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If you thought flock was bad, check out Leonardo SignalTrace - this is stalking on a whole new level

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If you thought flock was bad, check out Leonardo SignalTrace - this is stalking on a whole new level

Transcript

317 segments

0:00

Hey, everybody, how's it going? Hope you

0:00

have a lovely day. Welcome to today's

0:02

episode of Are You Getting [ __ ] I'm

0:03

your host, Louis Rossmann. On this

0:04

channel, I've talked a lot about Flock

0:05

cameras. They are known as automated

0:06

license plate readers, but they're not

0:07

really automated license plate readers.

0:08

They're actually cameras that have very

0:09

advanced AI in them that tries to figure

0:11

out who you are, even if you have that

0:12

license plate taken off of the car. They

0:14

are listening for gunshots. They also

0:16

listen for human voices. It's very, very

0:18

creepy. They're being put up everywhere

0:19

in many different cities. They give the

0:21

city employees the ability to tell where

0:23

you are at any point in time. It logs

0:25

this information. It is accessible

0:26

without a warrant by any So, you have

0:29

really no way of getting around this if

0:31

you use public infrastructure, use

0:32

public roads to get around. And one of

0:34

the things that I've said about this is

0:36

that it's going to continuously get

0:37

worse if you allow this to continue. And

0:40

it looks like it has. Welcome to LSAG

0:42

Signal Trace Intelligence System. So,

0:44

the way this works is your devices and

0:46

your car, those stuff that you carry

0:47

around with you every single day, have

0:49

data and have little things that they

0:51

give out about them. I'll just give you

0:52

a very, very basic, oversimplified

0:54

example. Cybersecurity people, please

0:55

don't like rip this too much to shreds,

0:57

but yeah, I'm just trying to get the

0:58

idea across. Is Let's say you have a

1:00

phone.

1:01

Let's say I tell the phone to connect to

1:02

Wi-Fi. Now, if I go away from my Wi-Fi

1:05

network, let's say it's always looking

1:07

for the Wi-Fi network of my house. So,

1:09

now I have a device that's always going,

1:11

"Where's Louis's Wi-Fi? Where's Louis's

1:13

Wi-Fi? Louis's Wi-Fi here?" Somebody

1:16

else can pick up that there's a device

1:17

nearby that is looking for that

1:19

particular Wi-Fi. And they may be able

1:20

to pick up certain things that are

1:22

emitted from my device

1:23

if I forget to turn certain things off.

1:25

And they can use that to fingerprint you

1:27

and figure out, "Oh, well, the only

1:29

person who ever passes by here who's

1:31

looking for this Wi-Fi is Louis. So,

1:33

even if his car's license plate is

1:34

changed, or even if he's in a different

1:35

car, there's probably Louis's phone in

1:37

there." And they can use this type of

1:38

information to figure out who you are

1:40

and where you're going. And that's what

1:41

this company does. "Identify suspects

1:43

through the electronic devices they

1:45

carry. Signal Trace is an advanced

1:46

signal intelligence system that enhances

1:48

traditional automated license plate

1:49

reader capabilities by detecting and

1:51

correlating nearby electronic devices

1:52

with vehicles of interest. It bridges

1:54

license plate recognition data with

1:56

sensor captured device identifiers, such

1:58

as those for mobile phones, Bluetooth

1:59

wearables, and vehicle systems to create

2:01

a unique trackable electronic

2:02

fingerprint for investigative use. When

2:04

multiple devices constantly move

2:06

together within a vehicle, Signal

2:07

Trace's algorithms link them to that

2:09

vehicle's license plate and timestamp

2:10

location data. This correlation provides

2:12

investigators with another layer of

2:14

actionable intelligence. Even if a

2:15

suspect changes or removes a plate, they

2:18

have a patent for a systems and methods

2:19

for electronic signature tracking.

2:21

Signal Trace correlates license plates

2:23

to a variety of identifiable device

2:24

types including mobile phones, tire

2:26

pressure sensors, vehicle hotspots,

2:28

wearables, watches, fitness trackers,

2:30

security and safety sensors, tablets and

2:31

smartphones, wireless headphones,

2:33

infotainment systems, laptops, and

2:36

you know, you can name some of your

2:37

Bluetooth devices. You can name

2:39

Oh my god.

2:41

This is making such a good argument for

2:43

using wired headphones. Wired

2:45

headphones. Elsag EOC plus capture

2:48

device frequencies emitted into the air.

2:49

It does not decrypt or capture the

2:50

contents of the devices or their

2:52

communications. Oh, it doesn't capture

2:54

my communications. It's just used in

2:56

tandem with other pieces of hardware

2:58

that are put up that violate the Fourth

2:59

Amendment by allowing the police and

3:01

city employees to figure out where I am

3:02

every single second of the day.

3:03

And they just combine it with little AI

3:05

systems so that even if I take my

3:06

license plate off, they just know that

3:07

it's me. Then they're not very far

3:08

[clears throat] off from being able to

3:09

use it to profile people to say, I don't

3:10

know, where do people that voted for Ron

3:12

Paul in 2008 and 2012 congregate on a

3:14

Wednesday night at 9:00 p.m.?

3:17

At what point are people just going to

3:19

show up at their city council and town

3:20

halls and say, [ __ ] this [ __ ] get this

3:21

the [ __ ] out of my city or we're going

3:23

to start cutting it out ourselves.

3:25

I really

3:26

I have seen pushback against this, but I

3:28

have not seen the amount or the level

3:29

that I would like. And I have this fear

3:31

that this type of stuff is not going to

3:33

get pushback against in a serious

3:35

concentrated way until

3:37

it's too late.

3:39

In Colorado, I already did a video on

3:40

how a gentleman gets pulled over every

3:42

single time he passes one of these

3:43

cameras because they have the wrong

3:45

arrest record. So, apparently I forget

3:47

if it was something like a lowercase or

3:48

versus an uppercase or like a a versus

3:50

an O or some [ __ ] like that. But because

3:52

of that error, he gets pulled over by

3:54

the police regularly. And the most

3:55

[ __ ] up part is they won't even tell

3:57

him who they think he is. They will say,

3:58

"Okay, I'm sorry, sir. This is an error.

4:00

This warrant is not for you." But, he

4:02

never knows. Are you chasing somebody

4:03

because they stole a Snickers bar from a

4:06

7-Eleven, or are you chasing somebody

4:08

that you think is Richard Kuklinski, the

4:09

Iceman? Because if you think that you're

4:11

chasing Richard Kuklinski, the Iceman,

4:13

then you you you think that this warrant

4:15

is out for somebody who has two or 300

4:16

murders, you might treat that person

4:18

differently. And if I knew that my car

4:20

was a car that you think belongs to a

4:22

mob serial killer,

4:24

that's dangerous for me. Because the

4:25

police are going to react differently

4:27

based on what they think you did. And

4:28

they won't even tell this man what they

4:30

think he did.

4:32

This man, who the police admit is not

4:34

accused of a crime, is not guilty of a

4:36

crime, is not suspected of a crime, is

4:38

pulled over regularly because the stupid

4:40

[ __ ] clanker in the database thinks

4:42

that he is somebody he is not. This man

4:44

says that he used this system to stalk

4:46

his ex because he was sleep deprived.

4:50

Why is this [ __ ] still here?

4:53

They're actually going to try and bring

4:54

this [ __ ] back to Austin, Texas very

4:55

soon. They're going to do everything

4:57

they can to try and install these

4:59

cameras even though they were taken out

5:00

earlier.

5:02

I hope everybody shows up against this.

5:03

You do not have to be anti-police to

5:05

think that this is [ __ ] weird. I have

5:07

never come out on this channel and said

5:08

that I am universally against the

5:09

police. I do not have an ACAB sticker on

5:12

my car, anything like that. That's not

5:13

me.

5:15

But, this is [ __ ] weird. This is

5:16

about so much more than Democrat versus

5:18

Republican or a back the blue bumper

5:19

sticker, anything. This is something

5:20

different altogether, and it's [ __ ]

5:23

weird. It's [ __ ] creepy, and it's not

5:25

something that I think you should be

5:26

paying for with your tax dollars. Let me

5:27

know what you think in the comments down

5:28

below.

5:29

What would you think if your city or

5:32

your police department announced that

5:33

they were going to start using this

5:34

technology to try and fingerprint

5:35

everybody who goes by

5:37

all the time

5:38

based on the wireless signals that your

5:40

devices emit? I don't want to just have

5:42

devices that don't emit anything

5:43

wirelessly. I want to have devices that

5:45

it just emit random [ __ ] wirelessly.

5:47

Sometimes I think we're at a point where

5:48

there's no turning back on any of this

5:49

stuff, and the best thing to do is not

5:51

to try and minimize the data that gets

5:53

collected, but maximize the amount of

5:55

junk data that we emit just to confuse

5:58

and [ __ ] up the system and make it

5:59

useless.

6:01

Let me know what you think in the

6:01

comments down below. That's it for

6:03

today, and as always, I hope you learned

6:04

something. Also, another last-minute

6:05

notice, I am this Tuesday, on the 23rd,

6:08

I'm going to be in California to attend

6:10

this hearing. This is a hearing at 9:30

6:12

a.m., room 2100 in the bill I don't know

6:15

if that's

6:16

1021 O Street or 1021 0 Street.

6:20

I guess I'd be just like that that

6:22

sheriff in Colorado that got the wrong

6:23

guy in the flock cam. But in all

6:25

seriousness, I'm going to be here on

6:27

June 23rd in the morning, and we're

6:29

going to be talking about this anti-3D

6:31

printer bill, where they're going to try

6:32

to put blocking technology in all 3D

6:34

printers to stop them from printing

6:35

firearm parts. This bill is going to try

6:38

and make printing certain shapes

6:39

illegal. They're going to try to imply

6:41

intent to a shape. This bill would

6:43

destroy the idea of being able to have

6:45

an open-source 3D printer. Because if

6:47

you mandate blocking technology be

6:48

installed inside of a 3D printer, then

6:50

you can't have a 3D printer that's based

6:51

on open-source software anymore. And if

6:52

your 3D printer is no longer based on

6:54

open-source software, it would allow the

6:55

manufacturer to do things like say, "Oh,

6:58

we've released a new update. If you want

7:00

to be able to print more than three

7:01

things a day, you have to pay a

7:02

subscription." Because you wouldn't be

7:03

able to leak the code that isn't a

7:05

certified printer. I have written

7:06

several wiki articles that may be useful

7:08

for you to bring by. We have a bunch of

7:10

evidence that many people from the 3D

7:12

printing community have contributed.

7:13

Something like this, the evil Glock

7:14

switch, fully automatic conversion

7:16

device, easily detected by algorithm.

7:17

The same device with an added

7:19

superfluous geometry, which the user

7:21

simply removes following printing,

7:22

making detection by an algorithm

7:23

basically impossible. We've gone over

7:25

how this Glock pistol that's fit with

7:27

this specific rear back plate looks very

7:29

similar to a hot shoe mount for a

7:31

camera.

7:32

Silencer for a gun looks just like a

7:35

flashlight.

7:37

Cordless drill grip looks like a gun

7:39

handle. This law is so stupid in so many

7:41

ways. The best way to ensure that this

7:43

type of crap does not spread to the

7:44

entire country is to get as many people

7:45

to show up as possible. Remember that

7:47

Bloomberg is behind this. Bloomberg is

7:48

funding this. He has given 50 to over

7:50

$50 million

7:51

to the group that is pushing this

7:53

garbage all over the country and don't

7:55

let him win. Even if you don't care

7:56

about 3D printing, do it for the sake of

7:58

freedom.

7:59

How many of you are pissed off that

8:00

Gamers Nexus got the Gamers Nexus and

8:02

video documentary pulled? If you're

8:04

still mad at that,

8:05

show up in Sacramento on Tuesday

8:07

morning. I'll be there. I'll be filming.

8:09

I'd like to talk to some of the people

8:11

that are showing up and I would like to

8:12

get as many people as possible to make

8:15

their voice heard. I need you to show

8:16

up. I need you to show up well dressed,

8:18

well groomed, well spoken. Be

8:20

professional, be courteous, be polite,

8:22

but be informed. Don't assume that you

8:24

have to be an expert in order to push

8:25

this stuff through because again, the

8:26

people that are pushing this through are

8:27

so [ __ ] ignorant that they actually

8:29

believe that banning shapes is a thing.

8:34

Trust me, they're not a [ __ ] expert.

8:36

And whatever experience you believe

8:38

you're missing that would not make you

8:39

qualified to show up at an event like

8:40

this,

8:41

you are more qualified than the people

8:43

showing up in favor of this bill. I

8:44

guarantee you that. That's it for today

8:46

and as always, I hope you learned

8:47

something. I'll see you in the next

8:48

video and I'll look forward to seeing

8:50

you on Tuesday.

8:51

Next. Bye now.

Interactive Summary

Louis Rossmann discusses the growing concern over privacy-invading technologies, specifically Flock cameras and 'Signal Trace' systems that track individuals via electronic device emissions like Wi-Fi and Bluetooth signals. He highlights the dangers of these automated systems, including false positives that lead to wrongful police interactions. Additionally, he urges public opposition to proposed legislation in California that would mandate blocking technology in 3D printers, which he argues would destroy open-source hardware and enable corporate control over user devices.

Suggested questions

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