HomeVideos

When 21 Sikhs Fought 14,000 Afghans...

Now Playing

When 21 Sikhs Fought 14,000 Afghans...

Transcript

607 segments

0:00

It's the morning of September 12th,

0:02

1897.

0:03

And from his small signaling post in the

0:06

Sana mountain range, Isha Singh of the

0:09

36th seek regiment stares out beyond the

0:12

frontier of the British Empire

0:15

towards

0:16

Afghanistan. On both sides, Ishar sees

0:20

the enemy approaching. In the valleys

0:22

north and south of the ridge, the Pton

0:24

fighters of the Aphridi and Ojakai

0:27

tribes are gathering. There are hundreds

0:30

of them. No, thousands.

0:33

And they're all bearing down on Ishar's

0:36

tiny command at Saragari. With less than

0:40

two dozen men at his disposal, Ishar

0:43

cannot hope to hold out against such

0:46

numbers. He needs help, and he needs it

0:49

fast. As the sun climbs higher into the

0:52

sky to the east, Ishar calls to his

0:54

signaler, Sepo Gurmuk Singh. Quickly, he

0:58

says, get the message to Fort Lockhart.

1:00

We need reinforcements now. From his

1:04

signaling tower, Gurmuk relays his

1:06

commander's words along the ridge line.

1:08

As the enemy draws closer, he scans the

1:10

horizon, eagerly, awaiting the reply.

1:13

Within just minutes, it comes. A series

1:16

of mirror flashes from the nearby fort

1:18

tells Gormma everything he needs to

1:20

know. The fort is pinned down. There

1:23

will be no reinforcements.

1:25

No help is coming. Ishar gathers his men

1:29

together. They now have a choice. They

1:31

can attempt to flee, scattering back

1:33

across the jagged ridge to Fort

1:35

Lockheart. Perhaps they'll make it,

1:37

perhaps they won't. Or they can stand

1:41

and they can fight. They choose.

1:44

amazingly enough to fight. And so begins

1:48

one of the most uneven battles in

1:50

military history as 21 seek soldiers

1:53

take on a force of up to 14,000.

2:02

Afghanistan is the graveyard of foreign

2:04

aggressors. The American lev invasion of

2:07

2001 saw eight countries join forces

2:10

with the Afghan Northern Alliance to

2:12

crush the Taliban and root out al-Qaeda.

2:15

The action ended 20 years later with a

2:18

Taliban victory and an ignominious

2:20

retreat. 3,500

2:23

coalition troops lost their lives across

2:25

the campaign as well as perhaps 92,000

2:28

of their Afghan allies. Throughout the

2:30

1980s, the USSR fought a 9-year war

2:33

here, losing at least 14,000 soldiers in

2:36

the process. The war has been described

2:38

as the Soviet Vietnam, but for historian

2:41

William Mey, this does not do it

2:43

justice. The United States survived

2:46

Vietnam, me said. Soviets did not

2:49

survive Afghanistan. So, the soil of

2:52

Afghanistan is rich with foreign blood.

2:54

And in fact, this had been true long,

2:57

long before the Soviets and the

2:59

Americans arrived. For more than a

3:00

century before this, Afghanistan already

3:02

had its reputation. It was the place

3:05

where foreign superpowers came to die.

3:08

The first Anglo Afghan War of 1838 was

3:11

supposed to be a bit of smart

3:13

maneuvering from the British. By taking

3:15

Afghanistan, they would block any

3:17

potential Russian advance towards India.

3:19

But a series of bizarre decisions and

3:21

catastrophic miscalculations ended with

3:24

bitter defeat and the disastrous retreat

3:26

from Kabal in the winter of 1842. That

3:29

retreat ranks alongside the sandalwan

3:32

cartoon as one of the greatest

3:34

humiliations of British colonial

3:36

history. It's definitely a story for

3:38

another time. But some of the images of

3:40

the retreat from Kabul give us an idea

3:42

of what Imperial forces experienced in

3:45

Afghanistan. For example, the image of

3:48

the total destruction of the 44th East

3:51

Essex Regiment at Gandermak as British

3:54

troops were wiped out by Muhammad

3:56

Akbakhan's snipers. Or the image of

3:59

Assistant Surgeon William Briden riding

4:01

alone into Jalalabad, exhausted and half

4:04

dead, with part of his skull sheared off

4:07

by a sword strike. When asked where the

4:09

army was, Brighton apparently replied,

4:12

"I am the army." These images tell us

4:16

something very important. The colonial

4:18

powers of the world could not expect an

4:21

easy ride here. By the 1890s, the

4:24

British understood this well. And so the

4:26

imperial territories of South Asia

4:29

stretched from Balakistan in the west to

4:31

Burma and Malaya in the east and from

4:33

son in the south to Kashmir in the

4:35

north. They did not extend into

4:38

Afghanistan. The northwest frontier

4:41

province represented the very limits of

4:43

the British Empire. Here a string of

4:45

fortresses built by Ranjit Singh of the

4:47

seek empire decades earlier stared out

4:50

at the frontier and into the lands of

4:52

Afghanistan beyond. This was a dangerous

4:55

land. Local past groups carried out

4:58

sporadic attacks on imperial troops. But

5:00

in the main the frontier held firm.

5:02

British Empire troops largely seeks and

5:04

seo from other parts of India had

5:06

succeeded in bringing the land under

5:08

control or at least they thought they

5:10

had. For a while the British opted to

5:13

invest rather than invade. They paid a

5:16

subsidy to the local Ephridi Pushton

5:18

tribes people and in return the Ephreddy

5:20

would protect the nearby Kyber pass the

5:23

critical artery connecting Central and

5:25

South Asia. But in 1897 this fragile

5:29

alliance broke down. The Afridi launched

5:31

a campaign of their own in the past and

5:33

British forces lost control of this key

5:35

strategic asset. Working together with

5:38

the Araxai and Chamani Pashon tribes,

5:40

the Afridi could call on a force of

5:42

50,000 men and could potentially drive

5:45

Britain's Imperial troops back from the

5:47

frontier. Two attacks on Fort Gulstan on

5:50

the Sulleane mountain range on the 3rd

5:52

and 9th of November 1897 were repulsed

5:55

by Imperial troops. But the assaults

5:57

were enough to rattle the British and in

5:59

response they sent a relief column from

6:01

Fort Lockheart on the Somana Range

6:03

several miles away to the east. After

6:05

these defeats, the Paston decided to

6:07

change their tactic. They realized that

6:09

these two forts could not see one

6:11

another and so could not communicate

6:13

directly. The forts depended on a

6:15

signaling post located on the rocky

6:18

ridge between them, the post of

6:21

Saragahi. Saragahi was not undefended

6:24

though. A small garrison at the post was

6:25

led by Havda Isha Singh a Punjabi seek

6:28

who was known for his strong willed

6:30

ferocious attitude. It seems Ishar was

6:33

both an enormous asset to the British

6:35

and also a bit of a pain in the rear

6:37

end. In the words of Major General James

6:40

Lunt, Isha was a somewhat turbulent

6:43

character with an independent nature.

6:46

But General Lunt certainly admired the

6:48

Halvida. He went on to say Isha Singh in

6:52

camp a nuisance in the field

6:55

magnificent.

6:57

Alongside Isha were two other NCOs,

6:59

Corporal La Singh and Lance Corporal

7:01

Chanding. Serving under these three men

7:03

were 18 SEO including the signaler

7:06

Gurmuk Singh. In addition, there was one

7:08

non-combatant, a cook named Dart. This

7:12

meant 22 men in total protecting a

7:15

crucial line of communication between

7:16

the two forts. There's some disagreement

7:19

as to what weaponry these men carried.

7:21

The author J. Singh Soal believes the

7:24

men were armed with state-of-the-art

7:26

Martini Henry rifles. In Singal's words,

7:29

the most efficient rifle of the time,

7:31

robust, accurate, and simple to use.

7:34

Another historian, Amarinda Singh,

7:36

disagrees, though. He believes that the

7:38

seek troops at Sanagahi carried older

7:40

versions of the rifle. It had been

7:42

common practice to give out inferior

7:44

weaponry to native troops to prevent a

7:46

rerun of the mutiny in 1857. Either way,

7:49

the odds were against Ishar and his men.

7:51

The Pastian rebels were using their own

7:53

copies of captured British Martini

7:55

Henry's constructed by their own skilled

7:57

gunsmiths, and they outnumbered the

7:59

Sikhs by more than 500 to one. Even

8:02

worse than this was the ammo situation.

8:04

Ishar's garrison had only 400 rounds of

8:07

ammunition. If this was not enough to

8:09

repulse an attack, they'd need to rely

8:11

upon their bayonets and their strength

8:13

in hand-to-hand face-to-face combat. So,

8:17

when centuries first saw thousands of

8:20

Pton warriors of the Ephridi and Orai

8:23

tribes massing in the valley to the

8:25

north on September 12th, their blood

8:28

must have run cold. Victory was not

8:31

going to be possible here. But neither

8:34

was surrender nor retreat. To quote

8:37

Singh Sahal, "Fleeing or asking for safe

8:39

sanctuary would not have been considered

8:41

an option. Their marshall creed called

8:43

for them to take a stand. From beyond

8:45

the walls of the post, the Pton's tribes

8:48

made overtures to the seed detachment."

8:50

To quote the military historian Push

8:52

Pindar Singh Chopra, the tribesmen

8:55

called to the Seikhs up the hill.

8:57

Listen, why are you fighting us? This is

9:00

not your war. All we want is the British

9:03

out of here. But Isha and his men put

9:06

little stock in these words. The Aphi

9:08

had made and broken many promises

9:11

before. Like the promise to govern the

9:13

Kaiba pass for the empire from the

9:15

perspective of the 36 Sikhs leaving

9:17

their post and throwing themselves at

9:20

the mercy of their enemy was suicide. To

9:23

quote Singh Chopra again, to the

9:25

Afghans, the Seikhs gave a very abusive

9:28

answer. History does not record what

9:30

this crude answer was, but the meaning

9:32

is clear. No surrender today. As the

9:35

tribes gathered beyond the walls of the

9:37

signaling post, Gurmuk Singh took to his

9:39

helioraph signaling device. He sent an

9:42

urgent message to Lieutenant Colonel

9:43

John Horton stationed at Fort Lockheart.

9:46

The message was short and stark. Enemy

9:49

approaching the main gate, need

9:51

reinforcement. Horton's reply was

9:53

similarly concise. Unable to break

9:55

through, hold position. This would have

9:58

sent a shock wave of realization through

10:00

the men at Saragahi. They were going to

10:02

have to fight and very likely die alone.

10:06

But J Singh Sahal believes the men at

10:08

Salagari may have actually retained some

10:11

hope. As he says, Lieutenant Colonel

10:13

Horton was not one to leave a single

10:15

soldier behind, let alone allow the

10:18

strategic communications post to be

10:20

threatened. Help was expected, as was

10:23

reinforcement.

10:25

The question was when that help would

10:28

come, and no one could be sure. By 9:00

10:31

a.m., the Pton had grown tired of

10:33

talking, and they'd launched their first

10:35

assault on the signal post. This meant

10:37

rushing the post from three sides and

10:39

then charging over the broken ground up

10:42

the slopes of the ridge. The remaining

10:44

side was a sheer cliff face and so was

10:46

unassalable. The cliff was both a

10:49

blessing and a curse for the Seikhs. It

10:51

was one less side to defend, sure, but

10:54

it also meant that they were backed into

10:56

a corner. The first assault went badly

10:59

for the past. The seikhs were in a far

11:01

better position and laid down withering

11:03

fire onto the advancing tribesmen. As

11:05

the Pton retreated, they left behind at

11:07

least 60 bodies, lifeless on the

11:10

mountain side, as well as a number of

11:11

wounded. Isha and his men had won round

11:15

one, but they used up 25% of their

11:19

rounds in the process. High in his

11:22

tower, Gurmuk Singh apprised Lieutenant

11:24

Colonel Horton of the situation. The

11:26

first attack had been repulsed, but

11:28

there were more attacks expected.

11:30

Further down the slope, the Pton

11:32

commanders realized this was not going

11:33

to be as easy as they thought. The

11:35

terrain put them at a real disadvantage,

11:38

but they could still use it to help

11:40

shield their advance. The next assaults

11:43

would do exactly that. Crouching behind

11:45

rocks and wriggling across the folds of

11:47

the ground, a new wave of Paston

11:49

fighters advanced on the post. These

11:51

fighters also had another weapon on

11:53

their side. Out there among the dead and

11:56

dying on the ridgeel line lay two

11:58

tribesmen. They were uninjured and ready

12:00

to play a decisive role. As their

12:03

comrades retreated, these two had

12:05

remained, mapping out the defenses and

12:07

spotting potential weak points.

12:09

According to the official report on the

12:11

battle, the two hidden tribesmen quote

12:13

remained close under the walls of the

12:15

northwest bastion where there was a dead

12:17

angle and were quote fully cognizant of

12:21

the defects in the flank defense. This

12:24

northwest wall faced Fort Gullistston a

12:26

short distance away and at Gullistston

12:29

Major D'vor was watching the events at

12:31

Saragahi with great anxiety. To the

12:34

major's horror, he actually saw the two

12:36

Pton saboturs at work. They'd begun

12:39

digging beneath the foundations of the

12:41

post, threatening to undermine the

12:43

structure and breach the defenses. The

12:45

men at Saragahi could not know this. The

12:48

defenders watched the tribesman

12:50

approaching on three sides, taking

12:52

careful aim and making every shot count.

12:55

Fort Galiston's own signaler sent

12:57

message after message across the ridge,

12:59

trying desperately to warn the defenders

13:01

at Saragahi. His mirror glinted sharply

13:04

in the midm morninging sun, but there

13:05

was no response. It's possible that Gmuk

13:08

Singh simply could not see the messages

13:10

relayed from Galis. The past had set

13:13

fire to the brush along the northwest

13:15

side of the post, and by now this had

13:17

spread into a significant blaze. As

13:20

smoke settled like a shroud across the

13:22

northwest ridge, it blotted out the

13:24

signal at Gullis. From his tower, Gurmuk

13:27

Singh could contact Fort Lockheart, but

13:30

not Fort Gulliston. It's also possible

13:32

that Gurm simply could not communicate

13:34

with both forts at once. It usually took

13:37

three men to run a signaling post. One

13:39

to operate the heliggraph signaling

13:40

device, one to interpret the responses,

13:42

and a third to write everything down. It

13:44

seems unlikely that Ishar would have put

13:46

three of his mega command in the tower.

13:49

And instead, it's possible that the

13:51

other two sepo were deployed in fighting

13:53

positions and Gmuk was doing the job of

13:56

three men by himself. Despite the

13:58

difficulties, Gmuk sent a number of

14:00

messages to Fort Lockhart. And these

14:02

messages give us an idea of how

14:03

effectively the Sikhs were fighting. A

14:05

message received at midday stated that

14:08

one of the SEOs had been killed. The

14:10

defenses remained intact, though three

14:12

of their rifles had been damaged by

14:14

gunfire. The first victim of the assault

14:17

is believed to be Sepo Bagwan Singh.

14:20

Rather than leave their comrade out

14:21

there in the midday sun, the seikhs went

14:23

to great efforts to bring Bagwan back to

14:25

the inner buildings. Corporal L Singh

14:28

and Sipo Jiwa Singh apparently carried

14:30

the body of their brother back. The

14:32

corporal may have been seriously wounded

14:35

in this act of honor. Things though were

14:37

about to take a significant turn for the

14:40

worse. The two men secreted beneath the

14:42

northwest wall were still working hard

14:45

to undermine the defenses. Despite their

14:47

mountain casualties, the past would soon

14:50

have a weak point to aim for Lockheart.

14:52

Lieutenant Colonel Horton had a good

14:54

view down into the valley to the north.

14:56

And so his signaler had more bad news

14:58

for the men at Saragahi. There were more

15:02

passion than first realized, perhaps as

15:04

many as 14,000 men who were massing in

15:07

the valleys below and preparing to pour

15:10

up onto the ridge. What's more, Afridi

15:13

and Ojakai snipers were deploying on the

15:15

nearby hillsides, armed with

15:17

longbarreled gazile musketss. These

15:20

snipers could accurately hit targets up

15:23

to 500 m away and could pick off the

15:26

defenders one by one. It was these

15:29

gziles that had been the ruin of the

15:31

British forces half a century before.

15:34

Despite fighting bravely, the Seikks

15:36

were running out of time. Eventually,

15:38

the Pastion were going to overrun the

15:40

signaling post. Horton realized he had

15:43

to make a move. He had to do something

15:45

to help the men at Sagardi. But with his

15:48

own position far from secure, he could

15:50

only spare a few men. 14 troopers of the

15:53

Royal Irish Regiment sied forth from

15:56

Lockheart to snipe at the Pastton from

15:58

afar. The idea was to lure the tribesmen

16:01

away from the post and buy some time for

16:03

the 36th Sikhs. But the Pton did not

16:06

take the bay. Instead, they focused

16:08

their attention on the front gate of the

16:10

signaling post. Those who reached the

16:12

gate attempted to set it on fire,

16:14

burning their way through into the

16:16

compound, but time and time again, their

16:18

attacks were pushed back. The Sikhs were

16:20

holding firm at Saragahi. Perhaps if

16:23

they could keep on stalling the

16:25

tribesmen, they might just be able to

16:27

hold out until relief arrived. But their

16:30

supplies were running low. As the

16:32

non-combatant dad shuttled back and

16:34

forth with water and rifle rounds, it

16:37

became clear the situation was growing

16:39

dire. At 2 p.m., Gummuk Singh signaled,

16:42

"Low on ammo. Need ammo urgently."

16:46

Again, Fort Lockheart could only tell

16:48

the defenders to keep on waiting. Then,

16:51

just after 3 p.m., disaster. After 6

16:54

hours of fighting, the efforts of the

16:57

two hidden diggers came to fruition.

16:59

Major Dvu watched helplessly as the

17:02

northwest wall began to collapse. The

17:05

two diggers began battering the

17:06

fortification with rocks and sticks to

17:08

help the collapse on its way. Quickly, a

17:11

gap appeared in the wall some 7 ft wide.

17:15

And this was what the enemy had been

17:16

hoping for. They let out an almighty

17:19

yell and charged up the hillside. Some

17:22

of the past aimed for the breach in the

17:24

wall while others charged the gate to

17:26

the compound. Now Isha and his men

17:28

understood what was going on. They

17:31

rushed down desperately to defend the

17:33

breach and fought the tribesmen back

17:35

with their bayonets. As Singhow tells

17:37

us, as the tribesmen crowded over their

17:40

own dead and injured to get into

17:41

Saragahi, the few seeks that were left

17:43

inside put up a stubborn defense. Of

17:46

course, it couldn't last. The sheer

17:48

weight of numbers supported by Jezar

17:51

fire from the nearby hills gradually

17:53

pushed the Seikhs back. It's difficult

17:55

to know precisely what happened next.

17:58

It's believed that Ishar Singh now

18:00

ordered his men to retreat to an inner

18:01

perimeter and as his men fell back,

18:04

Ishar covered them by fighting on alone.

18:06

He may have cut down several more

18:08

tribesmen before he himself fell beneath

18:11

their blades. The remaining Sikhs now

18:14

sought out new fighting positions,

18:16

places where they could make their last

18:17

stands. One SEO locked himself in a

18:20

guard room and took pot shots at his

18:22

asalants through loopholes in the wall.

18:24

Paston accounts say that this single SEO

18:27

took out at least 20 of the tribesmen

18:29

with his rifle. When the Paston realized

18:31

they couldn't rush the position, they

18:33

simply set the guard house on fire and

18:35

the SEO died in the flames. The

18:37

remaining Sikhs were now inside the

18:39

tower, fighting a losing battle with the

18:41

tribesmen. As the Pton advanced higher

18:44

and higher, Gormuk Singh remained at his

18:46

post, signaling to Fort Lockheart.

18:48

Gormuk must have known it was nearly all

18:51

over. As he listened from the upper

18:53

floor of the tower, the shouts and

18:55

gunshots from his comrades grew

18:57

increasingly quiet. Meanwhile, the

18:59

voices of the Pton grew closer and

19:02

closer. He sent out his last message to

19:05

Fort Lockheart. Down to one, request

19:09

permission to dismount and join the

19:11

fight. Realizing that all was lost, the

19:14

signal at Lockheart sent out his somber

19:16

reply.

19:18

Permission granted. Barricading himself

19:20

in his signaling shed, Gormuk now took

19:23

up a fighting position. At the start of

19:25

the day, the odds had been 14,000 to 22.

19:30

Now, after almost an entire day of

19:32

bloody struggle, there were perhaps

19:34

around 13,600

19:37

to one. Gome's comrades had slain

19:39

hundreds of tribesmen. But now he must

19:42

face the remnants of that massive force

19:44

all by himself.

19:46

It's possible that Gmuk killed as many

19:49

as 40 of the Afghans. As the tribesmen

19:52

attempted to rush through the choke

19:53

point, he found himself in a strong

19:55

position,

19:57

but he couldn't last. After repeated

19:59

attempts to storm Gormick's stronghold,

20:01

it's believed the Paston decided instead

20:03

to just set fire to the signaling shed

20:06

and burn Goum out. With his final

20:09

moments now growing nearer, Gum yelled

20:11

repeatedly, "Bleshal Satriakal," which

20:15

translates to something like, "One will

20:18

be blessed eternally." Who says that God

20:20

is the ultimate truth? Sing Jal believes

20:24

Gurmuk fought on until he knew all was

20:26

lost. With just a single rifle round

20:29

remaining, he turned the gun on himself

20:31

and put that last bullet through his own

20:33

head. He was

20:36

19 years old.

20:38

The entire garrison including the cook

20:40

dudad now lay dead. The battle of

20:43

Saragahi perhaps the most uneven last

20:46

stand in the history of human conflict

20:48

was over and Ishar's 22 seeks had

20:51

written themselves into the history

20:53

books. It's believed that between 180

20:55

and 450 past died in the assault on

20:58

Sagahi. Some sources put the number as

21:00

high as 1,400, but most agree that this

21:03

is unlikely. While this barely made a

21:06

dent in the 14,000 strong force bearing

21:08

down on the ridge, it did buy some

21:11

significant time for the defenders

21:12

elsewhere. Once the Pton had burned down

21:15

the signaling post, they began advancing

21:17

along the ridge to Gullistston. The fort

21:19

was home to Major Dvau's garrison of

21:21

three officers and 175 seek troops. In

21:25

addition, there were a number of

21:26

civilians at Gullistan, including the

21:28

major's pregnant wife and their

21:29

children. The bloodshed was not over.

21:33

Seek forces would distinguish themselves

21:35

for a second time that day at Galiston

21:37

and they would continue distinguishing

21:39

themselves for the following two days

21:42

before relief finally arrived. The seek

21:45

defenders inflicted massive casualties

21:47

on the advancing tribesmen. Hundreds of

21:50

Pton fell on the approaches to the fort

21:52

while the Seikhs at Gullistan lost only

21:54

two men. The British soldier J. A

21:56

Lindsay had this to say as the

21:58

victorious 36th seek regiment marched

22:01

back along the ridge from Gullistston on

22:03

the morning of September 15th. They

22:06

carried the standards they had captured

22:08

from the enemy. They are a splendid core

22:10

and have made a great name for

22:12

themselves.

22:13

The battle of Saragahi was one of the

22:16

opening engagements in the

22:17

seven-monthlong Ti campaign. By April

22:20

the following year, the British Empire

22:22

forces under William Lockheart and

22:24

Prattup Singh had succeeded in subduing

22:26

the Pton uprising, but at a heavy cost.

22:30

British troops suffered 1,150

22:33

casualties across the campaign, perhaps

22:35

indicative of the attitude towards

22:37

Britain's colonial troops at the time.

22:39

It's unknown how many Indian soldiers

22:41

lost their lives in putting down the

22:43

uprising. Against the bloody backdrop,

22:46

the events of September 12th, 1897 could

22:48

have faded into obscurity. It was a

22:51

relatively small engagement with

22:52

relatively few casualties, and it was a

22:54

rare defeat in an eventual victorious

22:56

British campaign. But the nature of the

22:59

fighting and the astonishing bravery

23:02

shown by those men at Salagahi, hundreds

23:04

of miles from home, ensures that those

23:07

events have never been forgotten. 10

23:09

years later, the Camperound Chronicle

23:11

carried this memorial. The magnificent

23:14

defense of the native soldiers for

23:16

nearly 9 hours until totally annihilated

23:19

was unparalleled in the events of the

23:20

Frontier War of 10 years ago and is now

23:23

historical. September 12th is therefore

23:26

a day memorable in the history of the

23:28

Indian frontier regiments. Up on the

23:31

sunbaked frontier stations, the memory

23:33

of the brave men who fought until death

23:36

for the honor of the British service is

23:38

kept alive by a general holiday on every

23:41

anniversary of the defense. All of the

23:44

defenders were awarded the Indian Order

23:47

of Merit. Their grieving families were

23:49

given 50 acres of land and 500 rupees

23:52

each. To this day, three good rowers

23:55

serve as memorials to the bravery of

23:57

those men. One is at the battle site

23:59

itself with two others at Amitritza and

24:02

Filispur. Selagi Day is still observed

24:04

each year on the anniversary of the

24:06

battle. It is the regimental battle

24:08

honors day of the seek regiment and part

24:11

of their proud history. For General

24:13

Lunt, Isha Singh may have been a

24:15

nuisance in camp, but for some 9 hours

24:18

on September 12th, 1897, the Halvadar

24:21

and his comrades defended the imperial

24:24

frontier with incredible skill and

24:26

bravery. And Queen Victoria herself

24:29

could not have asked for finer men to do

24:32

the job.

Interactive Summary

The Battle of Saragari, fought on September 12th, 1897, is recounted as one of history's most uneven battles. A contingent of 22 Sikh soldiers, led by Havildar Ishar Singh, defended a signaling post in the Saragari mountains against an estimated 14,000 Pashtun fighters. Despite being vastly outnumbered and receiving no reinforcements, the Sikhs mounted a fierce resistance for nearly seven hours. The battle highlights the historical context of Afghanistan as a challenging territory for foreign powers and emphasizes the extraordinary bravery and sacrifice of the Sikh soldiers, who fought until their last man, inflicting significant casualties on the attackers. The defense of Saragari bought crucial time for other British-held forts and is remembered as a testament to unparalleled courage.

Suggested questions

6 ready-made prompts