My biggest concern as I said to you then

and I want to share it with the audience

now is that there is a lack of

appreciation amongst my generation or

younger about how lucky we are to have

lived in this relative peace, the long

piece as it's known historically. Right.

>> Uh it's the inner cold war period which

was wonderful. I really enjoyed it. It's

when the great powers ceased funding

opposing sides on insurgencies. So that

uh this is a period when Africa I think

parts of it had doubledigit growth rates

or much higher growth rates and I get it

tiny economies so it takes a while to

get somewhere and now that's over right

Russia had turned inwards to as Putin

was trying to consolidate power and

China had turned inwards with all these

economic reforms. Well now they're

turning outwards and the United States

noticed it's it's not the only big boy

on the block anymore and it's having

palpitations over that one. We got these

very reckless leaders all over the

place.

>> This is the global gambit.

>> Okay. Isn't that what we're doing right

now? Isn't that why I'm asking you?

>> I guess I don't know the answer on what

Putin what Xiinping and Fran France plan

to plan to do. I think anyway.

>> No, that's my point. Like you're talking

about the Europeans needing to have a

better plan. But if they can't plan

based on some degree of speculation,

then what's the point?

>> You're right. Plans contain assumptions.

So you state your assumptions. what they

are and away you go.

>> We've been having a hell of a load of

hypotheses, right? Um during our

conversation,

>> it's you're talking about the future.

How does one know?

>> So, okay, let's talk more about the

past. How much do you think the past of

Russian relations with China can define

the future of them?

>> I've done an entire podcast on Russia

and Chinese relations that sum up what

little I know on the subject. And for

many years, Russia was strong and in the

driver's seat. And now China's strong

and Russia's uh in the receiving end of

that relationship.

And

uh the reversal is a combination of

Russia's implosion and China's rise.

Right. And

uh it will uh

it uh it's it's not a good position for

Russia to be in. And then it's um

isolating itself completely from the

west. then throws it uh right at at

China's mercy. And don't expect I don't

think China has ever been merciful.

>> Why? But why would China care? More

specifically, they're a

>> care about what about uh about

>> uh holding all the cards visa v Russia.

Of course you like holding cards visa v

Russia,

>> but they're not they're indifferent to

who leads the country. Look at Iran

right now. They don't care whether the

regime topples as long as they get what

they want. As long as they

>> Yeah. Well, we're talking about whether

they're going to get what they want from

Russia, and I'm suggesting they probably

will.

>> Yes, of course. But to what how much

does that depend on what state Russia is

in? How much does that depend on the

person?

>> Oh, the weaker Russia is, the better

from Chinese. I mean, in terms of what

leverage you have over them. Um, but

understand that getting what you want

and it has two parts to that equation.

One is the competence of your own

strategy. So that lies within your own

department and it also depends on the

incompetence of the other side and

something you do not control. And be

aware if the other side's very

competent, you're going to have

troubles.

>> But to be devil's advocate on that, the

Chinese aren't free of their own

challenges.

>> No, no, they are. Nor's Russia. And

they're just I gave you the math on

their relative GMPs, GDPs. Uh China's

just got a much bigger piggy bank to go

spend money to do things than Russia

does.

>> No, for sure. Look, look, Russia's

longevity in its current form is a

ticking time bomb. It's a matter of

time. But this is why it's important to

>> who knows, think of think of North

Korea.

It amazes me how long that dystopian

mess, the Kim dynasty can remain in

power. It just seems to be endless.

>> So, so at what point does strategic

dependence for Russia turn into

strategic vulnerability?

>> I think the strategic dependence is a

strategic vulnerability. So you don't

think there comes a point where we're

already past the point of too far for

Russia. There's no they can't reverse

their dependency or

>> Oh another concept pivotal errors. If

you make we all make errors but if you

make a pivotal error I'm just it's a

term um that I cooked up uh probably

based on somebody else's whatever that I

don't even remember. It's there's no

going back to the status quo ante and

the voice choices following your pivotal

error are much worse than the ones you

had before going in. So Japan's attack

on Pearl Harbor pivotal error because

they're in a world of hurt afterwards

and it's it's going to be it's going to

be much worse than before having done

that. Vladimir Putin uh if he had just

kept with I got Crimea

uh at no cost uh and quit right there uh

he would have been he would have gotten

his Nordstream 2 in and be making all

kinds of money that way. It's over. He's

made a pivotal error. There's there's

just no going back. The choices going

forward for Russians are worse and worse

and worse. So, uh good strategists try

to avoid pivotal errors. And what I

worry about as an American is whether

the United States is about to make a

pivotal error. Going after Greenland

would be a pivotal error for the United

States.

>> Okay. No, that that's fair. Um but okay,

just to on the Cen Russo dynamic, the

thing that interests me is that the

worse things get, the more desperate

Putin becomes.

>> Oh yeah. Yeah. He's on death ground.

Another concept from Sunza, death

ground. It means you are in such rotten

shape that your only hope of survival

and it's not a really high hope is to

fight. And so for Putin personally,

that's why he's going to double down

because if he goes, "Oh, gee whiz, I

made a mistake, boys. Can't we back out

of this one?" Uh, he's dead man, right?

I would imagine.

Uh, and so he's not going to do that,

I believe. And then I'm speculating, but

I think I got pretty high odds on this

one. But on all speculation, you make a

hypothesis and then you keep examining

it. And when the data suggests

hypothesis is wrong, by all means change

your hypothesis. Uh so death ground is

an important one. You can also flip

death ground on Ukraine because it's not

just that if Ukraine

uh capitulates, not only is Suzinski a

dead man, but the Ukrainian people are

dead people. The number of people who

would be systematically murdered and

their culture would be gone is huge in a

culture affects everybody. And so if you

do that to other people, you get you

galvanize the most incredible opposing

alliance so that even a failed country

be can become a very competent

adversary. And a previous example of

that is Hitler with his genocidal plans

that turns Russia, which is basically a

failed state after all this

collectivization and shooting the Soviet

Union after shooting the general staff

and other people. It turns them into a

lethal adversary and it galvanizes the

alliance from hell that takes care of

Adolf Hitler. So death ground, it's a

good concept to play around and go who's

on death ground and who's not. the

Russian people are not on death ground

uh whereas Ukrainian people are the

value of victory that what's called

value of the object another uh concept

is much higher for Ukrainians generally

than for Russians for Russians it's like

a it it'll be a feel-good moment if they

could actually win whatever they define

win in Ukraine is but for Ukraine it's

existential so they will never give up

and the Russians are just going to be

they're they're on a trajectory to wind

up like North Korea. Give it a

generation or two.

>> Well, it sounds to me like you're

describing the wondrous trinity or

aspects of it.

>> The wondous trinity clash with

>> the idea of the rationality of Putin,

the hatred for his people,

>> the probability of the military

imploding. How much does that play

relevance to

>> Oh, the trinity or you can what is it?

It's uh the government, the people in

the military or associated with certain

abstractions, passions for the people,

rationality for the government,

creativity for the military, although

it's only most closely associated. But

anyway, you can use that triangle as a

framework to do an assessment on another

society and it's a useful framework to

use. And then others, I think it was

Michael Handel, a a long departed

colleague of mine at the Naval War

College who said there should be a

fourth item that because Claus was

before the industrial revolution that

should be technology or something,

technology, economics or something and

to make it a quadrilateral instead of a

triangle and I don't know what his

abstraction would be associated with the

economy. Who knows? Hard work. I don't

know.

>> I think the tech one is is important.

>> Yeah. Well, that way Michael Handel

would say you need all four. But there

are various ways you can assess another

country. The trinity is one way. It's

good. You do my trinity, their trinity,

strengths and weaknesses for both.

That's one way of assessing things.

>> Um

>> well, what about I don't know the the

center of gravity then or the relevance

of decisive. So for center of gravity I

think for Clausowitz the idea and then

you can go is it in physics there's one

but um as you're playing around with it

in politics or something else I think

it's the idea it's like the item that if

you detonate it the whole structure goes

like if you're trying to detonate a

building if you could figure out exactly

where to lay the charge the whole

building would go. And so this is where

people think if they hit a center of

gravity presupposing one even exists um

that they would uh win the war

operationally

and you know but whether you achieve

your strategic effect uh objective would

be another matter entirely. But then the

question is um with centers of gravity

it lends you to think of only one

instrument of national power

>> thinking or one military target when in

fact uh what holds up a society may be a

whole network of different things anyway

>> how much

>> it's a concept it's interesting concept

>> but how much does it apply or say

concepts apply to the current

circumstances All

right. I have um I am no great reader of

Jaine. I've read uh passages of him in

other people's books, but my impression

of him he's very operationally minded uh

about just massing armies and going for

military objectives and

uh I think it's Michael Handles this is

my former colleague reading of

Clausowitz where he emphasizes the

importance of objectives and

particularly limited and unlimited

objectives. I think this is Michael

Handel's interpretation of Clauswoods,

but some Clauswitz

uh expert can feel free to take me out.

But um I think those two are useful

concepts because a limited an unlimited

objective is when you're going to do

regime change on the defeated and the

most unlimited sort of objective is when

you're going to also commit genocide on

the defeated people, right?

But limited objectives are something a

whole continuum of things where the

defeated government's going to still be

in power. And there's a whole continuum

of what the objective is. Is it going to

be take a little bit of territory? Is it

you're just negotiating some trade deal?

Is it they stole your bullion and

they're going to give your bullion back?

There's a whole continuum of what these

limited objectives are. But the basic uh

discriminator of limited and unlimited

is very useful I think because the

unlimited objective puts

uh the country that is a target of the

unlimited objective on death ground

which means they're going to fight to

the death and it it's transformative on

how a country will fight whereas a

limited objective

uh doesn't put the other side on death

ground and how hard they fight may be

quite may not be that hard. So when

you're doing limited and unlimited

objectives, you have to do it for all

parties engaged. It's does party A have

an unlimited party versus B and does B

have an unlimited party uh objective

versus the other. For instance, Putin

certainly has an unlimited objective

against Zilinski and the government and

certainly against the Ukrainian people.

He wants to erase it as a culture.

uh Zalinsky and friends and Ukrainians

generally do not have an unlimited

objective against Russia. They have no

desire to conquer Russia. They want

Russia to stay home. That's it. Just go

away. Um they would, I'm sure, love to

see uh Vladimir Putin dead. Uh but

having Russians stay home would be the

the big thing for Ukrainians and stay

there from now until doomsday. Yeah. So,

it's an unlimited war visa for uh Putin

and it is a limited war for Ukrainians.

It makes uh Russia's wartime objectives

much harder to achieve. They're not

feasible. Ukraines may well could well

be feasible.

>> Well, it's a it's a description. It's a

mixture of the ideological motivations

as it is the practical

ability to achieve them. Right. My

>> Oh, yeah. Well, that's a whole other

thing about objectives is when you're

doing your assessment, you should uh

look at your strengths and weaknesses

and all your enemies strengths and

weaknesses and anybody who might want to

join the party, their strengths and

weaknesses. And then from that, you pick

a feasible objective.

And it's amazing the number of

belligerents who've chosen unfeasible

objectives,

right? My country included. We're going

to create democracy in Afghanistan.

It's not feasible.

No nation building.

>> The Afghanis are not in on that.

>> So do you think that this is a

reflection of the way the world's going

or the western policy military approach

is limited by now?

>> What's the this in your sense? Is this a

reflection this

>> what you're talking about the greater

emphasis on limited object objectives?

>> I'm just giving you a concept that you

can apply backwards and forwards across

time. If you find it useful, use it. if

you don't toss it.

>> But what I'm trying to do is uh

implement it in the real world right

now. We're seeing a

>> part of your assessment um you are back

back when we were talking about what's

speculation and what's not. I would have

part of my assessment regardless what

country I am uh is what are everybody's

objectives? Uh which ones are limited

and unlimited? What's the value of the

object? like how much do they want their

various grab list of objectives and

who's their primary, secondary,

tertiary, adversary and go took put it

all up on the wall and see what aligns.

It'll tell you a great deal about the

world. But let me be more specific

because what I mean is that I I feel

that especially in Europe, I sort of

alluded to it earlier, we need to have a

greater

clarification in our mind about what it

is we want to represent and how we aim

to do that. For a long time, for much of

my lifetime, the West or Europe has

always preached about democracy, rule of

law, but then we're not consistent in

upholding it. We go in and conduct an

illegal war in Iraq. We go in and try

and nation build in Afghanistan, and it

doesn't sustain. And if anything, it

turns the rest of the world, the global

south and whatever against the West. I

like democracy. I like living in Europe

and that sort of thing. It goes to what

we were talking about America. But my

point is that is it not time for us to

have a re-evaluation of how we seek to

conduct ourselves?

>> That's what's going on right now. That's

why it's so profoundly destabilizing.

The old uncertainties,

the old certainties are now uncertain.

And uh in part it's the passing of the

World War II generation who uh because

there were so many veterans uh that were

profoundly influenced by that uh that

they had one way of looking at things

and their children, grandchildren,

great-grandchildren are not informed by

these experiences

and uh are taking a different view of

things and history moves on. Right?

We're in a different situation now and

uh we are in a period of very rapid

technological change which many people

find profoundly destabilizing. At your

age it's like wow the world's my oyster.

All these career possibilities opening

up. I think for older people

>> who are particularly in their 50s or

better who are scared stiff that their

profession is going to disappear and

wondering then what. So it's uh we're in

a profoundly

uh unstable moment and we also have are

in a period when there are reckless

leaders in high places in many uh

important countries across the globe.

And as a historian to me it feels like

the 1930s in really bad ways.

And

so it's um important for all of us to

engage with each other to not do a redo

of a world war. It's such a mess

uh uh going in um that direction.

>> Anyway, you were pretentious times.

Well, yeah, we had our our heartto-heart

before we came on air about, you know,

our concerns, generational

considerations. My biggest concern, as I

said to you then, and I want to share

with the audience now, is that there is

a lack of appreciation amongst my

generation or younger about how lucky we

are to have lived in this relative

piece, the long piece as it's known

historically, right?

>> Oh, it's the inner cold war period,

which was wonderful. I really enjoyed

it. It's when the great powers ceased uh

funding opposing sides on insurgencies.

So that uh this is a period when Africa

I think parts of it had doubledigit

growth rates or much higher growth

rates. I get it tiny economies so it

takes a while to get somewhere. Uh and

now that's over right. uh Russia had

turned inwards to as Putin was trying to

consolidate power and China had turned

inwards with all these economic reforms.

Well, now they're turning outwards and

the United States notices it's not the

only big boy on the block anymore and

it's having palpitations over that one.

And uh we got these very uh reckless

leaders all over the place.

And unlike as I mentioned, I think it

was uh before you got me on the air, uh

of this World War, the the generation

that came off of World War II, both in

the defeated countries and in the

victors, um that uh understood and

didn't don't want another World War. And

they're the ones who uh set up the

prosperity that was incredible in

Europe. And this includes Germans and

Japanese, right? the Japanese economic

miracle. It's after World War II.

Uh and it led to incredible compounding

prosperity.

I think part of the problem, here's

another concept for you. Negative and

positive objectives. So a positive

objective is you make something happen.

So I'm going to take that hill. Either I

do or don't. You see whether I did. A

negative objective is say prevent you

from taking that hill.

Well, if no one takes the hill, some

could argue you were never trying, so I

never achieved anything, right? And so

institutions

are in many ways about negative

objectives, preventing disasters.

And so people see the overhead from them

and the inefficiencies and some of the

corruption and go,

um, look at all of this. But um if

you're going to take down US aid, and

I'm no expert in US aid, but if US aid

by providing aid that prevents uh

something from sparking into a regional

war,

uh that aid is actually really cheap,

but no one's going to be able to prove

that it prevented the inter the regional

war, even though it may well have. And

it's like uh um people get sick of

regulations. Okay. I guess in

Switzerland you've just had a there's

been this terrible fire and a lot of

young people died and that one had to do

I suspect with not enough inspectors

coming through. Um but if the

institutions

inspect then you have no fires like the

one where 40 young people have lost

their lives.

Uh on the other hand, you go, "Well, the

institutions are always expensive. Let's

get rid of them." Well, then you're

going to have all sorts of infolding

disasters

uh on your hands. So, it's about these

negative objectives. They're incredibly

important.

Um but they're unmeasurable and

therefore they're inherently

controversial.

So, people are going to go for the

tactical wins and the clickbait of what

they can get at the tactical and

operational level. Whereas the states

people who are thinking of the next

generation and about these negative

objectives are going to get no credit.

And we think about the real human the

real heroes in uh human life are those

people who averted world wars. We'll

never know who they were or what

decisions they made, but they're the

true heroes.

>> Okay. And so to try and avoid saying it

speculatively, Sally,

>> speculative apparently this this

afternoon. No, I'm just being uh

facitious. But what I mean is my my

question, my followup is what would you

prescribe? How would you assess

therefore the best way to educate people

and to ensure that younger generations

are aware of of what matters? What

>> I don't know the best way. I know that

as an old retired professor, much of my

education provided by national

fellowships that were paid on the

taxpayers's dime. I'm doing my best

uh to provide concepts to people in a

variety of podcasts and this is not

remotely the retirement career I had in

mind right um and it's to share concepts

with others to help them uh make

informed decisions because I'm looking

at the United States and what goes on

right now in the United States it rhymes

with ancient Athens ancient Athens blew

its alliance system by being ever more

coercive with its allies. So, they got

fed up with Athens. And then it got

overextended in a bunch of recreational

wars, things that it didn't have to be

involved in, but it was. And then it had

really um uh dysfunctional domestic

politics where different factions are

going at it and together this destroyed

Athens. You can go visit the Parthonon.

It's beautiful. But to me, it is a mute

symbol of a civilization that destroyed

itself and never recovered. Do not think

that this is a one-off thing for Athens.

This is a human problem that you can do

things from which it's unreoverable. And

I look at the United States now and we

got a bunch of operationally tactically

focused people in both parties running

the show. And they need to get with the

program and start thinking of the next

generation.

before it's too late.

>> Quite the um quite the moment to to to

end on. I was on

>> Good idea.

>> I was I was in the Pathanon in uh in

August. It was a delight to finally

visit it properly. Probably not the best

time to go. It was 40°, but the

principles and symbolism of it still

struck home, Sally. And certainly much

of what you've said uh in this extensive

and very generous uh length of a

podcast. I really appreciate and I hope

it's the first

>> I am devoted to your generation.

Uh I I I'm doing what little I can, but

I believe uh we are in an all hands on

deck moment, Navy terminology, in which

everyone needs to do what they can and

if together we bring out our best ideas

and hear everybody out and certainly

don't uh kill people with whom you

disagree, but hear them out.

uh we'll muddle our way through this.

We're all descendants from people who

did, right? Uh that our uh grandparents

and parents and others uh they made it

through a peaceful end to the cold war.

That is an enormous achievement.

So it's now uh it's now our turn,

particularly people my age, to do

something.

Well, I just hope there's a little bit

more of piping down. Um, but I certainly

bravo Zulo to uh use what limited naval

terms I know from my grandfather in his

time.

>> Oh, they do they use that one in

Britain, too?

>> They did. I'm not sure if it's

>> Oh, they still use it in the US Navy.

>> Well, Bravo Zulu.

>> Oh, yes, they do. Admiral, send it

around. You've got a three-page uh oped.

Bravo Zulu. Okay. It was three pages.

Yep. I am.

>> Well, for our fellow land lovers, uh

they may not know these uh these

detailed terms, but um it's always a

pleasure to uh to speak with you and

people of such intellect.

>> So, thank you very much for that.

>> I got no special intellect. I've just

I'm an old professor. I did what I was

supposed to do. I graded all the papers.

I spent time with students. And I uh

spent my vacations doing research. And

this is what little I know. But I'm not

spe I'm no more special than anybody

else is. And I'm no smarter than anybody

else. I just This is what it looks like

at the end of a career if you spent your

time reading a certain selection of

readings. Anyway, it's been fun. Good

luck with your podcast.

Thank you very much everyone on the

outside. We'll see you all soon.