All right, Alexander. Let's talk about

the G7 meeting that wrapped up from from

France.

Uh the two big topics of discussion were

Iran and and the Iran

MOU, which which was signed in in

France. And we we did a dedicated video

on on that. And the other big topic, the

one that that interests the the

Europeans

was interests the Europeans more

was was project Ukraine. And attending

the G7

was Ukraine. Zelensky was was there.

What is What is he doing at a G7

meeting? Well, he's there begging for

money and weapons, and it looks like he

got it. What What What Zelensky asks, he

always gets. And he is going to get He

got money. He's going to get

not only weapons, it looks like he's

going to get licenses to produce those

weapons. Of course, Ukraine is not going

to produce those weapons. This is all a

cover so that when those weapons are

used against Russia, Ukraine can say,

well,

the the West can say, well, these were

Ukrainian weapons produced by Ukraine.

You see, here's the license. But of

course, these weapons are going to be

produced in the United States and in

Europe and and elsewhere. But anyway,

they're providing the the cover story

already. Interceptors, long-range

missiles, all of these things are going

to start being produced. And they're

going to start being fired into Russia.

And And you got the uh

the sanctions the the sanctions snapback

on Russia on Russian oil. Uh Trump

agreed to or at least it seems that he

that he agreed to to everything

uh that was proposed by the Europeans.

Uh Macron is telling us that Trump is is

united with Europe in their views of of

Ukraine.

And uh and the message that that Russia

is in retreat and Ukraine is advancing.

That's actually coming from Macron as

well. Yeah, they're everywhere. So,

yeah,

you know, the a type of of recommitment

of of the G7 to project Ukraine

with the United States pledging to

recommit.

>> Yes.

>> To to project Ukraine. That's that's

basically the message that that Macron

and France as the host nation wanted to

to put out there.

>> Yes, that is absolutely correct. That

was the optics

a meeting arranged

very strange meeting between Zelensky

and Trump. G7 documents which are

obviously prepared well in advance.

Having just come from Russia, I have to

say that the unreality of it all is um

very very sharp to me. I don't think any

of these things that they are talking

about are going to happen. Licensing

production of weapons is of course a

fantasy. The Germans have

obtained all kinds of licenses to

produce weapons, Patriots for example.

We are years away from seeing any of

that happen. The United States

cannot supply weapons to Ukraine or to

Europe because there aren't any weapons

now to give.

And of course we've talked many times

about drones and all all of those kind

of things.

I I think we are

coming to the end of all of that too. So

yes, Trump goes along. He agrees to all

of these things as he always does. Trump

always agrees to everything that is put

before him. He agreed to what the

Israelis want. He agreed to what the

Europeans want. He agrees to everything.

But none of this is going to happen and

none of this is going to make any

difference.

In terms of

diplomacy, negotiations

to end the conflict, that is clearly

essentially over.

And I think that what we're going to

quietly see is the continued dialogue

between the Russians and the Americans

continue.

That is annoying an awful lot of people

outside Russia.

Within Russia itself,

I think it's a much more complicated

story than people understand. And this

is what I'm quickly going to say, we can

explore that further in this program.

>> You you're a complicated story, the

negotiations between Russia and the

United States, you mean?

>> Yeah, dialogue between Russians and

Americans. There are people who of

course oppose this. People within the

senior levels of the military, people

within the security services, people

like that. My overall sense sense is

that if you talk about talk to ordinary

Russians, they are in favor of it.

And I did speak to ordinary Russians. I

think mostly they are in favor of it.

For the first time over the time that I

have been in Russia, I've had many

contacts with Russia. I was able to

speak to working-class Russians, which

is something I've never done

previously. I mean, they don't have any

expectations of any major shift in

relations between the Americans with the

Americans. But overall, they would

certainly prefer dialogue between their

their their government and the

Americans. And the overwhelming mood

that I got

when I was in Russia is that as

everybody um

feels that the war is going correctly

and is going to be won and all that,

the one thing they do not want

is an outright conflict with the United

States. There is support for the war as

it is being fought now,

but there would be no there would be a

very different situation if we got into

a situation of outright conscription.

And um I think that because of that

a dialogue with the Americans that keeps

the situation basically where it is at

the moment is what people would prefer

to see. I am not talking about as I said

people with the you know the generals,

the foreign ministry people, people in

industries, those sorts of things. I'm

talking about the wider sections of the

Russian population based on the people I

spoke to.

>> Okay. Okay. Well, let's let's get back

to that a bit later. Um the

>> Yeah.

>> the licensing for for weapons for

weapons production.

>> Yeah.

>> The the thinking is that they're not

going to produce anything. That this is

just going to be a a scenario where they

they slap a

fresh coat a sticker a fresh coat of

paint on

>> Yeah.

>> on a Taurus missile or on a whatever.

Whatever missiles they have lying around

and and they say okay, made in Ukraine.

>> Yeah.

>> they start firing them into Russia. What

do what do you say of that?

>> Well, I'm sure that's exactly the plan.

But again having actually been to Russia

and having had some feelings about what

actually is going on with the drone and

the missile offensives. I don't think

it's going to make any difference. I was

in Russia when there were drone attacks.

They're having actually

an even less impact on the real

situation there than I had assumed they

were.

There is a certain degree of nervousness

on the part of people about them. But

the extent to which ordinary life

continues

really uh astonished me.

>> Well, I mean perhaps you had a different

perspective.

>> No, I mean I

>> But that's absolutely the view I

>> I come with the argument that yes, it's

you're talking about a huge country,

huge population, especially in in

Moscow. You're talking about 15, 20

million people. And yeah, you're

absolutely right. Um

>> Yeah.

>> You know, life is life in Moscow

seems very it is very normal.

>> No.

>> Right? But

you do meet people that that have seen

the drones.

>> Yeah.

>> That that have been affected by the

drones. You have people that have been

affected by the drones. Um for example,

traveling with airport cancellations and

stuff like that.

Uh the the drones are being launched

into Moscow every single day or into

Russia every single day in very large

>> Yes.

>> numbers. Is it We're not talking about

20 drones or 30 drones. We're not

talking about 100, 200, 300 drones every

single day that are being launched in

into Russia. There's a lot of debate and

discussion as to where these drones are

coming from.

>> Yes.

>> Who's really launching them? What

direction are they coming from?

>> Yeah.

>> And uh and people are dying.

>> Yes.

>> Civilians, you do have

significant

civilian casualties. Um a school bus was

hit

>> Yeah.

>> with um

with um foot football

ch- children on a football team.

>> Yes.

>> And and and the bus was hit by by a

drone.

>> No.

>> Um the the sense that I got from from a

lot of people

was that uh

what's the government doing

>> Right.

>> about it? They seem to be very detached

from the whole thing. I mean I you're

you're a thousand percent correct in

that this is not going to change the

war.

>> No.

>> Um

what's happening on the front line is

not affected by any of this. Russia's

going to continue to to grind down the

Ukraine military. They're going to

continue to to win.

Um

but

the government needs to address this

because it is affecting it may not

affect the 20 million people living in

Moscow, but it does affect certain

certain Russian citizens and people who

are many

you know, they're these are Russian

people. These are Russian citizens.

These are kids going to play football. I

mean

the point is that

that that it seems like the government's

very detached

from from what's happening or they don't

just don't seem to to really put much

focus on it. I mean a drone

smashed an oil

refinery

just the other day

about 15 20 kilometers from the Kremlin.

>> And it and it is and it disrupts our

flights and it disrupts our flights.

>> Yeah. And and and when you break

everything down and you get to to to a

certain level you have to you have to

admit that

here you have the number one nuclear

power

which has put all these red lines

being attacked on a daily basis

and and yes maybe there wasn't a red

line with drones, but there definitely

is a red line with long-range missiles

without a doubt. Putin put a red line

with long-range missile strikes

and we all know just around we all know

that the long-range missile strikes

are coming. They they already are there.

I mean they already are are launching

long-range missile strikes, but we do

know that the long-range missile strikes

are coming. They're telegraphing to

everybody that the long-range missile

strikes are coming.

>> Right. Well, I I I'm going to I'm going

to just make a few observations now and

I'm going to first of all point out that

I was not actually most of the time that

I was in Russia in Moscow at all.

I was mostly in Pskov, and it was in

Pskov, which is a small town

in Well, not a very small town, but you

know, a smallish town in Northwestern

Russia.

Um

that's actually where I was. Now, Pskov

is um a town with very strong

connections with the military.

There's a major military base there

where um one of the airborne paratroop

divisions um is located.

So, it it's very much what you might

describe as a place which is in some

respects very involved in the war. I

mean, a lot of local people um they have

soldiers who are in the air in the

military, they're fighting on the front

lines, and all of those kind of things.

It's also a place where you would expect

drone attacks to happen. Again,

precisely because there are significant

military industries, including in the

electronics sector in the region. And of

course, there's also, as I said, these

military bases there.

So, I'm going to make a general

observation about Russia today. To an

extent that I had not anticipated, it is

a country at peace.

This is a very strange thing to uh

describe, but um

you don't

see, when you are in Russia,

very much visible sign of the war.

The economy functions, the shops are

filled, people go to work, people

children go to school, the universities

continue to function. This is

a surprisingly peaceful place.

What the West is trying to do

is they're trying to shatter

or disrupt

this sense of normality

and peace that exists there.

I think that they understand. I think

that by the way, um, having been to

Russia, I think that some people in the

West are much better informed and

understand this a lot better

than we suppose. They understand that

this is a peaceful country. They

understand that because the country is

at is at peace, because the economy is

functioning normally,

if things are simply left as they are,

then

over time the war in Ukraine will be

decided decisively in Russia's favor.

So, they're trying

to disrupt and shatter this sense of

peace.

And this is what the drone attacks are

all about. They are intended

to, um,

change

people's perceptions

about the peaceful conditions of life

inside Russia.

And to try to force

the Russians

to do things like starting to mobilize,

starting to conscript people, starting

to do things which, as I said

previously, would completely change

the sentiment, the dynamic about the war

within Russia itself.

Now,

what has happened up to now is that, of

course, people are aware of the drones.

I also spoke to people who have seen the

drones. There is talk about the drones.

But, it reminded me very very much

of the mood in London

in the 1970s

at the peak of the Irish Republican

Army's bombing campaign against the

British mainland.

Um bombs are planted.

Some people are killed.

Damage is done.

It attracts

a great deal of attention.

But the reality is that

going about your own life

you are aware

that at a certain level your own

personal chances of being caught up in

any of this

are extremely small.

So it's not going to change your overall

mood.

I was also in Moscow

at the time of the Beslan affair

and the height of the jihadi bombing

campaigns

in Russia.

And the mood then

was far more nervous

and far more frightened than anything

that I've seen today.

>> I understand what you're saying, but

why would there be a fear of

conscription from I mean that's the

logic that

that that that I'm not getting.

To me I I I I think that the argument of

of of fear that the West is going to to

to cause chaos to the point where

there's going to be mass conscription or

something like that. I don't think that

that relates to the drones.

I

I see it as

and

and the discussions that I had with

people

about the drones is not so much of of a

disruption of

of say a

a a

normal

everyday life that's that's taking place

in Russia for most people.

It's more of of the West, NATO, Europe,

the United States

being given a a free pass to attack

Russia at will.

And I think this is the part that

that that is causing a lot of discontent

and anger

for for for Russians. The fact that, you

know,

um

we we have the war in Ukraine and

and there was some sort of of an

understanding that the war would be

would be managed in a way

that that would mean that

pre um

uh post-2014

Russia

would uh

Crimea and and and and and the and the

new territories though Russia considers

them part of Russia as those are are

attacked they would they would be

considered part of the battlefield. That

was

That was kind of a rough understanding

of what people had with the war in in

Ukraine was was that okay as Russia we

see Crimea obviously Crimea in the

constitution and and these new and these

new oblasts are part of the Russian

Federation.

But the West doesn't see it like that.

So as as this war is being fought there

was this understanding that that attacks

in these areas were

were attacks that were going to be

managed or accepted. I mean I I don't

have another word to to describe it, but

that seemed to be how how the United

States and Russia decided to go about

the conflict. You know what I mean? And

>> Yes.

>> But but but the red line was was don't

you dare as as the collective West

>> Yes.

>> go after

pre-2014

>> Yes. Russia

>> Yeah.

>> Now, Ukraine can go after pre-2014

Russia

>> Mhm.

Mhm.

>> as Ukraine with what weapons they have

or what drones

and no one's going to to to argue that.

But as the West

don't you dare go after pre-2014 Russia.

And and and the the the anger that that

I see

the misunderstanding that I see is is is

that there's a lot of

a lot of people are saying "Wait a

minute. They are going after us and

they're not only only going after us one

time or two times. They're now going

after us on a daily basis. And now

they're trying to fool us with this

whole long-range missile cover story."

>> Yeah.

>> And and we see what's coming.

>> Yeah. I I I think that this again I

suspect is partly because we're talking

to to different people because

I absolutely agree that there is a

desire

or or or or a will

to to to keep this conflict managed, not

to expand it beyond its present

boundaries, to keep it basically

confined to Ukraine.

And I think that if we're talking about

the drone offensive I do think the drone

offensive has achieved its objectives in

the sense that it has

obviously caused

a certain degree of nervousness and

disquiet.

But it has not come anywhere close to

shattering the overall sense of

normality within which this war is

conducted and which enables as I said

the Russians to continue their advances

in Ukraine and to keep them at a

distance. Now, when I talked about

conscription um I this is an important

point to understand.

The people who are fighting the war are

volunteers.

Um i- if we have an atmospheric crisis

inside

Russia

where um the government comes to the

view

that it can only win the war by

conscripting

young people

then as I said I think the mood will

change.

And this by the way is I think one of

the major limiting factors in the way

that the war is being conducted in the

sense that the Russians cannot send two

or three million men into Ukraine to win

the war quickly without undertaking

conscription. So that explains to some

extent the way in which the war is being

fought. It's being fought as I said by

people who are volunteering to go and

that

affects in some respects the pace but it

ensures stability within Russia itself

and it also ultimately means that sooner

or later the war will be won. Now the

drones are not shattering this sense of

normality. They're not creating a

crisis.

Heavy missile strikes

might be a different

might be a different thing altogether

but this brings us back to the question

of whether the West really is in a

position to conduct or to

help the Ukrainians to conduct a major

missile offensive against Ukraine of the

kind that would fundamentally make a

difference

and against Russia sorry against Russia

of a kind that would make a fundamental

difference and which would defeat the

air the Russian air defense system. The

Russian air defense system is very well

organized to shoot down missiles. It

struggles to shoot down drones because

they are small and because it really

wasn't organized to deal with drones.

Even then, apparently, they were able to

bring down most of the drones. The

missiles they're probably better able to

to deal with, but of course an impact

from a missile is a completely different

thing from

the question of a drone. Now, the big

question there is, will we get

a missile offensive from the West of

that kind? You're quite right, it will

be a West. I mean, the Ukrainians have

no ability to produce missiles, and they

certainly can't produce missiles as a

result of the licensing arrangement.

That would take [clears throat] years. I

mean, that's never going to happen. I

mean, that is absolute nonsense.

But, can the West actually do that?

And I'm going to suggest probably not.

There aren't that many missiles in the

West today. The United States has had to

stop supplies of Tomahawk missiles

and to Germany and Japan because

Tomahawk missile inventories are very,

very reduced.

Um

there are apparently more JASSM missiles

um that can be air-launched, but Ukraine

lacks aircraft

to launch these sorts of missiles. So,

yes, we might see attacks with some

missiles, but I don't think again it's

going to be enough to disrupt the

atmosphere of normality, as I said, that

exists there. The Kremlin can cope, can

deal with the situation

as it is at the moment.

I don't think it

feels

that the drone offensive itself

is having such an impact that it needs

to stop,

that it needs to cause it to readjust

its overall plans. And um

speaking again to people who basically

are Putin's working class base, that was

overwhelmingly the sense I got from

talking to them. They are not in any way

turning against him or losing confidence

in him.

And I think this is where, as I said,

discussions between the Americans and

Russians are important because um

it enables the Russians and the

Americans to

tell and explain these things to the

Americans. And basically, as Putin did

in his last conversation with Trump

don't let the Europeans lead you up the

garden path.

It like Netanyahu, they may tell you

that you can do all of these various

things and it's going to change things,

but ultimately it won't.

>> No, I'm put I'm Putin's right to to say

that and it won't. I mean, the way I

describe the the situation in in Russia

and with Ukraine is absolutely Russia is

winning the war against Ukraine and

they're going to win the war against

Ukraine.

But Russia has lost its deterrence to

the West.

I I mean,

and then you're going to push back on

this, but

everything that's that that you're

describing to to me

and to a lot of people

who are who are trying to analyze what's

going on is that

whether it's one drone or 300 drones a

day or one missile and and five missiles

a day

uh Russia is being hit and it's not

being hit by by Ukraine. Now, does this

mean

because I get whenever I I bring this

up, I get pushed back in the in the

comments, "What what do you want? Russia

to attack NATO?" No.

But but Russia could have other

asymmetrical ways that it could

establish deterrence. For example

cutting off the gas and the oil, which

they still do not do, amazingly. It's

amazing that they don't do it. They

still do not do it after 21 sanctions

packages. They still don't do it.

>> Yeah.

>> I mean, there there ways that

asymmetrically

they can establish the trust. For

example, another great example is just

by saying that diplomats should evacuate

Kiev, just by saying it, not doing

anything, not launching anything, just

by saying it,

the entire West freaked out.

>> Yes.

>> I mean, you don't have to launch strikes

or attacks

into NATO or or or take us to World War

III.

But but the Kremlin doesn't even do

these things,

which which is very odd, very weird,

that that they that they continuously

fail to establish deterrence. So, yes,

you're right. They're going to win the

war. They're winning the war. There's no

doubt about it. Kostantinovka, Lyman,

you document everything in your videos

every day.

>> Yeah.

>> And everyone understands this.

But my belief is that in winning the

war,

they've failed to

to to uphold their deterrence against

the West. And and I do believe that if

there's one takeaway, one victory that

the United States

can can can can claim as they come out

of this proxy war, which they are

backing and they are running,

they can come out understanding that,

you know what?

Uh Russia's red lines and and their

deterrence is not really what they claim

it to be. So, maybe in two or three or

four or five years, we can revisit

a conflict with Russia again.

>> I I think there's a I think there's a

lot of force in what you've said. But

look, this is again coming back to the

mood that I found there.

And my sense about what the Kremlin is

basically all about. The Kremlin

its first priority

is to maintain stability inside Russia.

To develop the continue to develop the

economy.

To

increase living standards.

To preserve the sense of normality

that exists there.

I think

escalating to the point

where you're talking about

re-establishing the kind of deterrence

that um

you know

the Russians

would want you would need to achieve by

doing that which would be you know by

threatening

say to seize you know seize ships launch

missile strikes against Europe or

>> No no no I never said launch missile

strikes

everyone always says in the comments

what do you want to start World War III?

No no no no I want to be clear. I am not

advocating for

All right let let let let I'm saying

other other things.

>> Yes but the point about like cutting off

gas

>> Yes yes okay

>> But but the point is the point is this

any kind of escalation of that kind even

even the more sort of

quiet levels

would result in a heightening of

tensions to the point that

the Kremlin would be worried that it as

I said shakes the sense of internal

stability and normality

that exists in Russia today. So that's

that's the Kremlin's first priority. It

is stability and normality in Russia and

the

improvement of living standards which of

course all of that goes together to

reinforce stability.

The second

priority is to win the war.

And that of course they are doing.

Um as I said, it's not moving as fast as

it

in objectively could do. But then then

again, if you're going to start winning

the war more quickly, that might require

things to be done inside Russia

to move the economy more towards um,

militarization.

Perhaps to start conscripting people,

which again undermines the first

priority, which is internal stability.

As for the third objective, which is

establishing long-term deterrence with

the United States,

what the Kremlin would probably say, if

you ask them, and I don't just mean

Putin, by the way, I mean

more people in the Kremlin than I

perhaps had anticipated. What the

Kremlin would probably say is that the

best deterrence is normality within

Russia, victory in Ukraine. Once you've

achieved those two things,

the

the

the effect of deterrence will be

reestablished

because the balance of forces

in Europe will move

further to your advantage. And this is

where maintaining dialogue with the

Americans is important. You are doing

that

not so much in order to achieve a peace

agreement within Ukraine today. Nobody

expects that to happen. But because once

the war is won,

you want to maintain

you want to have some kind of basis

to talk to the Americans in the future.

>> [snorts]

>> All right, final question to to wrap up

the video, question comment. I know what

you said.

Uh,

the NATO and the the Europeans and and

the the States, they have an advantage

over Russia. Uh perhaps Russia is

miscalculating in this in this thinking.

Um the one advantage is that the

Russians are saying, "If we win the war

in Ukraine, then that establishes

uh the deterrent establishes the

deterrent."

Can you not make the counterargument and

say that for the United States

or the Europeans,

it doesn't matter. They'll they'll

gladly sacrifice Ukraine

in order to extend Russia or weaken

Russia? So, it for them, Ukraine is not

really um the the main point. It's

weakening and extending Russia that is

the main uh

focus of their war against Russia. It's

not It's not about preserving Ukraine or

preserving Ukrainian democracy or

human rights or whatever they go on and

on about.

Their goal is to keep the war going

in order to weaken

and extend Russia as long as they can.

And the second uh question that I have

to you is

can you also not say that Russia's at a

disadvantage in that

they they are accountable to to Russian

citizens to provide that stability?

If they don't provide stability and

normalacy

normalacy or normalacy? Anyway,

>> [laughter]

>> just anyway. Um if they don't provide

>> normal I I wouldn't call it even

normalacy. I would call it normalcy.

>> Normalcy, okay. If they don't provide

that

Yeah. Right.

>> Uh uh absolutely.

>> Okay, so if they don't provide that,

then then then the people get very very

angry, very upset, very nervous. And

that's the last thing that the Kremlin

wants.

>> Exactly.

>> You can make the argument that the

Europeans, especially the Europeans, to

a lesser extent the Americans, but maybe

you could say the same thing for the

United States cuz it's far away, but for

the Europeans, especially the EU,

it's unelected. They're accountable to

no one. Mhm. So, what if if if they cut

off Russian gas

and the Europeans pay

five times more or 10 times more and

they're upset about it?

What do they care?

They're not accountable to anyone. They

don't have to answer to anyone. So, they

can make the dumbest of dumb moves Mhm.

>> to hurt Russia while also hurting their

own people and their own stability and

it doesn't matter. Uh Russia cannot do

those things. They can't They can't make

a a move that hurts Europe

but also hurts their country because

they're accountable to their people.

While the Europeans can hurt their

people, they can even hurt their people

more

while also

in their minds hurting Russia because

Ursula, she doesn't answer to anybody.

Kaja Kallas doesn't answer to anybody.

Costa doesn't answer to anybody. So, can

you not say that in that case the

Europeans definitely have an advantage

over the Kremlin?

>> They absolutely do and this is the This

is the key point. This is what you need

to understand about what is happening.

Now, first of all,

I I don't think that the war itself is

weakening Russia. I think the war itself

as it is as it is happening is actually

strengthening Russia. I I'm going to say

straight away and this is a subject for

another program. I had underestimated

um the extent to which um there's been

an economic upswing in Russia and that's

a separate topic

to discuss. But, Russia today is a much

much richer country, much stronger

country than the one I saw when I was

last there, which is in 2019. Just just

just just to make that to say make that

observation. What the West wants to do

and and this is the key thing to

understand. By the way, Russians

understand this very well. What the West

wants to to in Russia is regime change

in Russia.

This is why the Kremlin is so concerned

to maintain normalcy and stability in

Russia. They do not want to have a

situation

where there are protests, where people

feel angry, where there is much

criticism of the I mean you they they

they can they can absorb

you know, the level of criticism that

exists at the moment, but they don't

want a situation in which people feel

you know, motivated to come out onto the

streets in large large numbers or

strikes to happen in factories or

anything of that kind.

Um provided

they can keep things at the level that

they are now, then they know they will

win. And they know that they will win in

Ukraine. And at that point, as I said,

they think that they can reestablish

some kind of contact with the Americans.

What the Europeans and the hardliners in

Washington need to do and Ukraine itself

is just an always was just a battering

ram, you know, a tool to try to disrupt

internal stability within Russia. What

they are trying to do is to shake this

internal stability that Russia has

achieved. That was what the drones were

doing. And to a great extent, they are

not succeeding. The missiles possibly

will be the next attempt. The sanctions,

the endless numbers of sanctions that we

are seeing, they're partly part of that

that

attempt

as well. And the sanctions, I would say,

if you are in Russia up to now, they

have been completely unsuccessful. Um

we need to discuss and this is a topic

for another program, the gas and oil

industries. And this is a this is an

important and interesting topic. I'm not

going to discuss it now. But you're

absolutely correct in saying that Osila

uh

um

Kaja Kallas

uh Malta

>> Constantinople

>> Costa All of these people they are

prepared to take extreme steps with the

economic situation within their own

societies in order to try to shake that

stability that exists in Russia now. But

that is the game that is being played.

Can the Kremlin um deal

with all of these pressures that have

been made against Russia up to now,

maintain stability, maintain a normally

functioning economy because you're

absolutely right in saying they they do

feel in a strange kind of way much more

accountable. They are much more

concerned with what people in the

streets are thinking, what happens in

factories and

and you know, protests and that kind of

Russia has not reached that it is not in

that kind of situation where you could

have 100,000 people turn up for a

protest as you can in Berlin for example

and it really doesn't make any

difference. It That isn't the state of

Russia today. Um so the Kremlin Russia

is much more vulnerable in that respect

than the West is. But in order to shake

that stability, it has to be tried

externally.

From it has to be done from outside and

so far any attempt to do it, the

Russians have been able to find ways to

counter. So this is the real game that's

being fought. What goes on in

Konstantinivka, in Lyman, in all of

these places is incidental to the bigger

picture, which is the that there is

still an objective to achieve regime

change in Russia. That's still there,

hasn't changed, but in order to achieve

it, the West needs to do it by shaking

things shaking things up in Russia

itself. So far, it hasn't managed it.

>> Yeah, yeah. I agree. That's that's the

advantage that the West has though, too.

They can come out with an advantage.

They can come out with a statement

that they made today one of the

commissioners and and they announced

that today the short-term contracts for

pipeline gas to Russia expire for the

EU. So, the EU is not going to to be

importing any any gas via pipeline that

is on a short-term contract and they're

celebrating it.

>> Yeah, absolutely.

>> And the EU celebrating it knowing that

it hurts EU citizens much more

than it hurts Russia.

>> Yes.

>> But for them,

it's fine because they don't have to

worry. Like you said, if 200,000 people

descend onto the streets of Paris or or

or Berlin, what do they care? They

couldn't care less. Even if Merz goes

tomorrow,

>> Exactly.

>> someone worse than Merz is going to just

replace him. So, it doesn't matter. And

Orban and Orban, we'll we'll find a way

to deal with him. Give us time. We'll

eventually get him out of the way as

well.

>> Exactly. I mean, I you know, I I don't

want to you know, use this word, but in

>> in in some respects, for all the

controls that there are in Russia and

there are controls now, um this remains

a more democratic country than people

realize and certainly one where they

especially because of their history,

they do not take stability for granted.

They are not going to take risks with

the internal stability that has been

achieved there now.

And as I said, the entire purpose

of the West,

or at least of the Europeans and of the

hardliners in Washington, who are still

very much in the ascendant, what they

have been trying to do,

basically ever since 2014,

is they're trying to find some way to um

disrupt this internal stability that

exists inside Russia. And you know, that

the the pressure is there, the drones

are coming, the missiles are probably

coming. The The big question is,

as I said, can the Russians somehow

absorb all of this in ways that allow

ordinary life to continue as it is

doing? And up to now, they've managed

it.

Whether that will change in the future

is something we'll have to wait and see.

>> The The West is never going to give up.

>> No, I think that's right. But what what

what what the Kremlin says to itself, if

we get through this, once we won the war

in Ukraine,

the Americans,

they will see that they can't shake us.

And that's the moment when we can start

to talk. And maybe not talk about some

of the things that Kirill Dmitriev wants

to discuss. You're absolutely right. I

mean, you tell me this, there are many,

many critics of Dmitriev in Russia. And

I've spoken to some of them, by the way.

But maybe not the great economic, you

know, relationships that some people are

talking about, but some kind of return

to strategic stability,

which the Kremlin

believes

the Americans will ultimately want in

their own strategic interests. But that

is a massive topic for a further

discussion.

>> I think we're very far away from that.

>> very I I mean, I I The war The war has

to be won first before we ever get to

that where we ever get to that point.

>> Yeah.

All right, we'll end the video there the

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