Could you see a scenario whereby NATO

has this disunityity of like higher

spending countries versus the lower

spending ones which then the Kremlin can

somehow exploit or is that a little bit

of a overextended fantasy?

>> No is the answer. Uh you see the E3 who

are not Eastern European countries,

Germany, the UK and France very strongly

supporting Ukraine and leading the

coalition of the willing even though

Germany doesn't want to put its forces

on the ground but it's the one that is

going to spend more than probably all

the other put together in terms of

additional funding. It has committed to

spending probably what will result in

about a trillion euros more over the

course of the next 5 to 10 years than

would have been the case and that is

very substantial. This is the global

gambit. How's it going everyone? Welcome

back to the Global Gambit podcast that

looks at geopolitics, economics,

international relations and a particular

emphasis on the war in Ukraine. Now,

we've had a lot of guests to discuss the

war and where it's going, what is

happening, what isn't happening, and I'm

quite bowled over to be saying that I'm

introducing a phenomenal guest in the

form of General David Petraeus, who is

well, he needs no introduction other

than that, I can tell you for sure. But,

General, it's a pleasure to have you on

the program. Thank you very

>> Yes. Um, been a long time coming and we

have quite an array of questions. So,

I'm looking forward to this. But I think

firstly really, we've seen a lot of

developments across all of the world.

But it seems to be that when it comes to

the war in Ukraine, there's always been

a big misconception about Russia's

military's capabilities, what it can do,

what it can't do. What do you think is

the single biggest misconception the

West still has?

>> Well, I think the single biggest

misconception is that Russian

success is inevitable. I don't think

that that is the case at all. Uh, in

fact, I think that the

recent decision by the EU to provide

$105 billion equivalent in financial

support for Ukraine, which will solve

its fiscal and economic problems for the

next couple of years, and very

importantly, enable Ukraine to double

the production of drones and to scale up

the production of the Flamingo cruise

missile Ukraine has developed in

particular, which has a range much

longer than the Tomahawk cruise missile

the US has discussed. It's a 3,000 km

range and actually a larger warhead as

well. And then the assistance that's

been provided from European countries in

particular, but also the US when it

comes to shoring up Ukraine's air and

ballistic missile defense systems,

uh providing some of the interceptors

and systems that Ukraine is not yet able

to make itself. And so I think this is

going to help Ukraine uh defend its

airspace and also to at the very least

slow the Russian advance which has

already been glacial and extraordinarily

costly. Noting that Russia has already

had over 1.2 million killed and wounded.

That's more than the United States

sustained in all of World War II. Uh,

and then also the pressure, the

additional pressure likely on the

Russian economy if the US congressional

sanctions are approved, and Senator

Graham said the White House had green

lit those, added to the 19th round of EU

sanctions, uh, would really target the

Russian military industrial ability. uh

noting that Russia is also about to run

out of money in its national welfare

fund which has enabled uh the continued

production of military hardware and

software and the like and then also

go after those who are sustaining the

Russian war economy, those who are

buying it oil and gas and those who are

providing the components to it. And if

these actions are taken, Russian success

is by no means inevitable. In fact, I

think it's actually quite possible that

Russia would reach a point where

Vladimir Putin realizes that he needs a

sessation of hostilities,

perhaps even more than the Ukrainians

do.

>> It's certainly the case that I think

there's a lot of um over exaggeration

around what the Russian military is

capable of. A lot of emphasis on

strategic patience, but when it comes to

Ukraine as well, certain analysts often

emphasize uh manpower. And despite the

bravery that we've seen from the

Ukrainian armed forces, the ingenuity,

innovation around asymmetrical warfare,

for example, why is it that Ukraine

hasn't been able to turn more of these

uh things into into strategic

breakthroughs like we saw with the

counter offensive in August of 22? Well,

first of all, I think the nature of the

war in Ukraine has changed dramatically

from uh the point where you mentioned to

which you referred when Ukraine was able

to counterattack very successfully

um in the fall of the first year of the

war. Uh but since then lines have

hardened very substantially.

uh the Surrovican line named for the

Russian general who established the

multi-layered

uh defensive fortifications in the

southern part of Ukraine uh which was

one of the factors that styied the

effort by Ukraine in that second summer

uh to continue its counteroffensive

operations but also now the advent of

massive numbers of unmanned systems that

are always over the battlefield and have

ubiquitous surveillance with the

exception of periods of very heavy fog

or exceedingly foul weather. And that

means that the the front lines such as

there are now and they're no longer

clearly defined by trenches and uh barb

wire concertina wire minefields and all

the rest of that. uh they're much more

again combat outposts of elements

particularly on the Ukrainian side

because it's so lethal uh to be in the

area of the front lines if you will the

forward edge of the battlefield for each

of those sides. I think it really is

remarkable actually that Ukraine has

uh turned its incredible innovation uh

in air, ground and maritime systems and

on at the sea. I think this has

translated into very substantial

strategic achievements. Essentially, the

Ukrainians without a navy have sunk over

35% of the Russian Black Sea fleet and

forced the entire fleet to tie itself up

inside a port as far from Ukraine as it

can get uh in southeastern part of the

Black Sea. Ukraine has also carried out

some incredible operations

uh on Russian soil through the air,

including the one in which maybe a

million or so dollars worth of small

Ukrainian drones secreted in the roofs

of large transport vehicles were able to

position themselves near strategic

airfields of Russia's thousands of

kilometers apart uh and destroy or

damage some 5 to7 billion dollars worth

of strategic aircraft.

To be sure, again, on the front lines,

they've largely hardened and the gains

such as they are have generally been on

the side of the Russians, but these have

been glacial. They've been quite

incremental uh and they have been

incredibly costly for the Russians. So I

think this innovation but it's

innovation on both sides because the

Russians have also

uh become quite innovative as well.

They've also learned some very hard

lessons um and they are presenting many

more challenges for the Ukrainians. It's

very much a back and forth between each

side uh trying to find some new

capability or some new breakthrough that

can enable them to do what it is that

they want to do whether on the ground,

in the air or at sea.

>> To me, the uh the characteristics around

what we're seeing now on the Russian

side is quite reflective of what we've

seen in the Second World War, for

example, where the Soviets did

eventually begin to sort of catch up.

There's always a bit of a delayed

effect, but I find over time the

Russians get into a little bit of a

rhythm. They get into a momentum. And

with that in mind, whilst obviously NATO

and and Trump and all the other

elements, the disunityity there, what do

you think is going to be the the single

biggest factor that could shape the

trajectory of the war in the next, I

don't know, half a year because things

are very difficult to judge on the

military front, the strategic, the

diplomatic.

>> I think it would be full implementation

of what I described at the outset. So,

not just the provision of $105 billion

equivalent of money to Ukraine by the

EU, not just the existing sanctions

already imposed by the U and imposed by

the US which went after Luke Oil and

Roseneft of course and a number of other

Russian entities, but additional US

sanctions, additional provision by the

EU countries, European countries really

in this case and uh the UK and us of air

and ballistic missile defense

capabilities

uh and then the further actions to go

after the Russian war economy and those

who enable it. Uh I think those could

together prove to be very significant as

could the

uh increase in production of the

flamingo missile system that I described

earlier. It is so significant in its

capabilities,

in its range and uh the warhead size

that it will prove to be very very

problematic for the Russians. Uh again

all of this together might constitute a

bit of a gamecher

perhaps enough uh to where the fragility

of the Russian economy is exposed the uh

expenditure of the remaining money in

the national welfare fund but not for

what national welfare but for the

military-industrial complex when that

runs out and as the casualties just

continue to mount on the Russian side.

you know, one of their

calculations

uh is that the Russians can outsuffer

the Ukrainians, the Europeans, and the

Americans. And I don't think that that

is true or will prove to be true if the

US takes the actions that I think we

should be taking together with our

European partners. But to be a little

bit more specific on this, do you not

think it is um completely impossible to

to to say whether the Ukrainians can

outlast the Russians because of the uh

lack of unity in Europe, not just within

NATO, but the whole of the EU. We've got

Robert Fico in Slovakia, obviously

Victor Orban in Hungary, and a continued

skepticism among certain countries

around uh their willingness to meet

their targets of NATO spending, for

example.

>> But there's no question that there are

discordant voices. They don't tend to be

the most important by any means. And

that hasn't prevented the European

Commission from agreeing on $105 billion

equivalent of funding for Ukraine, which

is very, very substantial.

>> It is. But when you've got Donald Trump

saying he's going to I don't know annex

Greenland at this point and I think

frankly being incredibly insultive to

the Danish who 43 soldiers which is I

think about 7% of their population if

you put it in ratio to the size of the

population.

How does Europe manage this in the

context of Ukraine? the 105 billion is

is a nice start, but for me it's almost

a bit of a disappointment because it was

this whole idea of um taking the frozen

assets and so to give them a loan is

sort of a little bit of a it's not quite

the full extent that we're expecting.

>> No, it's a zero interest loan that they

don't have to repay until the Russians

pay reparations.

Um, and sure, I'd like to have seen the

$200 billion plus uh of frozen reserves

used as collateral in some way for

euroclear bonds to Russia with the same

term uh collateral bonds

uh to Ukraine on the same terms. But at

the end of the day, $105 billion is a

huge sum of money. Uh, and as I

mentioned, it solves Ukraine's fiscal

and economic problems for 2 years and

enables them to scale up production of

their drones very substantially. And

these other issues, I think, at the end

of the day, aren't going to detract from

the effort to support Ukraine. Um,

noting that President Trump has gotten

increasingly frustrated with Russia.

Ukraine has made a very good faith

effort uh to reach the terms of an

agreement and the Europeans have been

very supportive and the US was even

there in in Paris uh and agreed to be

part of this in terms of a monitoring

mechanism etc with ironclad uh

guarantees that if Russia resumes uh

hostilities after a cessation of

hostilities

uh that there would be certain actions

automatically taken to support Ukraine

and to punish Russia.

>> Okay. Um so just on this a little bit

more because you've obviously worked

extensively on asymmetrical warfare and

the Ukrainians have demonstrated a again

a novel approach to the use of drones

and other sort of technical uh pieces of

equipment. Um what do you think that the

Europeans especially should be learning

from Ukraine because frankly they're the

ones who have the most experience of

dealing with Russia in a military

context.

uh all of us, the US included, North

American members of NATO, every country

should be learning a lot more from

what's going on in Ukraine. Uh this

isn't just evolutionary, if you will, or

innovation. This is revolutionary

change in how wars of the future likely

will be fought. Not all of them to be

sure. Uh but I think all wars of the

future will feature much larger numbers

of unmanned ground, air, and maritime

systems of a whole variety of different

types.

uh and that that will be the case with

any type of war, but particularly

uh with major combat operations such as

we're seeing uh on the ground in Ukraine

and actually on the ground in the

Russian Federation uh based on what the

Ukrainians are sending into Russia on a

nightly basis.

M now we've seen uh exercises by NATO um

relatively recently I think in late

November December but it was largely

overseen by the French um and this was

sort of a demonstration of NATO minus

the US or core elements of the US uh

military infrastructure. Do you think

that NATO has the capacity to handle

Russia for lack of a better word without

the US?

>> It depends on what Russia does. Uh and

frankly the real imperative that I think

Europeans and North Americans recognize

uh is the need to stop Russia in

Ukraine. Uh, and if that's the case,

they're not going to have much capacity

for anything other than what they've

been doing, which is periodically fly

drones into the airspace of European

countries, uh, cut their oceanic

communications cables,

uh, carry out the occasional

assassination or effort to interfere in

elections or with misinformation or

disinformation and the rest of that. So

it's really imperative again to stop

Russia in Ukraine. If they were ever

successful in Ukraine, Muldova

absolutely would be next and that does

country does not have uh the kind of

capabilities to withstand Russian

action. Uh and then I think you start to

worry about one or more of the Baltic

states uh in particular Lithuania which

is featured prominently in President

Putin's diet tribes in recent years. I

think personally that after the original

intent of sort of turning Ukraine into

an equivalent of Barus that the Russians

have been largely set on this idea of

Novarusia, the new Russia um that

Katarina the Great, Katherine the Great

sort of uh acquired, shall we say, and

and then that leads neatly into into

Moldover and Transnistria. But if Putin

is conducting such provocations as we

saw a lot around the end of the summer,

what does that say about his strategic

thinking about his frame of mind? Is it

literally just he's lashing out or is it

because he is testing the defenses and

he has uh deeper seated uh implications

and things in mind?

>> I think he's trying to threaten European

countries. He'd like to scare them uh

away from supporting Ukraine. He'd like

to divide Europe as well uh and

particularly of course to drive a wedge

between uh the European members of NATO

and Ukraine.

But I don't see that as having been

successful. Certainly there are major

European concerns and inadequacies.

uh the idea of the drone wall and the

rest of this in the eastern front of

NATO uh have a very long way to go in

terms of operationalizing that concept

and as we're seeing in Ukraine which

arguably has the best counter drone

capabilities in the world by far and

certainly those that are operational uh

on a daily basis. Uh this is seriously

hard government work. Uh again, even

Ukraine is struggling to knock down more

than probably

70 to 80 or more percent of the drones

that Russia sends at them on a nightly

basis and

struggling to do the same against all

the missiles that are coming in as well.

Uh so again, NATO countries need to

learn a lot more from this than has been

the case so far. And my concern is that

while very much applauding the

commitments by NATO countries to spend

much more on defense to increase from 2%

of GDP on defense to 3.5%

of GDP on defense and 5% if you take

into account infrastructure spending

related to the effort to shift uh the

focus from what still is to a degree the

old inner German border out to the

eastern front of the new NATO. Um, I

hope that the way that money is spent

results in a hole that is greater than

the sum of the parts rather than a hole

that is less than the sum of the parts

because of inefficiencies

uh inability to operate together uh and

the like.

>> Those are quite operational aspects. But

again, it kind of makes me return to the

strategic dynamic because for me, my

biggest concern is is the is the sort of

disunityity. The Eastern European

states, the Baltics, Poland, Romania,

they understand the immediate threat

posed by by Putin versus uh well, I'm

just going to call them out, Spain

specifically, who never seem to reach

their NATO targets for spending. Um,

could you see a scenario whereby NATO

has this disunityity of like the high

the higher spending countries versus the

lower spending ones which then the

Kremlin can somehow exploit or is that a

little bit of a overextended fantasy?

>> No is the answer. Uh you see the E3 who

are not Eastern European countries

um Germany, the UK and France very

strongly supporting Ukraine and leading

the coalition of the willing even though

Germany doesn't want to put its forces

on the ground but it's the one that is

going to spend more than probably all

the other put together in terms of

additional funding. uh it has committed

to spending probably what will result in

about a trillion euros more uh over the

course of the next 5 to 10 years than

would have been the case and that is

very substantial given that Germany is

the number three economy in the world

not just the leading economy in the EU

um and those three countries are working

very closely together they're the ones

that have been really driving UK and

France in particular when it comes to

the coalition of the willing

and again they're not Eastern European

countries. Certainly there are some

actually generally pretty small

countries that have a jaundice view of

supporting Ukraine, have a degree of

affinity uh for Russia as would

certainly be the case with Hungary and

Victor Orban

and just to a lesser degree again now

the Czech Republic um some others that

you might be able to identify

but again they are not particularly

significant in this overall effort. Uh

notwithstanding that Hungary is is of

course one of the Eastern European

countries and right out on the eastern

front of NATO.

>> I think if you reinstall the law and

justice party in Poland, you could just

identify the uh the vice group as

frankly the four countries that have

this uh uh should we say problematic uh

stance on on Ukraine, Russian given

Poland's shift, that's not the case. But

>> I don't think Poland has shifted that

much. I know the prime minister and min

and deputy prime minister/minister of

foreign affairs very well. Obviously the

president um creates some challenges for

that but by and large Poland is very

very strongly

uh in favor of its rearmament if you

will spending very substantial amounts

of money on that. Uh and it's a country

that obviously has had its airspace

violated by Russia. So I don't think

there is domestic disagreement

uh over their need to substantially

augment their military capabilities and

by and large to continue to support

Ukraine very aggressively.

>> Sure. Now when it comes to NATO as a

whole versus the EU right now Trump is

obviously making his remarks. Personally

I don't think there's going to be

military operation over Greenland but an

economic arrangement of some form. But

the point being is that the EU needs

some kind of army. This has always been

a conversation. Macron has often pushed

it, especially Europe's broader

strategic autonomy. What's your view of

the relevance of the EU in the context

of NATO, Ukraine, Russia, the US and and

so on.

Well, I think the EU is very very

important when it comes to the EU

commission and I think the that Europe

is fortunate uh to have Ursula

Vanderline as the president of the

European Commission for a second term.

Uh I think the EU foreign minister uh

position

uh is a very important one and again

fortunate to have a strong a former

prime minister uh in this case uh in

that role. Uh the EU as a military uh

element however has never made a great

deal of sense to me unless actually

uh the European

defense initiative or identity or there

there have been various names for this

over the years going all the way back uh

to the early post cold war period

uh and I've watched them because over

the years I was for example

uh a NATO onear, three star, four star,

all in the postcold cold war period. Uh

in addition to having a US hat in each

or coalition hat in each of those cases.

Um and I've never been that convinced uh

that the EU brings additional military

capability

because generally it doesn't. There are

no additional battalions or uh drone

units or anything else that are

established as a result of an EU uh

initiative. Uh there could be some

relevance if the EU adopts a different

course of action than is possible with

NATO. That's generally not the case. So

again, I'm I'm a bit tepid on the idea

of an EU military force when you already

have NATO with all of the established uh

force structure, command and control

arrangements, all of the enablers, if

you will, especially if the US is part

of it. Um, and the idea of having to

have some separate European defense

identity of some type just using the

same forces doesn't seem to make a great

deal of sense to me. That said, in a

political sense, the EU Commission is

very important. Uh, and the same I think

with the diplomatic component of the

European Commission as well.

So is there a degree of interoperability

that you could see for example because I

I think the

>> only unless it agrees already because of

NATO. I mean the EU is not going to

bring greater interoperability, greater

numbers, greater capabilities, greater

anything. I don't think what it does

bring though is an extraordinarily

important complimentary capability to

that of NATO as has been exhibited with

the EU economic sanctions imposed on

Russia over many years including now

most recently the 19th round of those

sanctions and then as I've underscored

several times the $ 105 billion

equivalent most recently of economic

support for Ukraine.

>> From a purely military standpoint,

Operation Absolute Resolve was amazing.

No denial that no other country could

conduct what the US did. But is it still

not based on quite

questionable pretenses?

>> Uh you can argue the legality of what

has been done and there are plenty of

international legal experts that are

arguing on both sides. By the way, I

don't think there is a shred of argument

for the legality of what President Putin

has done to Ukraine.