The End of the Obama Coalition
1638 segments
from New York Times opinion this is the
Ezra Klein
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show so in my postelection essay I said
that the 2024 election marked the end of
the Obama
Coalition but what does that mean well
in part it means that some of the
political strategies the Democrats
thought would turn Obama's 2008 and 2012
coalitions into an enduring generational
majority they failed Democrats worked
damn hard over the past few years to
deliver what they thought what they were
told Black and Hispanic and workingclass
and Union voters wanted and instead of
solidifying support from those voters
they're seeing them flee to Donald Trump
but I'm also saying something about the
structure of the democratic party itself
the Obama era wasn't just built around
one person it was a collection of
Institutions and power bases and Elite
networks Michael Lind a columnist tablet
the author of the book the new class war
and the co-founder of new America he's
argued that it was kind of a political
machine one built around Urban political
support Foundation nonprofits mass media
there are parts of Lyn's analysis I
don't agree with in particular I think
the machine has worked very differently
after Obama left the White House than it
did before I think it's been a machine
without a boss in a way that has not
worked out well for the Democratic party
but I think seeing the Democratic party
through the lens of its component
institutions the places where the people
who run it and staff it work when
they're out of power where they're
educated where they go to find deputies
and higher Staff and get funding and to
see the people they used to work with
and still listen to and learn from I
think that's really important that's
what a political party
is and because of it I don't think
what's next for the Democratic party is
just new ideas or campaign tactics I
think it's shaking free of an
Institutional structure or maybe even an
Institutional straight jacket that's no
longer working maybe hasn't been for
some time and it's learning how not to
listen so much to its funders and
interest groups and how to listen listen
more to the people it's been losing as
always my email as reclin show atny
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times.com Michael Lind welcome to the
show thanks for having me so you've been
arguing for some time now that the
Democratic party since Barack Obama has
has changed in form that at its Center
is a different kind of liberal what you
call a Gentry liberal and a different
set of inst institutions nonprofits and
Foundations what you call the Obama
machine tell me about that the Obama
Democrats in my view are the first
American National party that is also a
national machine in the sense that it's
kind of replicated on the national level
the sort of machine structure that has
long existed both in Republican machines
and Democratic machines at the state and
local level and the elements of the
Obama Democratic machine and it's not
that Obama was aiming for this it's just
sort of evolved under his watch it's the
cities if you look at the 10 most
populous cities in 2000 four of them had
Republican Mayors today it's they're all
Democratic and you basically every Big
City over a million or so people in
every college town is 100% Democratic
all the time and this is kind of new
so since the population is largely Urban
now in the United States to have a
national Democratic machine really just
means linking up these big city Urban
machines and college town you know onep
party systems and the way it has been
linked up in the Obama era has been
through several methods the most
important is campaign
Finance so we've seen this
nationalization of politics and this is
true with the Republicans as well as the
Democrats but the Democrats pioneered
this where donors in San Francisco and
New York and Chicago few other big
Democratic cities are increasingly
influential in state and local and city
council elections around the country and
that has a homogenizing effect on State
and local Democrats and Regional
Democrats you have the old party
structures of the ward healers and the
party bosses and tammony Hall and that
sort of thing they still exist to some
degree but they've been so eroded that
they have been replaced in these
Democratic cities where much of the
American population lives by nonprofits
by not by think tanks that kind of
nonprofit but by Service delivery
nonprofits dealing with homelessness
with uh education with other things
which get grants from the city
government to carry out functions which
were performed before the Outsourcing uh
uh that took place beginning with the
Clinton era these were performed by
salaried civil servants and and since
then the number of civil servants has
not gone up but the so-called Blended
Workforce of contractors uh both
nonprofit and for-profit has just
exploded well the number of civil
servants has gone up at the state and
local level hasn't gone up in the
civilian population federally but state
and local it's gone up quite a lot
you're quite right thanks for correcting
me but about a third of their income
comes actually from Washington right
it's grants from U HHS and other federal
agencies and there's a real question I
think of democratic legitimacy small D
and this is true for the Republican
equivalent as well if these Urban
functions uh are are being carried out
by nonprofit employees who get some of
their money from local donations they
get some of it from rich people on the
coasts they get some of it from
government agencies like HHS they get
some of it from corporations they get
some of it from city council grants then
you know they have multiple
Masters and and in what sense to whom
are they Inc accountable I think there's
something interesting in this that I've
been wrestling with and it's one reason
I want to have you on the show because
I've been thinking about the way you
describe this as a machine and the way
you describe it as a a modern form of
patronage and I found that that
initially I rejected that I was like
this isn't like Tam Hall where you know
boss tweet is handing out the jobs but
then I thought more about the role that
foundations and nonprofits play in
modern Progressive politics in the
Democratic party the amount of power I
know them to hold in terms of what the
White House ends up doing in terms of
what happens in in
Congress it did seem to me that there
was some explanatory value in thinking
about this as a modern patronage network
not exactly based on jobs though
sometimes based on on jobs but based on
campaign Finance donations and and
grants so I'm curious to hear you
describe a bit about how you think this
is similar to and dissimilar from past
networks of patronage and what we would
have thought of as political machines
the jobs thing is important uh uh the
political machines particularly the ones
in the big cities in the United States
where there were large immigrant
diasporas one of the jobs of the local
machine could have been Republican or
Democratic machine was to pressure
employers to hire Irish Americans or
Italian Americans or whatever in return
for votes but it was done informally and
extra legally this has been replaced in
the new Progressive Democratic machine
in my view by these categorical
directives uh so for example the Biden
Administration when it comes to power it
says it will have this whole of
government approach for equity which in
practice means affirmative action it's
just another word for affirmative action
but
it's not the personal kind of patronage
in the past where the ward healer would
say I want you know one of my
constituent uh Sons to get a no-show job
in the warehouse in New York or whatever
now it's all done bureaucratically right
you put down are you aapi that is Asian
Pacific Islander or African-American or
hispanic/latino or non-hispanic white uh
and then in order to get government
funding your organizations have have to
have the Equitable quotas they don't use
that name but that's what it is so there
is a a jobs element there what is unique
that did not exist in the past is the
extent to which the donors
simultaneously pay for the Democratic
politicians but they also
determine what progressivism is and they
determine what progressivism is by
deciding what to fund and what not to
fund and so merely by omission they can
eliminate entire topics from the
definition of progressivism because if
progressivism is what the
nonprofits that are called Progressive
are doing well if they can't raise money
they're not going to be doing it so uh
and I've seen in the nonprofit sector
you simply can't raise money from uh
Progressive donors on promoting
collective bargaining and and trade
unionism this is something that the
somewhat libertarian neoliberal donor
class is not terribly thrilled with uh
unions they may tolerate public sector
unions but they don't want them in their
Tech and finance corporations I I don't
feel like I'm going to push you on this
because I know a fair amount about what
the huet foundation funds which is one
of the very big funders on the
Democratic side and they fund lots of
figures including on the right who are
trying to bring back labor unions who
are pro- sectoral bargaining in the sort
of anti- neoliberalism turn that the
progressive Foundation world has taken
in the past couple of years trying to
revitalize labor has been a pretty big
part of it that doesn't feel to me
admitted at all no well I think huet
though is not typical hasn't been
typical of the progressive foundations
in the last 20 or 30 years you're quite
right they fund efforts across the
political Spectrum on the right as well
as on the left as part of their Beyond
neoliberalism project but what I'm
talking about is individual Mega donors
their family foundations apart from huet
the Ford foundation and so on and the
reason the emphasis is on
non-economic cultural issues which are
perfectly legitimate in many cases
whether it's gay rights or or trans
rights or environmentalism is is defined
as kind of a social issue I think it
reflects the interest of the donors if
the donors wanted a strong union
movement then there would be all kinds
of pro labor think tanks all over
Washington DC but you wouldn't have this
pattern of single issue groups where you
have feminists over here you have the
Human Rights Campaign over here and so
on in my essay after the election I said
at the end of it that I thought we were
seeing the end of the Obama Coalition
the Obama Coalition was exhausted and
and
defeated and as happens when you have to
write after an election I wrote a thing
that I think is true but didn't have a
lot of time to think that deeply about
why did I think it was true and working
through some of your work on this and
and you're much more critical of
certainly the Obama machine in its
Heyday than than I am so to help me
think through this I want to play you a
clip of Obama this is from five years
ago and it's once the leader of the
democratic party talking way I don't
think you hear Democrats talk that much
now this idea of Purity and you're never
compromised and you're always
politically woke and all that stuff you
should get over that quickly the world
the world is
messy there are ambiguities
yep people who do really good
stuff have
flaws people who you are
fighting may love their
kids
and you know share certain things with
you and and and I think that one danger
I see among young people particularly on
college campus Mal and I talk about this
but I do get sense sometimes now among
certain young people and this is
accelerated by social media there is
this sense sometimes of the way of me
making change is to be as judgmental as
possible about other
people and that's enough like if I tweet
or hashtag about I'm curious what what
you hear when you hear that and how it
compares to you to to the Democratic
party you see today well what I hear is
someone who even though he bequeathed
this more centralized uh homogeneous
machine I think not necessarily
deliberately he actually worked his way
up in Chicago politics and in National
politics at a time when there were blue
dog Democrats technically there still
are but the poor blue dogs are almost
extinct you know there were gypsy moth
Republicans that you wanted to vote with
the your faction of the Democrats across
party lines so in that sense I hear
someone more like LBJ or FDR or you know
any other democratic president where not
only is your own party a coalition and
you're the power broker you're not the
dictator at the end of the day you can't
get things done in our system of checks
and balances without winning over a fair
number of people in the other party this
trend that you associate with the Obama
machine feels to me like it got out of
control after Obama left the scene that
when it actually had a political boss in
the person of Barack Obama himself and
and the people directly around him who
had some power over it and some sense of
it it was actually fairly well
restrained which is why Barack Obama was
a very successful president but since
him I think Hillary Clinton was much
more dominated by you know quote unquote
the groups I think the Biden
Administration was obsessed with
Democratic coalitional management and
keeping everybody in the Coalition on
board in a way that was very different
than how the Obama Administration
operated and so you sort of describe
this as a an ongoing thing with maybe
even Obama as like the shadow political
boss it looks to me like almost a
culture that no longer has a boss even
to some inside the nonprofits I feel
like the bosses of the nonprofits got
weaker in recent years and the staff's
got stronger it's like you have this
machine but you don't have any political
bosses anymore and have it maybe for
some
time well I think that's true of
machines in the past so for example
they're assembled by these very
charismatic politicians who are as you
say in case of flexible enough to tone
it down when it's backfiring right and
and to keep it under control but when
they leave you you have it's kind of
like after Stalin dies in the Soviet
Union you get this oligarchy instead of
like the one powerful figure so you
could call it the Post Obama machine
where uh basically no one's in charge
and power goes down to the sort of
self-perpetuating
organizations uh and it would be
interesting for historians and
presidential
biographers to explain why Joe Biden who
was expected to be kind of the Centrist
old timey new delish Democrat who would
keep the progressive single issue groups
under control why he really was the most
culturally left president much more so
than uh Obama who was who was careful to
try to keep his Centrist streak red and
maybe it was personal incapacity maybe
it was a calculation to win over the the
Bernie Sanders voters I don't know the
answer I think this idea of the Post
Obama machine feels truer to me and I do
think it's worth spending some time on
this question of of Joe Biden because
the Biden White House worked differently
than other white houses I've been aware
of and one of the ways it worked
differently was it was just much more
concerned with keeping the left engaged
in the Coalition back in the Obama
Administration there was constant
bickering between the White House and
what it called the professional left
which was many of these groups and
Robert Gibbs the press secretary would
unload on the professional left and then
people get mad at Robert Gibbs and he
would stand by his remarks and this was
understood at every level of it Ram
Emanuel was like this Barack Obama
himself was often like this there was a
lot of there was much more tension
between the Obama Administration and the
left than there was between the Biden
Administration and the left and maybe
that was the Biden Bernie Sanders
Alliance I mean he almost did lose a
nomination to Bernie Sanders so the that
the left was a much more live Force had
changed but I think in a weird way you
see it with Bernie Sanders himself
because Bernie Sanders is a left figure
used to be quite left on economics but
culturally moderate on other things more
proun and it's one way Hillary Clinton
ran against him right that sort of
famous line that you know you can break
up the big Banks but it won't solve
systemic racism but over time Sanders
also became much more coalitional in his
approach to the left right he's not
saying no to anything either one of the
the critiques many people made of the
democratic party in this period And I
think it's true and it goes beyond Biden
to to these figures is it just nobody
said no to anything and so then you have
things like kamla Harris signing an ACLU
document saying yes to surgeries uh
gender surgery for undocumented
immigrants in jail right and that gets
used against her in in all these ads
that sort of reflects a culture in which
nobody is saying no to the groups at any
level of American Democratic politics
but I'm not exactly sure why that
evolved in the way it did and I'm
curious how how you see it if we brought
in it from Just Joe Biden well I I'll
ask you the question uh but but first
I'll point out that a lot of this
started in Obama's second term it was
his education department issued the
transgender directive saying that then
the doj and the education department
would cut off funding and maybe
investigate k312 schools that don't let
high school kids join sports teams of
the opposite sex and so on and I got the
impression that this took even Obama by
surprise I don't think this was
something he was pushing it was just
like the the bureaucracy filled with
these these single issue nonprofit
groups so here I have a question for you
Ezra related to this how much do you
think the uh
internet and Twitter in particular which
we know progressives used more heavily
or at least they did before musk than
than conservatives how much has that
empowered these groups in the old days
if you upset the environmentalists or
the uh feminists or or one another
single issue Group Well people would
write angry letters to the new Republic
but it was like age of paper right but
now you know they can denounce this and
then millions of suburban Urban
progressives around the country you know
will retweet their
condemnation of the Democrat for caving
in on this issue do you think that's a
factor I definitely think it was a
factor in the
2018 2021 era where I think that Twitter
and particular I mean I think it maybe
goes back before that too was a
tremendous
accelerator of ideological amplification
and Division I don't think there's a
Bernie Sanders campaign that succeeds in
the way it does in
2015 without Twitter and Reddit and and
places online where the intensity of his
support could turn into money could turn
into media coverage I mean I remember
being at at Vox back then and we were
watching anything we we put Bernie
Sanders name on like go to the top of
Reddit and that leads to a lot more
media oxygen for for Sanders the same
thing by the way is happening on the
right with Donald Trump I don't think
there's a trump campaign in the way we
ultimately see it without Twitter either
so I I definitely think that's true
there's also another dimension to this
that you just made me think about with
the the example of trans kids in in the
Obama Administration
which is there were issues where the
principles understood the issues really
well and had political experience with
them right so Barack Obama had as much
experience or more experience than
anybody in the Obama Administration
running and navigating race issues in
American life and he knew where he was
going to let things go in the
administration and and knew where he
wasn't but you had a sort of some new
issues begin to emerge particularly
around gender where the principles
didn't have very much experience with
them they had not been used to this I
mean you you talked about feminism but I
would describe the issue that there
differently you had so many female
politicians who actually knew how to
navigate that and knew what they thought
their constituencies would bear and
would not bear and had a lot of
credibility in the room on it and on
some of these newer issues it took time
I think it's still taking time to have
politicians who feel comfortable with it
and when they didn't feel comfortable
with it a lot more was outsourced to
staff and in some of these cases you got
outcomes that now looking back Democrats
probably wish they had held the line a
little bit closer in I want to be very
careful because I'm not comfortable with
the just let's throw trans rights
overboard but I think that what you
normally do in a movement like this is
you decide which things you're going to
fight for and which things you're maybe
not ready to have a fight over or maybe
haven't even decided what the position
should be on the kids in sports question
has been incredibly difficult for
Democrats even though it's so far from
the most important question
in trans rights or trans
nondiscrimination out there and I think
it just wasn't one that they were ready
for and sort of nobody just kind of put
the stop on it I think also you see
about that that KLA Harris um ACLU
questionnaire there was this pressure to
say yes to edge
cases so what I think of after two
decades in the nonprofit sector at
various times is Lynn's law of nonprofit
advocacy you go as far as the voters
support your position and then you go
beyond the border into further territory
where the next position is unpopular and
this is a deliberate strategic move
because if you just are advocating for
what everybody believes anyway then
you've won right nobody's going to write
you a check but if you go 10 or 20 or
30% further into the controversial realm
then you will be attacked and in the
case of progressive nonprofits you're
being attacked by the right which is
what you want and you can say we're
being attacked for this and then you can
link it to your previous gains by saying
you know they don't only oppose this
bridge head into enmy territory but they
want to roll back everything we've done
in the last 100 years so I I do think
that kind of edginess that's baked into
NGO annual fundraising newsletter
culture that's how you get people to
open their wallets and I think that
explains a lot of 2020 whether it was
was the trans issue whether it was the
defund the police things that make
perfect sense if you're a nonprofit
trying to pry openen the wallets of uh
you know small number of billionaire
Mega donors and and big foundations are
just electoral poison there was a
conflict I think about Sometimes some
years ago between Obama and
AOC and it had to do with Obama
criticizing activist tactics which he
did quite a bit and this is post
presidency for him and I see making this
point that not everybody's job is to be
within the Overton window right the
activists have a different job than
presidents um than politicians Etc but
on the other hand the the implication to
that point was that Obama was doing
exactly what he should have been doing
even though this was being used as a
criticism of him that if that everybody
has different jobs and actually it is
the job of the
politicians to hold the line at where
the politics net out for their side
because as you said the nonprofits are
and as AOC said the nonprofits are not
there to win 51% of the vote but the
politicians are and I think this goes to
the coalitional dynamic that that you're
describing and I saw this a lot covering
policy in the last couple of years where
when you weave in the nonprofit complex
into the official party people are
moving between it all the time right
going from the administration to the
nonprofits nonprofits to the
administration members of Congress are
bringing in these groups every time
they're doing legislation and sort of
you know taking their temperat and the
coalitions really matter and you got to
stay on the side of the Coalition or
they'll get mad at you and then you've
mixed up people's roles and by the way I
think that's a Twitter thing and a
social media thing too where people who
used to operate in quite different
spheres of politics were endlessly
thrown into one conversation together
collapsing the roles between activists
between politicians between media
figures between political scientists
between Grassroots organizers between
donors like everybody's in the same
discourse level acting as if they're
doing the same thing when they're really
not I think you're right and but I think
it's a danger for the Republicans as
well because there's this very online
people talk about the new right but but
they're sort of like the moderate
thoughtful policy WS like Oren Cass and
others and and then there are just these
internet autodidact gurus who compete
they're not competing for donations
necessarily like the progressive
nonprofits are these gurus on the right
are competing for money right I mean
it's a commercial law and and and
attention that translates into patreon
subscriptions or whatever uh and and
that's always been the big difference
between for the last 30 40 years between
the Democrats their agenda tends to be
shaped by
nonprofits the uh Republicans going back
to Murdoch and fox and exacerbated in
the internet era and in the Twitter era
they're a counterculture but they're a
commercial counterculture culture so in
the old days you know Rush limbo was
wanted he had to sell Ronald Reagan gold
coins or whatever okay he wasn't he
wasn't raising money from the coch
brothers and I think now it's going to
be a problem for the Trump
Administration that is uh if you have a
lot of younger staffers in particular
who are immersed in this very online
culture where they're trading shocking
memes back and forth every every day or
so and they're going to end up Staffing
you know various positions and and
they're not necessarily going to be on
the same page as their political
appointee bosses
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we've been talking about the way the
Democratic party has changed and we've
been talking about the way some of those
changes have led to democratic party
weakness but you can look at this from
the other perspective too I mean if you
look at the time period of you know
1950 to 2000 and look at how well
Democrats do presidentially in the
popular vote when they have this more
workingclass labor oriented base and you
look at 2000 to 202 before and how
Democrats do in the popular vote they do
better they I mean the 2024 is the first
time Republicans have won the popular
vote since 2004 and they look to people
estimating this who I'm reading like
they going to win it by one to two-ish
points nationally in arguably the worst
environment for incumbents we have seen
since 2008 worldwide right I mean we
have just seen in every wealthy
democracy that has had an election the
incumbent party get destroyed and the
Democratic party actually its loss if
you look at this on a on a chart is much
more modest than the losses of other
parties that were in power in this
period you know compare them to the
absolute annihilation of the Tories in
in the UK and one argument you might
make on that is actually this has not
been masterful politics from Donald
Trump and JD Vance that how extreme they
are you know childless cat ladies and
all the rest of it has held down what
could have been a very very strong
Republican performance to something that
you know if you have two percentage
points of the vote go the other way
Republicans don't even win in
2024 well that that's true but as David
Axelrod pointed out the other day the
only two groups where Harris improved
over Biden are college educated whites
and people making more than $100,000 a
year so I think the the two narratives
about what happened on Tuesday one is
it's a long-term realignment and the
other is it's a short-term result of the
anti-incumbency backlash because of the
postco inflation I think they're both
correct and I think of this in terms of
a covid analogy so covid can affect lots
of people but the ones who have prior
vulnerabilities are the most endangered
so I think the Democratic party had a
lot of Prior vulnerabilities going in
but there's no doubt that being the
incumbent party it suffered uh at the
same time like these other incumbent
parties both on on the right and the
left but one thing the narrowness of the
Republican victory has left me thinking
about is it the fact that we're in a
realignment doesn't mean the Republican
party has realigned into a necessarily
winning Coalition it might yet but this
all seems very consistent to me with the
realignment looking something like
Republicans have 48% of the vote
naturally and Democrats have 52% and so
in 2020 when you have a very similar
coalitional structure but it's a bad
year for the incumbent because of the
pandemic and also because Donald Trump
is bad at being
president you know Trump loses three
points for the incumbent effect and he
gets beat in the popular vote by you
know four to five points and this year
when the Biden Harris Administration are
the incumbents and it's a very very bad
year for incumbents and they lose a
couple points as a penalty to that Trump
wins by one to two points and so you
might have a realignment but one thing
happening in the Democratic party right
now is the sense that they need to
everything that the way the coalitions
have restructured is going to consign
them to minority status forever
potentially certainly I think a lot of
Republicans feel themselves on the cusp
of like a grand era of
winning and you know this other story
seems possible too that the realignment
is not actually that advantageous for
republicans and in a very good year or
what should have been a very good year
they did okay and if you look at the
Senate Races they actually didn't do
that well I mean in the battlegrounds
States Democrats won six of the seven
contested races at least as I say this
right now before Pennsylvania is fully
called but it looks to me like
Republicans will win Pennsylvania that's
a perfectly fine outcome for Republicans
I guess so they won the Senate house
it's all very close they won the
presidency but in a year when maybe it
could have been much more dominant it
doesn't make this Coalition they've
assembled look like such an obvious
majority Coalition well I I agree with
that but we have to keep in mind that
neither party is what I called a
conventional big tent party of the kind
that existed you know in the ' 80s and
90s and even the 2000s the Post Obama
Democrats really are this incredibly
homogeneous wellp policed on message
machine you know with these powerful
single issue progressives kind of
dictating the platform the Republicans
are this island of broken toys right
there this Coalition of Misfits who
oppos OS the the Post Obama democrats
for various reasons the the various
elements of that Trump's Coalition that
he put together with skill or or by
accident they don't necessarily have
much in common with each other they are
anti-woke social Democrats there are
Libertarians who hate big government
there are the evangelicals and those
were all part of the old Republican uh
Coalition but then there are also trade
unionists who think they're getting
nothing from the Democratic party there
are uh growing numbers there's still a
minority uh of uh African-Americans and
Latinos who don't think they have any
loyalty to the Democratic party so one
of the things we're likely to see if the
Republicans get a trifecta that is they
control all three of the elected
branches of government then these
tensions are going to come out and that
can be an opportunity for Democrats but
but I think the only way the Democrats
can seize that opportunity is to say you
know we're not going to be a homogeneous
conformist
machine anymore we're going to be a big
tent party and we can have some
Democrats who oppose transgender uh uh
medicine and we have others who want a
tough line on illegal immigration and
like most of the parties from the age of
Martin Van ber to the present they pick
three or four or five issues that are
that are the litus test everybody has to
agree with and then you have a free vote
depending on your constituency on on
other issues one place where I think
that the actions of this Democratic
Coalition are in ttention with the
narrative about this Democratic
Coalition is that it often sounds like
what people are saying is Well the
Democratic party's really abandoned the
working class right used to have this
trade unionist party and the people in
it were more working class and they held
much more more power in it and then you
have Bill Clinton and NAFTA and and now
here we are but since Bill Clinton and
as a part's become more college educated
and this realignment has been underway
the party's economic policy has become
relentlessly more left Barack Obama was
well to Bill Clinton's left Hillary
Clinton ran on an agenda well to Barack
Obama's left Joe Biden ran on an agenda
and governed on an agenda to Hillary
Clinton's left right it was a notable
and not accidental thing that after the
first presidential debate as this clamor
arose for Biden to step aside his
biggest Defenders were Bernie Sanders
and the squad Biden was the most pro-
labor president certainly in my
lifetime it didn't seem to matter so
what do you make of both the way in
which the Democratic party did become
more economically populist in a
substantive way as it became more the
party of this class and what do you make
of the fact that that didn't seem to
protect it at all among the voters that
these sorts of
material policies were supposed to
attract well I I think you you have to
distinguish two things you have to
distinguish a bipartisan
consensus first in favor of
neoliberalism and then in favor of post
neoliberalism a work in progress from
progressivism on on these cultural
issues so what has changed is and and
you're quite right about this in both
parties the Democrats and the
Republicans at least the Trump Wing
there has been a bipartisan move away
from free market globalization
I think with the Republicans who were
really indistinguishable from under Bush
you know from today's uh progressives
you know on immigration uh the
Republicans became more restrictionist
and I think you'll see more
restrictionism from Democrats uh in the
future under pressure from their voters
so I think we we're undergoing a shift
as big as the shift from the New Deal
consensus that was shared by Republican
presidents like Eisen hour and Nixon to
the sort of Reagan Thatcher Clinton
Blair neoliberal consensus and the main
reason for that shift I don't think is
domestic I don't think it's I think it's
geopolitical it's the rise of China that
made the business Elite and the donor
class and more and more intellectuals
and and economists rethink neoliberal
economics but since the shift is taking
place at different speeds in both
parties then it's kind of like it was in
the neoliberal era you know where the
parties basically agreed on high levels
of immigration and and more you know
free trade agreements at least after
2000 so they're going to fight over
abortion and they'll fight over gay
marriage and I think on these other
issues assuming you have two post
neoliberal parties the post neoliberal
Democrats and the post neoliberal
Republicans then these issues are
favoring the Republicans let me give you
an example in the amarist poll of
registered voters by NPR for on behalf
of NPR 50
7% of Latinos agreed that all illegal
immigrants should be
deported uh and the number was slightly
lower for black Americans okay this is
not what Democrats have been telling
themselves when it comes to uh voter ID
requirements that you have to show a
photo a government ID in order to vote
according to Pew 75% of blacks 81% of
whites 84% of Asians and
85% of Hispanics want mandatory photo
voter ID laws and this is Pew Research
Center it's not a right-wing push pole
or something and just one more example
the Supreme Court decision against
race-based affirmative action was
approved according to Gallup again a
nonpartisan agency 52% of blacks 63% of
Asians 68% of Hispanics in 72% of whites
approved the Supreme Court ban or
partial ban on race-based affirm ative
action so the Democrats it's not simply
enough to say well we're post neol
liberal and we're more pro-union and
we're want strategic trade industrial
policy these other issues they just are
not on the right side of these issues
even for their Black and Hispanic
constituents I think this is a place
where it's very important to look at the
power of this nonprofit complex in the
Democratic party because part of what
that power has been based on and I say
this based on a lot of reporting and and
good firsthand knowledge is a sense that
the way to understand what many of these
collections of Voters want right if
you're going to slice them into black
voters and Asian-American and Pacific
Islander voters and Hispanic voters and
and Union voters too by the way right I
mean you can keep going like this that
the way you'll understand it is by
listening to what the groups purporting
to represent them
want and in some cases that can be
telling I think unions are more often
reasonably good at at telling you what
at least parts of their membership want
although they have a broader agenda than
just that but I think specifically in
the case of non-white Voters it proved
really really deceptive so the groups
that were you know in a sense
representing Hispanic voters within the
Democratic Coalition they were part of
what was leading Democrats many of them
in 2020 to say they were going to
decriminalize border crossing
unauthorized border crossing but that
wasn't what Hispanic voters wanted it
was many of the groups representing
black Americans that pushed the
Democratic party towards defund the
police rhetoric and not all of them went
all the way there but they went much
closer and in cases kamla Harris did go
there but that was never popular and
certainly is not now popular among black
Americans and so there's been this
Dynamic where you have these groups that
are claiming to speak for very very wide
swwa of the
electorate and persuading Democrats of
things that those parts of the
electorates simply don't believe
in the room where the Democrats are sort
of making these decisions you have
staffers from these groups and they're
often maybe the only black person in the
room or maybe the only Hispanic person
in the room so they're granted a degree
of of deference but it has proven to be
a misleading form of politics because
these aren't Mass membership groups and
and this is a place where I think the
democratic theory political theory has
just actually and truly failed the
Democratic party moved into a position
of thinking it was doing more than it
ever had before to win over the
allegiance of this Multicultural
electorate and it is lost huge amounts
of support among that very same
Multicultural electorate because the
people it was listening to as its guide
to how to win them over were
non-representative that's exactly right
if all of the leaders of these various
communities are career nonprofit people
or academics funded by the Ford
foundation and other big gr tours in
their their AstroTurf and this is the
big difference between modern
Progressive ISM and the older liberalism
the two greatest uh civil rights leaders
of the 20th century A Philip Randolph
was a uh a union leader of the railroad
Porters Union and Martin Luther King Jr
you know was a Baptist Minister part of
this Mass membership organization and
then beginning in the 60s and 70s I
won't name names but you know the way
you become a spokesperson for you know
women or lgbtq or African-Americans or
Hispanics is not having this Mass
organization behind you of members it's
also not winning elections it's your
success in getting grants for your
nonprofit or for your University program
uh and George W bush or maybe it was
Carl Rove I don't know who who came up
with this but there's very clever during
the Bush
Administration they were being denounced
as being anti-black by the designated uh
spokespeople for the black community in
the media and in in the nonprofit sector
so Bush invited a bunch of uh Urban
black pastors to the White House you
know who were actual real Grassroots
leaders they didn't approve of in
particularly either as I recall but but
but that's the difference
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something this makes me think about is
the way this is played out in Democratic
policy
making
often outside of the major issues people
are paying attention to so one thing
that's been very important in Democrats
in the past couple years and is
obviously Central to the Biden
administration's policy Legacy is is the
decarbonization Investments right put
aside what you think of them right the
bid Administration certainly wants to
build as much green energy
infrastructure as fast as it can and
I've done a lot of coverage of the way
that permitting and procurement and land
use rules and environmental litigation
and
legislation have proven to be real
obstacles in Democrats building fast and
affordably you have uh example after
example of major energy projects being
stalled in environmental litigation
getting you know sued because uh this
thing that will build a huge number of
solar panels and create a huge amount of
solar power could conflict with an
endangered species or some other set of
laws even if really just what's
happening is these laws are being
wielded by people who don't want the
thing in the first place and so I was
covering and watching what was happening
in Congress is people tried to Grapple
with this and tried to think about on
the Democratic side what pering reform
might look like
and when I would talk to the people
working on it I was just stunned by the
power of small groups environmental
justice groups and so on that didn't
really represent anybody or at least not
any large numbers of people you know and
they would just explain to me that if
you couldn't get them on board they
couldn't move forward with this at all
and I'd say well what is the power of
these groups like what what what is
their leverage on you and there was
never an answer it was just a
coalitional decision that had been made
in the culture of the way the Democratic
party now made policy right it wasn't
that somebody thought they would turn
votes on them wasn't even anybody
thought that one version of this would
be more popular or even more noticed
than
another it's just that a culture of how
you make policy had emerged a culture of
who you listen to had emerged and it
couldn't be broken even if that meant uh
genuinely smaller chance of achieving a
goal that you believed and had told
everybody else was existentially
important the the speed of
decarbonization in the coming 10 years
and I really began to understand it is
at I mean this is probably where I
departed from the version of this
calling it a machine it seems like a
culture to me not a culture sort of
built on anything it's a culture built
on Norms and and and practices not
exactly on
Leverage well it it's not new back in
the 1990s I was having a conversation
with a democratic staffer about some
sensible educational reform I don't
remember what it was and he worked for U
Senator Ted Kennedy at the time and he
he said well we'll have to run it past
the
groups that was the first time I had
heard of the groups you know clearly
with a capital G so well you say it's a
culture but on the other hand it has to
be perpetuated from generation to
generation and if you pulled the plug on
the funding then a lot of these groups
would wither away and if you funded
other groups and you know I I take your
point about the Democrats being
rhetorically and sometimes substantively
more Pro labor but I think Epi is like
the only you know real prot Trade union
think tank of of any stature in in
Washington still right the economic
policy it's been around for 40 years uh
so Money Talks right and if these groups
are raising money from the same donors
that you need to raise money from as an
elected politician then and I don't
think I think it's perfectly rational to
worry
that if you stiff the groups they will
go running to Daddy
Warbucks and say he betrayed our cause
right how much do you see this as
different on the Republican side was it
different on the Republican side in the
air of George W bush and is it different
on the Republican side in the era of
Donald Trump because it's not as if
there aren't Republican interest groups
not as if the Chamber of Commerce has
not at at many times wielded enormous
power the business round table and with
trump it often seems to me to have moved
into he's not even listening exactly to
groups he he's listening to individual
people who are giving him money he's got
this very funny but dark I think riff
where he basically says he didn't like
electric vehicles but then Elon Musk
came to support him and now he's got to
like electric vehicles and I think
that's sort of how he thinks about it he
seemed to change his position on Tik Tok
after meeting with a major donor who is
also a major Tik Tok investor Trump had
been in favor of as president um forcing
Tik Tok sold off to an American firm and
he reversed his position on that sort of
famously suggested to a bunch of oil
Executives that if they gave him enough
money they could have huge amounts of
influence in his administration that the
Democrats listen to the groups it seems
to me now that Trump just kind of has
transactional relationships with
individual people who can help him and
he'll sort of do what they say if he
decides it is worth it to him well I
can't speak about Trump individually
with any Authority but I think going
back even to the 80s and 90s while the
Democrats have been a coalition of
mostly nonprofit astro turf funding
groups the Republicans uh have been kind
of a tribe I mean there's a group of
people they've had the white working
class for several decades and it's
expanded now with Working Class People
of other races there other electoral
constituency not their donors but their
electoral constituency is small business
owners uh particularly in uh the
physical world I I'll just read you a
list of the industries that give the
most money proportionally to the
Republican Party poultry and eggs mining
livestock home builders Automotive steel
Dairy oil and gas okay and this is quite
different from the Democratic list of
tech education public sector and so on
but here's an interesting point that uh
Jerry Taylor formerly of the nanon
center made for me in a TR me very
deeply he said that most people in all
parties don't have this litmus test of
issues and you have to check off every
issue they basically kind of belong to
one party or the other and they follow
the cues of the leaders and you
particularly see this I think on
immigration and trade with Trump so when
Bush was the leader he says oh
immigration is great you know free trade
we need more fdaas and most Republicans
the small business owners in the white
working class they went along cuz you
know he's the commander-in-chief of our
party and then Trump comes along says no
no no the opposite and then they sort of
follow along with him and and I think
this is backed up by the famous uh
political science research that shows
that the mass public does not have
consistent systematic opinions uh you
you have to be an intellectual or or a
member putting together a party platform
to try to make sure your different
beliefs cohere and and this gives the
Republicans I think under anybody not
just Trump more
flexibility than the Democrats because
the Democrats don't have they used to
have it but they don't have like this
just this demographic base where they
say okay you know we're going to dial
back on trans issues or we're going to
add nuclear to the list of the green New
Deal they just don't have that
flexibility that the Republicans do does
that make sense it does and it doesn't
to me because I would say that if you go
back even a couple of years the
Republicans do not feel to me like they
have very much ideological flexibility I
mean they've all signed gr noris
anti-tax pledge you know if you're
thinking about the sort of mid 2000s or
2010s they all have to be against the
Affordable Care Act they can you know
stake a more moderate or it's very hard
to stake a moderate position on
Healthcare and what's interesting to me
about Trump and one of the reasons he's
been effective is that he just doesn't
play by those rules personally that he's
a small set of things he cares a lot
about he's very anti-immigration he's
quite anti-trade very mercantilist very
skeptical of alliances very Zero Sum
oriented but on the other stuff he just
doesn't care right and you know he'll
move around on abortion right he makes
his promise to the right wing that he'll
appoint judges for them um and he he
fulfills that promise but it's a very
transactional promise I don't think
Donald Trump spent a lot of his time as
a person thinking about Pro lifee issues
and and he has much less sense or
internal pressure of what goes with what
than other people do so he's you know
much more willing to to Bob and and
weave on the things he doesn't care
about and the list of things he doesn't
care about is very long well I think
that's right but but it's also because
he's Rich it's also because he's Rich
But Mitt Romney Mitt Romney was rich too
and Mitt Romney did not go you're a
typical Republican member of Congress
even if the public does not want Cuts in
Social Security and manicare your libert
Aran donors do right and they're not
yeah but I think if you I think if you
looked and you looked at the number and
there are quite a few of them because
members of Congress are overall pretty
wealthy particularly in the Senate I
think if you looked at the Republicans
who are independently wealthy like look
at a Rick Scott that dude is extremely
rich I don't think you would find
they're more moderate or more
independent in this way than the other
ones have been no I my only point was do
you have to raise enormous amounts of
money every two years if you're a member
of Congress
MH and and that creates to me the the
big dividing line which I think will
manifest itself if the Republicans do
end up having a majority is their their
donors are not on the same page as their
voters and you think that's still as
true as it once was yes I have it on
good authority that the uh Republican
donors in 2024 want to cut deficit
spending and have taxes cut too well the
only way you do that is is by
drastically cutting government programs
and it's the whole George W bush agenda
and the biggest now the heaviest weight
donor on the Republican side is musk and
he's been very clear that he wants to
cut I think he called it $2 trillion
dollar from the federal government right
I I had vivec ramaswami on the show and
having him on it was a very interesting
conversation convinced me that there's a
much bigger part of the Maga movement
that on a lot of these government
spending issues looks like the
Republican party used to look like with
a much more Nationalist and an
internationally skeptical set of
trappings or even you could say
commitments but that in terms of how
they feel about federal spending they
remain much more libertarian and and
musk who clearly wants to and will
probably exert tremendous influence in a
trump
Administration I think you know has very
strong anti-woke feelings but if you
look at his beliefs about government and
taxes and so on they're pretty standard
Republican rich guy feelings and so some
of the ideological swerve that people
assumed is going to happen when JD Vance
was picked on the ticket it may not
happen because I I do see a republican
donor class more authentic to the Trump
movement emerging and cohering and it
wants to ban a bunch of books from
schools but it also wants tax cuts and
big government spending cuts well I
think that's right you can think of the
Republican party as being three parties
there's the donor party and they're just
Libertarians I mean they're Pro gay
rights and they're pro-abortion and and
all of that and but also you know free
trade and they want unlimited labor
Arbitrage and they they're anti-union
then there are there's the Republican
primary electorate the primary voters
who like the Democratic primary voters
are much more likely than the public to
be college educated and to be
philosophically ideological inconsistent
and these are your your small business
owners the kind of proverbial local car
dealer right in in the small town or the
suburbs and they are today as in the
past utterly opposed to organized labor
to a higher minimum wage and all of that
because many of them have low-wage
service businesses and then finally
there's the Republican General
electorate which Trump has successfully
expanded and in vance as well by
reaching out to African-Americans to
Hispanics and to others but between
elections the politicians are going to
hear mostly from the donors and they're
going to be eyeing the next primary
uh when the primary electorate is much
more anti-government than the general
electorate when you think about these
parties going forward right let's say
you're the Democratic party and and you
want to win back these workingclass
voters right you think the realignment
that is now sort of found or it seems to
be nearing in almost terminal form where
you know Democrats really are the party
of the affluent and and the college
educated and Republicans really are the
party of most people who who don't have
a college education you want to do
something about it and you look at Joe
Biden and you think well this guy tried
to run a full employment policy he tried
to have you know much more industrial
policy he tried to be very pro-union
that mean they supportive of minimum
wage increases and it didn't work it
anti- worked right it failed what do you
do is it aesthetic it's the kind of
person you're nominating it's the
cultural issues right if you were a
candidate who you know like a new era
for Democrats has to begin like I I I
believe like the Obama era has ended and
at this point like the politician sort
of photocopying what he did or getting
too far from what he was able to do and
the sort of influence he was able to
exert like what sends strong enough
signals that it breaks the way the
system is is realigning do you do you
look around and see people who are an
example of that or uh have been
successful at that well Bill Clinton I
think you need to have a sister Soldier
moment with some of these nonprofit
groups and it could be the greens or it
can be the trans movement or something
else and and just say look you know
you're a part of our team and and we
agree with you on many things but we're
not going there uh the other thing that
Clinton and Gore did successfully was to
build up the Democratic Leadership
Council which I think you know some on
the left called Democrats looking for
cash but in a big ttin party you could
say well we're a different kind of
Democrat but there are are various kinds
of Democrats there's not just one kind
of democrat so there's historical model
for this when it comes to appointing
people to office and this is something I
would advise both parties to do the
Republicans as well as the Democrats
don't appoint ideologues whether they're
from left-wing nonprofits or from
right-wing you know substack accounts or
whatever appoint staffers and former
elected officials and and staffers who
worked for elected officials like
Congressional staffers and to the
executive branch and agencies because
even if you're kind of a young very
online staffer for the a senate
committee or a house committee through
your boss you do have a sense you know
like you you have to make concessions to
be politically viable so I I think with
the Democrats in particular I would have
more appointees to the executive branch
in the future from the government itself
both elected officials and government
staffers it can be state legislatures
and city councils and fewer people from
the World Wildlife Fund or whatever when
you imagine the Democratic party might
evolve from here what should the power
centers be I mean it is going to be a
collection of Institutions all parties
in a way are and political parties
themselves are much weaker than they
once were for all kinds of reasons
including campaign Finance laws so when
you imagine this party that has created
its sister Soldier moment with at least
some of the groups certainly they
declared some independence from them
maybe a stronger leadership that is able
to say no more easily but are there
alternative bases of support I mean if
you imagine a healthy party are there
institutions and power centers that
should you know that exist now but
should be wielding more more power than
they are is this just subtraction or is
it also addition well I think it's
mainly subtraction of the influence of
big donors and of the nonprofits because
if you look at normal political parties
in the US past and and also in
modern-day Democratic Europe and Asia
the party line the agenda the policies
the campaign strategies they are set by
career politicians and their staffs
right they're political parties and it's
very odd to have any political party in
any democracy where basically the
politicians have to accept this agenda
from like nonprofit organizations funded
by the donors that they have to raise
money from so you know I I think at the
end of the day the party politicians are
going to have to emancipate themselves
from attendence on nonprofit staffers
and uh from Mega donor contributions I
don't know how they do this now with the
Supreme Court being so hostile to
campaign Finance reform one suggestion I
made to a democratic friend is that you
you make the leaders of the democratic
party and the campaign committees and so
on Democrats elected from swing
districts right because it's a problem
for both parties when you have your
Democratic leaders like Pelosi or or
Schumer and the Democrats and and like
McConnell you know the in the
Republicans being from the safest seat
and so uh my Democratic friend explained
well but they do that so that your
Democratic leader is does not lose the
next election in the swing District so
as happened in Tom dashel yeah yeah so
so I can see that but but I I do think
that if your leaders come from these
completely safe seats then just because
of their environment they're they're not
going to be as sensitive to the the need
for the the party to attack to One
Direction or another as the more exposed
elected
representatives I think that's a good
place to end always our final question
what are three books you'd recommend to
the
audience well a couple of books that
I've read in the last year or so that I
think are more timely than ever uh John
Judas and ruy tshira where have all the
Democrats gone the soul of the party in
the age of extremes 2023 making uh uh
similar criticism of the the Captivity
of the democratic party to what they
call the shadow party of nonprofits and
I I think Democratic leaders thinking
about rebuilding the party ought to read
the where have the Democrats gone by
Judas and toira on the new right you
have some really Dynamic Innovative
thinkers one of them is uh soram Mari uh
in his book also from last year a
tyranny ink how private power crushed
American Liberty and what to do about it
whether this is influential or not in
the the Trump fance Administration we'll
see but but it's it's worth reading by
itself and my third book is about one of
my heroes or heroins Mary Harris Jones
Mother Jones as she was nicknamed uh who
who lived from 1837 to 1930 great Irish
American immigrant labor activist and
the book is Elliot J Gorn from 2001
Elliot J Gorn Mother Jones the most
dangerous woman in America and I'll
leave your listeners with a quote from
Mother Jones sit down and read educate
yourself for the coming
conflicts Michael Lind thank you very
much thank you
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this episode of the eclan show is
produced by Roland who factchecking by
Kate Sinclair and Mary March Locker our
senior Engineers Jeff geld with
additional mixing by ammen sahota and
Isaac Jones our supervising editor is
Claire Gordon the show's production team
also includes Elias iswith and Kristen
Lynn we have original music by Pat
mccusker audience strategy by Christina
samuli and Shannon Busta the executive
producer of New York Times opinion audio
is Annie Rose ster sir
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Ask follow-up questions or revisit key timestamps.
Ezra Klein and Michael Lind, author of 'The New Class War,' discuss the evolution of the Democratic Party's 'Obama Coalition' into a centralized, institutionalized 'machine' now disconnected from its base. They explore how nonprofit organizations and donor networks have replaced traditional local party structures, leading to a shift toward cultural issues and a weakening of the party's appeal to working-class voters. The conversation touches on the dangers of the nonprofit industrial complex, the role of social media in amplifying ideological conflict, and whether the party can or should emancipate itself from these dependencies to become a 'big tent' party again.
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