So something seriously bad continues to

plague Putin's war in Ukraine. Now by

some assessments, Russia is still

advancing in the country. But well,

that's if you consider meters or perhaps

even centimeters to be strategically

significant. There's another point here

too. The paradox. The paradox that the

more ground Moscow takes, the weaker its

army may actually be becoming. According

to European, Ukrainian, or

interestingly, third party officials,

Russia's battlefield losses are surging

so much they're reaching the point where

Moscow's ability to sustain its

offensive operations are being openly

questioned by everybody, including

Russian commentators. So in this video,

I wanted to look specifically at these

latest rising casualty numbers. Why

Vladimir Putin strategy is delivering

these painfully slow gains and whether

or not this is genuinely a turning

point, not just say in the Russian

economy or elsewhere, but for Russia's

military front. This is the global

gambit. How's it going everyone? Welcome

back to the channel where we look at the

nexus of geopolitics, economics, and

international relations. Now, if you're

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you'll know we predominantly cover the

Russo Ukrainian war, and that's what we

return to this time. You see, Putin has

always made it clear there is a bet he

has waged in this war. Not on lightning

breakthroughs or maneuver warfare as

it's known, but on strategic patience,

sustained pressure of grinding,

relentless assaults across a broad front

designed to exhaust Ukraine's manpower

and political will. The assumption being

simple, Ukraine cracks first. Now, there

are notions there which some of you may

disagree with, of course, and more in

the video as we go. So, do let me know

in the comments what you think. But you

see the problem with Ukraine cracked

first is well is that the way Russia is

fighting cannot generate this kind of

operational breakthrough Putin is

demanding even as losses mount. There

have been many blunt assessments in that

Russia's current approach is unlikely to

produce results that are militarily

decisive. We often focus on the

strategic elements here, but of course

it's important to consider the tactical

as well. Despite having seized the

battlefield initiative in 2024, Russia's

advances remain glacial in its most

prominent offenses. Russian forces have

been advancing between 15 and 70 m per

day. You thought what I said in the

opening hook was a joke. It isn't. To

put that into perspective, that is

slower than many battlefields of the

First World War, including the Battle of

the Song. According to other

institutions, this rate of advance is

slower than almost any major offensive

campaign. In modern warfare, recent data

reinforces that picture. Between the 1st

and 25th of January alone, Russian

forces captured just 152 km of Ukrainian

territory. That's the slowest rate of

advance since the March of last year.

Now, winter conditions considering stiff

Ukrainian resistance has also been part

of it and the dense drone coverage have

all contributed to this progress. just

being non-existent and it is coming at

such a cost to Russia that has not

experienced anything like this since the

Second World War. Indeed, some of you

may well have seen that joke online of

the fact that if you put a snail on the

eastern side of Ukraine, it will have

crossed the entirety of the country in

the time that the Russians have managed

to get as far as they have, which well

is nowhere. Now, let's talk losses for a

second. Western and Ukrainian estimates

suggest that at least 325,000 Russians

have been killed. fatalities, not just

casualties, since the full scale

invasion. That figure alone is of course

staggering, but it's only partial. You

see the total Russian casualties,

killing killed, wounded or missing, now

standard at roughly 1.2 million. On the

Ukrainian side, estimates put it at

600,000. Point being that together, this

war is approaching a gr a grim

milestone, nearly 2 million military

casualties in under four years. By any

historical comparison, these losses are

indescribable. Russian battlefield

deaths in Ukraine are estimated to be

more than 17 times greater than the

Soviet losses in Afghanistan during the

1980s, which lasted a decade, 11 times

higher than the Russians first and

second Chetchin wars and more than five

times greater than all Russian Soviet

wars since the Second World War.

Additional estimations put Russian

casualties exceeding by roughly 2 to one

or even 2 and a half to one. But that

imbalance hides a darker reality for

Ukraine because Ukraine's population is

much smaller and its ability to absorb

prolonged losses is therefore far more

limited. And of course those numbers

continue to rise for Ukraine as well.

Delinsky has claimed that 30 to 35

Russian soldiers are killed or seriously

wounded every month. But of course there

is a little bit of a information warfare

consideration here with western

officials citing different figures

including wounded soldiers who may never

return to combat. Point is though that

many argue that a growing share of

Russia's casualties are unreoverable and

that in modern warfare significantly

matters but it also applies in a large

degree to Ukraine. Part of the reason

these casualties are unreoverable

because of what the war is about how

it's done. is defined by drones.

According to some intelligence

reporting, 70 to 80% of all kills and

casualties on both sides are because of

drones. So that changes everything. A

wounded soldier is no longer easily

evacuated. Evacuation vehicles are

targeted. Medical teams are targeted.

And so even things like pause and

recovery operations are often

impossible. A wounded soldier can

rapidly become a liability when dozens

of drones are hovering overhead,

watching or actively hunting for anyone

trying to recover that personnel. I.e.

being wounded increasingly means in the

longer term being lost due to succumbing

to your wounds.

Moreover, Russia has adapted tactically

but at enormous human expense. Instead

of large mechan mechanized assaults,

Russian forces now rely heavily on

dismounted infantry attacks like

motorized assaults and infantry tactics

using small assault units much more

mobile. This preserves equipment, but it

also burns through people. Not that

Russia has much care for that. Russia

has deliberately traded manpower there

for hardware. And for a long time,

Moscow simply did not care because it

believed it could always replace the

men. But and as we'll come to now, that

assumption itself is under strain.

You see, on paper, Russia is still

meeting its recruitment goals, around

35,000 new recruits every month, but up

to 90% of those recruits are now

replacing battlefield casualties, not

expanding the force capacity overall.

That is a crucial shift to understand.

Russia's claims to have recruited over

420,000 men with similar targets set for

this year. But the quality of that

recruit level is also deteriorating. In

many estimates, including a video I made

over a year and a half ago, have put

that the official, the well-trained

forces, properly trained forces of

Russia, have stopped being the primary

fighters on the battlefield. Now, it

consists of convicted criminals,

redeployed wounded soldiers, and anyone

that the Russian state can largely get

their hands on. Desertion rates are at

their highest point in the war. And so

to keep the numbers up, Russia leans

heavily on lavish signing bonuses

largely funded by regional governments

by the different Oblasts. But in some

regions, recruits are even offered

equivalents of several years average

wages up front. Moscow specifically that

has gone further. The Kremlin

increasingly recruits men from outside

Russia, from Central Asia, South

America, and Africa. We've seen reports

of just how many Malian people or those

from Sudan are even fighting on the

front lines in Russia. So many are drawn

by the misleading promises while others

face direct pressure or even coercion.

Therefore, this is not about ideology.

It is not about patriotism. It is about

the poverty economics scaled up to

sustain a war of attrition. We cover the

economy of Russia a lot, including an

upcoming part two I have with

Constantine Somalov of Inside Russia

where we look in depth at the economics,

the significant blowback on inflation,

on the sustainability, on supply chains

of of course across the country. The

bonuses that the Russian state now

offers are starting to bite. Russia's

regions spend at least 500 billion

rubles alone on enlistment payments.

Signing bonuses now account for roughly

half% of Russia's GDP. That's just to

recruit soldiers. So it may be

manageable for now, but as the Russian

wartime economy continues to slow,

regional budgets go into the red. And so

to save money, Moscow has to restrict

payments to families of the missing

soldiers or the redeployed injured

soldiers. The burden falls

disproportionately on Russia's poorest

regions as well. Men from places like

Baratia and Tuva are vastly more likely

to die in Ukraine than men from Moscow.

Eventually, as many, and I continue to

emphasize, you simply just run out of

people for whom the money is really

worth it. Would the war ultimately be

decided on the battlefield or will it be

decided further away in deep inside

Russia? as those who really understand

that the economy is untenable and it is

untenable. Putin himself has admitted

the slowing growth, the unlikelihood

that the economy will grow by more than

one to one 12% this year compared to 4

1/2% the past couple of years. But of

course, as always, this does not mean

that Russia is about to imminently

collapse. It does not mean the war is

ending, unfortunately. But by almost any

measure, this is already one of the most

destructive wars in modern history, not

just in Europe. Approaching two million

total military casualties with

territorial gains measured literally in

meters.

Putin's strategy is producing

diminishing returns. It always has been.

The slower advances, the higher losses,

the worsening recruitment quality, and

the untenable economic strain. Ukraine,

meanwhile, faces its own brutal

constraints. the smaller population, the

mounting mobilization issues and harder

polit political limits on how far it can

stretch society without breaking. Putin

has wanted this war of endurance and he

is getting it. But the question now, as

it has long been in my mind, is whether

Russia can keep the fighting. It can to

a point. The question is how much damage

both sides and especially Russia

increasingly is willing to absorb to

move the front line by literally a

couple of hay bales and whether such a

trade-off remains politically in the

interests not just of Putin but of

course all of those who keep it in

power. But that's it from me everyone.

Thanks very much for watching. If you

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