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What U.S. and JAPAN Did for Ukraine Is INSANE… Putin Just Became POWERLESS | Other War Stories

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What U.S. and JAPAN Did for Ukraine Is INSANE… Putin Just Became POWERLESS | Other War Stories

Transcript

2036 segments

0:00

As quiet as a mouse, Japan has just

0:03

unleashed one of its most innovative

0:04

technologies. But that tech isn't being

0:07

deployed in Japan itself, it's inside

0:09

Ukraine, and it's busy making Putin's

0:12

surprise aerial strikes absolutely

0:14

powerless. What Japan just did for

0:16

Ukraine is insane, as it has delivered a

0:18

devastating blow to Russia without

0:20

firing a single shot. Japan didn't need

0:22

to. What it has delivered is the product

0:24

of an alliance with Ukraine that Putin

0:26

never saw coming. As the skies over

0:28

Ukraine are polluted with larger swarms

0:30

of Russian Shahiti type drones than ever

0:32

before, partnership has emerged between

0:34

a major Japanese company and one of

0:36

Ukraine's many drone development

0:38

businesses. Founded about 10 years ago,

0:40

Terror Drone Corporation is one of the

0:42

largest tech companies in Japan. With

0:45

650 employees and a listing on the Tokyo

0:48

Stock Exchange, it's a growing

0:50

enterprise that has announced its entry

0:52

into the defense sector and crucially

0:54

makes about 60% of its revenue from

0:56

alliances that it has built outside of

0:57

Japan. That's where Ukraine comes into

0:59

play. Deep in the frontline city of Kh

1:02

is a company named Amazing Drones.

1:04

Couldn't be more different than Terror

1:06

Drone Corporation in terms of how it was

1:08

created. Where terror was a business

1:10

born from a desire to profit, Amazing

1:12

Drones was created from the fires of a

1:14

war that Ukraine never wanted to fight.

1:16

But Amazing Drones has grown. What was a

1:19

volunteer initiative 3 years ago has

1:21

developed into a full-fledged company

1:23

that is a major part of the Brave One

1:25

defense cluster that Ukraine has set up

1:27

to encourage its drone manufacturers to

1:29

think big and create what Ukraine needs

1:31

to defend itself. Now, Amazing Drones is

1:34

working directly alongside Terror Drone

1:36

Corporation, and they have developed a

1:38

hugely important piece of technology

1:40

that could put an end to Putin's

1:41

surprise aerial bombardment strategy.

1:44

That technology is the Terror A1, an

1:47

interceptor drone that solves every

1:48

problem that Ukraine has with Russia's

1:50

Shahiti type longrange attack drones.

1:53

Born from a meeting between Amazing

1:54

Drones founder Maxim Clemenco and Terror

1:57

Drone founder Toru Tukosiga at a defense

1:59

exhibition in 2025, the Terra A1 is an

2:02

absolute beast in anti- drone defense.

2:05

With a top speed of 300 km or about 186

2:08

mph and a range of up to 35 km, which is

2:11

a little over 20 mi, this interceptor

2:13

drone offers the speed and range needed

2:15

to tackle Russia's incoming Shahid

2:17

drones. It can also cover the full

2:19

mission cycle for an interception from

2:21

initial surveillance to detecting

2:22

targets and finally interception all

2:25

within a single 15-minute flight. Don't

2:28

underestimate the importance of this

2:29

speed. What the Terra A1 lacks in

2:32

firepower as it doesn't carry anything

2:34

like the sort of warhead you would

2:35

expect from an attack drone. It more

2:37

than makes up for that by being 100 km

2:39

or about 62 mph faster than Russia's

2:41

typical Shahid type drone. So, this

2:43

isn't just an interceptor that loiters

2:45

and then gets into a position for a

2:47

Shahid to strike it. The Terra A1 can

2:49

hunt a Shahid down, chasing it in an

2:51

inescapable drone death dance in the sky

2:53

until it hits its mark and sends the

2:55

Russian contraption back to Earth with a

2:57

bang. Not that these death chases will

2:59

always be needed. In fact, they may

3:01

prove remarkably rare. As United 24

3:04

Media points out, the Terra A1 is a

3:06

stealthy drone. With its electric

3:07

propulsion system, it emits very little

3:09

noise and practically no heat signature,

3:12

making it incredibly difficult to detect

3:13

for a Shahi drone operator back in

3:15

Russia. In many cases, the only sign

3:17

that a Terra A1 is coming would be if

3:20

the interceptor flies in clear view of

3:21

the cameras set up in a Shahi drone. In

3:24

most cases, the Terra A1 will loiter,

3:26

spot a target, and blow it up before the

3:28

operator even knows it's coming. Oh, and

3:30

the Terra A1 can operate independently

3:33

of an operator. It's an intelligent

3:35

drone that can blow up Russia's Shaheds

3:36

without extensive training, be that of

3:38

the drone itself or the operator

3:40

controlling it. And here's where it gets

3:42

serious. The Terra A1 costs just $2,000

3:45

to build. Stick with us and you'll find

3:47

out why that's so important. But for

3:48

now, the partnership that has produced

3:50

this drone is still in the very early

3:51

stages of development, and scaling is

3:53

next on the horizon. Terror Drone has

3:56

already put its money where its mouth

3:57

is. A $10 million investment has been

3:59

made to fund the production of Terra A1

4:01

drones through one of its subsidiaries.

4:03

This is capital that provides more

4:05

benefits for Ukraine than the money

4:06

itself. Interest rates on Japanese

4:09

capital are around 2% while those in

4:11

Ukraine itself hover around 20%. What we

4:14

see here is an investment of cheaper

4:16

cash than amazing drones could get in

4:17

its own country. And that money is going

4:19

to be used to build more Terra A1s than

4:21

Russia can handle. Right now, production

4:23

is relatively slow. A single worker can

4:25

put together two Terra A1s per day. And

4:28

it's unknown how many workers Amazing

4:29

Drones has in its workshops, but

4:32

processes are being streamlined. Money

4:33

is pouring in, and very soon, the Terror

4:35

A1 is going to be manufactured at a

4:37

scale that could make it one of the most

4:39

important tools that Ukraine has for

4:40

defending its skies and its people

4:42

against the scourge of Russia's shiites.

4:45

That scaling will have to take place

4:46

under fire, and Tokusha knows that the

4:48

traditional sort of factory isn't the

4:50

answer. Such factories become targets.

4:52

But as the terror drone founder says,

4:54

Ukrainian engineers already have

4:56

practical know-how how to decentralize

4:58

production and operate under constant

4:59

threat. We are studying and considering

5:01

this approach as well. What we see in

5:03

that seemingly innocuous statement is

5:05

that it's far from a one-way

5:06

partnership. Ukraine is getting new

5:09

interceptor drones, but Japan is getting

5:11

knowledge and experience that is combat

5:13

tested and very much needed in a world

5:15

that is increasingly plunging into

5:17

chaos. Terror drone is already

5:19

considering launching the production of

5:20

Ukrainian drones on Japanese soil. There

5:23

they can be built both to benefit Japan

5:25

and potentially to be sent to Ukraine

5:26

for use against Putin's forces. What

5:28

we're seeing here is as important as the

5:30

Terror A1 itself, as Ukraine is forging

5:32

a relationship with a major Japanese

5:34

company that is spilling over into a

5:36

wider relationship with Japan itself.

5:38

We've seen inklings of this happening

5:39

already. Japan has been a constant

5:41

supporter of Ukraine in its war against

5:43

Russia, though predominantly on the

5:44

humanitarian side. In February, Japan

5:47

pledged $3.8 million to help Ukraine

5:49

repair some of its cultural sites that

5:51

had been damaged during the war. Another

5:53

$1.3 billion had been pledged to Ukraine

5:55

under the Japanese Peace in Ukraine

5:57

project as of April 1st. And also in

6:00

February, the UN announced the United

6:01

Nations Industrial Development

6:03

Organization has concluded a series of

6:05

grant agreements with 47 Japanese

6:07

companies that will start testing their

6:08

business models and technologies inside

6:10

Ukraine. These are signs of a burgeoning

6:12

relationship between two powerful

6:14

nations. The alliance between Amazing

6:16

Drones and Terror Drone is just one of

6:18

many examples. And there's more. In

6:20

March, the governments of Ukraine and

6:22

Japan began preparing an

6:23

intergovernmental partnership that

6:24

facilitates the transfer of defense

6:26

equipment and technologies. The idea is

6:28

to help the two countries participate in

6:30

more joint production, which in turn

6:32

will lead to localization projects focus

6:34

on weapons. Already, Japan is looking

6:36

into purchasing Ukrainian attack drones,

6:38

which could become a key part of its

6:40

offensive arsenal if tensions erupt in

6:42

the Indoacific. For Ukraine,

6:44

partnerships like these ensure a regular

6:46

influx of weapons and money, both of

6:48

which it can use to defend itself

6:49

against Russia. Ukraine is becoming a

6:51

major player in a global geopolitical

6:53

context, and none of this would be

6:55

happening if Putin hadn't made the dumb

6:57

decision over 4 years ago to launch a

6:58

full-scale invasion of a country that he

7:00

thought would crumble in days. Ukraine

7:02

stood firm. It's been doing that for

7:04

over 4 years. And the irony is that all

7:06

that Putin has succeeded in doing in

7:08

Ukraine is creating an even stronger

7:10

country that has developed ties with

7:11

allies that would never have existed if

7:13

Putin had just stayed put. But we'll

7:15

come back to that topic later. Before we

7:16

do, and before we cover why Terror A1 is

7:19

going to be important for Ukraine

7:20

directly, this is a quick reminder that

7:22

you are watching the Military Show. If

7:24

you're getting value from the insight in

7:26

this video, remember to subscribe to the

7:28

channel so you don't miss what's coming

7:29

next. Now, why is the Terra A1 such a

7:32

huge boon for Ukraine? The answer lies

7:35

in Russia's aerial tactics. Since it got

7:37

its hands on Shahid technology, Russia

7:39

has been engaged in the economics of

7:41

exhaustion against Ukraine. In other

7:43

words, it's been launching swarms of

7:45

drones at Ukraine in everinccreasing

7:46

numbers, all with the aim of burning

7:48

Ukrainian infrastructure, cities, and

7:50

people to the ground. The numbers are

7:52

horrific, though Ukraine is finally at

7:54

the point where it's able to match

7:55

Russia blow forblow on the longrange

7:57

front. In March alone, Russia fired off

8:00

6,462

8:01

drones at Ukraine. For the first time

8:03

since the war began, Ukraine has

8:05

exceeded Russia's monthly total,

8:07

launching 7,347

8:09

longrange drones of its own. But this is

8:12

new ground for Ukraine. Launching

8:14

multiple thousands of drones in a month

8:16

is well trodden ground for Russia, and

8:18

it's been causing problems on the

8:19

economic front. For so long, the counter

8:21

to longrange drone attacks was the use

8:23

of modern air defense systems such as

8:25

the Patriot units that Ukraine has

8:26

received from the US and other Western

8:28

allies. The Patriot is a very important

8:30

system for Ukraine. It's vital when it

8:32

comes to intercepting Russia's ballistic

8:34

missiles. But as an anti- drone defense

8:36

system, the Patriot is practically

8:38

useless. Has nothing to do with the

8:40

Patriot's capabilities and everything to

8:41

do with the sheer cost involved in using

8:43

the Patriot against drones. The Council

8:46

on Foreign Relations lays the numbers

8:47

bare. A single Shahid type drone costs

8:49

Russia about $35,000 to build. One

8:52

advanced Patriot missile interceptor

8:54

sets Ukraine back $4 million. It doesn't

8:57

take an economics genius to tell you

8:59

that the Patriot isn't the right weapon

9:00

for dealing with Russia's drones. If

9:02

that system had been all that Ukraine

9:04

had at its disposal in March, for

9:05

instance, Ukraine would have had to

9:07

spend over $25.8 billion to achieve a

9:10

100% interception rate. Of course, that

9:12

expenditure is ludicrous. But even

9:14

cheaper air defense systems such as the

9:16

Coyote set the user back $125,000 per

9:19

shot, the council points out. Ukraine's

9:21

big challenge beyond the damage that

9:23

Russia's drones cause has been finding

9:24

an air defense solution that makes sense

9:26

on a purely economic scale. It's here

9:29

where the Terror A1 could prove to be

9:31

the single most important weapon that

9:32

has entered Ukraine's arsenal. We told

9:35

you earlier that a Terra A1 costs

9:36

$2,000. Assuming a 100% interception

9:40

rate on Russia's March swarms, that

9:42

would add up to a little over $12.9

9:44

million. Certainly not an insignificant

9:47

amount of money, but far lower than

9:48

using systems like the Patriot. Then

9:50

there's the cost to Russia. If a Shahid

9:52

type drone costs $35,000, then $6,462 of

9:56

them costs over $226 million. Advantage

10:00

Ukraine. With weapons like the Terror

10:02

A1, Ukraine goes from scrambling to find

10:04

enough money to fund its air defense

10:06

network to knowing that every Russian

10:07

air strike is going to cost Putin far

10:09

more to launch than it will cost Ukraine

10:11

to overcome. There's also the added

10:13

benefit that technologies like the Terra

10:15

A1 allow Ukraine and Japan to point to

10:17

what the US is doing in Iran right now

10:19

and say, "Look, we have something better

10:20

and cheaper than Patriots that you can

10:22

use. The US could use something like

10:24

that." What it's doing in Iran right now

10:26

is far from efficient. On March 20th,

10:28

United 24 media reported on the comments

10:30

being made by Ukrainian drone

10:32

specialists who have been deployed to

10:33

the Middle East to help with Iran's

10:35

Shahi drones. There, the instructors

10:37

witnessed the US use up to eight Patriot

10:39

interceptor missiles to take out a

10:41

single aerial threat. In other

10:43

instances, the US has used SM6 missiles,

10:45

which cost about $6 million each, to

10:47

take out Shahid drones that cost just

10:49

$70,000. We told you earlier that this

10:52

sort of approach wouldn't be sustainable

10:53

for Ukraine. The same is true for the

10:55

US, even with its enormous military

10:57

budget. What Japan and Ukraine have just

10:59

done together could be something that

11:01

helps both to build stronger ties with

11:02

the US. But let's come back to

11:04

interceptor drones for a moment. Those

11:06

who've been paying attention to

11:07

Ukraine's approach to air defense during

11:08

the past few months will know that the

11:10

concept of interceptor drones is nothing

11:12

new. Ukraine has been using these kinds

11:14

of drones for months and they have

11:15

proven exceptionally effective. Pravda

11:18

reported on how effective these types of

11:19

drones have become for Ukraine in a

11:21

March 3rd piece where it revealed that

11:22

interceptor drones took down 70% of the

11:25

Shahi type attack drones that Moscow

11:27

launched at Kev during February. Across

11:29

all of Ukraine, interceptors are

11:31

responsible for taking down 30% of

11:33

Russia's attack drones. The

11:35

commander-in-chief of Ukraine's armed

11:36

forces, Alexander Searski, highlighted

11:38

the difference these types of drones

11:39

have made to Ukraine, stating, "Despite

11:42

significantly deteriorating weather

11:43

conditions and a shortage of strike

11:45

capabilities, in February, we did not

11:46

allow the performance of small air

11:48

defense to decline. Last month, our

11:51

interceptor drones carried out around

11:52

6,300 sorties, destroying more than

11:55

1,500 Russian UAVs of various types.

11:58

Bear in mind that this technology is

11:59

still fairly new, but Ukraine has been

12:01

jumping on it." The National Security

12:03

and Defense Council of Ukraine says that

12:05

2026 has already seen Ukraine increase

12:07

its internal production of interceptor

12:09

drones by eight times compared to 2025.

12:12

Now, more than 20 Ukrainian companies

12:14

are working in this field, and the

12:16

drones that Ukraine is producing have a

12:17

mission success rate that exceeds 60%.

12:20

That doesn't seem to be the case based

12:22

on Cerski's numbers, though the council

12:24

may be referring to total interceptor

12:25

deployments rather than a direct

12:27

comparison between interceptors used and

12:29

shaheds destroyed. Regardless, it's

12:31

clear that interceptor drones are a

12:33

major technology that Ukraine is leaning

12:35

heavily into developing further. What

12:37

we're seeing in the Ukrainian skies

12:38

right now represents the early stages of

12:40

that technologies development. The

12:42

Terror A1 is the next evolution. Fast,

12:45

autonomous, cheap, and built through a

12:47

partnership with the Japanese company

12:49

that opens the door for so much more for

12:51

Ukraine. And soon part of a

12:53

multi-layered air defense shield that

12:55

defends against Shahiti type drones at

12:56

close range while other systems deal

12:58

with Russia's missiles. There are

13:00

broader implications of all of this, and

13:02

we've touched on them earlier in the

13:03

video. What we're seeing with this new

13:05

partnership is another example of how

13:07

Putin has achieved the precise opposite

13:09

of what he wanted to do when he launched

13:11

his so-called special military operation

13:13

in Ukraine. That operation was supposed

13:15

to wipe Ukraine off the map. But what

13:17

has happened after 4 years of fighting

13:18

is that Putin's war has made Ukraine

13:20

stronger, geopolitically speaking, than

13:22

it has ever been before. The strength

13:24

and partnership between Ukraine and

13:26

Japan is just one example. Both see the

13:28

mutual benefits of forming defense ties

13:30

that couldn't have existed before

13:31

Putin's invasion forced Ukraine into

13:33

becoming the world's foremost innovator

13:35

in the drone space. We're seeing similar

13:37

types of relationships being formed

13:39

between Ukraine and partners all over

13:40

the world. In the Middle East, Ukraine

13:42

has signed decadel long defense deals

13:44

with several Gulf countries that are

13:46

looking for ways to combat the Iranian

13:47

Shahi drones that are the basis for the

13:49

drones that Russia fires into Ukraine.

13:51

Ukraine's assession to the European

13:53

Union is touted by some to be happening

13:54

as soon as 2027, and that will only

13:57

strengthen Ukraine's ties with a block

13:58

that has already been as stalwarts a

14:00

contributor to Ukraine's defense as they

14:02

come. Ukraine's drones have made much of

14:04

this possible. The likes of Saudi Arabia

14:06

and Qatar would never have even

14:08

considered partnering with Ukraine on

14:09

defense matters in the past. They

14:11

wouldn't have felt the need to. The same

14:12

goes for Japan. Ukrainian President

14:14

Vladimir Zalinski has already declared

14:16

that Ukraine is ready to share its

14:18

marine drone and interceptor

14:19

technologies with Japan as far back as

14:22

February and the Terror A1 may well be a

14:24

product of that sharing. All these

14:26

nations had modern military tech either

14:28

built internally or provided by partners

14:30

like the US. But now Ukraine is key to

14:32

all of their plans. In a weird and

14:34

roundabout way, Putin is the reason for

14:36

that. His war has made Ukraine stronger

14:39

on the geopolitical stage. And that

14:41

strengthening has come at a time when

14:42

Russia's global influence is weaker than

14:44

it has been for a long time under Putin.

14:47

In 2026 alone, Putin watched as

14:49

Venezuela's former dictator Nicholas

14:51

Majuro was taken out of the picture.

14:53

That's one ally down. The chaos in Iran

14:56

has cost Russia another ally in Ali

14:58

Kune. Though we still have to wait to

14:59

see if Operation Epic Fury delivers on

15:01

regime change that would [ __ ]

15:03

Russia's influence in the Gulf, right

15:04

when Ukraine's position in that region

15:06

is at the strongest that it's ever been.

15:08

Russia isn't even being trusted for its

15:10

weapons anymore as it burns through its

15:11

equipment stockpiles in Ukraine, proving

15:13

with every passing day that its weapons

15:15

aren't what they were marketed to be.

15:17

More of its former buyers are turning to

15:19

other suppliers. Russia's arms exports

15:21

have fallen 64% in the last 5 years, the

15:24

Moscow Times reported on March 9th. That

15:27

isn't just down to Russia needing more

15:28

of the weapons it produces. Customers

15:30

like India and China are buying less. As

15:33

this is happening, European Union

15:34

countries, of which Ukraine may soon be

15:36

one, are selling four times as many

15:38

weapons as Russia. So, Japan's Terror A1

15:41

is going to be huge for Ukraine in the

15:43

direct sense. A new type of interceptor

15:45

drone is more than welcome for a country

15:47

that is increasingly relying on these

15:48

cost-effective weapons to tackle

15:50

Russia's long-range assaults. But it's

15:52

the broader implications that should

15:54

worry Putin. With this deal, Japan and

15:56

Ukraine are closer than ever on the

15:58

defense front. The same can be said of

16:00

Ukraine and many other countries. Putin

16:02

can only watch as Russia's influence

16:04

crumbles and Ukraine's grows. Every

16:06

intercepted Shahid will hammer that

16:08

reality into the Kremlin's head. And

16:10

every terror A1 that takes flight

16:12

reminds Putin that Japan is on Ukraine's

16:14

side. But maybe Putin won't be paying as

16:16

much attention to Ukraine's and Japan's

16:18

new interceptor drones as he should. The

16:21

magical spear of Odin sounds like

16:24

something straight out of Norse

16:25

mythology. a godlike weapon, perhaps

16:28

offered as the reward for completing a

16:30

quest in a game of Dn D. But the spear

16:32

is real. It's in Ukraine right now. And

16:35

thanks to Sweden, Ukraine has something

16:37

so terrifying in its hands that Putin

16:39

knows he can't stop what's coming.

16:42

Gungir has arrived. And there's nothing

16:44

Russia can do about it. Russia knows

16:46

that this is the case because Gungir

16:48

isn't just some weapon that Sweden has

16:49

promised to deliver Ukraine at some

16:51

point in the distant future. It's not

16:53

only already in Ukraine, but it was used

16:55

in one of the most devastating strikes

16:57

that Ukraine has carried out against

16:59

Russia's military and oil infrastructure

17:01

in the Black Sea to date. We thought we

17:04

knew everything that Ukraine was willing

17:05

to reveal about that strike. On April

17:07

6th, the news broke that Ukraine's

17:09

unmanned systems forces had worked

17:11

alongside the country's naval forces to

17:13

launch a devastating strike against

17:15

Russia's seash offshore oil drilling

17:17

platform in the Black Sea. While

17:19

damaging that platform would be

17:21

important for Ukraine in terms of

17:22

landing another blow against Russia's

17:24

oil industry, the real reason why it

17:25

struck the seash platform was that

17:27

Russia has been using it as a

17:28

surveillance and military outpost for

17:30

much of the war. Radars for short-range

17:33

air defense systems had been loaded onto

17:34

the platform along with electronic

17:36

warfare systems. All of which

17:38

transformed it into a military asset

17:40

rather than an oil one. Ukraine took

17:42

seash down and as far as we knew it did

17:45

it using drones. That's essentially what

17:47

the commander of Ukraine's unmanned

17:49

systems forces, Robert Bravdy, claimed

17:51

when he announced the attack in a

17:52

telegram post. The floating drill rig

17:54

seash was worked out by the birds of 413

17:57

OP Reed, together with the forces of the

17:59

Navy's deep sea attack, Bravy declared.

18:02

And it's not like he was lying. Video

18:04

soon surfaced of Ukraine attacking Seash

18:06

using drones seemingly launched from

18:08

maritime drones sent into the Black Sea.

18:10

So that was it. The operation was done

18:12

and dusted, and we knew how Ukraine had

18:14

pulled it off. But looks can be

18:15

deceiving and Brovdy, purposefully or

18:17

not, had left out a key part of the

18:19

equation that has since been revealed.

18:21

It wasn't just drones that struck Seash

18:24

on the night leading into April 6th.

18:26

Ukraine had also unleashed Swedish

18:28

Gungir missiles. On April 7th, the Kev

18:31

Post reported that the Ukrainian Navy

18:33

had revealed and then later confirmed

18:35

the use of the Swedishmade RBS-15

18:38

missile in the Sebast known as Gungir,

18:41

which loosely translates into the

18:43

magical spear of Odin. The missile is an

18:45

anti-hship powerhouse and until this

18:47

point, it wasn't really known whether

18:49

Ukraine had the missile or not. The

18:51

outlet reports that a video made public

18:53

by Ukraine's Navy has revealed that

18:55

Gungir was used in the strike against

18:57

Seash and that footage has sent a shock

18:59

wave through Russia lasting for about 20

19:01

seconds. The footage shows Ukraine

19:03

launching its Swedish missiles from what

19:05

appears to be a groundbased platform.

19:07

The Osin warfare X account notes this is

19:09

the first public appearance made by the

19:11

Gungir in the Ukraine war. Though it

19:13

seems that Ukraine has had access to

19:15

Sweden's powerful missiles for much

19:16

longer. We'll be getting back to that

19:18

point soon. First, the video shared by

19:20

Osin warfare appears to show two

19:22

launches of the Swedish missile. The ke

19:24

post adds that other footage that has

19:25

surfaced shows those missiles scoring

19:27

direct hits against the seash platform,

19:29

which it says lies about 60 to 80 km or

19:32

about 37 to 50 mi northwest of the

19:34

Crimean coast. Comparisons between the

19:37

videos and clearer pictures of the

19:38

launchers typically used for the Gungir

19:40

offer further confirmation that Ukraine

19:42

has indeed deployed the Swedish missile.

19:44

Don't ignore the proximity of the Sebash

19:46

platform to the Crimean coast either.

19:48

That gives you some indication of why

19:49

Ukraine chose the specific oil drilling

19:52

rig to target. The electronic warfare

19:54

devices and air defense systems that

19:55

Russia has loaded onto the Seash

19:57

platform were clearly in place to

19:59

protect Russia's assets in Crimea. Now

20:02

those defenses are burning. Struck by

20:04

the magical spear of Odin with follow-up

20:06

strikes carried out by Ukraine's drones.

20:08

That oil drilling rig can no longer act

20:10

as an early warning system for occupied

20:12

Crimea. We anticipate reporting on a

20:14

strike against the Crimean mainland,

20:16

perhaps against targets off the coast

20:17

that Seash was protecting in the very

20:19

near future. For now, we can confirm

20:21

that the RBS-15 is officially part of

20:24

Ukraine's arsenal. That has caught

20:26

everybody off guard, not least Putin and

20:27

his Kremlin cronies, who thought that

20:29

Ukraine was increasingly being forced to

20:31

rely on the missiles that it's building

20:32

itself as it stockpiles of Western

20:34

missiles dry up. Seash just showed Putin

20:37

that Ukraine isn't in a one or the other

20:39

situation. It has both its own missiles

20:41

and western missiles and it can use them

20:43

to hit some of the most important

20:44

military assets that Russia has in

20:46

Crimea. So Putin has to deal with yet

20:49

another western missile being provided

20:50

to Ukraine. And this is where things

20:52

start to shift on the battlefield. The

20:55

arrival of the Gungir in Ukraine isn't

20:57

just dangerous for Russia in terms of

20:58

the firepower that the missile brings to

21:00

the table. It's also yet another sign to

21:02

Putin that his attempts to intimidate

21:04

Sweden into staying neutral have failed.

21:06

Russia has instead turned what for

21:08

centuries had been a country that tried

21:09

to stay out of war into one that is

21:11

actively arming a Russian enemy and is

21:13

doing everything that it can to stop

21:14

Putin in his tracks. We'll be exploring

21:16

the second of these points soon. Stick

21:18

with us until then. As for the missile

21:20

that Ukraine has just deployed to

21:21

shatter Seash, it's the last thing that

21:23

Russia wants to see in Ukraine's hands.

21:26

Why? A look at the basic specifications

21:28

of the missile is enough to answer that

21:30

question. Made by SAR Bow Force

21:32

Dynamics, the RBS-15 or robot system 15

21:35

if we want to get non- Norse about it is

21:37

actually a full-blown family of

21:39

anti-hship missiles that have been

21:40

designed to combine the ship shattering

21:42

capabilities you'd expect from this kind

21:44

of missile with a land attack capability

21:46

that makes it extremely versatile. The

21:49

missile's range can extend beyond 300 km

21:52

or 186 mi, though this depends on the

21:54

specific version of the gun near that's

21:56

used. The warhead weighs about 200 kg or

21:58

about 440 lb. And the missile is almost

22:01

capable of hitting Mac 1. It comes in

22:04

just under at Mac 0.9, but that still

22:06

translates to a speed of about 690 mph.

22:09

So Ukraine has its hands on a missile

22:11

that moves fast, hits hard, and has a

22:14

long enough range to be used to strike

22:15

all sorts of targets in the Black Sea,

22:17

Crimea, and the occupied territories of

22:20

mainland Ukraine. The key post adds that

22:22

the RBS-15 uses a combination of GPS and

22:25

inertial navigation to stay on track

22:27

when fired toward a target. It also has

22:29

a terminal active radar which gives it

22:31

homing capabilities that feed into the

22:33

fire and forget functionality that makes

22:35

the missile so effective. That

22:36

functionality offers precisely what it

22:38

says on the tin. Ukraine can program a

22:41

target into the missile, fire, and then

22:43

forget about having to make any manual

22:44

mid-flight adjustments as the missile

22:46

handles everything else itself. We

22:48

mentioned earlier that the RBS-15 is

22:50

actually a family of missiles. That's

22:52

led to speculation about which versions

22:54

Ukraine has and which it used to strike

22:56

the seash oil rig. Naval news has some

22:58

potential answers here. It says that the

23:00

footage that Ukraine's Navy released of

23:02

the missile being fired first confirms

23:04

the use of the RBS-15 because we see a

23:06

double exhaust plume emitted during the

23:08

launch phase. That's a characteristic

23:10

the Swedish missile is known to have and

23:12

it's also one that is absent in all of

23:14

the other missiles that Ukraine is known

23:15

to have in its arsenal. The outlet adds

23:17

that the version Ukraine used is likely

23:19

to have been either the Mark III or

23:20

MarkV variety of the Ganga, both of

23:23

which have several upgrades over early

23:25

iterations. The enhancement of the range

23:27

up to and over 200 km or 124 mi is one

23:31

of those upgrades. Ukraine is using the

23:33

Gunga to attack Russian facilities in

23:35

the Black Sea. That extended range is a

23:37

must. It's also worth noting that

23:39

Ukraine's target was a strange cross

23:41

between land and seabbased. An offshore

23:43

oil rig isn't exactly a ship, though you

23:45

could argue that it shares some

23:47

characteristics, especially as it's

23:49

based in the ocean. At the same time,

23:50

it's not really a land target, though,

23:52

will have strengths and vulnerabilities

23:54

that aren't seen on vessels. That

23:56

mishmash makes the use of the Mark III

23:57

or four version of the RBS-15 even more

24:00

likely, as these are versions of the

24:01

Swedish missile that were made to be

24:03

capable of striking targets on land and

24:05

sea. Versatility, then is key to what

24:07

makes the magical Spear of Odin such a

24:09

massive addition to Ukraine's arsenal.

24:11

However, there's one more factor at

24:13

play. That factor alone changes

24:14

everything and makes the RBS-15 the

24:16

perfect choice for the strike that

24:18

Ukraine just pulled off. But before we

24:20

get to that, this is a quick reminder

24:21

that you are watching the military show.

24:23

If this is the kind of insight that you

24:25

want to see, make sure that you are

24:26

subscribed to the channel. So, the other

24:29

factor,

24:31

the RBS-15 was already a good choice for

24:33

the attack on the Seash based on its

24:35

range and strength. However, there's

24:37

something else about the platform that

24:38

we mentioned earlier in the video that

24:39

may have caught your attention. In

24:41

addition to the air defense radars on

24:43

the oil rig that Ukraine wanted to take

24:44

out, Russia has been using the Seash oil

24:47

platform for its electronic warfare or

24:49

EW devices. Through EW, Russia is able

24:52

to scramble GPS signals and send both

24:54

drones and missiles off course. That's

24:56

where the RBS15 comes into play. The

24:58

missile has been optimized not only to

25:00

operate in coastal and open sea

25:02

environments, but it's also equipped

25:04

with electronic counter counter

25:05

measures. In other words, the Gungir has

25:07

EW of its own that it can use to

25:09

counteract the EW that Russia is

25:11

employing against Ukraine's missiles and

25:13

drones. It's a fire versus fire

25:15

approach. And what it means is that the

25:17

RBS-15 is innately resistant to the GPS

25:20

jamming and spoofing techniques the EW

25:22

devices loaded onto the Seash platform

25:24

employ that stop attacks just like the

25:26

one that Ukraine pulled off on April

25:28

6th. So, the magical spear of Odin

25:30

likely set the stage for what was to

25:31

come later. Ukraine used its Swedish

25:33

missiles to shatter Russia's Seash EW

25:36

systems and then followed up with the

25:38

drone strikes that we already knew

25:39

about. Those drones, unencumbered by

25:41

Seash's EW presence, could then strike

25:44

the oil drilling platform's air defense

25:46

radars with a level of precision that

25:47

wouldn't have otherwise been possible.

25:49

This is an incredibly intelligent and

25:51

layered approach to a strike. Ukraine

25:53

once again has shown Russia that its

25:55

approach to deep strikes goes far beyond

25:58

merely pointing missiles and drones at a

25:59

target and hoping they hit it. The seash

26:02

strike was well planned at every stage

26:04

and the Gungmemir was key to making the

26:06

whole thing work. That will worry Putin.

26:09

He knows that future strikes against

26:11

Russian assets in Crimea have been made

26:12

possible by the destruction of Seash.

26:15

But the real question he'll be asking

26:16

himself is how on earth this happened in

26:18

the first place. Russia has been caught

26:20

with its pants down as Ukraine has

26:21

unleashed a weapon that it hasn't used

26:23

before. However, if Putin was paying

26:25

attention, he would have at least had an

26:27

inkling that something like this was

26:28

coming. Though the arrival of the

26:30

magical spear of Odin appears to have

26:32

been quiet, it's actually the result of

26:34

dealings between Ukraine and Sweden that

26:36

have been a long time in the making.

26:38

Sweden set out its stall pretty early

26:40

when it came to who it supported

26:41

following Putin's February 2022 invasion

26:43

of Ukraine. Way back in June 2022, the

26:46

country committed to a defense package

26:48

that would see it send anti-tank

26:49

weapons, 12.7 mm rifles, and most

26:52

importantly, RBS17 anti-ship missiles to

26:55

Ukraine. That particular missile is

26:57

essentially the Swedish version of the

26:59

US-made Hellfire, only it had been

27:01

adapted so it could be launched from

27:02

warships or via a ground firing post

27:05

that could easily be set up and

27:06

dismantled anywhere alongside Ukraine's

27:08

coast. That was a warning to Russia.

27:10

Sweden was willing to arm Ukraine with

27:12

missiles from the very beginning of the

27:14

war. And as Militani noted at the time,

27:16

the far more powerful RBS-15 was still

27:18

waiting in the wings. However, not a lot

27:21

seemed to happen on the Swedish missile

27:22

front for 2 years after the arrival of

27:24

the RBS7. And then something changed. We

27:27

didn't hear much about it at the time,

27:29

and it was under reportported in the

27:30

media, but according to the Kev Post,

27:32

Sweden and Ukraine signed a deal at some

27:34

point in 2024 for the transfer of RBS-15

27:37

missiles to Ukraine. That means one of

27:39

two things. Either it's taken around 2

27:41

years for Sweden to deliver on the deal,

27:43

which is why we're only now seeing the

27:44

emergence of the Gungir in Ukraine, or

27:47

Ukraine received this missile months, if

27:48

not years ago, and it's been waiting for

27:50

the perfect time to unleash it. Either

27:53

way, Russia has just felt the power of

27:54

the magical spear of Odin, and there

27:56

could be a lot worse to come. The Kev

27:59

Post adds that Sweden is far from the

28:00

only country that uses the RBS-15.

28:03

Thailand, Algeria, Bulgaria, Poland,

28:06

Germany, Finland, and Croatia also

28:08

operate the missile. Of those countries,

28:10

all of the European nations are active

28:12

supporters of Ukraine's defense against

28:14

Russia, and they have all transferred

28:16

weapons to Ukraine in the past. Now, we

28:18

know that Sweden has signed a deal with

28:19

Ukraine to transfer RBS-15 missiles, but

28:22

what about Germany or Finland? Do they

28:24

have deals in the works? Have those

28:26

deals already been signed, and we just

28:28

haven't heard about them? Could

28:29

negotiations for Gungir transfers begin

28:31

now that Ukraine knows exactly how

28:33

useful its Swedish missiles can be

28:35

against Russia? These are all questions

28:37

that for now are unanswered. There are

28:39

also questions that should be ringing

28:41

out around the Kremlin as many of these

28:43

nations sending Gungir missiles to

28:44

Ukraine could mean that more attacks

28:46

against facilities like Seash line

28:48

Russia's future. And it gets worse for

28:50

Russia. Not only is Sweden supplying its

28:52

seas shattering missiles to Ukraine, but

28:55

it's actively working alongside Putin's

28:57

enemy on the development of more

28:58

missiles. That's according to Defense

29:00

Express, which reported back in January

29:02

2025 that defense officials from Ukraine

29:05

and Sweden had met to agree on a new

29:07

joint initiative for the development of

29:09

a longrange weapon. We haven't heard a

29:11

lot more about that deal since the

29:13

Defense Express report, but what it

29:14

shows us is that military cooperation

29:16

between Ukraine and Sweden is

29:18

intensifying. Putin has to be wondering

29:20

how things got to this point. Before he

29:23

launched his invasion, Sweden seemed to

29:24

be a non-factor to Russia. For 200 years

29:27

before the Ukraine war, Sweden had

29:29

steadfastly pursued a policy of military

29:32

neutrality and non-alignment that was

29:33

designed to ensure the country didn't

29:35

get dragged into other people's wars.

29:37

Then the tanks started rolling into

29:38

Ukraine and everything changed for the

29:41

Swedes. For the first time in two

29:43

centuries, Sweden saw a threat that it

29:45

needed to work to counter. The attitude

29:47

in the country became clear. First,

29:49

Putin would target Ukraine. Then, he

29:52

might shift his attention to the Baltic

29:53

and Nordic nations. Russia's aggression

29:56

is what led to Sweden giving up two

29:57

centuries of neutrality to become one of

29:59

the newest members of NATO. That move

30:01

was made official in March 2024, and it

30:04

led to the expansion of the collective

30:06

defense organization that Putin has

30:07

often used as one of the reasons for

30:09

launching his invasion in the first

30:10

place. Russia wanted NATO to get

30:13

smaller, to get rid of the nations on

30:14

the eastern flank that Putin believes

30:16

encroached too closely on Russia's

30:18

territory. However, all that Putin has

30:20

achieved with his invasion, at least

30:22

from the Swedish perspective, is turning

30:24

a neutral nation into an enemy. Beyond

30:26

NATO, Sweden has also thrown its support

30:28

behind Ukraine. We've touched on that

30:30

already with the missile and weapons

30:32

transfers that started as far back as

30:33

June 2022. But the alliance between

30:36

Sweden and Ukraine runs much deeper, and

30:38

that's a major problem for the Kremlin.

30:40

Since February 2022, Sweden has

30:42

contributed over 13.7 billion dollars to

30:45

Ukraine's war effort. Deals are also

30:47

being signed, as we see with the

30:49

transfer of RBS-15 missiles to Ukraine.

30:51

Other deals involve even more dangerous

30:53

assets, such as the ones signed between

30:55

Ukraine and Sweden that will see the

30:57

latter deliver up to 150 of its Grian

31:00

fighter jets to Ukraine over the course

31:02

of the next decade. Sweden even has

31:04

Russia in its cultural crosshairs as

31:06

meetings between Sweden and Ukraine's

31:08

cultural ministers show that it wants to

31:10

work with its newest ally on

31:11

derification across the board. When

31:14

Putin invaded Ukraine, he was meant to

31:16

win quickly. The so-called special

31:18

military operation would be over in

31:20

days, and Russia will be able to use

31:22

that victory to intimidate other

31:23

European countries. But as Ukraine

31:25

defended itself and Russia got bogged

31:27

down in a war that's now lasted for more

31:29

than four years, all Putin has succeeded

31:31

in doing is being the catalyst for

31:33

alliances to be forged that would never

31:35

have existed if his forces had stayed

31:37

put. Now Sweden is an enemy, one that is

31:40

actively treating Russia as the largest

31:42

threat to its national security, which

31:44

is what has laid the foundation for so

31:46

much of the cooperation between Ukraine

31:47

and Sweden that we're seeing today. So,

31:49

the magical spear of Odin being

31:51

unleashed against Russia is important

31:53

because of the immediate results that it

31:55

has achieved. Ukraine's Swedish missiles

31:57

have taken out a key Black Sea radar and

31:59

EW outpost, and that will lead to the

32:02

creation of more aerial corridors that

32:04

Ukraine's missiles and drones can follow

32:05

to hit Crimeir itself. But perhaps more

32:08

important than the strike itself is what

32:09

the strike represents. Putin has created

32:12

a Swedish monster. And now that this

32:14

monster is working alongside Ukraine,

32:16

nowhere in the occupied territories is

32:18

safe from Ukraine's wrath. Gungir isn't

32:20

the only weapon inspired by Norse

32:22

mythology that Sweden is using against

32:24

Russia. The wars in Ukraine and now in

32:27

the Persian Gulf, have shattered many of

32:29

the usual rules of engagement. All sides

32:31

in these conflicts are making prodigious

32:33

use of drones, both on the front lines

32:35

and for longrange strikes far behind

32:38

them. A massive arms race has ensued

32:40

with nations around the world scrambling

32:42

to develop the most deadly, scalable,

32:44

and cost-effective attack drones with

32:46

the utmost urgency. At the same time, an

32:49

equally crucial arms race has emerged

32:52

alongside counter drone technology, also

32:55

known as CUAS solutions. Counter drone

32:59

efforts run the gamut from cheap

33:01

handheld net guns to advanced missile

33:03

systems that cost hundreds of millions

33:06

of dollars. But now, Swedish giant SAR

33:09

has come up with a unique concept that's

33:11

been proven in action and may just

33:13

change NATO's entire approach to anti-

33:15

drone warfare, the Loki. So, let's take

33:19

a closer look at the Loki system, what

33:22

makes it such an innovative concept, and

33:24

how it could change drone warfare

33:26

permanently. Now, CUAS has become big

33:30

business. A spate of drone incursions

33:32

into European airspace in mid to late

33:34

2025 exposed how unprepared much of

33:37

Europe was for the kind of bombardment

33:40

by drone swarms that Ukraine and

33:42

increasingly Russia have been compelled

33:44

to continuously fend off. Traditional

33:46

missilebased air defense systems like

33:49

the MIM104 Patriot and the Iris T have

33:52

proven to be effective at taking out

33:54

long range drones like Russia's Shahed

33:57

Jiren variants. effective, but not cost

34:00

effective. It's simply not feasible to

34:02

use multi-million dollar interceptor

34:05

missiles to shoot down drones that cost

34:07

tens of thousands, especially not when

34:09

the drones can be produced at a rate of

34:11

hundreds per day, while the interceptor

34:13

missiles are produced at a rate of

34:15

hundreds per year. So, the race is on to

34:18

develop CUAS solutions. Now, between

34:21

2026 and 2030, NATO members and close

34:26

allies are expected to spend more than

34:28

$210 billion on air and missile defense

34:31

capabilities. Much of that will be

34:34

allocated for high-end systems like

34:36

Patriots, Iris T, and SAMP systems. The

34:39

need to protect against high-end threats

34:41

like Russian and Iranian crews and

34:43

ballistic missiles is as critical as

34:45

ever. However, billions are also pouring

34:47

into air defense systems specifically

34:50

focused on drones, especially systems

34:52

that offer a workable cost to kill ratio

34:55

and are easy to produce in large

34:57

quantities and quickly. The latest

34:59

unmanned airspace 2026 global counter

35:03

UAS systems directory lists over 1,000

35:06

CUAS systems from more than 550

35:09

companies that are under development or

35:11

in production around the world. The

35:14

directory breaks the systems down into

35:16

11 different categories. Systems for

35:18

capturing drones like net guns,

35:21

uncrrewed ground vehicles, detector

35:23

systems, directed energy weapon systems,

35:26

electronic counter measures or ECM guns,

35:30

integrated systems, intercept drones,

35:32

missiles, munitions, and others,

35:34

including software. But unlike most of

35:37

the systems listed, they might have

35:39

difficulty slotting Loki into one single

35:41

category or another. Because what makes

35:44

this system special isn't some brand new

35:46

high-tech way of bringing down drones or

35:48

innovative use of AI. Rather, its beauty

35:52

lies in pragmatically putting together

35:54

abundant existing components to create a

35:56

highly effective and costeffective

35:58

system. SAR didn't try to reinvent the

36:01

wheel. They didn't have to. Their

36:03

engineers looked at existing components

36:05

sitting on their shelves designed for

36:07

entirely different use cases and

36:09

realized they already had everything

36:11

they needed to produce the ultimate

36:13

drone killer. And it's a move that has

36:15

CUAS designers around the world going

36:18

either hang on why can't we do that or

36:21

gimme. Now the fact that it's SA coming

36:23

up with pragmatic and innovative

36:25

solutions to pressing military problems

36:27

should come as no surprise to seasoned

36:29

observers of the global

36:30

military-industrial complex. They've

36:33

been doing it for decades after all. The

36:35

company whose name is short for Senska

36:37

Aeroplan Aka Bolagget or Swedish

36:40

Aeroplane Corporation was founded in

36:43

1937. It subsequently became the

36:46

dominant defense industry company in

36:48

Sweden with a market cap in excess of

36:50

$35 billion. It's by far the most

36:53

important company in the country in

36:55

terms of scale, technological

36:56

innovation, and strategic importance.

36:59

Over the years, SAR has consistently

37:01

delivered a smorgus board of weapons

37:03

widely in demand around the world for

37:05

their quality, practicality, and

37:07

reliability. The most notable of these

37:10

are probably the iconic JAS39 Grippen

37:13

fighter jet, 84 anti-tank weapon, RBS-15

37:17

anti-ship missile, double eagle mine

37:20

clearing naval drones, KL Gustaf M4

37:23

recoilless rifle, trackfire remotes

37:25

weapon station, and giraffe radar

37:27

systems. And the last two items on that

37:30

list are now being combined in the brand

37:32

new Loki system. Loki was first

37:35

presented in February 2025. The fruits

37:38

of a collaboration between the Swedish

37:40

Air Force, the Swedish Defense Material

37:42

Administration or FMV, SAR and other

37:45

partners. It combines existing

37:47

technologies into a modular system that

37:50

can be assembled in different

37:51

configurations like LEGO. The system

37:54

integrates a mobile radar SARS Giraffe

37:57

1X with a trackf fire remote weapon

37:59

stationed armed with heavy and medium

38:01

machine guns along with electronic

38:03

warfare components. That means it can

38:06

track both physical targets and signals

38:08

in the electromagnetic spectrum

38:10

providing both early detection and

38:12

multiple options for neutralization.

38:14

Because of its modular design, other

38:17

attachments such as a directed energy

38:19

weapon, for example, could conceivably

38:21

be attached with relatively little

38:23

hassle in the future. More about those a

38:25

little later, but for now, the known

38:28

components of the system are all widely

38:30

used across NATO member states and

38:32

beyond, reducing interoperability and

38:35

operator training learning curves to a

38:37

minimum. Take the radar for example. The

38:40

giraffe radar family began development

38:42

in the 1970s with the first systems

38:44

delivered in 1977. They were originally

38:47

developed alongside the RBS70

38:49

surfaceto-air missile. Early giraffe

38:52

radars were mechanical 2D 3D pulse

38:55

dopplerless systems operating in the GH

38:57

band and designed to detect low-flying

38:59

aircraft in cluttered environments. Over

39:02

time, the family evolved into advanced

39:04

digital systems culminating in the

39:06

giraffe agile multi-beam or AM. The AM

39:10

is a 3D passive electronically scanned

39:13

array or PESA radar that has been widely

39:16

exported and used in both land and naval

39:18

roles as the sea giraffe in the latter

39:20

case. But the real leap forward came in

39:22

May 2014 when SAB unveiled the giraffe

39:25

1X, the variant used in Loki. Perhaps

39:28

with a nod towards the emerging field of

39:30

drone warfare, this compact Xband active

39:34

electronically scanned array or ISA

39:36

radar marked a shift toward mobility,

39:39

rapid deployment, and multiroll

39:41

capability. The ISO array allows the

39:43

radar to steer its beams electronically

39:45

rather than mechanically. That means

39:47

faster scanning, improved reliability,

39:50

and the ability to track multiple

39:52

targets simultaneously. The ISSA radar

39:54

also provides three-dimensional

39:56

tracking, meaning it can determine a

39:58

target's range, bearing, and altitude.

40:01

This is critical when dealing with small

40:03

drones or low-flying threats that can

40:05

blend into ground clutter. In addition,

40:08

advanced signal processing enables the

40:10

system to distinguish real targets from

40:12

birds, terrain, and weather effects,

40:14

improving detection accuracy in

40:16

congested environments. The result is

40:19

that the Giraffe 1X offers 360° coverage

40:22

with a full volume scan every second.

40:25

It's sensitive enough to detect low,

40:27

slow, small, or LSS targets like drones

40:31

on top of its counter RAM. That's

40:33

rockets, artillery, and mortars. Sense

40:35

and warn functionality. The land variant

40:37

has a range of around 47 mi, while the

40:40

naval variant has a range of around 61

40:43

mi. More recently, the Giraffe 1X

40:45

deployment set was added in 2023,

40:49

improving transportability and

40:50

readiness. And in 2024, the compact

40:54

radar module was introduced, enabling

40:56

the antenna to be folded into the

40:58

housing at the press of a button. With a

41:00

total system weight under 330 lb, it can

41:04

be readily deployed on light vehicles,

41:06

mast, or rooftops to provide

41:08

simultaneous air and surface

41:10

surveillance. It can be operated either

41:12

remotely or locally and offers flexible

41:14

integration with command and control or

41:17

C2 systems. In other words, it can be

41:19

seamlessly linked with other sensors,

41:21

communication networks, weapons

41:23

platforms, and decision-making tools to

41:25

enable coordinated military operations.

41:28

With all those features, little wonder

41:30

that demand for the Giraffe 1X has been

41:32

high. The US, Sweden, Latvia, and the UK

41:36

are all procuring the system either to

41:38

be used on light vehicles, tactical

41:40

units, fixed sites, or integrated into

41:42

naval platforms. Now, it's also the eyes

41:45

and ears of Loki. That makes perfect

41:48

sense. The giraffe's characteristics are

41:50

perfectly suited to a modular mobile

41:53

CUAS platform like Loki. Even better,

41:56

with healthy demand from home and abroad

41:57

for the various iterations of the

41:59

Giraffe for almost half a century, SA's

42:02

production lines are welloiled and it

42:04

inventories are well stocked. From SA's

42:06

perspective, for Loki, the giraffe is

42:09

pretty much an off-the-shelf solution.

42:11

And it's more or less the same story

42:12

with the weapon system that fires at the

42:14

targets identified by the giraffe. The

42:17

trackfire remote weapon station or RWS.

42:21

Like the giraffe, its choice was

42:23

somewhat of a no-brainer for SA.

42:25

Trackfire is a remotely operated weapon

42:27

and sensor system specifically developed

42:29

by SA for integration on naval vessels,

42:32

fixed defense positions, and land

42:34

vehicles, i.e. on platforms just like

42:37

Loki. The system was publicly launched

42:39

at the DEI 2007 Expo in London and

42:43

entered service in 2012 with Finland's

42:45

Navy, its first major deployment. That

42:48

was followed by a 2017 contract with the

42:50

aforementioned FMV that saw the track

42:53

fire integrated domestically onto combat

42:56

boat 90s and other naval platforms. And

42:58

at least 26 of those boats ended up in

43:01

Ukraine. Since 2022, Sweden has sent

43:05

Ukraine 21 packages of direct military

43:08

aid worth a whopping 11.3 billion.

43:12

Included were donations of advanced

43:13

weapons systems like Archer artillery,

43:16

Stridzvan 122 tanks, air defense

43:19

systems, and CB90 boats like Trackfire

43:22

RWS. 10 CB90s were delivered to Ukraine

43:26

in February 2024 and a further 16 in

43:29

January 2025. As it turns out, those

43:33

Trackfire integrations were some of the

43:35

last of the old configuration of the

43:36

system. The new configuration, no doubt

43:39

heavily influenced by Ukraine's

43:41

experiences during the war, was about to

43:43

be unveiled. The Trackfire Aries was

43:46

also unveiled at DSEI, albeit of the

43:48

2025 edition. It's specifically designed

43:51

for CUAS operations, and it's the

43:54

perfect fit for Loki. Optimized for high

43:56

precision and crew protection while

43:58

firing on the move, it supports 360deree

44:01

azimuth rotation with elevation from

44:04

minus20° to + 55°. Now, those aren't

44:08

particularly impressive specs compared

44:10

to rival RWS systems, which typically

44:12

also have 360° azimuth. The naval

44:15

variants of the Kongsburg Protector RWS

44:18

and Korean Hanoir Defense Naval RWS have

44:21

the same depression of minus20° but a

44:24

slightly higher elevation of plus 60°.

44:27

Rin metal RMG30 RWS variants typically

44:31

offer -15° to a plus 60° elevation and

44:35

the Turkish Aselson stamp naval RWS

44:38

beats all of them with a minus15° to a

44:41

plus 55° spread. Now, that's the kind of

44:44

information you find on any old military

44:46

focused channel on YouTube. Here at the

44:48

Military Show, we dig beneath the

44:50

headlines to bring you the real story.

44:52

So, make sure you subscribe to the

44:54

channel so you never miss out. So, the

44:56

Trackfire might be at a slight

44:58

disadvantage compared to some of its

45:00

rivals. But what it lacks in amplitude,

45:02

it more than makes up for in precision.

45:04

It features true stabilized independent

45:07

line of sight or silos for short. That

45:10

means the independently stabilized

45:12

sensor module is decoupled from the

45:14

weapon's axis and thus isolated from

45:16

weapon recoil effects that enables the

45:19

operator to maintain an uninterrupted

45:21

line of sight on the target, greatly

45:23

reducing target acquisition times in the

45:25

process. The Trackfire Aries's unique

45:28

configuration also enables a target to

45:30

be continuously lays during the

45:32

engagement sequence, providing a highly

45:34

accurate and comprehensive ballistic

45:36

calculation, including 3D target

45:38

prediction. But the real value is

45:40

perhaps this. It's a modular system

45:43

designed to be configurable,

45:44

interoperable, and implementable on an

45:46

expanding set of platforms. There are

45:49

two main units onto which others can be

45:51

plugged. The first is a director unit or

45:54

DU which houses the sensor module or SM.

45:57

The DU connects to the human machine

45:59

interface or HMI which includes the

46:02

gunner's display, fire control panel,

46:04

control handle, and video tracker. What

46:07

that means in practical terms is that

46:09

the crew has a powerful visual

46:11

representation of the environment and

46:13

its targets at its fingertips. Operators

46:16

can literally identify threats, select

46:19

the appropriate response, and fire

46:21

without having to break visual contact

46:22

with their screens. A dual command

46:25

facilitates shared capabilities, leading

46:27

to even shorter response times and

46:29

reduce sensor to shooter cycles. Plus,

46:32

the system is set up for integration

46:34

into other platform systems, meaning

46:36

targeted image data can be transmitted

46:39

both within the platform and to and from

46:41

others. As for the firepower it can

46:43

deliver, flexibility is the Trackfire's

46:46

middle name. A wide range of weapon

46:48

aectors can be mounted, often in

46:50

combination with one another. The Aries

46:52

variant comes standard with a 30x113 mm

46:56

M230 LF Bushmaster chain gun, but it can

46:59

also handle the Browning M2 HMG 12.7 mm

47:03

heavy machine gun, FN Mag 587.62

47:07

mm generalpurpose machine gun, MK19 40x

47:11

53 mm, and the HK GMG 40x 53 mm grenade

47:16

launchers and lighter missiles. You can

47:19

also mount complimentary solutions such

47:21

as non-lethal aectors and jammers. In

47:23

Loki's case, the suite includes a

47:25

Browning M2, an FN Mag 58, and

47:28

electronic warfare components for

47:30

jamming. However, any of the other

47:32

weapons we just mentioned, along with

47:34

smoke launchers, dazzlers, spotlights,

47:36

loudspeakers, and even lightweight

47:38

cannons can also be mounted onto it as

47:40

required. But even the basic package

47:43

gives you something most other CUAS

47:45

systems don't. two different detection

47:47

and engagement options, physical and

47:50

electromagnetic spectrum tracking. This

47:52

gives you multiple options for

47:54

neutralization in addition to early

47:56

detection. And that goes a long way to

47:58

solving the elephant in the room problem

48:00

for NATO. Cost appropriate responses

48:03

against small lowcost drones. Now, it's

48:06

not just the cost of the materials that

48:08

factor into the equation when developing

48:10

CUAS solutions. The time it takes to go

48:13

from idea to active in the field is just

48:15

as huge a concern. The longer it takes,

48:18

the more costly the end product is

48:20

likely to be. In this regard, Loki must

48:22

have broken some kind of NATO record. It

48:25

took just 84 days to get from evaluation

48:28

to delivery. An eyewateringly small

48:30

amount of time compared to most weapon

48:32

systems. Loki was actually conceived as

48:35

a kind of speedrun experiment to see how

48:38

quickly the Swedes could evaluate and

48:40

deliver a new CUAS system. And the

48:42

experiment definitely seems to have

48:44

worked. What began as a defense industry

48:47

demonstration turned into an intense

48:49

3-month sprint to deliver a mobile

48:51

adaptable system to the Swedish Air

48:53

Force's combat units. Evaluation began

48:56

in January 2025 and less than 3 months

49:00

later, working units were delivered

49:02

ready for testing in the field. That's

49:04

genuinely quite a feat of modern

49:06

military engineering. So, how did they

49:08

do it? Well, according to Carl Johan

49:11

Bergholm, senior vice president and head

49:14

of SA surveillance business area, since

49:16

this wasn't a typical product

49:18

development cycle spanning several

49:20

years, we had to think outside the box

49:22

and take an innovative approach to

49:23

overcome this challenge by cleverly

49:26

repurposing existing products and

49:28

integrating new features and

49:29

technologies. We brought the concept

49:31

together at record speed. Now, having a

49:34

stack of world-class components on the

49:36

shelf ready to be integrated into the

49:38

new system no doubt helps significantly.

49:40

Of course, it's one thing to deliver a

49:42

prototype. It still has to prove itself

49:45

on the battlefield. And in Loki's case,

49:47

it already has. In September 2025, SA

49:51

confirmed that Loki had been deployed

49:53

for the past 6 months in Poland. It had

49:56

been used at the Malborg air base where

49:58

Swedish forces from the 21st wing and

50:00

later the 17th wing had been on NATO

50:03

assignment. Their task was primarily

50:05

securing Allied facilities including a

50:07

logistics hub central to the transfer of

50:10

military aid to Ukraine. So how did it

50:13

perform? The official word is well

50:15

pragmatic and understated. As you might

50:18

expect from a Swedish officer, effective

50:20

air operations require robust ground

50:22

protection. The systems we deployed

50:24

significantly strengthened base security

50:27

both for us and our allies, said

50:29

Lieutenant Colonel Christian Berlesen,

50:31

commander of the Swedish contingent in

50:33

Poland. Photos of the system give us a

50:36

bit more detail. Markings on the system

50:38

indicate successful interceptions of 36

50:41

quadcopter type drones and 17 fixedwing

50:44

UAVs during the radar tests. The photos

50:47

also reveal the MacGyver like

50:48

construction of the system. The radar

50:50

was simply mounted on a pallet and

50:52

secured with elastic tie downs. The

50:55

power supply was also arranged simply

50:56

and practically with wires routed

50:58

through an extension cord likely

51:00

connected to a generator. Next to the

51:02

radar is a red container equipped with

51:05

antennas, clearly the jamming box. It

51:07

hasn't been painted, likely reflecting

51:09

the project's emphasis on speed rather

51:12

than refinement. Now on the one hand

51:14

that focus might present some issues for

51:17

SAR as it markets the Loki around the

51:19

world. The system is now being trained

51:21

at the platoon level by the Swedish 21st

51:24

Wing with full integration into combat

51:26

units planned by the end of 2025. But

51:29

NATO integration requires a stricter set

51:32

of standards such as regulatory wiring

51:34

practices. By the looks of these early

51:36

models, some elements will likely need

51:38

to be tidied up before they can be more

51:40

widely deployed. But on the other hand,

51:42

the collaborative spirit and agile

51:44

approach employed in developing Loki

51:46

could serve as a blueprint for future

51:48

projects or even a shift in NATO

51:50

doctrine. As Swedish Air Force Chief

51:53

Major General Ununas Wickman puts it,

51:55

"This is a clear example of how we are

51:58

building the capabilities required and

52:00

that we're prepared to deviate from

52:01

normal processes to meet today's threats

52:04

quickly. We need to constantly evolve

52:06

and find fast and competent solutions to

52:08

build a stronger air force." Now, we

52:10

don't know how much it costs, but Loki

52:12

is scalable and adaptable to evolving

52:15

threats since it can be further enhanced

52:17

with additional sensors and weapon

52:19

stations as required. It can even

52:21

operate during redeployment, providing

52:23

continuous protection while on the move.

52:25

It slots effortlessly into layered air

52:28

defenses and is designed for expanding

52:30

integrations and interoperability with

52:32

other systems. How many other systems

52:34

can NATO say that about? Those features

52:37

could be a critical factor in the years

52:39

ahead. The humble Iranian Shahed drone

52:41

has changed warfare to the extent that

52:44

even the US was compelled to reverse

52:45

engineer it to quickly create an analog

52:48

of its own. Nothing can match the power

52:50

of high-end systems like the Patriot and

52:52

THAAD to detect and destroy inbound

52:54

aerial arrivals. But Ukraine alone could

52:57

swallow an entire year's production of

52:58

Pac 3 missiles in a matter of months if

53:01

it could get its hands on them. Maybe

53:03

the face of warfare is changing so fast

53:05

that the age-old, lengthy, but lucrative

53:07

defense production cycle just isn't

53:09

sustainable anymore. It's too expensive

53:12

and way too slow. This is a brand new

53:15

US-made system that's never been seen in

53:18

action before. And it's reportedly

53:20

achieving great success in bringing down

53:22

Russian longrange German attack drones

53:25

in Ukraine, the Tempest. So, let's take

53:28

a closer look at this system and the

53:30

unique role it could fill in Ukraine's

53:32

anti- drone air defenses. When Russia

53:35

first invaded Ukraine in February 2022,

53:38

unmanned airborne vehicles were an

53:41

ancillary aspect of warfare used

53:43

primarily for reconnaissance and

53:45

standoff strikes. But in less than 4

53:47

years, they've become critical elements

53:50

of both offense and defense for both

53:52

Russia and Ukraine. On the front lines,

53:56

kamicazi FPV drones of both the GPS and

53:59

fiber optic guided varieties dominate

54:02

the skies, making any form of movement

54:04

extremely dangerous. And deep in the

54:06

rear of both nations front lines, long

54:09

range attack drones like Russia's Geran

54:12

family of loitering munitions and

54:14

Ukraine's FP1 re down hell on critical

54:17

infrastructure like power stations and

54:20

ports. Russia's relentless attacks on

54:23

Ukrainian energy infrastructure with

54:25

missiles and gerons has left major

54:28

cities like Keev, Khkefe, Nepro and

54:30

Odessa in the dark without heat or water

54:33

for extended periods in the middle of a

54:35

frozen winter. So stopping these nightly

54:38

bombardments has never been more

54:40

critical. And now Ukraine has a fearsome

54:43

new arrow in its quiver. In early

54:46

January 2026,

54:49

Ukraine's Air Force Command Center

54:51

released a video showing the Tempest

54:53

system in action, proving that at least

54:55

one such system was on active duty in

54:58

Ukraine with the Air Force the likeliest

55:00

operator. Interestingly, a heavily

55:03

blurred version of the same video was

55:04

released the previous October,

55:06

suggesting that the system had been in

55:08

use in Ukraine for several months before

55:11

its use was confirmed publicly. The

55:13

Tempest system made by the Virginia

55:15

based defense contractor V2X was only

55:19

unveiled in October at the Association

55:21

of the United States Army or AUSA

55:24

exhibition in Washington. No official

55:27

announcement of the supply of the system

55:29

to Ukraine has been made by the company

55:32

or US military sources. However, the

55:35

fact that a western weapon system has

55:37

been covertly tested or put into service

55:40

with the Ukrainian armed forces is

55:42

hardly an isolated case or

55:44

controversial. Since Russia's invasion

55:47

began, numerous Western companies have

55:50

exposed their prototypes and emerging

55:52

systems to actual combat in Ukraine, a

55:55

situation that's evolved from ad hoc to

55:58

official. In July 2025, Ukraine's

56:01

foremost defense innovation cluster,

56:04

Brave 1, announced the launch of a new

56:06

program called Test in Ukraine that

56:09

allows foreign companies to test

56:11

military technologies on the

56:12

battlefield. According to Brave 1, the

56:15

initiative allows foreign companies and

56:17

governments to create solutions for real

56:19

war challenges while receiving immediate

56:22

feedback from military personnel and

56:24

improving their products based on combat

56:26

experience. It also streamlines

56:29

procedures for acquiring permits to

56:31

import the gear and addresses practical

56:33

scenarios like what happens when testing

56:36

equipment gets damaged or destroyed

56:38

during battlefield trials. So it's

56:41

unsurprising that a system like the

56:43

Tempest has been covertly put through

56:45

its paces in Ukraine like so many other

56:48

weapon systems. Not all of these

56:50

experiments work out. For example,

56:53

Ukraine recently pulled the plug on new

56:55

orders for HX2 strike drones from German

56:58

defense startup Heling. The HX2 was

57:02

designed to operate autonomously using

57:04

AI for terminal guidance, midcourse

57:06

navigation, and visual target

57:09

acquisition. However, despite previously

57:12

announced plans to acquire up to 6,000

57:14

of them, they reportedly failed to meet

57:16

expectations during frontline testing by

57:19

Ukraine's 14th regiment. Although

57:22

refuted by Helsing, the Ukrainian forces

57:24

reported issues with takeoff, a lack of

57:27

promised AI features and vulnerability

57:29

to electronic warfare jamming which

57:31

disrupted communication with operators.

57:34

Based on the limited information

57:36

available about its performance to date,

57:38

the Tempest seems to be far more

57:40

effective. In the footage shared by Air

57:43

Force command of the Tempest system in

57:45

operation, an operator identified with

57:47

the call sign shorty says, "As of now,

57:51

our crew has destroyed 21 Shahhead

57:53

drones. The Shahhead 136 is the original

57:57

Iranian drone from which the Geron

57:59

family has been adapted. This machine

58:02

keeps the sky locked down, he says,

58:04

adding that his crew had previously been

58:06

deployed to Ukraine's eastern regions

58:09

where they destroyed all targets they

58:11

attacked there. Now, love watching

58:13

Frontline Tech actually prove itself in

58:15

battle. Hit subscribe to the Military

58:18

Show. We break these systems down while

58:20

they're still smoking. So, what is the

58:23

Tempest system and what makes it such a

58:25

compelling proposition for Ukraine's air

58:28

defenses? In a nutshell, the V2X Tempest

58:31

is a highmobility vehicle with a

58:34

launcher for AGM114 Hellfire missiles

58:37

that have been optimized for a counter

58:39

unmanned aerial systems or CUS role.

58:43

It's understood to fire the longbow

58:45

variant of the missile, which carries a

58:47

20 lb warhead and uses radar instead of

58:50

laser guidance to track and home in on

58:52

targets. The system combines a twin

58:55

longbow launcher with the radar, which

58:58

is placed on a highly mobile, modular,

59:00

and lightweight 4x4 chassis, a Canon

59:03

Maverick X3 SSV by the looks of it.

59:06

According to V2X, the buggy platform is

59:09

built from commercial off-the-shelf or

59:12

coots components, delivering speed,

59:15

modularity, lethal precision, and

59:17

scalability in a lightweight

59:19

configuration tailored for forward

59:21

deployed counter UAS missions. It's a

59:24

design philosophy that emphasizes speed,

59:26

simplicity, and survivability. The 4x4

59:30

chassis means the Tempest can maneuver

59:32

across rugged terrain with ease, keeping

59:35

pace with mechanized infantry or special

59:37

forces units in dynamic environments.

59:40

Its low profile and high agility make it

59:43

ideal for rapid shoot and scoot

59:45

engagements where threats are detected

59:47

and intercepted and the vehicle then

59:49

quickly repositions before the enemy can

59:51

respond with counter battery fire or

59:54

electronic targeting. These shoot and

59:56

scoot capabilities are further enhanced

59:59

by the fire and forget features of the

60:01

longbowow missile that the Tempest

60:03

fires. Originally designed for the US

60:06

Army's AH64D

60:08

and E Apache Longbow attack helicopters,

60:12

it's the most advanced variant in the

60:13

Hellfire missile family. The missile is

60:16

equipped with an active millimeter wave

60:18

radar seeker that enables autonomous

60:21

target acquisition and engagement in all

60:24

weather conditions without requiring

60:26

continuous operator guidance. With a

60:29

range of up to 5 mi, the missile allows

60:31

the Tempest to neutralize larger class 2

60:34

and three drones, loitering munitions,

60:36

and even low-flying helicopters. To keep

60:39

the system compact, efficient, and

60:41

highly focused, B2X opted for a single

60:44

Radert type radar as opposed to a full

60:47

spectrum sensor suite. This makes

60:49

perfect sense given the systems focus

60:51

mission profile. Although a Rader type

60:53

radar is limited to a single direction,

60:56

it provides focus accurate target

60:58

tracking and fire control data for the

61:00

missile system while keeping the

61:02

vehicle's electronic signature low,

61:04

allowing it to remain undetected until

61:07

it's ready to strike. This kind of radar

61:09

is not intended for wide area

61:11

surveillance, but rather to serve as the

61:13

final engagement center, receiving cues

61:16

from external sources in a network's

61:18

battlefield environment. And that's

61:21

exactly the kind of integrated air

61:23

defense setup in which Ukraine is

61:25

deploying it and where it may provide an

61:27

incisive edge to fend off the variety of

61:30

aerial threats posed by Russia which

61:33

range from fighter jets and bombers

61:35

through ballistic and cruise missiles

61:36

fired from land, sea, and air to drones

61:39

of various sizes and ranges. Ukraine's

61:42

air defenses consist of multiple layers.

61:44

At the heart of Ukraine's anti- drone

61:46

wall is a network of detection systems,

61:49

including radar and thermal systems,

61:52

which identify incoming drones, track

61:54

them, and alert the components of the

61:56

wall that shoot them down. These are

61:59

augmented by a network of electronic

62:01

warfare systems, which disrupt drones's

62:04

navigation, forcing them to ground, to

62:06

miss their intended targets, or even in

62:09

some cases to return to sender in

62:11

Russia. In terms of shooting the drones

62:14

down, the first layer is Ukraine's

62:16

fighter jets, including Soviet era

62:18

Sue27s and its US-made F-16s and French

62:22

Mirage 2000s. Missiles fired from these

62:25

jets have proven pretty effective at

62:28

taking down high value arrivals like

62:30

cruise and ballistic missiles. However,

62:33

Ukraine has few of them. They're

62:35

expensive to operate and maintain.

62:37

stockpiles of the missiles they fire are

62:39

in short supply and they're not

62:41

cost-effective solutions against Russian

62:43

drones that are much cheaper. The next

62:46

layer is Ukraine's network of

62:48

traditional missilebased air defense

62:50

systems such as its US-made MIM104

62:53

Patriot and German Iris T systems.

62:56

They've proven effective against

62:58

incoming high value missiles and drones

63:00

alike and are typically placed to

63:02

protect Ukraine's key cities and

63:04

infrastructure.

63:05

However, much like the fighter jet

63:08

situation, these high-end launchers and

63:10

the missiles they fire are also limited

63:12

in number both inside Ukraine and in the

63:15

stock piles of its allies. The missiles

63:18

themselves can also be much costlier

63:20

than gerands, making them a far from

63:22

ideal solution for bringing down these

63:24

noisy destructive pests. At the base of

63:27

the layered anti-defense network are

63:29

mobile fire groups. These are

63:31

essentially small mobile units on

63:33

vehicles mounted with heavy machine

63:35

guns. They're numerous, highly mobile,

63:38

quick to deploy, and systems like the

63:40

German Flak Panzer Japard have proven

63:43

very effective at bringing down common

63:45

Jiren variants along with a plethora of

63:47

other Russian reconnaissance drones and

63:49

loitering munitions. The Japard features

63:52

twin 35 mm Ericon KDA autoc cannons

63:56

firing a combined rate of 1,100 rounds

63:59

per minute. Paired with an S-band

64:01

surveillance radar with a detection

64:03

range of roughly 9 miles and a coup

64:06

tracking radar, it's ideally suited for

64:08

engaging fastmoving low-flying drones

64:11

like the Jiren and Jiren 2 variants. The

64:14

Japard fires high explosive and

64:16

subcaliber 35 mm ammunition that

64:19

detonates near the target or tears

64:21

through it at extreme velocity, creating

64:23

a dense cloud of fragments in the

64:25

drone's flight path. The result is a

64:28

very high probability of kill against

64:30

drones and loitering munitions. More

64:32

importantly, a single ahead shell is

64:35

estimated to cost around $1,000 compared

64:38

to gerons which are estimated to cost

64:40

between 20,000 and $100,000 depending on

64:44

the variant, warhead, and other included

64:46

features. This ammunition is also much

64:49

more plentiful and quick to produce than

64:51

interceptor missiles. That means

64:54

compared to missile-based systems, the

64:56

Jetard offers a low cost to kill ratio,

64:59

allowing Ukraine to preserve its limited

65:01

and expensive missile stocks for higher

65:04

impact threats like Iscanda arrivals. As

65:07

a result of these advantages, the

65:09

Jeepard and other similar mobile machine

65:12

gunbased systems have become key

65:14

components of Ukraine's anti- drone

65:16

defense. However, there are limits.

65:19

While they're quick and cost-effective

65:21

to deploy and thus ideal for shoot and

65:23

scoot operations, machine guns are only

65:26

able to engage targets at limited

65:28

altitudes and relatively low speeds.

65:31

They're perfect for defending against

65:32

the standard low-flying moderate speed

65:35

Jiren ones and twos. However, in recent

65:38

months, Russians have adapted Jirens to

65:40

fly at much higher altitudes beyond the

65:42

range of machine guns. The newer Jiren 3

65:45

drones are also jet powered as compared

65:47

to the propeller-driven earlier

65:49

iterations, greatly increasing their

65:51

cruising speed and making it harder for

65:54

slower moving bullets and shells to

65:55

bring them down. In addition to a dozen

65:58

or more Russian missiles, Ukraine's air

66:00

defenses must contend with anywhere from

66:03

100 to 600 long range drones on a

66:06

nightly basis. Many of those are much

66:08

cheaper gabbera decoy drones

66:10

specifically designed to distract and

66:12

use up precious air defenses with

66:15

payload bearing gerons flying through

66:16

the gap that process creates. If these

66:19

drones are flying beyond the reach of

66:21

its gun-based defenses, Ukraine is

66:23

basically left with two bad options.

66:26

Using its limited and expensive missiles

66:28

to bring them down or bracing for

66:30

impact. It's a tricky challenge for

66:33

Ukraine to overcome. It needs a drone

66:35

killer that has the range of an

66:36

interceptor missile, but is as quick and

66:39

cost effective to produce as a shell. In

66:41

response to this challenge, Ukraine has

66:44

introduced a new layer to its anti-

66:46

drone war. And it's arguably the one

66:48

with the most promise, interceptor

66:50

drones. In essence, this involves using

66:52

small, cheap, high-speed drones to shoot

66:55

down the much larger gerons and other

66:57

Russian loitering munitions like the

66:59

BM35 Ital. It's an ingenious solution

67:03

that solves both parts of the challenge.

67:05

Firstly, the drones being used as Jiren

67:08

killing projectiles are essentially

67:09

modified FPV drones of the type in

67:12

ubiquitous use by Ukraine on the front

67:14

lines. Ukraine has reportedly been

67:17

producing hundreds of thousands of these

67:18

drones monthly since 2024. So, producing

67:22

thousands of interceptor drones monthly

67:25

is not only extremely doable, but for

67:27

the most part without foreign

67:28

assistance. These interceptor drones

67:31

also typically only cost $3,000 to

67:34

$5,000 to produce. That may be several

67:36

times more than a jetard shell, but it's

67:39

several times cheaper still than even a

67:40

low-end $20,000 Jiren. With a new

67:43

improved jet powered Jiren 3 and Jiren 5

67:46

variants, estimated to cost upwards of

67:48

$100,000.

67:50

These cheap interceptor drones are a

67:52

seriously cost-effective way to take

67:54

them out. The available evidence

67:56

suggests they're also pretty effective

67:58

with an average success rate of 68%

68:02

according to President Vladimir

68:03

Zalinski. In July, he set a target of

68:06

production of 1,500 FPVt type

68:09

interceptor drones a day and by the end

68:12

of the year that target had reportedly

68:14

been met. It's an impressive feat and

68:16

one that likely enables Ukraine to build

68:18

up a stockpile. Although Russia

68:20

reportedly has the capacity to pump out

68:23

500 gerons and gabberas a day, it

68:26

typically only uses a fraction of those

68:28

in its nightly raids, meaning it's

68:30

almost certainly building up a stockpile

68:32

itself. If Russia ever decides to launch

68:34

the mega strikes involving thousands of

68:37

Jirens that have often been predicted

68:39

but never materialized, a large

68:41

stockpile of interceptor drones will be

68:43

worth its weight in gold. Indeed, with

68:46

so much focus on interceptor drones in

68:48

Ukraine these days, and in light of its

68:51

wellocumented struggles to reliably

68:53

secure high-end systems and interceptor

68:56

missiles from partners, where does the

68:58

Tempest fit into its air defense matrix?

69:01

Well, for starters, it's unclear just

69:03

how many Tempest systems Ukraine already

69:06

has. The footage revealed so far only

69:08

verifies a single system, and given how

69:11

new the system is in general, it's

69:13

highly unlikely that there are more than

69:15

a couple of Tempest in active service

69:17

with the Ukrainian armed forces at

69:19

present. Still, if it's as effective as

69:22

Shorty says it is, and if it's deployed

69:24

at scale, it could slot neatly into

69:26

Ukraine's air defenses as another

69:28

oblique layer. If interceptor drones

69:31

filled the gap between missiles and

69:33

guns, the Tempest mobility and

69:35

ruggedness could fill a gap between

69:36

interceptor drones and Ukraine's

69:38

existing high-end missile-based air

69:41

defense systems. For the most part,

69:43

Ukraine's Patriot, Iris T, and other

69:46

high-end land-based systems are kept

69:48

well away from the front lines. They

69:50

guard key cities and facilities in the

69:52

rear from Russian Iscander, Caliber,

69:55

Kinszal, and KH 101 missile strikes and

69:58

are used sparingly due to the ongoing

70:00

shortage of replacement interceptor

70:02

missiles. Ukraine's jards and other

70:05

machine gunbased mobile defenses are

70:08

also predominantly found in the rear,

70:10

protecting the same cities from the

70:11

girens that typically accompany the

70:13

missile strikes. The fact that they're

70:15

vehicle mounted gives them shoot and

70:17

scoot capabilities that would make them

70:19

just as effective on the front lines.

70:21

But that's not where Russia tends to

70:23

target its girens. Russia primarily uses

70:26

fablide bombs, fiber optic FPV drones

70:30

and artillery on the front lines, not

70:32

loitering munitions. Girens are for

70:34

power stations, ships loaded with

70:36

Ukrainian grain and multi-story

70:39

apartment buildings far from the meat

70:41

grinder of the front lines. Now, in the

70:44

same rear high value defense setting,

70:46

the Tempest would likely only add

70:48

marginal value to Ukraine's air

70:50

defenses, especially in places where

70:52

Patriot or Iris T systems are also in

70:55

place. The Tempest's Longbow missile

70:58

only has a range of around 5 mi compared

71:01

to the Patriot Pack 3's 112 mi and Iris

71:04

TLM's 25 mi. Its effective altitude is

71:09

also significantly lower, 20,000 ft, as

71:12

compared to the PAC 3's 120,000 ft and

71:15

the SLM's 66,000 ft. So, they're only

71:19

really effective against low altitude

71:21

targets and offer a much shorter

71:23

engagement window than their more

71:25

illustrious counterparts. Then again, at

71:27

less than $150,000

71:30

each, long bows are two to four times

71:32

cheaper than SLM missiles and much, much

71:35

cheaper than Pack 3es, which go for $4

71:37

to $7 million each. They're also likely

71:40

to be substantial stockpiles of Hellfire

71:43

missiles available for use with Tempest.

71:45

By 2021, more than 87,000 Hellfires of

71:49

all variants had been produced, with

71:51

estimates suggesting that roughly 10,000

71:54

to 14,000 of those were AGM114L

71:57

longbow missiles specifically, and many

72:00

of those appear yet to be expended. But

72:02

with more cost-effective jets and

72:04

interceptor drones also in the mix for

72:06

targeting low-flying gerons, it's hard

72:09

to make a case for mass deployment of

72:10

Tempest in a rear setting. However, on

72:13

and close to the front lines, the

72:15

Tempest might give Ukraine an edge. A

72:18

missilebased air defense system that can

72:20

be quickly deployed almost anywhere,

72:22

fire, and disappear before the Russians

72:24

even know it's there. The missile

72:27

launchers are installed on either side

72:28

of the vehicle's roof, giving the

72:30

Tempest a balanced elevated firing

72:32

platform with wide engagement arcs. The

72:35

Longbow missiles are fire and forget, so

72:38

once they launch, the vehicle doesn't

72:40

need to stay in contact with them,

72:41

dramatically reducing operator exposure

72:44

time. They can fall back almost

72:46

immediately after launch, then rapidly

72:48

rearm and redeploy, making the Tempest

72:51

ideal for the quick and in-n-out

72:53

operation so vital on the battlefield.

72:56

Over and above the mobility provided by

72:58

its 4x4 chassis, the Tempest lightness

73:01

also makes it suitable for frontline

73:03

use. Besides being driven into place, it

73:05

can be deployed from transport aircraft,

73:08

moved by light logistics, and sustained

73:10

with commercially available parts. Add

73:12

it all up and you can see how a fleet of

73:14

several dozen or preferably 100 Tempest

73:17

spread across the front line could make

73:19

a massive difference to Ukraine. They'd

73:22

provide Ukraine with a kind of firstline

73:24

missilebased air defense system,

73:26

enabling it to engage Jirens much closer

73:28

to the front line and thus further than

73:30

their ultimate targets. The Longbow's

73:33

ability to precisely strike land-based

73:35

targets as well as drones means that the

73:37

Tempest would simultaneously provide

73:39

Ukraine with a Himer's kind of option

73:42

with a smaller range and less

73:44

destructive power, but much more

73:46

mobility and less financial impact to

73:48

replace. Like all weapon systems, there

73:51

are of course a few limitations to the

73:53

Tempest, or at least what is known about

73:55

its current early incarnation. The

73:58

radar's narrow field of view means it

74:00

depends on a broader sensor network to

74:02

provide early warning and target data.

74:04

That means it's not entirely

74:06

independent, which can be a

74:08

vulnerability. Also, the Tempest 2

74:11

missile payload means it has limited

74:13

capacity to respond to drone swarm

74:15

attacks unless deployed in numbers or

74:17

paired with additional support systems.

74:20

Still, in the emerging era of

74:22

decentralized fast-paced air warfare,

74:25

these limitations should be seen more as

74:27

tactical constraints than strategic

74:29

flaws at this point. No doubt, like so

74:32

many other weapon systems, the

74:34

capabilities of the current Tempest will

74:36

be refined and enhanced thanks to the

74:38

combat experience gained in Ukraine. If

74:41

it lives up to its initial promise as a

74:43

Jiren killer, we can expect to see the

74:45

Tempest in much wider use, both in

74:48

Ukraine and possibly by the US Army as

74:50

well. We'll of course keep you updated

74:52

with Tempest developments as we do with

74:55

all the most innovative new military

74:57

hardware. So, subscribe to the channel

75:00

so you don't miss out. Thanks for

75:02

watching.

Interactive Summary

Japan and Ukraine have formed a strategic defense partnership, highlighted by the development of the Terra A1 interceptor drone. This collaboration aims to provide a cost-effective solution to Russia's long-range drone bombardment, while deepening geopolitical ties. Simultaneously, Ukraine has utilized Swedish RBS-15 anti-ship missiles, known as the 'Gungnir,' to strike Russian assets in the Black Sea, demonstrating its ability to employ diverse Western technologies effectively. The video further explores advanced counter-drone systems like the modular Swedish Loki and the US-made Tempest, showcasing how rapid innovation and integration are crucial to Ukraine's defense strategy.

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