This is [music] Bloomberg Law with June

Graasso from Bloomberg Radio.

>> It is undisputed that my client has

alleged an assault that is just brazenly

illegal. Uh he was at respondents mercy

in federally funded custody when he

handed them a copy of controlling

precedent holding the RLupa protected

his right to keep his hair long. They

threw it away, handcuffed him to a chair

and shaved him bald. Damon Landor is a

devout Rastafarian who hadn't cut his

hair in two decades following his faith

in which dreadlocks are a sacred symbol.

So when he was transferred to a

Louisiana prison with just weeks left on

his 5mon sentence, Landor handed prison

guards a copy of an appeals court

decision holding that cutting religious

prisoners dreadlocks violated federal

law. But a guard threw the ruling into

the trash. And despite Landor's pleas,

he was handcuffed to a chair and held

down as his kneelength dreadlocks were

cut and his head was shaved. During oral

arguments, the Supreme Court justices

condemned Landor's treatment and the

blatant disregard of his religious

rights. Here's conservative justice Amy

Coney Barrett.

>> Look, the facts of this case are

egregious. So, if on the facts we were

looking for a case in which there should

be money damages, this is it. But it

turns out this case wasn't it. Today in

a six-to3 decision, the court's

conservative majority ruled that Landor

cannot sue the prison officials who cut

off his dreadlocks, finding that the

religious land use and institutionalized

persons act, better known as Raulupa,

can't be used to hold those who violate

inmates religious rights financially

responsible. The opinion was written by

Justice Neil Gorsuch, who telegraphed

that conclusion during the arguments.

>> The circuits are unanimously against you

and have been for many, many, many

years. So saying that something awful is

going to happen, it's all whatever's

happened has happened, right?

>> But the liberal justices disagreed. and

in a descent by Justice Katanji Brown

Jackson expressed concerns that now

state prison officials will have little

incentive to follow the law regarding

the religious rights of inmates. My

guest is Richard Garnett, a professor at

Notre Dame Law School and director of

the school's program on church, state,

and society. Rick, what's your reaction

to this decision and the implications of

this decision? The result in this case

and the Landor case is not surprising

given the way the oral arguments went.

It was clear that the justices or at

least a majority of them were very

focused on the federalism issues in this

case. And that's what makes this case

kind of tricky. It has a religious

freedom dimension for sure because the

facts involve a really shocking

violation of a prisoner's religious

freedom rights. But there's also this

kind of technical constitutional law

question about the power of Congress to

authorize certain kinds of lawsuits. And

so, you know, some of the reactions to

the case, I think, are misguided

[clears throat]

in the sense that I I've seen some

reports that, oh, this is just the court

not caring about a minority religion. I

think that's not the right way to think

about it. Um, you know, a group of the

justices, the six and the majority here,

have a pretty consistent vision of

federalism, and they believe that there

are limits on the federal government's

power to authorize certain kinds of

relief against state officials. Now, I

should confess, I filed a brief on the

side of the prisoner in this case. In my

view, the right answer was that this

action was authorized. But the reason

the court ruled against him in my view

was not because it was unbothered by the

egregiousness of this violation, but

because they just didn't think the

federal government had the power to

authorize the suit. So what this means,

in my opinion, among other things, is

that state governments need to really

step up and make sure they provide

meaningful relief for prisoners whose

religious liberty rights are violated by

officials as Mr. Landor's clearly were.

Raulupa was designed to protect the

religious rights of inmates. So why

doesn't it work for this inmate whose

religious rights were I mean everyone

agrees clearly and blatantly violated?

>> Yeah, this is and I apologize for

getting into the weeds a little bit, but

Raulupa is a special kind of statute.

It's authorized by what we call the

spending power, which means that it's

not so much a direct regulation as it is

a deal. The Congress says to the states,

"If you want this money, then you have

to agree to comply with this

understanding of religious liberty

rights." The wrinkle in this case is

that Mr. Landor wasn't suing the state.

He wasn't suing the state prison. He was

suing the the prison employee in that

employees personal capacity. So, you

know, you're not suing the prison.

You're suing, you know, Officer Jones.

And the thing is, Officer Jones never

took any federal money. So, he didn't

make this deal with the federal

government. So, according to the court,

since officer Jones, that's not his

name, I'm making that up, didn't make

the deal with the federal government,

that means that the federal statute

doesn't authorize a lawsuit against

Jones. And it's all based on these kind

of, you know, firstear law school

constitutional law debates about the

regulatory powers of Congress and how

much power Congress has to attach

strings to the money it spends. And

there's a long tradition of the court

saying, you know, there are limits on

the strings you can attach to money. So

again, nothing in today's opinion denies

that the officers behave badly and that

Mr. Landor's religious freedom was

violated. It's that the particular

relief that Landor was seeking, that's

a, you know, money damages lawsuit

against an individual wasn't authorized

by the statute or couldn't be authorized

by the statute. So the majority said

that state employees didn't consent to

face lawsuits in their personal

capacities when Congress passed Raula.

As a practical matter, when would an

employee willingly consent to be sued?

And Justice Katanji Brown Jackson in

descent said today's decision magically

transforms a federal statute into an

invitation to be accepted or declined

deemed binding only if each particular

defendant has explicitly agreed to be

penalized. I mean to the average person

the dcent makes sense.

>> Well and again I was on that side in the

end. I do think she oversimplifies the

federalism issue. There's plenty of

precedent to the effect that these

regulatory spending arrangements do

function kind of like a contract. That

said, in my view, the better ruling

would have been to say that when the

state entered into this effectively

contract with the federal government and

took on the burdens to respect the

religious liberty of inmates that

because these folks are the employees of

the state, those folks kind of take

employment subject to the requirements

that are laid on their employers. And

that includes what the statute calls

appropriate relief, which if you really

want to get in the weeds, that's kind of

what this case really came down to is

what counts as appropriate relief. So, a

concern that Justice Jackson raised and

that I share, even though I think she

oversimplifies a bit, is that, you know,

the incentives on state prison employees

to respect religious inmates rights,

those incentives are going to be muted a

bit if they're not subject to damages

for, you know, egregious violations. I

mean, this wasn't kind of a judgment

call, reasonable minds can disagree kind

of thing. It's very clear on the facts

of this case that Mr. Landor's rights

were again outrageously violated. And so

there's a concern and this is one of the

concerns that Justice Jackson raised and

that I share is that the effectiveness

of the statute which I mean as you said

earlier June the point of the whole

statute was to protect prisoners

religious freedom rights is going to be

weakened or undermined if that kind of

what do you want to call it stick is uh

is pulled away.

>> Could Landor have sued the state and the

state prison system?

>> Yeah. So this is about a particular

cause of action and you know there are

almost certainly other ones that in

theory could have been available to him

and you know again my my hope is that

some states will respond by making sure

that they create additional causes of

action for prisoners like this. But you

know there's a tendency and we all we're

all familiar with it that it's easy to

kind of lose sight of prisoners and

their rights. You know out of sight out

of mind we tend to other our prisoners.

But it isn't it isn't the case that this

decision means that Landor would never

have any relief for this kind of

violation. The decision is limited to

relief under this particular statute.

>> The court in 2020 allowed Muslim men to

sue over their inclusion on the FBI's

nofly list under a sister statute, the

Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

Explain why the same reasoning didn't

apply here.

>> Yeah, this is an important distinction

or at least it was to the court. So, the

Religious Freedom Restoration Act is not

a spending power statute. It's a statute

that rests on Congress's power to

enforce the 14th amendment and it's a

statute that only applies to the federal

government. Raulupa is on the one hand

much broader. It applies to not only the

federal government but the states. On

the other hand, it's also narrower

because the basis for it, the

justification for the Raulupa statute is

this spending power and the lines of

doctrine about Congress's power under

the 14th amendment are just different

from the lines of precedent about

Congress's power under the spending

clause. And again, I know this is really

the kind of thing that makes normal

people's eyes glaze over. So, I

apologize to anybody who's listening to

it, but but for legal purposes, it

really does make a difference which

power a Congress is using. And with

Raulupa, because it was only applying to

the federal government, these federalism

concerns are not in play. Congress is

perfectly within its rights to subject

the federal government to various

standards of liability and to create

causes of action against the federal

government. But because we have a

federalist system, it's more complicated

when Congress imposes standards on the

states and that's what explains the

difference.

>> Can you explain why this would be a, you

know, there was an ideological split,

why it would be a conservative liberal

split on this? Again, this is

generalizing with these labels and so

on, but it tends to be the case that the

conservatives are more interested in

federalism, and it tends to be the case

that the liberals are more friendly to

Congress's power to create causes of

action. What divided the court was not

the importance of religious freedom. I

mean, you know, a couple years ago, we

had a case involving a Muslim prisoner

who wanted to grow a beard, and it was 9

to zero. uh everybody agreed on the

importance of that under Raulupa, but

there was no question about federalism

in that case because the cause of action

wasn't against uh the person in his

individual capacity. It was against the

prison system. So the justices, you

know, whether they're appointed by

Democrats or Republicans, they all agree

that the religious freedom rights of

prisoners are important, but divided

them here were these, you know, issues

that divide them in lots of cases.

again, debates about federal power and

debates about the ability to create

causes of action.

>> We've talked before that, you know,

there's been a string of victories for

religious liberty. Is this the first in

a long time where there was a defeat,

you might say, for religious interests?

>> I'm thinking out loud here, it is the

first in a while. So certainly religious

freedom claimants have done well with

this court. Now, I suppose some might

say, for example, that when a claimant

filed a lawsuit against the War Memorial

Cross in the American Legion case that

they were seeking to vindicate their

religious freedom and they lost. But I

think it's certainly true that this

court has been friendly to religious

freedom claims. But, you know, I can't

think of any of those claims that

involved the same federalism concerns

that this one did. Probably the last

case I can think of where the religious

freedom claimants lost was Trump versus

Hawaii, which was a challenge to the

so-called Muslim ban that the Trump

administration had put into place early

in its first administration, I think.

>> Thanks so much for your insights today,

Rick. That's Professor Richard Garnett

of Notre Dame Law School. Coming up next

in another 6 to3 decision, the court

sides with the Trump administration on

green card holders. This is Bloomberg.

The Supreme Court sided with the Trump

administration today in an immigration

case dealing with the government's power

over green card holders returning to the

country. The 6 to3 decision down

ideological lines centered on an

immigration officer's decision to put a

green card holder on immigration parole

when he returned from a short trip to

China because he'd been accused of a

thirdderee trademark counterfeiting

crime. The conservative majority in an

opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas

reversed the second circuit court of

appeals and said that the immigration

and nationality act doesn't require

border officers to establish by clear

and convincing evidence that the green

card holder had committed a crime

involving moral turpitude. While the

dissenting liberal justices in an

opinion written by Justice Katanji Brown

Jackson said that the decision

effectively sentences the green card

holder to immigration limbo before he'd

been convicted of any crime. Joining me

is Leon Fresco, a partner at Holland

Knight and the former head of the office

of immigration litigation in the Obama

administration. Leon, will you start

with the basics about green card holders

and what happens when they re-enter the

country?

>> Sure. So, here is what happens when a

person obtains a green card or what is

also known as lawful permanent residence

in the United States. The common

conception is that that person can just

stay permanently in the United States

and if they want to become a citizen,

they can become a citizen. But if they

don't want to become a citizen for

whatever reason, maybe if they're from a

country that they'll lose their

citizenship from there, so they don't do

it, then that's fine, too. But that's

actually not true. There are ways you

can lose your green card. And one of the

ways you can lose your green card is if

you commit a criminal offense that is a

deportable offense. So what happens is a

lot of times people don't realize these

sort of interplays between the green

card law and the immigration law until

they travel outside of the United

States. And so here's what happens when

you travel outside the United States.

When you travel outside of the United

States and you try to reenter, you show

your green card to the Customs and

Border Protection official who is at the

airport. And 99 out of 100 times that's

not a big deal. They swipe your green

card and they let you in the country.

But what the law says is that if you in

the intervening time that you traveled

or we didn't realize it before and now

we're just realizing it for the first

time that you committed some sort of

criminal offense, then it's not a taken

forranted thing that you just reenter

the United States with your green card.

What they basically say in the statute

is you start from scratch again having

to prove that you are entitled to be

admitted in the United States. And so

the question in this Supreme Court case

is what happens in a world where the

person was accused of the crime and in

this case it was a crime of trademark

counterfeiting. because a Chinese

citizen who was charged with trademark

counterfeiting. So what happens when

it's a person who's charged with a crime

but not convicted of a crime? And so if

this person had never left the United

States, they could never be placed into

deportation proceedings unless and until

they actually were convicted of the

crime. the charging wouldn't change

anything because if they were innocent

then that would not lead to any

deportation. But this issue did not

arise with the person just staying in

the United States. This arose where a

person becomes a lawful permanent

resident in 2007. They get charged for

the crime in May of 2012. they leave the

United States and then try to re-enter

the United States while the charge was

pending. And so at that point, the

Customs and Border Protection says,

"Look, in this situation, you don't get

the presumption that you are a lawful

permanent resident who just gets to

reenter the United States. We treat you

like everybody else who if you are

charged with a crime don't get to just

enter scot-free. So what we're going to

do is yes, we'll let you enter because

you do have this green card, but we're

not going to let you enter as a lawful

permanent resident. We're going to enter

you in as a parole e. And that way when

we try to deport you, if you try to use

your lawful permanent residency as a

defense to deportation,

you will have the burden of proof to

show that you're not deportable as

opposed to the government having the

burden of proof to show that you are

deportable. And so that's what happened

here.

This was an appeal from a second circuit

decision, but there's a split in the

circuits on this issue. Probably one of

the reasons why the court took this

case. So, there was a circuit split

between the second circuit who had ruled

in favor of the foreign national and

previous decisions from the fifth and

the ninth circuit that said, "Hey, wait

a second. In these cases, why doesn't

the border patrol that's at the airport,

why don't they have to do exactly the

same thing an immigration judge would

have to do if this person had never left

the United States, which is essentially

wait to see if they're convicted of the

crime before they strip someone of their

lawful permanent residency. So that's

what the second circuit said. The

government appealed that decision

because they didn't want to shortcut the

ability of the border patrol to find

people with criminal issues at the

airport and place them in removal

proceedings. They view that as an

important safeguard for America that you

know it's we don't think about people

until they try to reenter. That's a good

sort of like reminder. Hey, this person

exists. Let's check their background.

And so they like that that reminder

exists in the system. And so they ask

for a Supreme Court review. And when the

government asks for a Supreme Court

review, they usually get it. And in this

case, it turns out the Supreme Court

held today 6 to3 that yes, Customs and

Border Protection at the airport does

not have to actually put you through

sort of a little mini hearing or wait

until you're actually convicted of a

crime. They are more than capable or

legally able to now after this decision

take someone who's been charged of a

crime but not convicted of a crime and

conditionally allow them in the country

with what's called a parole which is

just basically a legal fiction that even

though your body's in the US your legal

body is still waiting to see what will

happen after a hearing and so they said

they can do that and then at the time of

the immigration court hearing. Now, the

burden will be on the foreign national

to prove that they shouldn't be deported

as opposed to the burden being on the

government.

>> The six conservatives didn't say there

had to be any standard. The second

circuit had said clear and convincing

evidence of the crime at the border, but

there's no standard at all to it could

be the intuition of the officer. The

court actually did leave open the

separate question of what appropriate

evidentiary standard, if any, applies at

the border. So, you're correct. At the

moment, it's totally up to the

discretion of the Customs and Border

Protection whether to say I think

there's something wrong with your

immigration status that I'm not going to

just accept your green card as evidence

that you should be lawfully permanently

admitted to the United States. instead

I'm going to just parole you in and let

an immigration court figure that out.

Every time the Supreme Court does

something like this, it always leads to

a subsequent case that needs to clarify

this. I understand an incrementalist

approach generally. But whenever

something like this happens, it's

inevitable where two or three more years

of just chaos occurs because the Supreme

Court didn't want to give an evidentiary

standard in the first place here. And

the Supreme Court ultimately doesn't do

that in this case because in between the

time of this fact pattern and now the

person does actually get convicted of

this counterfeiting offense. And so the

court figures, okay, if this person is

convicted of the counterfeiting offense,

then it's not really important that we

go down this road because it's not going

to make a difference in this case. this

person. Now, the only decision left is

whether this counterfeiting offense is

what's called a crime involving moral

turpitude or it isn't. And that comes

down to the concept of whether it's

really considered a moral offense like a

murder or a rape or a burglary or

something or is it considered a pure

regulatory offense? And if it's a pure

regulatory offense, then this person

won't be deported. But that's the point

is the court basically leaves this more

important issue of for another day of

what the border patrol whether they have

any standards at all before they can

decide to reject your green card and

conditionally let you in the country as

opposed to lawfully permanently letting

you in the country and so yes that's yet

another uncertainty now for even people

who have been here 20 30 years

>> so Leon who is going to make that

decision ision about whether the crime

is one of moral turpitude

>> that will now be made first by an

immigration judge who's an employee of

the department of justice. It's going to

get remanded all the way back down. It

gets remanded to the second circuit, but

the second circuit will remand it down

to the board of immigration appeals who

will remand it back down to the

immigration judge and then it'll work

its way back up to the second circuit

because presumably the immigration

court, especially now in the current

climate, will probably rule that it is a

crime involving moral turpitude. And

then it'll be up to the second circuit

who no longer has to defer to the

immigration courts anymore under the

loper bright line of cases which says

look when there's a legal issue there's

a legal issue this isn't really anything

we have to defer to here. So in the end

this decision is going to be made by the

second circuit who will have to decide

whether this individual's counterfeiting

conviction actually constitutes a crime

involving moral turpitude. So Leon, the

three liberal justices dissented and

Justice Katanji Brown Jackson wrote that

the decision to put the green card

holder on immigration parole effectively

sentenced him to immigration limbo

before he'd been convicted of any crime.

She wrote, "I worry that the court has

now handed the government a massive

blank check." Well, I mean, there's

definitely some merit to the argument,

and I don't see how even the majority

could dispute that they're really hoping

that the good faith of the men and women

in the Customs and Border Protection

continues to operate in good faith so

that this doesn't become an excessive

problem. Of course, if it becomes an

excessive problem, then the court's

going to have to revisit this. And this

is why I say these fact patterns tend to

lead and evolve into foreseeable

excessive problems. But they point out

in the dissenting opinion that one of

the main problems here is if the Customs

and Border Protection wants to sort of

proform invalidate your green card in

this manner, they can place you in

detention when they do this. And when

they place you in detention, then

depending on where they place you, if

they place you in some remote rural

area, you also will have very difficult

time in accessing an attorney. And if

you can't access an attorney, then you

can't make the defense as to why you

shouldn't be deported. And basically,

this whole thing can essentially lead to

a revocation of someone's green card by

default in a fact pattern where wouldn't

actually be lawfully permitted. And so

from that standpoint, the only thing

preventing this is the good faith of the

men and women working in the government.

And now we're going to have to see. You

know, usually the way this works is you

put constraints on the good faith,

hoping that people do operate in good

faith, but just in case they don't,

there are constraints so that people

know, hey, this will be reviewed by this

person, etc. But now we'll have to see.

Will the good faith that has been given

in terms of this blanket authority to

the Customs and Border Protection be

abused or will it be used in a way that

is still very rare for criminal type of

cases and not just for all types of

lawful permanent residents re-entering

in the United States after visiting

abroad? I mean, is there an undercurrent

here of the administration trying to

undermine perhaps the security that

green card holders may feel? The idea is

to say since you don't actually have to

be convicted of a crime and you can

basically have this green card status in

a sense conditionally revoked while you

go through immigration court if the

Customs and Border Protection has any

reason to think that you committed a

crime as opposed to you are convicted of

a crime. then everybody is potentially

on notice that if there's anything on

your phone or anything on your laptop or

anything anywhere that someone at the

CBP could decide to inspect and decide

to say, "Oh, well, it looks like you've

committed XYZ,

then yes, you won't be allowed to enter

in the United States." So now everybody

has more incentive. First, as a factual

matter, yes, mind your P's and Q's, but

also I think you will end up seeing the

immigration bar start giving advice

about what types of electronics to bring

into the United States or or don't bring

any, leave them all here, etc. Because

the potential for application here, you

know, pretty much you confiscate

anybody's computer, you can you can find

something. And so you say, "Oh, you

know, there's a mattress, you didn't pay

your mattress tag violation or

whatever." And so from that standpoint,

it becomes very very complicated.

>> The most high-profile case of the term

probably is the birthright citizenship

case and also ending TPS status. I mean,

does this decision at all indicate the

way the court might go in other

immigration decisions to come or is it

separate? Well, I will say I was

surprised that this decision was six to

three. I'm not surprised that there was

a majority of votes for this decision

because at the end of the day, I think

it's incremental enough that the court

can come back if the CBP starts going

too overboard with regard to rejecting

lawful permanent residents and come back

and impose some type of evidentiary

standard. So I do think that part is not

surprising, but I do think that because

the oral argument there was a lot of

concern about how broad this thing could

be applied and yet they still wrote a

decision that at least for the short

term allows this doctrine of cancelling

people's green card so to speak at the

airport to be applied in as broad a

fashion as possible. meaning it hasn't

been constrained by this particular

decision. Then I do think maybe not

exactly in the birthright citizenship

case. Although we'll wait and see

because there are some things here where

they might let Congress actually do some

legislation, which they would never do

because the Congress won't have the

votes either way to pass anything on

this. But I could see something like

that now from the standpoint that it

seems that the court really is willing

to say that in any of these cases where

we are going to defer to the political

system in the way it would work normally

if it was full of good faith actors that

were all doing their job. Not like the

world that exists today where the

Congress can't really pass anything. And

in a world where people in the

administrative branch have sort of

changed depending on what administration

they're in how they operate and how they

view the law. They don't read the law

like an AI chatbot. They read the law

based on policy priorities of of

different administrations. They're still

willing to seem to give a lot of good

faith difference here. And so we'll have

to see whether that ends up being wise

or not.

>> Okay. Stay with me, Leon. Coming up next

on the Bloomberg Law Show, I'll continue

this conversation with Leon Fresco. The

case about alleged Venezuelan gang

members sent to a notorious El Salvador

prison back in March of last year is

still going on. I'm June Grao and you're

listening to Bloomberg. I've been

talking to immigration law attorney Leon

Fresco of Holland Knight. So now let's

go back in time to, you know, early in

the Trump administration and those

flights in March of last year where the

administration sent alleged Venezuelan

gang members to a notorious El Salvador

prison. That case is amazingly still

going on even though the Venezuelans

have been returned to their home and set

free. Oddly enough, this case is still

going on even though Venezuela is now an

ally of the United States. And so the

whole idea that remember the if these

deportations of Venezuelans that were

taken to El Salvador were all based on

the idea that Venezuela was an alien

enemy of the United States and that

people here were acting in sort of in

cahoots with the Venezuelan government

to be our enemy and and destabilize the

United States. And so even though all of

that has now changed, one, the

government hasn't actually withdrawn its

theoretical doctrine that's gone on in

other cases where these issues are being

appealed that there are still Venezuelan

alien enemies of the United States. So

that's going to be interesting. I don't

know what the government's going to end

up doing with that again given that

we're in this world where we have this

cooperation with the Venezuelan

government. But in this particular case,

you still have Judge Boseberg who

remains upset from the quote unquote

original act in this case, which is he

said orally,

bring the people back if they're on a

plane and don't send people to El

Salvador if they're not on a plane. And

yet people never got sent back and

planes didn't turn back and and people

got sent to El Salvador. And so even

though the Supreme Court said that he

didn't have jurisdiction to have that

case that needed to be filed as

individual habiuses by the people who

were subject to these orders and

couldn't be done as a class action in

DC. Judge Booseberg still said, "Yeah,

but if you lied to me in my courtroom, I

should still have contempt authority to

do something about that." And the DC

circuit in a three judge panel basically

disagreed with that and said, "Look,

this case has reached an end. You don't

have contempt authority to do anything

at this point. And even if you if you

want to try to issue a contempt order,

go ahead because you already know what

happened. So if you want to basically

hold former Secretary Gnome in contempt

or anybody else, that's fine. But what

Judge Booseberg wanted to do is hold an

evidentiary hearing with testimony

before he issued a contempt order and a

criminal referral and all of that. And

then now looks like the full DC circuit.

That's the decision says let's see

whether he can do this or not because

there was hundreds of judges who did an

AMA brief saying look judges have to be

able regardless of in the end whether

they're right or wrong still be able to

patrol their courtrooms for people who

will lie to judges. And so from that

standpoint, you know, we'll see if the

DC circuit ends up saying regardless of

whether there was jurisdiction or not,

you still can enforce your courtroom and

issue contempt orders for things that

happened while you puditively did have

jurisdiction over the matter. And then

if that does happen, I'm sure the

government will appeal to the Supreme

Court and the Supreme Court will have to

decide whether Judge Boseberg actually

can continue with this contempt issue or

whether it's over and we just move on to

another issue. I mean, I would say just

looking at the numbers that since the

full court has decided to hear the case,

it might be because a lot of the judges

are interested in reversing the 2 to1

decision that went against Judge

Boseberg, but that's just looking at

numbers.

>> And I mean, he's a very well- reggarded

judge in DC.

>> He certainly is, and he was subject to

repeated attacks by the attorney general

and the president. So before we go,

Leon, tell us about the cows.

>> So for 30 years, every administration

and every bipartisan presidency has said

you can't bring in temporary

agricultural workers to do dairy work

because you have to milk those cows

every day. The cows don't just

seasonally need to be milked. And the

Trump administration out of all the

issues that it could have picked decided

this is the one issue where we will take

the pro-immigrant stance and let people

bring in immigrant workers to milk the

cows even though they have to be every

day so they're not seasonal. Oh well

that's not our problem. We're going to

let them come in. And so clearly the

agricultural industry got a huge win

there.

>> And the cows are happy too I guess.

>> Yes. And the cows are happy as well.

[laughter]

We've talked about so many immigration

issues, Liam, but I never thought it

would be about milking cows. Thanks as

always. That's Leon Fresco of Honda

Night. And that's it for this edition of

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