I think we may be in a moment of foreign

policy rupture in the Democratic Party.

It reminds me of years ago when the Iraq

war remade the Democratic Party. The

Iraq War, which is why Barack Obama beat

Hillary Clinton in the 2008 primary,

changing the course of American

politics.

>> Because I will offer a clear contrast as

somebody who never supported this war,

thought it was a bad idea. I don't want

to just end the war, but I want to end

the mindset that got us into war in the

first place. That's the kind of

leadership I'm going to promote

>> right now. Israel and Gaza feel to me

like they are becoming the center of a

similar rupture. The thing that started

here for me was a few weeks ago Brian

Shots who is a Democratic senator from

Hawaii. He's often talked of as maybe

the next Senate Democratic leader after

Chuck Schumer. So a guy with an

incredible sense of the pulse of the

party. He tweeted, "I'm not into

blacklisting [music] anyone from future

work in their area of expertise, but I

do think it's fair to want a whole new

crop, a whole new crop of foreign policy

staffers in the next Democratic

administration. It's not like the same

120 people are the only people who know

anything." Then Senator Chris Van

Holland, again very well respected in

the party, very much someone in its

mainstream, he wrote an opinion piece

for the [music] Times, laying out how

different he thinks the Democratic

Party's policy on Israel needs to be,

how badly he thinks the Biden

administration's policy failed. And then

he went on to say, "Primary voters won't

trust any Democratic presidential

candidate who does not have a record of

moral and strategic clarity on these

issues, especially if, as a legislator,

he or she voted to send Mr. Netanyahu

bombs, even as his government imposed a

total blockade on Gaza. Nor will they

support a candidate who plans to

reinlist the senior Democratic decision

makers who whitewash the truth during

the Biden administration [music] and

refuse to acknowledge their complicity.

Complicity is a strong word in a intern

[music] democratic fight here. Then

we've seen a number of Democratic

primaries beginning to split [music]

over Gaza. It has become an essential

issue in the Michigan Democratic Senate

primary where Abdul Elsad leads in many

of the new polls.

>> You're watching Democrats bend over

backwards in the most pretzel-like way

to justify the war. They're like, "This

is an illegal war, but if they asked me,

I'd fund it." If you don't have the

[music] courage to call out the moral

abomination of a genocide, then what do

you have the courage to call out in the

first place? This is a moral roarshock

test for our party.

>> It was very present in the New Jersey

House primary that Adam Hami, a doctor

who had treated the injured in Gaza,

just won.

>> I was running on something very simple

is that we should be spending on healthc

care, not bombs. [music] we should be

spending on our communities here, you

know, in New Jersey, in America, uh, and

not funding bombs overseas for, you

know, atrocities and genocide. We should

not be funding the endless wars that

we're seeing.

>> It's been at the center of the House

primary in my district in New York,

where Brad Lander is running against the

incumbent, Dan Goldman. And much of

Lander's attack is centered on Goldman's

support for Israel.

>> Representative Goldman does not view

what's happening there as a genocide.

I've been fighting against Israel's

occupation of the West Bank and Gaza uh

since 1990. I've never heard him say the

word occupation [music]

in that context.

>> Lander 2 is well ahead in recent polls.

Into all of this comes Trump's war in

Iran, a war he has fought alongside

Israel and just the general failure of

his tariff and foreign policy. And so

it's made this moment a moment when

something new really could emerge. The

Democratic Party is not going to go back

to Bidenism. It is not going to try to

replicate Trumpism. So what would

something different actually look like

beyond just Gaza though? Of course,

including Gaza, what would it do

differently? Matt Dus is the executive

vice president at the Center for

International Policy. He's worked at the

Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace and the Center for American

Progress. He served as Senator Bernie

Sanders foreign policy adviser and he's

advised Representative Alexandria

Cosiocortez. thus is really at the

center [music] of foreign policy

thinking among the elected left. I want

to have man to explore a question that I

think might come to define the 2028

primary. What would a left foreign

policy look like? [music] What would it

actually try to do in the world? As

always, my email escline shown

times.com.

[music]

>> Matt Dus, welcome to the show.

>> Thank you. So, you wrote a piece in the

Nation recently saying that Democrats

can't avoid a reckoning on Gaza. What is

that reckoning?

>> Well, I think first it involves

understanding that um we're not going to

sidestep Gaza as an issue as as the

party moves forward. Um I do think the

Gaza debate, the Gaza debacle, the Gaza

genocide um stands for a lot that is

wrong with our politics. And I think if

Democrats are going to be able to offer

a compelling alternative vision of how

they're going to govern, they really

need to have a discussion, have a

debate, have a reckoning um with what

the Biden administration did, not just

with the policy, but with the the

campaign of what I think was clearly

disinformation that accompanied that

policy. And that's going to involve some

very tough conversations. that's going

to be putting um you know a spotlight on

some key officials who served in the

Biden administration um and some of whom

probably hope to serve again and

probably should not get to.

>> What do you mean by a campaign of

disinformation?

>> I mean I'm looking at you know the way

that the Biden administration talked um

the White House, you know, the the State

Department, you had this constant um

refrain of, oh, we're not seeing that.

We've not made that assessment. We have

not made an assessment or drawn the

conclusion that they are in violation of

international humanitarian law when it

comes to the provision of humanitarian

assistance into Gaza.

>> Given the nature of Hamas's track record

of colllocating itself with civilians,

using civilians as human shields, uh

we're unable to make a conclusive uh

determination uh as it relates to

violations of international humanitarian

law. We at this time have not made an

assessment that they're that the

Israelis are in violation of US law.

>> And it was clear that they were choosing

not to see things that were happening.

Everyone else in the world could see

these things were happening.

Palestinians themselves were reporting

these things were happening. Israeli and

Palestinian human rights groups is

international NOS's reporting that these

things were happening. This is one of

the things that I really I I think

underlines this disconnect here is the

Biden administration made an assessment

within a month of the Russian invasion

of Ukraine in February 2022. Within a

month, uh, Secretary of State Blinken

came out and made an assessment that

Russia is committing war crimes.

>> Yesterday, President Biden said that in

his opinion, war crimes have been

committed in Ukraine.

Personally, I agree. The idea that they

could not make a similar assessment of a

military into whose operations the

United States has vastly more visibility

I think is just just it's just not

credible.

>> See you know many of the people in the B

administration. You've talked to them.

>> What do you think happened? And and when

I ask I mean it in a very specific way.

What do you think were the set of

commitments or values because these

people see themselves as having deep

commitments and deep values

>> that in your view went wrong and led to

the policy that we had? Yeah, I mean I

think first this really does come down

to Joe Biden, not only Joe Biden. Um but

Joe Biden I think had a very particular

conception um both of how US policy

toward the Middle East, how US policy

toward Israel should work and he had a a

very serious confidence um uh I would

say misplaced but he had great

confidence in his own judgment about how

to use US foreign policy. Um he had a

view of the US-Israel relationship which

he he said many times there should be no

daylight. If there were differences in

opinion, differences in policy those

should be expressed privately whereas in

public uh the United States should

remain essentially in lock step with

whatever the Israeli government was

doing. And I think he has had that view

for a very long time. Um his his view

was okay we're you know we're going to

express some differences with what

Israel is doing here and there but we're

not really going to put any real

pressure on them to change policy. You

know, as a former staffer um myself, I

know that once the boss has kind of laid

down the parameters um of where he or

she is willing to go and not go, I think

staffers start to tend to shape, you

know, you stop arguing and you say,

"Okay, this is these these are the

guardrails um and you start to shape

policy within those guardrails." And

Biden made clear repeatedly and he made

clear actually during the 2020 primary

uh when Senator Sanders kicked off a

debate about conditioning military aid

uh to Israel. I mean Biden at the time

called that a preposterous idea. There

was maybe there was that one time when

he withheld one shipment of uh 2,000lb

bombs, but other than that there really

no consequences for what the entire

world could see was an ongoing set of

atrocities. I have a question about this

that that maybe you know the answer to

because it's always confused me. I think

it's fair to say at this point for the

left Gaza exists as a if not the central

failure of the Biden administration. And

I agree with you that much of that comes

down to Joe Biden himself.

>> When Biden was being pushed to step

down,

>> the some of the strongest people

fighting that effort, trying to keep

Biden in place were Bernie Sanders and

AOC.

>> And I never quite understood why. you

know them better than I do particularly

given like the centrality of Gaza now

and obviously that was true in 2024

what was going on there

>> I mean I can say what I know what I from

my perspective I think their view was

you know they knew Biden obviously they

disagreed with the Gaza policy they were

two of the most vocal critics of the

Gaza policy but they knew that when it

came to other policies in domestic

economic policy trade policy they at

least had an ear in in the White House.

Um Joe Biden um and his team had been

willing to talk with engage with them on

a whole range of issues beyond foreign

policy. But I also I got to say I feel

like there was also I think a pragmatic

sense and this is just my suspicion. I'm

not you know this I don't have any

inside information. I think it makes

sense like listen if someone's going to

push Joe Biden out it's not going to be

the progressive left. They're very

aware. I think all progressives in the

Democratic party are aware that we have

a centrist establishment that is always

looking for reasons to call us, you

know, disunifying records. So, I think

that kind of played into their hesitance

as well.

>> Let me then ask you about the way the

policy was changing as you say that in

the 2020 campaign, Bernie Sanders kicked

off a debate on conditioning aid,

>> which is something that has been

anathema in the Democratic party for a

long time. All of a sudden, it's not. I

thought the op-ed by Senator Chris Van

Holland was a pretty significant Yeah.

>> moment. I mean, he's a

>> an establishment figure

>> uh who's been very outspoken on Israel

for a long time. It's worth saying.

>> Let me ask it directly. What in your

view should the Democrat's position

towards Israel be? What is the right

policy here?

>> Well, I think first of all, it's to end

aid. It's to end I mean, Israel is a

wealthy country. Um there's there's

really no need for American taxpayers to

continue to subsidize uh their defense

budget. I mean that's a position that

was put out there by AOC and I think

about 5 minutes later Rahm Emanuel came

up right behind. So very interesting.

These are two people who kind of

represent different polls in the party.

But I do think we're getting close to

that. Um but then moving from that I

think it's not just aid, it is sales.

And we do have laws on the books. I mean

this is why I found the whole

conditioning aid conditioning arm sales

debate so bizarre the way it was treated

as some kind of you know kind of weird

punishment. We have laws on the books

that condition aid to every country

according to a set of principles whether

it's the Lehey law whether it's the arms

export and control act. There are

existing laws that you know prohibit or

restrict the sale of arms to militaries

or military units that have a proven

record of human rights abuses. We have

simply not upheld those laws. multiple

administrations have simply simply

ignored them. And again, this is what I

was saying about the Biden

administration.

>> Do we I have a question for you. Would

you say we follow those laws in general

and make an exception for Israel or do

we not follow them in general?

>> I think there are certain countries,

Israel being one, Egypt, others,

countries that we have, Saudi Arabia.

Um, yes. I mean, so I think listen, the

arms the arms lobby is an extremely

powerful one. There is a strong

incentive to just kind of push these

sales through. Do you think it comes

from the arms lobby or do you think it

comes from the American foreign policy

establishments or the president's

feeling that the alliances with these

countries are important for other

reasons?

>> I think it's all those things. I mean,

in in some cases, it might be one more

than the other, but I do think this gets

to a much bigger problem is that the

security state, the military-industrial

complex, whatever word we're going to

use now. I mean, this is a real problem.

This is how we part of how we ended up

in this ridiculous war with Iran. But

getting back to what the Democrat's

position should be on Israel, I think

yes, first of all, you know, uphold our

existing laws when it comes to arm

sales, but also let's really tee up a

policy that empowers, you know, the best

actors um toward in Israel and Palestine

rather than the worst ones because

unfortunately, as I see it, that is what

our policy has been doing for the past

20 plus years.

>> Can you describe how it's done that and

then what the alternative would look

like?

>> Right. I mean, I think we've had a

policy where basically all the

consequences and disincentives and

punishments and sticks, so to speak,

have been focused on one side, not

entirely, but mostly. That's on one

side, the less powerful side, the

Palestinians. Um, there's always some

kind of new condition that's placed on

them to receive aid. And, you know, and

again, some of this is is legit.

Obviously, we we should impose

consequences for for terrorism. I mean,

that that that that is true. Um but at

the same time there are zero

consequences that are imposed any any

real meaningful consequences that are

ever imposed on the more powerful side

uh the Israeli side. And I think this

this this dynamic has really, you know,

given Israel a very reasonable belief

that they can just press forward with

with de facto annexation which is

ongoing as we speak with entrenching

their control over all of the land of

Israel and Palestine in perpetuity and

to weaken and diminish the Palestinian

national movement to just, you know, a

completely, you know, controlled subject

population within a greater Israel.

That's the situation we're in right now.

And the reason this keeps ticking in one

direction is because there's no reason

for it not to. I mean, there are no

consequences for more and more extremist

leaders in Israel to raise and implement

more extremist policies. At the same

time, you know, Palestinians look at

that and they look at their own kind of

ineffective corrupt leadership and

they're like, "What is this?" They they

see only more occupation and it empowers

extremist voices who are saying, "No,

the way to get our freedom is through

the gun." Um, and that's what I mean

when like we have pursued policies that

have empowered uh some of the worst

actors who don't want peace. Um,

>> so be specific for me. What are these

policies and what would their

alternative or opposite look like?

>> Yeah. I mean, I would say first of all,

let's look at Gaza. You need um first of

all, governance basic, you know, Gaza as

as as I'm sure your your your listeners

know, I mean, it's it's a ruin now. It's

still it's a series of tent cities. Um,

but the way to bring order, the way to

bring services to people, the way to to

bring real control is to have it

governed by Palestinians. That's

ultimately the only way um that you're

going to be able to

>> Can that include Hamas?

>> I think it has to include some kind of

tacid agreement with Hamas. As we as we

all know, Hamas remains in Gaza. Um, it

has not been destroyed. Um, so they they

continue to be a relevant force. But I

think what we have to come around to is

just understanding that, you know, the

the disarmament of Hamas will never

happen under a situation of occupation.

It will only conceivably happen under a

situation of legitimate Palestinian

self-governance.

>> And what does it look like on the other

side? What what have these policies been

and what would they be towards Israel?

>> I mean, first off, let's start to create

disincentives for these policies. Let's

let's state plainly that these the

settlements are illegal. um that that

officials who who support them and

facilitate their growth um should face

consequences. They should face

sanctions. I think you know one of the

very few good things that the Biden

administration did on Israel Palestine

was you know sanctions against violent

settlers but I think that's just the tip

of the iceberg but I think it will start

to shift the dynamic once you show that

there are real costs for these policies.

>> Let me ask you about attention here.

Something Biden administration officials

often told me was, and including on this

show at times, was that there was only

so far they could push or restrain

Netanyahu, and they thought it was

better to remain in conversation, to

remain with some leverage over the

Israeli government. It's funny when you

were talking about why AOC and Bernie

might have wanted Biden to stay on the

ticket despite deeply disagreeing with

him on Gaza.

>> Well, they had his ear.

>> Mhm. And you know, even right now, there

is huge amounts of criticism from the

Israeli opposition that Netanyahu is

listening too much to Donald Trump and

not launching the scale of assault on

Lebanon that he has promised and that

they want him to launch. So like even

the incredibly modest level

>> of uh concession Netanyahu appears to be

making to Trump has become a political

liability for him in Israel. So there is

some tension here between kind of

maintaining,

you know, the line of communication and

the possible, you know, influence over

Israeli decisions, but then you're

complicit in them arguably.

>> Yeah.

>> How do you think about that?

>> Yeah. Well, I would say three things.

One is first of all, even if you don't

change their behavior at all, you are at

least no longer providing arms for a

genocide. I count that as as a win in

and of itself. Second of all, this idea

that okay, they could just move forward

without us. I don't I mean, we have

enough um you know, Israeli security

officials, not just recently, but going

back many years saying, listen, without

US support, we could not we simply could

not continue. I mean, that is what this

the Israeli security echelon believes.

And third, this idea that they were just

staying engaged to have influence. I

don't buy that. And the reason I don't

is I'm going to go back to I believe it

was 2019. And this is when I was working

with Senator Sanders on a war powers

resolution on Yemen. Uh the United

States was involved in support of the

Emirati and Saudi war on Yemen. Um

massive humanitarian crisis at that time

the worst humanitarian crisis in the

world. And Senator Sanders and along

with Senator Chris Murphy, Senator Mike

Lee offered a war powers resolution

which basically says the president has

taken the United States into a conflict

without the appropriate authorization uh

from Congress. And at the time, a number

of former Obama administration officials

published a letter, which we really

appreciated, saying that they had made a

mistake because this war started under

the Obama administration. And initially,

President Obama and his team supported

it for exactly the reason you just said

in Israel, which was to say, okay, we

don't necessarily like this war on

Yemen, but staying engaged and staying

supportive of what the Saudis and the

Amiradis are doing will give us some

influence in how this war is conducted.

They said in that letter that was a

mistake. We were not able to have

meaningful influence. And in fact, what

we did was just give affirmation to a

terrible war. And some of the people who

signed that letter went on to serve in

the Biden administration and are now out

here offering the exact same argument

for why it was better to continue

supporting Netanyahu and Israel and

Gaza. And I don't buy it. The other

argument you'll hear this sometimes from

Democrats very often from Republicans is

that Israel is an American ally. We

stand with our allies. Israel is a

important strategic partner in the

region and intelligence and cooperation

and other things.

>> And so there is an American strategic

interest more of a realist take than a

values-based take

>> in maintaining a tight alliance. Do you

buy that?

>> What I mean are we benefiting from our

our relationship to the Middle East

right now? What's happening? are we

benefiting from this relationship? I

mean, yes, I hear this argument a lot.

It's it's kind of almost it's like a

holy rit in Washington. Um, but I I I I

do question it. Yes, it's good to have

allies. It's good to have democratic

allies. I think the United States should

work with with allies uh to defend their

legitimate security interests. I think

what Israel has been doing is not

remotely uh legitimate. Um, when I hear

people bring up, oh, like do we have

this cooperation on technology on on on

tech? And my answer is, well, well, for

what? You know, obviously this is very

very good for Israel. This alliance has

been very very good for Israel. But when

I look at the costs and benefits both

strategically, ethically, morally,

politically, diplomatically

to [snorts] the USIsrael relationship, I

don't think it works out in the US's

favor. I think it's up to a larger

foreign policy debate that is happening

right now about what should drive

American foreign policy.

>> And when I listen to some of the people,

some of whom you have advised who are

articulating this on the left, AOC,

>> Bernie Sanders, people like Chris Murphy

and Jason Crowe, congressman,

>> something they center is that our

foreign policy should be based on

values.

>> Hear a lot of talk of interest, but but

they will talk a lot about values. What

values? What does it mean to have a

values-based foreign policy?

Well, I would say democracy is one. Um,

self-government, a government that that

delivers, you know, for its people.

[snorts] Um, and that sounds simple. It

is, but I would I would kind of take

things back to some very first

principles about what foreign policy is

for. Any country's foreign policy is is

meant to advance the the safety and the

prosperity of that country's people.

That's what American foreign policy is

for. I think as as a progressive I would

add the word you know solidarity to

that. I mean I want to be in solidarity

not only with people in my country but

communities outside our country and I

feel like even though we have don't have

the ability to to fix the world um I

think what we can do at the start is to

do less harm. Um there are places where

the United States has done and is

continuing to do enormous harm. That's

not the entire story of our foreign

policy by any means. I think the United

States has done enormous good. um over

the past decades. I think there's

enormous good we can do into the future.

I would also say, and this is something

you've heard um you know, from people

like Congressman Crow, from AOC,

obviously from Bernie, um from from

Senator Murphy, the people you

mentioned, is you know, we need a

foreign policy that that really delivers

for America's working families. Um I

think we need to take take things down

to the wheel, so to speak. And you know,

I'm not in the habit of really

complimenting Trump all that much, but I

do think he has provided an opportunity

or at least revealed an opportunity um

by challenging some of the very basic

kind of preconceptions of, you know,

post-war, you know, unipolar moment

American primacy um that is enabling us

to have a debate and we have to have it.

So, I want to explore what that foreign

policy would look like. And I think a

good place to start is a speech that

Congressman Crowe, who's from Colorado,

former Army officer, gave at the Center

for American Progress. I think it was

last October. I want to play a clip of

it here.

>> The biggest divide that I see right now

and how we view this problem is those

who believe that Donald Trump is the

cause of it versus those who believe

that Donald Trump is a symptom

of it.

And that requires looking back over the

last 30 years and looking at it through

the lens of the people that I grew up

with in a workingclass town in the upper

Midwest.

Those who I fought with

and those who I now serve.

In those last 30 years, we've had over

20 years of failed military

interventions,

$3 trillion,

three million combat tours, over 7,000

of our own dead, tens of thousands

of others dead.

And what's not in those numbers is the

unequal burden

that was borne by the working class. He

goes on to say in that speech that we

often mistake the core debate here for

being a policy conversation, but what is

is a conversation about trust

>> and that the foreign policy

establishment has lost trust. It has

broken faith. So you're sort of half in

and half out of that establishment.

>> I think a good place to start is how do

you see this question of trust? How how

was it lost if it was and what builds

it?

>> Yeah. Um well again I mean what what

Congressman Crow said right there about

the the key divide [clears throat] being

between those who see Trump as the

problem and Trump as a symptom I think

is right on. I I I think that explains a

lot of the debate right now. I'm very

much on the symptom side and I think you

know the lack of trust. I mean it really

does come down to this one line from

Trump that others have used and that is

the system is rigged and Trump gets

traction with that because he's right

the system is rigged. Americans can see

it. They can feel it in the lack of

control that they feel over their own

lives, over economic lives, political

lives, um social lives. Um they feel, I

mean, I think confronted by technology

that is designed to ent trap them. They

feel kind of exploited by different, you

know, costs, you know, to you know, to

extract the maximum amount of wealth of

every step they take, every symptom of

every disease, every, you know, every

game that their kids play in sports. And

I think that attaches to foreign policy

because one of the big, you know,

whether it's, you know, the war in Iraq,

which was, you know, again, sold to the

Americans on what what people understand

now were misstatements or outright lies.

Um, you had the the, you know, financial

crisis in 2008, which again, not

necessarily a foreign policy crisis, but

I think its global impact and certainly

its domestic impact. All of these things

add up to uh, you know, an elite

establishment that either doesn't know

what it's doing or is simply looking

after its own interests. And I think one

of the speeches that I've referenced a

lot is um the speech that JD Vance gave

at the Republican National Convention in

2024 um where he talked about his own

personal story, you know, as Congressman

Crow did there. But but JD Vance, I

think, spoke very very effectively

about, you know, someone who grew up uh

in in in rural America as he did and and

what communities de-industrialized

communities suffered. um the lie that

was told about, you know, neoliberal

trade, economics, NAFTA, the war in Iraq

that he served in. Um he laid out a

whole story of elite failure of of lies

that were told to working people like

the ones that he grew up with.

>> In small towns like mine in Ohio or next

door in Pennsylvania or Michigan, in

states all across our country, jobs were

sent overseas and our children were sent

to war. And somehow a real estate

developer from New York City by the name

of Donald J. Trump was right on all of

these issues while Biden was wrong.

>> And I think what Democrats really have

to do and I think what Congressman Crowe

was starting to talk about in that

speech with I think was a really good

speech is, you know, Democrats need to

come up first of all with an

acknowledgement of the real problem that

connects with the one that Americans are

feeling, but offer a compelling vision.

Okay, this is how we're actually going

to govern in a way that can change your

life and make it better.

>> You mentioned JD Vance in the 2024

campaign. I

>> mean, Vance ran that campaign very much

articulating a view

>> that Donald Trump was the anti-war

candidate

>> that Donald Trump meant an end to these

kinds of foreign entanglements, these

dumb wars.

>> Now, obviously, we are

>> imshed in Iran.

>> What happened? Well, it it turns out

that Donald Trump lies um that is one of

the things that happened. But you're

right. I mean, both Vance and Trump um

in in in the months and and especially

the weeks before election day 2024

leaned in hard on this anti-war message.

Trump was a pro peace president. We were

going to get out of these dumb endless

wars. That's actually something he ran

on in 2016 as well. And um you know I

think it is very interesting if you go

back um every election since the end of

the cold war in every election including

starting with 1992 with the one

exception of 2004 the the more anti-war

candidate has won. Um I'm not going to

say that they won because they were

anti-war. Um, but I do think that is a

very interesting set of data which I

think says at the very least that there

is an audience for a much less

militaristic vision of America's role in

the world. I mean, even Joe Biden in

2020, he ran on a pledge to end the

forever wars. Uh, he ran on a much less

militaristic uh platform that he ended

up teeing up for Kla Harris in 2024. And

Trump took advantage of that. Democrats

just abandoned the anti-war lane and

left it wide open for Trump. Again, I

didn't I said then and I say now

obviously no one should believe Trump,

but I do think he had at least the

political intelligence to recognize that

that was an attractive message and I

think Democrats really need to

understand that.

>> Let me try to make the case for the

other side of this, right? Putting aside

the question of who performs electorally

because I think that's kind of tricky um

and why they perform. You take Biden as

an example. I think Biden thought he had

learned some important lessons. And one

thing that his people always bragged

about was that he was the first

president in some time to have not

committed American troops to new wars.

They ended the Afghanistan war. People

hated the way that looked at the very

least. That's when Biden's approval

rating fell beneath 50% and never

recovered.

>> But then it wasn't Joe Biden who invaded

Ukraine.

>> It was Russia. I mean you named earlier

the very first value that a left foreign

policy based on democracy right you have

[snorts] Russia invading a democracy

Biden I think is trying through this

period to calibrate a response to that

that does not in mesh American troops

but but nevertheless does not abandon

Ukraine to Vladimir Putin you know Hamas

attacks on October 7th it's another

thing Biden responds to as opposed to

something he is creating [gasps] how do

you think about those from this

perspective maybe not where the Gaza war

eventually went but but but these early

moments because a lot of foreign policy

is not what the president decides to do.

It is something has happened

>> and now he has to make a decision,

>> right? I mean, let's take all of those.

Um, you [snorts] know, first, yes. I

mean, personally, I think all things

considered, um, his his response to the

Russian invasion of Ukraine was was a

good one. He's gotten, you know,

criticism from his right, those who

believe that he should have just given

Ukraine all the weapons immediately. um

some on the left who say no he we we

were provoking Russia. I mean my own

view is like yes Russia what invaded

Ukraine. It was reasonable to help

Ukraine defend itself. Um I think there

are legitimate you know criticisms that

the Biden administration should have

been more willing to you know get into

talks with Putin along the way. I am

still unconvinced that Putin was ever

interested in ending this war. I don't

think he's interested in it right now.

Obviously, he gets a key vote, but I

think, you know, comparing that to Gaza,

and I think he made a huge mistake in

twinning Ukraine uh with with Israel in

the speech he gave in October of 2023.

>> Hamas and Putin represent different

threats, but they share this in common.

They both want to completely annihilate

a neighboring democracy. completely

annihilated

>> because yes, the precipitating factor

for you know the Gaza war, what became

the Gaza genocide were the attacks of

October 7, but that war did not begin on

October 7 as you know. I mean it did it

did not come out of nowhere. Um you know

is the you know Israel was not just

sitting quietly minding its own

business. There was an ongoing campaign

of expulsion, of ethnic cleansing, of

violence that existed in the Palestinian

territories that and had done so for

many years. Biden came into the Middle

East having promised to rejoin the Iran

nuclear deal. He came in and more or

less kept Trump's policy in place. We're

going to keep pressure on them to try to

get a longer and stronger deal. And I

think this was based on a, you know, a

belief of the need to maintain the US's

position as the regional security

guarantor in the Middle East. And I

think that was a huge mistake. So I

don't think it's quite right to say just

that he was responding uh to the events

of October 7. I think his administration

had taken steps um that led to October

7. Obviously Hamas deserves

>> that's a big claim. Say more what you

mean by that when you say they took

steps that led to October 7th. I

>> I do think by buying into the idea I

mean let's understand the Abraham

Accords were about a number of things

but one thing they were about was

sidelining the Palestinian issue.

>> Do do you just want to describe these

quickly? They because they started under

Donald Trump not Joe Biden. That's

right. No. So, the Abraham Accords were

announced in August of 2020. Um, an

agreement first between Israel and the

UAE. Um, brokered, I guess, to some

extent by the Trump administration,

although they always like to take more

credit, I think, than than they really

deserve. Quickly joined by Bahrain, but

they were significant because these

were, uh, the first agreements in a very

long time that normalized relations

between Israel and regional uh, Arab

governments. They were presented as, you

know, major peace agreements despite the

fact that the UAE had never really been

at war with Israel. Still, the fact that

this relationship between Israel and the

UAE, which had gone on for years under

the surface was now public, um was was

an achievement. There's no doubt. But

from Netanyahu's perspective, and I

think from Netanyahu's supporters

perspective in the US, part of why this

was a success is that it kind of kind of

demonstrated their long-standing

argument, which was that we don't need

to solve the Palestinian issue first. um

as many have claimed who can kind of

just push this to the side and move

forward and and have normal relations

with the the the rest of uh the region.

Um and I think it's it's it's pretty

clear that even though the Abraham

Accords weren't like the precipitating

factor for October 7, it was one of the

factors that led to Hamas's thinking

about why they needed to take um action,

horrific action, no doubt, uh to kind of

put the Palestinian issue uh uh back on

the regional and global agenda. So to

stay there for a minute although I want

to ask broader questions about this.

What do you think the Biden

administration should have done

immediately after October 7th because I

mean that attack is a yes

>> I mean it is a more than horrific

attack.

>> Yes.

>> It is a genuine act of absolutely war.

It is war crimes

>> and done to an American ally certainly

at that moment.

>> What should the response have been? I

mean, I think the response initially was

the right one, which was to show, you

know, strong support for Israel, for the

people of Israel, for um I I think Joe

Biden going there himself. Um but he

didn't use that credibility to do what I

think he should have done, which was

very quickly uh within weeks, certainly,

I would say by the middle of November,

um it was abundantly clear that this

just was not an act of self-defense

anymore. this was this was a series of

atrocities um meant to just obliterate

Gaza um and and and and to kill

civilians. I mean, I I think this is

kind of the core understanding is that,

you know, the way that that the Biden

administration and many in Washington

talk about um this issue is that they

treat civilians suffering, civilian

casualties as if it's a regrettable um

you know, kind of consequence of an

overall just objective. It is not.

civilian suffering is part of the policy

and I think that became very very clear

certainly by November.

>> I think by the end of Biden's presidency

>> the feeling many Americans have about

him

>> is not so much that they dramatically

disagree with any one of his decisions.

The public opinion on Israel and Gaza is

split at that point. It's not like a

winning issue in one direction or

another.

>> Ukraine is a kind of complicated issue.

It's that they don't like the way

America seems focused on these places

that are not important to them.

>> Prices are high here and yet we're

spending all this money arming Ukraine.

were engaged in somehow this war in that

Israel is waging in Gaza that seems like

a mess that seems horrible that you're

seeing on your phone, the atrocities of

and like in some way I think what people

hated about Bidenism by the end was that

the world felt out of control.

>> There's something Chris Murphy, Senator

Murphy wrote on the substract just

recently. He wrote, "We would be

misreading a lot of the essential

elements of Donald Trump's foreign

policy if we just said it was about

jingoism or xenophobia because a lot of

what he talks about is really about

power. His message is that these global

forces that we are endlessly told are

just out of our control can be inside of

our control." Mhm. I think this is

actually a pretty important insight

because I think one of the tensions of

American foreign policy and particularly

American public opinion towards foreign

policy is on the one hand we do feel a

sense of responsibility. We don't want

bad things to happen elsewhere in the

world and particularly some set of them

we feel that we should engage in them.

On the other hand, we don't want to

engage too much. And then when we do

engage and it turns out we cannot

control them at an acceptable cost or

maybe as we found in Iraq or Afghanistan

at any cost, we get angry about that.

>> And this tension of wanting control but

not having it is, I think, a real knot

>> at the center of the politics of foreign

policy here. And I'm curious how that

lands for you. Yeah, I mean I do, you

know, I think Senator Murphy has really

been a he's he's one of these he, you

know, obviously he's a strong voice on

foreign policy, but as you noted there,

I think he always he also has a very uh

strong compelling theory of of the

deeper case um of of what of of the

problems in our politics right now. Um

and and I would I I would agree with

that. Although I think part of this, you

know, the tension between wanting to do

good, wanting to have control and and

losing control, I mean, that's going to

keep happening as long as we have this

this foreign policy that is driven by,

you know, sustaining American primacy by

trying to sustain America's role as a

global, you know, hedgeimon.

>> What do you mean by that? Because the

things we're talking about here, I

actually don't buy that what we were

doing in Ukraine is trying to sustain

America's role as a global hegeon. I

don't buy that in Gaza what we were

trying to do is sustain America's role

as a global hegeimon. I don't think

that's how the Biden administration

justified it to themselves. I don't

think that's really how they thought

about it. So either do you disagree that

that's what they were really trying to

do.

>> I I would I would agree with you a bit

more on Ukraine. I do think there were

habits of mind um especially from Biden

um you know who who's not even a a

person not a creature of the postcold

war is a creature of the cold war. So, I

do think that, you know, this idea of

the US helping to confront Russia was

something that was kind of deep in his

foreign policy DNA. And I think part of

what we saw in Gaza and what led up to

it um as I was saying was driven by uh

an effort through the Abraham Accords

through this proposed US Saudi Israel

peace agreement which would involve you

know security guarantees with Saudi

Arabia was based in my view on on

sustaining America's role as a regional

security guarantor and and also to box

China out of the region. I mean, because

that was kind of the overriding focus um

of Joe Biden's foreign policy. And if we

remember going back, I think it was was

it June 2021 where he had um a summit

with Putin. I think the goal um of of

Biden's Russia policy initially was to

be like, "All right, let's just park

Russia and Putin over here. We're not

going to have a great relationship with

them, but we want to kind of bring some

predictability to the relationship so we

can focus on the real problem, uh which

is China." And I do think the China

focus, you know, the the the kind of

obsession with strategic competition

with China, I do think that what

underlies that is an effort to sustain

America's, you know, global primacy.

>> So I do agree with that. I agree with

this on China. But I think all these are

a little bit different. I think the

reason this distinction might be

important is that obviously people's

goals matter

>> and the way I read these different

events

involvements is the reaction of the

Russian Asia was really a view about

Ukraine and Europe

>> and what America's role was in that and

not wanting to allow Putin just begin

taking territory because that would be

destabilizing for the world and we had

to do it because nobody else could. I

think uh if it was the case that Europe

was more capable of,

you know, being the uh munitions factory

for Ukraine, America would have been

happy to have let them do at least to

some degree.

>> I I don't know. I hope they are doing

that now. I mean I mean I hope they're

doing that. Yeah, because ultimately

that's that's where this needs to go.

>> On Israel, I think a lot was driven by

Joe Biden's actual commitment to Israel,

>> which is something sort of you said

earlier as well. And then China, I think

there's a a different set of questions

that are are very real there about

American primacy.

But the reason I'm I'm I'm focusing on

this for a minute is that I think that

there is a difference that gets

conflated often in foreign policy and we

move on different sides of it between is

what we are trying to do uphold

responsibilities that maybe

>> no we don't really want to be doing the

American people don't really want to be

doing but in the long term it's better

for the global system that somebody is

doing it

>> versus are we actually trying to

dominate the system bring it in our

favor keep competitors from rising up

and those are sort of two different

problems because on the one level if you

say we should stop just trying to ensure

American hegeimonyi which I think is

like also a little bit different than

primacy right hgeimani is a control

primacy is a leadership I think a lot of

people like nod and and and agree and I

probably nod and agree

>> and on the other hand I just think say

Ukraine is a hard problem

>> and that we don't really want to be

doing this but a lot of things happen in

the world that we don't like and we have

to kind of make kind of tough decisions

around them. But I'm not sure that, you

know, in some of these cases that a

president Bernie Sanders, a president

AOC, a president Chris Murphy would be

free from the pull of American

responsibility. the sense that if we

don't stop something from happening,

>> it'll happen and then we will be blamed

both, you know, they we here being this

imaginary administration by either the

American people who don't like what just

happened or bad things will happen in

the world which will eventually end up

on our doorstep.

>> I think that's all I mean I agree with

that. I mean there are certain things,

you know, that are that are beyond the

US's control. It's not I've you know

never said and I don't believe that it's

all part of some grand plan. Um, there

were a lot of contingencies that popped

up, a lot of unforeseen events like the

Russian invasion of Ukraine that the

Biden administration certainly did not

want to happen. Um, and as I said, I

think all things considered, they

responded to that pretty reasonably. Um,

but I do think that when you look at the

sweep of Biden's foreign policy, you

know, kind of captured in, you know, one

of the things that he said upon taking

office when he went to Europe, America

is back. you know, we've gotten past

this brief little hiccup with this this

weirdo Donald Trump and now America's

back doing America things and everybody

can chill. Um, and America's back in the

business of helping you know the global

system run. And I think we had already

moved beyond that both in terms of what

America was capable of, what others in

the um, you know, others in the world

were interested in. So yeah, I would

certainly agree. There are times when

only the United States, as of right now,

certainly the United States, you know,

has the capacity, whether it's in arms,

whether it's in convening capacity,

whether it's in influence, whether it's

in economic power, whether it's in

diplomatic power to help solve and

address certain problems. But I think

the debate has to be okay, what are

those situations? Um, and what tools

should we deploy in those situations?

Let me take the American global hegemony

question from a broader perspective. You

said that the American foreign policy

establishment often ask a question. How

do we better sell continuing American

global military hesge money to the

American people rather than hearing that

Americans just aren't that into it.

Americans, you said, are just not that

into global military hgeimani because

it's destructive. It's wasteful. It

increases inequality. It steals money

from the working class and it funnels it

upward to a tiny unaccountable elite. I

think there's a broader than Ukraine or

Gaza or even China. I think there's a

broader view on the left that America's

view of its role in the world and what

it puts into maintaining that role in

the world is destructive.

>> So make that broader case to me and what

it would look like to to turn away from

that in our foreign policy.

>> Yeah. I mean I think you know Americans

want their country to to be strong, to

be powerful, to play a major role in the

world. I think any country's people do.

Um, and more than that, I'll say I think

Americans want their country to do good

in the world. That's how I feel. I think

that is that's that's broadly shared.

But I do think we have to look really

really take a very very hard look at at

what this what global military hegemony,

global whatever term you want to use for

it is actually delivering. And this is

where I would go back uh to JD Vance's

speech uh at the at the 2024 RNC. We've

had just multiple wars. We have them

ongoing right now. Um they're not as big

as as as Iraq and Afghanistan were. Um

but we have we have many American troops

deployed um around the world on

counterterrorism missions. Um do we

actually need all of this to keep us

safe? How much are we spending on this?

And and to whom are the benefits really

acrewing? Um I think the question a lot

of Americans ask when they you know they

see their communities having been

de-industrialized. um their children

face a worse future than they do is

okay. I want America to do good. I want

America to be strong. Um but again, as

you said earlier in the conversation, I

don't understand how these conflicts and

our engagement in them is actually doing

that.

>> You have this line that elite impunity

is at the core of our political crisis.

Tell me what you mean by that.

>> I mean the sense that the wealthy, the

powerful, the well-connected, the

influential don't pay a price. they

operate according to a different set of

rules uh than the rest of us. This is

it's part of political corruption. It's

part of the loss of control. It's it's

it's a reflection of the system being

rigged.

>> So there's that broad version of it, but

but you've also made this point and I've

seen others begin to make this point

around the foreign policy establishment

and around people in Democratic

politics, people in Republican politics.

Brian Shots, uh, the senator from

Hawaii, recently put out this tweet

where he said, "Look, I'm not trying to

blacklist anybody,

>> but I think that the next Democratic

administration should have sort of a

full turnover in, uh, its foreign policy

staff."

>> You know, I've seen you sort of connect

this to the need for a reckoning around

Gaza. So, so what what does it actually

imply?

>> I mean, I think there's two things about

that. one is um you know from from

Senator Shatz's comment I think there's

a sense that there has been just this

kind of kind of group of Democratic

foreign policy professionals that tend

to cycle in and out of of Democratic

administrations and they move up to the

next job and that we need to reach out

to a much broader pool of talent. There

are a lot of very smart uh young foreign

policy folks in Washington and beyond

who want to get engaged. We need to to

be a we need to draw them in to the

process. uh so we don't keep repeating

and you know regurgitating the same

policies and the same approach. But I

think there's also a second piece of it

and I think uh Senator Chris Van Holland

got to it a bit more sharply in the

op-ed that he wrote in the New York

Times a few days after Senator Shatz's

tweet and that had to do with specific

actors inside the Biden administration

um who he said should not serve uh in

future administrations. And I think this

is part of accountability as well. Um,

we're going to have policy disputes,

policy disagreements, policy debates.

Uh, I do think that the Biden

administration's Gaza policy was beyond

just a policy dispute. It was a policy

of supporting genocide. Um, and I think

if if you know part of restoring

accountability is is making clear that

the senior officials uh who carried out

that policy um should not work in

government again. So, so does Gaza here

become is it becoming I mean I'm sort of

watching this in primaries and I think

it's a a pretty important thing

happening right now. You see it in the

Michigan Senate primary. You see it here

in New York where Brad Lander and Dan

Goldman are running against each other.

You saw it in New Jersey um

congressional primary.

>> Does Gazier become sort of like the Iraq

war in the Democratic party?

>> Uh or Democrats more divided on that

than they were on the Iraq war? I mean,

there there is this question of like, do

Democrats split over this? In the same

way that I wonder about this for

Republicans after Donald Trump, I mean,

Israel and support for Israel really

seems to me to be a a question that is

splitting both parties internally.

>> I hope it doesn't become like the Iraq

war because I don't think anybody really

paid a price for the Iraq war, at least,

you know, the officials who who carried

it out. Um, I want to see some

consequences for the people who carried

out the Gaza policy. I mean, in terms of

the debate, um, you know, I I do think

yes, this is becoming a litmus test. Um,

your position on Gaza, you know, it

really does go to credibility. Um, the

way someone chooses to talk about this,

for example, you know, Kla Harris, um,

the way she, you know, the language she

used, oh, too many civilians have died

and and we're pressing for a ceasefire.

it just it didn't convince anyone. Um

even for people who perhaps didn't care

about the issue all that much, they

could tell that this was not genuine.

And I think, you know, the reverse is

true, I think, for Zoran Mandani. Uh the

way that he he didn't raise Gaza, by the

way. I mean, Gaza was raised by his

critics, um because they thought it

would be an effective way, uh to weaken

and criticize him, and they did that

because they don't know what time it is.

he stood firm on a set on a set of

principles um under fire and I think

even for people who probably don't know

or maybe care about the issue as much

they saw that and that added to his

credibility. So I do think yes for a a

lot of Democratic voters many of them

care about the issue they want their

leaders to be on the right side of it

but it also gets to a much larger you

know idea of can I trust this person?

Are they for real or are they just going

to regurgitate the usual set of

establishment talking points?

>> So, I want to play here something that

uh Congresswoman Okasiocortez said at

Munich.

>> So, I don't know if it's necessarily

that we were in a post if we are in a

post rules-based order. I think it's

possible that we were in a pre-

rules-based order [laughter]

and we have an opportunity to explore

what a world would look like if we

upheld democracy, human rights,

trade that actually centers workingass

people instead of acrewing

overwhelmingly the benefits of trade to

the wealthiest.

>> Tell me about that idea that we were

actually in a pre-ruules-based order.

>> Right. I mean, I think it's it's it's a

great line. I mean, what I've you know,

when I'm in conversations about the the

so-called rules-based order, um I've

often referred to um you know, I think

it was Gandhi's comment when he was

asked what he thought about Western

civilization. He said, "I think it'd be

a great idea." Um that's what I think

about a rules-based order. And I think

that's what the congressman was getting

at there. Yes, there is a lot about the

postw World War World War II order that

is admirable, that's very optimistic.

There are elements of that elements of

it that we definitely should try to

revive and save. I think the

international, you know, the the United

Nations and all the various

organizations that work under its

umbrella are very important. Having a

um, you know, you know, a global center

where people can talk about their

problems rather than than fight over

them um is hugely important as a

concept. Yet I do think we've gotten to

a point where the double standards and

the hypocrisies had gotten so stark um

that the system has just lost

legitimacy. And you know what about the

international system can we really divi

revive and strengthen um such that we

can use the term rules-based order

unironically. So you've been bringing up

JD Vance and and I think one interesting

difference between the way even

skepticism

of the foreign policy of the past 20 or

30 years emerges on the right and the

left is on the right it has taken shape

as a critique of rules

>> and [clears throat] Donald Trump I think

in particular holds to the view that

America should not be bound by rules

should not be bound by institutions to

the extent we are we should just create

our own that we dominate in a more

thoroughgoing way. I think JD Vance has

certainly been supportive of Donald

Trump and his project to do that. I

think on the left there's more of this

idea that actually the rules might

protect us more than we think they do.

>> That allowing oursel to be bound by them

would be better than where we have ended

up. That it would have kept us out of

Iraq, right? Because we cannot in fact

get the UN to go along.

So I'd like you to go a little bit

further with this when you say okay like

if we did try this rules-based order if

we were bound by rules in these slow

frustrating multilateral institutions

where Russia and China can veto things

on the UN security council

there is a a tension between

>> positive restraint and then [snorts]

being subject to um the agendas of bad

actors. How do you think about it?

>> Yeah, I mean I think what you just laid

out there is right. It's it's basically

a zero- sum critique versus a positive

sum critique. I mean, for for for Trump,

for Vance, it's as you said, it's all

about America should be able to do

whatever we want. Um, if if we're

getting a good deal, others have to lose

and vice versa. But also, this is the

kind of positive sum kind of, you know,

principle that kind of undergurtded the

creation of the international system.

The idea that countries, including the

United States, will agree to be

constrained by a set of rules. Um, and

that ultimately makes us uh safer. I

mean, I think that that's it right

there. Um, but the the the process and

the project of of reacrediting

the concept of international order, the

concept um of of international rules, I

think, is is one we have to undertake.

It's not going to be one administration.

Um, and and in order to do that, I think

we have to reacredit it with the

American people. So, I hope that we'll

have candidates and, you know, and and

hopefully a president.

>> Is that possible to do? I mean, here I'm

mindful of what Murphy said because this

to me is one of the the the deep

contradictions here. I don't think

people I don't think Americans want what

we've ended up doing.

>> And also, I mean, I was around in

Washington at a time when the

rules-based international order was

stronger, let's call it.

>> And it was a menu was very unpopular. I

mean, we got here on a pathway that

comes, I think, from in the '9s, people

feeling that the UN and others made it

almost impossible to respond to

genocides and, you know, Rwanda and

Yugoslavia. Um, it goes to to sort of

George W. Bush after 9/11 and and and

the feeling that America just has to do

whatever it needs to and it can't be

held back. And that I think was

obviously a terrible mistake.

There's a sort of amazing moment in the

Obama administration where he says

there's a red line if in Syria Assad

uses chemical weapons and then the last

minute he says I want congressional

authorization if I'm going to do this

and he doesn't do it.

>> And I supported that. I thought he made

the right call. But I think certainly in

Washington he got an enormous amount of

ongoing criticism from it including by

the way from Donald Trump

>> uh for being weak.

>> Right. And this goes to to this broader

point of like the fight over control

>> because what you're kind of saying to

people is

you will get better outcomes by giving

up control

>> by binding yourself and the power you

have to these rules and these

institutions that you do not have full

authority over and you might end up not

being able to do things that you think

are a good idea that you were elected to

do.

uh and

you know in the teeth of this moment

where we have a completely I think

unaccountable president acting wildly

erratically recklessly

all of a sudden there's a lot of

interest in you know should we should

Congress retake its war powers

>> should we you know reinvest energy in

the UN and the World Bank and you know

all these organizations

>> but it feels like we just end up a

little bit on this pendulum

>> and this pendulum I think is is very

much again about control. So how do you

sell people on the idea that binding

American power in rules that will bind

us even when we don't want to be bound

>> is a good idea.

>> Yeah. I mean first of all you have to

show people that they have to be able to

feel that it's true. Um and let's be

honest I don't think um an election is

necessarily going to be won or lost on

this argument. you know, it's, you know,

just since you mentioned the uh the red

line comment, um I think that gets to a

lot of what we're seeing right now in

terms of Congress taking control and

taking responsibility.

Um you know, there are some, as we see,

most of, if not all, Republicans are

fine with letting Donald Trump just

carry forward. I mean, they have had

multiple opportunities to vote for war

powers resolutions, whether it's on

Venezuela, whether it's on Iran, whether

it's now on Cuba. I mean, they're

choosing not to take ownership. Um and I

and I and I think this goes to a much

deeper problem. It's not a problem of

one president or one administration. Um

I think it really goes to the deeper

political problem of how we've just you

know the use of military violence has

become just such a regular occurrence

and I and I think people do have an kind

of I think an innate understanding that

it is not supposed to be this way

because it is not. This is something

that uh Congressman Crowe really

emphasizes in that speech he gave at CAP

that I think is really correct.

>> The first question you should ever ask a

member of Congress before they ever

start talking about foreign policy

is are you willing to reclaim your

foreign policy powers?

Our founders believed that Congress had

fundamental role in our foreign policy

from trade to treaties to war powers and

to appropriations.

For decades, Congress has seated and

given up many of those powers.

Our founders knew that these things were

too important to be entrusted simply to

the executive

because it needed accountability to

those closest to the people.

>> I think I mean let's premise here the

Iraq war is a absolute unmitigated

catastrophe and I think about the debate

that led to it and the absence of debate

that led to Iran.

>> And I think that given how little

support there was for Iran, you could

not have gotten that vote through

Congress.

And so I'm not saying that having

Congress will always stop you from

making dumb decisions. Ultimately,

Congress did give uh Bush power to go to

war in Iraq, but nevertheless, it at

least forces it slows things down and

forces a debate and forces a process

that I think is valuable. And I think

foreign policy can often seem very um

like hard to pin down because well it's

Ukraine, it's Gaza, it's China, it's

Venezuela. I mean all these are

different uh situations.

But I think something connecting many of

them is they're operating without a

process that restrains the president.

It's very strange to me how little the

president can do on most domestic policy

right now given the filibuster and a

polarized Congress and much else. And

then we give him all this power on

foreign policy, which of course also

creates an incentive for the president

when he can't get much done domestically

to start trying to create a legacy,

right,

>> through ambitious foreign policy

>> uh adventurism.

>> And that feels to me like a like an

interesting place where something could

really change. And I've seen it from

Bernie Sanders, from Okana, from AOC,

from others. A real focus on Congress

should, you know, reclaim its role here

because at least forcing that through

the more representative body where the

American public has more say in the

moment.

>> Uh you can imagine that as a kind of

more procedurally based

>> Yeah.

>> order that at least, you know, to the

extent it binds us, it binds us

domestically.

I mean, I think that's right. Um, it's

not the whole story. Let's not, you

know, put too much into the process. The

process matters. But I do think that the

criticism that some have made of

arguments around war powers, and I tend

to agree, is that, you know, for

example, the problem with the Iran war

is not that Trump failed to file the

appropriate papers paperwork. Um, it is

a manifestally stupid idea uh from the

beginning. Um, and I think keeping that

second part um in in mind is really

important. I want leaders. I want

leaders. Yes, it's important to reassert

Congress's constitutional authority over

military violence, but we need leaders

out there articulating why this is just

a horrible idea.

>> But this is your whole argument. I mean,

I agree that we need leaders

articulating why it's a horrible idea.

But I think your whole argument, or at

least some of the rules-based argument,

is that sometimes you're going to have

stupid ideas.

>> Yes.

>> And sometimes you're going to have

stupid leaders.

>> Yes. And the point of having rules and

processes

>> is because you don't believe you will

always be governed by the wisest of

philosopher kings.

>> Absolutely. That's right.

>> The other dimension of a lot of the

foreign policy arguments I've heard from

people like Sanders is the idea that you

you need a foreign policy that centers

the working class and that foreign

policy is domestic policy on some level.

That that this kind of division we've

created is not real. Now, Joe Biden also

said that he said he was going to have a

foreign policy for for the middle class.

That was a big way that he and Jake

Sullivan and others expressed themselves

as having a pivot from what had come

before. So, what is different in the way

that that that you and others more on

the Democratic party's left flank are

imagining this compared to what Biden

and his team were doing when they sort

of announced this right

>> transformation?

>> Yeah. And I do think that the foreign

policy for the middle class I think was

good. I mean that's something I I I

really think that deserves praise like

to the

you know Trump shocked everyone by

winning in 2016 and I think that the

foreign policy for the middle class kind

of represented a real effort to a real

self-critical effort to say what have we

missed about what Americans believe and

don't believe about foreign policy. I

mean, in the language of recovery, um

the first step is admitting you have a

problem. And I think that that those

that that effort was a recognition of

the real problem. And I think it's it's

kind of um conclusions were represented

in a speech that that Jake gave at

Brookings uh in April 2023. And this was

interesting because it was the national

security adviser offering essentially a

speech on the global economy, America's

trade policy. And it represented a

turning of the page so to speak from the

old neoliberal era. So recognizing first

of all that a lot of the theories that

underly that era the idea that okay if

we just get rid of taxes and we kind of

let you know free trade people trade and

make money and kind of constrain states

from from imposing you know restrictions

and and regulation

um then you know rising tide will lift

all boats so to speak. That was an

important recognition that yeah you know

that turns out that's not really true.

It's produced a lot of very bad

consequences that have led us to this

moment. But I think the question is

having acknowledged that and having come

back to the idea that yes, it is right

and appropriate for governments to play

a major role in shaping and guiding the

economy. Um the question is to what end?

And I think obviously the one of the

main ends is to benefit the safety and

prosperity of the American people. But

going back to what we've talked about

with China being the kind of guiding

focus of of the Biden administration's

foreign policy, um, you know, I think

there are a couple ways you could have

gone from that speech. One is how do we

really invest in a genuinely more

equitable global trade order? How do we

invest it, you know, build an order that

protects workers not just in the United

States, um, but empowers workers around

the world, including in China, and does

not pose American workers and Chinese

workers, as as in a kind of zero sum

competition with each other. Um and then

there's the other path which I think

they took which to say okay now we're

getting back involved in the economy

because we are in this strategic

competition with China and we now see

trade as yet another weapon in in in a

toolbox uh to kind of assert America in

in this competition and I think that was

the wrong choice. I I I I think we need

to go with with option A.

>> So what would option A have looked like

in practical terms? what would they have

not done that they did or what would

they have done that they didn't do?

>> I think certain ideas I mean the global

um minimum corporate tax is one thing

that they they worked on. I think

discussing a global minimum wage um is

another thing just for an example that's

something that Senator Sanders um has

proposed uh for starters um cuz I think

part of the challenge that that we face

is you know we have you know a

developing world if we can whatever term

we want to use global south you know

that is you know has very young um

populations. Um they are already engaged

in in in shaping the global agenda. The

United States needs to have um a

relationship with these country.

Obviously, China is has done a lot of

work to build its own relationships in

these countries. I don't want to treat

these countries um as simply an arena

for US and China competition. But I

think we we we need to approach this in

a positive some way.

>> What would the global minimum wage look

like? How would you apply that to a

country? I was in Kenya not long ago. I

mean huge amount of Kenya is in the

informal economy

>> uh country where much of the country is

very very poor right and certainly not

the poorest country in Africa

>> uh when you're imposing a global minimum

wage on these countries presumably with

some of the stick being American trade

opportunities

>> what does that actually look like

>> yeah I don't know what it looks like um

but I'm saying the

>> whose job is this

>> yeah [laughter]

>> I mean I mean getting the United States

to to propose this and putting the

United States in the position

>> but I'm asking is it a good idea you to

know what it would look like to know if

it's a good idea.

>> Yeah. Okay. Fair question. Still still

working on what it exactly looks like.

But what I'm saying is proposing, you

know, putting the United States in the

position of we are not just there to

extract wealth. We're not just here to

empower the people that have been

dominating and and and exploiting you. I

guess maybe the question I was getting

at because it's interesting to me where

you went with that. I think the question

I was getting at there is, is the global

minimum wage an effort to protect

American wages or to raise other

countries wages? because those are two

actually quite different projects.

>> I mean, I think it's based on the idea

that Americans security is bound up with

the security and prosperity of others

around the world. I mean, this is not

just a, you know, a high flown bit of

rhetoric. I do think it, I mean,

[snorts] as someone on the progressive

left, that's an understanding that I

bring is that if we can diminish

deprivation, disease, and suffering in

other communities around the world,

ultimately that is going to acrue to our

own safety.

>> I agree with that. I I think the the

thing I'm pushing on here is in what way

would America imposing wage standards on

other countries

>> Yeah.

>> whose economies it doesn't really

understand and certainly does not

directly manage.

>> Right. You know, when I do foreign

economic reporting and probably when I

do it from places that are poorer,

>> I am always struck with how maddeningly

hard

>> it is to make a poor country, forget

rich, just middle middle income.

>> And so

it it's like I could see a version of

this that is actually you've found