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"A threat has to be common knowledge for it to be effective" - Steven Pinker Part 3

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"A threat has to be common knowledge for it to be effective" - Steven Pinker Part 3

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440 segments

0:00

[Music]

0:05

and and this starts to become uh

0:07

important uh in he's not just trying to

0:10

meet people in in London or or New York

0:13

in Shelling's original game. By the way,

0:16

you said there are two options in a

0:17

coordination game. I mean that in a in a

0:19

classical coordination game, sure, but

0:21

there could be any number. Yes. Um as

0:23

this is the problem with London, any

0:24

number of places and any number of

0:26

times. Um, and

0:29

even though there are only limited

0:30

number of plausible places,

0:33

there might easily be 20 plausible

0:35

places. And you know, Leicester Square,

0:37

Trafalga Square, St. Paul's Cathedral.

0:40

>> I I asked Pen Vogler, who's a the

0:42

publicist at Penguin Books, who's been

0:44

accompanying me to many of these events

0:46

because I wanted a London equivalent of

0:48

the uh clock in in Grand Central Station

0:51

in New York for for a London audience.

0:54

She suggested Nelson's column in

0:55

Trfalgar Square, which is another is a

0:58

which is which is also good. By the way,

0:59

I should add since I'm I'm with an

1:01

economist, but I consulted some of my

1:03

economist game theorist call colleagues

1:06

at Harvard. I said, isn't this great?

1:08

I'm going to be publicizing game theory

1:10

and and and e economic analysis. He

1:13

said, 'Well,

1:15

he said, 'You should know that some game

1:17

theorists are rather annoyed at

1:19

Shelling's examples because Shelling's

1:21

point is there's a point at which game

1:24

theory cannot tell you what the uh how

1:26

to get into the equilibrium. There's

1:28

more than one that drives game theorists

1:31

crazy because the answer comes from

1:33

psychology. And and Shelling was very

1:36

explicit about this. He said whimsy,

1:39

humor, puns, history, accidents, all of

1:43

these can be solutions to what otherwise

1:45

would seem like a cut and dried problem

1:47

in mathematics.

1:48

>> But I mean, Shelling was Shelling was

1:49

right. He was I mean that's why he was

1:51

the greatest game theorist who ever

1:52

lived. He's amazing. Did you did you

1:54

ever get the chance to meet him?

1:55

>> I met him once. Yes. and and u c can I

1:59

give another anecdote from shelling

2:00

because it just it does show off his

2:03

brilliance both as a theoretician but

2:05

also as a as a intuitive psychologist as

2:08

a human being very savvy about how

2:11

people interact. This also speaks to the

2:14

question of is there any how many levels

2:16

of I know that he knows can you go and

2:19

is there really a qualitative difference

2:21

between common knowledge which at least

2:23

implies an infinite number and say three

2:26

or four levels. Isn't three or four

2:27

levels good enough? So he recounts an

2:29

example where he's on a car trip with a

2:32

colleague and the colleague is engaging

2:34

in one of AC acade academics's favorite

2:36

pastimes which is complaining about the

2:39

unfairness of an anonymous peer review.

2:42

So you you um so this this his his

2:46

friend is fuming about this idiot, this

2:49

who gave him this totally unfair

2:51

review. Then Shelling realizes he

2:54

himself was the one who wrote that

2:56

review is you know double blind review.

2:59

Um, and then you what to do? And

3:03

especially since it occurs to him, you

3:05

know, now that he's with me in the car,

3:07

uh, it might occur to him that I'm the

3:10

author of this review, especially since

3:12

he's recounting it to me, you know, with

3:14

me right next to him. Um,

3:19

if I were to confess, that would be

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deeply embarrassing. I would have, you

3:23

know, betrayed a friend, stabbed a

3:25

friend in the back. um if he were to

3:28

confront me again it would be highly

3:30

awkward. Notice by the way that

3:32

awkwardness which has come up in several

3:33

of our scenarios in the uh the the uh

3:38

sexual uh proposition in the bribing the

3:41

major D. Awkwardness is the emotion that

3:44

we feel when uh excuse me um one um

3:51

social relationship say friendship or

3:54

hierarchy um is an occasion for us to um

3:58

behave in a way that's appropriate for

4:00

some completely different relationship

4:01

type. So challenging um uh treating a

4:05

matraee who is the master of his uh

4:09

domain as if he was a mere salesperson

4:12

or treating a platonic friend as a a a

4:16

sexual partner that gives rise to the

4:18

emotion of awkwardness. So back to this

4:20

case the relationship of communal

4:23

friendship clashes with one of them

4:25

passing judgment on the other and uh it

4:28

could lead to awkwardness. But Shelley

4:30

notes that he might even, let's say, he

4:32

figures out that it was me. Uh, he might

4:36

choose to um

4:39

to um pretend that he still doesn't know

4:42

as he goes through his dialogue. He

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might even not only know that it's me,

4:47

but he's savvy enough to figure out that

4:49

I might know that he knows, but as long

4:52

as neither of us mentions it, we are

4:55

spared the awkwardness. He said, "As

4:58

long as there's no common knowledge,

4:59

which would happen if Shelling had

5:02

confessed, if the other one had accused

5:04

him, that changes the dynamics of the

5:07

social social situation qualitatively

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and um and it is the difference between

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as many levels of embedded knowledge as

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you want and common knowledge because

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each one could have like Vzini and and

5:21

and Wesley even think, well, he must

5:24

know that I know that he knows that I

5:26

know." But again, as long as they can

5:27

think that all they want, as long as

5:29

they don't blurt it out, they can

5:31

maintain the friendship.

5:32

>> He he was really a remarkable man. I

5:34

would say Shelling is probably the

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reason why I became an economist reading

5:38

reading Shelling's

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>> uh books. Shelling was a was a game

5:42

theorist who ended up reasoning about

5:44

everything from um how to convince

5:47

yourself to quit smoking. uh he did

5:50

early complexity science modeling and he

5:52

and he also is the reason why there's a

5:55

there's a red telephone between um

5:58

Moscow and uh and Washington DC sort of

6:01

realized it might be a a good idea to

6:03

set up a way of establishing common

6:06

knowledge in a crisis and and also

6:07

thought through it's not totally

6:09

straightforward because when you get a

6:11

call on that phone how do you know how

6:12

do you know who was on the other end so

6:14

he really thought through those

6:16

processes he

6:17

>> he won a Nobel Prize in in econ

6:19

economics. So I guess it could have been

6:20

a Nobel Prize in peace uh for that

6:22

reason. Yeah.

6:23

>> And some of his some of the logic of

6:26

threat deterrence uh was played out for

6:30

wicked laughs in Doctor Strange Love.

6:33

>> Yes. Which which he was he was I think

6:36

involved at an early stage in uh I think

6:39

Kubri Kubri looked him up but yes

6:41

>> he has the most mortant common knowledge

6:43

joke in the history of cinema. Forget

6:45

Seinfeld, forget The Princess Bride. But

6:48

the I guess it won't be a spoiler alert,

6:50

I assume. Well, maybe I shouldn't

6:52

assume, but the um the plot hinges on uh

6:56

an infernal device that the Soviets have

6:59

invented called the It's set, of course,

7:01

in the midst of the Cold War, called the

7:02

Doomsday Machine. This is a network of

7:06

um buried nuclear weapons that would go

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off if the Soviet Union was attacked. so

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many that it would spread fatal

7:14

radioactivity through the atmosphere and

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just lead to the the end of all life on

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Earth. The I mean that sounds like a

7:21

crazy thing but uh because it is so

7:25

terrible it is the ultimate deterrent.

7:27

It was the ultimate security for the

7:29

Soviet Union uh never to be attacked by

7:31

the United States knowing that the

7:33

doomsday machine would go off and it

7:34

would go off automatically. So that it

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was impossible and this is where Sheling

7:39

comes in. the Soviet um uh premere

7:43

couldn't have second thoughts when an

7:45

attack was underway, thinking, well um

7:49

it would be crazy to kill every human uh

7:52

now that the attack has been launched,

7:54

so I'm actually not going to activate

7:56

the machine. Well, then the problem is

7:57

that the Americans could anticipate that

7:59

and therefore attack with impunity.

8:01

That's why it's set off to go

8:02

automatically. But the kink in the plot

8:05

is that before the doomsday machine was

8:08

announced, a rogue American general, for

8:12

cockamame reasons, decides to drop a

8:14

bomb on the Soviet Union, which

8:16

>> because they were stealing our precious

8:17

bodily fluids,

8:18

>> our precious bodily fluids, yet another

8:20

twist. Um, and in in one of the the the

8:24

the blackest of black humor episodes, as

8:29

the brilliant Dr. Strange Love is uh

8:32

conferring with the American president

8:33

and the Soviet ambassador and this might

8:36

have come out of shelling said uh this

8:38

is you know this is ingenious but the

8:41

whole point of the doomsday machine is

8:43

lost if you keep it a secret that is if

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it's not common knowledge

8:48

uh why didn't you tell the world and the

8:51

ambassador says the premier was going to

8:53

announce it at the party congresses on

8:55

Monday as you know the premier loves

8:57

surprises

8:59

uh fish because the grim, you know,

9:03

insane logic of the doomsday machine or

9:05

any threat has to be common knowledge

9:08

for it to be effective. And the joke

9:11

there is that in that weekend in which

9:12

it wasn't common knowledge, uh, the

9:15

world would end.

9:17

We have questions. They have come in via

9:19

slider. Is there a I thought you see you

9:23

can all see that there's just a there's

9:26

just a vague placeholder slide up there

9:28

but I had thought that there was a QR

9:30

code for Slido. Anyway, maybe you could

9:32

put the QR code for Slido back up. There

9:34

are questions if you want to send more

9:36

questions in. Actually, I had a I had a

9:38

question about Slido. So, Slido is this

9:41

app where you can you can log in and you

9:44

can send questions and they appear here.

9:46

Apparently, anybody who's looking at the

9:48

Slido

9:50

web page for this event can see all the

9:53

questions that everyone else has has

9:56

asked. So, it generates a kind of common

9:58

knowledge about what questions have been

10:00

asked. Um, and I'm want I wanted to ask

10:02

you to reflect on that as a design

10:03

decision. Is it better that everybody

10:05

sees everybody else's questions or is it

10:07

better if the questions are anonymous? I

10:09

think it would be better if they were uh

10:11

anonymous because um it's not exactly

10:14

the same, but it's reminiscent and and

10:16

and and since you're an economist, it's

10:18

relevant to bring up an idea from John

10:21

Maynard Kanes um in which he tried to

10:24

explain speculative investing when

10:26

people buy some security not because of

10:29

its fundamentals, its productive value

10:31

like a company builds a factory, they

10:35

turn out products, they sell the

10:37

products at a profit, you buy a share,

10:39

you get some fraction of that profit.

10:41

But speculative investing where you buy

10:43

something because you think that

10:45

tomorrow other people will think that

10:48

it's worth more than what you paid for

10:50

today. And they think that because the

10:52

day after tomorrow they think that even

10:54

still other people will think it's worth

10:56

more. So he compared it to a beauty

10:58

contest. He claimed that it ran in the

11:00

British papers of the day. Although it's

11:02

not clear that there ever was such a

11:03

beauty contest where the object is not

11:06

to pick the prettiest face, but to pick

11:08

the face that the most other contestants

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pick knowing that the other contestants

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are picking the face with the same kind

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of anticipation. Everyone is trying to

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predict what everyone else will predict

11:20

that everyone else will predict. and sh

11:23

is actually shelling took it up that

11:25

very situation and suggested that it the

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only solution to that is a a focal point

11:31

something that pops out. Um and and the

11:33

the prediction is that if say one of the

11:35

faces was u say a red head and the all

11:38

the others were brunettes that would be

11:41

be the way to win a such a beauty

11:43

contest. Anyway, it's called the

11:45

Keynesian beauty contest in his honor.

11:48

And it's often applied to uh runaway

11:52

economic phenomena, speculative bubbles,

11:55

irrational exuberance, buying crypto be

11:58

not because you think crypto is uh

12:00

solves any problem, but because you

12:02

think other people will buy crypto

12:03

because they think that other people

12:04

will buy crypto. Or it's inverse, the

12:09

burst bubble, the bank run, the

12:11

speculative attack where if people say

12:14

if word gets out that people are nervous

12:17

about the solveny of a bank, people will

12:20

frantically try to withdraw their

12:22

savings while there's still savings to

12:24

withdraw uh out of fear that other

12:27

people fear that still other people's

12:29

fear that still other people fear that

12:31

the bank may be insolvent. And so it can

12:33

actually make the bank insolvent even if

12:35

the bank was perfectly sound based on

12:38

the uh a public signal a common

12:40

knowledge generator that something might

12:42

might be wrong. So the question is in

12:44

this case by the way one other

12:46

application of that is bestsellers top

12:49

40 uh radio hits

12:53

um there's reason to think that because

12:56

a Keynesian beauty contest can give rise

12:59

to kind of nonlinear vicious circle a

13:02

positive feedback loop things that are

13:05

popular become more popular that

13:07

sometimes what gets on the bestseller

13:09

list can be baffling publishers rack

13:13

their brains trying to figure out what

13:14

makes for a bestseller. And sometimes it

13:17

could be uh capricious that for whatever

13:20

reason something becomes a little bit

13:21

popular. If people know that it's

13:24

popular, they say, "Well, I'm going to

13:25

buy that cuz it's popular," making it

13:27

still more popular. And so you can get

13:30

rather um capricious choices as to what

13:34

makes a best loan and what doesn't. So,

13:36

in this cont context, um it's possible

13:39

that if people were to I don't know if

13:41

they if you can upvote a question.

13:42

>> Yeah, you can upvote. I'm ignoring them,

13:44

don't worry. But, uh you can upvote,

13:46

>> but for whatever reason, if one of the

13:48

questions gets a little more popular

13:50

than the others, people might pile on

13:52

even if it wasn't a particularly good

13:54

question.

13:54

>> It's because it's it's being shown to

13:56

people first and therefore they they

13:58

have the the the ability to judge it. We

13:59

we should um I do I do have questions.

14:01

We should get to that. Yes. But but

14:03

before we do, there is this amazing um

14:06

little uh nugget in the book about Super

14:10

Bowl advertising and the kind and

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specifically so the the it's this the

14:14

idea that I don't know 100 million

14:16

people watch the Super Bowl. I don't

14:17

know what the number is, but you could

14:19

pay to reach 100 million people by

14:21

advertising on lots of websites or by

14:24

advertising on lots and lots of TV

14:26

shows. Or you could pay to reach 100

14:28

million people with one Super Bowl ad.

14:31

And and there's a theory that there's a

14:33

particular kind of product that would

14:35

want the Super Bowl ad rather than even

14:37

if it's more expensive, rather than

14:38

reaching 100 million people by showing

14:40

the same ad to 100 million people um

14:43

through all these different channels. So

14:44

So

14:45

>> yes. So this is this I owe to a

14:47

political scientist named Michael Chu

14:49

that um uh who analyzed Super Bowl ads

14:52

and he noted that the most expensive ad

14:54

in the history of television was the ad

14:56

that introduced the Macintosh computer

14:58

in 1984. It ran only once. The Apple

15:03

hired Ridley Scott, the famed director

15:05

of Alien and Bladeunner to uh to to

15:08

conceive it and and direct the ad. It

15:11

did not mention the Macintosh computer

15:14

even though it was a revolutionary

15:16

product in its time. At that time

15:19

everyone used IBM PCs which had um 80

15:23

rows of 24 characters or is it 20 24

15:25

rows of 80 characters and you had to

15:27

memorize uh arcane alpha numeric strings

15:31

to use it. The Macintosh was you know

15:34

insanely great. It had windows and icons

15:38

and a menus and a pointing device, but

15:41

the ad did not mention that. It simply

15:43

had a um it capitalized on the fact that

15:47

the year was 1984 as in the the uh

15:51

Orwell novel and it had a woman in a um

15:55

red shorts and an athletics singlet

15:58

burst into a grim corporate meeting hurl

16:01

a mallet at the screen. It just exploded

16:05

in a fireball and the crawl said on

16:09

January 25th, Apple will introduce the

16:11

Macintosh and you'll see why 1984 won't

16:14

be like 1984. So like what's the deal?

16:17

Why would they spend so much on an ad

16:19

that doesn't mention the product? Well,

16:21

what they had to sell was not just the

16:22

product, but common knowledge of the

16:24

product because no one would buy this

16:27

revolutionary new technology if they

16:29

thought there weren't enough other

16:31

people buying it so that the price would

16:33

come down. There'd be uh user groups,

16:36

there'd be software, there'd be

16:38

peripherals. So, Apple had to uh

16:41

convince people that they wouldn't be

16:43

the only one. and a Super Bowl that

16:46

everyone was watching knowing that

16:48

everyone else was watching it would be

16:50

the way to generate that common

16:52

knowledge in an instant. And showed that

16:54

advertisers were willing to pay more per

16:57

eyeball for events like the Super Bowl

17:00

that are sort of like shelling points

17:02

and that they pop out. People know that

17:04

other people uh are paying attention to

17:06

it. So other products that depend on

17:08

network effects like a new credit card

17:11

which is useless if no store will accept

17:14

it but no store will accept it unless

17:16

they think a lot of customers have it.

17:18

So the discover card was announced on

17:19

the Super Bowl. The first jobseeking

17:22

website was announced on the Super Bowl.

17:24

Plus products that depend on on brand

17:26

loyalty where you wear them in public.

17:29

You have to know that other people are

17:31

aware of it. And uh so the the Super

17:34

Bowl as a common knowledge generator is

17:36

the preferred medium for that kind of

17:38

product.

Interactive Summary

The discussion delves into game theory, particularly Thomas Shelling's contributions, highlighting how his work often extends beyond pure mathematical game theory to incorporate psychological, social, and cultural factors in predicting human behavior and achieving equilibrium. Key concepts like "focal points" and "common knowledge" are explored through various examples, including the challenge of coordinating meetings in London, an anecdote about Shelling navigating a socially awkward situation involving an anonymous peer review, and the strategic implications of the Doomsday Machine in "Dr. Strangelove". The conversation also introduces John Maynard Keynes's "beauty contest" analogy to explain speculative bubbles and collective choices, and Michael Chu's analysis of Super Bowl advertising as a powerful generator of common knowledge for products with network effects, such as the original Macintosh computer.

Suggested questions

4 ready-made prompts