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Why the World Suddenly Has Too Many Ships

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Why the World Suddenly Has Too Many Ships

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264 segments

0:02

Open up a live marine traffic map right

0:04

now and you will see oceans choked with

0:07

green, red, and yellow arrows. From the

0:09

Straight of Mala to the English Channel,

0:11

the seas are currently hosting the

0:13

largest commercial army of ships in

0:15

human history. Just a few years ago, the

0:17

global economy was begging for vessel

0:19

space. Retailers were chartering their

0:21

own private bulk carriers just to get

0:23

inventory across the Pacific. And the

0:26

cost of shipping a single steel box

0:28

skyrocketed by a thousand%. Fast forward

0:31

to today and the maritime industry is

0:33

facing a massive structural hangover, a

0:36

severe overupp of ships. The global

0:38

fleet is expanding at a breakneck pace

0:41

with shipyards in China and South Korea

0:43

working continuously to launch vessels

0:45

that were ordered during a temporary

0:47

panic. To grasp the current surplus, we

0:50

first have to understand the fundamental

0:52

economics that govern the water. Roughly

0:54

90% of all globally traded goods travel

0:57

by sea. The entire premise of modern

1:00

maritime logistics is built on a single

1:02

ruthless economic principle, economies

1:05

of scale. For decades, ocean carriers

1:08

realize that the easiest way to drop the

1:10

cost per unit per container or TEU was

1:13

simply to build bigger boats. It takes

1:15

roughly the same number of crew members

1:17

to operate a ship carrying 5,000 TEUs as

1:21

it does to operate a behemoth carrying

1:23

24,000 TEUs. Fuel costs increase, but

1:27

not linearly compared to the payload.

1:29

This relentless pursuit of efficiency

1:31

gave birth to the mega ship era.

1:33

However, these massive vessels operate

1:36

within a broader philosophy that

1:37

dominates global manufacturing, just in

1:40

time supply chains. In a perfectly

1:42

tuned, just in time system, warehouses

1:44

are practically obsolete. The ships

1:47

themselves act as floating inventory,

1:49

arriving at automated ports exactly when

1:51

a factory needs raw components or a

1:54

retailer needs seasonal stock. This

1:56

system is incredibly efficient,

1:58

stripping overhead costs to the absolute

2:00

bone. But it is also exceptionally

2:02

fragile. Just in time supply chains

2:05

assumes perfect weather, perfect port

2:07

operations, and perfect geopolitical

2:09

stability. When the system functions

2:11

smoothly, the exact right number of

2:13

ships are deployed to meet demand. But

2:15

when the system breaks, the resulting

2:17

shock waves create a phenomenon known as

2:19

the bullhip effect. And this effect is

2:22

the primary culprit behind today's

2:24

vessel surplus. To understand why

2:26

shipyards are currently launching record

2:28

numbers of vessels, we have to look back

2:31

at the chaos of the pandemic. When

2:33

global lockdowns began, consumers

2:35

stopped spending on services, vacations,

2:37

restaurants, concerts, and diverted

2:40

trillions of dollars into physical

2:41

goods. Suddenly, everyone needed home

2:44

office equipment, exercise bikes,

2:46

electronics, and home improvement

2:48

supplies. This historic spike in demand

2:50

slammed into a logistics network that

2:52

was entirely unprepared. Ports became

2:55

severely congested because of localized

2:57

lockdowns and labor shortages. Ships

2:59

were waiting weeks just to drop anchor

3:01

outside of Los Angeles, Long Beach, and

3:03

Rotterdam. Here is where the bullhip

3:06

effect took hold. In supply chain

3:08

economics, the bullwhip effect describes

3:10

how small fluctuations in consumer

3:12

demand cause progressively larger

3:14

fluctuations further up the supply

3:16

chain. The consumer buys two extra

3:18

monitors. The retailer sees monitors

3:21

flying off shelves and orders 10 extra

3:23

from the distributor to be safe. The

3:25

distributor sees a massive spike from

3:27

multiple retailers and orders 50 extra

3:29

from the manufacturer. The manufacturer

3:32

demands raw materials for 100 monitors

3:34

and books double the usual shipping

3:36

capacity to ensure delivery. Because

3:38

ships were stuck in port traffic jams,

3:40

they weren't sailing back to Asia to

3:42

pick up empty containers. This created

3:45

an artificial scarcity of both ships and

3:47

boxes. Shippers panicked. To guarantee

3:50

their cargo would move, they double or

3:52

triple book space on multiple vessels.

3:54

Ocean carriers looked at this data and

3:56

saw what looked like infinite

3:58

unquenchable demand. Consequently,

4:00

freight rates went vertical. A container

4:03

that used to cost $1,500 to ship from

4:06

Shanghai to Los Angeles suddenly cost

4:08

$10,000 to $12,000.

4:11

In this brief window, ocean carriers

4:13

made historic eyewatering profits. In

4:16

fact, the major shipping cartels made

4:18

more profit in a two-year span than they

4:20

had in the previous two decades

4:22

combined. They were suddenly flushed

4:24

with unprecedented mountains of cash.

4:27

And in the shipping industry, when you

4:28

have excess cash, there's really only

4:30

one thing you do with it. Armed with

4:32

pandemic windfalls, ocean carriers went

4:35

on a historic shopping spree. They place

4:37

orders for hundreds of new vessels,

4:39

focusing heavily on ultra-large

4:41

container vessels capable of carrying

4:43

upwards of 24,000 TEUs, as well as a

4:46

massive fleet of Neopanamax ships.

4:49

However, ships aren't built overnight.

4:51

From the moment a contract is signed to

4:53

the moment a bottle of champagne

4:55

shatters against the hull, it takes

4:56

roughly 2 to 3 years. By the first

4:59

quarter of 2026, the global ship order

5:02

book hit a 17-year high, reaching a

5:04

staggering 191 million compensated gross

5:08

tons equivalent to 17% of the entire

5:11

existing global fleet. For containers

5:14

specifically, the order booktofleet

5:15

ratio sits at an alarming 37%.

5:19

This means that while the world was

5:20

returning to normal, consumer demand for

5:22

physical goods was cooling off and port

5:25

congestion was unwinding, the shipyards

5:27

in China and South Korea were building

5:29

the largest influx of maritime capacity

5:31

in history. Between 2024 and 2026, an

5:35

estimated 7 million TEUs of additional

5:37

capacity was delivered into the global

5:39

market. In 2026 alone, another 1.7

5:43

million TEUs are hitting the water with

5:45

nearly three million more scheduled for

5:47

2027. We are currently witnessing a

5:50

tidal wave of steel entering a market

5:52

that no longer requires it. So, what

5:54

happens when a massive influx of new

5:56

capacity meets cooling global demand,

5:59

you get a structural downycle.

6:01

Currently, the supply demand ratio on

6:03

main east west trade routes shows a

6:05

capacity surplus of more than 10%. In

6:08

the highly leveraged world of maritime

6:10

shipping, even a four or 5% surplus is

6:14

usually enough to trigger a brutal price

6:16

war and drive freight rates down to

6:18

break even levels. By the laws of supply

6:20

and demand, the massive overcapacity we

6:23

have today should have completely

6:24

crashed the freight market. But if you

6:26

look at current spot rates, they're not

6:28

quite at rock bottom. The market is

6:30

currently being artificially supported

6:32

by geopolitical friction, specifically

6:34

the crisis in the Red Sea. Because of

6:37

attacks in the Babel Mandev Strait,

6:39

virtually all major container lines have

6:41

rerounded their fleets away from the

6:43

Suez Canal, forcing them to sail around

6:45

the Cape of Good Hope in Africa. This

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diversion adds roughly 3,500 nautical

6:50

miles and 10 to 14 extra days to a

6:53

voyage from Asia to Europe. By forcing

6:55

ships to take the long way around, the

6:58

industry is effectively absorbing about

7:00

9% of global fleet capacity. The Red Sea

7:03

crisis is acting as a massive sponge,

7:05

soaking up the excess ships that were

7:07

ordered during the pandemic. Be

7:09

furthermore, carriers are actively

7:11

engaging in capacity management, a

7:13

strategy known as blank sailings, where

7:15

they simply cancel a scheduled voyage to

7:17

artificially restrict supply and keep

7:19

freight rates from collapsing entirely.

7:22

Normally, in a market this overs

7:24

supplied, shipping lines would send

7:25

their older, less efficient 20-year-old

7:27

vessels to the scrap beaches in South

7:29

Asia to be broken down for steel. Yet,

7:32

scrapping activity has practically

7:34

ground to a halt. Carriers are terrified

7:36

of letting go of tonnage. The pandemic

7:38

taught them that having surplus ships is

7:40

the ultimate insurance policy against

7:42

sudden black swan events, strikes, or

7:45

canal closures. Looking ahead through

7:47

2026 and into 2027, the global container

7:51

shipping market is firmly locked into a

7:53

prolonged structural down cycle. The

7:55

math is unavoidable. Fleet growth is

7:58

consistently outpacing cargo demand, and

8:00

it likely will continue to do so until

8:02

the end of the decade. There are three

8:04

major forces that will dictate the

8:06

economics of trade in the near future.

8:08

First is the unwinding of the Red Sea.

8:10

The biggest wild card in global

8:12

logistics today is the Suez Canal. If

8:14

the security situation stabilizes and

8:17

major carriers resume transits through

8:19

the Red Sea, it will instantly release

8:21

over two million TEUs of capacity back

8:23

into the market. This sudden injection

8:25

of efficiency would strip away the

8:27

artificial buffer, likely causing

8:29

freight rates to plummet as carriers

8:31

scramble to fill their massive new

8:33

ships. Second is the green transition.

8:36

Despite having too many ships, carriers

8:38

will likely continue ordering new ones.

8:41

Why? Environmental regulations. The

8:43

International Maritime Organization,

8:45

IMO, is aggressively tightening

8:47

emissions rules. Carriers are being

8:49

forced to order new vessels equipped

8:51

with dual fuel engines that can burn LG,

8:53

methanol, or ammonia simply to remain

8:56

compliant with international law. This

8:58

means the fleet will keep growing, not

9:00

because the market needs more space, but

9:02

because it needs greener space. Third is

9:04

market share warfare. The major shipping

9:07

alliances are currently sitting on

9:08

massive post-pandemic cash reserves. In

9:11

previous down cycles, carriers would

9:13

bleed money and go bankrupt as we saw

9:15

with Hanzin shipping in 2016. Today, the

9:18

big players have enough liquidity to

9:20

sustain below break even rates for

9:22

years. We may see a brutal war of

9:24

attrition where carriers deliberately

9:26

run their mega ships at a loss just to

9:28

protect their market share and wait out

9:30

their competitors. The ships launching

9:32

from Asian shipyards today are physical

9:34

monuments to the panic of 2021. For

9:37

consumers and importers, this overupp is

9:40

generally good news. It means lower

9:42

transportation costs and more resilient

9:44

supply chains. But for the ocean

9:46

carriers, the next few years will be a

9:47

masterclass in survival as they try to

9:50

keep their massive new fleets busy in an

9:52

ocean that simply has too many ships.

9:54

Thanks for watching and see you in the

9:56

next video.

Interactive Summary

The global shipping industry is currently grappling with a severe oversupply of vessels, a phenomenon driven by the 'bullwhip effect' during the pandemic. Carriers, fueled by record profits, placed massive orders for new ships that are now entering a cooling market. While current geopolitical tensions in the Red Sea and strategic capacity management are artificially propping up freight rates, the industry faces a prolonged structural downcycle. Looking ahead, the combination of environmental regulations, the potential normalization of trade routes, and intense market share warfare between major carriers will define the maritime economy for the rest of the decade.

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