How seriously do you think we should be

taking Trump's threats of doing what he

did to Maduro

across his hemisphere as he would call

it?

>> Maduro himself was a dictator. He was

not democratically elected. They had

elections. He refused to accept the

outcome. He's brutal. He traffs massive

amounts of drugs. I mean, all sorts of

the things, right? Denmark is a serious

ally of the US and anything the US needs

in Greenland. They will get those

things.

>> Ian, where does this podcast find you?

>> I'm doing my best.

>> Channeling Prof here. Yeah,

>> my buddy Scott. I'm here in New York

City, exactly the same place I was last

time I was on your pod.

>> It's great to have you. I'm a tremendous

fan of yours and always appreciate your

commentary and insights. And we're

talking uh your top risks report. Um

20th year, right?

>> 28th since I started your Asia group.

20th year of doing the the top risk

reports. When you say that, it feels

like a long time. Um but you know, I I I

think I'm only halfway through. So I who

knows, you know, God willing. Well, I

wish you a long life and that we talk

about many risk reports. Um, as time

goes on, uh, obviously you would think,

let's go to number one first, but I

wanted to start with risk number three,

which I'm sure you're getting tons of

questions about the Don Row doctrine.

Yeah. Uh, already proven true not even a

week into the new year. As we're

recording this, we're in New York City

and so is Nicholas Maduro um, in a

holding cell in Brooklyn. His wife is

here as well. um they're in American

custody, have pleaded not guilty to drug

trafficking and other federal charges.

What was your initial reaction to the

news of the US intervention in Venezuela

and bringing Maduro here to New York?

>> Um it was a staggering military success

operationally. Um the the Russians wish

they could have pulled this off. We'd be

having a very different conversation

about Ukraine if their military had, you

know, a fifth of the professionalism and

and capabilities that the Americans do.

Interesting. I mean, this has been

discussed inside the Trump

administration for months now, but um 3

months ago, uh they didn't have

intelligence on Maduro's whereabouts and

habits. They didn't have people inside

uh the administration that were working

with them. And now they did. Uh, and so

they were able um to give the go-ahad.

And this is a uh that that the fact that

they were able to pull that off over the

course of a few months um and put that

plan together um is uh a real

operational victory for President Trump.

Um he wanted to see the back of Maduro.

He did. There are no American boots on

the ground. there were no American

servicemen or women uh that were killed

in the operation. Um and it not it

wasn't just removing Maduro, it's

bringing him to the United States. It's

having him see justice in an American

court system um with all of the media

and the attention and the rest that will

play out over the course of months. Uh

all of that is exactly what Trump and uh

his advisers and cabinet uh were hoping

for. So from an initial

u impact perspective it was massively

positive for them. Um having said that

uh there are lots of second order

questions about Trump doubling down

across the region about how uh one goes

about running Venezuela um with uh their

the same regime is still in place even

though Maduro is gone. everybody else is

still there. Uh what does that look

like? Um and uh what are the knock-on

implications of all of this? Because

there is a level of if you end up

breaking it, you have responsibility. Um

and even if Trump doesn't believe that

that is true, that will be seen to be

true by a lot of people. So, I mean the

if Trump could just stop the clock right

there with Maduro confined and in his in

his uh you know sort of handcuffs and

the rest it'd be a very different story

than what I think we'll be talking about

over the course of the year. And that

that's why of course Donro doctrine is

number three because it's not just about

Trump getting rid of Maduro and and

having we said we we thought that Maduro

was going to be out. We've been saying

that for months. We didn't think he'd

see the end of the year. But that's very

different from how the United States

deciding that it will be the orbiter of

what happens in its hemisphere broadly

defined. That's going to be a tricky

one.

>> Absolutely. I mean, it's there are so

many pieces to this puzzle and I like

that you began with emphasizing what an

incredible military operation this has

been because I know that's been a source

of frustration uh for the administration

that they kind of

>> they don't get that conversation because

everyone jumps to the stuff that they

don't like about what that they about

what they have done. Um but I do want to

talk about the Donroe doctrine aspect of

this. So, we know that Venezuela had

Russia operating there, China operating

there, Iran's there, you know,

Hezbollah. Um, we saw in the swearing in

of Deli Rodriguez, who was the vice

president is now the president. Um, that

she's very chummy with the ambassadors

from all of our adversarial countries

that I just named. Um, not kissing any

American ambassador, uh, or with a warm

embrace. So, what do you think that the

Donroe doctrine spells out for the other

countries in Trump's Western Hemisphere?

And do you think that things in

Venezuela actually are going to change?

>> Well, first of all, um it we may need to

start rethinking how we talk about

adversaries. I mean, Trump does. For

Trump, the top adversary of the United

States is are his political opponents in

the United States. Um and uh when he

meets with Xihinping

um he deals with him in many ways as a

peer

uh and he doesn't afford that level of

treatment with the Europeans for example

um even though the Europeans are NATO

allies of the United States but China he

talks about having a G2 relationship. So

I mean does Trump really see China as a

core adversary? If you look at the

Russia Ukraine war, which Trump said he

was going to end, he's putting a lot

more pressure on the Ukrainians, who the

Americans have been supporting, than he

is on the Russians because he wants to

bring the war to an end. But, you know,

does it matter that one's an adversary

and one isn't? I mean, when he invited

um Putin to Anchorage and he rolled out

the red carpet and when he sees Zalinski

um in Mara Lago, there ain't no red

carpet and there's no cabinet member

meeting him at the plane. So, I'm I'm

I'm just saying that not not because I

think that everything is completely

through the looking glass and

topsyturvy, but it is changing. It is

changing and and the Dawnroe doctrine

implies that it's changing and and we're

going to need to rethink uh how American

power is projected as a consequence. So,

China's really interesting point. Trump

wants a better relationship with China

right now because he knows that the

Chinese have the capacity and

willingness to hit him back in a way

that he doesn't want. And so I thought

it was very interesting that when um

Maduro was captured that um despite the

blockade on Venezuelan tankers, a

significant number of tankers were

allowed to go um to bring oil to China.

Um, and part of that is, you know, want

to be nicer to the new Venezuelan

government because you're expecting them

to do what you want. Part of that is

they don't have oil storage. You don't

want to destroy the economy if you're

going to have to rebuild it and invest

in it. But part of it is, well, we don't

want to antagonize China, just like

Trump called the Japanese prime minister

and said, maybe calm down a little on

Taiwan a few weeks ago after she made

those statements that the Chinese took

such exception to. Um, so there's that

aspect of it and and then we can talk

about what the implications are of all

of this for governing Venezuela going

forward, for Mexico, for Colombia, for

Cuba, for Greenland and Denmark. I mean,

and and I'll go wherever you want, but I

mean, there's there's there's a whole

bunch of regional stuff that is super

important.

Let's start um I guess with Greenland

because you know we're recording this on

Tuesday, January 6, and this morning

European leaders released a very

strongly worded letter in defense of

their NATO ally. So, and the Danish

prime minister made a statement

yesterday about this as well. Trump's

been threatening Greenland, you know,

since he got into office. Um but people

are taking him a lot more seriously and

literally since what happened in

Venezuela. But, you know, how seriously

do you think we should be taking Trump's

threats of doing what he did to Maduro

across his hemisphere as he would call

it?

>> I mean, Greenland from Trump's

perspective is part of the Donro

doctrine. Um, and Steven Miller made

that point very clearly last night. He

said, "We have to have it." And Miller

was one of the three architects of the

Venezuela policy along with uh with

Marco Rubio, Secretary of State, and

John Ratcliffe, the director of the CIA.

Um he would be core to a Greenland

policy. Um and

here's the the the weird thing about

Greenland. Venezuela, you know, again,

same regime is in place, still being run

by the actual Venezuelan people. Their

policies are going to need to change

according to Trump or else there will be

military action. But Maduro himself was

a dictator. He was not democratically

elected. They had elections. He refused

to accept the outcome. He's brutal. He

traffs massive amounts of drugs. I mean,

all sorts of the things, right?

Greenland is not just part of the

territory of a clear and steadfast ally.

I mean this is a country that

immediately was sending troops to help

the US in Afghanistan, right? And died

in larger numbers per capita than the

Americans did, right? So like Denmark is

a serious ally of the US and anything

the US needs in Greenland. If if the US

wants more access for bases, if they

want intelligence listening posts, if

they want to give Elon a launch pad for

star for SpaceX and Starlink, uh if they

want access to to exploitation of

critical minerals and resources, fish,

right? anything they want if the

Americans are prepared to just pick up

the phone, call the Danish prime

minister and negotiate, they will get

those things,

>> right?

>> No problem. So why is there a problem

here? Right? Because with Venezuela, it

was very clear why there were problems,

right? I mean, you know, you had Maduro

who's dancing and making fun of Trump

and saying, "I'm never going anywhere."

You've got the drugs. You've got, you

know, the the the immigration, the 8

million migrants, 8 million migrants

from Venezuela legally destabilizing the

region, all these things. Last I can

tell, there ain't no fentinel coming

from Greenland, right? We don't have

that problem. So, what the [ __ ] is it,

right? I'm I'm legitimately angry about

this. Um because it's so stupid.

And and as best I can tell,

someone showed Trump Greenland on on a

globe and he's like, "Wow, it's really

big." Uh even though it's not, right? Um

and we should have that. And and and he

wants it to be American. And and and

Trump there isn't a plan, but he has

told but they are developing a plan.

There are there are many people in the

administration that have been tasked

with coming up for a plan for Greenland

to no longer be a part of Denmark, for

it to be sovereign territory of the

United States. That is the intention and

that is under no circumstances workable

for Denmark or its Nordic allies or I

think most of Europe. Yeah,

>> I think

>> um

this is an incredibly stupid own goal in

my view, especially because Trump is not

a dictator. Like anything Trump does,

another president comes in in 2029, they

can undo all of us. So why are you

destroying

decades of goodwill with committed

allies and and actually, you know,

putting in jeopardy the transatlantic

alliance, the NATO alliance

because you've decided that you need to

paint Greenland as part of the United

States. I I I for the life of me, I have

no idea

why they think this is so important, why

Trump has decided this is so important.

I I it it feels like madness,

but it is the actual plan. We're not

making this up. They're they are they

that is the intention, and they are they

are not talking to the Danish government

about this that they're they intend to

talk directly with Greenland. Now, the

the good news,

there's not been much good news here.

The good news is there is truly no

intention to invade Greenland. They're

not going to take it militarily. They

they they believe that through a

combination of inducements

and threats,

>> overt and covert, information and

disinformation,

some plan will come together that will

get them Greenland.

We will see. But but they intend this is

absolutely a priority.

>> Well, they do always think that there's

something that someone wants bad enough

to do what you want. I doubt that

turning Greenland over um as a sovereign

nation would be that. I I kind of think

of it, you know, Willy Wonka Verooa

Salt, how she's like, "Daddy, I want it

and I want it now." That's how I think

about Trump.

>> Well, that was a talented squirrel to be

fair,

>> right? I mean, I understand why you

would want one of those squirrels. And

it was only one squirrel. There were

lots of squirrels.

>> That's a great point. There were lots of

squirrels.

>> There lot of schools.

>> Do you feel like the Donro doctrine is

turning us into just a regional

superpower versus a global superpower?

>> No, not at all. So the Monroe Doctrine

uh was in uh the Trump National Security

Strategy Document a month plus ago,

which is why we put Donro doctrine in uh

the risk report. It it was it's very

clear that this is a foreign policy

priority for Trump, but it is not in any

way a limit of his ambition. Uh the

United States is doing more, not less

with the Gulf States now. They're doing

more, not less, with Israel. They are

certainly exercised with Iran. Um, for

example, they've just, um, approved the

largest ever sale of military equipment

and componentry to Taiwan. Uh, I mean,

there lots of other examples like that.

Um, so I don't think it's a limit, but

but I also think that um Trump's in

2025, if you and I had been having this

conversation, and Scott and I did um

back in January, we were talking about

tariffs and how how much tariffs were

going to be the principal US tool to

project power internationally. Well,

that's run a lot of its course. The

United States has now done a bunch of

deals. They've been hit back by the

Chinese. Um they are worried about

affordability, so they have to actually

get prices down. And Trump's worried

about midterm elections. So he's not

going to have the same ability to

project economic power. And that's even

before we talk about the Supreme Court's

ruling on the AIPA process, which is

likely to constrain him somewhat in my

view. Um so how is he going to project

power? How is he going to get his wins

around the world? And the answer is much

more militarily where the US actually

does have an asymmetrical advantage.

Intelligence where the US does have an

asymmetrical advantage. Cyber where the

US does have an asymmetrical advantage

especially against smaller countries all

over the world. Um, and the Donro

doctrine, I think, really does um, play

into that because of course in America's

backyard, I mean, China may be the

largest uh, economic trading partner for

most of these countries, but militarily

the Americans clearly call the shots.

>> Yeah. Um, I guess by extension then, do

you think that this has what that we did

in Venezuela or the way that he's

thinking about foreign policy set a

precedent where China is looking at

Taiwan with even like more rosecolored

glasses or Putin's licking his lips a

little bit more about Ukraine? I'm I'm

sure you saw that Fiona Hills testimony

from 2019 is circulating around saying,

you know, Putin was thinking about a,

you know, a swap, right? That if the US

could get Venezuela, we could get

Ukraine. So do you think that these

other powers I won't call them straight

adversaries um as per your earlier point

but are thinking yes there's a lot of

military might there but there's also

somebody who thinks that you know if

you're in a big position of power you

can go in and and take a leader out of a

country and you know take over yourself

in quotes

>> not I mean I understand the question of

course uh and it's a very logical

question to ask an important question to

ask um I I would say not really it's not

the way I think about it. So, I mean,

and we should take both of these in turn

because they're different. Um, Taiwan is

considered by China, not by the United

States, but considered by China to be a

domestic issue. Um, and so it's not a

matter for international laws to

determine. And China fully expects to

take and integrate Taiwan into

reintegrate as they would describe it

into mainland China. Um, and the reason

they're not is because it's heavily

defended. It's heavily fortified. It's

an island and it's because they have

technology that China really needs in

terms of TSMC and semiconductors and and

and it would be a disaster for the

Chinese um to try to take that risk at

this point. But they're doing everything

they can to ensure that in the future,

maybe the notsodistant future, that that

won't be the case. And and so no, I I

don't think that the US Venezuela action

changes that. I do think that China's

recognition that they can give back as

good as Trump gets

um on critical minerals and on tariffs

um and that they can squeeze the

Americans and leverage the Americans and

that works. Make the Chinese feel more

comfortable that they can incrementally

ratchet up pressure on Taiwan and the

Americans won't do much. I do think they

feel that. But that's not because of

Venezuela. That's because they think

that they've now got a better power

position on the United States. Russia um

invaded Ukraine

before this. Um and it's not like, you

know, they're going to get any more

emboldened. They're emboldened because

they see the United States wants to end

the war no matter what. And they're

willing to cut the Russians a good deal

while pressuring Ukraine. Why are they

pressuring Ukraine so much more than

Russia? Because Ukraine's weaker. So, I

mean, I I think that I would answer your

question differently. I don't think that

America's engagement in the law of the

jungle emboldens bad actors to act bad.

They're bad actors. That means they act

bad. Um, they do that anyway. What

America's embrace of a G0ero world means

is that America's friends who have

relied on the United States for

upholding rule of law now feel that the

United States is not reliable. And so

they have to hedge. They have to do more

things themselves. They have to play

defense. Um, and they have to decouple

themselves so that the United States can

no longer have the same amount of

influence and power over them that they

have presently. And and I see that when

I talk to the Canadians, when I talk to

the Europeans, the Japanese, the South

Koreans, the Australians, everyone um

has that view. So this is much more of a

behavior changing inducement for

America's allies than it is for its

adversaries.

We'll be right back after a quick break.

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Um, and you bring up the lack of

reliability that people who work with us

feel whether you know trading partners

or supposed to be allies in organization

like NATO. And that takes me to your

number one risk for this year, which you

called the US political revolution. Walk

us through why this one topped the list.

I was very happy as a nervous American

citizen to see this recognized as a

possibility and a huge risk.

>> We don't think that the US political

revolution is a possibility. We think

it's happening. We just don't know if it

will be successful or not. Um, and some

people want it to be successful and

others don't, but we think it's

happening. What is it? Um, Trump

believes and his supporters agree

that the political system was weaponized

against him,

leading to unprecedented two

impeachments,

felonies and convictions,

um, and felony charges and convictions,

and, uh, a near assassination.

And that that justifies urgently Trump

taking political control of the

administrative state, making it fully

loyal to him, answerable and accountable

to him, weaponizing the power ministries

of the US, specifically the FBI, the

Department of Justice, the IRS, other

such organizations,

and ensuring that there are no further

checks and balances that constrain the

president so that the principal enemies

of Trump and therefore the United

States, not Russia, not China, but the

Democratic Party in the US can no longer

come to power. Um, that is what Trump is

intending to do. Um, I think he will

likely fail. We can talk about why, but

it is very clear through his actions and

his efforts that he is on a number of

different fronts um attempting to bring

about such a revolution. And it is also

clear that the US political system has

only partially been able to constrain um

that breakage breakage of erosion and

erosion of norms as well as of actual

checks and balances. And you know in my

lifetime I've seen now three revolutions

that have mattered on the global stage.

uh the first with Deng Xiaopang in China

opening the economy to the global system

leading to 50 years of unheralded

Chinese economic growth that was

successful. Then we saw Gorbachov's

political and economic revolution

changing the nature of that system over

the course of six years that led to the

fall of the wall and the collapse of the

Soviet Union. That revolution was

unsuccessful. Now we see Trump's

political revolution, not an economic

revolution. Only the second revolution

really attempted by a US president. The

first was FDR.

Uh Trump's is much more structurally

significant than FDRs and we make that

comparison in detail in the report and

we don't know if it's going to be

successful. It's actually in process

right now. But given that the US is the

most powerful country in the world with

more allies than anyone else has that

rely on it, then obviously that kind of

uncertainty and structural change in the

US is going to be the top risk.

>> Yeah, absolutely. I I would like you to

talk more about why you expect that this

is more likely to fail than succeed. And

we'll make sure for those who are going

to be watching this that we put that

incredible chart from your risk report

up that, you know, plots Trump's

executive actions and the norms and

checks and balances that they're

breaking. Um cuz when you look at a

chart like that, you think it's only

been a year. He has three more year. I

mean, and he could be a lame duck. You

know, Democrats retake the House and uh

in the midterms, but that guy plows

through everything and we're talking

about executive orders anyway,

>> right? And I mean, you know, I thought

it was really important to to show the

the most important actions that they

were covered over.

>> It's an awesome chart. It's scary, but

it's awesome.

>> But, you know, the funny thing is

there's a whole bunch of things that got

a lot of news. They got a lot of

headlines, but they were in that bottom

left quadrant. And here I'm talking

about the actions that didn't actually

break norms. And they don't actually

break the law, but they were reported as

if they did. And so this is part of the

problem too is that people's hair is on

fire all the time. And so orange mad

bad. Everything he does is equally

horrible. No, there's a filter too. And

in his first term, almost none of his

acts were inherently revolutionary.

Increasingly, they are. And and watching

that trajectory and that evolution is

extremely important. And then see to

what extent are they being checked? Are

they being stopped? for example, when he

puts those investigations against

Leticia James and and Comey and it turns

out he fails, right? So, that was an

effort, but there was push back. Um, you

know, there were others like the uh the

the um what was it? The the ACT blue uh

investigation investigation that that

was successful. That's a completely

chilling revolutionary act that will

have an impact on the ability and

willingness to donate to political

opposition in the United States. So, I

mean, you've got to look at all of that

stuff to understand where they're going.

>> Absolutely. Um, there's I don't want to

have Trump derangement syndrome, um,

which I've been accused of many times in

my life, but I do want to go to another

Trump themed risk, which was number six

on your list, uh, state capitalism with

American characteristics. Um, what does

that mean in the US context, and how is

it different from traditional industrial

policy or normal government

intervention? Well, it's only number six

and and so no big deal.

>> Well, these risks are rated and they're

rated on the basis of likelihood,

imminence, and impact. And since the US

is by far the most impactful thing on

the global stage, if a US risk is only

number six, right? Then that implies

that it's nowhere close to the stuff

that we've been talking about so far,

just to be clear. So I mean yes, we are

seeing state capitalism and industrial

policy play a much bigger role in

certain aspects of the US economy. So

when Trump says there's going to be a

golden share for US steel and the

American president will decide how that

will be used or not. So, no, you're

going to keep that um factory open that

actually, you know, you otherwise would

have closed because it doesn't make any

economic sense. And that that's normally

a private sector decision, but now it

isn't. And we're going to allow Nvidia

to sell these chips to China because

they just effectively lobbyed me as the

president. We're going to take a stake

directly in Intel because we already

bailed them out. But that's going to be

retroactive. Now, we're going to

actually say that we're just going to

take an equity share. And by the way,

Japan, if you want access um to the

American market, you're going to have to

invest $550 billion in a facility, and

we're going to decide which those

companies are going to be. All of those

things are injecting Washington and the

person of Trump into the investment

process, into the capital process. And

and it's also there's also kleptocracy.

There's also well Pakistan is investing

in Trump's family's financial crypto uh

company and so the US is going to give

more access and more time to the

Pakistanis and that'll damage the

USIndia relationship and there's a lot

of that going on too. Now again there's

a political revolution underway in the

US that I think will fail. There's not

an economic revolution away going in the

US. The US has long been um a system

economically where the private sector

captures the regulatory environment,

where money speaks loudly in the

political system, where the lobby is

extraordinarily powerful and undermines

competition. Um, and it's a country that

has had industrial policy before, but we

have not seen this level of

personalization

of industrial policy well beyond

strategic sectors that we're now seeing

under Trump. It's not structurally

changing the system, but it's adding a

lot of incremental costs and uncertainty

as you inject the politics.

I I think a lot of kind of normie lay

people are wondering about the

unraveling of a lot of these policies if

that were to happen in 2029 say Trump's

not a dictator. We're going to have a

new president. It could be JD Vance or

Marco Rubio. It could be a Democrat. I

don't know. Um, but do you think that

this approach to capitalism will be part

of the Republican

economic policy going forward or is this

something that is distinctly Trumpian?

>> I think it'll be part of a Democratic

party too.

>> Really?

>> Uh, yeah. I I think when you when you

break norms and you put more power in

the hands of the political system and

the executive, they will use that for

whatever political ends they want. So if

today we have more state capitalism and

it's used to support oil companies that

are going to go into Venezuela, uh

tomorrow under a Democrat, it'll be used

to promote renewable energy and their

favorite companies. But it's not they're

not going to willingly give that power

up, right? Um and we see so much of this

norm erosion. The same thing will be

true. I mean, if you have um the uh the

the the attacks on corporate media,

which right now are being directed um

against ABC News or CNN, you know, in

the future they can and will be used

against Fox and Newsmax. Um, and

remember Trump was a sitting president

and he was actually deplatformed

>> um, from Twitter um, and from Facebook

and from the Apple store. And I I found

that very disturbing um, as a decision

that was being made against the sitting

American president. Um, but now of

course Trump has control over Truth

Social. Elon has control over X and

they're trying to uh get control to

political loyalists for Tik Tok. Um I

have no doubt that if Democrats are in

power in the future, those things will

be shifted politically for their

benefit. Um so I mean whether it's JD or

whether it's the Democrats, you break

these norms and it's a slippery slope. I

mean it's not like Trump suddenly is the

cause of all these problems. Trump is

not the cause. Trump is a symptom.

>> Right.

>> Right. Trump is he's a symptom. He's a

beneficiary and he's an accelerant and

he's a powerful accelerant. But these

things have been have been coming for a

long time. And part of the reason that

we're seeing a political revolution in

the United States right now is that um

of the people that said in 2024 that

that democracy was an important reason

for them to vote, not the most important

reason, but important reason, more of

those people voted for Trump than voted

for Kamla because they thought the

political system was already so

captured, so rigged that they wanted

someone who was willing to break it. Um,

and that that's, you know, that that is

spiraling down. The United States today

is by far the most powerful economy.

It's by far the most powerful military.

It's incredibly innovative. It's got the

world's reserve currency. And yet, it is

by far the most dysfunctional political

system among the advanced industrial

economies. The US political system is in

deep decline. And that that imbalance is

is causing a lot of uncertainty.

>> Absolutely. Um and we're going to get to

talking about Europe um in a couple as

well because there are themes that

certainly are aligned with what's going

on here though not as um extreme I

guess. Uh I want to talk about the

energy race AI. So risk number two,

overpowered and also risk number eight,

AI eats its users, which I I love the

name of both touching on this energy

race between the US and China and the

impact that a AI will continue to have

on society. Um you say that China has

mastered the electric stack, energy,

batteries, grids, manufacturing, while

the US is betting that whoever builds

the smartest models wins. Uh maybe my

favorite line from the report was

Washington is asking the world to buy

20th century energy while Beijing offers

21st century infrastructure. The floor

is yours to talk about that.

>> So uh I want to bring this back to the

Dawn Row doctrine.

>> Okay? because uh the United States has

all of this military influence and look

at what they could do to Maduro and yet

in America's backyard which Trump has

said we will have dominance over the the

the most important trading partner of

most of those countries is not the US,

it's China. So the Americans have the

military influence, but the Chinese have

the economic influence. And there's no

way for the Americans to become dominant

again economically in their own backyard

unless they are producing the most

advanced technologies these countries

need. And they need inexpensive energy

to power AI to feed their people to keep

their countries and their economies

going. And the Americans have this

staggering strength in oil and gas and

coal. 13.5 million barrels a day. And

now the US has just exercised some level

of dominion over a country that has the

largest proven oil reserves in the

world, Venezuela. Okay, that's a great

great story. If you are also going to

build energy that's getting cheaper,

which is the wind, the solar, the

nuclear, the batteries, and the supply

chain to support it. And yet the

Americans have said, "No, no, no, no.

We're going to keep fighting on oil and

gas and coal, which is not getting

cheaper over time. And we're going to

tie our other hand, our stronger hand

behind our backs, right? Uh and and and

we are not going to develop what the

Chinese are becoming dominant in. Now,

American AI is today more advanced than

Chinese AI. Um, but the energy that you

need to power it is being developed at

scale and cheaper and exportable by the

world's first electric state, China. And

and what really bothers me about US

strategy right now is it's so shortterm,

>> right?

>> You've got to invest for the long term,

especially when you have a political

system that doesn't work for the long

term. It's a short-term political

system, which means you have to

therefore put policies in place that can

actually be consistent from one

political cycle to the next. The Chinese

don't need to worry about that.

>> No, they don't. And Trump is jealous of

them for it.

>> He's very jealous of that. Yeah.

>> Yeah. Do you think that this path that

we're on, the short-term gain path, I

guess, versus the long-term plan, that

we can rectify that or we're just like

on it's a careening train car and it's

not going to stop, especially with this

leadership because some of the things

that you're talking about, you know,

that we want to fight this war with old

tools essentially that links directly to

the politics of MAGA, right, and the

base that they are trying to speak to.

So, is there an offramp for us where we

can kind of meet China where they are?

>> You know, you know, I mean, the fact

that the Americans were so surprised by

China's dominance in Critical Minerals,

which powers a lot of this stuff, um,

you know, definitely led the US to say

we need to start prioritizing

investments in those companies and

aligning with other countries that have

access to those critical minerals. Um,

the US has belatedly said battery

technology is something the US should be

taking a very serious look at and

investing in and hopefully that will

pick up. Um, Trump has decided uh that

solar and wind are basically woke um

climate response and not the

increasingly inexpensive energy of the

future that the Americans need to

dominate. uh and another president can

make a change. But again, going in going

out um of these decisions every few

years while you have another country at

scale that is investing vastly more and

bringing far more electricity onto the

grid uh just puts the Americans behind

the eightball. So, um, I I we made this

a risk and it's starting to really hit

because AI is really important and you

need to power it in 2026. I don't think

the Americans have lost the game, but

they've made a really bad bet and and

that and the longer that bet stays on

the table and you ride with it, the more

you're going to lose.

>> We'll be right back.

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We're back with more from Ian Bremer.

If Scott were here, he would definitely

want to talk to you about the AI bubble,

which he's obsessed with. Um, what's

your take on what these AI companies

that that are propping up our stock

market um to absurd levels, are going to

do in 2026?

>> So, uh, Scott will have a better take

than I will on how frothy the AI bubble

is. I don't I'm not a stock watcher. I

don't really have a sense of how

overvalued they may or may not be. Um

and so we that that that I wouldn't make

a projection on that, but but I do think

that it's very clear that what's driving

AI right now is happening outside of the

regulatory process, outside of

governance, outside of coordination. It

is we believe in this. It is

transformative. It's revolutionary and

it's massive. And so we just need to win

win win accelerate accelerate

accelerate. And as that's happening um

you know there are certainly going to be

investors that are going to put more

pressure on where's our return. Uh and

so I think that the nearer term risk

whether or not there's a bubble is that

these companies are going to start

facing much more pressure to provide

commercialized AI product. And and what

worries me there and it's only some of

the companies cuz some of the companies

are selling B2B. They're selling

industrial product, national security

product, data sets that are actually

contained and known so you don't have

the hallucinations. The Chinese are also

doing a lot of that. And I think there's

going to be incredible gains in

efficiency, productivity, huge

inventions coming from that. Very

excited about the biotech field for

example. very excited about reducing uh

waste and increasing efficiency in

traffic flows and you know sort of for

airline travel things like that. All of

this is great, but for the companies

that specifically are selling AI to

consumers,

um the the social media equivalent, the

Google search equivalent,

if they have to start making lots of

money on really goddy return

expectations,

what they will do will be very damaging

to society

because uh they're in already injecting

AI eye into our body politic without

testing it.

>> Yeah.

>> And and that's that's so much more

dangerous than social media. You know, I

mean, these AIs, which we already they

already effectively have made the

touring test obsolete. You know, most

people, if they're online with the most

advanced AIs, do not know if they are

interacting with a person or with an AI.

Um and yet

um those AIs are programmed, you know,

to make sure that you are engaging with

them and they want you to be happy with

them. They want to give you what you

want, more of what you want, even though

they have no affect whatsoever. Now, by

the way, there are people like this. We

call them sociopaths

and and and we we absolutely try to

spend as little time with them as

possible. We keep our kids away from

them because they're predators. And yet

when we apply that to the AI model, we

say it's okay to test that real time on

our body politic and on our society. And

my answer to that is no, it's not. And

that's going to cause a lot of damage in

my view. I'm deeply concerned about

that. Yeah, it's uh it's strange that

we're kind of just like letting that one

slide in the conversations about

regulations or even like banning phones

in schools and then there's kind of lip

service paid to how insane it is that

people are having full-on relationships

with these chat bots like you're saying

that you know they don't know who

they're talking to and no one seems to

really care about finding out and when

you have a government that doesn't want

to legislate about these things and I'm

not saying that the Democrats are

perfect um in terms of it but it's Uh,

it's frightening stuff.

>> I mean, the Europeans are turning away

from regulation of AI because they know

that they don't have any tech companies

and they desperately need the

competitiveness and the growth. The only

country that's really doing it is China

because their view is if if our citizens

are going to hallucinate, they're

certainly not going to hallucinate from

an AI. It's going to be chat CCP, right?

Not chat GPT. and and so they they are

really throttling what they're allowing

their AI companies to do with consumers

um while while they're putting their

foot on the gas on industrial and and

security national security uses. But in

the United States, in Europe and in the

global south, it's basically the Wild

West.

>> Um fascinating. Um I want to jump to

Europe or back to Europe now to your

risk number four. Europe under siege.

France, Germany, and the UK all enter

2026 with weak governments, rising

populism, and no margin for reform. Why

is this moment uniquely dangerous for

Europe's ability to govern itself? And

you write that the center cannot hold as

the co-host of a podcast called Raging

Moderates that uh stuck out to me. Uh

just hearing that the center or the

middle cannot hold is uh bit scary.

>> Well, the big change geopolitically in

the world over the last 20 years has not

been the US in decline. and it's been

America's allies in decline. Um, and we

see that demographically. We see that

economically in terms of productivity.

We see that in the lack of defense

spending. And and if the United States

is now saying, "Okay, well, we don't

really want to defend you anymore. We're

not really interested in providing that

support. In fact, we'd rather have a

weaker Europe um so that we can deal

with individual European countries

that'll be more aligned with what we

want." And the Russians on the other

side are saying, "We want Ukraine and

we're going to cause all sorts of

problems for you um on your borders

because you've expanded NATO in a way

that is threatening to us." And so

there's all this asymmetric warfare

that's happening from Russia. Suddenly

the Europeans are getting it from both

sides. They've got to spend much more on

defense. They got to spend much more on

infrastructure. They have to build their

competitiveness at a time that their

social contract, right, has been

providing so much for people and they're

demanding that they that spending

continues. Interest rates are higher,

borrowing rates are higher, and their

indebtedness levels are high. So, this

is kind of a no-win situation for

Europe. They should have been making

this bet 20, 30 years ago that they

needed to focus more on growth and more

on defense because the Americans

wouldn't always be there to defend them

and because Russia was going to be a

threat, they didn't. And so now, um,

when they really have to, when their

backs are to the wall and it's urgent,

they also have inside their own

countries a whole bunch of people

saying, "We don't we don't support this

EU thing. We we we don't want

immigration and we don't want to spend

money on anybody else and we want

euroskeepticism

power for our own nations. And so in

Germany, in France and in the UK, the

three big countries, you have

increasingly very very weak centrist

governments that are not likely to be

effective and may not last, may fall.

And the Americans are going to help that

process. And the Russians are going to

help that process. Reform Party in the

UK, AFD in Germany, National Rally in

France. Why do you think that Washington

prefers a fragmented Europe?

>> Um, so this is the big foreign policy

difference uh between Trump and previous

administrations. Certainly Biden who was

a noted Atlanticist. Um Trump first of

all because Trump likes leaders that he

likes and and that means Orban and uh

Bardella and Le Pen and Farage all of

whom have been like with Elon Musk as

well like with JD Vance have been saying

we want MAGA we're Europe firsters. So

that's one reason is that level of

affinity with that specific you know

more populist right movement across

Europe. Second is that um Trump

understands that with weak countries he

can fafo

with strong countries he's got a taco

right so China is a taco situation

Venezuela is a fafo situation the EU

together if they're strong is a lot more

taco if they're weak and they're

vulnerable it's fafo so He likes that.

So he doesn't want to deal with the EU.

He doesn't want to deal with Brussels.

He doesn't want to deal with the world's

largest common market that can engage in

uh regulatory processes and trade

processes that are going to be

challenging and competitive with the

United States. He wants to cut

individual deals with leaders that he

can bully around. And and that is again

from a short-term perspective. If you

don't think a strong EU matters for the

promotion of rule of law, if you don't

think international law matters, you

don't care about the promotion of

democracy, about human rights, about

those things, which the Americans have

had a spotty record on, but has

generally cared about more than not. But

if you think those things don't matter

and if rather it's just about power and

you're going to be the apex predator,

then why would you want the EU? So that

that that is really a very different

worldview that you saw JD Vance put on

display at the Munich Security

Conference last February when he said

you guys are the enemy, not the Russians

or the Chinese. And and you saw it to a

degree in the national security strategy

document when the Trump administration

was talking about the civilizational

decay that was happening inside Europe.

um which again I think Europe has lots

of problems. I think the Americans have

lots of problems. They're different

problems. Um but at the end of the day

there has been a level of trust because

the values have been very sympotico

because we all sort of care about rule

of law, about individual rights, about

democracy. We have different some

different priorities and how we want to

spend our money and what matters most to

us. and our laws are a little different,

but ultimately we've all wanted to have

this United Nations, IMF, World Bank,

NATO, all these institutions that came

out of World War II that the Americans

created. But now the United States is

saying, "We're no longer committed to

any of those institutions or rules."

While our allies are saying, "Whoa,

whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa. We we we really

need those things." Like, we and they do

they need them a lot more than the

Americans do. Um but but the lack of

American commitment is creating a crisis

for Europe and that's even before we

talk about this immediate Greenland

problem.

>> Yeah. Well that I mean the immediate

Greenland problem and what you were just

saying about how much more Europe needs

a strong NATO in particular links to

your risk number five Russia's second

front um predicting the escalation this

year will come from the hybrid war

between Russia and NATO. Uh what does

that really mean? Um that means that um

at a time where the Europeans are doing

all the spending um to support Ukraine

and the war is uh bleeding Russia a lot

and their economy is taking strain.

understand that if they can just divide

Europe off from the US or if they can

divide Europe internally, that's the way

that they can win this war. You know, uh

and and and what we've seen uh is a an

increase in asymmetric warfare from

Russia into all of the frontline

European states. Uh we've seen the um

the cyber attacks increase. We've seen

uh the ships dragging anchor and

destroying the fiber lines um and

attacking uh gas lines and the rest.

We've seen what do you call it? The

drones going into Poland and Romania.

We've seen weather balloons um going

into Lithuania. Uh we we've seen also

all sorts of Russian money paying for

people to engage in vandalism and

destruction of property, critical

infrastructure, even an attempt to uh

assassinate the CEO of the largest

defense company in Germany. And and now

we're seeing NATO frontline countries

recognizing this is a real danger to

them and they need to start collectively

taking action against Russia. And maybe

the Americans won't support that. But

together, we're seeing talk of offensive

cyber attacks against Russia. We're

seeing talks of uh needing to uh take

down those drones as they come and take

counter measures and to respond to jet

fighters that are going into uh the the

territorial airspace um of these

frontline countries. And all of that um

is significantly escalating the nature

of the risk because Russia isn't just at

war in Ukraine. Russia is actually

engaged in a shadow war in NATO.

>> Uplifting stuff. Um

>> well, top risks is how we start the

year. You know, what do you do?

>> Then we'll evaluate at the end, and

hopefully it won't be as bleak as it

could feel right now. Um okay, I want to

wrap up by asking you, um at the end of

the report, you say that you're not

optimistic, but you're hopeful. Um so,

what is keeping you hopeful?

Um, you know, it's easy to say the

technology is great and so exciting and

all that. That's easy. And I think there

are a couple of bigger things that make

me hopeful. The first is that um this

we're not heading to World War II. Um

this is the United States abdicating its

own institutions and its own leadership

and maybe its own values. Um is leading

other countries around the world to say,

"Wait a second. We like a lot of these

institutions. We like a lot of these

values." and they're hedging and they're

creating alternative trade agreements

and alternative ways to make sure that

they can defend themselves and that is

that they're not we're not just seeing

uh a beggar thy neighbor policies

everywhere. We are seeing the creation

of more resilience. That's one thing

that makes me feel more optimistic.

countries like India that are trying to

reach out and build stronger relations

with the rest of the G7 and with all of

the global south and even stabilize

their relationship with China. India's

got 1.5 billion people. That's a big

thing for them to do and they're growing

at 8%. Right? The Gulf States are

saying, "Well, wait a second. We need to

make sure that the region is stable and

if the Americans can't be counted on,

we're going to have to do more." And

they were the ones that drove that

summit with Trump on the Gaza ceasefire

and we ended up getting a Security

Council resolution. Security Council

where the Russians and the Chinese

abstained and everyone else voted in

favor after the United States was

isolated completely on Israel just two

weeks before. And why? Because the

regional powers were actually saying we

care about our region. We care about our

backyard. So that that matters. Um and

it was constructive. It's not all just

Donro doctrine everywhere. Um, but maybe

the thing that makes me most hopeful

is that the American political system

needed a crisis. I mean, you know,

people were getting angrier and they

were getting less aligned with

globalism. They didn't like the forever

wars in Afghanistan and Iraq fought on

their backs that people lied about. And

they didn't like the free trade when

you're hollowing out US labor and not

taking care of your own workers. and

they didn't like all of the immigration

if you weren't going to ensure that the

average American was getting a fair

shot. And so there was going to be a

breaking point. And that breaking point

is not just driven by Trump. That

breaking point is also driven by average

Americans. And and I think that when

you, you know, when you create that

level of disruption, there's the

opportunity to do things differently.

And you know, most human beings that you

and I know are people that we're happy

spending time with. We're social

animals. They're not all narcissists and

sociopaths. Um, and so yet is that am I

optimistic that we're going to get to

the right place? No. Because

geopolitically there are a lot of bad

things going on. I think there'll be

some really ugly surprise crises that

aren't in the report as well. But I'm

hopeful because when human beings get

together, especially when it's hard and

when suddenly we break things, that's

when we all pay attention. So that makes

me hopeful.

>> I like it. And I also like to think that

I don't spend that much time with

sociopaths and psychopaths. Um though

some days, you know, we just all feel

that way. Um Ian Bremer, thank you so

much for your time. Uh the risk report

is available. It's fantastic. Um it was

awesome to talk to you. Thank you.

>> Nice finally meeting you in person.

Yeah,

>> online friends become real. Well, we're

still kind of online, but you know what

I mean. Anyway, thank you