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Apollo's Torsten Slok Talks Bonds, Monetary Policy | Bloomberg Talks

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Apollo's Torsten Slok Talks Bonds, Monetary Policy | Bloomberg Talks

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Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts,

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radio, news.

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>> And that does bring us to our top story

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for the hour, the direct intervention by

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the Treasury to control the costs of the

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$40 trillion US debt pile. The

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historical track record of such invent

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interventions are spotty. The two most

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recent successes, first the treasuries

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repurchase in the early 2000s of about

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67 billion of primarily longerdated

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bonds. It was a protracted operation

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that did actually push the 30-year yield

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down by about two percentage points from

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67 to 46 over about a 2-year stretch.

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And then second, there was Operation

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Twist in 2011. That was a duration

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management scheme where the Fed, not the

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Treasury, bought $400 billion of

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longerterm treasuries while selling an

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equal amount of short-term debt. Now,

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Besson's actions so far seemed to be

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standalone independent, which is curious

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given that two years ago, he blasted his

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predecessor at the Treasury, Janet

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Yellen, for what he characterized as an

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attempt to re-engineer the world's

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largest bond market. But it's also

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curious timing for all of this as Fed

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Chair Kevin Worsh preps for his own

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communications moment, a speech Friday

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at Jackson Hole, Wyoming that ostensibly

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is supposed to be about some of the

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wonkier, more procedural matters out

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there. But no doubt there will be high

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attention as to whether wars is willing

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to formally aid in Bessant's

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intervention and whether he'll actually

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offer a more detailed explanation of the

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path for Fed rates. Torstston, he joins

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us right now. He's the chief economist

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over at Apollo and he joins us right

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now. And Torstson, I want to start first

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with Scott Bessent. uh what the Treasury

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is exactly trying to do and whether

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history might actually be at his side

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with regards to the potential

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effectiveness of some of this bond

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buying.

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>> Well, the first thing is that it really

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is three things. He started with the Yen

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intervention that was pushing long rates

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down. Then he had the FEMA intervention,

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the 2 billion went to 4 billion, which

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also has been pushing rates down. And

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today we heard some talk about well

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maybe the Treasury general account will

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also be used to lower long-term interest

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rates. So there's almost a almost

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campaign from the Treasury here in an

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attempt to try to put a cloud over rates

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markets that is attempting to try to

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limit how much rates can be going up. So

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on their own these initiatives have had

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so far a more limited effect. But the

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fact that this cloud is hanging over the

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market that suddenly something could

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happen especially if the TGA the

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Treasury general account for the

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Treasury the Fed account of the Treasury

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account of the Fed is being used that

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could potentially have a bigger impact.

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Well, well, well, when we talk about the

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bigger impact though, I I would assume

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the number, the dollar figure has to get

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a little bit bigger than just 2 to four

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billion or whatever he said he might go

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up to here. I mean, is there a number

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that you look at where you think that a

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would have an impact, but more

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importantly a lasting impact?

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>> Yeah, that's why today's news about the

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Treasury General account, which really

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is the Treasury's like checking account

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at the Federal Reserve, that has more

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than $900 billion in it at the moment.

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And that could potentially be a much

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bigger impact on the market because the

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threat of using as much as hundreds of

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billions of dollars on buying long rates

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could potentially have some

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implications. But that being said, a

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checking account always needs to be

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refilled with new issuance. So in that

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sense, it's really more the threat of

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this happening at some point that is

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having the biggest impact.

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>> Well, well, that's what I'm curious

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about, too, is would you even need to

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tap that? Because I mean I think back to

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when the ECB did something similar uh

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and they never actually made good on it

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cuz they didn't have to. It was just the

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idea that they said they would do it if

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necessary was enough uh to scare the

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market into sort of uh towing the line.

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>> That's exactly right. So that's why it

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really ultimately is very similar to

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currency intervention from a central

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bank. If you say as a central bank that

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we may step in and do something, we may

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stay in and buy or sell our own

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currency, then that on its own could

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also be a very important factor. When

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you then think about the risk that this

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as a headline could potentially begin to

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weigh in this case on rates and

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potentially suddenly create a drop in

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yields because of the Treasury deciding

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to do something. So that is probably

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shaking out some of the people who are

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now betting on rates moving higher. But

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it gets to this idea though if I mean if

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we do get to a general account situation

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where they're either threatening to use

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it or actually use it. This goes far

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beyond debt management. I mean and now

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we're um you know I don't know what we

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call it is it I mean I don't want to

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call I don't want to use the the QE word

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or the uh maybe it's just yield curve

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control. I mean how would you

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characterize that if we do get to that

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stage?

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>> Yeah. So the underlying dynamics are of

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course that rates are going higher

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because inflation has been higher and

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the fiscal situation unfortunately has

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also putting upward pressure on rates.

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So therefore those fundamental forces

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are still in place at the moment. So for

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that reason these are certainly more you

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could call spotty interventions that are

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trying at certain points to limit how

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much rates are going up. But that being

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said, it's still a cloud hanging over

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the rates market that this could now the

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third item coming along with the Tur

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general account also now suddenly being

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in play. That also means that suddenly

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these things could suddenly jerk rates

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much lower and because of that that

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still is something that likely will

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begin to put some limit on how much

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rates can go up because you can suddenly

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be jolted down to a lower level.

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>> Does it matter that at least as of right

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now this is the Treasury Department

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going alone and the Fed at least based

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on what we know is not actually involved

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in any of this. Do you think that would

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change? Yeah, that does matter because

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at the moment the Treasury of course is

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living under the condition that there is

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a budget deficit which in round numbers

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is like 5 6% of GDP. That's not going to

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change and if that's not changing that

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means that there's still a need to

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finance the government deficit and as a

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result of that government debt levels

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are still going up. So in that sense

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these things are all smaller things that

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are happening on the fringes because on

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their own they're not changing the

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fundamental forces that are driving

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rates higher. Namely at the moment

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higher inflation and also the fiscal

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situation. Well, let's talk about some

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of those fundamental forces. I mean,

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obviously, we've talked a lot on this

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program, the for near $40 trillion debt

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load. Obviously, the servicing load

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again. I was just looking at uh uh just

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the interest payments projected for Q4,

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and I think it was close to $200

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billion. I mean, which is insane. So,

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this that's not something the Treasury

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can solve on its own. Certainly, not

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even the Fed can solve on its own.

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That's something in theory that Congress

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would have to address. And as far as I

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know, it doesn't look like they're ready

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to do that.

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>> Yeah. And the risk with interventions in

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any shape and form in lowering loan

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rates is that if you issue more in the

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front end that has two risks. First of

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all, it lowers the weighted average

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maturity of debt outstanding. That means

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that the weighted average maturity of

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what is the debt level in terms of

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duration that will become lower. In

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other words, we will simply get that

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much more debt is now in the front end.

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And the second risk with that is that if

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much more debt in particular is in T

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bills that means that it becomes much

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more sensitive to what the Fed is doing

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because now a bigger share of debt

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outstanding is in the very very front of

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the yield curve. So if Kevin WS decides

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to raise rates at one of the upcoming

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meetings that means that debt interest

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payments will go up because there now is

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more sensitivity now that more debt is

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in T bills.

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>> Well on that point though I mean if the

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weighted average maturity goes down I

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think right now it's around like 5 and a

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half 57 or something like that. Exactly.

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Um and that's because of the shorter end

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stuff. Does that by I want to say by

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default but does that mean that does

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that put upward pressure on the average

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interest rate that we have on that debt

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overall?

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>> Yeah. So it means that you certainly

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become more dependent in the front end

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because now you have more debt in the

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front end that then depends on what the

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Fed is doing. What happens in the long

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end becomes certainly a very important

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question around how does the long end

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interpret what's going on. If the long

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end says everything is great no we don't

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need to have high rates. We can now

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begin to go down. Then you would have

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that the debt servicing cost would go

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lower. But if the long end begins to

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say, hey, we have some fundamental

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forces that are still at play and these

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have not changed, then of course the

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long end could go higher. And as a

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result, the net effect would be you're

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both more sensitive to higher rates from

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the Fed in the front end. But you now

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also would see the term premium where we

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see long rates go up because now the

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market is beginning to question either

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the Fed's commitment to 2% inflation or

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also the overall the fiscal situation

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where now debt levels still again

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continue to go up. Do do you have any

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expectation that Kevin Walsh will

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address this in his Friday speech?

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>> I think at Jackson Hole that he will

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probably be focusing more on the

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economic outlook. He'll probably

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focusing more if anything on the

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framework that the Fed is having at the

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moment just to try to address some of

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these criticisms that he has seen in

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terms of the last press conference where

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a lot of people said yes we understand

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that forward guidance may be going away

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but now instead we should be focusing on

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framework guidance. Tell us what is the

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framework? Are you focusing on the

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balance sheet? Are you focusing on

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tightening financial conditions? Are you

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focusing on the Fed funds rate? What are

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the tools you're going to use to tighten

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monetary policy to try to get inflation

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to come down?

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>> You think he will do that? He seems like

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he does not want to be that

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communicator.

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>> So that's why I think that most of the

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discussion will probably not be so much

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around the task forces. It probably

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don't want to preempt what they're going

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to deliver later this year, but it's

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probably going to focus more on what is

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the economic situation at the moment and

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therefore less on the overall framework

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for communication for the balance sheet

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for data that he has in the task forces

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but really more just laying out what is

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our view on the economic outlook at the

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moment without giving any forward

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guidance. It was interesting looking at

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the last minutes and some of the

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anecdotal evidence that came out prior

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to that about uh a big focus on

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artificial intelligence and how it's uh

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affecting either productivity or

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inflation or vice versa depending on

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your perspective. Do you think this will

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become much more of a dominant

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conversation uh not only at the next Fed

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meeting but for the next couple of Fed

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meetings?

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>> Yes, I do think that this is becoming

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very important exactly for the reasons

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you're mentioning namely that at the

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moment because the AI built out requires

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hiring more people. It requires buying

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more memory, more chips, more equipment,

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buying land. It also involves

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construction. That means that in the

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near term AI is actually inflationary.

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But once AI is adopted and deployed and

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implemented, then we should expect to

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see that AI will be disinflationary. And

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we'll probably also have some important

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impact when we think about who it is

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that's impacted. namely we could almost

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begin to see a reversal of the K in the

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K-shaped consumer whereby the high end

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is going to see lower wage growth is

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going to see lower job growth whereas

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the lower leg of the K blue collar

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workers are probably going to ultimately

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still see stronger wage growth

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ultimately also going to see better job

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growth because AI is mainly hurting

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those who have more skills who have more

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education

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>> all right Dorson got to leave it there

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really appreciate it Dorson Slock chief

10:18

economist over at Apollo

Interactive Summary

The video discusses recent Treasury interventions aimed at managing the US debt and influencing long-term interest rates. Economist Torstson Slock explains that while these individual initiatives have had limited effectiveness, the potential threat of using the Treasury General Account (TGA) creates a 'cloud' over the market that may limit how high interest rates can rise. The discussion also covers the risks associated with increasing short-term debt, the limitations of Treasury-led efforts without fiscal policy changes from Congress, and the potential inflationary versus disinflationary impacts of AI on the economy.

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