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Endangered Species Put at Risk & Prediction Markets | Bloomberg Law

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Endangered Species Put at Risk & Prediction Markets | Bloomberg Law

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845 segments

0:02

This is Bloomberg Law with June Graasso

0:05

from Bloomberg Radio.

0:10

>> 13 environmental groups are suing the

0:13

Trump administration, asking federal

0:16

courts in California and Washington

0:18

State to throw out the administration's

0:21

deletion of the Endangered Species Act's

0:24

definition of harm. The deletion allows

0:27

developers and private land owners to

0:30

modify or even destroy endangered

0:32

species habitat without it being

0:35

considered harm to the species. Even

0:37

though the destruction of their habitat

0:39

is the main reason that species become

0:42

endangered, an attorney at the Western

0:44

Environmental Law Center representing

0:47

the plaintiffs, Pete Frost, said in a

0:49

statement, "No longer protecting where

0:52

grizzlies, salmon, and owls live will

0:54

make them go extinct. We're hopeful the

0:57

court will clarify what the Endangered

0:59

Species Act has always meant." Joining

1:02

me is an expert in environmental law,

1:04

Pat Parento, a professor at the Vermont

1:06

Law and Graduate School. Pat, start by

1:09

explaining what the Trump administration

1:11

has done here to the Endangered Species

1:14

Act.

1:15

>> Well, they have just published a final

1:18

rule rescending what's called the harm

1:21

rule under the Endangered Species Act,

1:25

which has been on the books for over 50

1:27

years. was first enacted in 1975

1:30

in the Gerald Ford administration and

1:33

it's been upheld by the US Supreme Court

1:36

in 1995 in the case Sweetome versus

1:40

Babbot. So now the Trump administration

1:43

is saying forget about all that. We

1:46

hereby resend the harm rule and oh by

1:50

the way we're not going to propose a

1:52

replacement. We're just going to say we

1:55

don't need a harm rule at all. We don't

1:57

need to define the word harm which is in

2:00

the statute, right? We don't even need

2:02

to do that. So, we're just going to

2:04

repeal it. We're not going to comply

2:06

with NEPA. We're not going to do an

2:08

environmental impact statement. We're

2:09

not going to comply with the Endangered

2:11

Species Act itself, which requires

2:14

consultation. It's internal consultation

2:19

before you take an action like this and

2:22

produce what's called a biological

2:24

opinion to demonstrate that the action

2:28

that you're taking will not jeopardize

2:32

endangered species or result in the

2:36

adverse modification of their critical

2:39

habitat.

2:41

So, it's crazy on stilts what we're

2:45

talking about. You can boil it down to

2:47

this. The Trump administration has

2:50

hereby decreed that destroying the

2:53

habitat of endangered species is not

2:57

harmful.

2:58

>> The administration claims that this

3:00

change would reduce permitting

3:03

requirements and compliance costs for

3:06

farmers, land owners, and energy

3:09

producers.

3:10

>> Right. without producing real data to

3:13

show that this rule is responsible for

3:16

what I guess you would call it

3:18

unreasonable cost. I mean it's certainly

3:21

true that every law that Congress enacts

3:25

is going to impose certain obligations

3:28

on people that will in turn require the

3:31

expenditure of some money. That's what

3:33

regulation is all about. The money being

3:36

spent is for a good purpose, a public

3:39

purpose, right? You can argue about how

3:42

important saving endangered species is.

3:45

If you ask the American people, they

3:48

will tell you it's really important.

3:51

That has been a consistent polling

3:53

result over the life of the Endangered

3:55

Species Act. From 1973 to today, the

3:59

amount of public support for this law is

4:03

in the 90% range. Okay. So, yeah. Do

4:08

compliance with laws require money? Sure

4:12

they do.

4:13

>> And is it true that the loss of habitat

4:16

causes more species to go extinct than

4:19

any other single factor? Yes, it is the

4:22

leading cause of species extinction in

4:24

the US and globally. The other thing

4:27

about it is the Endangered Species Act

4:30

is all about habitat. I mean, the very

4:33

stated purpose of the law is to conserve

4:36

the ecosystems

4:38

upon which these species depend. So,

4:41

right from the get-go in 1973,

4:44

this is really kind of amazing for

4:45

Congress to be this ecologically

4:48

literate. In 1973, they were talking

4:51

about ecosystems. They were talking

4:53

about habitat. That was the whole point

4:56

of the law. Congress recognized that

4:59

loss of habitat was driving species to

5:02

extinction. And unless it was both

5:05

stopped or arrested and mitigated, more

5:08

and more of the species would go

5:10

extinct. Right now, 13 environmental

5:13

groups are suing in two different

5:15

federal courts, one in California and

5:18

Washington State. What is the basis of

5:21

of their lawsuit?

5:22

>> Multiple grounds for all three. There's

5:25

three lawsuits now, and there's more in

5:27

the works, by the way. They start by

5:29

saying the Sweet Home decision in 1995

5:33

is still the law of the land. It has not

5:37

been overturned. The Trump

5:39

administration is clearly aiming to get

5:43

this issue back in front of the Supreme

5:45

Court in their hope that the Supreme

5:47

Court will reverse its decision in Sweet

5:50

Home and basically adopt the disscent in

5:54

Sweet Home written by the late Justice

5:57

Antinine Scalia. I mean, what we're

6:00

seeing is almost a resurrection of

6:01

Scalia. You know, there's an echo here,

6:04

right? Because this is the same strategy

6:06

that Lee Zeldon is pursuing under the

6:09

Clean Air Act to repeal the endangerment

6:12

finding. Once again, EPA, the Trump

6:15

administration is saying the Supreme

6:18

Court got it wrong in Massachusetts

6:20

versus EPA. We don't have authority to

6:24

regulate greenhouse gases, and we're

6:26

going to get that issue back in front of

6:27

the court so they can overturn Mass

6:30

versus EPA. Same thing is happening here

6:33

with the harm rule. They want to get

6:35

this case back to the court in the hopes

6:38

that they can get a decision overturning

6:40

the sweet home decision. The reason they

6:43

believe they have a shot at this, of

6:44

course, is because the Supreme Court has

6:48

now overturned the Chevron doctrine with

6:51

deference to agency interpretations.

6:53

It's true that the Sweet Home decision

6:56

was based on Chevron because at that

6:58

time 1995

7:00

that was the framework that the Supreme

7:03

Court was using to evaluate statutory

7:07

terms that were ambiguous. Right? And

7:10

the principle of of Chevron was if the

7:13

words of a statute are ambiguous, and I

7:15

suppose some might say the word harm is

7:19

ambiguous, although the dictionary makes

7:21

it crystal clear that it it includes

7:23

anything that hurts something. You know,

7:26

the interpretation that harm does

7:29

involve destruction of habitat, which

7:31

causes, by the way, actual injury. The

7:34

rule, I didn't really explain it. rule

7:37

says habitat modification or destruction

7:40

that actually injures or kills a

7:43

species. So the test is approximate

7:46

cause test. That's what the Supreme

7:47

Court said in in Sweet Home. So you know

7:50

that it's not an easy test to meet. You

7:53

really have to be able to say the

7:55

cutting of these trees which will take

7:57

down nests of the spotted owl will lead

8:00

to actual injury of an identifiable owl.

8:04

So the test is stringent, okay? It's not

8:07

loose at all, but it is a vital test

8:10

because if you don't save nesting

8:13

habitat, breeding habitat of species,

8:16

guess what? They go extinct.

8:19

You spoke about the late Justice Scalia

8:22

and the Interior Department said in a

8:25

statement that it was reversing a

8:27

regulatory overreach not authorized by

8:30

Congress and will defend its authority

8:32

to honor the law's plain text. Are they

8:36

basically saying, "Yeah, we're going to

8:38

follow what Justice Scalia said."

8:40

>> Oh, yeah. They've adopted the Scalia

8:42

descent in Sweet Home Locktock and

8:44

Barrel. But here's two problems with

8:46

that. number one in Justice Stevens

8:50

majority opinion in Sweet Home, which by

8:53

the way was six to3 with the late

8:56

Justice Okconor filing a very strong

8:59

concurring opinion and taking on the

9:02

Scalia descent wholeheartedly, shall we

9:05

say. So in Justice Stevens majority

9:08

opinion in Sweet Home, a majority of the

9:11

court agreed that the Scalia

9:13

interpretation was not supported by the

9:16

text of the law or the context of the

9:19

law or the history of the law or the

9:22

purpose of the law. In other words, it

9:25

was roundly rejected. And they weren't

9:28

relying on Chevron for that. They were

9:31

taking on Scalia's interpretation and

9:34

saying it is not the best reading. They

9:37

didn't use those words in those days.

9:38

That's what the court will use today is

9:41

the best reading test for interpreting a

9:44

statute. Right? But the point is again

9:46

the majority in Sweden

9:52

now wants to adopt. The second problem

9:55

here with what Scalia was saying is that

9:59

in 1982,

10:01

Congress amended the Endangered Species

10:04

Act to create what's called the

10:05

incidental take permit program. Okay? I

10:10

testified in support of that amendment,

10:12

by the way. But the point is that

10:15

amendment was addressing the harm rule.

10:19

It was addressing the fact that the

10:21

Ninth Circuit in a very famous case, the

10:24

Palea case out of Hawaii involving this

10:27

endangered bird on Mono Kia in Hawaii,

10:31

the Ninth Circuit had said, "Yeah, the

10:34

the harm rule is the law." And yes,

10:37

destroying the habitat of the pila is

10:39

unlawful under the Endangered Species

10:42

Act. And the court, the Ninth Circuit,

10:44

ordered the state of Hawaii to remove

10:47

the exotic sheep that were being

10:50

imported for hunters to shoot because it

10:53

was destroying the habitat. So, Congress

10:56

was reacting to a specific court

10:59

decision, applying the harm rule, and

11:02

instead of overturning the harm rule,

11:05

which is what the Trump administration

11:07

is saying Congress would have done if it

11:10

had the chance to do it, instead of

11:12

that, Congress basically codified the

11:16

harm rule by saying you need a permit

11:19

and you need a permit for habitat

11:21

destruction or modification. And oh by

11:23

the way, to get the permit, you have to

11:26

prepare a habitat conservation plan to

11:30

offset the impact on the habitat from

11:33

your activity. So there you go. You have

11:36

two really strong arguments against what

11:40

the Trump administration is trying to do

11:42

in resurrecting the late Justice

11:45

Scalia's descent in Sweet Home and

11:48

making it the law of the land. Well,

11:50

many of the conservatives on this

11:52

supermajority

11:54

revere Justice Scalia. That's one point.

11:57

And another is that this last term, they

12:00

reversed two long-standing decisions.

12:04

One, Humphrey's executive, more than 90

12:06

years old, and a 25year-old campaign

12:10

finance rule, plus effectively reversing

12:14

the Voting Rights Act. So, do you have

12:16

any confidence that they will follow

12:19

precedent?

12:21

>> Well, we know of course that uh the

12:24

court will do what the court will do

12:26

with five votes. I think this one will

12:30

be a closer call. I don't rule out, of

12:32

course, the prospect or the danger that

12:35

the Supreme Court might do what Trump is

12:37

asking it to do. You can't rule that

12:39

out. But here's the thing. Justice

12:42

Roberts in the Loper Bright case which

12:46

overturned the Chevron doctrine said

12:49

very clearly, "Our overturning Chevron

12:53

does not mean that prior decisions of

12:57

this court that relied on Chevron are

13:01

not still the law. They are still the

13:04

law unless and until of course the

13:07

Supreme Court changes the law." So the

13:10

argument that loper bright automatically

13:14

means Trump wins is wrong. It's just

13:18

flat wrong on the face of of the

13:20

Loperbrite decision. It's certainly true

13:23

that if this case gets to the Supreme

13:26

Court, there's a risk that it'll do the

13:28

wrong thing from the standpoint of

13:31

protecting endangered species. I would

13:33

be naive to the extreme to think that

13:36

you know the Supreme Court is bleeding

13:38

over the fate of endangered species. But

13:41

on the other hand, this principle which

13:43

is called statutory starry decisis when

13:47

the Supreme Court has said that a

13:49

statute means something specifically

13:53

that is a strong precedent. So it

13:56

doesn't get overruled with the snap of a

13:58

finger or the fact that there's a new

14:00

administration in town who doesn't like

14:03

the prior ruling. So that's not enough

14:06

to get that victory that Trump is hoping

14:09

for in this case.

14:11

>> I'll ask you the question I usually ask

14:13

you, which is, so let's say that there's

14:15

a Democratic administration that comes

14:17

in next and overturns the overturning of

14:22

the harm rule. How much damage can be

14:25

done in the remaining two years of the

14:27

Trump administration if there's not an

14:29

injunction put in place?

14:31

>> Yeah. Well, there is going to be a

14:33

request for a preliminary injunction and

14:35

maybe even a temporary restraining order

14:37

right out of the box. The Earth Justice

14:39

is handling that one of the major cases

14:41

and boy, that's the most formidable

14:43

environmental litigating group in the

14:45

country. They will leave no stone

14:47

unturned. So, the problem is by saying

14:52

that the harm rule is no longer in

14:55

effect that influences all kinds of

14:59

activities that are ongoing. It means

15:01

that the Forest Service now, you know,

15:03

it's the Trump administration wants to

15:05

ramp up timber harvest in in the habitat

15:09

of many endangered species, spotted

15:11

owls, marble, muralets, you go down the

15:13

list a whole bunch, right? So what

15:16

happens now in that context of when

15:18

agencies still have the obligation to

15:21

ensure that their actions do not result

15:24

in jeopardy or adverse modification of

15:26

critical habitat if the Fish and

15:29

Wildlife Service and and Noah with

15:31

regard to marine species if they are no

15:34

longer engaged in analyzing whether the

15:37

destruction of the habitat is going to

15:40

result in harm to the species that's

15:43

going to affect a lot of the decision-m

15:46

that multiple agencies are doing, the

15:49

Fish and Wildlife Service won't be

15:51

providing them with the kind of

15:53

biological information they need to meet

15:56

the demand of the Endangered Species

15:58

Act. So, they'll be subject to more

16:00

litigation over that. Now, the Trump

16:02

administration doesn't really care about

16:04

that. They're happy to see chaos in

16:07

litigation. That seems to make their

16:09

day, but the regulated community is not

16:12

going to be happy about that. timber

16:14

companies that are relying on Forest

16:16

Service decisions or BLM decisions for

16:19

grazing or mining or any number of

16:22

things. You know, if you start tearing

16:24

out the foundation of how the Endangered

16:27

Species Act is supposed to work,

16:30

including looking at the effects of

16:32

habitat loss, you're going to

16:34

destabilize the the whole regulatory

16:37

framework. So, some of this is being

16:40

laid out already. I've seen it in the

16:42

complaint that Earth Justice has filed.

16:45

They've called out specific projects

16:47

that will be affected by this decision

16:50

right now. Today, I predict we will see

16:53

a motion for at least a preliminary

16:55

injunction very soon.

16:57

>> I think the administration is just

16:59

ignoring that endangered species are

17:02

something that people care about. No one

17:05

wants to see a species go extinct.

17:08

>> They will. I think in time you're going

17:10

to see more and more maybe backlash is

17:13

the word, I don't know, more reaction

17:15

from the public over this and and

17:17

communities that have seen the value of

17:20

the restoration of endangered species.

17:22

If you think about the wolf

17:24

reintroduction or the fact that the

17:26

grizzly bear population has improved,

17:29

whether it's been fully recovered is

17:31

another question, but they certainly

17:33

have improved. And what has that

17:35

created? It's created a really robust

17:38

ecoourism industry, if you will,

17:41

recreationbased. Those gateway

17:43

communities around Yellowstone are there

17:45

to see the wolves. And that's money in

17:48

the pocket of local businesses, local

17:51

communities and schools and all the

17:53

rest. So, it's not true that restoring

17:56

endangered species, you know, is a cost

17:59

without taking account of the benefits

18:01

that it creates. So I don't think you

18:04

can make a case frankly that the

18:06

investment in recovering these species

18:09

isn't worth it. Quite the contrary.

18:11

Beyond the sort of ethical or moral

18:14

dimensions of the question, the on the

18:17

ground benefits of restoring ecosystems,

18:20

which is what the law is all about,

18:22

benefits local communities economically

18:25

and in many other ways. And Pat, you've

18:27

written an article for the conversation

18:29

that breaks all the legalities down in a

18:32

way that's easy to understand. It's

18:35

entitled Why Trump's move to gut the

18:37

Endangered Species Act likely won't hold

18:40

up in court. A pleasure as always, Pat.

18:43

Thanks so much. That's Professor Pat

18:45

Pento of the Vermont Law and Graduate

18:48

School. Turning now to the prediction

18:50

markets, which have gone from obscurity

18:52

to being everywhere. There's fierce

18:56

litigation between the states and the

18:58

commodity futures trading commission

19:01

over whether those platforms like Cali

19:03

and Poly Market constitute illegal

19:06

gambling or federally regulated

19:08

financial derivatives. More than 20

19:11

lawsuits and cease and desist actions

19:14

have been filed by states against the

19:16

platforms and the CFTC has now initiated

19:20

legal actions against nine states over

19:23

their push to rein in prediction

19:26

markets. In a case involving a White

19:28

House teleprompter operator that's drawn

19:31

attention, it's the CFTC doing the

19:34

enforcing. My guest is Columbia Law

19:36

School professor Joshua Mitz. He's a

19:39

leading authority on prediction markets

19:41

and insider trading. His new paper is

19:44

entitled from Iran to Taylor Swift:

19:47

Informed Trading in Prediction Markets.

19:50

So, President Trump's teleprompter

19:52

operator is on unpaid leave from the

19:55

White House after reports that he used

19:58

inside knowledge to make bets about

20:01

President Trump's speeches. What do we

20:04

know about this? I don't think there's

20:06

been a lot of detail released, but my

20:09

understanding is that he essentially

20:11

traded on Kshi and it was basically a

20:15

market which paid off. My understanding

20:18

was that it's a a mention market,

20:19

meaning a market that essentially paid

20:21

off when certain certain words or

20:23

phrases or text are read aloud and of

20:26

course or a statement is made at a press

20:28

conference. And of course, a

20:29

teleprompter operator would have access

20:33

to information regarding what was going

20:35

to be said, presumably would have the

20:37

transcript of the plan statements, so

20:39

would be uniquely in a position to

20:41

profit from trading based on that

20:43

information.

20:44

>> Khi is the one that alerted the CFTC

20:48

to what was going on. I'm not sure how

20:51

they knew that there was suspicious

20:52

activity.

20:54

>> Yeah. So Kelshi runs quite a bit of

20:57

surveillance on their platform and this

21:01

is something we talk about in our paper

21:03

the role of platforms to surveil and

21:05

police this kind of activity. What they

21:08

look for is abnormal trading trading

21:11

that seems to reflect some sort of

21:14

either you were very lucky or you had

21:17

potentially anformational advantage.

21:20

Part of Koshi's process is a know your

21:22

customer so-called KYC process by which

21:26

in order to trade on their platform, you

21:28

have to provide certain information

21:30

about yourself, where you work, what the

21:32

source of your funds are, and so forth.

21:35

So presumably, and this is, you know,

21:38

really just speculation, but I think

21:39

it's consistent with what we've seen,

21:42

Koshi would have undergone some sort of

21:44

surveillance review for abnormally

21:47

profitable trades and then look to see

21:49

if there was any possible connection

21:51

between the individual and the source of

21:54

the information that might be in fact

21:56

material to a given market.

21:58

>> During the investigation, reportedly the

22:01

CFTC alerted the federal prosecutors in

22:03

Manhattan. They didn't open a criminal

22:06

investigation. And I'm wondering why not

22:08

when they have opened two criminal

22:10

investigations. One involving a special

22:13

forces soldier who allegedly bet on the

22:16

capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas

22:19

Maduro and a Google employee who

22:21

allegedly bet on user searches using

22:24

internal company data. I mean, isn't

22:26

this similar to those? So for a criminal

22:30

case, we're going to need to see more

22:33

typically than simply taking advantage

22:36

of the information. But what prosecutors

22:39

are often looking for is a kind of

22:41

conscious awareness of wrongdoing or

22:44

sort of obvious departure from ordinary

22:47

norms of behavior to where it's just

22:50

straightforward to conclude that you

22:52

were operating with criminal intent. The

22:55

issue here, and I don't have any, just

22:58

to be clear, any information myself

23:00

about this case other than what's been

23:02

publicly reported, but the issue here

23:05

may be that I believe it was reported

23:07

that the words were relatively common

23:11

words or words that may have occurred in

23:14

a given speech by random chance alone,

23:17

just sort of like words that may have

23:18

been used in in the speech regardless.

23:20

And that might make it a little bit more

23:22

difficult for a criminal prosecutor

23:24

because if there's even some reasonable

23:27

doubt that the individual may have been

23:30

in possession of the information but may

23:32

have nonetheless believed at the time of

23:34

the bet that they were not actually

23:37

using the non-public information, but

23:39

that they were essentially wagering on

23:41

the same sort of probabilities that

23:43

anyone else could have wagered on and

23:45

that the likelihood of using a

23:48

particular word was sufficiently sort of

23:51

well known or it would have happened

23:52

anyway, then you know there's at least

23:55

possibly a defense that could have given

23:58

prosecutors some concern that the

24:00

information was not actually used. The

24:03

other possibility here is that the

24:05

individual may have not necessarily sort

24:09

of set out in an intentional way and it

24:12

could have been that there was some

24:13

other data that we're not aware of which

24:16

showed perhaps for example let's say

24:18

they were betting on lots and lots of

24:19

words and when you look at the totality

24:22

of what they were doing the intent

24:24

points in a slightly different direction

24:26

or at least there's an interpretation

24:28

that this particular trade was part of

24:30

some broader set of trades.

24:32

where the intent may not have been to

24:34

use this information. So, if there was

24:36

evidence of this kind, and again, I have

24:38

no information one way or the other. If

24:40

there was evidence of this kind, it

24:42

might have given criminal prosecutors

24:44

some pause about bringing criminal

24:46

charges.

24:46

>> Coming up next, the CFTC fights the

24:50

states. This is Bloomberg. I've been

24:52

talking to Colombia Law School professor

24:54

Joshua Mitz. His new paper is entitled

24:58

from Iran to Taylor Swift: Informed

25:01

Trading in Prediction Markets. These

25:03

prediction markets seem to have really

25:06

taken hold. They've struck deals with

25:09

major sports leagues to provide data

25:12

during games. During the Golden Globes

25:15

in January, a poly market Chiron flashed

25:19

before each award was handed out,

25:21

correctly predicting nearly all 28

25:24

winners. And I'm just wondering how much

25:28

the prediction markets are now a part of

25:30

the fabric of our life.

25:33

>> If they've become a part of the fabric

25:34

of our lives, that's happened pretty

25:37

quickly given that these platforms have

25:39

seen explosive growth recently. So I

25:42

would want to see a little bit more

25:44

evidence over time. But I do think your

25:46

question is getting at something that

25:48

I've observed now for several years,

25:51

which is the increasing acceptance of

25:54

gamification or speculation, financial

25:57

wagering in the form of apps or sort of

26:00

digital technologies, which has really

26:03

displaced traditional gambling venues in

26:06

in lots of ways. People are flocking and

26:08

gravitating towards apps which allow

26:10

them essentially to bet, gamble, wager

26:13

money. Now, you can really go back years

26:16

ago, about 5 years ago, to the rise of

26:20

GameStop and meme stocks, which was a

26:23

kind of more tame and early version of,

26:26

I think, what we're seeing now. In the

26:28

years since, we've seen crypto being

26:30

used, for example, by politicians and

26:33

those who are closer to positions of

26:35

power or in positions of power

26:36

themselves. So I think when you look at

26:38

it as a trend, prediction markets may be

26:41

the latest and greatest iteration, if

26:43

you will, of this sort of financial

26:46

gambling, but it's it's really just that

26:49

I think the underlying trend is that

26:51

we've gotten much more comfortable with

26:53

speculation and wagering. And some would

26:56

say in a way that's similar to the

26:57

1920s. That's that's not my argument.

27:00

Others have made that argument. But

27:01

there's a real question as to what it is

27:04

in our society that has made these sorts

27:06

of speculative bets much more socially

27:09

acceptable maybe than they were in the

27:11

past.

27:11

>> So we have many states and the CFTC

27:15

locked in a a battle for who's going to

27:18

control this. There are over 20 lawsuits

27:21

and cease and desist actions have been

27:23

filed by the states against these

27:26

platforms. But the CFTC has initiated

27:29

legal actions against nine states. I

27:32

mean, what you just described sounds

27:34

like it's gambling. And why shouldn't

27:36

the states be regulating it?

27:39

>> Well, gambling as a kind of economic

27:43

activity is much broader than the form

27:46

of gambling that's been traditionally

27:48

regulated by state gambling laws. So,

27:51

you could look at the stock market as a

27:52

whole as a form of gambling, trading

27:54

frequently. You could look at uh

27:56

commodities futures trading in other

27:58

areas. If you want to trade silver

28:01

futures or gold futures or oil futures,

28:05

those are all commodities or derivatives

28:07

of commodities. And one can argue if

28:10

you're basically wagering that the price

28:12

is going to go up or go down, you're

28:14

placing a bet just like a highfrequency

28:17

trader would be. And none of that

28:19

activity would be regulated by state

28:21

gambling laws. So it's a bit tological

28:25

to say that gambling should be regulated

28:27

by states because states have regulated

28:29

gambling. The question really is what

28:31

forms of gambling have and should be

28:34

under state jurisdiction and which forms

28:38

belong within the federal regulatory

28:40

scheme. I think one very important

28:42

difference is that Khi and Poly Market

28:46

these prediction platforms operate much

28:48

more like two-sided financial markets

28:51

with market participants essentially

28:54

trading with each other or with

28:56

liquidity providers rather than players

28:59

who are interacting with an

29:01

establishment. And I'm not suggesting

29:03

that's necessarily an operative legal

29:06

differentiator, but I think if you look

29:08

at the economic nature of the activity

29:10

on these markets, there is I would

29:12

suggest perhaps a much closer similarity

29:15

between an oil futures market and a

29:18

prediction market. And they both involve

29:20

essentially matching bids and offers.

29:23

And the platform is serving as an

29:25

intermediary for this contract. It's to

29:28

be sure I think to your point there's a

29:31

lot of friction right now because this

29:33

activity unlike commodities trading or

29:36

futures trading really does feel much

29:38

more like the sort of consumer gambling

29:41

that has been traditionally regulated by

29:43

the states.

29:44

>> Is there a split among the courts about

29:47

how these should be viewed?

29:49

>> Well, I think a couple things. I mean,

29:51

I've been speaking in economic terms. I

29:53

mean the the legal question in these

29:55

cases really concerns preeemption and

29:58

the language of the commodities exchange

30:00

act and the whether or not state power

30:04

to regulate gambling falls and covers

30:07

particularly sports related contracts.

30:09

Not every contract on a prediction

30:12

market necessarily has the same legal

30:15

standing under state gambling law. So

30:17

contracts involving sports games in

30:20

particular seem to fit squarely within

30:23

the traditional domain of state gambling

30:26

laws and activity, gambling activity at

30:29

the uh state level. Sports contracts are

30:32

kind of your quintessential example.

30:34

Some of the other contracts like you

30:37

know crypto derivatives for example, I

30:39

think it's a much harder argument. So

30:41

what we're seeing right now in the

30:42

circuits is some grappling with the

30:46

exact language of the commodities

30:49

exchange act which defines the CFTC's

30:51

jurisdiction and what the CFTC is really

30:54

trying to do is to preserve maximum

30:56

jurisdiction and essentially to say look

30:58

I mean there's no question that certain

31:00

kinds of prediction contracts which are

31:02

themselves derivatives of let's say

31:04

crypto or other financial instruments

31:07

there's no question at least most of

31:08

those are within our authority

31:10

So why would that not also be true for

31:13

gaming or other kinds of, you know,

31:16

contracts just because they happen to

31:17

involve areas that were traditionally

31:19

under state regulation? And it's really

31:21

more of a statutory interpretation

31:23

question before the circuit courts right

31:25

now. But I think fundamentally as an

31:27

economic matter, there are some

31:28

differences, but it probably will

31:31

ultimately have to be resolved by the

31:32

Supreme Court. And I would expect that

31:34

if I had to put a prediction on it that

31:37

uh uh the CFTC will win in the end

31:39

>> in light of the fact that the the Trump

31:42

administration is all in on the

31:45

prediction markets. Is enforcement by

31:47

the CFTC enough?

31:49

>> Well, what we talk about in our paper is

31:52

that enforcement here can occur on

31:54

multiple levels. So there's actor or

31:57

contractbased enforcement where you say

31:59

here are some particular trades. we're

32:01

going to look at these trades. We're

32:03

going to dig into an individual's

32:05

trading history and bring an enforcement

32:06

action against that individual or in

32:08

extreme cases perhaps criminal

32:10

indictment. But there's also platform

32:12

level surveillance and platform level

32:15

regulation. And while it's true that the

32:17

Trump administration has been relatively

32:20

pro- innovation or pro sort of a

32:22

hands-off approach when it comes to

32:24

financial innovation in the crypto

32:26

space, digital asset space and now to

32:28

some extent in the prediction market

32:30

space. It's also true that these

32:32

platforms have been at least KI and to a

32:35

certain extent polyarket US as well.

32:37

They're US armed. they've been really

32:39

stepping up to show that they are

32:41

enforcing uh these sorts of insider

32:43

trading fraud and manipulation rules on

32:46

the platform. And we've talked about

32:47

insider trading, but it's not only

32:49

insider trading. I mean, some of these

32:50

smaller markets in particular are

32:52

amendable to manipulation where

32:54

individuals can control the outcome of

32:56

the market. So outcomebased manipulation

32:59

and we know that in many cases you know

33:02

it's something like over 90% maybe as

33:04

high as 99% of the participants on these

33:06

platforms are losing money. So you know

33:09

there needs to be adequate disclosure

33:11

regarding the risks of participating and

33:13

and so forth. Platforms I think have

33:15

taken some actions that are helpful in

33:17

that direction in terms of both

33:19

combating misconduct and protecting

33:21

consumers. But there's more that can be

33:22

done there and that seems to be an area

33:24

where maybe there's some openness on the

33:26

part of the Trump administration to sort

33:28

of enlist platforms in kind of inducing

33:31

a more informed and and hopefully fairer

33:34

and safer market for consumers.

33:36

>> Tell us a little more about your paper.

33:38

>> Well, the paper looks systematically at

33:39

Poly Market and identifies over 200,000

33:44

episodes of potentially informed

33:47

trading. And we basically identify

33:50

across a wide range of we have five

33:52

criteria that we employ to identify what

33:55

we consider potentially informed trading

33:58

that we don't necessarily conclude

34:00

reflects the use of material non-public

34:03

information. We recognize that some of

34:05

this activity might be in fact informed

34:09

trading which is lawfully acquired. But

34:11

we think that what it shows is that the

34:13

prediction markets are in fact

34:15

facilitating the systematic exploitation

34:18

of information that is non-public and

34:21

there's a number of consequences which

34:23

follow from that. So we talked about

34:25

surveillance at the platform level. We

34:27

also think in the paper talk about some

34:29

of the proposals. There have been some

34:30

legislative proposals to outlaw uh

34:34

certain uses of information, certain

34:36

kinds of contracts. We think that, you

34:38

know, some of these proposals are in

34:40

fact moving the ball forward. Others are

34:42

essentially summarizing existing law.

34:44

I'll just say part of the problem here

34:46

is not only having strong legal rules,

34:50

but thinking about enforcement because

34:52

when actors are trading globally using

34:55

anonymous identities on the blockchain

34:57

and so forth, the problem is just as

34:59

much a practical one of identifying

35:01

who's engaging in the trading and who's

35:03

sharing the information as it is

35:06

figuring out what the rule should be. So

35:09

we talk in the paper about just the role

35:11

of as I mentioned platforms not only in

35:13

surveillance but in cooperating and in

35:16

fact we really need a global perspective

35:19

because you know it can't be enough for

35:21

the United States to take actions on its

35:24

own. We really need to see international

35:26

cooperation especially when there are

35:28

transnational networks which is

35:30

something that we've seen in insider

35:32

trading more broadly. I mean this is how

35:34

insider trading rings are brought down

35:36

and so that same sort of approach needs

35:38

to be taken for the prediction markets

35:40

as well.

35:41

>> Thanks so much for sharing your thoughts

35:42

with us. That's professor Joshua Mitz of

35:45

Columbia Law School. And that's it for

35:47

this edition of the Bloomberg Law Show.

35:49

Remember you can always get the latest

35:50

legal news on our Bloomberg Law podcast.

35:53

You can find them on Apple Podcast,

35:55

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35:56

www.bloomberg.com/mpodcast/law.

36:01

And remember to tune in to the Bloomberg

36:03

Law Show every week night at 10 PM Wall

36:06

Street time. I'm June Graasso and you're

36:08

listening to Bloomberg.

Interactive Summary

This episode of Bloomberg Law covers two primary topics: the legal challenges against the Trump administration's rollback of Endangered Species Act protections, specifically the definition of 'harm', and the complex legal and regulatory landscape of prediction markets. Expert guests analyze the potential impact of rescinding habitat protection rules and the ongoing jurisdictional battle between states and the CFTC over regulating platforms like Kalshi and Polymarket, noting the inherent risks of informed trading and market manipulation.

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