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Sarah Paine: How Putin is Destroying Russia as Great Power

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Sarah Paine: How Putin is Destroying Russia as Great Power

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165 segments

0:00

So, okay, let's talk more about the

0:01

past. How much do you think the past of

0:03

Russian relations with China can define

0:05

the future of them?

0:06

>> I've done an entire podcast on Russia

0:09

and Chinese relations that sum up what

0:12

little I know on the subject. And for

0:15

many years, Russia was strong and in the

0:18

driver's seat. And now, China's strong

0:20

and Russia's in the receiving end of

0:22

that relationship.

0:24

And the reversal is a combination of

0:26

Russia's implosion and China's rise.

0:28

Right? It's not a good position for

0:30

Russia to be in and then it's um

0:33

isolating itself completely from the

0:36

West then throws it right at at China's

0:39

mercy. And don't expect I don't think

0:41

China has ever been merciful.

0:43

>> But why would China care more

0:45

specifically? They're a

0:46

>> care about what about holding all the

0:49

cards visav Russia. Of course you like

0:51

holding cards visav Russia.

0:53

>> But they're not they're indifferent to

0:55

who leads the country. Look at Iran

0:57

right now. They don't care whether the

0:58

regime topples as long as they get what

1:00

they want. As long as they

1:01

>> Yeah. Well, we're talking about whether

1:02

they're going to get what they want from

1:03

Russia. And I'm suggesting they probably

1:05

will.

1:06

>> Yes, of course. But to what how much

1:08

does that depend on what state Russia is

1:11

in? How much does that depend on the

1:12

person?

1:13

>> The weaker Russia is the better from

1:15

Chinese. I mean, in terms of what

1:17

leverage you have over them, but

1:19

understand that getting what you want

1:21

and it has two parts to that equation.

1:24

One is the competence of your own

1:26

strategy. So that lies within your own

1:29

department and it also depends on the

1:31

incompetence of the other side and

1:33

something you do not control. And be

1:35

aware if the other side's very

1:37

competent, you're going to have

1:38

troubles.

1:39

>> But to be devil's advocate on that, the

1:41

Chinese aren't free of their own

1:42

challenges.

1:43

>> No, no, they are. Nor is Russia. And

1:46

they're just I gave you the math on

1:47

their relative GMPs, GDPs. China's just

1:50

got a much bigger piggy bank to go spend

1:52

money to do things than Russia does.

1:54

>> No, for sure. Look, look, Russia's

1:56

longevity in its current form is ticking

1:59

time long. It's a matter of time. But

2:01

this is why it's important to

2:04

>> who knows? Think of think of North

2:05

Korea. It amazes me how long that

2:08

dystopian mess, the Kim dynasty can

2:11

remain in power. It just seems to be

2:12

endless.

2:14

>> So, so at what point does strategic

2:16

dependence for Russia turn into

2:18

strategic vulnerability?

2:19

>> I think the strategic dependence is a

2:21

strategic vulnerability. So you don't

2:23

think there comes a point where we're

2:25

already past the point of too far for

2:28

Russia. There's no they can't reverse

2:30

their dependency or

2:31

>> another concept pivotal errors. If you

2:34

make we all make errors, but if you make

2:37

a pivotal error, I'm just it's a term um

2:41

that I cooked up probably based on

2:43

somebody else's whatever that I don't

2:44

even remember. It's there's no going

2:47

back to the status quo ante and the

2:51

voice choices following your pivotal

2:54

error are much worse than the ones you

2:56

had before going in. So Japan's attack

3:00

on Pearl Harbor pivotal error because

3:03

they're in a world of hurt afterwards.

3:05

It's going to be it's going to be much

3:06

worse than before having done that.

3:09

Vladimir Putin, if he had just kept with

3:12

I got Crimea at no cost and quit right

3:15

there, he would he would have gotten his

3:16

Nordstream 2 in and be making all kinds

3:18

of money that way. It's over. He's made

3:22

a pivotal error. There's there's just no

3:24

going back. The choices going forward

3:25

for Russians are worse and worse and

3:27

worse. So, good strategists try to avoid

3:30

pivotal errors. And what I worry about

3:32

as an American is whether the United

3:35

States is about to make a pivotal error.

3:38

Going after Greenland would be a pivotal

3:41

error for the United States.

3:43

>> Okay. No, that that's fair. Um but okay,

3:46

just to on the Cen Russo dynamic, the

3:49

thing that interests me is that the

3:51

worse things get, the more desperate

3:53

Putin becomes.

3:54

>> Oh yeah. Yeah. He's on death ground.

3:55

Another concept from Sunza. Death

3:57

ground. It means you are in such rotten

4:00

shape that your only hope of survival

4:04

and it's not a really high hope is to

4:07

fight. And so for Putin personally,

4:11

that's why he's going to double down

4:12

because if he goes, "Oh, gee whiz, I

4:14

made a mistake, boys. Can't we back out

4:16

of this one?" He's dead man, right? I

4:18

would imagine. And so he's not going to

4:21

do that, I believe. And I'm speculating,

4:24

but I think I got pretty high odds on

4:26

this one. But on all speculation, you

4:29

make a hypothesis and then you keep

4:31

examining it. And when the data suggests

4:33

hypothesis is wrong, by all means change

4:35

your hypothesis. So death ground is an

4:37

important one. You can also flip death

4:39

ground on Ukraine because it's not just

4:42

that if Ukraine capitulates, not only is

4:45

Suzinski a dead man, but the Ukrainian

4:48

people are dead people. The number of

4:50

people who would be systematically

4:51

murdered and their culture would be gone

4:54

is huge. in a culture affects everybody.

4:58

And so if you do that to other people,

5:01

you galvanize the most incredible

5:03

opposing alliance so that even a failed

5:05

country be can become a very competent

5:08

adversary. And a previous example of

5:10

that is Hitler with his genocidal plans

5:13

that turns Russia, which was basically a

5:15

failed state after all this

5:16

collectivization and shooting the Soviet

5:18

Union after shooting the general staff

5:20

and other people. It turns them into a

5:23

lethal adversary and it galvanizes the

5:27

alliance from hell that takes care of

5:29

Adolf Hitler. So death ground is a good

5:32

concept to play around and go who's on

5:35

death ground and who's not. The Russian

5:37

people are not on death ground whereas

5:39

Ukrainian people are. The value of

5:41

victory, what's called value of the

5:43

object, another concept, is much higher

5:45

for Ukrainians generally than for

5:47

Russians. For Russians, it's like a it

5:49

it'll be a feel-good moment if they

5:51

could actually win, whatever they define

5:53

win in Ukraine as. But for Ukraine, it's

5:56

existential. So, they will never give

5:58

up. And the Russians are just going to

6:00

be they're they're on a trajectory to

6:02

wind up like North Korea. Give it a

6:04

generation or

Interactive Summary

The discussion examines the shifting power dynamics between Russia and China, highlighting how China has become the dominant partner due to Russia's internal decline and isolation from the West. The concept of "pivotal errors" is introduced, identifying Russia's invasion of Ukraine as an irreversible mistake that has led to a much worse strategic position. The conversation also explores Sun Tzu's "death ground" concept, applying it to Putin's desperate personal situation and Ukraine's existential fight for survival, which ensures Ukraine's unwavering resistance against an adversary that is ultimately on a trajectory towards isolation akin to North Korea.

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