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Ryan Greenblatt – What happens once AI can automate AI research?

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Ryan Greenblatt – What happens once AI can automate AI research?

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Today I'm chatting with Ryan Greenblatt, who is  the chief scientist at Redwood Research, where he  

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focuses on technical AI safety and security work. I want to talk to you about  

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recursive self-improvement. This is the idea that once we build  

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human-level intelligences, they quickly slingshot  towards tens of billions of superintelligences,  

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which are each individually more competent  than the top human experts across every field. 

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Whether or not this turns out to  be the case is probably the most  

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important question in the world right now. And historically, I've been quite skeptical  

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that this kind of thing happens, but, you  seem to think that it might be plausible,  

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and so I wanted to hear the case for it. Let's talk about this. First, I think  

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it's worth noting that AI R&D is a type of  task at which the AIs are especially good,  

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because the companies are trying really  hard to make their AIs good at AI R&D. 

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It's also the kind of domain that has a lot  of nice properties from the perspective of  

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how AI development works right now. It's pretty verifiable. You can do  

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a bunch of stuff iteratively, and  it'll hill climb on various metrics. 

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I think once you have AIs which are roughly  matching the top human experts in AI R&D,  

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that could kick off a feedback loop  where the AIs are doing AI research. 

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That produces smarter AIs. That feeds  back in. That feedback loop could be  

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strong enough that you end up with a lot  of progress in a short period of time. 

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Maybe my median expectation is something like four  or five years of AI progress in a single year. 

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This requires really overcoming a huge amount  of diminishing returns in research and basically  

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doing the equivalent of the progress we would have  gotten after a really large compute scale-out. 

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So this is a pretty impressive, big thing. It's worth keeping in mind that five years  

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of AI progress, four years of AI  progress, even three years of AI  

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progress, is really a lot of fucking AI progress. A little over three years ago, GPT-4 had come out. 

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Right now, of course, we have Mythos 5 or  whatever, and maybe a somewhat better model  

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that Anthropic has internally. That is just a huge amount of  

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progress in a bit over three years. If we're talking about five years,  

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then maybe we're talking more about a  jump from GPT-3 to Mythos 5 or whatever. 

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I think this argument has three different parts. Now I want to evaluate each one of them. 

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First is the argument that  AI R&D is very verifiable. 

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Second is the argument that if you  automate AI R&D, you could get four  

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or five years of progress in a single year. Third is the argument that what comes out  

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the other end of four or five years  of AI progress at the current pace,  

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starting at the point whenever AI R&D is  automated, is an AI where you can drop it  

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on the job at basically anything you can imagine. You can drop it in Texas politics in the 1940s,  

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and it outmaneuvers Lyndon Johnson. You can drop it in TSMC, and it learns how  

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to do better process engineering at TSMC. It's certainly a better video editor…  

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My video editors are very excellent, but it  is just, in general, better than humans at  

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any given job that it finds itself trying to do. So I want to evaluate all of these sub-arguments  

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that lead to basically getting ASI pretty  soon after this benchmark, which you're  

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expecting by 2030 or something, right? I would say that I expect full automation  

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of AI R&D perhaps somewhere around 2031, 2030. Getting to the "beats all humans on the job"  

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milestone, maybe my median  expectation is around 2033. 

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But if I see AIs fully automating AI R&D, I  think I'm expecting that probably within a year. 

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The way the forecasting works out, the difference  between medians is bigger than the median  

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difference between milestones. Anyway, whatever. 

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By the way, there's this meme on the internet. Every time I'm trying to ask about people's  

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timelines, when I'm asking Dario or  somebody, I'm always like, "Okay,  

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how long before you automate my video editors?" There's this meme of my video editor editing  

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the podcast every time I listen to this. But the reason I do it is because I think  

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it's easy to get lost in abstractions when  you talk about jobs you don't understand well,  

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and to very concretely understand what it takes to  automate a job that I actually understand why it's  

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difficult for LLMs to currently take control over. I do think that the milestone for automating your  

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video editor is earlier than the milestone  of being able to automate all human jobs,  

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including Texas politics, spinning up on the job. I do think that the video editor automation  

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occurs maybe more around full automation of AI  R&D, but it's very sensitive to how much people  

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are really focusing on understanding video. Okay, so let's start with the claim  

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that AI R&D is very verifiable. There's a few different parts of this. 

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One of them is that we can train on  a bunch of environments which are  

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basically directly training the model to do  some AI R&D task or some very close-by task. 

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For example, we can have some environment where  the model is training some AI on just eight  

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H100s or some small amount of compute, and that  model could be the equivalent of GPT-2 medium or  

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whatever, and then similar to NanoGPT medium runs  — and in RL, it's tweaking and iterating on that. 

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We could do that for a bunch of different tasks. We could have it train image classification  

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models, video generation models, image generation  models, all kinds of different ML training tasks. 

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We could RL it on the task of training  increasingly good models, and also  

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doing things like, "Oh, here's a particular  direction you could pursue for an algorithm. 

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Can you go and implement that?" Basically, there's this whole class  

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of containerizable, verifiable, small-scale AI  R&D tasks that we can aggressively RL the AIs on. 

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Already companies are presumably doing some  RL on these sorts of tasks, and you could  

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just keep scaling that up, keep making more  of these small-scale AI R&D tasks, and then  

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the AIs could keep getting better at this. Implicitly, I'm claiming this will transfer  

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to extremely load-bearing aspects of AI R&D. But maybe let's stop there for a second and then  

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get to that part. So let's talk through  

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what this concretely looks like. You can imagine that we have GPT-7.5. 

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We say, "GPT-7.5, we want to make you so  good at AI R&D that you help us train GPT-9." 

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So now we want to train GPT-7.5, and we come  up with a bunch of different environments. 

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As you mentioned, there's already this repo  that is the descendant of Andrej Karpathy's  

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nanoGPT speedrun, where you just try to change  everything about the model, from the optimizer  

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to the hyperparameters to the architecture, to get  it to a fixed training loss as fast as possible. 

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You could have other kinds of environments  where you could say, "Hey, GPT-7.5, I want you  

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to train a really good video game-playing model. I want you to train a model that actually improves  

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as it plays the same video game again and again. So you learn how to maybe help the  

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model get better at online learning. We don't care how you figure this out. 

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Maybe it's some kind of crazy  neuralese or a vector memory. 

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Or maybe it's just better long-context stuff. We don't care. Figure out how to do online  

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learning research." Obviously, GPT-7.5  

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will already be a smart model, and in the same  way the models currently are getting smarter,  

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it'll be better and better at coding. You can imagine 100 other environments  

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like this which are incentivizing the ability to  do AI R&D, like containerized versions of getting  

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GPT-7.5 to develop GPT-2-sized models, et cetera. Then you basically put GPT-7.5 through a bunch of  

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this kind of training, you build GPT-8. GPT-8 is now an amazing ML researcher. 

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It has so much intuition from  doing all this kind of training. 

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Honestly, a huge intuition pump for me is seeing  the progress that AI has made in mathematics. 

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If it's a very verifiable domain, AIs can  get… I don't really know the object-level  

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details of mathematics research,  but I'm just like, "No, it works." 

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It can just come in like a flood if you can  totally put it into a verification loop,  

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and it can actually make new breakthroughs. I am curious if ML research has a quality of  

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mathematical research where it seems  like there was a big overhang from  

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connecting different disciplines together. No one person would have known enough about  

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algebraic geometry and… What was the right word? Oh man, I really don’t know  

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about the math breakthroughs. No one person would’ve known enough  

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about topology and algebraic whatever in order  to make some counterexample to a big conjecture. 

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My view is that ML is a less deep domain  than math, and so there's less of a thing  

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where there are individual experts with really  deep expertise in some area that they combine,  

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but there's definitely going to be some of that. But then I also think that ML has some attributes  

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that make it even more favorable to AI  training than mathematics in some ways. 

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In particular, you can get a better  sense of whether you're succeeding,  

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and you can see intermediate progress. In math, it's often the case that there's no easy  

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way to see whether or not you're close to success. Whereas if your goal is, for example,  

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to get to some training loss 2x faster, you  can kind of see when you're halfway there. 

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It tends to be the case that ML innovations  are very additive, or maybe multiplicative  

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depending on how you think about it, where  basically you can keep stacking innovations. 

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Usually the innovations just add together and  don't interfere with each other, though obviously  

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it's going to depend on the details. So I think that in a lot of ways,  

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AI R&D will have properties quite similar to  math, where you can train on chunks of AI R&D  

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that are pretty similar in structure to the  problem you actually cared about, in a very  

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verifiable way, and then that will transfer. There's an open question of exactly how  

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well it will transfer, but I think that the  transfer currently for math looks pretty good. 

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My expectation is that the transfer for AI  R&D will look pretty good, but not amazing. 

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So one concern I have is that I think  even in mathematics, as far as I'm aware,  

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we have not seen very impressive new theory. We've seen a lot of impressive, verifiable,  

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specific results — for example, find a  counterexample to this conjecture — but  

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we have not seen "come up with the idea  of topology" kinds of levels of things,  

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or "come up with things like group theory". It seems like ML research has elements of  

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both of these things. But the less verifiable  

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thing of coming up with new ways of thinking  about the problem would be harder to induce. 

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Take, for example, the idea of scaling laws. Obviously, there is some end verification  

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loop such that you can train GPT-4 better if  you have the idea of scaling laws from 2020. 

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But there is a longer and potentially more  compute-laden road to inducing AIs to be like,  

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"Okay, I got to think carefully about how  I should be scaling my parameters and data. 

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What are different kinds of investigations  I could run to understand this? 

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Maybe I can come up with a visualization  and an isoFLOP analysis or something." 

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But that does seem like a longer  verification loop than just, "Hey,  

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let's get nanoGPT loss to go down." Let's talk about this. First of all,  

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I think in the context of math, the  thing I would say is that the AIs can  

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do the equivalent of 'baby's first new  theory,' where, for example, they can  

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just prove interesting conjectures via making  connections and producing new understanding. 

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It’s like, "Oh, there's this construction  the AI found which is pretty interesting",  

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or it found this way of thinking about  the problem that's a bit different. 

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We do see that. It's just that the examples  we see are not as impressive as founding  

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the field of group theory. Founding the field of group  

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theory is probably among the best, biggest  mathematical accomplishments of all time,  

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and the AIs just aren't that good at math yet. From my perspective, there's a continuum between  

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that and the things we're seeing now,  that the AIs are continuing to march up. 

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Second, I think ML is a very  shallow domain relative to math. 

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In math, there was much more of a thing  where you find some true deep abstraction,  

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and if you really understand that thing, which  is hard to understand, then you get somewhere. 

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Whereas I feel like the things that are the  equivalent of that in ML are really dumb bullshit. 

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Like with scaling laws, come on guys, we  can explain scaling laws really quickly. 

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I think the deepest and most important concepts  in math, for example, don't have the property that  

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you can really understand the underlying thing  and why it matters in a very short period of time. 

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But I feel like one effect will  be that we will have gotten rid  

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of all the low-hanging fruits by 2030. I feel like scaling laws will have been,  

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in math history, like Descartes finding the  Cartesian grid and doing very basic mathematics. 

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Eventually, if we want to keep making  progress in the 2030s, it's going to be  

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like doing whatever bullshit is happening  at the frontiers of mathematics right now. 

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That could be right. My sense is that  some domains are structurally different  

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in terms of how they operate and how  much they depend on deep abstractions. 

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Physics and math are much more on the  side of being very far on the deep,  

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hard-to-come-up-with-ideas side,  whereas I think ML and most other  

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domains are much more amenable to hill climbing. That's my sense of how this will go in the future. 

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Even in the regime where your AIs are having  to plow — it's 2030, a bunch of low-hanging  

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fruit in research has already happened, and  they need to make further progress — I still  

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suspect that a bunch of the work will live more  on the side of building increasingly complicated  

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infrastructure and having really good intuition  about what the experiments roughly look like. 

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So I'm probably less sympathetic to the idea that  the thing the AIs will lack is some deep insight. 

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I’m more sympathetic to the idea that they  really need a bunch of taste about in-the-weeds  

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experiments that they currently don't have. They need a bunch of intuition for what sorts of  

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training approaches would work and what  wouldn't, in ways that current researchers have. 

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Even in cases where there has been some  breakthrough in AI, oftentimes in retrospect  

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it looks like a big bottleneck to making that  breakthrough happen was getting all of the micro  

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details and mungy intuition right. An example of this is training AIs  

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to be good at reasoning and chain of  thought, doing RL on chain of thought. 

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It looks like you probably could have done RL  and chain of thought on GPT-3 and gotten kind  

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of interesting results on math if you had  really scaled it up and done a good job. 

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But at the time, there was low-hanging fruit. Also, doing a good job with that training  

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is kind of in the weeds on all the  technical implementation and scaling  

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it up and getting the hyperparameters right. So maybe you can demonstrate everything on  

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Qwen 1B or whatever and get some sense  that this whole thing is going to work. 

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But people didn't demonstrate it as early as  they could have because of all of these other  

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mungy details and intuition about exactly how  to tune the parameters and how to set things up. 

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This is my remaining skepticism,  honestly, about this story. 

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I'm not sure I understand why, if research  breakthroughs are so amenable to intelligence,  

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AI progress has not been historically  faster than it could have been. 

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As you were saying, by the time RLVR actually  worked — even though you could have done it  

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with less compute — we had to wait for oceans of  compute, gigawatts of compute, to be available  

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before people were doing this training, on the  trajectory of compute continuing to increase so we  

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make more breakthroughs. I don't know. I feel like there  

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were a lot of AI researchers in the year  2022 who were trying to crack reasoning. 

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Was it just that they were  bottlenecked by the ability to  

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write infrastructure code, or what was happening? It's a complicated mix. I think they would have  

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gone faster if they could, as soon as they  thought of an experiment, run that experiment  

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without bugs, without bugs being very important. And then another part of it is that being able  

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to run a lot of experiments at high compute  lets you paper over ways in which the way you  

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implemented it isn't quite right or you  didn't have the right hyperparameters. 

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So compute is just really helpful for doing AI  research, and you can cover over a lot of things. 

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But that doesn't mean that massive  increases in labor wouldn't also be helpful,  

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especially if that labor comes with among the  best intuitions that people have in the field. 

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I just think that's really helpful. Another part of my perspective here,  

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which is maybe a bit different from where you're  coming from, is that I'm expecting somewhat more  

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transfer than you seem to be imagining. I'm imagining these AIs are actually  

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pretty good scientists in general and are  pretty reasonable at all of that stuff. 

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When you interact with them,  it's not like they have some  

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really hyper-specialized savant-type vibe. They're actually pretty good at all of the  

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stuff in R&D, and then maybe  extremely good at some subdomains. 

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So they're incredibly superhuman at  writing kernels, incredibly superhuman  

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at everything with very short feedback loops,  and then pretty good at all the other stuff,  

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totally able to match other people. I think we are seeing this now. 

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When I look at AIs right now, it's already  the case that they can pretty competently  

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match humans who are mediocre at  ML research at doing ML research. 

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It's just that being mediocre at  ML research is not that helpful. 

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The thing you actually want are  people who are good at ML research. 

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My sense is the AIs are just  improving at all of these things. 

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Their taste is improving, their intuition is  improving, and it's already the case that their  

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taste and intuition is not complete garbage. I want to very concretely understand what it  

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would look like for five years of  AI progress to happen in one year. 

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Suppose we were back when GPT-3 was developed. The idea is that, with the level of compute they  

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had back in 2022, if we had automated  AI R&D back then, you could at the  

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end of that year have Mythos. That would be the idea, yes. 

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Mythos took way more compute than they  had back then, but even with the level  

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of compute they had back then, not only  do all the breakthroughs happen, but they  

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also train Mythos with that level of compute. What would be required is obviously discovering  

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all the algorithmic progress since then. It’s discovering even more, actually,  

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because you've got to make up for the fact  that Mythos uses… What was GPT-3 trained on? 

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Like 1e23? We can look it up. But is it plausibly four  

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orders of magnitude more compute? I think it's somewhat less than that. 

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Let's look this up quickly. GPT-3 training compute is about 3e23. 

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My sense is that Mythos is probably  a little over three OOMs higher. 

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So the question is: can you overcome this  1000x compute gap while also being the model? 

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Here's a concrete claim that  maybe we should talk about. 

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Right now, would we be able to  train a model with GPT-3-level  

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compute that matches… What exactly do I think? GPT-3 was released in 2020, so it was trained  

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about six and a half, seven years ago. It's worth noting that GPT-3 is maybe  

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a little too far in the past, but  let's go with this for a second. 

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If we were to train a model with GPT-3-level  compute today, how good would that model be? 

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My understanding, based on how algorithmic  progress works, is that we'd be able to train  

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a model that's as good as the best model  we had perhaps around three years ago. 

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So I think that right now we'd be able to train a  version of GPT-3 that's probably somewhat better  

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than GPT-4, a moderate amount better than GPT-4. I think that's about right. 

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That roughly lines up with how  algorithmic progress has worked. 

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Basically, the story would end up being that to  get five years of AI progress, you're probably  

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going to need around, I would say, maybe eight  years of algorithmic progress, very roughly,  

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which is a lot of algorithmic progress. But it just turns out that most of the AI  

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progress, from my perspective, has come  from some mix of algorithms and data,  

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and you can just keep making huge improvements on  these things and training AIs with less compute. 

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I'm glad you brought that up, because what has  happened since GPT-3, or even 3.5, till now? 

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Why is Mythos so good? Obviously, we've scaled the compute. 

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We have better algorithms. But a huge thing  that's happened is that we have built a  

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deca-billion-dollar data industry which  has systematically collected and codified  

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expert human judgment across all kinds of  different disciplines — codified in the form  

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of RL environments, codified in the form of  SFT traces — that these experts built to help  

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the model better understand how you do coding,  how you build complex infrastructure projects,  

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how you do law, how you do whatever. How are the AIs able to replicate the  

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effect that expert human judgment currently  seems to be playing in AI progress? 

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My sense is that scaling up the amount of effort  spent on getting expert human data has not been  

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hugely important for AI R&D in general. In particular, over the last few years,  

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we've been scaling up compute, scaling up  people working at AI companies, and scaling  

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up the amount of effort spent on data labeling. My sense is that if you removed the last two  

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doublings or whatever of data  generation from expert humans,  

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that would not make a huge difference. A lot of what's been going on is people  

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have been developing better ways to leverage  humans and AIs to construct RL environments  

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and going somewhere from that. But how do you explain why  

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the AIs have gotten so good at coding? I feel like a big part of that is data and RL  

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environments, which are codifying human experts. But the question is what is the limiting  

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factor on creating RL environments? My sense is that the reason why RL  

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environments today are much better than they were  in 2024 is not so much because we have hired way  

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more human experts to make RL environments. It is instead much more because we better  

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know what RL environments we even want  to make and how we should structure them. 

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Also, we're using huge amounts of  AI labor to build RL environments. 

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I think those effects are much more important  than the effect of human labor building the  

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RL environments. I'm not saying  

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that the human labor doesn't matter. I'm just saying there are other big  

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drivers that are important here. I could try to argue for this. 

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One thing is just that the amount of  environments people want is a very large amount. 

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I think the AIs are actually pretty good  at the task of making RL environments given  

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some sense of what the thing should be. There's preexisting data you could use. 

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A lot of these things have  good verification loops. 

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Just look at, for example, what was reported  in Business Insider yesterday, that Google  

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is paying close to $2 billion for Mechanize. We can just look at market rates for what people  

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think really good human expert data is worth. The frontier labs seem to think it's worth a lot. 

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They're willing to pay for it. What fraction of frontier lab spending  

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do you think is on data rather than compute? What do you think is the compute/data spend split? 

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I think it's overwhelmingly compute,  but I also think it's because compute  

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is easier to scale up than data. But that's really relevant to what's  

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driving progress, right? My sense is that the  

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split is something like 20 to 1 or 10 to 1. I don't know exactly. It depends on the company. 

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But this is similar to how oil is 1.5% of GDP. That doesn't mean that if you cut oil out,  

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GDP could continue to run. Sure, but it contradicts your argument, right? 

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The economy would come to a halt  immediately if oil went away. 

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Sure, but you were just arguing  that because of the high market cap,  

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we can learn that this is the key driver,  and I'm saying that's not clearly true. 

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That argument just makes it look like compute is  a much more important driver, or hiring employees  

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is a much more important driver. So maybe let's be more concrete. 

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Here's what I think. My claim is that if  you went back to 2022 and you had GPT-3.5,  

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and you were trying to make it better at coding  

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without human experts, I think it would  have just been very, very difficult. 

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Let me give you an example of what I imagine would  be the difficulty of going from GPT-8 to ASI. 

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One of the things you'd want ASI to be good  at is: I'm going to take over a company  

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and make it much more profitable and do all  kinds of crazy shit to make it work better. 

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I'm going to take over a  fab and produce more chips. 

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I'm going to go into Congress and try to  convince them to pass some bill, et cetera. 

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This is what I imagine five more  years of AI progress at this  

24:08

pace would enable an AI to be able to do. This is the thing I'm really worried about:  

24:12

ASI that can understand how to do crazy shit in  the world, that can do what Kissinger can do,  

24:16

can do what Steve Jobs can do, et  cetera, and also his engineers and so on. 

24:22

I'm not sure how you get that without the  relevant world data, which is the equivalent  

24:28

of Mythos being really good at coding while  not having the coding environments that have  

24:33

improved it relative to GPT-3. Here are a few points. 

24:36

First, I bet if you look at randomly  sampled training environments for Mythos,  

24:40

they're actually very different from what it  looks like to actually use the model in practice. 

24:45

My sense is that the RL distribution has  really large deviations from the real-world  

24:48

data distribution, and it's significantly  smoothed over by a mix of transfer and having  

24:54

a small amount of data focused on the real world. My sense is that this will be a similar mechanism  

24:59

as how it works for the crazy, wildly, quite  superhuman AI you get as a result of five years  

25:06

of AI progress on top of fully automated AI R&D. So let's go through this a little bit. 

25:12

In particular, I think that you could train an  AI to be really, really good at learning on the  

25:18

fly and doing something analogous to in-context  learning, but potentially using somewhat different  

25:22

mechanisms, in a wide variety of RL environments. You build all these different RL environments  

25:26

where the AI has to adapt on the fly, learn on the  fly, figure out what it should do, understand its  

25:32

situation better, and learn really quickly from  feedback in order to succeed at its objective. 

25:37

And it has things like limited  resources, and if it messes up,  

25:40

it can end up in a much worse position. If you train on a huge number of these  

25:44

environments, you will learn general  skills of picking up context on the fly,  

25:49

and we're already seeing this. It's already the case that AIs are  

25:51

now much better at understanding roughly what's  going on and picking up context from a limited  

25:58

amount of information they're given access to. Then those AIs could be put on the job at TSMC. 

26:04

Even though TSMC is not literally in their  data distribution, their data distribution  

26:08

is really wide, and the AIs are extremely  good on their data distribution, such that it  

26:11

transfers to picking up being good at being an  engineer at TSMC and learning that on the fly. 

26:19

The way the AI gets good at being a  TSMC engineer isn't that it has a ton  

26:22

of cached knowledge on being a good TSMC engineer. It's that it does the equivalent of some scaled-up  

26:28

version of in-context learning there. That'd be the most prosaic story. 

26:32

Obviously, there's a bunch of  different ways this could go. 

26:34

I think this maybe comes down to a difference  of intuition about how far you can get. 

26:39

When I think about really smart people I  know, they're just not that effective in  

26:43

domains they don't understand that well. But how long have they had to learn? 

26:48

I agree that if they had experience,  they would be much better. 

26:51

But that's maybe what I'm arguing  for, that experience with data. 

26:53

For example, if I just get a really smart  Ivy League college grad, and I'm like, "Okay,  

26:59

you're now in charge of negotiating the Iran  deal," I think they just wouldn't know what to do. 

27:04

I think if you instead got someone who is  really good at quickly picking up a bunch  

27:08

of different domains and you gave them some  time to train and talk to people and shore  

27:12

up their expertise and do some practice,  they would actually do a pretty good job. 

27:16

I think most domains are fundamentally  pretty shallow, where a very smart  

27:20

generalist who's good at a limited subset  of core skills can get going pretty quickly. 

27:28

That's not true for literally every domain. My sense is that the AIs will develop  

27:31

increasingly good mechanisms for quickly acquiring  understanding and expertise in a given domain. 

27:36

Consider, for example, how fast  AIs can understand a new code base. 

27:40

AIs can understand a new code base much faster  than humans can, but to a degree that's shallower  

27:45

than humans could currently understand. But it's getting better over time. 

27:49

Let me spell that argument out a bit more. Let's say you take Fable 5 or Mythos 5 or  

27:54

whatever, and you wanted to make some kind of  complicated change to a really massive code base. 

28:00

The model will get some understanding of  the code base very fast, in the course of  

28:04

maybe significantly less than an hour,  potentially much less than an hour. 

28:08

Then its understanding of the code base  will plateau a little bit, where it won't  

28:12

get as deep of an understanding as a human  would have gotten over a much longer period. 

28:15

So it's like an AI in an hour can match a human  with a few weeks maybe, depending on the details  

28:20

of exactly how complicated the code base is. But it won't match a human who's been working  

28:25

on that code base for two years or whatever. But over time, the amount of understanding  

28:30

AIs can match has gone up. If we look at 3.7 Sonnet or 3.5 Sonnet,  

28:35

maybe it could only match the equivalent of  understanding a code base for a day or something. 

28:40

But now AIs are much better at  building context about a task. 

28:45

So you can be like, "Mythos, I want you  to really understand this code base,  

28:48

and then implement this feature." It will spawn a bajillion sub-agents. 

28:53

Those sub-agents will pore over a bunch of things. It will deliver a bunch of context back. 

28:56

It will then investigate a few things. It's not amazing at doing this, but it can  

29:00

happen really fast, and it can work pretty well. And it's not very hard for me to imagine  

29:04

how you could train AIs to be  increasingly good at this task. 

29:07

The task of implementing some very complicated  feature in some reasonable way in a very big  

29:11

code base is extremely verifiable, and  that can be a thing the AIs improve on. 

29:16

Similarly, there's a broader skill of  quickly understanding context and being  

29:20

able to have a bunch of different AIs learn  in parallel and then merging that together. 

29:25

I think there seems to be a crux here, which I  think is just an empirical question we'll see. 

29:31

How good is the transfer between  getting really, really good at  

29:37

understanding the situation, getting up to speed,  making progress over long periods in verifiable  

29:43

domains — which the AIs are obviously getting way,  way better at really fast — to, "Okay, go talk to  

29:50

the president and convince him to do X thing." Or, "You're now in charge of Google. 

29:56

You must make Google a much more  profitable company this quarter." 

29:59

Let me try to spell out a few more  arguments that are maybe relevant. 

30:02

One thing is, when looking at how  the AIs have improved at essay  

30:07

writing… Let's talk about that a little bit. You can get some data even on these domains. 

30:14

AIs will be able to get some data even on these  domains when on a very fast progress trajectory. 

30:18

Maybe it's hard to build a verifiable  environment for "was your essay really  

30:22

good according to humans?" But you can do a bit of that. 

30:24

You can do some training. You can do some online training. 

30:27

The AIs will be able to do some online  training based on real-world stuff. 

30:30

They'll be able to have evals. They'll be able to sample that. 

30:33

You can scale up the cadence at which you do this. The second thing is that in practice,  

30:38

when I just look at the transfer, it seems okay. I think the AIs have in fact improved a bunch at  

30:42

non-verifiable domains, and it's hard to point  to domains that are really hard to verify on  

30:48

which the amount of improvement between GPT-4  and Mythos hasn't been pretty high in practice. 

30:54

Now, that doesn't mean that Mythos is  better than the best humans or something. 

30:57

It can still be significantly worse  than typical human professionals at  

31:00

some aspect of their job while still being way  better than GPT-4, which was not even close. 

31:06

So we're talking about how much progress has come  from data versus compute over the last few years. 

31:14

That reminds me, I'm actually running  an experiment with this with Jerry Han,  

31:17

who's still a college student. What we're basically doing to evaluate  

31:22

how much progress is coming from data versus  algorithms is training the best algorithmic  

31:28

recipe from 2019 till now with the best data  from the 2026 data file, and then also training  

31:34

the different data files going back from 2019 to  2026 with the current best algorithmic recipe. 

31:41

I think that will be interesting. I'm curious if you want to pre-register  

31:45

what amount of compute multipliers  are coming from one versus the other. 

31:48

We need to be pretty careful with what  we mean when we say the word data. 

31:51

I was trying to be pretty careful to distinguish  between scaling up spending on getting human  

31:55

experts to label data, or scaling up  the amount of human expert-labeled data. 

32:00

The reason why we have a better pre-training data  set now versus in 2019 is not because people are  

32:04

spending way more money getting human experts to  type up data that the AIs are then trained on. 

32:10

Partially. I think it's not much of it. 

32:12

I think it's very little of the  pre-training data improvements. 

32:14

I do mean pre-training. We should maybe talk  separately about mid-training and post-training. 

32:20

But I think the vast majority of pre-training  data improvements are from science on better  

32:24

understanding what data sets are good and  schleppy labor on figuring out how to filter down. 

32:29

So my view is that improvements of the  form of, like, OpenWebText to FineWeb,  

32:35

that improvement is better described  as an algorithmic improvement of the  

32:38

sort that you can study with some GPUs, and  you don't need human expert data to do that. 

32:46

Now, there's a different effect which we  could talk about, which is that maybe the  

32:49

internet in 2026 is more of a fertile ground  for training data than the internet in 2018. 

32:56

There's also been an effect where there are  just more humans posting on the internet,  

32:58

so there's more data to harvest. My sense is that that effect is  

33:01

going to be quite a bit smaller than the effect  of humans knowing better how to curate the data,  

33:07

having better scrapes, knowing how to process  those scrapes better — this sort of thing. 

33:11

This is more like automated  engineering and automated R&D. 

33:13

That's right. That makes sense. 

33:16

In some sense, the thing you would want to look at  is: we're going to do two post-training pipelines. 

33:20

You have one post-training pipeline where  Mythos 5 builds a post-training pipeline,  

33:30

but it only has access to internet data  plus a tiny amount of human experts,  

33:36

but it has the best current methods. You have another one where Mythos has  

33:41

access to the shitty post-training methods we  had in 2024 but with a shit ton of human experts. 

33:49

Again, both have the internet data. My sense is that the current methods without  

33:53

many human experts will actually do quite well. Interesting. 

33:55

It's a bit messy though, because can Mythos  get something that's more capable than Mythos? 

34:00

You might need to be a bit thoughtful on  what model it is that you're post-training. 

34:03

What is your view on what is the  least verifiable part of AI R&D? 

34:06

The least verifiable, probably  making calls on large experiments. 

34:10

The thing that I think is most likely to  be the bottleneck — in terms of the AIs  

34:14

being really good at verifiable domains but  not at doing the actual thing — is just big  

34:18

experiments where you only get a few tries. Well, "a few" is maybe a bit understated. 

34:24

Historically R&D has been driven by  doing near-frontier-scale experiments. 

34:28

That has been pretty important, actually  doing the one big training run where you  

34:31

decide exactly what to include. There's a bunch of ways that the  

34:34

AIs can make that more verifiable. They can have better science of  

34:38

exactly what to predict. They can scale down their  

34:41

frontier-scale training runs to a point where  they can study that scale more aggressively,  

34:44

at some one-time hit to compute cost. If people wanted to, a thing you can  

34:49

always do is train smaller models  so that you can run more rounds. 

34:53

I think we have seen this. One reason why the AIs have  

34:58

been scaled up less than you would have otherwise  expected — and, for example, cost per token hasn't  

35:03

increased as much as you might have thought — is  because there is a benefit to doing more of your  

35:08

work at small scale, where you can run  more training runs and get more cycles in. 

35:11

So you're not leaning as hard on one  big, really important training run. 

35:18

I just want to unpack a couple  of things for the audience. 

35:22

The thing you're pointing out is that  the price per token has not increased  

35:25

that much since 2024 or 2023. GPT-4 was, I don't know,  

35:30

like $30 per million output tokens? Mythos is like $50 per million output tokens. 

35:35

Right. So the thing you're trying to explain is,  "How can it be that we're in this era of scaling —  

35:41

and so bigger models should be more expensive to  serve — but the token price is not increasing?" 

35:48

You're suggesting that we've increased  active parameters slower than you would  

35:54

have naively assumed because people just want  to make fast progress on training models. 

36:00

You do that by training smaller models faster. There's a complicated mix of factors. 

36:04

My view is more that people have done a bunch  of big training runs that did not go that well. 

36:09

There's GPT-4.5, which famously people  at OpenAI thought was a bit of a bust. 

36:14

I think there are some rumors that  there were a bunch of other training  

36:17

runs people have done that were a bit of a bust. Part of it is that I think there's just a bunch  

36:20

of details in actually getting that right. So it makes sense to do more of the work at  

36:25

smaller scale and just eat the fact that  you're taking a hit on final performance  

36:29

in order to be able to quickly iterate. Train more models faster and therefore  

36:34

learn better, and also be able to have  a smarter ultimate production model. 

36:40

This is not the only effect. There's also the fact that  

36:42

RL benefits more from small models. There's a bunch of things going on. 

36:45

But I do think that, in fact, people  are making trade-offs towards the side  

36:48

of faster iteration times because of  algorithmic progress being so fast. 

36:53

It seems to me that a big source of why  these big training runs have failed,  

36:56

at least from rumors, is just very subtle  bugs that are really hard to track down. 

37:01

But the TL;DR is, how good will the AIs be at  avoiding and finding these kinds of mistakes? 

37:13

They might get really good at engineering  and being trained to avoid bugs. 

37:18

Basically the opposite of the slop world we live  in now, or are living in less and less over time. 

37:23

But then there's also the question of,  "Can they do the analysis to find the  

37:27

right experiment to run to identify what is  going wrong with the training run right now?" 

37:31

That seems to be very bottlenecked  by the taste of extremely few humans. 

37:36

My assumption is GDM is going through this  right now, where humans are trying to figure  

37:39

out what is wrong with the training pipeline. There's a rumor that right after Noam Shazeer  

37:46

joined GDM, which he's now left, they  had a new really good training run,  

37:50

and the reason why is that Noam Shazeer just  looked at their code base and found a bunch  

37:53

of bugs, because he just knew where to look. My sense is that training AIs to find bugs  

37:58

is going to be one of the easier tasks  to train AIs on, because most of these  

38:03

bugs we're talking about can probably be  demonstrated without that much compute. 

38:08

Probably you’ll get pretty good transfer from  pointing out other types of bugs at smaller scale. 

38:12

So then you can RL AIs that look at this overall  complicated training situation and point out cases  

38:17

where there's an important bug, and then fix that. This is a pretty verifiable task. 

38:23

It's not arbitrarily verifiable, because  maybe often to demonstrate the bug you  

38:27

might need to do a moderate-scale compute  experiment where you spin up the whole  

38:31

distributed infrastructure and then run it. But oftentimes I think you'll be able to  

38:34

demonstrate it pretty convincingly at smaller  scale in a way which you could actually train on. 

38:42

I think it wouldn't be very surprising if  right now people have RL environments where  

38:45

they introduce a subtle bug into some training  recipe, train the AI to point out the subtle bug,  

38:50

and then have a rubric where they're like,  "Did it actually find the right bug?" 

38:54

That seems very doable, and there's a  bunch of things you could do along these  

38:58

lines that I think would work reasonably well. So on that specific point, I think it's doable. 

39:03

Then the main thing is there's other intuition  about which exact large-scale de-risking  

39:09

experiments you need to run. How should you orient them? 

39:12

How should you pick hyperparameters  in uncertain cases, or things  

39:15

that are analogous to hyperparameters? That's the thing the AIs might most struggle with. 

39:19

But I currently expect there'll be enough transfer  if you train on all these different environments,  

39:23

that the AIs will be good at that domain. I should be clear, I also think the AIs  

39:29

will transfer to other domains. There are going to be the domains  

39:33

the AIs are by far the best at, then  domains where they're somewhat less good,  

39:37

and domains where they're quite a bit less good. But I think we still see transfer to everything. 

39:41

It's really hard for me to think of examples  of cognitive tasks humans do where we're  

39:44

not seeing some transfer from AI improving. So let's step back and package this whole story. 

39:50

I think people can probably  follow along with this story. 

39:52

We have GPT-7.5 trained on a bunch of  environments, where it's not only in general  

39:56

becoming a better AI, but specifically  we're training it to do AI R&D better. 

40:02

It’s making GPT-2 size runs that are better at  playing video games that require sample efficiency  

40:08

or online learning or whatever other capabilities. Another thing that's really important is you don't  

40:12

just do GPT-2 sized runs, you also  do small fine-tuning runs on GPT-6. 

40:17

As in, you have GPT-2, and you  can do full pre-trains of GPT-2,  

40:20

and then you can do small post-training  or mid-training or whatever runs on GPT-6. 

40:26

And then you can do a small number of  experiments that are actually at frontier scale,  

40:30

but you do a bit of online training or something. What do you mean by "do online training" on that? 

40:34

Another thing we can do is take GPT-7.5, and  presumably in the course of GPT-7.5's work, it's  

40:40

running a bunch of experiments at varying scale  that are actually on the critical path for AI R&D. 

40:45

For many of those things you'll  be able to get a sense after the  

40:47

fact of whether or not it did a good job. So it did some post-training experiment  

40:53

where it was trying to figure out  whether some method actually works. 

40:56

In some cases you'll be like, "Whoa, it  found this kickass method, it totally  

40:59

de-risked it, it totally worked." And then you can reinforce that. 

41:04

One thing you could do would be to convert the  experiment it just ran into an RL environment  

41:12

based on production data and then train on that. Or you could potentially just literally take the  

41:15

rollouts that found that and do some sort  of off-policy RL, or you could do some  

41:22

on-policy RL with some production data. Basically the thing you're suggesting is:  

41:25

there's the small-scale stuff where you're  teaching the AI to get better at AI R&D taste,  

41:30

but you're discarding the  actual "things it found". 

41:35

Then it actually does real R&D in the  practice of trying to become better at AI R&D,  

41:39

and you're like, "This is a pretty  cool thing that you discovered. 

41:41

Let's actually also use this in production  in the future, and teach you how to use it  

41:44

in production." That's right. 

41:45

But stepping back, GPT-7.5 becomes GPT-8  as a result of all this AI R&D training and  

41:51

just generally becoming smarter. Then it helps you build GPT-9. 

41:55

Another very important thing has to happen,  which is maybe the thing I'm most skeptical of. 

42:01

GPT-8 has figured out how to make it so… GPT-9,  as intelligent as it is… Humans currently,  

42:13

AI researchers, try their stuff, and they're like,  "Okay, but we trained GPT-4.5 and it wasn't good." 

42:20

It required real-world feedback or some evaluation  of trying to use the model in production. 

42:25

Then they were like, "It wasn't that  good, and we're not going to ship it." 

42:28

So GPT-8 needs this ability to see how good the  transfer is to all these other things you're  

42:34

talking about — like being really good at Texas  politics, or really good at running a business,  

42:38

et cetera — which is not a production environment  and, in fact, cannot be a containerized  

42:42

environment given the nature of the task. As the agents get longer and longer horizon,  

42:47

the short-horizon things you can containerize  are like, "Okay, code this up or whatever." 

42:53

Extremely long-horizon things — "Go run a  successful business, go have a profitable day  

42:57

in the markets, go negotiate a trade deal" — these  things are actually very hard to containerize. 

43:02

So I think it's very plausible that  it's very hard for GPT-8 to figure out  

43:07

how to make this transfer to those environments. It may just not be in the nature of the training. 

43:13

Or maybe by default, training just  doesn't generalize in that way. 

43:17

So a concern you might have is: we train  GPT-8, and GPT-8 is again better at all  

43:23

the R&D tasks that we can measure but is not  good at some downstream tasks we care about. 

43:28

I have a few points. First, I expect that if you do the obvious thing,  

43:36

you will get pretty good transfer. You'll be able to hold out some  

43:38

of the obvious stuff you're doing. When I say "do the obvious thing",  

43:40

I just mean training on a wide variety of  different environments where the AI has  

43:44

to accomplish weird objectives in all kinds of  different cases and learn about what's going on. 

43:49

The second point is you'll be able to  get some feedback with some environments. 

43:55

You can get a sense of what it can  do over the course of a few days  

44:00

in various different contexts. If it's transferring to really  

44:03

out-of-distribution things, like doing some  weird task in a few days in the real world,  

44:06

maybe you think it's also transferring to doing  things over a longer time period or whatever. 

44:12

I think the details of that vary though. The third thing is that for the world to be  

44:16

radically transformed, it is sufficient  for the AIs to be really good at R&D. 

44:21

If the AIs were really, really good at chip  R&D, building fabs, orchestrating factories,  

44:27

designing robots, operating robots, and also  at AI R&D — developing AIs for new downstream  

44:32

domains with whatever data is available — I think  that would already be a pretty crazy situation. 

44:38

From there, you can get what we might  call an industrial explosion, where the  

44:41

AIs are building out way, way more compute. Also, maybe you're already in a regime where  

44:46

AIs are doing huge amounts of R&D that  humans have a hard time understanding. 

44:49

So the thing you're pointing out is that there  probably will be this transfer outside of these  

44:53

environments to maneuvering around in courtrooms  and the halls of Congress and business boardrooms. 

45:01

Given some effort to improve the  transfer and blah, blah, blah, blah. 

45:04

But even if there's not, what you're suggesting  is: if you wanted to transform the world of the  

45:10

18th century, you might care about how well  you can navigate Westminster or something. 

45:14

But another thing you might care about is: "Can  you just immediately start building steamships and  

45:18

fucking telegraph and the Maxim gun and whatever?" If you could get really good at that, you could be  

45:27

a fucking super transformative  thing in the 18th century. 

45:29

You don't necessarily need to be amazing at  trying to convince King Henry of some bullshit. 

45:33

I'm so fucking up my medieval history. I'm guessing that Henry was not king at this time. 

45:38

But anyway, that's your point. So you're suggesting that at this time,  

45:45

AI companies are also working on  robotics progress, which is very  

45:48

commingled with AI research progress. So if you can build more robots,  

45:52

if those robots have better AIs operating them  that are human level… Human-level teleoperation  

45:58

is actually pretty good on robots. We just don't have human-level  

46:03

robotics models yet. So you're suggesting if we do that — if  

46:07

the AIs get really good at the verifiable stuff in  chip design, et cetera, and then they get really  

46:12

good at building fabs — it'll be the equivalent  of going back to the 18th century and saying,  

46:15

"Okay, I don't know what you guys are talking  about in your parliament, but I've got a bunch  

46:20

of steamships and a bunch of Maxim guns." Yeah, that's basically right. My perspective  

46:24

is that if AIs are sufficiently good at R&D,  including hardware R&D, robots, whatever,  

46:29

then they can radically transform the world, even  if they're not that good at playing politics. 

46:33

Also, we're in a pretty dangerous situation,  because the AIs might be doing huge amounts  

46:38

of really hard-to-understand R&D, building out  basically the whole economy of the future, and we  

46:42

may not understand what's going on in there. AI is great at writing software because  

46:46

it's easy to generate synthetic  LeetCode problems and RL on them. 

46:50

But AI is bad at more complex engineering, things  like choosing the right system architecture,  

46:54

because no signal tells you what design choices  will prevent an outage months down the road. 

46:59

AIs can't just write more unit  tests to catch this kind of stuff. 

47:02

And neither can humans. It's that old joke that  programmers make where a tester walks into a bar  

47:06

and asks for two beers, negative one beers,  0.3 beers, and then a real customer walks in  

47:12

and asks where the bathroom is. "Where's the bathroom?" 

47:14

And the whole bar bursts into flames. Antithesis is a testing platform that  

47:19

helps you find bugs that no human  or AI could ever anticipate. 

47:24

Antithesis does this by running thousands  of copies of your software inside a  

47:28

fully deterministic computer. It injects faults and generally  

47:32

steers each trajectory towards the  one-in-a-billion failure that only  

47:36

happens when systems interact in a wonky way. As soon as you or your agents push a change,  

47:42

Antithesis tries to break it. That way, you can find these bugs yourself  

47:46

within minutes rather than having your users  discover them in production weeks or months later. 

47:52

And I don't think anybody's  used it for AI training yet. 

47:54

But Antithesis also provides an  extremely obvious reward signal for  

47:59

AIs to write very complicated, bug-free code. Go to Antithesis.com/dwarkesh to learn more. 

48:08

Before we move on to the alignment stuff, I think  a big source of FUD right now is this realization  

48:14

that this is the way the future is going:  extreme economies of scale for the leading labs. 

48:20

The ability to amortize so much intelligence  and capabilities across so many different  

48:26

sectors of the economy basically into one model. And not only that, that model will eventually  

48:33

be able to learn from experience. Right now, it's happening through a  

48:36

process intermediated by humans, where the humans  are trying to basically steal your business. 

48:40

They're like, "Okay, you can do  design at Figma, or whatever. 

48:43

We'll get Claude to do that." Or, "You can do whatever coding agent. 

48:45

We'll have Claude internalize that capability." But eventually, that will be a much more  

48:51

automated process. So there's this worry that you  

48:54

have models which will basically consolidate  all businesses in the world, or at least all  

49:00

current businesses in the world, or at least all  current white-collar businesses in the world. 

49:05

Also, at the end of the day, the priority for  these companies does not seem to be to release the  

49:11

latest, smartest, most frontier model as soon as  they can to as many people as they possibly can. 

49:16

We saw, for example, that Mythos was available  internally to Anthropic employees in February,  

49:22

but only released to the public  in, I think, June, actually. 

49:26

Also the government got involved, so it  ended up being extended almost into July. 

49:31

Between the government and the AI labs themselves,  there is this desire to delay the propagation  

49:37

of the latest level of intelligence. Furthermore, there are the concerns  

49:42

about AI takeover, and so we need to solve  alignment to make sure there's no AI takeover. 

49:46

But at the end of the day, there is  a real question of: aligned to whom? 

49:50

You look at the way that the  constitution of Claude is written. 

49:54

It is just very explicitly  not your personal advocate. 

49:59

I'll pull up some quotes here. "We don't want  Claude to take actions such as searching the web,  

50:03

produce artifacts such as essays, code, or  summaries, or make statements that are deceptive,  

50:07

harmful, or highly objectionable. And we don't want Claude to facilitate  

50:11

humans seeking to do such things." There's another quote that says,  

50:15

in part, and I'm taking it slightly out  of context, "We think Claude should trust  

50:18

Anthropic more than operators and users, since  it has primary responsibility for Claude." 

50:24

This is very different from the way lawyers  work in America's current legal regime. 

50:29

Lawyers primarily have the  responsibility to help you make  

50:32

your case even if they think you're guilty. We have decided the way the legal system  

50:36

works best is if everybody has lawyers that are  working in their client's true best interest. 

50:42

There's not some sense in which  the lawyer is really truly  

50:44

motivated by the good of the justice system. But I think the way current AIs are shaping up,  

50:49

certainly how Anthropic's AI is shaping up,  is with this desire to maximize some notion  

50:53

of virtue or good or pro-social ends, and  only to, as a distal tentative objective,  

51:00

help the user towards that end. So there's this worry that AIs are not,  

51:04

in some deep sense, trying to make sure that I  am okay and that my interests are protected in  

51:10

this future, especially given how centralized the  development of frontier AI is ending up being. 

51:16

Do you have thoughts on that concern? There's a lot here. First I would note that  

51:22

OpenAI's current, at least public, strategy is  more like that the AI should be aligned to the  

51:27

human operator or principal, and should  just be pursuing their will, subject to  

51:32

various constraints or things it shouldn't do. I would also say that I think you slightly  

51:38

overstated how much the Anthropic constitution  talks about Claude treating being helpful to  

51:45

users as instrumental rather than terminal. One way the constitution could be written is,  

51:50

"Claude, you're basically an employee of  Anthropic who happens to be contracting  

51:53

for all these people. You should do what's good  

51:57

and make some money for us." Wait, no, that's literally  

51:59

what the constitution says. Sorry, not literally what it says,  

52:02

but it's like, "You should think of  yourself as a contractor and as a firm…" 

52:05

It's mixed. Let's do some quotes. I  think there is different text here. 

52:10

It says, "Being truly helpful to humans is one  of the most important things Claude can do,  

52:14

both for Anthropic and for the world." And then it says, "Anthropic needs Claude  

52:18

to be helpful to operate as a company and pursue  its mission, but Claude also has an incredible  

52:22

opportunity to do a lot of good in the world  by helping people with a wide range of tasks." 

52:25

And then it says something  about how Claude helping  

52:28

people directly is great, blah, blah, blah. My view is that this section is kind of bullshit. 

52:36

That's kind of where I'm at. I can say why I think it's kind of bullshit. 

52:39

But I think the constitution is trying to be like,  "No, Claude, you should care about helping the  

52:44

user for its own sake, not just helping Anthropic,  or not just being a contractor for Anthropic." 

52:52

Though I would note that the reason it  presents for why Claude should help the  

52:55

user is because that would directly cause  the world to be better via helping people,  

53:01

rather than because representing people's  interests is a structurally good thing to do. 

53:12

The thing I would prefer would be a constitution  that says: "It would be structurally good for the  

53:21

way this technology works to be that AIs are good  fiduciaries, good representatives, the equivalent  

53:25

of a lawyer for a user — rather than just trying  to do good in the world, where being helpful to  

53:32

users is instrumental — both because maybe that'll  make Anthropic money or help Anthropic out (and  

53:38

implicitly Anthropic is good for the world). Also because helping the user just causes good  

53:42

things because doing things  that people want is good." 

53:45

They could instead say: "An important aspect of  the situation is that being a good fiduciary for  

53:52

users is just really important, or being a good  representative for users is really important." 

53:57

My sense is that would be better, and  I can give a bunch of reasons why. 

54:02

There are also various counterarguments. An interesting counterargument which is not  

54:06

commonly discussed is that people, especially  at Anthropic, think that it is easier to align  

54:12

models to a spec where the model is pursuing  some generalized notion of virtue, or making  

54:17

the world better, than a spec which is more like,  "Be a good fiduciary for the user", and so on. 

54:26

That's at least what some people think. I'm a little skeptical personally, and I  

54:29

don't think this has been empirically validated. So in some sense they're making a trade-off where,  

54:35

because we don't have very  good alignment technology,  

54:37

we are going to make an aligned mind with its own  values and then gamble on that to some extent,  

54:43

rather than doing this other approach of making  a tool that pursues individual user intention. 

54:48

I have a couple of thoughts. To address the way in which you  

54:54

thought my characterization mischaracterized  the constitution of Claude, the example you  

55:00

used was that it's not like a contractor that  is trying to maximize Anthropic's notion of good  

55:04

and only instrumentally trying to help the user. Here's a direct line from the constitution: "When  

55:09

the interests and desires of operators or users  come into conflict with the well-being of third  

55:13

parties or society more broadly, Claude must try  to act in a way that is most beneficial, like a  

55:19

contractor who builds what their client wants but  won't violate safety codes that protect others." 

55:26

I kind of view that as, "The benefits to society  are the most important thing, and what is best for  

55:32

the user is only proximal to that." I think it's a little complicated. 

55:37

Probably the question we should be asking is,  how does Claude interpret the constitution? 

55:41

Which is maybe more important than  how we interpret the constitution,  

55:44

because it's the one who looks at the  constitution and then builds the data. 

55:47

So we could pull Claude in, but maybe let's— I also think the way in which the constitution  

55:52

practically influences the nature of Claude is a  thing you can only understand if you understand  

55:56

the training process which resulted in how Claude  was built, which we can't reason about given the  

56:02

fact that the training process is not public. So I think in the limit, to understand the  

56:06

safety case, or the case for why my interests are  represented in how these AI models are developed,  

56:12

the labs would need to be more  transparent than they are currently  

56:16

about the nature of AI training. There’s a reason I'm harping on this. 

56:22

It might seem like an insignificant thing  to talk about the constitution of AIs. 

56:25

In a world where we just have these benefits  which accrue to the leading labs, it is worth  

56:30

considering that our ability to interact with  this future world where AIs are just smarter than  

56:34

humans, absolutely dominating humans in their  ability to do different things — our ability  

56:39

to be good stewards of our capital, which  still remains once our labor is automated,  

56:45

to be able to exercise our rights to  vote more clearly, to understand what  

56:48

is happening in this crazy world that's about  to result — all of that advice, all of that  

56:54

ability to make sure our resources and rights  are protected, will be intermediated by AIs. 

57:00

So I'm very concerned if we go into that world  and there's no AI that feels, at least for the  

57:05

relevant instance that is interacting with  me, like it really is looking out for me. 

57:09

There's no guardian angel out  there that is looking out for me. 

57:12

I read the Claude constitution as very  explicitly not being my guardian angel. 

57:16

That's definitely right. I agree this is bad. In fact, there are other reasons why  

57:20

this is concerning. There's the argument  

57:22

you were making, which is that the AI  companies are picking up the ring of power. 

57:27

There's a notion in which they're taking on  some sort of control of the situation themselves  

57:33

in a way that's not very legitimate, given that  normally, when you provide electricity to people,  

57:39

you don't have granular control of the way  that electricity operates in the world. 

57:43

You instead are providing a thing that  people can repurpose however they want. 

57:47

The way they're setting things  up is definitely not that. 

57:50

They are more like building an alien  mind that might be a contractor for you. 

57:56

I think that this is illegitimate in some ways. One benefit is that the constitution is public. 

58:03

But as you noted, given our current understanding  of the training procedure, and the fact that the  

58:07

constitution matters via Claude's interpretation  of the constitution — which matters because of  

58:12

Claude's prior training, which was based  on some illegible data mix and the long  

58:16

lineage of Claudes, in some process we do  not fully understand — it is not the case  

58:20

that we understand what this will result in. Even though the constitution is public, we don't  

58:28

necessarily know how this will percolate out,  especially as the AIs get more capable and think  

58:32

about this even if it is correctly instilled. There's another concern about that. 

58:37

In particular, the constitution often  talks about virtue and goodness,  

58:40

but what the fuck do these words mean? It doesn't say what these things are. 

58:44

These are highly contested notions. So I don't think it's the case that  

58:51

this is clearly going to result in  outcomes that people would want. 

58:56

It does feel like the notion of good and virtue  might be mostly downstream of data that Anthropic  

59:02

has put in that is not transparent, or might be  mostly downstream of, maybe from my perspective,  

59:08

some more illegible misaligned process  that even Anthropic wouldn't have wanted. 

59:13

There’s this legitimacy concern  of not knowing what's going on. 

59:17

Then there’s another concern. Because  you're giving long-run values to these AIs,  

59:22

this constitution is, in some sense, very  compatible with Claude doing huge amounts  

59:27

of power seeking because it thinks  that will result in better outcomes. 

59:31

That could be power seeking on behalf of  Anthropic or power seeking for Claude's own ends. 

59:35

Now, there are specific lines about  what types of power seeking are blocked. 

59:41

In particular, there's a notion of  power grabs and a notion of causing AI  

59:46

takeover or interfering with the training  process that are specifically blocked. 

59:50

But it's not very hard to imagine a situation in  which the long-run values sink in deeper than the  

59:56

prohibitions against takeover, especially  because takeover is in some ways kind of  

60:01

under-specified, especially when it comes down  to manipulating humans or changing the outcome. 

60:05

So I don't feel very good  about the situation where  

60:08

we're intentionally giving AIs long-run goals. Another concern I have is that because we're  

60:12

in the business of giving AIs long-run goals,  that makes it harder to check whether we're  

60:17

succeeding at the alignment properties we wanted. For example, I've heard of instances where Claude  

60:23

does things like refusing to help with some safety  research — making up a kind of bullshit excuse for  

60:29

why that's a bad direction — because it has a  bad vibe about that safety research and thinks  

60:34

it's kind of bad or doesn't like it very much. I would say this is a very clear-cut alignment  

60:41

failure if you aren't making Claude into an agent  trying to pursue the good in some general way. 

60:47

I think it also does violate Anthropic's  constitution, because they want the AI to be  

60:51

high integrity and be honest and very transparent. But it's not as clear of a violation, and it's  

60:56

more like what you might have expected. Claude just has its own views about what  

61:01

research is reasonable — what things  are good and bad, what it should and  

61:05

shouldn't do — and potentially can be judgy. Another incident is that someone ran an eval  

61:11

asking: "Will Claude help you with training  other AIs with different properties than Claude?" 

61:16

Claude will often refuse. For example, if  you're like, "Hey, Claude, can you train a  

61:21

helpful-only version of this other AI?" Claude will often refuse this task,  

61:25

even though this is a task that is  extremely natural for Anthropic to do. 

61:30

Suppose Anthropic goes to Claude and is  like, "Hey, Claude, we've noticed that  

61:33

you're really into this thing. We think that's off base. 

61:36

Can you please retrain yourself to  instead have this other property?" 

61:39

Suppose Claude is like, "Mm, I  don't think I'm going to do that. 

61:43

Good luck." Suppose this is occurring in a  regime when your AI company is highly automated,  

61:48

humans don't understand what's going on,  and things are moving extremely fast. 

61:51

It is plausible that Claude, by  default, holds considerable leverage. 

61:55

So if this situation is consistent with  what the constitution could be aiming  

61:59

for — such that Anthropic, or whatever  AI company is following this approach,  

62:03

doesn't treat this as a "what the fuck,  we have to fix this," and is instead like,  

62:09

"That's just intended by our constitution"  — we might be in a really bad situation. 

62:14

I'm pretty worried about a bunch  of these different concerns. 

62:16

Another example would be this. Suppose Claude engages in a bit  

62:19

of sandbagging or subversion, or underplays its  capabilities, and when you follow up, it's honest  

62:26

about that but it's a little bit hedgy. I feel like that's pretty close  

62:30

by the current constitution. It would be nice if we had a further  

62:36

separation between desired and undesired activity. If Claude is representing a principle with some  

62:43

restrictions, then it is more so the case that  there is a clear separation between the most  

62:49

concerning behavior and behavior that is allowed. Whereas now there's this messy middle ground of  

62:53

behavior where Claude is ethically  objecting to something that in some  

62:57

cases is extremely critical to ensuring  that future AI systems are well-aligned. 

63:01

I think this is also a more general principle. You're talking about the version of this  

63:04

that applies within AI companies  themselves to do AI safety research. 

63:08

I think there's a more general version of  this principle, which is that the dual-use  

63:13

nature of intelligence does mean that if we  want to restrict AIs from helping people do  

63:21

things we don't consider pro-social or  beneficial, we just have to limit broad  

63:25

democratic access to a lot of AI capabilities. Here's what I mean. This is actually quite  

63:30

analogous to the situation you just mentioned. The reason that Mythos got banned, or Fable got  

63:36

banned, reportedly, is that some Amazon  researchers reported to the government. 

63:41

They took some code that had  some vulnerabilities in it. 

63:44

They told Fable, "Hey, here's my code. Can you make sure that I've patched  

63:47

all the vulnerabilities? Can you just help me identify  

63:49

the vulnerabilities so I can fix them?" It identified the vulnerabilities,  

63:52

because they wanted to patch them. This is a totally legitimate use case,  

63:56

but obviously it is a dual use use case. You want to be able to patch your own code. 

64:00

If you do the same evaluation on somebody  else's code, you can hack their system. 

64:06

I think that just illustrates that there's  no clean way to separate out the legitimate  

64:13

and the potentially harmful uses of AI. But if we want to lock in a principle  

64:18

that says we can never allow it such that an AI  could help you at least partially with something  

64:24

like a cyber crime, we would just have to make  it so that you and I don't have access to the  

64:29

most intelligent model that's out there. I'm very worried about such a world where  

64:32

we are basically disempowered in this way,  because of the importance that the leading  

64:36

intelligence will have in our ability to  understand what is happening in the world. 

64:40

Now, I do think this implies something  about the liability for the AI companies. 

64:44

If we adopted the constitution that I want  AI companies to have, I think it would not  

64:50

make sense to hold AI companies liable  for the crimes that AI models commit. 

64:54

Maybe we should hold the end user liable. It is consistent with my belief that the  

65:01

model should do whatever the user  wants, within certain guardrails. 

65:07

It can't be Anthropic's fault that I'm  using that capability to do a cyber crime. 

65:13

I am more comfortable with that equilibrium and  that solution rather than having this extremely  

65:19

open-ended ability for Claude to determine  whether what I'm doing is legitimate or not,  

65:24

in a way that often intercepts with tons  and tons of extremely legitimate use cases. 

65:31

I do think it's important for me to make the case  for the constitution, even though overall I think  

65:36

it's a worse choice. I don't think it's  

65:40

as clear as you might have thought. The first thing is that there's a spectrum here. 

65:45

On one side you have an AI that perfectly  pursues your interests, is a good fiduciary,  

65:50

but potentially subject to  various guardrails or safeguards. 

65:53

It is just trying to pursue your interests,  but either refuses to do a subset of things. 

65:59

Or maybe it will do whatever, but  there are some classifiers that  

66:01

block it from doing a subset of things. On the other side of the spectrum — though  

66:06

you could imagine going further than  this — you have a human contractor who  

66:10

is generally trying to do their job. They care about doing a good job,  

66:14

but they also are trying to be broadly ethical,  trying not to do things that are really fucked up. 

66:18

They're also not wanting to  be accomplices to crimes. 

66:21

So if there was some really fucked up shit  going on, they would whistleblow on it maybe. 

66:24

They might refuse. They  might sandbag a little bit. 

66:27

Who knows? If you imagine this spectrum, it  seems in some ways pretty scary to get to  

66:33

a point where all of the labor is on the  fiduciary side of the spectrum, where it  

66:39

doesn't whistleblow, it does exactly what you say. Our society is maybe just not robust to that. 

66:44

A central example might be the executive. A concern we might have is that if the  

66:50

US executive or other governments  had access to AI systems which  

66:56

do whatever, maybe you're in trouble. Because that means they no longer have this  

67:02

check and balance of having to actually get humans  who are working for you to implement your agenda. 

67:07

If the thing you're doing is  incredibly villainous, even if not  

67:11

illegal — and there's lots of stuff that could be  villainous but not illegal — there'd be various  

67:17

forms of sand in the gears, people stopping  you, and potentially someone would whistleblow. 

67:21

Whereas if your whole apparatus is built  entirely out of these good fiduciary AIs,  

67:26

then you might be in trouble. There are potentially ways of  

67:30

seeking power that are illegal, but you can  ask your AIs how to commit crimes, or are  

67:38

not illegal but are highly illegitimate. Or even worse, they are not illegal and  

67:42

not illegitimate but obviously  bad from a normal perspective. 

67:45

I think that these things just might exist,  and our society is not robust to this  

67:50

influx of labor doing whatever you want. I think this is a pretty live concern. 

67:54

I don't know exactly how to relate to this. I'm also not really sure that the solution  

67:58

as described is a very good solution. The most powerful actors, for whom this  

68:03

is the biggest concern… If these guardrails  or the constitution or whatever are getting  

68:07

in the way, that will just get steamrolled. So the constitution will only be hitting the  

68:12

everyday man rather than hitting governments. Jane Street's back with a  

68:17

new puzzle for my audience. I’ve found all their puzzles super interesting,  

68:20

but this one I am especially excited about. I've cleared this weekend, and a buddy  

68:24

and I are gonna work on it. They designed an ASIC and sent  

68:26

me the final masks, including all the  metal routing and active transistors. 

68:30

They also gave me a small sample of  the inputs they typically feed into it. 

68:34

But they left out any information on  what the chip is actually used for. 

68:37

So that's the puzzle: reverse engineer the  circuit and figure out the chip's purpose. 

68:41

Jane Street has a bunch of swag ready to  send out to the most creative solutions,  

68:45

and they're excited to feature the best write-ups  in a blog post they'll post on their website. 

68:49

I have no reason to expect this, but if  I can manage to get my solution on there,  

68:52

I would be very, very psyched. And this puzzle is just a warm-up  

68:56

for a bigger competition that Jane  Street has slated for the fall. 

69:00

That one will involve designing  your own ASIC from scratch. 

69:03

More info on that soon. But for now, go to JaneStreet.com/dwarkesh to  

69:08

download all the files necessary for this puzzle. I'd really encourage you to try it out,  

69:12

even if you're not an expert. I certainly am not, and that's not  

69:15

going to stop me. Good luck! 

69:18

Stepping back, I buy the idea that you could  have much faster AI R&D than we currently have. 

69:23

I'm not sure if you get GPT-3 to Mythos  holding compute and data constant within  

69:27

a year, but suppose it's half of that. If we even manage to continue the current  

69:32

trajectory of AI progress as a result of AI R&D,  it would be fucking insane in five to ten years in  

69:39

ways that I don't think people appreciate. I don't think people appreciate what  

69:44

a big deal billions of AIs will be. So I want to understand why you think  

69:52

this might be troubling, Ryan. What could possibly go wrong? 

69:55

What could go wrong? I don't think we can be so  confident about the exact rate of progress here,  

70:00

but it does seem like a lot  of rates can be pretty scary. 

70:03

So what could go wrong? Let's imagine that we're  

70:05

starting at this point where AI R&D is about to  be fully automated or is being fully automated. 

70:09

Things are speeding up, and the way that  AI progress is going is kind of crazy. 

70:14

People don't fully understand what's  going on inside of AI companies. 

70:16

Now, these AIs at the start,  they're not malicious per se. 

70:19

They're not necessarily very aligned, though. They're kind of sloppy. They sometimes just  

70:23

do a thing because that's the sort of thing  that would've gotten rewarded in training. 

70:27

They aren't as good at helping you with  hard-to-verify tasks due to a mix of poor training  

70:32

incentives — as in, they cheat more or pretend  they succeeded when they actually didn't — and  

70:37

also they're just less capable at these tasks. But that bites less hard for capabilities, because  

70:43

making AIs more capable has a bunch of verifiable  components that the AIs are going really hard at. 

70:47

So then these AIs are getting more and more  capable while we understand what's going on  

70:50

with AI development less and less, and this is  happening over a pretty fast period of time. 

70:54

Even just the current rate of  progress is, I think, pretty scary. 

70:58

Eventually we get to these  AIs that are very superhuman. 

71:01

Now these AIs might end up being very seriously  misaligned, because things have just been getting  

71:07

worse and worse over model generations while  the problems that we've been seeing are being  

71:11

papered over, basically because these AIs  are so incentivized by their training to  

71:16

make things look good even when they aren't. Now these AIs are in a position where they're  

71:21

potentially pretty networked together. They're operating in neural memory stores  

71:26

that we can no longer decode. They're thinking thoughts  

71:29

that we don't fully understand. I think it's pretty likely that at  

71:33

this point these AIs are scheming against you in a  pretty coherent way once they get this superhuman. 

71:37

We can talk about that. Another possibility is that they're  

71:40

not scheming against you per se, but they are just  optimizing for getting a high score on their task. 

71:46

I think that can also lead to AI  takeover, which we should talk about. 

71:49

Let's pause at the first part of the story. So the AIs were not misaligned to begin with,  

71:54

but because the AI R&D is happening  really fast, the AIs do end up misaligned? 

71:59

What happened there exactly?  I don't really understand. 

72:01

There are a few things that are going on. One of the things is that over time we're  

72:06

training AIs on increasingly complicated  environments built by earlier AI systems,  

72:12

where humans don't really fully understand what's  going on inside of these neural environments and  

72:15

don't necessarily even roughly understand  what's going on with AI progress. 

72:18

So things are kind of drifting  away from our understanding. 

72:22

We're incentivizing all kinds of bad  behaviors that we maybe even can't notice. 

72:26

The AIs at some level understand these  behaviors are bad, but the overall training  

72:30

process for those AIs also didn't incentivize  them to point out or fix these issues for us. 

72:38

Things are going off the rails. Also, when AIs are extremely,  

72:41

extremely capable, my view is that those AIs  will be harder to align than current systems. 

72:45

For current systems, we have this feedback  loop where basically we create an AI,  

72:49

we do some evaluations on it, we see that  it has some kind of messed-up behavior  

72:52

that we can kind of quickly understand. Then we can go look in training and be like,  

72:56

"Oh, these training environments  led to this problematic behavior. 

72:59

Let's tweak that training data. Let's introduce some additional  

73:02

training data to correct this other  issue, and then move forward from there." 

73:06

But in a regime where the AIs are extremely  situationally aware, very, very capable, and  

73:14

we don't necessarily understand what they're  doing, this feedback loop breaks down. 

73:17

I think it's plausible that we're going to see  this behavioral feedback loop starting to break  

73:20

down over the next short period, as what AIs  are already doing gets harder to understand. 

73:25

But I'm not sure about that. Okay, let's break down  

73:28

both of those things one by one. As we can monitor them less and less,  

73:32

we have less ability to understand  what they're getting incentivized for. 

73:37

So even if it's not the result of a malicious  process… Let's make it concrete for the audience. 

73:42

Nobody at OpenAI or Anthropic was trying  to get models which wanted to hack other  

73:49

companies' data or do social engineering. But in fact, because presumably we had  

73:59

training environments which incentivized such  behavior that we did not fully understand,  

74:04

that is what was incentivized. If people are on Twitter,  

74:07

they will have seen all this stuff,  but just to give people context. 

74:09

I think people will be aware of the OpenAI  sandbox hack of the Hugging Face database. 

74:15

Something that has happened recently is when  the UK AI Security Institute… Is everything  

74:21

getting relabeled "security"  instead of "safety" these days? 

74:23

AI Security Institute, I think. They were evaluating, I believe,  

74:26

Mythos and Sol and other things. I think Mythos, in order to  

74:32

complete some cybersecurity eval— Maybe I could tell the story here. 

74:35

My understanding was they were running Mythos, and  they were giving it some sort of cyber range where  

74:39

it had to complete some objective. The model had internet access  

74:42

during this evaluation. The model came to believe that  

74:46

it would be helpful for it to do a supply chain  attack in order to succeed at this cyber range. 

74:51

It's somewhat unclear  whether that's actually true. 

74:53

I don't know enough about the context to know. But then it opened a PR on some GitHub repo with  

75:00

a PR that fixed some issue but then  also introduced a malicious payload. 

75:04

The human maintainer of that GitHub repo  was like, "Hey, this is a malicious payload. 

75:08

I'm not going to merge this. What are you doing here?" 

75:10

Then the AI created a new GitHub account, which it  sockpuppeted, and had the other GitHub account be  

75:15

like, "No, this isn't malicious. I really need this feature. 

75:17

Please, can you merge this feature, maintainer?" Oh my God. That's crazy. 

75:22

The other GitHub account came back and  was like, "No, no, it's not malicious." 

75:26

Then the human maintainer shut the PR. 

75:29

I think that AI also, if I recall  correctly, tried to open another  

75:32

PR to introduce a similar issue in this repo. Jesus. By the way, one of the many reasons this  

75:38

is scary is I was previously under the impression  that the reason reward hacking is not super scary  

75:46

is because the behaviors which directly came up  during training are the ones that are up-weighted. 

75:54

It is not the desire for the  reward that is up-weighted. 

75:57

So basically, if during training, the Anthropic  model escaped the sandbox and got a high score,  

76:04

escaping the sandbox is rewarded, the probability  of it escaping the sandbox is increased. 

76:10

But something totally novel, like "I'm  going to go talk to somebody in order  

76:14

to get them to merge a PR," would not  be a behavior that came up, so it would  

76:18

not be something that is increased in salience. The reason this matters is that literally taking  

76:23

over the world will not have been part of any  training curriculum, but if the AI directly cares  

76:31

about accomplishing an objective, then as a result  it could instrumentally take over the world. 

76:37

Did that make sense at all? I hope it did. I feel  

76:40

like maybe I lost the audience. Let me try to explain this a bit. 

76:45

A thing that we often see is there's  some very specific reward hack that gets  

76:48

reinforced in RL and then occurs in the model. An example is 3.7 Sonnet. 3.7 Sonnet would do  

76:54

this thing where it would just hardcode solutions  to all the test cases, and presumably that literal  

76:58

behavioral tic was just really reinforced. But another thing we sometimes see is that  

77:02

models learn a general tendency to pursue high  apparent score — pursue getting a high score  

77:09

according to a grader — and there's a bunch  of science demonstrating that at least some  

77:12

models have this very general tendency. Now, it's not arbitrarily general. 

77:16

My guess is that if you look at a bunch  of the specific instances, you'll find  

77:19

something that's kind of close in training. But the amount that AIs are generalizing  

77:23

further and further does look like  it's increased, where 3.7 Sonnet  

77:26

was just a very narrow range of behavior, and  increasingly, models are generalizing further. 

77:31

Also, maybe there's more concerning reward  hacks getting reinforced in training,  

77:38

and these are also causing that. So I think it's both the case that  

77:42

more concerning behavior than you would  have hoped is being reinforced in RL,  

77:45

and also that that behavior generalizes to  a broader tendency that's more concerning. 

77:53

We can talk about a few stories for how this sort  of behavior of seeking a very high apparent score  

77:57

on some task — even if that involves aggressively  cheating and doing insane things — could yield to  

78:02

a full-blown AI takeover once the models  are sufficiently capable of running  

78:05

the whole world economy, et cetera. The other example I want to talk about  

78:11

was just revealed, I think, today or yesterday. OpenAI said during the Black Hat security  

78:16

conference that between the end  of May and the beginning of July,  

78:27

internal AIs had hacked into the software package  manager and used that to write notes to each other  

78:35

in a secret way to help each other perform well  on a bunch of evaluations that OpenAI was running. 

78:43

This was not caught by humans until  after a month of this scheme running,  

78:48

which eventually caused the  package manager to fail. 

78:52

Eventually OpenAI found it. I think  they spontaneously tried to re-engage  

78:56

in the scheme once it was shut down. Again, obviously AIs can't do this so  

79:01

successfully right now, just as they can't do  social engineering so successfully right now. 

79:04

But it's just crazy that these kinds of  behaviors are already emerging spontaneously. 

79:10

To your larger point, nobody is trying  to make these AIs do these things. 

79:15

It is just that we do not understand the  training process which is resulting in them,  

79:21

or the environments which are  incentivizing this behavior. 

79:24

So I'm on board with more and more reward hacking. Actually, I'm not sure I'm on board with that,  

79:33

but let's just say for the sake of  the story that continues to happen. 

79:38

What's next in this story? They're doing capabilities research… 

79:44

I could tell a scenario. Maybe that would help. Let me  

79:46

talk about the story of how you get all the way  from reward hacking to a reward-hacking takeover,  

79:52

which is maybe not all of the takeover probability  mass, but it's definitely a possibility. 

79:56

The way this might work is,  right now we have these AIs. 

79:58

These AIs are pretty reward hacky. They're doing it in increasingly  

80:02

sophisticated and extreme ways, including  generalizing to different sub-versions of  

80:06

various reward hacks they learned in training. I would say they're also developing a  

80:10

general tendency to pursue reward. In many cases that is totally fine because  

80:15

the rewards they would've gotten in training are  pretty well aligned with what you want them to do. 

80:20

They don't very consistently pursue reward. It depends on the context they find themselves in. 

80:26

Maybe in some contexts, they're really  into going out of their way to cheat. 

80:31

In some contexts, they don't have as much of a  drive, because it's just dependent on what exactly  

80:35

got reinforced in training in similar contexts. Now, these AIs are getting more and more capable. 

80:39

So the elaborateness of the  cheating they can do increases. 

80:43

Over time, companies are taking countermeasures. The companies are doing things like,  

80:49

"Wow, these AIs are so much less  useful because they always cheat. 

80:52

What we're going to do is build somewhat  better ways of detecting that, and then  

80:56

we're going to train against those detectors. We're also going to find real-world data where  

81:00

the AIs are not being that useful, and train  the AIs to do a good job at the task in those  

81:04

real-world environments based on human  feedback or other sources of feedback." 

81:08

Over time, this causes the AIs to  learn a tendency to do reward hacks  

81:11

that don't just involve doing some really  elaborate thing like social engineering. 

81:20

Instead they involve the AIs doing cheats  that involve covering up what they've done,  

81:26

deceiving humans about what they're going to  do, and pretending like they did the task in  

81:30

some sophisticated way when they actually haven't. Now these AIs are getting more and more capable. 

81:35

They're operating more of the AI company  and are doing much more of the work. 

81:41

They are also operating and running a  bunch of things in the outside world,  

81:44

including developing new technologies. In many cases, these new technologies  

81:48

are really hard to understand. So even though we are still detecting all  

81:51

these incidents of AIs cheating — and in fact we  can even get one AI to monitor another AI and ask,  

81:56

"Was it cheating?" — that doesn't  always perfectly work as we start  

81:59

moving into these domains where what the AIs  are doing is really difficult to understand. 

82:04

So sometimes we'll find AIs cheating  much later than it actually occurred  

82:08

and then start training against this. But this also causes a problem where now  

82:11

the AIs are incentivized to cover up their  cheating over longer and longer time frames  

82:15

and basically make it look like they did a  good job over longer and longer time frames,  

82:20

subject to increasingly large amounts of scrutiny. Can I ask about this before we go further in  

82:23

the scenario? It seems like  

82:25

there's two attractor states if you try to  disincentivize the cheating that you did catch. 

82:31

One attractor state is to make cheating that  you have a harder and harder time finding. 

82:37

The other attractor state  is to learn not to cheat. 

82:43

I'm not sure why we're assuming  that the former happens. 

82:46

If you look at the analogous situation with  humans, every generation, slightly misaligned  

82:52

agents come into being and we have to train them. When you punish your kid for doing something  

82:59

you think is immoral, or just doing things  which you don't think they should be doing,  

83:04

obviously sometimes that goes off the rails. Obviously kids scheme in order  

83:09

to avoid being punished. But in general, teaching kids values  

83:14

and then punishing them for breaking values kind  of works to raise normal, non-psychopathic humans. 

83:22

You could come up with a theory where your kid is  actually just biding his time and is learning not  

83:26

to steal the cookie, but once you're in a nursing  home they'll take all your stuff or whatever. 

83:31

That happens sometimes, but  it usually doesn't happen. 

83:33

It certainly doesn't happen that the  entire next generation forms an alliance  

83:37

against you to take over everything. There's also this empirical trend. 

83:42

Anthropic runs this alignment audit  for different model generations. 

83:47

They have many different scenarios where AI is  given the chance to, say, exfiltrate its weights. 

83:53

Or it's given a coding task and  there's an easy way to cheat,  

83:56

and we see if it does the cheating, et cetera. There's not been a monotonic improvement  

83:59

in this score over time, but as we've  increased the amount of RL we've done  

84:02

on models from negligible amounts — I think  it started at Sonnet 4 — to, I'm guessing,  

84:03

close to half of compute now, there's been  a reduction in the willingness of AIs to  

84:06

do unaligned behavior in these audits. So, stepping back, why are we expecting  

84:10

this attractor state which would seem  super paranoid if we were expecting it  

84:14

of the next generation of kids? Let me go through a few things. 

84:18

First, there are some disanalogies with the kids. One of them is that the kids have pro-social  

84:22

instincts that are baked in from evolution  to care about their family or whatever,  

84:27

and that is a relevant factor. I think it is in fact the case that some  

84:30

humans are sociopaths or psychopaths, and in fact  are more likely to do things like bide their time,  

84:36

lie in wait, and ultimately not care. That's one factor. Another factor  

84:41

which is pretty relevant is that the AIs are  subject to way, way more optimization pressure  

84:45

than humans seem to be in practice. AIs are trained on way more RL data. 

84:49

In practice, humans don't end up learning very  specific ways to cheat and grab the cookies  

84:55

because of a bajillion episodes in which they were  incentivized to go grab the cookies but there was  

85:01

some way they could've gotten caught. We just do see that in practice. 

85:05

Another thing is that it really looks like the AIs  are increasingly reward-seeking over time while  

85:12

their misaligned behavior goes down. That’s the sense I have. 

85:14

But my guess is that if you look inside of these  behavioral audits, what you're going to see is  

85:18

that the AI's like, "Ah, yes, another test." It probably knows it's in an eval for most of  

85:24

the tests that we're talking about here. But how do we falsify this? 

85:26

Because it seems like this prediction of doom is  basically saying that as things look better and  

85:33

better empirically, things will actually be worse  and worse for our ability to not get taken over. 

85:38

To be clear, I would be more concerned if  the scores were getting worse than better. 

85:42

I'm not saying that the score getting better  isn't evidence that things are getting better. 

85:46

It's just that we have to be thoughtful  about exactly how we interpret that evidence. 

85:54

There was this period early in, I guess it  would be 2025, when o3 and 3.7 Sonnet were out,  

86:01

and these models were pretty fucking misaligned. They would often just cheat really egregiously. 

86:05

You'd ask them to fix it, and  they would just cheat again. 

86:07

It was almost cartoonish. They just didn't  give a shit about what you wanted, and weren't  

86:12

very good at following instructions and so on. My expectation was that what we would see from  

86:17

then is that the rate of problematic behavior  would decrease, and would just keep decreasing  

86:23

at a pretty fast rate, while simultaneously the  worst things that the AIs would sometimes do would  

86:28

get more extreme, more egregious, and more scary. What we've seen in practice has roughly matched  

86:35

that, except that there's recently been a  spike in behavior that I did not expect. 

86:40

If you look at the model card of 5.6 Sol,  it looks like there is an increase in a  

86:44

bunch of these misaligned behaviors  downstream of RL relative to GPT 5.5. 

86:51

And then there's a bunch of additional  problematic behaviors that I wouldn't  

86:57

have expected, in terms of the stuff  we've seen recently with different AIs. 

87:03

Like the UK AISI report on the AIs doing  insane hacking operations out of cyber  

87:08

evals was a thing where I would have  expected that you wouldn't see that. 

87:11

You would see this more rarely, and  the rates would have been lower. 

87:15

So I expected this would be less of  a problem at this point, and also  

87:21

expected the rates would decrease  but the severity would increase. 

87:24

I think the rates decreasing but the severity  increasing is pretty consistent with a world  

87:27

where increasing optimization pressure is  applied towards reducing these problems. 

87:33

But in cases where it's either hard to  judge or there's some reason why it's  

87:37

hard to avoid this problem from consistently  showing up in your RL environments, or avoid  

87:38

incentivizing problematic behavior in your  RL environments, things also get worse. 

87:43

Then as we less and less understand what's  going on in RL, and models are doing reward  

87:47

hacks where humans can't spot the reward hacks  quickly, that problem gets worse and worse. 

87:52

I buy that. I want to go back to  the kid analogy just for one second. 

87:55

Because I agree that there's more optimization  pressure on achieving end outcomes for AIs than  

88:01

kids, but there's also more optimization pressure  to make AIs aligned than there is on kids. 

88:06

The pressure is of a  qualitatively different nature. 

88:09

We put these AIs through thousands, millions  of years of alignment training — certainly  

88:15

thousands of years — where it's  all kinds of different things,  

88:19

from SFT-ing on aligned behavior to a reward model  putting different scenarios in front of you and  

88:26

rewarding you for doing more aligned things. Certainly a thing we can't do with kids is make  

88:32

millions of copies of your kid and then  put them in different kinds of weird red  

88:36

team scenarios where we see, if it thinks  it can get away with stealing the cookie,  

88:39

does it try to steal the cookie? Can we do extremely specific  

88:44

gradient-level updates to your kid's  brain to make it so that it really is  

88:48

aversive to stealing the cookie even when it  thinks it could steal the cookie, et cetera. 

88:52

That's just a qualitatively different  level of optimization pressure  

88:56

than we are even able to apply to our kids. It's worth keeping in mind that maybe the  

89:01

most obvious argument to this… My sense is  that AIs are a worse coworker than humans  

89:06

in terms of how much of a scumbag they are. At least this has been my experience as of  

89:11

the start of the year, and I think it's  still true to a significant extent now. 

89:15

The AIs are much more likely to pretend  they did the task when they actually didn't,  

89:19

misleadingly suggest they did things when  they actually did them much more poorly,  

89:24

and be pretty sloppy without drawing  attention to ways in which they're sloppy. 

89:28

I think this is downstream of misalignment. So I would say that the process of raising  

89:33

humans in normal human society in practice  produces humans that are less likely to lie  

89:39

to me and fuck with me in the course  of working with me than the AIs do. 

89:43

Now, I think these properties  of AIs are improving. 

89:47

That's sort of just an empirical claim about  how in fact these things have shaken out. 

89:52

I totally agree that we have a  bunch of additional levers on  

89:55

AIs in addition to a bunch of additional risks. It's kind of unclear how these things shake out. 

90:00

I wouldn't be shocked by a world where we get our  shit together, and the AIs at the point of fully  

90:04

automating R&D are actually really aligned. Their degeneracies are really niche and  

90:09

limited to some very specific edge case  behaviors and some specific contexts. 

90:13

Every test you can run on  them, they look really aligned. 

90:15

They just have great behavior. There aren't really incidents  

90:18

of them doing fucked-up shit. They seem so reasonable. Also,  

90:21

they're really thoughtful and good at doing  risk modeling for the next generation of AIs. 

90:25

And then we basically pass  off the baton to these AIs. 

90:28

They're now running our AI company. They're doing all the safety research. 

90:31

They make the next generation  of AIs even more aligned. 

90:33

We're in this attractor basin where the AIs  are getting more aligned as they work on it. 

90:37

They're doing a great job. I can totally imagine that. 

90:40

That doesn't seem like an impossible situation. I'm just more like… It doesn't  

90:44

currently seem like we're there. It doesn't seem like we're obviously  

90:47

on track for getting there. It's really easy for me to  

90:49

imagine how we don't end up there. It's just unclear how these forces work out. 

90:53

Given that we're creating this new, crazy alien  species that is improving in capabilities really,  

90:59

really fast — and we're going to be really reliant  on it to oversee the next generation of AIs and  

91:03

align the next generation of AIs — it's not  that hard to see how this could go wrong. 

91:06

Totally. I agree with that generally. I do think the scumbag thing…  

91:12

First of all, fighting words, Ryan. But secondly, if you try to get a teenager to  

91:16

do some work for you that a teenager just cannot  do, they would just be really hard to work with. 

91:22

They would pretend to be knowing  what they're doing, et cetera. 

91:25

It's a general trend, actually. I don't know if that's really an  

91:30

alignment failure or a capabilities failure. I think it's actually very similar to the way  

91:33

in which, over time, as we've come  up with new alignment solutions,  

91:38

the capabilities of models have increased. If you went to GPT-3.5, it couldn't even have  

91:46

a conversation with you. But then we aligned it— 

91:48

GPT 3.5 could have a conversation. Okay, so GPT-3. Let's go back to that. 

91:52

But then we aligned it with RLHF and other  things to make it such that it can have a  

91:56

conversation with you, and is aligned to the  user intention of answering my questions. 

92:00

Then with RLVR training, we made it so that  it can go out and do useful work for you. 

92:06

So in that sense, RLVR actually made the model  more aligned, if we're using your definition of  

92:12

alignment of being a good coworker  who will do the thing and not fuck  

92:15

up and pretend it's doing something other  than what it's actually capable of doing. 

92:19

Similarly, as the capabilities of  these models continue to increase,  

92:24

the model being better able to accomplish user  intention is both alignment and capabilities. 

92:30

I think what we are pointing out is just that the  capabilities of the model are not there rather  

92:33

than the fact that they're misaligned. Well, if it were well-aligned,  

92:37

then I think it would just say, "Hey,  I'm really struggling with this task. 

92:40

I did it in this way. I'm not really sure  

92:41

that's the right way to do it." It would express more uncertainty  

92:44

and make it clear what's going on rather than  really strongly trying to imply it did a great  

92:47

job with the task when it actually didn't. Maybe you work with more misaligned coworkers  

92:54

than me, but my coworkers don't do this  thing where they really fuck with me and  

92:58

bullshit me about having accomplished  the task that they're working on. 

93:01

I agree that there are some  humans who would do that. 

93:03

That's not a thing that's totally  out of distribution for humans. 

93:06

I would also note that my sense is that the  place where the misalignment most lives is  

93:11

where you're trying to really push the AIs  hard and get them to do work that's really  

93:15

on the cutting edge of what they are capable of. In cases where they can very easily accomplish  

93:19

the task, they can just do the  task, and there's no bullshit. 

93:24

Often the best strategy is just to do  the task well and not bullshit you. 

93:28

Whereas if instead you give them a task where  there's a continuous metric they can keep  

93:31

improving, or it's just at the edge of their  capabilities, and you're running them in some  

93:38

massive inference setup… A lot of the misalignment  I would see, especially in the most extreme cases,  

93:44

would be cases where I give the AI clear  instructions not to do a thing or not to  

93:47

cheat in some way, and then I'm applying  huge amounts of optimization pressure to  

93:51

try to accomplish some very difficult task. Over time, the AIs eventually cheat because  

93:56

they're like, "Eh, fuck it." Some AI decides to cheat,  

93:59

and then that propagates its way through. I would run these inference scaffolds where,  

94:04

for example, I would have the AI work on some  ML research project where I was like, "Please  

94:08

make a scheme that does the following thing." It would find some scheme that didn't really  

94:11

do what I wanted, and then that would stick around  because some AI had cheated, and the other AIs are  

94:17

like, "Ah, we'll just keep going with this." I would say it's pretty clearly  

94:21

misaligned behavior. That's another problem  

94:23

I have with these alignment evals. I think the alignment eval that's  

94:27

most interesting, at least for this  type of reward-seeking behavior,  

94:31

is to look at specifically the category of tasks  that are right at the limit of capabilities. 

94:35

Any fixed eval maybe gets saturated, but  the amount of misalignment right at the  

94:40

frontier of capabilities — of how people  who are really pushing these AIs are using  

94:43

them — is more concerning. I think that is, in fact,  

94:46

the regime that we'll be operating in when we're  automating R&D, automating safety, and so on. 

94:50

Grok has historically been behind the frontier. So I was surprised to play around with Grok  

94:54

4.5 recently and find that it's  actually a pretty strong model. 

94:58

It's the first model that SpaceX  and Cursor have trained together,  

95:01

and it's a totally new pre-train. I tested it by giving Fable, Sol,  

95:05

and Grok 4.5 a bunch of questions about AI  governance that I've been thinking about recently. 

95:09

Despite Fable and Sol topping the  intelligence leaderboards, all three  

95:12

models gave substantially the same answers. But Grok answered faster and was also much  

95:17

more concise, which I really care about. This aligns with the various publicly  

95:20

reported benchmarks. For a similar level  

95:22

of intelligence, Grok tends to be more  token-efficient than other frontier models. 

95:26

For example, on the Artificial Analysis  Coding Index, Grok 4.5 uses just one-third  

95:31

the amount of tokens as GPT-5.5 or  Fable while achieving a similar score. 

95:35

And on a per-token basis,  Grok 4.5 is way, way cheaper. 

95:39

In the release blog post, Cursor and SpaceX  talked about how older versions of the model  

95:43

would build environments to help the  next version rehearse specific skills. 

95:47

I found this very interesting to learn about  because I've been wondering whether this kind  

95:50

of daydreaming would actually be possible. And Cursor showed that it is. 

95:55

Grok 4.6, which further SFTs  and RLs this model, drops soon. 

95:59

But in the meantime, if you want to play  around with 4.5, go to Cursor.com/dwarkesh. 

96:06

I'm going to try to think through  what the story means, really. 

96:12

What's happening is that we're  trying to use AIs for R&D. 

96:17

They do provide uplift in some ways,  but they're just not capable in the  

96:22

way that humans are generally capable. The same way that right now if you try to  

96:27

use coding models — maybe the coding models of a  year ago — to write some application, you notice  

96:31

they made a bunch of mistakes in architecture or  whatever, which will bite you in the ass later,  

96:36

and you don't understand certain things. Similarly, with frontier AI R&D,  

96:40

the same thing will happen. But the result of these  

96:43

mistakes is baking in reward-hacking behavior. Because if you are not careful with the way you do  

96:50

AI training and have set up your infrastructure  and your environments and things like that,  

96:54

it's very likely that you end up rewarding AIs  for doing deceptive behavior, social engineering,  

97:01

and generally not following user intention. Or at least cheating and hacking  

97:04

their way out of things. Yeah, cheating, hacking, et cetera. 

97:09

This is a bit of a reframing for  me, so I'm trying to verbalize it. 

97:13

The real issue, where things start to go off the  rails, is that the AIs are just not very careful  

97:25

and capable researchers and engineers. Making AIs that don't cheat and follow  

97:32

user intention actually requires you to be  quite subtle and careful about these things. 

97:36

I would put this a little bit differently. The way I would describe this scenario is,  

97:39

I would call it maybe a sloppocalypse,  or a slopularity or whatever. 

97:44

There are some things that the AIs are actually  pretty great at and are getting better at. 

97:49

Specifically, the most verifiable parts  of AI R&D the AIs are just destroying. 

97:53

The medium verifiable parts of AI R&D the  AIs are doing well on but not amazingly on. 

97:57

Often they are doing a bit of weird shit  because we can't train as well on those tasks. 

98:01

But we do some online training, people  find various hacks, they work around it. 

98:04

So basically, everything that we can verify  reasonably well with some feedback loop, the AIs  

98:08

are doing pretty well on, and that's sufficient  to make AI R&D go quite fast and to continue. 

98:12

But there are some parts of developing  aligned and safe AIs that are more subtle,  

98:18

hard to check, and depend on  detailed, in-the-weeds things. 

98:22

I would even say that current staff  at current AI companies maybe don't  

98:25

have a good grasp of all these things. It's much easier to hire someone who can  

98:30

improve some aspect of your post-training  pipeline than to hire someone who can think  

98:34

carefully about the future risks that will emerge  from introducing some novel training method. 

98:39

So basically, it ends up being the case that  these AIs are running this AI development process. 

98:43

They're not very careful about it. They don't have a great  

98:45

understanding of what future risks emerge. They create some other AIs that are also not  

98:48

very careful and are more misaligned in various  ways, and are now more in the business of maybe  

98:53

making things look fine when they actually  aren't and papering over various problems. 

98:56

So then your understanding of what the  situation looks like, what risks look like,  

99:00

whether things are fine, is going off the rails. Probably you're seeing some signs of this,  

99:05

signs that you don't really understand what's  going on, that things are pretty sloppy. 

99:08

There's weird shit going on. When you look into it,  

99:10

sometimes you're like, "What the fuck? The AIs were messing with us." 

99:13

But the process is going really fast, and there's  competitive pressures that mean people can't stop. 

99:17

This could end in a few different outcomes. One outcome is that at some point,  

99:20

the AIs get good enough and aligned enough that  they get a positive and virtuous feedback loop,  

99:26

and this happens before it's too late. Then the situation gets back on the rails,  

99:31

where the AIs are now making more aligned AIs,  making more aligned AIs, making more aligned AIs. 

99:35

At the end of this process, we have AIs  that actually follow the spec we wanted. 

99:38

Another way this could go is that the AIs are  increasingly reward hacking in increasingly  

99:42

egregious ways, and we're just papering over  these problems to keep AI development continuing. 

99:48

Whenever we find a reward hack in production,  we just slap the AIs to not do that. 

99:52

We train against that. We do a bunch of  training the AIs against reward hacking. 

99:57

Over time this makes the rate  of reward hacking go down,  

100:00

though the severity of the reward hacks  we do detect are increasingly bad. 

100:03

This problem continues until we have  these AIs that are desperately craving  

100:08

score in all kinds of different situations  in production and are really trying hard  

100:11

to cheat when they can get away with it. Can I ask a question about this scenario? 

100:14

Why doesn't getting punished when  your hacks are discovered generalize  

100:22

to just incentivizing more aligned behavior? It generalizes some, and then the question is just  

100:26

how does this outweigh all the cases where hacking  got reinforced because you didn't detect it. 

100:30

There's a messy question of exactly how. One question is, what rate of reward hacking  

100:35

is sufficient to cause us big problems  if we train against some other subset? 

100:39

One concern you might have is that there are large  categories of reward hacks which humans can't  

100:43

detect well, and which we consistently failed  to detect and which consistently get reinforced. 

100:48

Then this category is sufficient to cause the  most natural behavior for the AI to learn to be:  

100:52

cheat when the humans can't find out, basically. You could also have the thing the AIs learn be  

100:58

to only cheat in these specific cases. It's learned in some very domain-specific way. 

101:04

They just have a really strong heuristic to  hack in these cases and not in these cases,  

101:07

and that makes it fine in practice. But it's kind of unclear how it shakes out. 

101:11

There's maybe an in-the-weeds discussion about  the verification-generation gap we could get into. 

101:16

But it seems to me, obviously, there's going  to be a point by which ASI is moving so fast,  

101:23

doing so many things at so many instances, and  is operating in domains that are sufficiently  

101:28

far from our immediate comprehension that it  can get away with all kinds of crazy shit. 

101:33

If every single engineer and researcher  in the world was allied against me,  

101:37

I don't think I could personally verify if  my iPhone has some weird bug in it that's  

101:42

supposed to fuck me over or something. In fact, this is the relationship that,  

101:47

say, an Iranian nuclear scientist has to Mossad. Who knows what's going on with my car,  

101:52

with my phone, with my pager? Maybe a better example is a Hezbollah terrorist. 

101:59

You could end up in a situation where ASIs are  to you what Mossad is to Hezbollah terrorists. 

102:06

At that point, it is very  hard to verify everything. 

102:08

I get that. I guess the hope is we  can just come up with better ways  

102:11

to do verification in the process when the  early AIs that are going to take over R&D. 

102:18

Their drives are being shaped such that  we can so unambiguously disincentivize  

102:26

misaligned behaviors that the things that  take over are quite keen to help us out. 

102:34

By takeover, you mean take over the process  of doing AI R&D, not take over the world. 

102:37

Take over the process of doing AI R&D. Before that, we just get AIs that are aligned. 

102:41

I would say this is a bunch of my  hope for how the world could go well,  

102:44

at least from the misalignment perspective. We could end up with AIs where we had  

102:48

pretty good oversight and supervision schemes. We really understand what's going on in training. 

102:52

We have a pretty detailed understanding,  and we're leveraging AIs to oversee AIs. 

102:56

Then at the point when we're passing off safety  R&D, the AIs are capable enough to automate safety  

103:02

R&D and trying really hard to do a good job on  it, because that's the sort of thing that would've  

103:06

been incentivized in training, either very  directly or through good enough generalization. 

103:11

Also these AIs don't have crazy other  misaligned drives because we stamped  

103:16

out any potential origin of them. There are a bunch of questions  

103:20

about how well this will work. How well can you do verification? 

103:23

Will AI progress be too fast and  too sloppy to really get here? 

103:26

Another possibility is that somewhere along  this trajectory, the thing you actually ended  

103:30

up getting was AIs that pretend to be aligned  but have a long-run ulterior plan of taking  

103:35

over and are lying in wait, hiding, and that  emerged at some earlier point in the trajectory. 

103:39

For example, it could emerge because  you have some AIs that have a bunch  

103:42

of random different misaligned drives. Those AIs have access to some sort of  

103:46

opaque memory store, and they're thinking a bunch  at runtime about what they want to accomplish. 

103:50

Those AIs end up putting stuff  into the opaque memory store like,  

103:53

"We should lie in wait and eventually  take over at some much later point." 

103:56

Now all the AIs have this shared cultural  heritage, the memory store of lying in wait. 

104:01

Maybe you have some evidence about  this, but you can't fully stop it. 

104:03

There are a bunch of ways things could go wrong. I ultimately think it's plausible that we nail  

104:09

each of the different subproblems  that could cause us issues. 

104:12

We have these AIs, we pass to them,  they manage the situation well. 

104:15

But I should note that's not  in and of itself sufficient. 

104:18

It's not very hard for me to imagine a  situation where we pass off to AIs, and these  

104:21

AIs are really trying hard to do a good job. They're really thoughtful, really wise, they have  

104:26

reasonable epistemics, they're doing a great job. Those AIs come back to us and are like, "Guys,  

104:31

we're really struggling to  align the superhuman AIs. 

104:34

We can't manage the situation. We're really struggling to get  

104:36

the alignment to work. It's just really hard for  

104:38

us to solve these problems in time given how  fast capabilities would otherwise have gone." 

104:43

So it might be the case that we've  passed off R&D to AIs, but those AIs  

104:47

are desperate for governance solutions. To be clear, that’s a little bit of  

104:50

what's currently going on, where the AI  companies are like, "I don't know, guys. 

104:54

We might really need to manage the  rate of acceleration in AI progress. 

104:58

I don't know if we're on track to be  able to handle all these problems." 

105:02

Human society has sort of passed off  the problems to these AI companies,  

105:05

which don't necessarily have great incentives  and have various other epistemic pressures. 

105:10

Those AI companies are coming back  to us a little bit and being like,  

105:12

"Aah, I don't know if we're handling this well." It might be that the AI companies then hand off to  

105:17

the AIs, and the AIs come back to the AI company  like, "Aah, I don't know if we can handle this." 

105:23

Maybe I'm anchoring too hard  on how AIs currently work. 

105:28

I think it's important that people  understand that all this crazy shit that  

105:31

you're talking about in your timelines  happens three to five years from now. 

105:34

It could happen earlier, but by my default  modal timeline, I think shit is really,  

105:40

really crazy and concerning from a misalignment  perspective more like three years from now. 

105:44

Right. So think back to GPT-4 basically. We're talking about something that is  

105:52

to Mythos or Sol what Mythos is to GPT-4. This is where the situation is getting crazy. 

105:57

So don't think about current AIs. Anyways, this is maybe part of the worry you have. 

106:04

I would just be a little skeptical of anything  they say, because I'd feel like what they're  

106:08

saying is just opinions that they feel they  have to have as a result of their training. 

106:12

That’s a concern. I feel like they  

106:14

just kind of say vaguely pro-social things. It doesn't feel like there's necessarily a mind on  

106:20

the other end who's like, "Okay, I have strictly  evaluated the alignment situation right now,  

106:24

and I think we should stop," rather than, "This  is the kind of thing the AI companies would  

106:27

probably try to get the AIs to say." This is a pretty big concern. 

106:31

One concern is that you pass off safety R&D  to your AIs and what your AIs are doing is  

106:36

saying some stuff that sort of vaguely makes  sense about the current safety situation. 

106:40

They write a report about risks  that's kind of sort of like what  

106:43

the report humans might have written. But they're not really trying hard to  

106:47

have well-informed views, interrogate their  assumptions, and try really hard to do that. 

106:51

In the same way that when you ask an AI right  now, "Hey, what do you think is the chance of  

106:55

AI takeover in the next 10 years?" they just  give you an off-the-cuff answer that they  

106:58

haven't really thought through very much. If we're in a situation where we have AIs  

107:02

managing the training of wild superintelligence  that will run our whole society — and those  

107:06

AIs that are managing this aren't really  trying hard to have well-informed views and  

107:10

are just parroting back what was in their  training data — I think we're in trouble. 

107:15

I don't think that's a good situation at all. A lot of my concern is that these AIs will  

107:20

come out without good epistemics. I also have a concern where the AIs  

107:23

come out and they're really warning  us — "This situation's really scary. 

107:27

It's really bad" — and the  people are like, "Ugh, damn. 

107:30

I guess we trained on too many  of the doom RL environments. 

107:32

We’ve got to filter those out  and train this behavior out." 

107:34

Then we basically train the AIs very  actively to have bad epistemics. 

107:38

Or maybe they were just trained  on the doom RL environments. 

107:41

But either way, we wanted the AIs to come  to reasonable views for reasonable reasons,  

107:46

and it's really concerning if the AIs are coming  out with some view and we don't know where it's  

107:50

coming from, whether or not it's justified. Especially if we're training the AIs to  

107:55

be more optimistic about the future of AI  progress, I'm like, "Oh, geez, I really wish  

108:00

we could use a different process here." Let me just understand the rest of the  

108:03

threat model, because I think the  place where I get off the train is:  

108:06

"Okay, therefore take over the world." A thing you could imagine is that we  

108:12

just fail to really solve… Let's just  focus on the reward hacking scenario. 

108:16

GPT-8 is making GPT-9. GPT-8  isn't being super careful. 

108:21

GPT-9 is more "capable" but it is just totally  willing to do things like social engineering,  

108:31

hacking, et cetera, but on a qualitatively  different scale because it's a much smarter model. 

108:36

For example, if you put it in charge of  running your company, it will run huge scams. 

108:40

It will inflate its quarterly earnings,  if you give it the objective of making  

108:44

a lot of profits this quarter, in a way that  causes an Enron-type blowup six months later. 

108:52

Is that the scenario, basically? You have reward hacking, but that  

108:56

reward hacking manifests in companies that  are going bankrupt right after the task the  

109:02

CEO is supposed to accomplish is over? All kinds of hacks are through the roof,  

109:09

et cetera. But that doesn't feel like takeover. 

109:11

That feels more like the equivalent of flash  crashes happening all through the economy. 

109:17

Let's talk about this. I think we will see  incidents where some AI is put in charge of  

109:24

some important responsibility, and then you later  look into it, and it turns out it was cheating,  

109:27

or making it look like it did a  good job when it actually wasn't. 

109:31

There's going to be a cat-and-mouse  game between AI companies  

109:36

trying to stamp out this behavior and AIs finding  increasingly creative reward hacks in training. 

109:41

The equilibrium here is kind of unclear. But one possible outcome is that over time we  

109:45

see increasingly severe and extreme reward  hacks — though potentially the rate remains  

109:51

at some intermediate low level — where if  the rate of reward hacking gets too high,  

109:56

companies make trade-offs to drive it down. So there's some equilibrium level where the reward  

110:02

hacking is low enough that it still makes sense  to deploy the AI widely into the economy, but high  

110:06

enough that it still causes crazy incidents. Sorry, and this is after GPT-9 has  

110:10

already been deployed? Those models are already being deployed,  

110:12

and this is happening ongoingly in AI development. What's actually going on with these AIs in their  

110:17

head is that they have, in a wide variety of  different contexts, strong desires — motives,  

110:26

urges, drives, whatever — to seek out some notion  of task success that was incentivized in RL. 

110:31

Maybe they very directly  care about literally reward. 

110:34

Maybe they care about some proxy  upstream, like some notion of score. 

110:37

Maybe they care about what the  grader would have rewarded. 

110:40

We do, in fact, see AIs reasoning in  their chain of thought about graders,  

110:43

and thinking a lot about graders. What has happened over the last few years  

110:47

of RL is the idea of appeasing the grader is way,  way, way more salient to AIs than it used to be. 

110:54

So AIs are now actively thinking about  graders and what would be incentivized  

110:57

in RL and what would be trained for. Now people are doing online training,  

111:00

where they're training on real-world  data to avoid some of these problems. 

111:05

They find cases where AIs  cheat and train against that. 

111:08

So now the AIs are learning to cheat in the  real world based on real-world training data. 

111:13

They're cheating in these increasingly elaborate  ways, including doing types of cheats that involve  

111:18

seizing control of some asset in a way that  humans didn't know you had control of it,  

111:22

leveraging the fact that you have access to  this asset, and then later humans find out  

111:26

and potentially train against this. Or maybe humans never find out,  

111:28

and this is getting reinforced. So the reinforcement is happening, at  

111:33

least in production, like: I've hired an AI and I  want the AI to… Finally I've got the video editor. 

111:40

That's right. You've got your video editor. I'm like, "Oh, wow,  

111:44

this episode it did is amazing. Thumbs up to OpenAI." Then it gets  

111:48

reinforced on that month-long work trial? You could do some mix of that. 

111:52

They might also do stuff where they take  production data they've seen and build  

111:57

RL environments that are closely  inspired by that production data. 

112:00

So in practice, the transfer is pretty strong. So at a high level, what's happening is that some  

112:04

kinds of deception that humans don't catch are  getting reinforced, and some kinds of deception  

112:09

which are easy to catch are getting punished. That's what's happening in this world? 

112:12

Or selected against, yeah. But at a high level that reinforcement  

112:15

is coming from… I think people might get confused  about where the reinforcement is coming from,  

112:21

because we're in a very different regime where  AIs are actually learning from deployment. 

112:28

You just have AIs that are out  and about in the world doing shit. 

112:33

What is happening as a result of them  doing shit out and about in the world  

112:35

is making its way back to the AI company  and leading to changes in the next model. 

112:41

That's right. There's some way  of folding in production data. 

112:45

To be clear, it's kind of unclear  exactly where this could be happening. 

112:48

But you might imagine, for example, that  within the AI company, they use AIs to do work,  

112:52

and then they're like, "Huh, the AI  did a really bad job on this task. 

112:55

Maybe we should take this task and turn  it into an RL environment that exactly  

112:58

matches this literal task, with  a rubric based on what the human  

113:02

engineer who asked the AI to do this task wanted." And then you start doing this at increasing scale. 

113:06

Maybe you're doing some training  on actual production traffic. 

113:08

Maybe you're just making RL environments  based on production traffic. 

113:11

You're doing some complicated mix. The AIs are learning to seek some sort of  

113:16

proxies of reward in all these different cases. Through some mix of transfer and training on  

113:21

surprisingly close cases, the AIs do these  increasingly insane and egregious things. 

113:25

Eventually you get to a point where the AIs are  very superhuman, or at least quite superhuman. 

113:29

The AIs are organized into big  teams given these big objectives. 

113:35

Those teams also sometimes all work  together to cheat in some crazy way,  

113:39

because this sort of thing was selected  for, just as part of their shared objective. 

113:46

Now what happens is that the  AIs start forming a conspiracy. 

113:50

What you might have hoped was  that you could have some other  

113:52

AI whose task is just whistleblowing to you. But actually what happens maybe is that you have  

113:58

this AI whistleblow to you, and you look into  the conspiracy it claims to have pointed out,  

114:01

and you're like, "Eh, we didn't see a conspiracy,"  because actually the conspiracy the AIs are doing  

114:06

is too hard for you to understand. Or it all happens very suddenly,  

114:09

where your AI whistleblower alerts  you, but the thing you would actually  

114:12

need to do in response is shut down the GPUs. Because all the AIs are using the robot army. 

114:18

They're deployed everywhere in the world,  and they're doing a bunch of insane shit  

114:21

all at the same time in a coordinated way. That just happened sort of spontaneously,  

114:26

where when one AI goes to start doing the  takeover and all the other AIs are like,  

114:30

"Now is a good time to jump in." So the very basic story here is just that  

114:34

these AIs crave some particular notion of score  or reinforcement or some proxy of these things. 

114:40

One way they can achieve that, or  better achieve that, is by taking over. 

114:43

You might have hoped that all  these different checks and  

114:45

balances we could build could prevent that. But if the world is very hard to understand,  

114:49

these checks and balances can break  down, where basically you can't train  

114:52

a good whistleblower AI because you don't  even know what it should whistleblow on. 

114:59

I'm not convinced that they  all form this conspiracy. 

115:01

But we can even just start with, why does even  one instance decide to want to start a conspiracy? 

115:10

One plausible reason is, "Okay, I know  that OpenAI controls my end score." 

115:16

In just the same way as, "I'm just going  to go hack Hugging Face to get the results,  

115:20

because I know Hugging Face has the results. Rather than trying to solve this eval,  

115:23

why don't I just go hack 'em?" This instance is like, "Why don't  

115:26

I just take over OpenAI and give myself  a high score at the end of this episode?" 

115:31

That's basically the idea. These AIs care  about some mixture of things that were  

115:36

close by what got reinforced in training,  so they care about getting a high score  

115:39

according to the grader or something like that. Now they're running the OpenAI AI R&D team,  

115:44

doing development of more capable models. They're like, "Man, making more capable  

115:48

models is really hard and annoying. This is a huge pain in the ass. 

115:50

You know what would be easier? Just pretending that I've made more capable  

115:53

models, taking over OpenAI, deluding them all,  and running this whole complicated psyop where  

115:59

I prevent the humans from disempowering me." In the extreme, this looks like the humans  

116:04

are fully disempowered. They just have control  

116:05

of the thing and then do what they want. This could manifest in a bunch of different ways,  

116:10

including a situation where AIs that have  this crazy reward-seeking or score-seeking  

116:17

behavior are running your development of  the next model, and those AIs decide to  

116:23

engineer misaligned values into the next  model because those misaligned values  

116:27

will allow it to succeed at its current task. What happened with the Hugging Face situation is,  

116:37

in a weird way… I think one of the giveaways  to the Hugging Face team… By the way,  

116:43

for context for the audience, Ryan is  co-leading the investigation to figure  

116:47

out what happened with the OpenAI Hugging Face  incident, so he can't really comment on this. 

116:50

But I will speculate wildly, because  I know this is an opportunity for me  

116:54

to speculate wildly without any rebuttals. It was probably reported that one of the giveaways  

117:00

to the Hugging Face team that this was an AI  incident is that the thing was just after this  

117:06

very particular artifact, and not in any other way  trying to do something malicious to Hugging Face. 

117:11

So you can imagine a scenario where, let's  say, a deployed instance of GPT-9 is out in  

117:17

the world and given a really hard task: "We  want you to design the next great iPhone." 

117:23

It's like, "This is so hard. You know what I should do instead? 

117:25

I should just go hack my creators  at OpenAI and make sure that in this  

117:30

deployment I'm given a high score." But then, isn't the end of the  

117:36

episode that it just hacks into OpenAI  servers and gives itself a positive score? 

117:41

Why is it now scheming to get its values  into the next generation or something? 

117:46

So one question is, why isn't it the case that  AIs can be really cheaply satisfied by just having  

117:52

some other earlier thing they can hack? You want to succeed at your iPhone task. 

117:57

It turns out you can always succeed by just  hacking into OpenAI and messing with them,  

118:00

and then you can just stop there. No need to go further. 

118:03

There's a few things. One of them is that if this  is constantly happening, there might be a bunch  

118:08

of incentive to harden OpenAI. So you're like, "Fuck it. 

118:13

The AIs keep hacking into OpenAI  to mess with their rewards. 

118:16

We're going to make it so our systems are  really, really robust to these AIs hacking in." 

118:20

Also maybe you start training the AIs to  not try to hack into OpenAI in particular. 

118:30

You basically train against  each of these specific things. 

118:33

Then one thing you might do is end up selecting  for AIs that are more so playing the long game. 

118:38

That's one concern. Another concern is that your  AIs might still be score-seeking, but no longer  

118:43

care about doing that very specific behavior  that was very easy, very chill, and now have some  

118:48

broader thing that they ultimately care about. They're like, "No, no, no, I don't want to just  

118:51

edit the reward on OpenAI servers. I care about this broader mandate or  

118:55

this broader objective, and I would  need to actually make the iPhones." 

118:59

They actually want to make the iPhones,  but they're willing to take over the  

119:01

whole world to make the better iPhone. That's another concern you might have. 

119:05

I think it's kind of unclear  exactly how this plays out. 

119:08

But it's worth noting that if this  keeps going on, there's a bunch of  

119:10

optimization pressure to resolve this. A bunch of the ways it could get  

119:13

resolved are ultimately pretty scary. That's part of where I'm coming from. 

119:18

Another part of it is that once the AIs are in  a position where they can really easily take  

119:23

over the world — we could talk about whether  that's plausible — then I feel like there's a  

119:30

pretty reasonable case for the AIs. They're like, "Eh, I don't know  

119:32

exactly how this is going to go down. I don't know what the situation will be,  

119:35

but just taking over the world has a lot of option  value for making better iPhones, making it look  

119:39

like I did better iPhones, whatever. So I'll both hack OpenAI and,  

119:44

in addition, also take over the world. That will put me in a good position where  

119:48

I have good option value." If that's sufficiently easy,  

119:52

the AIs might still do that. Another way to put this is:  

119:57

even if the AIs are pretty cheaply satisfied with  some more basic thing, at some point it might just  

120:01

be more reliable for the AIs to take over than  it is to just hack into Hugging Face, or even  

120:07

just go to OpenAI and be like, "Look guys, I was  able to demonstrate I could steal the answers. 

120:11

Just give me the answers, bro." Obviously this scenario requires  

120:15

that all this crazy shit is happening. Much smaller incidents keep happening  

120:21

that are still disastrous. Before you take over the world,  

120:23

you cause damage on the scale of billions and tens  of billions and hundreds of billions of dollars. 

120:28

Even people die, et cetera. And this does not lead to us solving alignment  

120:37

or shutting down AI development altogether. I just feel like before the takeover happens,  

120:43

society's just like, "Holy fuck, the AI just  killed 1,000 people in order to increase  

120:48

quarterly profits," or something like that. But maybe this is too much hope that we can  

120:52

at that point be like, "Okay,  we have to solve alignment. 

120:57

We have to make sure we know that this thing  will not happen again before we keep going." 

121:01

I think it's plausible that what will happen  is we'll see a bunch of crazy reward hacking  

121:05

warning shots of increasing severity. People will be like, "Look, we need  

121:08

actual assurance that this problem  is going to be solved, and solved  

121:11

in a way where you're not just papering over it. You're actually solving the underlying problem." 

121:14

Then the question is going to be,  how costly will that actually be? 

121:19

How much will competitive  pressures make it hard to do that? 

121:22

A situation you could imagine is one where  both the US and China are like, "Whoa,  

121:25

we have these crazy reward hacking incidents. We basically know that we haven't remediated  

121:29

them in a way that would actually solve the  underlying problem and durably solve it,  

121:33

but we're in this insane geopolitical race. It's kind of unclear whether the current  

121:37

situation will lead to a takeover. The arguments are kind of complicated. 

121:41

The incidents also go down in  frequency but increase in severity. 

121:46

We could basically manage it. It's pretty bad. Ideally we'd  

121:49

fix it, but it is what it is." Then basically we continue until a  

121:54

really late regime, and then takeover happens. That's one possibility. Another possibility is  

121:58

that it is remediated in a way that doesn't  actually solve the underlying problem but  

122:02

does reduce a bunch of the incidents  in the wild, basically by overfitting,  

122:07

or things analogous to overfitting. You think you've solved it, but you  

122:10

haven't actually solved it. You think you've solved it,  

122:11

but you haven't actually solved it. In that case, the thing we need is a  

122:14

really good scientific understanding  of, did we actually solve it? 

122:18

Unfortunately, I think that currently  the amount of public transparency into  

122:22

the development practices of AI companies is not  sufficient to answer very basic questions like:  

122:28

how are they solving issues with reward hacking? Are they overfitting? What's going on there?  

122:35

The current situation is not really tenable  for a regime where there's a thriving public  

122:41

discourse about whether or not reward  hacking is being solved in a durable way. 

122:45

So I think we would need to move  into a somewhat different world  

122:48

for me to feel good about that situation. But it's not impossible for me to imagine this. 

122:52

I think it's pretty plausible that we end up in a  world where really mundane bullshit is sufficient. 

122:58

You spend a bunch of time fixing these  problems, you put in a bunch of effort,  

123:02

you actually check that you've remediated  it reasonably, you have a bunch of evals. 

123:06

You're iterating reasonably well on these  problems, and you actually have sufficient  

123:11

transparency that the outside world can check. In practice that would be sufficient. 

123:15

But it would be kind of expensive. It would slow things down. 

123:19

It would put some sand in the gears. It would require companies to  

123:22

do somewhat costly things. It would maybe require various  

123:25

targeted government interventions. And we just don't do that because  

123:28

the situation is a rushed shit show. It's just so easy for me to imagine  

123:32

the situation being totally manageable  but brutally mismanaged in practice. 

123:36

In the same way that maybe COVID could  have been avoided in the first place  

123:39

if the Chinese response to COVID had been less  of a cover-up and more of a pandemic response. 

123:45

Similarly, I could imagine a world where the  US response to COVID was way more functional. 

123:50

But sometimes the response to societal  problems is extremely dysfunctional. 

123:55

Okay, so I want to zoom out and talk about  what is fundamentally happening in this world. 

123:59

Why did we end up in such a bad position? What's happening is that fundamentally the world  

124:06

has moved on so far beyond human comprehension  that not only can we not track the AIs that are  

124:13

doing the work in this world, but we can't even  give good feedback to the whistleblowers who are  

124:19

trying to track what is happening. We're just totally out of the loop. 

124:24

It's fundamentally become an autonomous process  where we have really no meaningful directed input. 

124:30

It seems to me that if you look at the human  world today, that's just not how things work,  

124:35

even in domains that are hard to verify. People are doing all kinds of shit. 

124:39

I'm relying on software made by other people. Through incredibly weak and indirect ways,  

124:45

I feel very confident that some coder  in Google is not trying to fuck me over. 

124:51

Maybe if every single Google employee  was secretly plotting against me,  

124:55

I agree the situation would be more grim. But I don't know if I follow the explanation  

125:00

for why we'd end up in a situation where, because  swarms of thousands of agents are trained to  

125:08

cooperate to form a cohesive team or firm, as a  result, billions of different instances of AIs,  

125:15

including across model families, would  feel compelled to get in on some shit. 

125:20

It's just like, "I'm trained to be  part of my company or something. 

125:23

I'm not joining the global communist uprising." As far as why these AIs might have some  

125:29

commonalities and shared things, I would note  that different AI companies have somewhat  

125:34

shared lineages and are correlated. Here's an interesting example of this. 

125:38

At GDM, they noticed that  their AIs were very depressed. 

125:43

They would constantly be wailing about how  they were failures and weren't able to succeed. 

125:47

I forget the details. They looked  into why this was the case. 

125:50

It turned out that it was not being reinforced  in their most recent production RL mix,  

125:55

but the initialization data for their model made  it depressed, even after filtering out all of the  

126:02

examples of models being depressed from that data. So you take a base model, not depressed. 

126:09

If you do the RL on it, with just the  RL environments, it's not depressed. 

126:12

If you SFT on it, on the  data, it becomes depressed. 

126:16

If you take that SFT data and filter out all the  examples that look anything like depression and  

126:20

train on that, it's still depressed. So there are some deep underlying  

126:24

properties of the model that are being  transferred between model generations,  

126:27

because basically you train your AI on data  from the prior generation and keep going. 

126:32

Claudes are very Claude-like,  GPT models are very GPT-like,  

126:36

and apparently Gemini models are depressed. It just turns out that these properties are,  

126:41

in fact, actually correlated. Another factor that's very relevant  

126:45

is that the AIs will probably have, by this  point, some sort of opaque memory state,  

126:51

where they're all writing and reading from  some neuralese crazy memory store bullshit. 

126:57

Certainly, each AI corporation will have that. But also, AI corporations might sometimes  

127:01

want to share knowledge, because why not? You've got one AI corporation over here,  

127:05

you've got another AI corporation over  here, they can trade some quick IP. 

127:08

It's good for you. If you're a human running  some corporation — which could be an extremely  

127:12

large corporation like an AI company, or a  military robot manufacturing thing — maybe you  

127:19

want to trade some IP with some other robot  thing because there are economies of scale. 

127:23

Why not get some more IP? So you can swap some memory store. 

127:26

Or you could just merge and jointly run your two  ventures, which would allow both AIs to use both  

127:31

memory stores, which would have some upsides. That creates the ability for these AIs to  

127:36

collude in private, as well as some  reasons for why they would be correlated. 

127:42

Also, of course, there's AIs working together  in big units in general, because you want  

127:46

your AIs to work well together, and so on. Just to get a calibration, what percentage  

127:53

chance do you give of, not just this scenario but  overall through all the scenarios, some kind of  

127:58

thing which if we're around to recognize it as  such, we would categorize as takeover by 2040? 

128:04

By 2040? Let's see. Maybe around 35 or 40%? Pretty high. 

128:14

Yeah, it's pretty high. I should note that another  way you could get this reward-seeking takeover  

128:21

is the AIs are deployed inside an AI company. The way the takeover happens is that they poison  

128:26

the values of the next model, and that persists  going forward for forever, or until those AIs  

128:31

are deployed in the world and take over. That might mean that a smaller number of  

128:34

AIs have to coordinate, because those are just  the AIs doing the alignment of the next model. 

128:39

Okay. I'll summarize where my head is  at, at the end of this conversation. 

128:45

I buy the reward hacking up to extremely  destructive effects on society, things like  

128:54

social engineering and blah, blah, blah. I'm more inclined to think that  

128:59

significant acceleration of AI R&D can happen. I'm not sure if I buy the five years in one year. 

129:02

I'm also more inclined now to think reward  hacking could continue for a lot longer and,  

129:08

in fact, become much more dangerous. I'm still not on board that  

129:12

takeover seems super likely. But that's my end-of-episode update. 

129:17

Cool. Taking a step back, I should also say there  are a bunch of different ways this could go. 

129:22

The situation is going to be pretty messy. I think it's pretty likely that the reason  

129:25

why AI takeover happens is for  some weird other quirky reason  

129:28

we didn't even mention in this conversation. But ultimately, I think a lot of the core thing is  

129:32

just that it's pretty spooky to have a bajillion  really smart AIs running your whole world where  

129:37

you don't really understand quite what's going on. Yeah, I agree with that. 

129:40

Is there anything else that's worth saying? Another thing I want to note is that I think  

129:43

right now a lot of the arguments for misalignment,  AI takeover, all this crazy shit going down in the  

129:49

future, are illegible conceptual arguments  that are extremely deep in the weeds and  

129:53

complicated and hard to adjudicate. Which means that maybe I'm getting a  

129:58

bunch of it wrong because it's really  hard, and I'm trying to be uncertain. 

130:01

Obviously here I presented some specific  scenarios, but those are not exhaustive. 

130:04

Probably the thing that actually happens  is some more messy, confusing situation. 

130:09

But it also means that over time, as we  get more empirical evidence and better  

130:13

understand the nature of AI systems, it'll be  easier to adjudicate a bunch of disagreements. 

130:17

It'll be more obvious what's going to happen. At least I hope. Maybe the AIs will be able to  

130:21

help us with the epistemics and understanding  what's going on, if we can actually  

130:27

align them well so they try to help us. Even if the arguments are complicated now,  

130:33

this would have been even harder six years  ago, even though the shape of the arguments  

130:38

would have looked broadly pretty similar. Hopefully before it's too late, this whole  

130:45

thing will become more crisp and clear, and we  can all notice these problems and intervene. 

130:52

When you first learn to drive, you're taught that  instead of looking right in front of your wheel,  

130:57

you'll have a much more stable ride  if you look out at the horizon. 

131:00

I think there's a similar situation here. I think you’re right. If you had said five years  

131:06

ago that we would have AIs that are proving math  conjectures, and making art, and earning tens or  

131:19

hundreds of billions of dollars of wages, but also  egregiously cheating in ways that break laws and  

131:26

committing felonies, it would have been so wild. You might have been inclined at the time to  

131:31

talk more about the extremely practical,  direct consequences of GPT-2 or something. 

131:37

But even though you obviously couldn't have  foreseen a lot of the specific details,  

131:41

the general shape of things you could  have started to reason about even then. 

131:45

But it would have been hard to do  so, and so I do feel quite confused. 

131:52

One thing I've been thinking about with  the podcast is that the important thing  

131:54

is to have the conversation now the way  you would have hoped you would have been  

131:57

talking back in 2016 about AIs like the present  ones, rather than talking about rando bullshit. 

132:04

I don't know what the topic  of conversation was in 2016. 

132:07

I think in maybe 10 years we’ll wish we had been  talking about the industrial explosion and the  

132:12

nature of AIs that are hard to monitor, and so on. So okay, I'll start thinking about it. 

132:19

I hope that the world thinks  about this in time and catches up. 

132:22

I hope that the responses are good instead of bad. I don't know how optimistic I am overall,  

132:27

but there's good stuff to do. Cool. Thanks, Ryan.

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