it felt more like that.

14:06

This feels quite different in terms of

14:08

its three mega companies. I is that the

14:11

case? How different is it from these

14:12

other hot IPO periods where you're

14:15

seeing lots of smaller companies come to

14:17

market? 2026 is unique. uh if if all

14:21

three of these companies do go public uh

14:25

you know three companies wi with uh the

14:28

largest IPOs in in the history of the

14:31

world uh the total proceeds being raised

14:35

uh are are big uh although as a

14:38

percentage of US market cap uh you know

14:42

in in the same ballpark as during 99 and

14:46

2000 and 2021 but the absolute number of

14:50

companies uh going public this year uh

14:54

is not going to be anywhere near

14:56

records. Um you know nowhere near the

15:00

311 operating companies that went public

15:03

in 2021

15:05

uh in in particular uh software uh

15:08

software as a service. We're not seeing

15:11

a lot of companies going public in

15:13

public and private markets. That there's

15:16

a widespread view that AI is threatening

15:20

the business models of a lot of these

15:21

companies. Uh there haven't been a lot

15:25

of biotech companies going public this

15:27

year. Uh so so we're seeing a lot of

15:31

enthusiasm for AI. Uh but uh that that

15:35

doesn't mean there's enthusiasm for all

15:37

sorts of industries. uh and and in that

15:40

regard in 99 and 2000 the internet

15:44

bubble uh there was enormous enthusiasm

15:47

for internet related companies uh with

15:50

justification but uh other industries

15:55

at the time the term that was being used

15:58

was old economy companies uh the IPO

16:02

market was actually kind of depressed uh

16:04

and and we're seeing you know some

16:07

analogies now where the market is uh

16:10

really gung-ho about certain industries

16:14

uh and less enthusiastic about others.

16:17

People always have the question and you

16:19

you alluded to this earlier that IPOs in

16:21

general are not a great investment over

16:24

a three-year time horizon unless of

16:26

course you're going to these larger

16:29

higher revenue companies then you said

16:31

they keep up. But do they outperform?

16:34

Because a lot of the narrative is that

16:35

you need to have exposure to this

16:37

company or else you're going to be left

16:38

behind. There's commentary about the the

16:41

permanent underclass that that these

16:43

that these companies and AI is going to

16:45

change the world so much that if you

16:46

don't have exposure,

16:48

you're going to be left behind. Is that

16:51

kind of always the narrative with these

16:53

new high-tech companies um and and do

16:56

the large ones that you're talking about

16:57

that keep up, do they actually tend to

16:59

outperform? I think there are a couple

17:00

of issues uh in in your question. One is

17:05

uh kind of a a hedging demand. If AI is

17:08

going to be disruptive changing the

17:10

world uh and your job is threatened um

17:15

you know maybe you should uh hedge some

17:19

of your human capital uh by having

17:21

exposure to AI if uh AI uh does threaten

17:27

some of your labor income. uh maybe

17:29

you'll make some money on your

17:32

investment side. Uh on the other hand,

17:35

that the history of technological change

17:39

is that the main beneficiaries are us

17:42

consumers. Uh and and workers uh not the

17:46

owners of capital. Uh for instance, um

17:50

you know what are some of the really

17:52

earthshattering technological changes

17:55

that have occurred over the years?

17:57

electricity. Um, you know, uh, how many

18:02

billionaires, uh, are are there from,

18:05

uh, all of the incremental improvements

18:07

in electricity? Um, I live in Florida.

18:11

Air conditioning has been great. Uh but

18:14

uh who has made huge sums of money off

18:17

of air conditioning uh for travel? Uh

18:22

you know a 100red years ago uh to get

18:25

from North America to Europe, you took a

18:28

boat. It it took a week or more. Uh now

18:31

you can have non-stop flights from all

18:34

sorts of places to other places uh at uh

18:38

relatively low cost. Um but have

18:41

airlines made a lot of money? Well, you

18:44

know, lots of people have noted over the

18:46

years that uh airline investors h have

18:50

on average uh destroyed wealth with AI.

18:54

Uh uh certain companies look like they

18:58

they will be making quite a bit of money

19:00

out of it. Uh but the the main benefits

19:04

are are going to wind up uh flowing to

19:07

as humans and our role as as consumers.

19:10

uh that this has been the story of

19:12

technological change where lots of

19:15

companies are going to be incorporating

19:17

AI into their businesses. It's going to

19:20

allow them to do things more

19:21

efficiently. Competition is going to

19:24

force them to lower product prices. Uh

19:27

and our standards of living will be

19:29

increasing over time. Uh will it be

19:32

evenly distributed? No. uh you know

19:35

nothing is is totally evenly distributed

19:38

but uh you know standards of living keep

19:41

improving uh not only in North America

19:44

but throughout the world. One of the

19:46

things I think is also unique about

19:48

these companies is the the regulatory

19:51

risk that is there with them. What do

19:54

you think about the the regulatory risk

19:56

for these companies and have there ever

19:57

been um companies that have come to

20:00

market with that sort of albatross

20:02

hanging over them?

20:04

>> There is no question that AI is

20:07

disruptive and going to be very

20:10

disruptive.

20:11

The internet was also disruptive. Uh

20:15

older viewers will remember when you had

20:17

to pay for a long-distance telephone

20:19

call. Um

20:22

you know communication be has become uh

20:25

costless. Uh

20:28

certain industries the media has been

20:31

totally disrupted. The law of unintended

20:34

consequences have not been repealed.

20:37

Nobody predicted uh 70 years ago, 60

20:41

years ago uh that fertility rates around

20:45

the world would fall as much as they

20:47

have. uh the

20:50

equivalent of concern about climate

20:53

change was the population explosion.

20:56

Nobody predicted uh that the worldwide

20:59

declines in fertility rates. Why have

21:02

they occurred? Uh a variety of reasons

21:06

that not all of which are fully

21:08

understood. Uh but the internet has

21:11

probably been partly responsible for it.

21:14

uh the availability of free online

21:18

pornography uh has uh affected the

21:22

behavior of of uh young males and in

21:25

particular with AI. The law of

21:28

unintended consequences has not been

21:30

repealed. You know, a lot has been

21:32

written about uh the decline in social

21:36

interaction with with people being

21:39

online.

21:40

uh you know people are doing this

21:43

voluntarily. There are some advantages

21:45

to it. Uh but there are unintended

21:48

disadvantages.

21:50

Um and uh with with regulation

21:54

uh how to deal with with some of these

21:56

things uh are difficult decisions. Uh

22:00

Europe leads the world in regulation.

22:03

uh a lot has been written about uh why

22:07

uh Europe has not been creating

22:10

world-class tech companies and uh a lot

22:14

has been written about the excessive

22:17

regulation there has been a big cost to

22:21

European companies and uh it's put them

22:24

at a disadvantage lowering the uh stock

22:28

market returns in Europe lowering

22:31

economic growth in Europe

22:33

um with with AI uh that there is a

22:38

legitimate concern about you know what

22:41

if we um have recursive self-improvement

22:45

where some of the models uh go out of

22:48

control and uh either by themselves or

22:52

with bad actors wind up doing uh

22:55

enormous damage. uh it could occur. Uh

23:00

companies like Anthropic, all of the the

23:03

uh big companies are worried about this.

23:06

They're putting in some safeguards. Uh

23:09

are the the safeguards going to be

23:12

sufficient? Only time will tell on that.

23:15

Uh so I I I think uh there's a lot of

23:19

self-regulation going on. That doesn't

23:21

mean there shouldn't be any government

23:23

regulation.

23:25

uh but you can also overdo it. Uh and it

23:29

it's it's really difficult in a lot of

23:31

these areas to figure out exactly what

23:34

the the right way of doing regulation

23:37

is. I guess my question was more about

23:39

any historical analoges where these new

23:42

disruptive technologies had come out and

23:45

people were like like around 1999 when

23:50

all these internet companies were coming

23:51

out were people trying to push for

23:54

regulation to sort of limit this

23:56

disruption or was there a more blas uh

24:00

free market attitude um about about the

24:04

internet at that period in time whereas

24:06

today Um, you know, it's a major it's a

24:10

mi, you know, we we just had primaries

24:13

here in New York City. I can tell you

24:15

that uh I've how many ads I saw that so

24:18

and so took money from AI. Don't vote

24:20

for this guy because he took money from

24:22

AI companies. So, it it it's driving the

24:25

political discussion here in the United

24:27

States. And and I just wonder, you know,

24:29

looking back at these prior cycles

24:31

whether that was the case. There's been

24:33

concern about technological change for

24:36

centuries. You know, lites, uh, uh, you

24:40

know, a couple hundred years ago, uh,

24:42

the industrial revolution was

24:44

threatening certain jobs. With most

24:48

technological changes, the the, uh,

24:51

disruption has been very gradual. You

24:53

know, think about agricultural

24:55

productivity improvement. uh 200 years

24:58

ago almost everybody in the world made

25:01

their living from agriculture. In the US

25:04

you know even broadly defined it's less

25:06

than 2% now. Uh one of the reasons why

25:10

our standards of living have gone up but

25:12

farmers haven't lost their jobs. What

25:16

happened is the children of farmers

25:18

decided I'm not going to be a farmer.

25:21

I'm going to move off to the city and

25:23

take some different job. So it it hasn't

25:26

been as disruptive. Uh with AI, the

25:30

rapidity of change uh and threatening a

25:34

lot of white collar jobs is creating a

25:36

lot of angst and legitimately so. It's

25:40

not irrational for lots of people to

25:42

worry about how uh my job might be

25:45

threatened. In the journalism community,

25:48

uh the internet uh destroyed the

25:51

business model uh of uh traditional

25:55

newspapers, magazines. You know, how how

25:58

many people read a print newspaper now?

26:01

Um

26:03

uh but uh

26:06

this really is disruptive with with the

26:09

uh ability to dramatically increase

26:13

productivity in certain areas uh in a

26:17

very short period of time. Uh so I I I

26:20

can fully understand uh disruption uh be

26:24

being a concern. But what should the

26:27

government do about this? Well, you

26:30

know, should we uh limit technological

26:33

change because they're going to be some

26:34

losers where um we're foregoing big

26:39

productivity changes and having a lower

26:43

standard of living for lots of people.

26:47

uh that that that's a a tougher issue in

26:49

terms of the dynamics of of there are

26:53

going to be some winners, some losers,

26:56

but on average standards of living will

26:59

be improving a it's not as if the US is

27:04

in a um uh situation where uh you know a

27:09

prohibition on improvements here means

27:12

the rest of the world will be standing

27:13

still. you know, in particular, China

27:17

is uh making great advances in in a lot

27:21

of areas and uh you know, unilateral

27:24

disarmament in western democracies

27:27

doesn't always end well. To your point

27:30

about China, I mean, yes, that is a very

27:32

uh that is a very unique aspect of this

27:34

that it it is in many ways an arms race

27:37

um between between the US and China. Um,

27:42

have there been IPOs like this with such

27:46

uh per national defense significance in

27:49

the past and and companies of of

27:52

national interest like this coming to

27:54

market?

27:55

>> There are are certainly some precedents.

27:58

Um but but uh you know there there are a

28:02

lot of companies with dual use um you

28:05

know Boeing uh knows how to build uh big

28:09

commercial airline

28:11

airliners really well uh and a lot the

28:15

same technology is used for military

28:17

airplanes for that matter. Uh, Anderell

28:21

uh is very much a um military tech

28:26

company. Um but uh Anthropic, Boeing,

28:31

others are are dual use. Um and uh you

28:36

know just where you um uh draw the

28:40

dividing lines is difficult. Certainly

28:43

the Trump administration

28:45

uh is uh you know doing some things uh

28:50

some are well thought out others on an

28:53

ad hoc basis you know some may be

28:55

vindictive in their motivation uh that

28:58

creates uncertainty for companies uh but

29:01

but it's not only in the uh tech area

29:05

sometimes in in the supply chain like

29:08

with rare earth metals another question

29:11

I would have is how these things work in

29:14

waves. So we uh in looking at the data

29:17

of um it was the IPOs that doubled in in

29:20

their first day was the data I I looked

29:22

at last night and you know there were a

29:24

lot of them in the late 90s going back

29:26

as far as 1996. Um you know we've had

29:30

enough time between 2021 that I would be

29:33

um I'm willing to say that this this

29:35

current wave of IPOs is not a

29:37

continuation of that wave. And and so my

29:41

question would be, do do you think that

29:44

this is the beginning of a of a

29:46

multi-year wave of public equity

29:48

issuance uh that we're seeing right now?

29:53

>> I don't think it's it's necessarily

29:54

going to result in in a big boom uh in

29:57

the number of IPOs.

30:00

Uh in 2021, uh there was a lot of

30:03

enthusiasm for software as a service

30:06

companies that has faded. But but with

30:09

AI uh the cost of training large

30:13

language models the the cost of doing

30:16

certain things uh is enormous

30:20

and it's an industry structure where

30:23

where some of the verticals are having

30:26

just a small number you know sometimes

30:28

one company uh unlike during the

30:33

internet bubble where where uh the same

30:37

logic of winter takeoff all in in

30:39

certain niches um was there but

30:42

companies were going public at uh a

30:46

stage when it wasn't clear who the

30:49

winners were going to be. Uh a and uh

30:53

now with with companies staying private

30:55

longer with more venture capital money

30:58

uh it tends to be the case that the

31:00

companies going public are those where

31:03

it's much more clear that these are

31:06

among the winners and those that uh

31:10

didn't achieve that never go public. Uh

31:13

some of them sell out in trade sales

31:16

being acquired by a bigger company in

31:18

the same industry, sometimes at a

31:20

premium, sometimes at a fire sale price.

31:23

Um but um you know by and large uh we

31:28

see the successful companies going

31:31

public where there's less chance of of

31:33

complete failure. Uh having said that uh

31:37

there is one big exception to that and

31:39

that is life sciences biotech

31:42

uh where from 2013 to 2022 a very large

31:48

percentage about 30% of all the IPOs

31:52

were in that one sector

31:55

and most of them went public with zero

31:59

revenue from product sales. Um and most

32:02

of them went public where they had a

32:05

business model where the chance that we

32:07

have revenue from product sales is zero

32:10

during the next 5 years. Uh that that

32:13

was an industry where uh that there are

32:16

voracious demands for capital. Uh where

32:20

lots of companies were were going public

32:23

uh where the scientific uncertainties

32:27

were big. uh some of them like madna uh

32:30

turned out to be big winners uh a lot of

32:33

them that the science just hasn't worked

32:36

but uh that you know that's the story of

32:39

drug development. Do you think that the

32:42

change from smaller more speculative

32:44

companies coming to market and public

32:46

market investors getting the chance to

32:48

invest in them in earlier stages to what

32:50

we have now with these later stage

32:53

companies being the ones that come to

32:54

market. Do you think that is a good

32:56

thing or a bad thing for markets?

32:58

>> I don't think it's good or bad. Um that

33:01

that there's been a lot of hand ringing

33:03

about individuals not having the

33:06

opportunity to get in at an early stage.

33:09

Uh but uh a lot of money has flowed into

33:13

venture capital and private equity. Uh

33:16

prices have gotten bid up. When you buy

33:20

high, expected returns are lower. uh and

33:24

I don't see any reason to think that a

33:26

free lunch is sitting there. Uh you know

33:30

LPS that last few years have not been

33:34

earning especially high returns on

33:36

average. you know, for the funds that

33:38

had invested early in SpaceX and

33:42

anthropic and open AI, they've done very

33:45

well. But a lot of VC funds didn't

33:48

invest in those companies and put a lot

33:52

of money into software as a service

33:54

companies, for instance, and haven't

33:56

done all that well. But but in in

33:59

general,

34:01

you know, I I I think money flows into

34:03

different asset classes

34:06

uh until the point where the expected

34:09

returns on a riskadjusted basis are not

34:12

abnormally high or low. And I I don't

34:15

see any reason for venture capital or or

34:18

private equity to be an exception there.

34:21

I I I just don't see a a free lunch

34:23

sitting there uh that that uh I'm

34:27

clamoring to invest in.

34:29

>> So do you think that we've reached that

34:31

state for those asset classes?

34:33

>> Yes. Um now you can also make the case

34:36

and it has been made and correctly so

34:40

that that certain asset classes are

34:43

illquid uh such as private equity and

34:46

venture capital. they're they're less

34:48

liquid than investing in publicly traded

34:51

stocks and bonds and and so there should

34:54

be an illquidity premium. Um and uh for

35:00

investors such as pension funds with

35:03

long horizons uh putting some of your

35:07

assets into these asset classes uh and

35:10

earning that illquidity premium uh is a

35:13

very sensible investment strategy. But

35:17

that illquidity premium is not based

35:20

upon a law of physics. Uh it's based

35:23

upon money flowing in and out. And my

35:27

opinion is that so much money has flowed

35:30

in that that illiquidity premium is

35:34

probably pretty close to zero. The other

35:37

side of it too is that we now actually

35:39

we do have access to those companies

35:41

still. So there are vehicles now for

35:43

retail investors who traditionally have

35:45

to wait for these companies to go public

35:47

to get access many of them in the form

35:49

of closedend funds that can trade at

35:51

huge premiums to the net asset value at

35:55

the private marks. I mean what do you

35:57

think about these new ways that people

35:59

can get exposure to these private assets

36:01

that as you just pointed out h have

36:04

largely been bit up uh with all the

36:06

capital that has flown into the space.

36:08

Do you think that that is is gonna by

36:10

and large harm investors?

36:12

>> For a lot of these products, you're

36:13

paying fees on fees. Uh there's, you

36:17

know, an extra level of middlemen

36:19

involved and uh you know, it's not at

36:23

all clear to me that the public market

36:26

investors are are going to do great. Um

36:31

that there there's also an issue of of

36:34

access. Uh lots of people want to invest

36:37

in Sequoia Capitals funds. Sequoia

36:40

Capital has a a phenomenal track record.

36:44

Uh but uh you know even big

36:47

institutional investors I are frequently

36:50

told by Sequoia Capital we don't need

36:52

your money. Uh for retail investors uh

36:57

that there's an adverse selection

36:59

problem. even if an asset class does

37:02

well, uh that doesn't mean the funds

37:05

that you can get into are going to do as

37:08

well as the average. Uh and I I think

37:11

that's a especially uh when there's an

37:15

extra level of fees involved. So, um,

37:19

you know, I I I just don't see uh that

37:22

that there's that this free lunch

37:24

sitting there uh that that uh retail

37:27

investors are losing out on. Well, even

37:30

doing as well as the average isn't

37:31

really that good, especially in in

37:34

venture. I think that the returns are

37:36

are clustered largely in the top desile

37:39

where if you can't get in to those

37:40

funds, um you're better off sticking

37:43

just to public markets. Um, but one of

37:47

the reasons that institutional investors

37:49

do tend to like uh these these

37:52

pre-market style funds is that the

37:56

volatility of them you you know they're

37:58

they're setting their own marks. They're

37:59

they're marked when they want to raise

38:01

and and you can do a lot of things to

38:04

avoid having to do an equity raise,

38:06

especially now with the size of the

38:08

venture debt markets. you know, you can

38:10

find ways to sort of bypass having to

38:12

take a down round and having any sort of

38:14

downward volatility in your portfolio.

38:18

Um, but there are new things coming out.

38:20

I we're starting to get um these, as of

38:24

right now, they're largely in in

38:26

offshore markets, but these perpetual

38:28

futures for unlisted companies that are

38:32

pricing these private assets. And so my

38:36

question would be do you think that that

38:38

is has the potential to change this

38:41

latestage IPO

38:43

uh phenomenon that we're seeing because

38:47

by and large people have said that it's

38:49

because they they like to stay private

38:51

because there's no fluctuation in the

38:52

asset value and allows them to think

38:54

long term. But if the market has has

38:56

created a financial derivative and it's

38:58

trading and it's setting the price and

39:00

that's informing what private market

39:02

investors think you're worth, uh what's

39:04

the point in in staying away from the

39:06

public markets? And so I I wonder what

39:08

you think about some of these new

39:09

developments and how they might change

39:10

some of these trends we've been seeing

39:12

over the last few years. There is this

39:14

issue of what Cliff Andessa said AQR

39:18

refers to as volatility washing that

39:21

using stale pricing uh takes uh an asset

39:26

that um uh actually is pretty volatile

39:30

and pretends that it is not volatile.

39:34

Uh, and uh, you know, some of the LPs

39:38

might want to uh, pretend that that they

39:42

like uh, this pretend lack of volatility

39:46

uh, because it makes them uh, sleep

39:48

easier at night or to uh, mislead uh,

39:53

the u

39:55

uh, fundamental owners about how risky

39:58

the investments uh, really are. Uh

40:03

so so uh you know my opinion is uh in

40:07

real estate uh as as well as VC and PE

40:12

you see a lot of volatility washing uh

40:16

uh among uh private real estate funds uh

40:22

they report much smoother returns and

40:25

wagged returns

40:27

uh than publicly traded REITs do.

40:30

for instance. Uh but on average uh the

40:35

private equity real estate funds have

40:39

lower returns. Um maybe it's it's

40:42

because uh some investors are willing to

40:45

overpay for fake lower volatility. Um

40:50

now uh per h have recently uh been

40:55

attracting attention. Uh maybe that's

40:58

going to be changing some things but uh

41:02

you know extra layers of fees um uh

41:06

complications

41:08

uh uh you know there's potential for

41:11

some fraud uh there uh you know I think

41:14

it's just a matter of time before there

41:17

are some scandals w with uh various

41:20

funds uh turning out to be ponzi schemes

41:24

uh you know that that's one of the

41:26

reasons that that people are willing to

41:28

pay up for a brand name behind it. Uh

41:31

less chance of of uh due diligence not

41:34

having uh been undertaken. But but e

41:37

even there there's still uh

41:39

opportunities to get taken. Uh after

41:42

all, even Sequoia Capital uh was a

41:46

victim of the FTX fraud. Certainly even

41:50

the the smartest people in the room got

41:51

caught up in in FTX and and many other

41:54

um fraudulent businesses and you know in

41:56

the private credit world there's a lot

41:58

of concern about private credit risk and

42:00

and by and large like the two biggest um

42:03

scandals we've we've had were pretty

42:06

fraudulent in their nature rather than

42:08

credit events. Um there there was a lot

42:10

of fraud going on there. Um but but my

42:12

question was more about you know take a

42:14

take a hypothetical company that has

42:16

raised at a at a hundred billion dollar

42:18

valuation in the private markets. Um and

42:21

people are speculating that it it might

42:22

be coming public soon and and so they're

42:25

now somebody has launched a perpetual

42:27

future on it and that perpetual future

42:30

based off of what's happening to public

42:32

market comps is now trading at $50

42:33

billion in terms of its its implied

42:36

valuation of the company. um you know,

42:39

how is that going to affect

42:42

private capital's willingness to pay up

42:44

for the $150 billion round that that

42:46

hypothetical company wants to get and

42:50

and how is that going to change the

42:51

calculus around doing another round in

42:54

the private markets? I mean, we've heard

42:56

about companies doing series H M L. You

43:00

know, we're we're going to run out of

43:01

letters eventually. Um and and I'm just

43:04

wondering whether this new form of price

43:06

discovery might might impact those

43:09

decisions if you see that being

43:10

possible. These markets getting large

43:12

enough that um they they they impact

43:15

capital flows in that way.

43:18

I I think there there is indeed uh an

43:21

issue that it's hard to mark something

43:25

at a stale price when there's an obvious

43:29

um public indicator out there that that

43:33

uh market participants are paying a

43:36

different price. uh with uh mutual funds

43:40

that that invest in private companies uh

43:43

they don't all mark that that uh equity

43:47

investment or for that matter private

43:49

credit investment uh to the same mark.

43:54

uh that the more transparent uh the

43:57

valuation on and the private investment

43:59

is, the harder it is to uh avoid uh

44:05

marking it to to market based upon that

44:08

that public number. and and and with

44:10

with mutual funds um where uh they've

44:14

got to post an NAB every day uh they

44:17

they do have a uh strong motivation to

44:23

have an accurate mark. um uh to the

44:26

degree that that you've got a uh tiny

44:29

portion of the portfolio in a a private

44:32

investment. Uh if you're not marketing

44:35

it to market, the distortion in the

44:37

overall NAV is pretty minor. uh the the

44:41

bigger is uh your portfolio

44:45

uh in that asset uh the the more

44:48

important it is to market to market to

44:51

prevent a stale price arbitrage

44:54

opportunity. Um that there um you know

44:58

are are some uh funds out there that uh

45:02

real estate funds that that uh use

45:04

appraised values that don't mark to

45:07

market. uh where uh the stale price

45:10

arbitrage uh is there uh I've taken

45:14

advantage of it on uh some occasions

45:17

where public market uh valuations of

45:21

real estate funds have dropped uh stale

45:24

pricing allows me to get out at a high

45:27

NAV with a predictable decline ahead. um

45:31

you know, I'm diluting the other

45:34

shareholders that haven't taken their

45:36

money out by by doing that. Uh and and

45:39

um uh the the one fund that that I did

45:43

this with where I know some of the the

45:45

board members uh you know, I I've told

45:48

them, you shouldn't be doing this. You

45:50

shouldn't be allowing people like me to

45:54

take advantage of the other

45:55

shareholders.

45:56

uh and it still goes on because a lot of

46:00

the constituents like those nice steady

46:04

uh returns. Well, things may be turning

46:07

and it tends to have to do with with the

46:10

introduction of retail into these

46:12

private markets. So, earlier this month,

46:14

there were announcements that the

46:15

Southern District of New York is

46:17

starting to look into valuation

46:19

practices of private credit and private

46:22

equity. And you know, there's a saying

46:24

in markets that they they don't take the

46:26

punch bowl away while while the music is

46:28

playing. Um, and and by and large,

46:30

institutional investors are kind of held

46:32

to a different standard. They you're

46:33

you're tall enough to ride the ride. You

46:36

can suffer the consequences of of your

46:38

folly if you if you make a mistake, but

46:40

retail investors are more protected. And

46:43

private assets, they're moving retail

46:46

into them. And so the the mismatch in

46:49

marks like like I I'm wondering whether

46:52

there's a world where if there is a deep

46:53

and liquid perpetual futures market in

46:56

private companies is a venture capital

46:59

firm going to be allowed especially if

47:01

they have some sort of evergreen vehicle

47:03

with access to those companies are they

47:05

going to be allowed to set their own

47:07

marks? Is that going to be, you know, I

47:10

this is speculative, but I I I I see a

47:13

world where there's just more retail

47:15

capital in there and and there's perhaps

47:17

more oversight. I think there is the the

47:20

possibility of a sea change here because

47:24

in in private markets where you've got

47:26

institutional investors, even if they're

47:28

being victimized,

47:30

uh they're hesitant to sue. Uh why?

47:34

Well, one of the reasons is if you've

47:36

got a history of suing GPS,

47:39

uh, you know, other GPS don't want you

47:43

as an LP. Uh, with retail in investors,

47:47

uh, class action plaintiff attorneys

47:51

are, uh, happy to jump in. Uh, they're

47:55

not worried about, uh, getting shut out

47:58

of, uh, future investment opportunities.

48:01

So the uh in incentives for um in

48:06

investors um or at least the incentives

48:10

of their attorneys I are different uh

48:14

and and I I think uh with retail

48:16

products uh that there's going to be

48:18

much more pressure to mark to market uh

48:22

especially when you've got uh you know

48:26

per uh giving uh clear signals about

48:30

market prices. Now, it will still be the

48:32

case that there will be a legitimate

48:35

argument that well, maybe those public

48:38

market uh

48:41

investors uh setting the price don't

48:44

have access to all of the private

48:46

information. Uh that that results in um

48:50

uh some of the insiders uh knowing that

48:53

that uh the the uh value is actually

48:57

there. even even if public market

49:00

investors aren't aware of it. Uh so it

49:04

it's it's not always going to be a black

49:06

and white decision and there there will

49:08

be some gray areas. I want to close with

49:10

a with a question about sentiment and

49:12

and uh depending upon which side of this

49:15

you're on, you're either very concerned

49:17

about the equity issuance that we're

49:18

seeing or you're very excited about the

49:21

equity issuance that we're seeing. Do

49:22

you think either of those groups are are

49:24

right or wrong based off of what your

49:26

study of IPO markets has told you?

49:31

>> Sentiment does matter, but uh sentiment

49:35

is partly based upon the fundamentals

49:37

and and this is one of the reasons that

49:39

it's so difficult to disentangle things

49:43

that that people tend to get optimistic,

49:46

overly optimistic when there are good

49:48

reasons to be optimistic. uh and and so

49:51

figuring out is this rational or is

49:54

there overreaction

49:56

uh is frequently quite difficult. You

49:58

know, there are very good reasons to be

50:00

really excited about AI. Uh but what's

50:05

the right price? Uh that that's much

50:07

harder to determine. Um I one thing I I

50:11

might uh mention that that we haven't uh

50:15

focused on is US venture capital has

50:19

done quite well. Uh but uh you know we

50:24

don't hear uh a whole lot about Japanese

50:27

venture capital, European venture

50:29

capital, Latin American venture capital.

50:32

Why? well that there haven't been the 10

50:35

baggers there uh with the frequency that

50:38

it has occurred in the US and uh you

50:42

know as as a result that the returns to

50:44

LPS haven't been as good um and not as

50:48

much money flows in as a result uh that

50:52

that's that's why uh the venture capital

50:55

market is so big in the US because there

50:58

have been so many of the 10 baggers um

51:01

and

51:03

you know with 2020 hindsight uh clearly

51:06

US tech has been the area to invest in

51:09

in recent decades. Um but you know a big

51:14

question is at current valuation levels

51:17

is it all priced in today?

51:20

Yes, that is the big question one that

51:21

we'll get the answer to over time but

51:24

unfortunately for now we're just going

51:25

to have to uh to speculate and wait and

51:27

watch. Uh, Professor Ritter at the

51:29

director of the IPO initiative at the

51:31

University of Florida's Warrington

51:32

College of Business. Uh, where can

51:34

people find your work?

51:35

>> My website IPO data page. If you just

51:39

Google J Ritter IPO data, it will pop up

51:43

right away.

51:44

>> All right. Well, thank you very much,

51:45

professor. Thank you.

Interactive Summary

The video features a discussion with Jay Ritter, director of the IPO initiative at the University of Florida, regarding the current historic landscape of IPOs, particularly focusing on mega-cap AI-related companies like SpaceX. Ritter analyzes the validity of these high valuations, the risks associated with private capital, and the shifting dynamics of market regulation and sentiment. He highlights that while AI is transformative, the primary beneficiaries are often consumers rather than investors, and cautions against the 'free lunch' narrative in private equity and venture capital.

Suggested questions

4 ready-made prompts