Welcome to another episode of the All In

interview. I'm really excited to be

joined by back to All In, Harvard

Professor Graham Allison. Professor

Allison, welcome back to All In. Thanks

for having me.

We last had you at the summit in Los

Angeles, so it's great to have a

conversation. A lot's happened since we

last got together. For the audience,

Graham Allison's the founding dean of

the Harvard Kennedy School. He's advised

every Secretary of Defense since

Kissinger.

He's helped dismantle 12,000 Soviet

nuclear weapons, and his book Destined

for War remains the definitive framework

for understanding the US-China

relationship. I think it's worth kind of

bringing forward some of the things that

have happened in the world since we last

met.

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>> Let's start with Iran. The US and Israel

are in the middle of an attack on Iran,

and the supreme leader is dead, but the

regime is still holding on to power.

Where do you think this conflict will

take us, and

are we sleepwalking into World War III?

Well, thank you again for having me

back. I feel you have a great podcast. I

enjoyed the summit, and I'm sorry we're

not there in person to to catch up, but

I think

>> Yeah. about Iran,

I have much to say, so this could be a

long lecture. Let me just do four or

five quick points. First point, most

important point, is that there's more

questions than answers.

So, there's a huge level of uncertainty

currently

about what's happening and about what's

likely to happen.

Part of this is Clausewitz's famous fog

of war,

but this is a fog of war that's actually

increased because we got two big fog

machines

uh adding to the confusion,

uh namely Trump and the administration

on the one hand and Bibi on the other.

And then we got all the chattering us

around it. So, I would say

why did Trump decide to go to war now?

And there's six different reasons he and

the administration have given, and each

one they back around. What's the

objective? Uh there's five different

objectives, back and around. And when is

this war going to end?

I don't know.

A day, a week, a month?

Who knows? So, it's very uncomfortable

to recognize how uncertain things are.

And most of the conversation about it

tries to make it more confident. But I

think the place to start is there's a

huge amount of uncertainty. Having said

that, I'll still give you my prejudices

about a few of the points.

Point two, this has been an an

extraordinary

uh demonstration of supreme military

power and supreme intelligence power. US

military and the intelligence community

and the Israeli counterparts have been

way, way, way off the charts. And I

think this should make all Americans uh

proud of what's

been built over this decade over two

decades of investment, but especially in

the past decade. Uh third point, there's

no tears to be shed for Khamenei and the

Islamic Republic regime. It's an evil

leader, an evil regime. Uh there's no

bad thing that could happen to them that

we shouldn't be cheering over that. Uh

next point though,

breaking something's a lot easier than

building something.

And destroying targets is something that

our military knows very well how to do.

Building a new regime, regime change, is

something that we know historically

doesn't work very well, at least in Iraq

and Afghanistan.

We had every word said

that's been said in this case.

And we then went in all in

and spent more than a billion dollars

and many, many thousands of American

lives.

And when we went through Afghanistan,

the Taliban were ruling. When we left

Afghanistan, the Taliban were ruling.

So, I would say unfortunately, it's

against a backdrop that's hard. The next

point, slightly more controversial,

but I think this is Bibi's war. If

you're reader or if you listen to this

and remember Moby Dick, they should go

look at it again. Ahab had this

fixation, obsession with the white whale

and tried to find a way to kill the

white whale whenever he could. For the

last two decades, that's been Bibi's

number one, number two, number three

agenda. He's tried to sell that war

to

Obama,

to Trump one, to Biden. And how he

succeeded in mesmerizing Trump, who

might thought had his number, I'm

surprised. So, I'm pro-Israel but

anti-Bibi in this respect. And I think

that's

I understand he's a brilliant

politically, but I don't think this

uh

uh the arguments that were made that

that Trump has actually repeated, that

Iran was about to

attack us, I see no evidence for that.

That Iran was about to get a nuclear

weapon, I see no evidence for that. That

Iran was building an ICBM that was going

to attack the US, I see no evidence for

that. There's many, many bad things

about the Iranian regime, but not most

of the claims that that were made. So,

I I look this and I hope it turns out

well,

but I remember that in wars very

frequently it's easy to get in and it's

quite difficult to get out. Let me

double click on that point. You

mentioned there's multiple reasons that

the administration has messaged for

doing this, multiple views on what

success looks like, multiple timelines

on ending it,

and that this is Bibi's war.

How do you think Trump was motivated to

do this?

What is the real motivation? And I will

ask this in the context of the big

delegation and visit to China coming up

next month. Was Trump motivated

fundamentally to create leverage with

China

and use this as a tool to try and

maximize his negotiating leverage going

into the Chinese negotiations? That's a

great question and I wish that the

answer was this was all part of a grand

strategy. That would make me feel uh

hugely better. But uh

I tried I do Trumpology and I was

actually having dinner last night with

Bill O'Reilly, a former student, who I

think is one of the better Trumpologists

who are trying to interpret and we were

going back and forth through this. It's

easy enough to see why the window,

tactically, the window in which this

attack occurred was chosen because here

you got 40 you got the supreme leader

and 40 of the other leaders of Iran out

in public. So, that's an opportunity as

a target. And then the best opportunity

that's come along. The question is why

would you be attacking them?

And especially Trump given his

uh campaign and his previous views about

not repeating the mistakes of the people

that took us into endless winless wars.

And I think it's I mean I I think Bibi

is a magician.

I think his single-mindedness

uh is impressive.

I think his agility in making arguments

and developing arguments is impressive.

How he managed to persuade Trump this

was a good idea for the US now, I don't

have a good idea. And I think that

I think if I listen to the reasons why

even the people closest around him have

given or that Trump have given, they

don't seem persuasive. Now, partly

Trump is erratic.

Uh partly he sort of you know, uh acts

on the basis of instincts.

Uh somehow it came to him that this was

uh

you know, something that could be done.

I think actually maybe painted a pretty

uh I mean the upside of this picture

if if it's successful, and I hope now

that we've gone into it it would be,

would be redefining security in the

Middle East for a generation.

So, getting rid of the Iranian regime as

the uh

uh Bibi and company have gotten rid of

the proxies of the regime earlier, which

again, since October 7th, been extremely

impressive, could possibly, you could

say well, there's going to be a whole

new Middle East. And if the if the

Middle East were all like the UAE,

uh that would be fantastic. Uh fantastic

for all the human beings that live

there.

So, I think maybe he got excited by the

upside, not quite

uh careful enough about the risks or the

downside cuz it the number of ways in

which this could go wrong, you know, if

if we woke up tomorrow or today and a

couple of ships have been sunk

or a couple of hundred of Americans have

been killed, it's going to have a very

different uh

a different image. And you think that

this is independent then

of the action with Maduro and

independent of

the big delegation headed to China for

big negotiation next month? Well, I

wouldn't say entirely independent. I

would think with Maduro,

so Trump, I think this again, this is my

uh whatever armchair Trumpology, but I

would say initially he thought tariffs

were a magic wand.

And every

leader thinks if you have a magic wand,

that's fantastic. He's tried the tariff

magic wand and discovered it

didn't quite have all the effects that

he imagined on liberation day.

Uh he didn't

discover the American military, which

genuinely is a huge wand.

And the Maduro operation was just

spectacular. I mean again, it's a

military and intelligence operation,

brilliant. No other country in the world

could even imagine doing something like

that. And that had actually, you know,

makes all of us stand taller.

It can also provide a little or

historically encourages hubris and an

imagination that this magic wand can

work in many other arenas.

I don't mind at all the proposition that

every other country should take account

of the fact that the US has the most

remarkable military and intelligence

community in the world. And that's not a

bad backdrop for China and for a China

trip. So I agree that things may not be

completely disconnected, but I think in

terms of the timing, I mean right now,

when is the war going to be over? If you

talk about three or four weeks, we're

we'll already he'll be in China March

29th.

So my

inclination, again, if we were just

doing a prediction markets, is that he's

going to find a way to declare this over

before then, cuz he's needs a little

time to get his mind set on that. But if

you ask the folks at the Defense

Department, if you ask the people in

Israel, they thinking this is another

month or beyond this war. So again

there's things I don't think are quite

you know in sync. Jason joined us for

some hours and it's always a treat to

have you here on here.

>> see you. Nice to see you. It's just

amazing to have you on here and to give

us this time. If things were to go

extremely well and Iran went from a

monarchy to a dictatorship and now in

this third act here in in the modern day

to a democracy

and you actually had a democracy with 93

million citizens in the Middle East.

What impact would that have on the

region?

We've seen the Gulf monarchies evolve

human rights but they're still

monarchies. You have one other I I guess

democracy in the region in Israel but

this could be extraordinary if it was a

democracy. What what would that mean to

the

to the global chessboard?

Well, it's a good question. I mean if

this could occur

it would be spectacular.

Even I think but I would say this is way

way way

too ambitious. There's 100 things

that would be wonderful outcomes

better than what's likely

that would be short of that. I remember

uh in Iraq after Bush failed to find

nuclear weapons which was the initial

I would say somewhat up rationale

for our going into Iraq.

Condi Rice who was the secretary gave a

speech about well how wonderful it'll be

when Iraq is a democracy and market

economy quote radiating stability

through the Middle East. So we're pretty

good at doing I have a dream you know in

that version. I think that's a way way

way stretch. I would be very happy with

a regime there that simply was not about

um building nuclear weapons, was not

about building missiles that threaten

the US and our friends and allies in the

region and not about supporting proxies.

And if it's a pretty cruel regime,

unfortunately that's unfortunate for the

Iranian people.

The Persian people,

and when I'm a student of history, I

love Persia. You know, I remember

Cyrus, and I remember

the Peloponnesian War. I remember, you

know, this is a fantastic culture and

history. They've been hijacked by a

terrible, terrible group of people. And

if those people can be somehow ousted,

you know, wonderful for

Iranian people and wonderful for the

world. I'm I if I were betting it,

again, I'd say go back to the first

point. It questions uncertainty,

finding signals in the noise extremely

difficult. But if I were betting it,

it'll end up that the guys with the guns

will in some version

be the next generation. And

if they're tamer

and less

uh

uh determined

uh to threaten our interests,

will this have been worth it? Well,

again,

we'll have to look at,

you know,

over the longer run. I think the other

thing that we know about wars

is that

they're unpredictable

and that they have many unanticipated

consequences. You know, I think as we

watch what's happening now and see what

impact does that have on oil and gas

prices, predictable. So, you can see,

and going and going. Well, what impact

does that have on other countries?

A huge. So, the number of countries now

whose economies are being disrupted by

this impact

and therefore blaming us for it.

So, I had a call from someone in Taiwan

yesterday saying, "Wait a minute, did

anybody think what this is doing for

us?" Since they get about half of their

uh their electricity comes from their

natural gas that that is now coming you

know now not not coming.

Uh

if you ask about what is this meaning

for

for Ukraine all the patriots

that were

to hope to prevent

missile strikes from Russia on Ukraine

are now

in the Middle East.

Mhm. So that's that many more target. So

this just unfortunately it unfolds in so

many so many different directions. Now I

don't want to seem too pessimistic about

it because again I think we've been

shocked

fortunately on the upside by how

a professional our military has and

intelligence folks have been

and also how pathetic uh or hollow the

Iranians have been. First day of the

attack I was at the the the Defense

Department and I gave them a list of 11

things that I would do

and be capable of doing if I were

playing the Iranian hand.

I and uh

they seem to be

I don't know. I mean I I I don't know

how to even want to say out loud but

they they act like a paper tiger. Do you

think there's there's more damage

that can be done by being more

successful? You know if we think back to

Iraq

Iran is twice as many people 100 million

versus 50 million four times the land

area a much better equipped military and

arguably the military system the regime

is embedded in every aspect of industry.

So the more successful the United States

is in dismantling

the Iranian regime

and as was advised by Condoleezza Rice

who apparently was just in the White

House today and

advising the president and publicly

stated it's time to finish them off.

It's time to go all the way, etc.

Does that not then leave a country with

no infrastructure, no leadership, 100

million people in tatters, and that's

the classic breeding ground

for some of these extremist groups to

seize control and seize power. And we

don't have the resources to go in and

have another multi-decade

Afghanistan-Iraq problem. I'm afraid I

agree. Yes, I think the

the uncertainties about that I mean, you

can do four or five different scenarios

for how this might conceivably end. It

could end up being a an extended civil

war in in Iran among the various

national groups, even some of them

possibly seceding. So, again, fairly

chaotic. Look like Syria plus, okay?

It could look like Iran or Afghanistan.

Well, excuse me, we were there for more

than a decade

with unlimited resources.

Hardly any constraints on the number of

people. And how did that work out?

So, I I I'd say that I'm I'm a small-c

conservative and

kind of think history

is not always

not it's certainly not the only guide,

but it's a good place to start.

Well, I'm I'm I would say nervous, yeah.

Is it too late to have a Venezuelan

outcome where we've taken out the head

of the snake and we've simply replaced

it? The snake can continue operating and

living without too much destructive

damage and effect, but it seems like we

may be a little too far gone now in

Iran, and that to take this all the way

might be very difficult to manage. I Is

it too late?

>> If I were again, we're all in the dark

and all the uncertainty, so back to

point one. But after that, I would say

Trump is erratic,

impulsive,

but he has some coordinates. And one of

them is is his power.

See? Mhm. November 3rd is a big day for

him.

He's focused on that. The economy is a

crucial element of that. That's part of

the framing of the of the China

relationship.

The impact of this on the economy is

already evident, okay, and could become

more evident.

The

public opinion

Again, I think he's I saw today uh

uh in the journal that he's sent Hicks

Hicks Smith out to sell the war.

Mhm. Good luck.

>> [laughter]

>> Mhm. I'm not sure he can sell uh so

public opinion of this is about six to

four unfavorable.

Mhm. Cuz [clears throat] they didn't

make the case for the war in advance.

Uh the impact of this on other parties

including uh parties that we care about

is negative.

Uh

So I I can easily imagine

in the next week even

uh and declare

If you look at actually the way in which

he's left himself room to declare

victory

at having, as you say, had a cut off the

head of the snake, destroyed their

military their nuclear capabilities,

destroyed their

ability to project power or in the

Defense Department we always say destroy

or degrade.

Degrade has a lot of dimensions as you

would point out and uh

now it's up to the Iranian people to

seize their own government and take

advantage of themselves. The difficulty

with that will be Bibi wants to fight on

till the regime is destroyed.

And that'll be an interesting struggle

to see how that goes. Earlier, Trump

demonstrated that when he thought

it was in American interest he was

prepared to pull Bibi's chain.

So, we'll see. This is I think in before

we move out of the MENA region

a topic that's coming up.

There's obviously no support for this

war in America. Most Americans put

foreign affairs today at 1 or 2% of

their concern. Economy and many other

issues are are high on their list.

And he's been pretty clear, "Hey, we're

not going to put boots on the ground."

And then there's this anti-Semitic

underpinning that's happening in America

that's become pretty acute.

And you had Rubio, who

mentioned earlier, say, "Hey, we did

this because

uh the Israelis were going in anyway and

we had no choice." And then they walked

that back. Explain to

the audience how we should look at that

turn of events where there's a group of

people in America, specifically people

in the MAGA party, who believe Trump has

betrayed them and that he's captured by

the Israeli

um government in some way and he's doing

their bidding. I'm not saying that

that's my perspective, but that is a an

undertone that we're seeing. And that's

something new in our lifetime, I think.

It It certainly is. So, this is a big

topic, but I'd say

when I talk about it, I I I say, "I'm

pro-Israeli

and anti-Bibi."

So, Bibi is not Israel. The people whom

I know mostly and respect mostly in

Israel are the national security barons.

The people who've been the

chief of staff or the head of Mossad or

the head of Shin Bet or the people that

work in that in those structures. And

they believe that Bibi is actually

destroying

the

Ben-Gurion's Israeli democracy

that they cared about. Or if take Tom

Friedman, it's pretty hard to accuse him

of being anti-Is-

you know, anti-Semitic, uh

but he's been I think very clear and

very courageous in pointing out that

what Bibi's doing to Israel's democracy

is really

destroying it. And the impact of that on

Jewish kids in America,

I mean, I see this on campus, where they

want to be proud of Israel. They they

deserve to be proud of the country that

has been built over these years, but

they look at the behavior of these crazy

right-wing settlers and their activities

in the in the occupied West Bank, or

they look at some of the activities in

Gaza, or they look at now the kind of

unlimited uh

war without any

any even attempt to make arguments about

proportionality, and just say, "Wait a

minute. That's not

the country I want to be proud of. I

want to be proud of of Rabin's Israel. I

want to be proud of Ehud Barak's Israel.

I want to be

proud of Ben-Gurion's Israel." And I'm

I'm pretty much of that of that

persuasion. I think what what uh

what Bibi risks in this,

and risked earlier, uh with uh siding

I mean, inter- interfering in American

politics,

in-

invites pushback.

So,

I think this could have a big long-term

negative effect both in the Democratic

Party and the Republican Party,

especially on the under younger people.

If you look at the polling for the under

30s on Israel, it's just like shocking,

you know.

Mhm.

Can we move to China because I think

that again, this is going to be the big

story over the next month. You've said

publicly that ousting Maduro from

Venezuela could embolden China to

accelerate a Taiwan takeover.

The CIA, it has been reported in media,

warned Tim Cook of Apple and other tech

companies about a possible invasion as

soon as next year. You've separately met

publicly with Chinese officials.

What's your view on the likelihood and

the timeline of a China attempted

takeover of Taiwan? And what are these

kind of motivating factors that might

make that happen sooner? So, let me

clarify. I I'm not sure or I may have

been misinterpreted, but obviously the

Chinese watch very carefully. They study

wars and they will learn lessons from

what's going on here, but I don't think

that is a I don't think the Venezuelan

operation other than making them feel

envious

about the capabilities will impact their

likelihood of attacking Taiwan. So,

Taiwan, number one,

I think the likelihood of an attack on

Taiwan

this year or next year

or even in the '28, but let me just do

'26 and '27, absent some major

provocation by Taiwan or some other

third incident is very low. I'd put it

at about where the

where the prediction markets are, 5% or

something low. So, I'm not counting on

that. So, why is that so low? I'm just

curious. Why 5%? Yeah. Okay, because,

first,

they they have a theory of the case

of what they call peaceful reunification

and they think things are evolving in

that direction. Uh the theory of the

case is that the current uh government,

which is a

DPP government, which currently is is

stymied

by its opposition in the parliament, so

they can't even buy the arm sales that

we

previously gave them. There's $11

billion

arm sales that the Chinese have

complained about, but Taiwan is the

legislature probably won't buy half of

that, okay? So,

the current president is struggling.

There's going to be election in January

'28

and they think it's likely that the

former

uh party the KMT will be elected.

Somebody that will be much more

sympathetic

to China and uh

a a devolving relationship. So, that's

number one. Number two,

the Chinese have been engaged in a

a deep deep purge of all of their

military leadership. I mean, it's hard

to believe and you read about in the

paper from time to time that he fired

this guy, he fired this guy. He's fired

the equivalent of every four-star

in our whole political system

and every combatant commander

and every commander who would be

commandeering the force commanding the

forces over, you know, to deal with

Taiwan.

So, while they've been building up that

military capability,

takes a long time to get that back in

the order in my view. So, I would say

that part's makes me feel less likely.

Third, I think he understands that uh if

he were to do this, there's a risk, not

a certainty, but a risk that the US

would become involved and that the

impact of that either on China's

economy, which he's got to worry about

first, and also what its evolution would

be significant. So, I'm I'm looking for

uh and oh sorry, finally, in Trump,

uh he has the most accommodating

president

uh that China's likely to see with

respect to Taiwan. So, Trump has made no

secrets. I mean, he talks publicly of

his views about Taiwan. In I think a

couple of the memoirs, there's this

discussion where

he's in the Oval and he's talking about

Taiwan and he picks uh somebody asks him

about Taiwan, he picks up one of those

Sharpies and goes thump, you know, on a

spot on the Resolute Desk and he said,

"That's Taiwan." Then he draws a sand

around the whole desk, He "That's

China."

So, I'd say, you know, I'm less worried

about Taiwan in the

in on the on the current path. Now, over

the longer run,

the Chinese are absolutely clear, she

and all the leadership, that Taiwan is

an inseparable part of China.

And how that could be satisfied in a way

that allow the Taiwanese

the degree or substantial degree of the

uh freedom for both their economy and

their society is the challenge that

we've been struggling with for a long

time. But, the good news is we've been

doing this for 50 years,

and Taiwan has never seen

such a manners, you know, such such

circumstances. So, I say to the

Taiwanese friends, you know, basically,

don't uh don't screw it up. Are we

taking the right course of action, do

you think? I guess the big question for

for you is what's the strategic

imperative

to keep Taiwan from falling under direct

Chinese control for the United States,

and are we taking the right actions to

hedge our bets, if you will, against

that happening? Meaning, onshoring of

semiconductor manufacturing, but also

maybe from a defense perspective and

positioning perspective, you can share a

little bit about whether we're

>> Sure. That's a big big question. So,

first uh

>> complicated situation to begin with.

Uh secondly,

Taiwan is halfway around the world as

President Trump says, and 90 mi off the

shore of China. And we're far away, and

we have a lot of other things to worry

about. So, it's a little bit like Cuba.

So, inherently indefensible

if China is were seriously determined to

either destroy it or to take it. Now, on

the other hand,

since the opening to China and the

Shanghai Communique, there's been an

agreement of maintaining a status quo

uh with the US commitment being what's

called strategic ambiguity, in which uh

the US and China have been committed to

Taiwan

internal development is left to its own

device,

and China doesn't use military force to

prevent that, but we say

Taiwan is this one China, and the only

China's capital is Beijing, and then we

have a a little bit of ambiguous way to

talk about the relationship between

Taiwan and China, but certainly letting

it evolve in any way that the parties

would be prepared to live with. Most

people expecting that over time this

relationship will work its way out. And

I when I talk to Chinese about it, I say

to them, "First, you've never seen 50

better years on either side of the

straits.

So, this has been fantastic for both

societies in terms of what they care

about. And secondly, if they look at

this situation, if China's

core strategy is correct,

uh which is the inexorable rise of

China,

and that continues,

in another decade or two,

Taiwan will look like a flea.

And therefore, not going to be an issue.

If it if If China's main narrative

doesn't work,

Taiwan is not going to be their biggest

problem.

So, they should work on the other

issues, yeah. If you think about China

projecting influence around the world,

how important is it for them to continue

to do that? There was recently

an objective, I think, of a GDP growth

in the 5% range, 4 to 5%. Is that right

for China, which

>> The 4 and 1/2 to 5, yeah. 4 and 1/2 to

5,

which is a record low in recent history

for them.

Is it imperative for China to continue

to extend

geopolitical and economic influence

around the world to grow its economy?

You know, going back to the framing of

the rising power, do they still need to

do that to keep people happy at home, or

is China going to be able to maintain

happiness at home in a multipolar world,

where China and perhaps the US and

perhaps some other countries share

influence around the world?

This is one you

raised and we talked about the last

time, which is interesting. I think we

agreed. So, let me

just again for people that don't

remember, start. So, first, China is a

meteoric rising power.

Never has a country risen so far, so

fast, on so many different dimensions.

If you take a snapshot of the year 2000

and the year 2025

and compare China on any metric of

power, it's just dumbfounding.

Dumbfounding. So, a country

that

I have compared it to kind of like a

Formula 1 racing.

A country that we couldn't find in our

rearview mirror

in 2020, or sorry, 2000, because it was

so far behind,

we have trouble finding in our rearview

mirror today because it's beside us or

in many races even slightly ahead of us.

Now, that's GDP, it was less than 5% of

global

or it was less than a quarter the US in

2000. Today, by purchasing power parity,

it's 25% larger. In 2000, trading, it

was

5% of global. Today, and we were 15,

today it's 35 and we're 25. If you do

advanced tech

in any any area, take 5G, my goodness,

take EVs, my goodness, take whatever.

Okay, so rapidly rising power.

That's essential.

That's the infrastructure for their

grand narratives, which is the

inexorable rise of China to its natural

position in the international order,

which they think is at at the top of the

pyramid.

So, they are absolutely determined to be

number one

in their own arena to begin with. And

then after that,

you know, maybe more. And they also they

have a second the second proposition.

There's the inexorable decline of the

US.

And they look at the various parts of

the US and the components, including

getting involved in unnecessary wars

as part of that story, as part of their

narrative. And that

dynamic, the shifting of the seesaw, is

what gives you this fluidity and dynamic

that we discussed before, which most

often, hard as it is to believe, but

most often discombobulates people so

much that then some incident or

accident, like something that happens

over Taiwan, leads to a vicious circle

of actions and reactions

that drags them into a war,

after which they think, my god, how did

this ever happen? So, that's a long

story, but I would say the economic

piece is essential for this. And that

economic peace means they want to be the

manufacturing work workshop for the

world and the foundry for the world and

the supplier for the world. There are

two

major challenges they have. I believe

one of them is population decline, the

other is unemployment and the AI that

we've seen and what's hitting first

could hit them in a major way.

Manufacturing is moving to robotics at

an alarming place. Then you have things

like self-driving which is a major job

there for for many people. So

on those two axis when you see the youth

unemployment which I think is 15 or 20%

in some locations in China and

population decline, is that she's two

biggest challenges to deal with and then

how does that affect

this, you know, bi- this uh Sure. uh

relationship?

>> Good question and this is more in your

old space than mine cuz I've tried to

follow but Elon says there's going to be

more robots than people, okay?

>> Yeah.

And if you ask him where where are the

most advanced robots in the world, the

ones that are kicking his ass or he

worries about, they're China. So they

got a huge number of robot companies.

When I was there in

uh last

When was I last there? In uh

uh

January, I went to see a factory of

Xiaomi Xiaomi, the phone company. They

Xiaomi 3 years ago decided that they

would make cars.

After watching Apple spend $10 million

not able to make a car,

within 3 years that factory is producing

cars right now.

And they have a huge demand for these

cars. They have three lines. One of the

lines is all robots.

Okay? So they're putting a lot of robots

to work. All right? More than half of

the working the factory worker robots in

the world are in China. Uh and so some

of the people are saying, well, you

know, if demographics is going to be not

so big a problem because if demographics

is only a problem because of workers,

which you know, we're going to have

worker In fact, the American workers are

more worried about, you know, taking our

jobs. So, that's a Now, the issue with

for the

uh impact on education, they have uh a

number of people that have been educated

in arenas that are now no longer, you

know, high-demand jobs.

And unfortunately, we have a lot of

that, too. I mean, if you look at people

college graduates now that graduated in,

I don't know, DEI subjects, they're

having trouble

uh getting jobs. So, I would say uh it's

a little There are more similarities

there than differences. The other thing

is Chinese have demonstrated a great

much greater capacity or readiness to

adopt and adapt to new technologies.

So, if you look at the

I'm sure you have or you all have

probably had him on, Jenson uh Huang, uh

but when he went to China, he said,

"Gee, I think I came to the future." You

know, that uh

uh the people don't, you know, they

don't use Not only do they not use

uh

uh

coins, they don't use bills, they don't

use checks, they don't use credit cards,

they just have their face

and then go through the store. Let's

shift around to

what some have described as the

longer-term playing field, which is near

the Arctic.

Some have argued that uh much of the

recent push for Greenland by the United

States is driven

by the military threat coming over the

Arctic from Russia and from China. I'm

wondering if you could just help frame

for our audience, why is Greenland so

strategic to the United States,

and is this effectively a proxy for

defense against China and Russia, and

why now? Another big question.

So, let me start with the bottom line. I

think the

at least from the

judgments of the people whom I

respect the most, we can we the US can

get everything we want from Greenland

without invading it or owning it. So,

Greenland has been an important base

for missile defenses, a tool tool base.

We had two other bases that we closed.

But we can open as many other bases as

we want, and they're very amenable to

that. I think President Trump's right to

say, "Well, yeah, but I I don't want a

short-term lease on these spaces."

Well, I would say a 99-year lease sounds

like a pretty good lease to me for, you

know, in 99 years, God knows what's

going to be happening. But to the extent

that missile defense and

is part of it, which it is, I would say

that's a part. For the naval component,

yes, there I think the as the Arctic

uh melts,

you already now have an opening of sea

lanes, and

the way that the

uh

uh

territorial ownership uh the abutters

have their claim to the local and the

regional.

And there the

the main claims are Russian and

Canadian. We have a chunk from Alaska,

and then Greenland would be a piece of

that. So, I would say that's relevant,

but those sea lanes uh

at least for the navy people I talked to

are they're not as important as they

used to be, because now there's so many

different ways to get at you're not

going to

try to blockade a

a uh

you know, a a waterway

uh with ships. You're going to do it

with smart minds or you're going to do

it simply by attacking the ships on the

on the way. And if it's underwater,

underwater is pretty much all the same.

But it's good to have narrow places and

shallow places for looking for things.

But

uh

So I I I would say I think Trump's uh

uh Greenland venture was more like for

fun. Uh plus

uh I mean I think uh one of the people

that knows him well uh says uh remember

he's first of a reality TV producer and

star. So he just has fun

starting with a a drama, uh getting

people very excited, uh letting the

tension rise, and then finding a

resolution. And I think we're attracted

to a resolution there. Let me push back

just on that point. What I have heard is

that there's rising

socialism in Western Europe, growing

concern that over time as socialism

becomes more of the mainstay in the

governing models in Western European

nations, those nations fall more under

the influence of China. And as a result,

if you think about the influence that

China could then have on on Denmark and

on Danish foreign policy, if the United

States doesn't secure what it needs for

the long term, and it may not know what

it needs for the long term physically in

Greenland today, we only know what we

need today, that we're at risk of China

having outsized influence over Greenland

tomorrow. And that that's the real

reason for the big push today for

Greenland. How does that sit with you?

And does that align kind of with with

what some folks are are concerned about?

I have to think about it. I hadn't heard

that argument just that way. Again, what

is socialism is complicated. Uh

certainly the Chinese Well, yes, they're

socialists in some respect. I would say

capitalism is I mean, they're autocratic

and they're party-led. But then their

economy is essentially

uh, fiercely uh, capitalist. I mean, you

have a

uh, the uh,

um,

uh, one of the one of the one of the one

of my friends was gladiatorial

conflict that makes the competition in

Silicon Valley look look tame as the you

know, as the parties fight each other.

Uh,

Well, cuz you can't make money cuz the

taxes are so high. But that's [laughter]

another

Well,

and in their case, you know, they they

they

they decide they're going into an arena,

let's say for example, EVs.

And so they give uh,

uh, advantages to companies getting

started, even subsidies. And then they

let them fight it out. And lo and

behold, at the end there'll be

uh, you know, 10 or five. But it's

fiercely competitive in the meantime,

and a lot of guys will get, you know,

trampled along the way. And then those

guys are excess capacity and they'll

sell things off,

you know, without any

concern about the capex. They're just as

long as they can stay ahead of the game,

you know, selling items or even selling

out their inventory. So I think the uh,

I think watching the way watching the

evolution of other countries, including

Europe, and when I think uh, and their

relations with China as well as with us

in this game is a very relevant point.

And

I would say that

uh,

one of the things that the Trump

administration has had trouble with is

recognizing that

if we're in a fierce rivalry with China,

they have four times as many people.

We need to have some allies with heft on

our side of the seesaw to keep it from

going the wrong direction and

so yes

kind of sometimes you need to give your

ally a cold bath

in order to get them to shape up

but uh

I think

uh

uh

getting Canadians to think of us as an

enemy is a pretty

wild idea uh uh I mean any treatment

that comes to that conclusion and if you

take Carney whom I know from when she

was in Harvard college kid he's he's as

American as anybody or he was but the

idea if you go and threaten a

politician's survival that's a pretty

good way to

piss them off and

if you threaten to take territory from

people

that's a pretty good way to make them

feel

hostile

so this is an unusual treatment if we're

trying to you know get guys with heft on

our side of the seesaw. At the World

Economic Forum I wasn't sure if it was

Davos or another one of their forums.

Were you at the Davos one this year?

Sure. So as a total aside just bringing

President Trump's impact

it was two and a half days of people

wondering what he would say when he got

there.

The town shut down as people watched his

two-hour stand-up Yeah. you know

delivery and then another two days of

people

sort of trying to understand and figure

out what happened there. So I there's

something

It was really It was a reality TV show

for sure. Yeah. So it took over the

whole place. This fellow uh

uh Butch who was his communication guy

for

a week or 10 days till he got fired in

the first administration said on the

first night I was at an event he said

remember this is going to be a real

reality TV show it's going to start with

the claim that we're going to invade

Greenland which by God invading an ally

that's a pretty big deal. He said, then

you're going to watch the drama build.

When Trump had a chance to speak, he's

speaking this long way back and forth,

back. But he then had a just a paragraph

in which he said, he basically took the

gun off the table.

But before that, he was doing a mafioso

act, even some some mafioso lines about,

you know, you could either have it the

easy way or the hard way. One of the

That's a Godfather line. And so people

were saying, yikes, you know, this what

it what it what has been loose on us. So

now you have all this drama, but then he

says, I've decided we're not going to

invade Greenland. You know, he he just

passes that off. So now the temperature

goes down. And now the third day he does

some other as

Institute of or Board of Peace, and he

says, we now have a framework of an

agreement. So

I think I think half of the time he's

having fun. Yeah.

You know, it's sort of ex- it it does

get people's attention. Sure it does.

You

on a substantive basis shared a

framework, 80 89.

And I think it you know, I've I've spent

a a bunch of time listening to the talk

he gave and and some people's reaction

to it. Maybe you could share it with the

audience and why it's important. Oh,

thank you. I'm glad you

So I think this is a big idea.

So these are three numbers,

each of which is the answer to a

question.

And if you can remember the three

numbers,

and you can identify the question to

which each one is the answer,

you have the big picture about

international security in the lifetime

of yourself

and even your parents. That's virtually

everybody who's alive today. So the

first 80 is the answer to what? How long

it's been since a World War. How many

years since a great power war? Since a

World War. Yeah. Now, whoa, wait a

minute. 80 years. This is the longest

peace in recorded history

since Rome.

This is not natural.

This is very abnormal.

This is a didn't happen by accident.

This was what the people who founded

the international order after World War

II

were trying to build a new world order.

Cuz they had just lived through a

terrible World War II.

Simply one generation before, they

remembered, "Hey, there was World War

I."

Mhm. So, if we just keep doing this,

we should expect World War III.

Mhm. It should [clears throat] have

already happened. If it could have

happened at the Cuban Missile Crisis.

So, no great power war, fantastic. And

but a a fragile

a work in progress all the time,

eroding

inevitably for many, many different

reasons. Right? Second 80.

How many years since we've [snorts] had

a nuclear bomb go off? Fantastic. So,

think about that. If you had gone

if there'd been prediction markets, and

you'd gone in 1945 or 50, you would have

got 10,000 to one odds against that.

It's impossible.

The weapon that ended World War II, and

you're not ever going to see any use of

those weapons in war? Whoa.

And then, nine? The number of countries,

nation-states, that have nuclear

bombs today.

>> Fantastic, Jack. You're right. How in

the world could you have only nine

countries having nuclear weapons?

Nuclear weapons being your kind of

ultimate security blanket.

Again, John Kennedy in 1963

said, "By the '70s, there'll be 25 or 30

nuclear weapon states."

Cuz he thought that as states acquired

the capability to build nuclear weapons,

they would do so.

Today, 90 95 states could have nuclear

weapons in a year or two if they decided

to build them.

Actually, into the '70s, Sweden had a

serious nuclear program. South Korea had

a nuclear program.

Taiwan had a nuclear program. US closed

those down,

created a so-called non-proliferation

regime.

That's accounted for this nine, but I

would say again,

uh fragile,

eroding, not likely to be sustained. So,

when I try to

do my uh giving thanks for

uh you know, things that I should be

thankful for,

thankful for 80 years without a great

power war?

If there were a great power war, you and

I we wouldn't be here, and we wouldn't

be having this conversation, and all the

other issues we have to deal with. So, I

would say that 80 the 80 and nine we

should not take for granted.

We should give thanks for the work that

was done to to build them, and then we

should notice what's going to be

required

to sustain this. And we almost had a

tenth nuclear power in Iran. We did. And

we had the latest two, if I'm correct,

you'll correct me cuz you're the expert,

Pakistan and North Korea, and we had

that one doctor Khan, I believe his name

was from Pakistan, who was trying to

spread and sell these. So, Absolutely.

Did we make a critical error,

we being the West, even the East,

humanity, the leadership, of letting

Pakistan and North Korea into this club?

Well, I mean, not not into the club, but

allowing them to get nuclear weapons,

which is right. The Israelis have had a

different idea.

Uh this goes back uh uh

uh to the original attack on Iraq,

on Osirak.

Uh

they got call it affirmative

non-proliferation.

So, they say, "We're not allowing

nuclear weapons in our neighborhood."

And they've uh destroyed the nuclear

weapon project in Iraq.

They destroyed the nuclear weapon

activity in Syria when the North Koreans

were building a plant there half dozen

years ago. And now they've been the

leaders in the destruction of the

Iranian nuclear program, which we

participated in.

I, however,

I'm uncomfortable about the wars and

even in Iran.

I had to cheer for this because I fear

additional nuclear weapon states. And I

wish that we had managed somehow, let's

say, the North Korean case.

I've even said this to Chinese

officials. I said, "You know, we and you

made a terrible mistake.

Maybe we made a bigger mistake

to let North Korea get nuclear weapons.

But what we should have said to you is,

'Hey, we have an idea. Nuclear weapons

are either good for North Korea and

South Korea

or they're good for neither of them.

Your choice.'

And that would have been hardball, but I

I think uh

uh

the idea of having Kim Jong-un

have now more than 100 nuclear warheads

and missiles that can reach the American

homeland

is crazy.

I mean, here we're talking about Iran

and what it might be.

Excuse me.

It takes uh 20 minutes longer from Korea

to get to Boston than from Iran or maybe

25 minutes.

So, I I think that uh

that's a useful perspective to remind us

that we let this thing happen.

It's a ticking bomb as far as I'm

concerned. If you ask me what to do

about it,

I I makes me you know

cry because Trump in the first

administration focused on this problem

very very seriously and did everything

that he thought he could. And I thought

it was a good a good effort,

even though it was not successful.

But the 20 other ways we've tried to

deal with that problem were all equally

unsuccessful.

>> How does China feel about nuclear

proliferation and North Korea having

these bombs? Well, I think they feel a

little ashamed at least

about what happened in North Korea and

kind of think, "Well, that wasn't really

our problem." But now, uh when you say,

"Well, if this keeps if things on the

current path, well, maybe South Korea or

Japan will have nuclear arsenals in

their backyard." They think that's a

terrible idea. And we would be not very

enthusiastic about a Venezuelan or

Canadian nuclear bomb, yeah. So, Dr.

Allison, just to kind of wrap our tour

of the world here, come back to the

United States.

Since we last spoke, there have been a

number of mayors elected in this country

that are self-declared socialists or

Democratic Socialists of America, DSA,

and there's a rising populist movement

in the United States that seems to be

manifesting in many cases candidates

that look and act like true deep

socialists and want to

enact socialist policies. What is the

risk to the United States if this

continues to go the way it's going? And

what is the

risk to the United States, do you think,

in 2028

if we have a Democrat controlled House

and Senate and a very populist Democrat

candidate that looks like a DSA member?

Where does this take us?

Well, I can't good for you all for

thinking of uncomfortable radical

questions, but real. Uh

So,

if you look at the numbers,

I have I I've been looking at them

lately. They're hard to believe

in terms of the split between wealthy

and poor or

uh rich and poor.

If you look at the uh who's benefited

for the last generation in terms of the

uh 0.01%, the 1%, the 10%, the 20%, or

that's us and all the people that we

know, virtually. And therefore, when we

say the market is, you know, third year

in a

in a in a bull market, and my goodness,

here it's up 15 or 16% or this 80% or

70% of people, this is not part of their

lives. And when I look at the numbers

about both what I think the facts are,

and then even more people's perception,

uh

uh

it's just not stable in a democracy if

everybody gets a vote.

And if uh

uh the top 10 or 20% are taking 80% or

70% of the pie,

that's not

stable and sustainable, I think. And

it's the political invitation

for a populist and demographic demagogic

uh uh just I mean, you don't even have

to be a demagogue to say, "That's not

fair. That's not reasonable."

Uh

So, I think that it's not this I mean,

this is beyond my

I mean, I I I can hardly deal with the

problems I

I focus on. This one is one that I look

over my shoulder and think, "Gee, wait a

minute. This person this can't be true."

But then, whenever I've been looking

into the numbers lately, they look as

bad as they appear.

And then,

this is extremely dangerous. And I would

say, "Yes." And so, I haven't heard

people talking about plausible ways

in which uh

you know, this could be addressed.

And I but I think it's a it's a

it's an invitation,

you know, for some more radical ideas.

And uh

So, while I like very much the Trump uh

accounts for kids to give them some

stake, I think that's a that's a

fantastic thing. I I I could probably be

persuaded

that

people even at my level of income

should pay another 10% of taxes or

whatever for

uh for some more

adjustment. I think the kind of

adjustments

that are basically putting people on the

dole

uh or

uh

support for

non-productive or semi-productive

activity

makes me very uncomfortable. Uh

I mean, unless they're lame or you know,

ill or or aging.

>> UBI proposals? Uh people getting a

universal basic income that that takes

motivation out of

>> me less I I I like incentive. I mean, I

think the the stuff of America has been

the opportunity for people to

to be incentivized to invent, create,

and create wealth that's benefits for

everybody. But, if the if the jam is not

getting spread

to 70% of the people,

that's not a sustainable political

situation. And And I think

I mean, I thought it was in the

in the New York campaign, we got to see

some preview of a bit of this.

And in the primaries, you're seeing

people going into this space. I haven't

seen anybody with a with a coherent

program yet. But, I think for serious

people thinking about what's good for

the country,

that's a

it's a good one to worry about. Well, it

seems Fred Berg that there's there's a

couple of proposals here. Minimum wage,

maybe some type of a wealth tax. There

are things that people are talking

about. We may not all agree with them.

And they may be hard to execute, but one

of them is for the people at the top. I

think you would agree,

uh Professor Allison,

the people at the top have the most to

lose here. And they should be thinking

about it and and maybe there's

generosity in

you know, maybe giving away wealth in a

more thoughtful way because there's so

much wealth in this top 1% 10% that they

can't possibly spend. And so this might

be something that that group of people

should be thinking a a little bit more

about. In the State of the Union, Trump

called out, you know, Dell and couple of

other people for having stepped up and

say, "Okay, I'm you know, I'm going all

in on this." I would say there's

something quite Well, that certainly

got my attention and made me think maybe

I should be doing something different.

Yeah. Yeah. Right.

Well, Professor Allison, you know, they

they say that you can measure a man's

knowledge and thoughtfulness by his

humility. I will say you have

extraordinary depth and you've thought

so deeply about so many of these issues

that this world is facing right now.

And yet you act with such humility and

grace when you speak about them. I want

to thank you for that. I want to thank

you for taking the time to be with us

today. Really appreciate it and look

forward to doing it again in person

soon. Yeah, thank you so much on behalf

of the audience and just on a personal

basis. This is such a delight and

privilege to be able to do with this

with you every year or two and man, I

hope we can just do it every year

because it's the highlight of my year

when we get to talk. And excuse me, it's

an honor for me. Thank you so much and

thank you for what y'all are doing and

thanks for thinking of such hard

questions out here. It's taking me home

tonight to think about socialism. Yes.

Yeah. Okay. Thank you, sir. Thank you.

I'm going all in.

>> [music]

>> I'm going all in.