Sarah Paine: How Putin is Destroying Russia as Great Power
165 segments
So, okay, let's talk more about the
past. How much do you think the past of
Russian relations with China can define
the future of them?
>> I've done an entire podcast on Russia
and Chinese relations that sum up what
little I know on the subject. And for
many years, Russia was strong and in the
driver's seat. And now, China's strong
and Russia's in the receiving end of
that relationship.
And the reversal is a combination of
Russia's implosion and China's rise.
Right? It's not a good position for
Russia to be in and then it's um
isolating itself completely from the
West then throws it right at at China's
mercy. And don't expect I don't think
China has ever been merciful.
>> But why would China care more
specifically? They're a
>> care about what about holding all the
cards visav Russia. Of course you like
holding cards visav Russia.
>> But they're not they're indifferent to
who leads the country. Look at Iran
right now. They don't care whether the
regime topples as long as they get what
they want. As long as they
>> Yeah. Well, we're talking about whether
they're going to get what they want from
Russia. And I'm suggesting they probably
will.
>> Yes, of course. But to what how much
does that depend on what state Russia is
in? How much does that depend on the
person?
>> The weaker Russia is the better from
Chinese. I mean, in terms of what
leverage you have over them, but
understand that getting what you want
and it has two parts to that equation.
One is the competence of your own
strategy. So that lies within your own
department and it also depends on the
incompetence of the other side and
something you do not control. And be
aware if the other side's very
competent, you're going to have
troubles.
>> But to be devil's advocate on that, the
Chinese aren't free of their own
challenges.
>> No, no, they are. Nor is Russia. And
they're just I gave you the math on
their relative GMPs, GDPs. China's just
got a much bigger piggy bank to go spend
money to do things than Russia does.
>> No, for sure. Look, look, Russia's
longevity in its current form is ticking
time long. It's a matter of time. But
this is why it's important to
>> who knows? Think of think of North
Korea. It amazes me how long that
dystopian mess, the Kim dynasty can
remain in power. It just seems to be
endless.
>> So, so at what point does strategic
dependence for Russia turn into
strategic vulnerability?
>> I think the strategic dependence is a
strategic vulnerability. So you don't
think there comes a point where we're
already past the point of too far for
Russia. There's no they can't reverse
their dependency or
>> another concept pivotal errors. If you
make we all make errors, but if you make
a pivotal error, I'm just it's a term um
that I cooked up probably based on
somebody else's whatever that I don't
even remember. It's there's no going
back to the status quo ante and the
voice choices following your pivotal
error are much worse than the ones you
had before going in. So Japan's attack
on Pearl Harbor pivotal error because
they're in a world of hurt afterwards.
It's going to be it's going to be much
worse than before having done that.
Vladimir Putin, if he had just kept with
I got Crimea at no cost and quit right
there, he would he would have gotten his
Nordstream 2 in and be making all kinds
of money that way. It's over. He's made
a pivotal error. There's there's just no
going back. The choices going forward
for Russians are worse and worse and
worse. So, good strategists try to avoid
pivotal errors. And what I worry about
as an American is whether the United
States is about to make a pivotal error.
Going after Greenland would be a pivotal
error for the United States.
>> Okay. No, that that's fair. Um but okay,
just to on the Cen Russo dynamic, the
thing that interests me is that the
worse things get, the more desperate
Putin becomes.
>> Oh yeah. Yeah. He's on death ground.
Another concept from Sunza. Death
ground. It means you are in such rotten
shape that your only hope of survival
and it's not a really high hope is to
fight. And so for Putin personally,
that's why he's going to double down
because if he goes, "Oh, gee whiz, I
made a mistake, boys. Can't we back out
of this one?" He's dead man, right? I
would imagine. And so he's not going to
do that, I believe. And I'm speculating,
but I think I got pretty high odds on
this one. But on all speculation, you
make a hypothesis and then you keep
examining it. And when the data suggests
hypothesis is wrong, by all means change
your hypothesis. So death ground is an
important one. You can also flip death
ground on Ukraine because it's not just
that if Ukraine capitulates, not only is
Suzinski a dead man, but the Ukrainian
people are dead people. The number of
people who would be systematically
murdered and their culture would be gone
is huge. in a culture affects everybody.
And so if you do that to other people,
you galvanize the most incredible
opposing alliance so that even a failed
country be can become a very competent
adversary. And a previous example of
that is Hitler with his genocidal plans
that turns Russia, which was basically a
failed state after all this
collectivization and shooting the Soviet
Union after shooting the general staff
and other people. It turns them into a
lethal adversary and it galvanizes the
alliance from hell that takes care of
Adolf Hitler. So death ground is a good
concept to play around and go who's on
death ground and who's not. The Russian
people are not on death ground whereas
Ukrainian people are. The value of
victory, what's called value of the
object, another concept, is much higher
for Ukrainians generally than for
Russians. For Russians, it's like a it
it'll be a feel-good moment if they
could actually win, whatever they define
win in Ukraine as. But for Ukraine, it's
existential. So, they will never give
up. And the Russians are just going to
be they're they're on a trajectory to
wind up like North Korea. Give it a
generation or
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The discussion examines the shifting power dynamics between Russia and China, highlighting how China has become the dominant partner due to Russia's internal decline and isolation from the West. The concept of "pivotal errors" is introduced, identifying Russia's invasion of Ukraine as an irreversible mistake that has led to a much worse strategic position. The conversation also explores Sun Tzu's "death ground" concept, applying it to Putin's desperate personal situation and Ukraine's existential fight for survival, which ensures Ukraine's unwavering resistance against an adversary that is ultimately on a trajectory towards isolation akin to North Korea.
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