I think a couple, you know, sitting

through all the sessions, a couple of

terms I've heard recurring through all

the discussions that we've had so far.

Supply chains, energy security. I think

we can all agree that energy security

and the global energy supply chains are

really have really faced a period of

profound disruptions, rapid

technological changes, heightened market

volatility, shifting political parities

are all reshaping the energy landscape

at every level. And these shifts are not

only changing how energy will be

produced, transported, and consumed, but

also how investors, governments, and

corporations are thinking about risk,

resilience, and opportunity in the in

the global supply chain for energy.

And we tracked the money and the

investment that's going into the global

clean energy supply chain, and in 2025,

we have tracked that about 127 US

billion dollars have gone into clean

energy supply chain, which is up about

6% year-on-year. And this is no longer

just a niche manufacturing story that we

see playing out in China, but a wider

capital allocation theme that's playing

out across a broader set of geographies.

Government wants control of technology,

they want jobs, they want supply chain

security, uh and the composition of the

investments is also changing, which

really gives us an insight into what is

top of minds uh

for for the industry. And last year,

about half of the investments went into

battery manufacturing. Um what we see

the investments that go into the

production of battery metals, which is

lithium, cobalt, and nickel, is also

growing, but the share of solar have

really fallen quite significantly from

its peak in 2023.

So, governments and corporations are

rethinking what energy security means

and how do they define energy security?

In the past, the question was pretty

straightforward. Do we have enough

access to coal, oil, and gas, and can we

get them to go where we you to

in time, affordably, reliably, and at

scale. This is a question that's now

increasingly difficult to answer and

increasingly difficult to plan about.

And the Strait of Hormuz really

highlighted how exposed the global oil

and gas supply chains are again. The

destruction of the the Strait of Hormuz

took out about 20 20% of global

liquefied natural gas supply and about

30% of global seaborne crude oil trade.

And about 80 to 90% of those actually

came are destined for Asia with China

accounting for more than a third alone.

And what [snorts]

started as an initial regional conflict

quickly escalated into a global energy

supply chain threat. In the wake of the

Gulf conflict, which unfortunately still

playing out, fossil fuel prices really

took to the sky reaching about 1.4 to

1.6 times of prices that we saw in

January of 2025.

And this escalating Middle East conflict

really highlights how continued fossil

fuel dependence could pose a threat to

global economy. And nowhere is that more

evident than in emerging economies such

as here around the Asia Pacific.

Where higher prices means higher cost

for power generation, industry, and

transport. And energy security is no

longer just about physical supply

because what even when cargoes do

arrive, affordability becomes a very

real concern. For governments, this

could mean increased fiscal pressures.

For corporations, this could mean

pressure on margins and cost

competitiveness.

You know, many markets here, especially

around in Southeast Asia, in China, and

India are still very heavily relying on

coal. And this has prompted a discussion

of could we see a comeback of coal as

part of the energy security question?

And while coal could provide a buffer in

the short term for countries that

dependent on the input of coal as a fuel

does not actually resolve the underlying

energy security concerns. And this point

was again recently underscored by

discussions in Indonesia, where there

were talks of potentially consolidating

coal exports under a state-owned entity.

And this adds another layer of

uncertainty for coal buyers.

Instead, what we think is that the

conflict in the Middle East could

actually accelerate the energy

transition because it reframes the

energy transition from this country from

just a climate policy choice to an

energy security and affordability

strategy.

And this is also highlighted in our BNEF

latest annual new energy outlook, which

is our long-term modeling out to 2050 of

how energy systems could evolve under

two scenarios, a least-cost scenario and

a net-zero scenario. And what it really

shows is the faster that economies could

reduce their dependency on fossil fuel

imports, the stronger it could improve

its energy resilience. And across most

major markets, the transition to

low-carbon technology actually sees

their energy inputs as a share of GDP

decline.

So, if the old question was, "How do we

have enough access to fossil fuels and

get them to where we need them to go?"

What are clients increasingly asking?

What's the the industry increasingly

asking? And people are increasingly

asking, "What's our exposure to supply

chains and our exposure to geopolitical

choke holds?"

And so, we took a look at how many times

the terms reshoring, onshoring, and

friend-shoring were mentioned in

Bloomberg news over the years. And we

see that starting from 2022,

um those the mentions of those terms

have gradually increased, but really

spiked into 2025. And then geopolitical

headlines dominated um news

uh the news cycle, and we saw quite a

sharp dip. But what is clear is that

supply chain strategies now a main part

in the mainstream state of of government

corporate

corporate and government policy

discussions.

We also see this in the increased

implementation of protectionist trade

measures such as trade tariffs on

equipment or product that are imported

or other form of trade pressures such as

the European Union's carbon border

adjustment mechanism. To be very clear,

these are two very separate mechanisms.

Trade tariffs are

implemented to encourage domestic

production and to level the playing

field, while the EU's CBAM mechanism is

seeks to address emissions and and

carbon leakage. But what this means is

that it matters now where a product is

produced. It matters how carbon

intensive it is.

Some countries are taking it a step

further by limiting or restricting the

use or import of equipment tied to the

product's market of origin. Take the US

for example. For the Clean Energy

Investment Tax Credit under the One Big

Beautiful Bill Act, they are prohibiting

the use of product or the proportion of

cost tied to what they term as

prohibited foreign entities.

So for for developers, this creates a

much more complicated optimization

problem because your task is no longer

just to procure the cheapest, most

affordable, cost-competitive product. We

now need to know

where this product is made, could it

affect our chances of getting tax uh

credits, uh would the ownership

structure of the factory that produced

this uh create any risk for us in the

future.

And the restriction of Chinese products

in some markets are already reshaping

global trade flow by redirecting supply

to um emerging markets where demand for

affordable clean technologies continue

to rise. And we see that China's export

for lithium ion batteries, uh electric

vehicles, solar, and wind continues to

boom across emerging markets as their

exports to um, developed markets uh,

starts to shrink.

At the same time, despite the surge in

policy attention, we see that onshoring

efforts across markets such as the US,

Australia, uh, and Europe have actually

been slow to materialize. Projects have

either faced cancellations or delays as

they face up cost and demand realities.

And while localization can increase

energy security, uh, it can create jobs,

it can create domestic manufacturing

capabilities, there is a trade-off in

that in that it can also raise near-term

deployment cost. And we have two

examples here. BNEF estimates that to

produce a solar module in the US and the

EU remains quite substantial uh,

substantially more expensive than

producing one in China or Southeast

Asia. And Italy actually provides

another clear example. In their solar

auction, the implementation of the

European Union's uh, Net Zero Industry

Act, where they exclude projects that

were using Chinese-made uh, products

that were made in mainland China or made

by Chinese-owned firms,

led to a average weighted bid price in

that particular auction round that was

17% higher than a previous solar auction

held within the same year but without

the restriction.

And the trade-off becomes even more

persistent due to this global

overcapacity that we're seeing, be it

battery cells uh, across the entire

solar value chain. Current operational

manufacturing capacity is more than

sufficient to meet 2025 demand already.

And what we see is that even though

manufacturing capacities outside of

China continues to grow, cost, supplier

debt, scale continues to favor incumbent

supply chains, and these are advantages

that are very difficult and challenging

to move. So, China's dominance in these

supply chains still remains, uh and

that's a reality that will be difficult

to change in in the near term.

And the last question that people is

asking as well is do we have access to

the metals and critical minerals that we

need to build the future energy systems?

Under BNEF uh new energy outlook

long-term scenario modeling, again, we

see that there will be massive

deployment of these transformative uh

low-carbon technologies. The momentum

for many of them already well underway,

and all of these would have impact on

the demand for energy transition metals.

Uh again, through our transition metals

outlook, we take a look at the impact

and leveraging on our 2025 results, we

see that the metals that are expected to

grow most significantly are all closely

linked to the transport sector. So,

demand for lithium, graphite, uh rare

earth,

manganese are all expected to triple by

2050 because uh EVs need these for their

batteries, they need the rare earth for

the magnets.

And again, if we look at the refined

supply chain of these metals, we can see

China's dominance clearly shows through.

We track 11 energy transition metals,

all of which are exposed to significant

supply chain risk, which we define as if

the top producers controls more than 30%

of global supply. And all but one of

these refined uh supply is dominated by

China. And of course, this has prompted

a lot of response from governments all

around the world. Governments are coming

up with policies, with partnerships such

as the US-Australia framework for

critical minerals. Um Australia, Brazil,

Canada, and Tunisia, South Africa

together hold some of the highest

concentration of these critical

minerals, and these five markets have

together provided about 45 billion of

financial and fiscal incentives in order

to spur uh additional supply chain to

diversify reliance on China itself.

So, resource-rich nations are really now

asking, "What is their potential role in

future global supply chains?"

Governments, corporations are faced with

choices. Do they have to choose between

Do they remain exporters of raw

materials, or do they try to capture

more value by processing and refining

these materials locally before exporting

them?

But, whatever these The question of

risk, resilience, control will be one

that governments and corporations will

need to balance forward. And so, I'm

really looking for the panel that

follows to learn about how we can

redesign ecosystems to be more resilient

in the future. Thank you.